Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Robert Michael Kuczewski, Petitioner v. Robin Marien, et al.
Supreme Court briefOct 22, 2024
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ORIGINAL
No.
FILED
OCT 2 2 2024
In the
LSUPREEMFFrS<UR^^K
Supreme Court of the United States
Robert Kuczewski,
Petitioner,
v.
Robin Marien, Gabriel Jebb,
Air California Adventure Inc.,
Respondents.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the Supreme Court of California and
Court of Appeal 4th Appellate District
Division One, State of California
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Robert Michael Kuczewski
302 Washington St. Suite 313
San Diego, California, 92103-2110
858-204-7499
bob@ushawks.org
BobKuczewski@gmail.com
October 22, 2024
Self-Represen ted
V
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. What is the standard for classification of
public figures and limited purpose public figures?
2. Can government officials suppress and shield
themselves from public criticism by delegating
governmental responsibilities to private businesses?
3. Does republication of official City Council
videos (already publicly available) create a risk of
liability for such republication?
4. What is the standard for “matters of public
interest” with regard to speech concerning
government management of public property?
5. Can defamation exist without at least one
provably false statement?
6. Can de novo appellate review be denied in first
amendment cases?
7. Is a $1.8 judgment excessive for seeking
redress of grievances from a local government?
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
All parties appear in the caption of the case on
the cover page.
RELATED CASES AND PROCEEDINGS
Robin Marien, Gabriel Jebb, Air California
Adventure v. Kuczewski in 37-2015-00015685-CUDF-CTL, Superior Court of California, San Diego.
Jury verdict on July 7, 2022.
Robin Marien, Gabriel Jebb, Air California
Adventure v. Kuczewski in D080658, Court of Appeal
of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District,
Division One. Decision filed on April 16, 2024.
Robin Marien, Gabriel Jebb, Air California
Adventure v. Kuczewski in S285143, Supreme Court
of California. Petition for Review denied on July 24,
2024.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
OPINIONS BELOW.
1
JURISDICTION.
2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY.
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
5
Introduction
5
History
10
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION....... 16
Standard for Limited Purpose Public Figures...16
Protect Citizen’s Rights..............................
18
Protect Publication of Official Documents........ 19
Standard for Matters of Public Interest
20
Requiring Factual Basis for Defamation..
26
Require De Novo Review for Free Speech.
28
Inappropriate Judgment of $1,800,003....
29
Summary of Reasons to Grant Certiorari
30
CONCLUSION.
32
iv
INDEX TO APPENDICES
Appendix A California Supreme Court Petition for
Review Denied
(July 24, 2024)
App. 1
Appendix B California Supreme Court Petition for
Review
(May 24, 2024)
App.3
Appendix C Petition for Rehearing in Court of
Appeal in D080658
(May 1, 2024)
App. 33
Appendix D Opinion in the COURT OF APPEAL,
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
(April 16, 2024)
App. 56
Appendix E Motion for New Trial
App. 68
(July 18, 2022)........
Appendix F Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict and Motion to Vacate the
Judgment
App. 85
(July 18, 2022)
Appendix G Opinion in the COURT OF APPEAL,
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
(September 28, 2017).......... App. 112
Appendix H Judgment for $1,800,003.00
(July 20, 2022).................... App. 168
vO
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES
376 U.S. 254 (1964) Times v. Sullivan
418 U.S. 323 (1974) Gertz v. Welch
388 U.S. 130 (1967) Curtis v. Butts
vi 1
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari
issue to review the judgment below and included as
APPENDIX H.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the highest state court to review
the merits appears at Appendix D to the petition and
is unpublished. This opinion was issued by the
California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate
District, Division One. Appendix C contains a
Petition for Rehearing by that Court which was
denied. Appendix B contains a Petition for Review by
the Supreme Court of California filed on May 24,
2024. Appendix A contains the response that the
Petition for Review was denied on July 24, 2024.
vii 2
JURISDICTION
The date on which the highest state court decided
my case was July 24, 2024 when the Supreme Court
of California denied my Petition for Review.
The Supreme Court of California’s denial followed
the April 16, 2024 affirmation of the Superior Court
of California’s ruling by the Court of Appeal, Fourth
Appellate District, Division One, State of California.
Appendices E and F contain a Motion for New
Trial and a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict. Both were denied. Appendix H contains
the Court of Appeals Ruling on Motions for SLAPP.
The San Diego Superior Court of California’s
ruling was issued on July 7, 2022.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U. S. C. § 1257(a).
viii 3
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The First Amendment of the United States
Constitution is short and clear:
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code states:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
U.S. Constitution - Article III Section 1:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish.
U.S. Constitution - Article III Section 2 :
ix 4
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, ...
U.S. Constitution - First Amendment:
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
28 USC §1254.
Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed
by the Supreme Court...
x5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of the Case - Introduction
This case involves a citizen’s First Amendment
right to seek redress of grievances through local
government. In this case, Petitioner Kuczewski has
been seeking - and continues to seek - proper
oversight of the Torrey Pines City flight park which
is owned by the City of San Diego and leased (at no
cost) to Respondents. Petitioner Kuczewski had been
a hang gliding, paragliding, and sailplane pilot at
that City park since 2004. During that period,
Petitioner Kuczewski personally witnessed or was
otherwise aware a number'of abuses (physical
violence, bullying, lease violatioins, accidents, and
deaths. Petitioner has often brought press clippings,
photos, videos, and eye witness reports to the San
Diego City Council seeking oversight at the park.
Petitioner Kuczewski and other users of the City
Park also met privately with two Mayors of San
xi 6
Diego and many City Councilmembers to urge them
to reactivate the Torrey Pines City Park Advisory
Board to address the safety and fairness issues at
that City Park. All of Kuczewski’s City Council
speeches were televised by the City of San Diego and
made permanently available on their web site.
Kuczewski asserts that all of his statements were
true. Petitioner Kuczewski and a friend (Margie
Holland, also named in the original lawsuit)
frequently copied portions of the publicly available
official San Diego City videos and republished them
on YouTube where they could also be embedded in
other web sites for wider viewing.
None of this would raise an eyebrow if the Torrey
Pines City Park were actually operated by the City of
San Diego. However, the City of San Diego had
delegated authority of that City Park to a private
business named “Air California Adventure, LLC”
which is owned and operated by Respondents
through a flat rate, no cost lease. This lease specified
xii 7
that the public shall have certain rights to use the
property as a public park. However, this lease
arrangement to a private company has instead been
used to shield the Park’s operation from any public
criticism with the claim that the operators are
“private individuals” and not “public figures” or even
“limited purpose public figures”.
This designation of the operators of a public park
as “private figures” by the Superior Court of
California (upheld by the California Court of Appeal
and California Supreme Court) muzzles citizens with
regard to their constitutional right to be openly
critical of the operation of a public park. It also
muzzles citizens in their ability to lobby the City of
San Diego to provide better management of that
public land.
Respondents have argued that they are not
“public figures” or even “limited purpose public
figures” with regard to the City Park because they
xiii 8
have not intentionally “thrust” themselves into the
public eye. But that argument is inherently flawed.
Who could say whether a famous actor pursued their
acting profession for fame or simply for the love of
acting? Who could say whether a famous sports star
pursued their profession for publicity or for the love
of the sport? Who could say whether any “public
figure” had pursued their work for personal interest
or for fame? So the primary factor in the decision
regarding “public” or “private” figures cannot be
ascertained based on their expressed intentions.
Indeed, the primary factor in determining the “public
figure” status must be the degree to which they can
actually affect and impact the public either globally
(as general purpose public figures) or in a specific
area (as limited purpose public figures). It is their
ability to affect and impact the public in some arena
that gives the public a greater right to be critical of
them than of truly private citizens. That standard
was clearly met in this case, because Respondents -
xiv 9
as operators of the Torrey Pines City Park (also
known as the Torrey Pines Gliderport) - have had
complete control over the safety and fairness and
rules of operation at that City-owned public park
throughout all of the events in this case.
Furthermore, the mere fact that Respondents
have voluntarily taken on the lease and management
of a prominent public park makes them limited
purpose public figures with regard to issues
surrounding that park. Respondents have also
advertised themselves on the Internet showing their
pictures and giving their biographies to promote
themselves and their business.
Yet the lower court issued jury instructions in this
case for defamation “per se” against a private citizen.
None of Petitioner Kuczewski’s statements were
proven false, but the incorrect “per se” aspect of the
jury instructions led the jury to focus on whether the
xv 10
statements were damaging without them ever being
proven false.
Statement of the Case - History
Petitioner Kuczewski began regularly flying at
the Torrey Pines Gliderport in 2005. Petitioner had
heard many complaints of Respondent’s abuses.
Petitioner Kuczewski personally witnessed many of
these abuses from 2005 to 2014. In response to these
abuses, Kuczewski began to petition the San Diego
City Council for oversight of the park by an official
Torrey Pines City Park Advisory Board.
In 2011, one of Respondent’s student customers
named Shannon Hamby was badly injured during
training. Hamby’s lawyers contacted Petitioner
Kuczewski to seek his testimony in the case.
Kuczewski initially declined, but was eventually
persuaded to give deposition testimony in the case
(Cal Sup San Diego 37-2013-00052120) in September
of 2014. Kuczewski’s expert testimony of gross
xvi 11
negligence was solid, and the case was quickly settled
in Hamby’s favor for an undisclosed amount of
money. Shortly thereafter (beginning in November of
2014), Respondents began to harass and bully
Kuczewski off the property with tactics of verbal
abuse and physical contact. Kuczewski continually
asserted his rights to be in the park, and allowed
himself to be arrested on three separate occasions to
bring the matter to court (an example famously set
by Rosa Parks decades earlier). However, no charges
were ever filed against Kuczewski, and in all three
cases, Kuczewski was freed with his bail feturned.
Eventually after meeting with San Diego’s City
Attorney, the arrests stopped, and Kuczewski was
again able to enjoy the park beginning in early 2015.
On May 11, 2015, Respondents filed the Complaint in
this action with the Superior Court of California, San
Diego County (Case # 37-2015-00015685-CU-DFCTL). The Complaint included causes of action for
interference, defamation, infliction of emotional
xvii 12
distress, and declaratory and injunctive relief. These
causes of action cited several years of speeches by
Petitioner Kuczewski to the San Diego City Council
requesting oversight of Respondent’s operation of a
San Diego City Park. Kuczewski adamantly denies
all of these causes of action. The causes of action for
defamation alleged that Petitioner Kuczewski’s
republication of City Council speeches removed their
protected status. Petitioner Kuczewski filed a CrossComplaint for assault, battery, and false
imprisonment related to retaliation for his speeches.
Both sides filed special SLAPP motions to strike the
opposing complaints, and both were denied. Both
parties appealed and both appeals were denied.
Petitioner Kuczewski was initially represented by
attorney Chad Morgan. However, Kuczewski could
not afford the cost of the representation and has been
self-represented throughout most of this case.
Parties disagreed During Discovery with
Petitioner Kuczewski delivering 2,673 requested
xviii 13
items (photos, videos, text messages, and
documents), and Respondents delivering only a few
publicly available documents and no photos or videos
or text messages as requested.
In 2019, Respondents identified their “Doe-1” as
Marjorie Mae Holland. Holland was named in 32 of
the 33 causes of action and in all 27 causes for
defamation. Defendant Holland was accused of
republishing portions of Kuczewski’s City Council
speeches that she downloaded from the City of San
Diego web site. Holland subsequently filed a special
motion to strike under Section 425.16 (SLAPP).
Defendant Holland’s motion was denied, appealed
and denied by the California Court of Appeals. The
Superior Court later ruled that Holland’s case was
defaulted for failing to file an answer to the
complaint after her SLAPP appeal had been denied.
Holland asserted that her answer was the same as
Kuczewski’s answer for all causes of action. The
Court ruled Holland to be in Default.
xix 14
The case against Kuczewski went to trial in June
of 2022. Much of Petitioner Kuczewski’s evidence was
not allowed by the Court including the actual video of
the Hamby injury accident where Kuczewski had
testified as an expert witness against Respondents.
Petitioner Kuczewski asserted that this video was of
importance because it motivated the actions against
him which were initiated shortly after Kuczewski’s
deposition in that injury lawsuit. The Court ruled
against admission of that evidence.
Prior to the trial, Petitioner Kuczewski submitted
and argued for jury instructions appropriate for
defamation of public figures and/or limited purpose
public figures. However, the actual instructions given
to the jury were for defamation of private citizens.
On July 7, 2022, the Jury delivered a verdict for
Plaintiffs/Respondents. The only surviving Cause of
Action was for Defamation Per Se. The jury awarded
damages of $500,001 to Air California Adventure,
xx 15
damages of $550,001 to Robin Marien, and damages
of $700,001 to Gabriel Jebb. The jury also awarded
$50,000 in punitive damages for a total of
$1,800,003. It’s worth noting that this award was
issued in July of 2022 shortly after the June 2022
jury award of $15 million judgment against Amber
Heard in the widely publicized Johnny Depp / Amber
Heard defamation trial (later reduced to $350,000 by
the court). Petitioner asserts that this widely
publicized award improperly influenced the jury in
this case, and no mitigating instructions were given.
On July 22, 2022, Appellant Kuczewski submitted
a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
and a Motion for New Trial. Both motions were
denied by the Superior Court.
On August 1, 2022, Appellant Kuczewski filed an
Appeal with the California Court of Appeal (Fourth
Appellate District, Division One, case D080658). On
April 16, 2024, the Court of Appeal affirmed the
xxi 16
Superior Court’s ruling. On May 1, 2024, Appellant
Kuczewski filed a Petition for Rehearing with the
Court of Appeal. On May 13, 2024, Appellant
Kuczewski’s Petition for Rehearing was denied. On
May 24, 2024, Petitioner Kuczewski filed a Petition
for Review with the Supreme Court of California
(Case S285143). Kuczewski’s Petition for Review was
denied on July 24, 2024.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
1. To properly establish the standard for
classification of limited purpose public figures.
The Torrey Pines Gliderport is part of the Torrey
Pines City Park and is wholly owned by the City of
San Diego. It is clear that anyone operating that site
on behalf of the government cannot claim to be a
“private” figure. Yet that is exactly what has
happened in this case. Plaintiffs/Respondents have
themselves sought out the notoriety of operating the
world famous Torrey Pines Gliderport under a no-
xxii 17
cost lease. The evidence shows that the income from
that choice has been well over one million dollars
every year. In return for that income, Respondents
have assumed responsibility for all operations at that
site - with no effective oversight from the City of San
Diego or the public. Indeed, that has been Petitioner
Kuczewski’s primary concern: lack of oversight. So
where does the “buck” stop in that situation? Who
should be held accountable for accidents, deaths,
bullying, and other abuses at that site? If citizens
can’t complain to their own City, then there is no
mechanism for feedback, and the system is out of
control. That cannot be allowed as a template for
management of public resources.
Plaintiffs/Respondents have advertised
themselves on their own web site for decades which
also makes them voluntary public figures (or at least
limited purpose public figures with regard to the
Gliderport). The California Courts have erred by
protecting them as private citizens.
xxiii 18
2. To protect citizen’s rights to be critical of their
government and their policies.
If the current ruling is allowed to stand, then all
governments can effectively shield themselves from
public criticism by simply hiring private businesses
to carry out public functions. According to the
Plaintiffs / Respondent’s theory in this case, the
operators of the Torrey Pines Gliderport are not
“public figures” or even “limited purpose public
figures” in spite of the fact that they are operating a
public park owned by the people of San Diego. If this
were allowed to stand, then all government services
from fire departments to police departments could be
replaced by private businesses to gain protection
from public criticism. The only interpretation that
avoids this disaster is to recognize that any business
operating as a defacto arm of the government (such
as operating a public park) cannot claim to be
“private figures” with respect to the freedoms of
speech granted by the federal and state
xxiv 19
constitutions. This is especially true (as in this case)
where such a private business is given wide latitude
to make and enforce rules regarding the public’s
safety and the public’s use of public land.
3. To establish that official and public government
documents (including video records) may be freely
republished without fear of million dollar law
suits for “defamation”.
Plaintiffs/Respondents have already admitted
that Appellant Kuczewski’s speeches before the City
Council are protected speech. However, they claim _
that republication of those exact same speeches by
posting them on the Internet at YouTube.com or
USHawks.org somehow removes their protected
status. This is an outrageous conclusion because ALL
City Council proceedings are already broadcast on
the Internet by the City of San Diego itself. Indeed,
that’s where all of Kuczewski’s videos actually
originated. All of the alleged “defamatory” videos
were downloaded from the City of San Diego web site
xxv 20
and then uploaded to YouTube. In both cases, that
same information is publicly available to everyone on
the Internet. Yet Plaintiffs/Respondents have not
sued the City of San Diego for publication of those
exact same videos. Furthermore, with the recent
widespread adoption of remote “Zoom” participation,
there are no limits to who can observe the speakers
at City Council meetings. The post-COVID City
Council chambers now have enough “seating” for
everyone in the world with access to the Internet.
4. To establish standards for “matters of public
interest” with regard to speech concerning
government management of public property.
Much of this case (for over 9 years now) has
hinged on the standard for a “matter of public
interest”. So far, all of the California Courts involved
in this case have determined that the operation of
the Torrey Pines Gliderport (part of a San Diego city
park) is somehow not a matter of public interest even though it is a very valuable piece of land fully
xxvi 21
owned by the City of San Diego. This determination
was used in denial of motions for SLAPP and in the
Jury Instructions treating Plaintiffs/Respondents as
“private citizens” rather than “limited purpose public
figures”. Appellant Kuczewski argues that this
determination is incorrect and it sets a number of
undesirable precedents.
There is no argument among the parties that the
13.5 acres of oceanfront property leased to
Respondents (for free) as the “Torrey Pines
Gliderport” is fully and completely owned by the City
of San Diego. There is no argument among the
parties that the Torrey Pines Gliderport is part of
the Torrey Pines City Park and that it falls under the
jurisdiction of the City of San Diego (which includes
the San Diego City Council, the Mayor of San Diego,
and the people of San Diego). These two facts alone
(that it’s 13.5 acres of oceanfront public park
property, and that it is completely owned by the City
of San Diego) makes it a matter of public interest.
xxvii 22
The property value alone justifies this classification.
Furthermore, the Torrey Pines Gliderport is an
admittedly world-famous hang gliding and
paragliding site. And finally, the Torrey Pines
Gliderport receives both local and national press
coverage for both its fabulous flying opportunities
and its numerous accidents and deaths. For several
decades, the accidents and deaths at the Gliderport
have been routinely featured in both television and
print media in San Diego. Some of those incidents
have also received nationwide press coverage.
Each of these factors alone could be decisive in
classifying the Torrey Pines Gliderport as a matter of
public interest. But taken together, the weight of the
evidence is overwhelming.
And even if all of that were not enough to tip the
scales in favor of being a matter of public interest,
Petitioner Kuczewski’s own speeches themselves
provided conclusive evidence. The central and
xxviii 23
recurring theme in all of Kuczewski’s videotaped City
Council speeches (presented at trial and during
appeal) was a simple request for the City of San
Diego to provide some form of oversight of a private
business operating a free lease of the City’s public
park.
In particular, Kuczewski continually urged the
City Council and the Mayor to reactivate the Torrey
Pines City Park Advisory Board. That Board was
formed in 2007 as a result of San Diego County
Superior Court Case No. GIC 861914. That case was
brought against the City of San Diego by the Coastal
Law Enforcement Action Network (CLEAN) for poor
oversight of the Torrey Pines Gliderport business. On
June 27, 2007, the City of San Diego and CLEAN
settled the lawsuit with a settlement agreement that
specified the creation of the “Torrey Pines City Park
Advisory Board” (TPCPAB). The TPCPAB was
formed in 2008, and “deactivated” in 2010. But
during that time, Kuczewski spoke at every single
xxix 24
TPCPAB meeting - even though the meetings were
not recorded or televised. And during that same time
period, Kuczewski did NOT speak at the San Diego
City Council meetings - which WERE televised. If
Kuczewski’s goal (as alleged) had been defamation
and not oversight, then why would he have avoided
the City Council spotlight in favor of the much
smaller and non-televised TPCPAB meetings?
The answer is clear. Kuczewski was petitioning
his government for redress of grievances as protected
by the Constitution of the United States (First
Amendment) and the Constitution of California
(Article 1, Section 2(a) and Section 3(a)).
Most importantly, the fact that the City of San
Diego even formed an official Torrey Pines City Park
Advisory Board is defacto evidence that the property
is a matter of Public Interest. The 11 Members of the
TPCPAB were all selected as either representatives
xxx 25
of existing public organizations or as direct
appointees of government officials:
Ginny Barnes: Mayor of San Diego
Ken Baier: Torrey Hawks HG Club
Ronald Brown: Torrey Pines Gulls Club
Mary Coakley: Park & Recreation Area 1
David Metzgar: San Diego HG and PG
Chris Schmidt: Sierra Club, San Diego
Edward Slater: Glider Clubs of So Cal
Brian Thompson: Torrey Pines Association
Linda Colley: University Planning Group
Ken King: Council District 1 Representative
Michael Stepner: Park & Recreation Board
All of those groups were part of the Torrey Pines
City Park Advisory Board because the Torrey Pines
City Park was (and still is) a matter of public
interest. Indeed, the formation of the Advisory Board
itself was ratified by the San Diego City Council.
How could Kuczewski’s public speeches urging the
continuation of that existing Advisory Board NOT be
considered a matter of public interest?
The matter of public interest issue is one of the
most important issues in this case because it was
used to deny Petitioner Kuczewski's Motion for
xxxi 26
SLAPP and (more importantly here) to adversely
affect the Jury Instructions issued at trial.
The matter of public interest issue is also one
which has little or no clear guidance from the higher
courts. Common sense would dictate that this case
does involve matters of public interest (as described
above), and yet the rulings by the California Superior
Court, the California Court of Appeal, and the
California Supreme Court have indicated otherwise.
A clarification of this matter of law is important for
both Courts and Citizens to understand the rights
and limitations on their ability to safely petition
their government for redress of grievances with
regard to public property being managed by “private”
companies.
5. To establish a firm and factual basis for claims of
defamation requiring at least SOME defamation.
One of the tell-tale signs of the weakness of
Respondent’s case is that they don’t quote a single
xxxii 27
“smoking gun” statement of Petitioner Kuczewski’s
that they can cite as defamatory. They don’t have
such a quote because Kuczewski has been careful and
accurate with his comments. The most egregious
example they can find is Kuczewski using the word
“thugs” to describe the bullying behavior he
witnessed and documented. Kuczewski has shown
undisputed videos of Respondents “giving the finger”
and shouting obscenities (thuggish behavior).
Petitioner Kuczewski has shown undisputed photos
of Respondents smoking in the non-smoking City
Park (thuggish behavior). Petitioner has shown
undisputed photos of lease violations for keeping a
hog on the premises and unlawful subleasing of the
premises (thuggish behavior). Petitioner has shown
video of unwanted physical violence by Respondents
(thuggish behavior). All of those statements and
videos were true. There was no statement of
Kuczewski’s that was proven to be false. Lacking any
actual false statements, Respondents have relied on
xxxiii 28
how it might “feel” to have things said that, while
true, were not flattering. This cannot become the
standard for defamation or we will have lost our right
to speak the truth.
6. Freedom of speech appeal decided without de novo
review?
Petitioner Kuczewski asserts that important
issues of law are involved in this case, and the case
should have been reviewed under the “de novo”
standard during the Appeal process. Respondents
have, for example, conceded that their law suit does
NOT include any of Appellant Kuczewski’s privileged
statements as spoken to the City Council and that
such speech is protected speech. However,
Respondents instead claim that the mere
republication of sections of the City Council’s own
video (which has already been published by the City
of San Diego) somehow becomes unprotected speech.
This establishes a new precedent in law that the
xxxiv 29
simple republication of protected City Council
speeches may subject the publisher to claims for
defamation. If allowed to stand, this decision
undermines the whole notion of freedom of the press
with regard to publication of our government
meetings. As such, this case deserved to be reviewed
de novo. In particular, the case should have been
reviewed on its merits by viewing the actual video
evidence of Kuczewski’s speeches to the San Diego
City Council. Yet the California Court of Appeal
decision did not address this most important aspect
of the case.
7. To establish that a judgment of 1.8 million dollars
is inappropriate in cases where citizens petition
their government for redress of grievances.
The judgment against Kuczewski for 1.8 million
dollars is obscene, and it reflects the lack of any
sanity checking within our justice system. There was
no financial evidence presented that Plaintiffs
suffered any losses due to Kuczewski’s statements.
xxxv 30
The hired “expert” made all kinds of general
statements, but provided no actual numbers showing
either income or loss of income over time.
Most importantly, this judgment has had an
enormous chilling effect on the reporting of abuses in
the sports of hang gliding and paragliding. These
sports are currently unregulated by the FAA, and
they are dominated by access to flying sites such as
the Torrey Pines Gliderport. The fear of speaking up
at City Council or testifying in a Court of Law will
cut off the feedback mechanisms needed to keep
these sports safe.
8. Summary of Reasons to Grant a Writ of Certiorari
The management of public land can never be a
private matter, and the people making decisions
about public land can never be private parties.
Indeed, before every single City Council speech at
issue in this case, the San Diego City Clerk had read
the following statement into the record:
xxxvi 31
Non-agenda public comment is an opportunity
for members of the public to make comment on
subject matters within the jurisdiction of the
Council.
And yet none of Petitioner Kuczewski’s alleged
defamatory City Council speeches regarding the
Gliderport (all of which were produced as evidence to
the California Courts) were ever stopped or
interrupted by the San Diego City Council or City
Clerk as being outside the jurisdiction of the Council.
So by the City of San Diego’s own repeated official
actions, all of the alleged speeches were indeed
appropriate subject matter for the San Diego City
Council to consider. This is the final proof that all of
Petitioner Kuczewski’s speeches were matters of
public interest contrary to the decisions of the
California Courts. If they were appropriate for the
City Council, then they were, by definition, matters
of public interest and were appropriately in the
public eye for public review of limited purpose public
figures with regard to operation of the Gliderport.
xxxvii 32
Finally, the precedents that have been established
in 376 U.S. 254 (1964) Times v. Sullivan, 418 U.S.
323 (1974) Gertz v. Welch, and 388 U.S. 130 (1967)
Curtis v. Butts have become outdated and do not
address the modern environment where video
cameras are everywhere, and every citizen is a
potential reporter. Please take this case to update
the scope and limitations of our First Amendment in
the modern era.
Conclusion
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Robert Michael Kuczewski
Date:
October 22. 2024
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.