Amicus Curiae Brief — William Trevor Case, Petitioner v. Montana

No. 24-624

In the Supreme Court of the United States

WILLIAM TREVOR CASE, PETITIONER

v.

MONTANA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MONTANA

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE STATE OF

MICHIGAN AND 34 OTHER STATES

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

Dana Nessel

Michigan Attorney General

Ann M. Sherman

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

P.O. Box 30212

Lansing, Michigan 48909

ShermanA@michigan.gov

(517) 335-7628

B. Eric Restuccia

Deputy Solicitor General

Timothy A. Baughman

Special Ass’t Attorney General

Attorneys for Amicus

Curiae State of Michigan

[additional counsel listed at the end of the brief]

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Where a warrantless entry of a home is not directed at the discovery and seizure of criminal evidence, but rather at providing necessary, immediate

aid or preventing or avoiding injury to persons, is reasonable suspicion of a need to render emergency aid—

not probable cause—sufficient to justify the entry under the Fourth Amendment?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented ...................................................... i

Table of Authorities .................................................... iii

Interest of Amici Curiae .............................................. 1

Introduction and Summary of Argument ................... 2

Argument ..................................................................... 3

I.

Entry into premises to render emergency aid

is governed by the Fourth Amendment’s

reasonableness standard, not the Warrant

Clause, and requires only that the police have

a reasonable suspicion of the need to provide

assistance. ............................................................. 3

A. When police render emergency aid to the

community, their actions fall outside the

Warrant Clause and its corresponding

probable cause requirement. .......................... 3

B. The history of the Fourth Amendment

also supports the principle that the

Warrant Clause’s probable cause

requirement is directed to searches in

furtherance of an investigation of

wrongdoing. ..................................................... 8

C. This Court’s precedents, and the need for

quick action to provide aid, support

applying a reasonableness standard―not

the probable cause standard―for entry

into a home based on emergency

circumstances. .............................................. 11

Conclusion.................................................................. 16

Additional Counsel .................................................... 17

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Alabama v. White,

496 U.S. 325 (1990) ............................................. 13

Bailey v. United States,

568 U.S. 186 (2013) ............................................. 14

Brigham City v. Stuart,

547 U.S. 398 (2006) ..................................... 5, 6, 11

California v. Acevedo,

500 U.S. 565 (1991) ............................................... 4

Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cnty. of San

Francisco,

387 U.S. 523 (1967) ............................................. 12

Caniglia v. Strom,

593 U.S. 194 (2021) ................................... 5, 6, 7, 8

Carpenter v. United States,

585 U.S. 296 (2018) ............................................... 9

City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan,

575 U.S. 600 (2015) ......................................... 2, 14

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,

531 U.S. 32 (2000) ......................................... 11, 12

City of Los Angeles v. Patel,

576 U.S. 409 (2015) ............................................. 12

Coolidge v. New Hampshire,

403 U.S. 443 (1971) ............................................... 4

G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States,

429 U.S. 338 (1977) ............................................... 7

Johnson v. United States,

333 U.S. 10 (1948) ................................................. 7

iv

Kansas v. Glover,

589 U.S. 376 (2020) ............................................. 13

Lange v. California,

594 U.S. 295 (2021) ............................................... 5

Maryland v. Wilson,

519 U.S. 408 (1997) ............................................... 4

Michigan v. Fisher,

558 U.S. 45 (2009) ..................................... 6, 11, 14

Michigan v. Tyler,

436 U.S. 499 (1978) ............................................. 12

Missouri v. McNeely,

569 U.S. 141 (2013) ............................................. 14

Montana v. Case,

553 P.3d 985 (Mont. 2025) .................................. 15

New York v. Burger,

482 U.S. 691 (1987) ............................................. 12

Ornelas v. United States,

517 U.S. 690 (1996) ............................................. 13

Riley v. California,

573 U.S. 373 (2014) ..................................... 4, 9, 11

Schmerber v. California,

384 U.S. 757 (1966) ......................................... 1, 13

Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs. Ass’n,

489 U.S. 602 (1989) ............................................. 12

South Dakota v. Opperman,

428 U.S. 364 (1976) ............................................... 7

Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1 (1968) ................................................. 14

v

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,

494 U.S. 259 (1990) ............................................... 9

Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,

515 U.S. 646 (1995) ............................................... 7

Other Authorities

Debra A. Livingston,

Police, Community Caretaking, and the

Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. Chi. Leg. Forum

261 (1998) ........................................................ 8, 10

Michael Gentithes,

Exigencies, Not Exceptions: How to Return

Warrant Exceptions to Their Roots, 25 U. Pa.

J. Const. L. 60 (2023) ............................................ 9

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. IV ......................................... 1, 3, 5

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

State and local law enforcement play a central role

in responding to emergency situations, and they often

have to make an emergency entry into a person’s home

to ensure that person’s safety. Amici States have a

substantial interest in ensuring that the police are

able effectively to provide such emergency aid to their

citizens, consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

Amici believe that requiring probable cause to

make a warrantless entry into a dwelling where police

believe a person is in need of immediate aid would not

serve the public and is not required by the Fourth

Amendment. The police here were not engaged in the

“often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966). Instead, they were responding to information about a potential suicide, supported by objective facts.

The Fourth Amendment should not prevent officers from taking reasonable action to protect persons

from such harm or render aid. They should be able to

enter a home based on a reasonable suspicion of the

need to render emergency help without being subject

to a probable cause standard that ultimately risks

public safety.

2

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Police are expected not just to protect the community from crime, but also to prevent injury and render

aid. Whether it be an elderly or disabled person languishing at home but unable to call for aid, a person

suffering from suicidal ideation with means to carry it

out, or a person with mental health challenges endangering himself or others, police are often tasked with

intervening to provide immediate help.

Rendering emergency aid is qualitatively different

from the function that undergirds both the Warrant

Clause and the concept of probable cause—detecting

crime or other wrongdoing. Rendering emergency aid

is a kind of exigent circumstance that places the police

in a role different from their investigative duties. Because the emergency-aid role does not implicate an investigative function, it should be guided by the Fourth

Amendment’s central value—reasonableness. The reasonableness inquiry is flexible and consistent with the

Constitution’s text and history and the public’s expectation that police “move quickly” where “delay would

gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.”

City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S.

600, 612 (2015) (cleaned up). For these reasons, the

proper standard is not probable cause, but the less

stringent reasonable suspicion inquiry. This conclusion is supported by the Fourth Amendment’s text and

history.

To foster quick responses and minimize secondguessing in this important role, this Court should recognize reasonable suspicion as the standard guiding a

warrantless entry to render emergency aid.

3

ARGUMENT

I.

Entry into premises to render emergency aid

is governed by the Fourth Amendment’s

reasonableness standard, not the Warrant

Clause, and requires only that the police

have a reasonable suspicion of the need to

provide assistance.

Reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth

Amendment and governs when police seek not to seize

evidence but rather to provide emergency aid. The presumption that arises under the Warrant Clause—and

its standard of probable cause—is tethered to investigations of wrongdoing. Outside that context, such as

where the emergency aid exception applies, no warrant is required, and entry into the home need not be

supported by probable cause. It need only be supported

by a reasonable suspicion that a person requires emergency aid. Such a holding both comports with the reasonableness focus of the Fourth Amendment and protects the community.

A. When police render emergency aid to the

community, their actions fall outside the

Warrant Clause and its corresponding

probable cause requirement.

The Fourth Amendment contains an overarching

reasonableness requirement and a clause limiting

when warrants may issue:

The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not

be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but

upon probable cause, supported by oath or

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affirmation, and particularly describing the

place to be searched, and the persons or things

to be seized.

This Court has therefore reiterated that the

Fourth Amendment’s paramount value is reasonableness. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381–82 (2014);

Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411 (1997). All

searches, including searches undertaken under a

proper warrant, must be reasonable, but not all reasonable searches require a warrant. As Justice Scalia

put it, “the supposed ‘general rule’ that a warrant is

always required does not appear to have any basis in

the common law . . . and confuses rather than facilitates any attempt to develop rules of reasonableness

in light of changed legal circumstances.” California v.

Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583–84 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). “The relevant test is not the reasonableness

of the opportunity to procure a warrant, but the reasonableness of the seizure under all the circumstances.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,

509 (1971) (Justice Black, concurring in part and dissenting in part).

The text of the Warrant Clause itself—which includes the requirement of probable cause—provides

much of the answer to when a warrant is required.

Close inspection of the Clause reveals that it does not

apply when necessity—exigent circumstances—justifies entry and search without warrant. Nor does it apply when police are not engaged in an investigation

into wrongdoing. Emergency aid entries into the home

satisfy both criteria. And once the Warrant Clause

drops out, we are left with a standard of reasonableness.

5

Exigent Circumstances. The Warrant Clause

provides that a warrant may be obtained only on a

demonstration of “probable cause, supported by Oath

or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to

be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Clause applies when officers anticipate the presence of the sought-after items in

the location to be searched; officers must provide evidence giving rise to probable cause that the evidence

will be found there. In short, a warrant is required for

searches intended to discover and seize physical items

or persons that probable cause demonstrates—ahead

of time—are present.

Warrants are thus not required when exigent circumstances justify entry and search. As this Court recently said, a warrant is excused when “the exigencies

of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so

compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively

reasonable,” such as to “prevent the imminent destruction of evidence or to prevent a suspect’s escape.”

Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 301 (2021) (cleaned

up). This means that not “all unwelcome intrusions on

private property” are prohibited, just “unreasonable

ones.” Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194, 198 (2021)

(cleaned up).

The need to provide emergency aid is a well-recognized exigent circumstance that falls outside the Warrant Clause. In Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398

(2006), this Court explained that such searches are

consistent with the Fourth Amendment, stating that

the “police may enter a home without a warrant when

they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing

that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently

6

threatened with such injury.” Id. at 403; see also id.

(“One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant

is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured”); Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (per

curiam) (warrantless entry may be justified where

“there was an objectively reasonable basis for believing that medical assistance was needed, or persons

were in danger”) (cleaned up).

Nothing in Caniglia is to the contrary. Indeed, the

Court there―as well as several justices writing in concurrence―recognized the emergency aid exception’s

ongoing vitality. The Court expressly stated that law

enforcement “may enter private property without a

warrant when certain exigent circumstances exist, including the need to render emergency assistance to an

injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Caniglia, 593 U.S. at 198 (cleaned up).

See also id. at 199 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“the role

of a peace officer includes preventing violence and restoring order”); id. at 204 (Kavanagh, J., concurring)

(“[T]he Court’s decision does not prevent police officers

from taking reasonable steps to assist those who are

inside a home and in need of aid.”); id. at 200–01 (Alito,

J., concurring) (Caniglia did not resolve the circumstance in which the police were “conducting a search

or seizure for the purpose of preventing a person from

committing suicide”).

Non-Law-Enforcement Purpose. The Warrant

Clause—and the textually included probable cause requirement—is aimed at searches that have as their

purpose the discovery and seizure of fruits, instrumentalities, contraband, evidence, property, or people in

furtherance of a criminal investigation. See G. M.

7

Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 358

(1977). Thus, in Riley the Court stated that “[o]ur

cases have determined that ‘[w]here a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence

of criminal wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness generally

requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.’ ” 573 U.S.

at 382 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515

U.S. 646, 653 (1995)). Continuing, the Court explained

that “such a warrant ensures that the inferences to

support a search are ‘drawn by a neutral and detached

magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting

out crime.’ ” Id. at 382 (quoting Johnson v. United

States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).

Searches that are not designed to investigate

crime or other wrongdoing are textually disconnected

from the Warrant Clause. This Court has therefore

recognized that in the “noncriminal context,” the requirement of probable cause is “inapplicabl[e]” because “search warrants are not required, linked as the

warrant requirement textually is to the probablecause concept.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.

364, 370 n.5 (1976).

Emergency-aid searches—particularly those intended to prevent injury of individuals within the

premises—are one prominent example of searches not

designed to investigate crime. They are thus textually

disconnected from the probable cause requirement. As

Justice Alito’s concurrence noted in Caniglia, “warrants are not typically granted for the purpose of

checking on a person’s medical condition.” 593 U.S. at

203. Rather, they remain governed by the Reasonableness Clause.

8

The emergency aid exception reflects a core fact of

modern-day policing: The police play a critical role in

safeguarding the community from harms that are independent of making arrests and detecting crime.

Debra A. Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking,

and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. Chi. Leg. Forum

261, 263 (1998) (“Communities have always looked to

local police to perform social services unrelated or at

best partially related to enforcing criminal law.”). Justice Alito’s concurrence in Caniglia listed different

kinds of emergency-aid actions involving entry into a

private home without a warrant, including “conducting a search or seizure for the purpose of preventing a

person from committing suicide,” 593 U.S. at 201, and

“warrantless, nonconsensual searches of a home for

the purpose of ascertaining whether a resident is in

urgent need of medical attention and cannot summon

help,” id. at 202.

These actions are distinct from ferreting out crime.

As a starting point for determining the level of certainty police must have to conduct an emergency-aid

home entry, one thing is therefore clear: the Warrant

Clause does not apply.

B. The history of the Fourth Amendment

also supports the principle that the

Warrant

Clause’s

probable

cause

requirement is directed to searches in

furtherance of an investigation of

wrongdoing.

This distinction between a search conducted as

part of an investigation and an emergency entry to

render aid is also reflected by history. The Framers

were concerned with searches that had “ ‘allowed

9

British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity.’ ”

Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 303 (2018)

(quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 403). This Court has emphasized the “widespread hostility among the former

colonists to the issuance of writs of assistance empowering revenue officers to search suspected places for

smuggled goods, and general search warrants permitting the search of private houses, often to uncover papers that might be used to convict persons of libel.”

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266

(1990) (citation omitted). Thus, the genesis of the

Fourth Amendment is the desire to make the government show its work to a degree sufficient to prohibit

wide-ranging exploratory searches intended to ferret

out criminal activity or other wrongdoing. Cf. id. (describing the “driving force” of the Fourth Amendment

as for investigative purposes).

While the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement hems in the investigatory function of police, the

role of police (as noted) extends beyond that, and has

since the Founding. Although the modern conception

of a police department was not established at the time

of the Framing and ratification, the constables of that

era performed a range of functions that have been categorized as part of a community caretaking function.

Michael Gentithes, Exigencies, Not Exceptions: How to

Return Warrant Exceptions to Their Roots, 25 U. Pa. J.

Const. L. 60, 80–81 (2023) (“[L]aw enforcement was

largely conducted by a system of constables and night

watchmen,” and these “constables primarily aimed to

keep the peace by responding to disturbances that

might be dangerous to the public at large, such as ‘affrays’ in taverns or potentially dangerous

10

‘vagrants.’ ”). And at the Framing, the Founders were

shielding themselves from the investigative actions of

the Crown, not efforts to render emergency aid. See

Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the

Fourth Amendment, at 263, 274 n.64 (“Community

caretaking’ denotes a wide range of everyday police activities undertaken to aid those in danger of physical

harm, to preserve property, or to create and maintain

a feeling of security in the community.”; “the central

preoccupation of the Framers was not the excessive

zeal of Crown officers seeking evidence to prosecute

crime, but the writ of assistance—that blanket warrant authorizing royal customs officials to undertake

searches that were not in aid of criminal prosecution

or “law enforcement” in the traditional sense, but that

generally had as their objective the seizure and forfeiture of untaxed goods.”) (cleaned up).

Like these historical caretaking functions, emergency entry into the premises here was for purposes

other than for the detection of crime or other wrongdoing. Such a non-investigative action, taken for the purpose of rendering aid to a person threatening suicide,

is governed by the requirement of reasonableness under the first clause of the Fourth Amendment, not by

the Warrant Clause and its corresponding probable

cause requirement.

A historical inquiry supports what the textual

analysis of the Fourth Amendment showed—that the

action here would not require a showing of probable

cause under the Warrant Clause. Again, emergencyaid entries are not searches for evidence. They are

emergency entries for another purpose entirely. Thus,

this type of action by law enforcement is governed by

11

the Reasonableness Clause, not the Warrant Clause

with its probable cause requirement.

C. This Court’s precedents, and the need for

quick action to provide aid, support

applying a reasonableness standard―not

the probable cause standard―for entry

into a home based on emergency

circumstances.

This Court’s precedents support a reasonable suspicion standard for when police may enter a home to

provide emergency aid. As noted, the police may enter

a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance where there is “an objectively reasonable basis”

for doing so. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403–04; Fisher,

558 U.S. at 49. This Court could easily have said that

the police must have “probable cause to believe” rather

than an “objectively reasonable basis.” But it did not

do so. This omission is not surprising because, as described above, probable cause is part and parcel of the

warrant requirement, which exists to limit police

when they are trying to discover evidence of criminal

wrongdoing. See Riley, 373 U.S. at 382.

Petitioner argues (at 23) that other exigent circumstances, such as the hot pursuit exception, require

probable cause for a home entry. Even assuming that

is correct, the hot pursuit exigent circumstance is

rooted in combatting crime. Not so for the emergency

aid exception.

The emergency aid exception is like the special

needs doctrine, which applies “beyond the normal need

for law enforcement.” City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,

531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). While narcotic checkpoints did

12

not fall into this category in Edmond, this Court explained that the “usual rule” of “individualize suspicion of wrongdoing” is not necessary under the Fourth

Amendment for other actions by the police, including

administrative ones. See id. at 37 (citing New York v.

Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702–04 (1987) (warrantless administrative inspection of premises of “closely regulated” business); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507–

09, 511–12 (1978) (administrative inspection of firedamaged premises to determine cause of blaze); Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 387

U.S. 523, 534–39 (1967) (administrative inspection to

ensure compliance with city housing code)). The reasoning is that the requirements of a warrant and probable cause are “impracticable” when, as is similar

here, the “primary purpose” of the searches is “[d]istinguishable from the general interest in crime control.” City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 420

(2015) (administrative search for compliance with hotel recordkeeping requirement). “Search regimes

where no warrant is ever required may be reasonable.”

Id. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S.

602, 619, n.10 (1989)).

The inquiry thus returns to reasonableness, which

is the overarching metric for the Fourth Amendment.

And the most reasonable standard for home entries to

provide emergency aid is a reasonable belief (suspicion) that emergency aid is needed.

This Court has explained that “[a]rticulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’

mean is not possible. . . . [T]he standards are ‘not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal

rules.’ ” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695–

13

96 (1996) (citations omitted). Instead, probable cause

and reasonable suspicion are “fluid concepts that take

their substantive content from the particular contexts

in which the standards are being assessed.” Id. at 696.

That said, “[t]he level of suspicion” required under

a reasonable suspicion standard is less than that necessary for probable cause and “depends on the factual

and practical considerations of everyday life on which

reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,

act.” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380 (2020)

(cleaned up). The distinction appears to be not so much

a difference in probability as a difference in the foundational facts needed to justify the entry: fewer are

needed under a reasonable suspicion standard. As

stated in Alabama v. White, “[r]easonable suspicion is

a less demanding standard than probable cause not

only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable

cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion

can arise from information that is less reliable than

that required to show probable cause.” 496 U.S. 325,

330 (1990).

Where the police are not engaged in the “often

competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,”

Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, it is reasonable to require

fewer foundational facts to justify an entry to render

aid. Police officers who encounter non-criminal emergencies typically must take quick action to prevent injury to a sick, injured, or suicidal person. The reasonableness inquiry is flexible and consistent with the

public’s expectation that police “move quickly” where

“delay would gravely endanger their lives or the lives

14

of others.” Sheehan, 575 U.S. at 612. Demanding the

level of foundational facts necessary for probable cause

will result in injuries and deaths, while not serving the

values underlying the Fourth Amendment.

The traditional application of both the probable

cause standard and the reasonable suspicion standard

are predicated on criminal investigatory police actions. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 154–56

(2013) (probable cause); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–

22 (1968) (reasonable suspicion). The reasonable suspicion standard in its ordinary application, however,

also encompasses the basis for what motivates the police for an emergency-aid entry: protecting safety. Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 193 (2013) (reasonable suspicion is based “in crime prevention and detection and in the police officer’s safety”). Just as the police may conduct a pat-down for officer safety, the police may enter a premises for the occupant’s safety. See

Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49 (“It does not meet the needs of

law enforcement or the demands of public safety to require officers to walk away from a situation like the

one they encountered here” i.e., where there may have

been a situation in which “medical assistance was

needed, or persons were in danger”). In both situations, a reasonable suspicion standard comports with

the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness touchstone.

That is all the more so true in the emergency aid setting because the person who is injured or ill will typically welcome the police’s entry into the home.

At bottom, police entry under the emergency aid

exception is based on safety, not crime detection or investigation of other wrongdoing. If police fail to act because they fear they may not have a sufficient ground,

15

the danger is not loss of evidence of a crime, but possible injury or even loss of life. A standard of reasonable

suspicion of the need to render emergency aid is thus

appropriate. Of course, the ensuing entry must be conducted reasonably, as searches inside the premises

cannot extend beyond the circumstances that justified

the entry in the first instance. But the reasonableness

touchstone demands only reasonable suspicion in

cases like this one, not probable cause.

This reasonable suspicion test is consistent with

the one applied by the Montana Supreme Court, which

(1) required “objective, specific and articulable facts

from which an experienced officer would suspect that

a citizen is in need of help or is in peril”; (2) allowed

the officer to “take appropriate action to render assistance or mitigate the peril”; and (3) required that the

officer not act beyond what is necessary to render assistance. Montana v. Case, 553 P.3d 985, 991–92

(Mont. 2025). “The requisite inquiry” was whether

“there were exigent circumstances rendering the entry

‘reasonable.’ ” Id. at 991. As argued here, “[w]hen a

warrantless entry is wholly divorced from a criminal

investigation and is otherwise reasonable, . . . the

probable cause element is ‘superfluous’ and should not

impede an officer’s duty to ensure the wellbeing of a

citizen in imminent peril.” Id. at 992.

And under the totality of circumstances here—

where the police were responding to a call that Petitioner was suicidal, they received a report at the scene

that his girlfriend had heard a gunshot, and they observed beer cans, a note pad, and an empty holster

from outside the premises—the entry was eminently

reasonable.

16

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana

should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Dana Nessel

Attorney General

State of Michigan

Ann M. Sherman

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

P.O. Box 30212

Lansing, Michigan 48909

ShermanA@michigan.gov

(517) 335-7628

B. Eric Restuccia

Deputy Solicitor General

Timothy A. Baughman

Special Ass’t Attorney General

Attorneys for Amicus

Curiae State of Michigan

Dated: SEPTEMBER 2025

17

ADDITIONAL COUNSEL

Steve Marshall

Attorney General

State of Alabama

Theodore E. Rokita

Attorney General

State of Indiana

Stephen J. Cox

Attorney General

State of Alaska

Brenna Bird

Attorney General

State of Iowa

Kris Mayes

Attorney General

State of Arizona

Kris W. Kobach

Attorney General

State of Kansas

Tim Griffin

Attorney General

State of Arkansas

Russell Coleman

Attorney General

Commonwealth of

Kentucky

Patrick J. Griffin

Chief State’s Attorney

State of Connecticut

Kathleen Jennings

Attorney General

State of Delaware

Brian L. Schwalb

Attorney General

District of Columbia

James Uthmeier

Attorney General

State of Florida

Chris Carr

Attorney General

State of Georgia

Liz Murrill

Attorney General

State of Louisiana

Aaron M. Frey

Attorney General

State of Maine

Anthony G. Brown

Attorney General

State of Maryland

Lynn Fitch

Attorney General

State of Mississippi

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Catherine L. Hanaway

Attorney General

State of Missouri

Alan Wilson

Attorney General

State of South Carolina

Michael T. Hilgers

Attorney General

State of Nebraska

Marty J. Jackley

Attorney General

State of South Dakota

Aaron D. Ford

Attorney General

State of Nevada

Jonathan Skrmetti

Attorney General and

Reporter

State of Tennessee

Matthew J. Platkin

Attorney General

State of New Jersey

Raúl Torrez

Attorney General

State of New Mexico

Jeff Jackson

Attorney General

State of North Carolina

Dave Yost

Attorney General

State of Ohio

Gentner Drummond

Attorney General

State of Oklahoma

Dan Rayfield

Attorney General

State of Oregon

Ken Paxton

Attorney General

State of Texas

Derek Brown

Attorney General

State of Utah

Jason S. Miyares

Attorney General

Commonwealth of

Virginia

Nicholas W. Brown

Attorney General

State of Washington

John B. McCuskey

Attorney General

State of West Virginia