Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Richard Grier, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefOct 1, 2024

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FILED: August 8, 2024

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

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No. 23-4027

(1:19-cr-00036-JKB-5)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

RICHARD GRIER, a/k/a Rich Homie

Defendant - Appellant

JUDGMENT

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In accordance with the decision of this court, the judgment of the district

codfi is 'affirmed and this case is remanded to the district court for further

proceedings consistent with the court's decision.

This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of this court's mandate in

accordance with Fed. R. App. P.-41.

/s/ NWAMAKA ANOWL CLERK

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^ l iSOM;Appeal: 23-4027

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UNPUBLISHED

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

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No. 23-4027

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•UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

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RICHARD GRIER, a/k/a Rich Homie,

Defendant - Appellant.

^Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Janies K. Bredar, Senior District Judge. (1:19-cr-00036-JKB-5)

_ Submitted: August 1, 2024

Decided: August 8, 2024

Before GREGORY, HARRIS, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Richard Grier, Appellant Pro Se. Patricia Corwin McLane, Assistant United States

•Attorney, Brandon Keith Moore, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE

/UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

^Unpublished opinions are riot binding precedent in this circuit.

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'MER CURIAM:

Richard Grier pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to conspiracy to

I gypirticipate in a racketeering enterprise, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(d), 1963. The

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/district court sentenced Grier to 15 years’ imprisonment, followed by a five-year term of

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supervised release, to run concurrently with his state sentence of life imprisonment. Grier,

:whO proceeds pro se on appeal, argues that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary,

the district court denied his right to self-representation, and the court erred in denying his

^motions for discovery. We affirm, but we remand for correction of a clerical error in the

judgment.

Because Grier did not move to withdraw his guilty plea or otherwise object to the

plea hearing in the district court, we review the validity of his guilty plea for plain error.

r "UnitedStates v. Sanya, 11A F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir. 2014). “Under the plain error standard,

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this [cjourt will correct an unpreserved error if (1) an error was made; (2) the error is plain;

(3) the error affects substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d

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480, 491 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In the Rule 11 context, this

inquiry means that [the defendant] must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for

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•pthe error, he would not have pleaded guilty.” Sanya, 11A F.3d at 816 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

A guilty plea is valid if the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently

r■pleads guilty “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely

Consequences.” United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 464 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal

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^ quotation marks omitted). “In evaluating the constitutional validity of a guilty plea, courts

P^ok to, the totality of the circumstances surrounding it, granting the defendant’s solemn

^declaration of guilt a presumption of truthfulness.” United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d

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><|263, 278 (4th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up).

Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a plea colloquy in

;..,^hich it .informs the defendant of, and determines he understands, the rights he is

■ ///ffelinquishing by pleading guilty, the charges to which he is pleading, and the maximum

* ',£nd any mandatory minimum penalties he faces. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). The district

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court also must ensure that the plea is voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or

promises not contained in the plea agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), and that there is

^factual basis for the plea, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). Any variance from the requirements

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^of Rule 11 “is harmless error if it does not affect substantial rights.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h).

W"- The district court frilly complied with Rule 11. Grier Confirmed that he pled guilty

■ Voluntarily and that his plea did not result from force, threats, or promises other than those

in the plea agreement. The court also appropriately determined that Grier was competent

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to plead guilty and that a factual basis supported the plea. Because his guilty plea was

valid, Grier waived his claim that the court erred by denying his motions for discovery.

f United States v. Glover, 8 F.4th 239, 245 (4th Cir. 2021) (noting that, “when a defendant

pleads guilty, he waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings conducted prior to

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’ "entry of the plea” (cleaned up)).

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees to a criminal defendant the right to the assistance

of'counsel.” United States v. Ziegler, 1 F.4th 219, 226 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation

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marks omitted). Yet, “it is equally clear that the Sixth Amendment also protects a

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^letendant’s affirmative right to self-representation.”

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Id. (internal quotation marks

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.omitted); see Faretta v. California,A22 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975). “We review a district

^court’s denial of a defendant’s right to self-representation de novo.” United States v. Bush,

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k04 R3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2005).

Grier argues that the district court and the magistrate judge denied Grier’s right to

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self-representation by appointing his then-dismissed counsel as standby counsel and by

(requiring Grier to rely on standby counsel to view discovery. Because Grier explicitly

,;i -stated that he wanted standby counsel to represent him during the joint Rule 11 and

sentencing proceeding, he waived his right to self-representation during that proceeding.

■ FMcKasklev. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168,176 (1984) (“A defendant can waive his Faretta rights

#:> . A defendant’s invitation to counsel to participate in [a court proceeding] obliterates

any claim that the participation in question deprived the defendant of control over his own

^•defense.”). Moreover, a defendant does not have the right to decline having standby

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Counsel appointed. Id. (noting that Faretta created “no absolute bar on standby counsel’s

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unsolicited participation”). Thus, the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion by

appointing standby counsel.

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The magistrate judge also did not abuse his discretion by determining that Grier

; would have to view discovery through standby counsel. United States v. Hunt, 99 F.4th

.16,1, 164 (4th Cir. 2024) (noting that “district courts have broad discretion to decide how

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much assistance, if any, standby counsel may provide”). Here, the magistrate judge denied

Grier’s motions for personal copies of the discovery in his case because of safety concerns

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re^ated to Grier having discovery files at his facility. Instead Grier had to view his

...discovery files through his standby counsel. This restriction did not constitute an abuse of

discretion. See United States v. Galloway, 749 F.3d 238,242 (4th Cir. 2014) (determining

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■tliat /district court did not abuse its discretion by denying pro se defendant’s requests for

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■;’.impersonal copies of discovery in his detention center “[i]n view of the legitimate security

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concerns and [defendant’s] failure to show any prejudice from the arrangement”).

Additionally, the magistrate judge suggested moving Grier to a federal facility that was

,\closer to his standby counsel so that Grier could more easily access his discovery; however,

<3rier elected to remain at his state facility.

Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We deny Grier’s motion to vacate

his conviction, and we deny as moot his motions for this court to decide his appeal. We

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•r-eidiand for the limited purpose of correcting a clerical error in the criminal judgment,

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\yhich incorrectly indicates the statute of conviction as 18 U.S.C. § 962, rather than 18

TJ.S.C. §, 1962. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 (governing clerical errors). We dispense with oral

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argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

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before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

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AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

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FILED: September 10, 2024

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4027

(1:19-cr-00036-JKB-5)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

RICHARD GRIER, a/k/a Rich Homie

Defendant - Appellant

ORDER

The petition for rehearing en banc was circulated to the full court. No judge

requested a poll under Fed. R. App. P. 35. The court denies the petition for

rehearing en banc.

For the Court

/s/ Nwamaka Anowi, Clerk

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

t4|NITED; STATES OF AMERICA

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Crim.No. JKB-19-36

RICHARD GRIER

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MEMORANDUM ORDER

Currently pending is the United States of America’s Motion for Transcript requesting that

/he Court permit access to an attorney inquiry hearing conducted on December 19, 2022, and

‘;f |||roduction of a transcript of the hearing. ECF 1136. The motion is not opposed. For reasons

'stated herein and in the government’s motion, the motion is GRANTED.

On November 22, 2022, this matter was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge

pursuit to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 301 to conduct an attorney inquiry hearing. ECF

. .1013. While represented by court-appointed counsel, defendant Richard Grier had filed pro se a

document with the Court stating that he “d[id] not wish to have the assistance of counsel” and

Vtdfid] not require the service of the public defender and/or appointed counsel.” ECF 1009. The

undersigned conducted the attorney inquiry hearing on December 19, 2022, as well as an initial

appearance and arraignment on the Fourth Superseding Indictment. The attorney inquiry hearing

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conducted on a sealed record and ex parte with Mr. Grier and his then-appointed counsel

ft yjthiSut objection from the government. During a colloquy pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422

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U.S.'806.(1975), conducted on the public record, Mr. Grier waived his right to counsel and

------------ --—:--------------------- ;----- -requested leave to proceed pro se, which was granted. Mr. Grier subsequently filed a Motion to

J^eceivpjpiseovery Files. ECF 1057..

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5ate,

On January 6, 2023, the undersigned conducted a Lqfler hearing in this matter, assigned

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"stand-by counsel, and denied Mr. Grier’s discovery motion. On the same date, Mr. Grier entered

TJIpledjpf guilty to one count of the Fourth Superseding Indictment before Judge Bredar and was

'sentenced.

Within days of entry ofjudgment in this matter, Mr. Grier filed two letters requesting

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'.'transcripts of the proceedings on December 19, 2022, and January 6, 2023. ECF 1072; ECF

1073. One of the letters indicated a need for the transcripts to prepare an appeal. ECF 1073. Mr.

Grier filed a notice of appeal on January 13, 2023. ECF 1078.[The matter was assigned appeal

:rframber’23-4027 in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and remains pending. The

appeal concerns, in part, matters that occurred during the hearing on December 19, 2022. In at

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least one .public filing with the Court of Appeals, Mr. Grier recounts statements he made in court

during both sealed and public portions of the attorney inquiry hearing, with citation to a

’,||ans(cri|)t of the hearing. United States v. Grier, Appeal No. 23-4027, Doc.TO at 10-17. (4th Cir.

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Te.b.,15, 2023)!No transcript is attached to the brief, however, see id. at 50, and it does not

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appear that a transcript of the December 19, 2022, hearing was ever produced.

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' i;; In its Motion for Transcript, the government now requests production of a transcript of

thp December 19, 2022, hearing and disclosure of the transcript to both parties. Mr. Grier’s then■f. ■

appointed counsel takes no position on the motion, and Mr. Grier has not filed an opposition.

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'- 'I' , Judge Timothy J. Sullivan has concisely explained the nature of attorney inquiry hearings

■’ trjjlthe importance of confidentiality in such proceedings:

Attorney inquiry hearings in this district are designed to address a

wide variety of problems that can arise between criminal defendants

and their counsel, A great majority of these problems can only be

addressed by the Court if the parties involved are invited to speak

A#:',. I#: * ? openly and with candor to the Court. This openness would be

frustrated if counsel for the Government were permitted to attend

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the hearings, because the defendant would have to choose between

openly explaining his problem with his attorney (in which case the

Government may catch a glimpse of his defense strategy and takes

steps to frustrate it) and explaining his problem in very general terms

(leaving the presiding judge to guess at the nature of the problem'

and its solution).

United States v.Byrd, Crim. No. RDB-14-0186, 2015 WL 221769, at *2 (D. Md. Jan. 13, 2015).

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However, reasons for denying the government access to the attorney inquiry hearing in

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■ .thisxase are. no longer present. In the appeal, Mr. Grier has publicly disclosed the substance of

Statements he made during the ex parte portion of the hearing, and it appears that he intended to

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ff-jf&arid rely upon a copy of a transcript of the hearing in the appeal, although the transcript itself

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rrSmissing. In this way, Mr. Grier has implicitly disclaimed any expectation of confidentiality he

(dad id the attorney inquiry hearing. Moreover, the government has shown a need for a transcript

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(of the hearing to respond to matters raised by Mr. Grier on appeal.

For the foregoing reasons and others explained in the Motion for Transcript, the motion is

. vGj^Al^pE.D.1 The government may order a transcript of the hearing conducted on December 19,

(2-022. (The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Order and a copy of the transcript, when it is

produced, to counsel for the government and to the pro se defendant, Richard Grier.

‘ f; April 20, 2023

; • Date

IS/-

Matthew J. Maddox

United States Magistrate Judge

: Although an appeal of the judgment entered in this matter is pending with the Court of Appeals, this

rourt may retain jurisdiction of ministerial matters in aid of the appellate process. See Doe v. Pub.

' 'pdizen,!^ F.3d 246, 258 (4th Cir. 2014) (stating the “general rule” that filing of a notice of appeal

, divests the district court ofjurisdiction and transfers it to the appellate court but noting “limited

.. exceptions .. . that permit district courts to take subsequent action on matters that are collateral to the

appeal ^ or to take action that aids the appellate process”) (citations omitted); Grand Jury Proc. Under

Seal v: United States, 947 F.2d 1188, 1190 (4th Cir. 1991) (“[A] district court does not lose jurisdiction to

proceed as to matters in aid of the appeal.”); Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 575 (10th Cir. 1990) (“The

district court only retains jurisdiction over tangential matters such as ... performing ‘certain ministerial

fprtcdphsftniaid of the appeal, such as correcting clerical mistakes in the record, approving appeal bonds,

. and issuing stays or injunctions pending the appeal.’”) (citaton omitted).

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FILED: September 18, 2024

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

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No. 23-4027

(1:19-cr-00036-JKB-5)

UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

. RICHARD GRIER, a/k/a Rich Homie

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Defendant - Appellant

MANDATE

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A The judgment of this court, entered August 8, 2024, takes effect today.

-This constitutes the formal mandate of this court issued pursuant to Rule

the Federal Rules pf Appellate Procedure.

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U.S. Department of Justice

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United States Attorney

District of Maryland

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Patricia McLane

ifssist&nt. United States Attorne}'

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Mailing Address:

36 S. Charles Street, 4th Floor

Baltimore, MD 21201

Office Location:

36 S. Charles Street, 4th Floor

Baltimore, MD 21201

DIRECT: 410-209-4642

MAIN: 410-209-4800

FAX: 410-962-3124

January 3,2023

VIA EMAIL ONLY

:Christopher Purpura, Esq.

Re:

United States v. Richard Grier

Criminal No. JKB-19-0036

;Dear Counsel:

: ' &<■ ^is ^etter> together with the Sealed Supplement, confirms the plea agreement (this

“Agreement”) that has been offered to Richard Grier (hereinafter “Defendant”), by the United

iijS^te^Attomey’s Office for the District of Maryland (“this Office”). If the Defendant accepts this

P’lease haye the Defendant execute it in the spaces provided below. If this offer has not been

adehpted by January 31, 2023, it will be deemed withdrawn. The terms of the Agreement are as

x' Pfiows:

Offense of Conviction

The Defendant agrees to plead guilty to Count 1 of the Fourth Superseding

Indictment, which charges the Defendant with conspiracy to participate in the affairs of a

racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). The Defendant admits that the

. Defendant is, in fact, guilty of the offense and will so advise the Court.

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Elements of the Offense

The elements of the offense to which the Defendant has agreed to plead guilty, and

which this Office would prove if the case went to trial, are that on or about the time alleged in the

Fpprth Superseding Indictment, in the District of Maryland:

There was an agreement among two or more persons to participate in an

enterprise—namely, CCC, as identified in the Fourth Superseding Indictment—that would affect

interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity

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thi# Agreement;

The Defendant unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly became a member of

The Defendant or another member of that conspiracy agreed to commit two

or more racketeering acts; and

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The racketeering acts included first degree murder, in violation of Maryland

Penalties

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The maximum penalties provided by statute for the offense to which the Defendant

pleading guilty are as follows:

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Supervised Maximum . Special

Maximum

Minimum

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Statute

Fine

Release

Assessment

Prison

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18U.S.C.

§ 1962(d)

N/A

Life

5 years

$250,000.

$100

Prison: If the Court orders a term of imprisonment, the Bureau of Prisons

has sole discretion to designate the institution at which it will be served.

Supervised Release: If the Court orders a term of supervised release, and

/■^^iDefendant violates the conditions of supervised release, the Court may order the Defendant

^|djned to custody to serve a term of imprisonment as permitted by statute, followed by an

additional term of supervised release.

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Restitution:♦ The Court may order the Defendant to pay restitution pursuant

oidir 18 U-S.C. §§ 3663, 3663A, and 3664.

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Payment: If a fine or restitution is imposed, it shall be payable immediately,

Unless the Court orders otherwise under 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d). The Defendant may be required to

pay interest if the fine is not paid when due.

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Forfeiture: The Court may enter an order of forfeiture of assets directly

. traceable to the offense, substitute assets, and/or a money judgment equal to the value of the

-j- property subject to forfeiture.

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Collection of Debts: If the Court imposes a fine or restitution, this Office’s

Financial Litigation Unit will be responsible for collecting the debt. If the Court establishes a

schedule of payments, the Defendant agrees that: (1) the fUll amount of the fine or restitution is

.nonetheless due and owing immediately; (2) the schedule of payments is merely a minimum

, schedule of payments and not the only method, nor a limitation on the methods, available to the

iltpitgd' States to enforce the judgment; and (3) the United States may fully employ all powers to

c|||4ft ?n the total amount of the debt as provided by law. Until the debt is paid, the Defendant

ag||ss to disclose all assets in which the Defendant has any interest or over which the pefendant

exercises direct or indirect control. Until the money judgment is satisfied, the Defendant

a; -horizes this Office to obtain a credit report in order to evaluate the Defendant’s ability to pay,

o?:i?'to request and review the Defendant’s federal and state income tax returns. The Defendant

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complete and sign a copy of IRS Form 8821 (relating to the voluntary disclosure of

liberal tax return information) and a financial statement in a form provided by this Office.

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Waiver of Rights

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The Defendant understands that, by entering into this Agreement, the Defendant

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■ surrenders certain rights as outlined below:

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If the Defendant had pled not guilty and persisted in that plea, the Defendant

. would have had the right to a speedy jury trial with the close assistance of competent counsel.

■That trial could be conducted by a judge, without a jury, if the Defendant, this Office, and the

Court all agreed.

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If the Defendant elected a jury trial, the jury would be composed of twelve

individuals selected from the community. Counsel and the Defendant would have the opportunity

it(^challenge prospective jurors who demonstrated bias or who were otherwise unqualified, and

would have the opportunity to strike a certain number of jurors peremptorily. All twelve jurors

. ' Would have to agree unanimously before the Defendant could be found guilty of any count. The

jury would be instructed that the Defendant was presumed to be. innocent, and that presumption

' .'cduld be overcome only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

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If the Defendant went to trial, the Government would have the burden of

jlfiimg the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The Defendant would have the right to

. confront and cross-examine the Government’s witnesses. The Defendant would not have to

present any defense witnesses or evidence whatsoever. If the Defendant wanted to call witnesses

defense, however, the Defendant would have the subpoena power of the Court to compel the

• t witnesses to attend.

The Defendant would have the right to testify in the Defendant’s own

defense jf the Defendant so chose, and the Defendant would have the right to refuse to testify. If

theJOefendant chose not to testify, the Court could instruct the jury that they could not draw any

hqvers& inference from the Defendant’s decision not to testify.

.1 ^

r-.

If the Defendant were found guilty after a trial, the Defendant would have

the right to appeal the verdict and the Court’s pretrial and trial decisions on the admissibility of

Evidence to see if any errors were committed which would require a new trial or dismissal of the

qjihrges. By pleading guilty, the Defendant knowingly gives up the right to appeal the verdict and

. tbfyGourt’s decisions.

•'Vr

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v '

By pleading guilty, the Defendant will be giving up all of these rights,

the right, under the limited circumstances set forth in the “Waiver of Appeal” paragraph

bpf\v, tq appeal the sentence. By pleading guilty, the Defendant understands that the Defendant

|ie|i»have to answer the Court’s questions both about the rights being given up and about the facts

;e:C the,, case. Any statements that the Defendant makes during such a hearing would not be

I'iipissible against the Defendant during a trial except in a criminal proceeding for peijury or false

statement

:v.

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If the Court accepts the Defendant’s plea of guilty, the Defendant will be

g.•'Ipjvthg'up the right to file and have the Court rule on pretrial motions, and there will be no further

4f|l: dr proceeding of any kind in the above-referenced criminal case, and the Court will find the

.^pjendant guilty.

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By pleading guilty, the Defendant will also be giving up certain valuable

•/4||vil rights and may be subject to deportation or other loss of immigration status, including possible

denaturalization. The Defendant recognizes that if the Defendant is not a citizen of the United

States,fpr is a naturalized citizen, pleading guilty may have consequences with respect to the

^5efendlmt’s immigration status. Under federal law, conviction for a broad range of crimes can

‘ lead to adverse immigration consequences, including automatic removal from the United States.

Jlemovdls and other immigration consequences are the subject of a separate proceeding, however,

fhd the Defendant understands that no one, including the Defendant’s attorney or the Court, can

; predict with certainty the effect of a conviction on immigration status. The Defendant is not

"relying on any promise or belief about the immigration consequences of pleading guilty. The

^Defendant nevertheless affirms that the Defendant wants to plead guilty regardless of any potential

'immigration consequences.

•

■ /,

■■

•^ *

Advisory Sentencing Guidelines Apply

The Defendant understands that the Court will determine a sentencing guidelines

||bjigeifor this case (henceforth the “advisory guidelines range”) pursuant to the Sentencing Reform

'fpof 1984 at 18 U.S.C. § 3551-3742 (excepting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) and'3742(e)) and

fiiU.S.G. §§ 991- through 998. The Defendant further understands that the Court will impose a

lentence pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act, as excised, and must take into account the

54«yis6ry guidelines range in establishing a reasonable sentence.

■

.....

Factual and Advisory Guidelines Stipulation

•$"“ T v->

This Office and the Defendant stipulate and agree to the Statement of Facts set forth

in Attachment A, which is incorporated by reference herein.

•vO • '•

4W. Mi . *

... ; ~

This Office and the Defendant further agree that, pursuant to United States

.. ^‘eptencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2E1.1, the base offense level is the offense level applicable

fp1 the Underlying racketeering activity.1 The underlying racketeering activities are murder,

attempted murder, armed robbery, and drug possession with the intent to distribute:

• • r;

X Murder (August 19. 2017): Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1, the base

Offense level is 43 because the offense involves first degree murder;

Vyt

X Murder (August 28. 20171: Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A 1.1, the base

ii.

diipjse level is 43 because the offense involves first degree murder;

______ ___________

yfriifsuant to U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1 note 2, if the underlying conduct violates state law, the offense level

cc^re^ponding to the most analogous federal offense is used.

;:0::

Rev. August 2018

'9 ■

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X iii.

Attempt Murder ^December 13. 20171: Pursuant to U.S.S.G.

i ,;§2A2.1, the base offense level is 33 because the offense would have involved first degree murder;

Attempt Murder (August 18. 2018V Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1,

X iv.

'Ufa*?

p^base offense level is 33 because the offense would have involved first degree murder;

- X v.

Murder (August 18. 20181: Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1, the base

^gfensdilevel is 43 because the offense involves first degree murder.

$!: •!*“ |l.,

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*\X vi.

Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute (January 2015

vwouglrMay 2021): Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (a)(5)(c)(5), the base offense level is 30. A 2,1'eybl increase applies pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) because a dangerous weapon was

possessed. The adjusted offense level is 32.

Grouping: Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1, application note 1, the offense

level for each predicate crime must consider the grouping rules under U.S.S.G. Chapter Three.

If one of the predicate crimes group under U.S.S.G. § 3D1 2(d) because offenses that fall under the

|?£A1.1 and § 2B3.1 guidelines are excluded from grouping. However, pursuant to U.S.S.G.

|;3l)l-.4(c), the Group for the attempted murders and drug offense are disregarded because they

1 ‘

’

. " _'ighest

offense level. Each of the murders

gets fine unit'pursuant to 3D 1.4(a), resulting in more than 3 units. As a result, 3 levels are added

tp the group With the highest offense level, resulting in an offense level of 46, pursuant to § 3D1.4.

This Office does not oppose a 2-level reduction in the Defendant’s adjusted

p||fipse level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a) based upon the Defendant’s apparent prompt

-3|&fignifion and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for the Defendant’s criminal

•d’ntSiet. This Office agrees to make a motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (b) for an additional

, |g|Mb1 decrease in recognition of the Defendant’s timely notification of the Defendant’s intention

.fi?enter a plea of guilty. This Office may oppose any adjustment for acceptance of responsibility

under U.S.S.G. § 3El:l(a), and may decline to make a motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), if

tfepeffspdant: (i) fails to. admit each and every item in the factual stipulation; (ii) denies

involvement in the offense; (iii) gives conflicting statements about the Defendant’s involvement

in, the offepse;, (iv) is untruthful with the Court, this Office, or the United States Probation Office;

(v|tfibstructs or attempts to obstruct justice prior to sentencing; (vi) engages in any criminal

conduct between the date of this Agreement and the date of sentencing; (vii) attempts to withdraw

tljfi-plea of guilty; or (viii) violates this Agreement in any way.

ig'.

Pursuant to U.S.S.G. Ch 5, Pt. A, app. noter2Mjecanse the total offense level

Wfiifldbe more than 43, the offense level is treated as

L^q\ f~SZ)

There is no agreement as to the Defendant’s cFuninaTlnstory and the Defendant

understands that the Defendant’s criminal history could alter the Defendant’s offense level.

Specifically, the Defendant understands that the Defendant’s criminal history could alter the final

Qf||p:|e level if the Defendant is determined to be a career offender or if the instant offense was a

pl^bf a pattern of criminal conduct from which the Defendant derived a substantial portion of the

Dfetbndant’s income.

•

R^i kugdk 2018

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Other than as set forth above, no other offense characteristics, sentencing guidelines

*8.

• ^c|ors, potential departures or adjustments set forth in the United States Sentencing Guidelines

v|l§!ift dispute'or will be raised in calculating the advisory guidelines range,

•|||%

...

9;-'

The parties reserve the right to bring to the Court’s attention all information with

‘fflijDect to the Defendant’s background, character, and conduct that the parties deem relevant to

Sentencing, including the conduct that is the subject of any counts of the Third Superseding

' -llfiictmlht.

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Obligation of the Parties

■ P

iO.

At the time of^entencing, this Office agrees that it will not recommend any

jlntence^greater than 24flrmonths’ imprisonment to run concurrent with the Defendant’s

Maryland state sentence in Criminal Case number 118257005. The Defendant is free to

^commend any sentence. This Office and the Defendant further reserve the right to advocate for

* treasonable period of supervised release, and/or fine considering any appropriate factors under 18

tf.S.C. § 3553(a). This Office and the Defendant reserve the right to bring to the Court’s attention

IflTinformation with respect to the Defendant’s background, character, and conduct that this Office

or Ihe Defendant deem relevant to sentencing, including the conduct that is the subject of any

counts of the Indictment. At the time of sentencing, this Office will move to dismiss any open

counts against the Defendant.

Waiver of Appeal

■ISfo

11.

In exchange for the concessions made by this Office and the Defendant in this

Agreement, this Office and the Defendant waive their rights to appeal as follows:

•jit!/' I;

the Defendant knowingly waives all right, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or

•iny other statute or constitutional provision, to appeal the Defendant’s conviction on any ground

whatsoever. This includes a waiver of all right to app^a].jheD^9iL4ant’s_c(^

tethelstatute/sl to which the Defendant is pleading guilty is unconstitutional, or on the ground

thaTthe‘ admitted conduct does not fall within the scope of the statute(s), to the extent that such

f<|i£illenges legally can be waived.

;

The Defendant and this Office knowingly and. expressly waive all rights

'loriferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3742 to appeal whatever sentence is imposed (including any term of

ipnprisonment, fine, term of supervised release, or order of restitution) for any reason (including

(lie ;, establishment of the advisory sentencing guidelines range, the determination of the

Defendant’s criminal history, the weighing of the sentencing factors, and any constitutional

challenges to the calculation and imposition of any term of imprisonment, fine, order of forfeiture,

G£d,fer of restitution, and term or condition of supervised release), except as follows:

■

The Defendant reserves the right to appeal any sentence that exceeds

' M^tatutory maximum; and

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%.y^tigust 2018

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ii.

;• •

This Office reserves the right to appeal any sentence below a

■statutory minimum.

The Defendant waives any and all rights under the Freedom of Information

ttflblating to the investigation and prosecution of the above-captioned matter and agrees not to

ijpby request for documents from this Office or any investigating agency.

' !f|;

Forfeiture

. ....... _ _.12.

The Defendant understands that the Court may enter an Order of Forfeiture as part

■■m.

of 4ie Defendant’s sentence, and that the Order of Forfeiture may include assets directly traceable

tS;;the qffense(s), substitute assets, and/or a money judgment equal to the value of the property

ferivedSom, or otherwise involved in, the offenses.

.r- i .

• 43.. 4 Specifically, but without limitation on the Government’s right to forfeit all property

• ^bjectffo’forfeiture.as permitted by law, the Defendant agrees to forfeit to the United States all of

The Defendant’s right, title, and interest in the following items that the Defendant agrees constitute

5'mpffey,'property, and/or assets derived from or obtained by the Defendant as a result of, or used

fcp facilitate the commission of, the Defendant’s illegal activities.

T.*> , 14.

The Defendant agrees to consent to the entry of orders of forfeiture for the property

^described herein and waives the requirements of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 1 l(b)(l)(J),

f|4Vand 43(a) regarding notice of the forfeiture in the charging instrument, advice regarding

- forfeiture during the change of plea hearing, announcement of the forfeiture at sentencing, and

“ llfedjporation of the forfeiture in the judgment.

15.

The Defendant agrees to assist fully in the forfeiture of the above property. The

'J^endant agrees to disclose all assets and sources of income, to consent to all requests for access

^^information related to assets and income, and to take all steps necessary to pass clear title to the

• ^feited-assets to the United States, including executing all documents necessary to transfer such

assisting in bringing any assets located outside of the United States within the jurisdiction of

tife'Unifed States, and taking whatever steps are necessary to ensure that assets subject to forfeiture

frefinade^ayailable for'forfeiture.

J6. * The Defendant waives all challenges to any forfeiture carried out in accordance

i,tHis Agreement on any grounds, including any and all constitutional, legal, equitable,

jgatutqry, or administrative grounds brought by any means, including through direct appeal, habeas

’ fjbrpUs petition, or civil complaint. The Defendant will not challenge or seek review of any civil

pf administrative forfeiture of any property subject to forfeiture under this Agreement, and will

'ftot assist any third party with any challenge or review or any petition for remission of forfeiture.

Defendant’s Conduct Prior to Sentencing and Breach

Between now and the date of the sentencing, the Defendant will not engage in

'j|jj$T$i#ctthat constitutes obstruction ofjustice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1; will not violate any federal,

Jjfes or local law; .will acknowledge guilt to the probation officer and the Court; will be truthful

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17.

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in-any statement to the Court, this Office, law enforcement agents, and probation officers; will

cooperate in the preparation of the presentence report; and will not move to withdraw from the

plea of guilty or from this Agreement.

J8. , If the Defendant engages in conduct prior to sentencing that violates the above

p|I|raph'of this Agreement, and the Court finds a violation by a preponderance of the evidence,

tjfft: (i) this Office will be free from its obligations under this Agreement; (ii) this Office may

p:tv'i:e sentencing arguments and recommendations different from those set out in this Agreement,

' iferin if the Agreement was reached pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C); and (iii) in any criminal or civil

..f^ceeding, this Office will be free to use against the Defendant all statements made by the

:4|§e'fend^nt and any of the information or materials provided by the Defendant, including

slktegients, information, and materials provided pursuant to this Agreement, and statements made

. luring proceedings before the Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

B-rb.cedure; A determination that this Office is released from its obligations under this Agreement

will not permit the Defendant to withdraw the guilty plea. The Defendant acknowledges that the

• f|eifendant may not withdraw the Defendant’s guilty plea-—even if made pursuant to Rule

JT(c)(l)(C)—if the Court finds that the Defendant breached the Agreement. In that event, neither

Ire Court nor the Government will be bound by the specific sentence or sentencing range agreed

^id;stipulated to herein pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C).

If A

Court Not a Party

19.

The Court is not a party to this Agreement. The sentence to be imposed is within

. ‘4® sole discretion of the Court. The Court is not bound by the Sentencing Guidelines stipulation

Jn-this Agreement. The Court will determine the facts relevant to sentencing. The Court is not

to accept any recommendation or stipulation of the parties. The Court has the power to

flf||pse a sentence up to the maximum penalty allowed by law. If the Court makes sentencing

flings different from those stipulated in this Agreement, or if the Court imposes any sentence up

dfejjhiaximum allowed by statute, the Defendant will remain bound to fulfill all of the obligations

iWger. this Agreement. Neither the prosecutor, defense counsel, nor the Court can make a binding

j:jp3t|icti$n, promise, or representation as to what guidelines range or sentence the Defendant will

flceiye. .The Defendant agrees that no one has made such a binding prediction or promise.

:P!1 ' ■ *’’

ivV-

- . Entire Agreement

S .V;

■ This letter, together with the Sealed Supplement, constitutes the complete plea

.agreement in this case. This letter, together with the Sealed Supplement, supersedes any prior

itflderstandings, promises, or conditions between this Office and the Defendant. There are no other

^gfeements, promises, undertakings, or understandings between the Defendant and this Office

|lher than those set forth in this letter and the Sealed Supplement. No changes to this Agreement

v|i'il be effective unless in writing, signed by all parties and approved by the Court.

Hr' ‘

Rfc-"-; August 2018

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If the Defendant fully accepts each and every term and condition of this Agreement, he

Should sigh the original and return it to me promptly.

IP'.?

Very truly yours,

■ ErekL. BarronUnited States Attorney

•fe•" • /'

• •i

•

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..'

Patricia McLane

Assistant United States Attorney

fh'ave read this Agreement, including the Sealed Supplement, and carefully reviewed every

p|ft of if. I understand it and I voluntarily agree to it. Specifically, I have reviewed the Factual .

; fad Advisory Guidelines Stipulation and I do not wish to change any part of it.

t-r

•

;

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Richard Grier

Date

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ATTACHMENT A

STIPULATION OF FACTS

. The undersigned parties stipulate and agree that if this case had proceeded to trial, this

Office would have proven thefollowingfacts beyond a reasonable doubt. The undersigned parties

ll§f§B,(stipulate and agree that the following facts do not encompass all of the evidence that would

been presented had this matter proceeded to trial.

TTT"

f I* / Cruddy Conniving Crutball or “CCC” is an Enterprise primarily based in east Baltimore

Jitty founded by Gary Creek and others around 2014. The Enterprise’s main purpose was to

.-Ipmmit violent acts to promote the reputation of the Enterprise and to command respect from the

afighborhood. The Defendant, Richard GRIER, is a member of the Enterprise and has been a

member of the Enterprise since at least October 2015. He and other defendants are responsible for

niore than a dozen murders and numerous non-fatal shootings, robberies, and caijackings between

2015 and 2020. Other names for the Enterprise are “SCL” and recently, “TRD”.

i# The Enterprise benefitted financially from, and affected interstate commerce by, selling

ilk

narcotics, murdering drug dealers, taking contract killings, and engaging in street robberies. The

Enterprise also robbed dice games, for cash and occasionally carjacked vehicles. Members of the

fliterprise would divide the proceeds of the robberies and murders among members who

participated, and often contact each other to commit a robbery if that member needed money.

V-

The Enterprise routinely used social media to identify and locate victims, and to

communicate with each other and share information so each member could.be aware of possible

pliaiigitipn.. If a member was arrested, other members of the Enterprise would start new

Ifemunication group chats or threads out of fear of law enforcement finding previous threads

fplfei an arrested member and following other members. The Enterprise also existed to conceal

ftl'lracts.

,.| - f

■ ■

, The Enterprise used at least fourteen firearms to commit crimes, often trading with each

JtjhferfrQr,other groups to avoid detection through ballistic evidence. They limited conversations

aflQjut; criminal plans to members of the Enterprise regardless of the danger such acts posed to

associates. Enterprise members also critiqued each other after committing crimes regarding ways

to improve their actions.

■ b

At least two or more members of the enterprise agreed to commit the following

racketeering acts in furtherance of the Enterprise, which are linked together through cell-site

ilfoipiation, ballistic evidence, witness testimony, and the contents of the Defendant’s and

conspirators’ cellphones and social media accounts. Specifically, to further the Enterprise, the

ifefendant participated in the following events:

■

•

A: "

the murder of Devonte Monroe on August 19, 2017 in the 1700 block of Durham Street.

The firearm that killed Monroe, a Springfield XD-9, 9mm handgun bearing serial number

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I^|g&ugust2018

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'GM714614, was recovered from a vehicle operated by a co-defendant on September 4,

2017;

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•

the murder of Carlos Jones on August 28, 2017, in the 100 block of S. Highland Avenue;

*»

1 • y the attempt murder of A.J. on December 13,2017, in the 1600 block of Cliftview Avenue;

'ify-

the attempt murder of rival gang members, on or about August 18, 2018, in the 2300 block

of Harford* Road in response to the members shooting at a co-defendant’s father who was

•5^1 , shot in the leg that same night; and

fi- F-

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•W-.the murder of Vuai Green on August 18, 2018, in the 2300 block of Harford Road.

■if- ■-

M .In

addition to these violent acts, the Defendant also agrees that he and at least one other

jfifewlbeh of Enterprise agreed to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute controlled

iubstances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and that it was reasonably foreseeable that the

Enterprise would be responsible for possessing with the intent to distribute over 280 grams of

Crack cocaine. Evidence of this agreement includes controlled buys by ATF agents in and around

th# Enterprise's territory; pole camera footage of the drug shop; and social media posts and

messages between the Defendant and other Enterprise members about how to sell drugs, where to

sellilrugs, and what to spend on drugs to make a profit from re-sale.

The Defendant agrees that he knowingly and willfully became a member of the agreement

^participate in the enterprise and that he or another member of the conspiracy agreed to commit

. .two racketeering acts, as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), including the racketeering

acts discussed above. The Defendant also agrees that it was reasonably foreseeable to him that a

victim could be murdered or shot during the course of the conspiracy. The Defendant also admits

t§4t%t was reasonably foreseeable that his co-conspirators would commit other acts that he did not

flipcipate in, including, but not limited to:

ill

On or about October 27, 2015, the murder of Quinton Heard;

'U' V

•

&xv> On or about June 1,2016, the attempted murder of A.F. in the 3200 block of Tivoly Avenue;

A|7

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or about November 19, 2016, the murder of Jamere Ricks in the 1700 block of E. 25th

Street;

* *"

On;;or about June 13, 2017, the murder of Antonio Griffin and Tereze Pinkney and the

fi'y . . attempted murder of C.S. and A.M. in the 1200 block of Bonaparte Avenue;

#f *.

»' On or about August 11, 2017, the murder of Thomas Johnson, a/k/a “Bunchy” in the 4100

block of Chesterfield Avenue;

■ • On or about August 20, 2017, the murder of Allen Rice, a/k/a “Freaky”;

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.'d <»'■.. .

•

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On or about November 26, 2017, the attempted murder of A.H. in the 1600 block of

Cliftview Avenue;

• On or about April 4, 2018, the attempted murder of rival gang members in the 2900 block

of Mayfield Avenue;

•- On or about April 10,2018, the attempted robbery of a dice game in the 1400 block of North

4 • Montford Avenue;

ft#

•

pfP® On or about April 16,2018, the robbery of J. A. in 'which his 2018 Mercedes Benz c300 was

taken in the 2600 block of Reisterstown Road;

•' ' .i •••»;

• On or about April 21, 2018, the murder of Diamante Howard;

;;

* ' On or about April 22, 2018, the attempt murder of M.G. and R.V.;

'.fir ' * ■

v " • OnoraboutApril27,2018,theattemptedmurderofS.J.inthe2200blockofHarfordRoad;

@h ofabout June 9, 2018, the murder of Dwayne Cheeks;

iU.

|| • On or about July 15, 2018, the murder of Joshua Bessick on Eagle Street;

2* ■

IS .

• On or about July 22,2018, the murder of Rashard Queen in the 900 block of 37th Street;

,*'! • On or about August 11, 2018, the attempted murder of K.T. in the 3000 block of Lavender

Avenue;

i p 9° or about August 14,2018, the attempted murder of J.S.;

|||f* On or about August 23, 2018, the attempted murder of D.D. during a dice game in the 1500

block of Madison Avenue;

if r

■jgjfi. • On or about August 25, 2018, the attempted murder of A.L. and C.G. at the.intersection of

'■$f . . St. Patrick Street and Dale Avenue in Baltimore County;

On or about October 10, 2018, the carjacking of K.W. in the 400 block of Cherry Blossom

Place;

<§f|cft- about October 10, 2018, the attempted murder of D.G. in the 3400 block of Miford

’Avenue;

^ • On or about October 11, 2018, the attempted murder of rivals in the 2600 block of Garrison

Avenue;

Rev. August 2018

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i©H or about November 23 , 2018, the murder of Howard. Gibson, a/k/a “Chico”, a member

i of “LTMN” at 3808 Echodale Avenue;

• On or about December 31,2018, the murder of Corey Moseley, in the 4900 block of Green

Rose Lane;

• On or about February 24,2019, the attempted robbery and murder of Q.W. in the 5200 block

of Cedonia Avenue;

On or about March 2, 2019, the attempted murder of Bel Air Road rivals in the 3300 block

of Brendan Avenue;

.$S|:

■J: ~l. •; .On or about April 14, 2019, the attempted murder of rival gang members D.C., E.S., and

• > AJ. in the 3500 block of Pehlam Avenue;

"if .» On or about April 22, 2019, the murder of Larry Matthews in the 1600 block of Cliftview

Avenue;

• On or about July 4, 2019, CCC members carjacked W.J. of his 2003 black Honda Accord

j&ik I® the 3500 block of Shannon Avenue;

■ .jfk”.

•'

• On or about July 4, 2019, CCC members attempted to murder A.C. and D.R. in the 5500

block of Bowley’s Lane;

On or about August 24, 2019, CCC members shot and killed CCC member Avery Rich

during a retaliatory shooting of a rival gang member; .

• On or about October 19,2019, the attempted murder of A.T. during a dice game in the 1900

block, of Hollins Street;

fp|r* On or about March 17, 2020, the attempted murder of T.B., A.V., I.F., J.F., A.O., D.P.,

- 1

G'.M., T.C., T.F., in the 300 block of McMechen Street;

■' • • On or about August 5, 2020, the murder of Donya Short and attempted murder of D.W. in

1% . the 1700 block of McCulloh Street and

■

4f;• On or about October 10, 20202, the murder of Brimar Livingston and the attempted murder

:.f

of C.J. in the 5900 block of Moravia Road.

^heyehi^focurred in the District of Maryland.

it--"

J&%X

Rev.' August 2018

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. <§

;S0 STIPULATED:

v•

Patricia McLane

Assistant United States Attorney

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Richard Grier, Defendant

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Rev. August 2018

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

Cl,

** UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ft.

, RICHARD GRIER,

Defendant.

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CRIMINAL NO. JKB-19-0036

UNDER SEAL

SEALED SUPPLEMENT TO PLEA AGREEMENT

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This is not a cooperation agreement

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Rev. August 2018

SEALED

12/19/22 Hearing

and that the jury may return, a verdict that you are guilty of

some or all of the offenses charged against you for reasons

"Ip tthat I've explained?

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THE DEFENDANT:

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THE COURT:

Yes.

And you're waiving your right to counsel

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aware- of the potential penalties that you face if convicted of

the offenses which include lifetime imprisonment?

THE DEFENDANT:

THE COURT:

Yes.

And in light of all this, I urge you to

reconsider your decision to waive your right to counsel and to

proceed pro se but, again, the choice is yours.

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So do you wish to waive your right to counsel and

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^represent yourself from this point forward in this criminal

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case?

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THE DEFENDANT:

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THE COURT:

Yes.

Was there anything else, Ms. McLane, that

17- |V you wanted the Court to cover with Mr. Grier before we proceed?

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No.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

.Okay.

Mr..Purpura, did you have anything

MR. PURPURA:

No.

r to add?

THE COURT:

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MS. MCLANE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

So I'll enter an order permitting

Mr. Purpura to be excused from- this matter and then from this

point forward, Mr. Grier will represent himself pro se.

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Ms. McLane, is there anything else for us to cover

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Patricia G. Mitchell, RMR, CRR

Federal Official Court Reporter

SEALED

MCLANE:

12/19/22’Hearing

The only thing that occurs to me is in

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of discovery, but I guess we'll maybe bring that up with

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Judge Bredar in terms of his access to it. Obviously, there's

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5* a lot of witnesses and safety concerns in terms of that.

THE- COURT:

Right.

But I understand that Jencks

vqky U''disclosure is at some point much closer in time to the trial in

b,?4 , this case?

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MS. MCLANE:

Yes, it is.

THE COURT:

Yeah, I would encourage you to have

■ .dialogue with Judge Bredar.

I'll also let him know the outcome

■of this proceeding, so he'll know to expect to hear from you.

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MS. MCLANE:

Great.

THE■COURT:

Anything else, Mr. Purpura?

Thank you, Your Honor.

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THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Grier.

THE CLERK:

All rise --

No, thank you, Your Honor.

Good luck to

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THE DEFENDANT:

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THE COURT:

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So you'll hear about it.

This Honorable Court now stands’

adjourned.

(Proceedings concluded at 1:07 p.m.)

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That's something that's going to have to

be taken up by .the trial judge.

THE CLERK:

How am I going to get my discovery?

Patricia G. Mitchell, RMR, CRR

.M- .

Federal Official Court Reporter

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

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:.4:E[INITED STATES OF AMERICA

Appellate No.: 23-4027

District No.: JKB-19-0036

tRICHARD GRIER

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RESPONSE TO APPELLANT’S PRO SE MOTION TO SELF-REPRESENT

Now Comes, Christopher J. Purpura, as appointed counsel for Appellant herein, and in

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: - itisponse to Appellant’s Pro Se Motion to Self-Represent (ECF Doc. 5) respectfully requests that

Sthis'Honorable Court allow the Appellant to appear Pro Se, appoint substitute counsel, or appoint

^substitute standby counsel, and in support thereof does state:

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• if .1. That the Appellant, Richard Grier, has filed a motion titled Pro Se Appellant’s Entry

I tf. ,Of Appearance, which was docketed on February 1, 2023, as. ECF Doc. 5.

In said

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'My”.

;■ motion Mr. Grier indicates that “any representation by him (undersigned counsel)

would prejudice Appellant’s claim(s).” This seems to suggest that Mr. Grier intends

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to challenge the voluntariness of his plea, competency of counsel’s representation,

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and/or other ineffective assistance of counsel claims before this Court.

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2- That undersigned counsel was appointed to represent Mr. Grier in the United States

District Court for the District of Maryland beginning in 2019.

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■ 3. That Mr. Grier filed a similar request to represent himself before the District Court,

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which resulted in the Court scheduling an attorney inquiry or hearing on counsel before

a Magistrate Judge of the District Court.

This hearing was held on December 19,

^2022, at which time Mr. Grier indicated to the Court that he wished to represent himself.

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4. That Court scheduled a second hearing for January 6, 2023, with the purpose of

addressing potential discovery issues and to conduct a Lafler Hearing.

That, after the

hearing, Mr. Grier asked to speak with Government Counsel about an amended plea

offer, that if approved, he would accept. Undersigned counsel was present and acting

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as standby counsel at this time.

5. That the amended offer was approved and the parties were able to schedule a Rule 11

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proceeding before Chief Judge of the District Court James K. Bredar. At the Rule 11

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proceeding Mr. Grier agreed to allow undersigned counsel to assist in the proceeding

as counsel of record.

The plea was accepted and the Court allowed the parties to

proceed directly to sentencing at which Mr. Grier received the sentence he negotiated.

6. That Mr. Grier filed a Pro Se Notice of Appeal.

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7. That based upon the foregoing there are significant issues with undersigned counsel’s

continued representation of the Appellant and substitute counsel be permitted to assist

i&. IVIr. Grier with his claims.

Wherefore, it is respectfully requested that undersigned counsel’s appearance be

withdrawn and that substitute counsel be appointed to assist Mr. Grier in his pro se representation.

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Respectfully submitted,

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/s/

Christopher J. Purpura

Purpura & Purpura

8 E. Mulberry Street

Baltimore, Maryland 21202

(410) 410-727-8550

Fed Bar # 27237

Counsel of Record/CJA Counsel

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on or before this 8th day of February, a copy of the foregoing

was delivered to counsel for the Government via ECF and with a copy mailed to the Appellant

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Richard Grier, #474750, North Branch Correctional Institution, 14100 McMullen Highway S.W.,

• Cumberland, Maryland 21502

/s/

Christopher J. Purpura

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Case l:19-cr-00036-JKB Document 988 Filed 10/19/22 Page 1 of 1

f/s

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

ImiTED STATES OF AMERICA ■

CRIMINAL NO. JKB-I9-0O36

Richard grier

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Defendant

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ORDER

Now pending before the Court is Defendant Richard Grier’s Motion to Compel Attorney

oduce Client s File (ECF No. 830) and Motion to Receive Discovery Files (ECF No. 768).

Defendant is currently represented by counsel. The Court does not permit ‘‘hybrid”

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i .presentation wherein a defendant is represented partially by himself and partially by an

appointed attorney, it’s either one or the other. At this point, Mr. Grier has elected to be

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represented by counsel. Accordingly, any motions or request that he wishes to make must be

P&fcoUedrtd, the Court only by his counsel. The Motions now before the Court {ECF Nos. 830,

7f?) are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

. DATED this

_ day of October, 2022.

"BY THE COURT:

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James K. Bredar

Chief Judge

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APPJt

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

ifNifED STATES OF AMERICA

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ilCHARD GRIER

* Criminal No. CCB-19-003 6

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ORDER

Pefendant ^c^ard Grier has filed on his own behalf a motion for dismissal (ECF 757).

Mr. Grier is represented by appointed counsel, who will be responsible for filing any appropriate

motions within the time to be set by the court. Accordingly, Mr. Grier’s current motion is

Denied.

So ORDERED this

29th day of November 2021.

M ■

/S/

Catherine C. Blake

United States District Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.