Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Tahina Corcoran, as next friend on behalf of Joseph E. Corcoran, Petitioner v. Ron Neal, Warden
Supreme Court briefDec 17, 2024
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**THIS IS A CAPITAL CASE**
EXECUTION SET FOR
December 18, 2024 (from 12:01 am until Sunrise CST)
No. _______
_________________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________________________________
TAHINA CORCORAN, next friend for JOSEPH E. CORCORAN, Petitioner,
v.
RON NEAL,
Warden, Indiana State Prison, Respondent.
_________________________________________
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
_________________________________________
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
_________________________________________
LAURENCE E. KOMP,* MO. Bar #40446
MICHELLE M. LAW, MO. Bar #45487
FAITH J. TAN, IL. Bar #6342729
Capital Habeas Unit
Federal Public Defender
Western District of Missouri
1000 Walnut St., Ste. 600
Kansas City, MO 64106
(816) 675-0923
laurence_komp@fd.org
michelle_law@fd.org
faith_tan@fd.org
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER
*Counsel of Record, Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court
i
CAPITAL CASE
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Every day, Mr. Corcoran is tormented by the guards at the Indiana State
Prison. The guards use an ultrasound machine they keep somewhere in the prison to
send out ultrasonic waves that torture Mr. Corcoran, telling him what to do and
inflicting excruciating pain. He suffers from a sleep and speech disorder that makes
him involuntarily talk out loud and reveal his innermost thoughts—which led to him
refusing the State’s offer of life sentences because they would not sever his vocal cords
to prevent this from happening. People retaliate against him when they hear his
private thoughts. He can hear them talking about him through the walls of his prison
cell. Of course, the ultrasound machine and the sleep and speech disorder are his
delusions. But the torture and the disorder have plagued Mr. Corcoran for the better
part of three decades. He attested he wants to escape prison and this torture, and
recently published a book about it. Testifying experts presented at a competency
hearing all found him to be irrational and incompetent with one noting Mr. Corcoran
would rather die than reveal his mental illness.
This case presents the following questions:
1. May a state court dispose of an evidentiarily-supported incompetency to be
executed claim under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and Panetti
v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 903 (2007), because the state court found the
condemned competent 20 years ago under the Dusky v. United States, 362
U.S. 402 (1960), and Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966)?
2. Does a state court violate the due process principles of Panetti when
it relies on evidence to find the condemned competent without
providing an adequate means for the condemned to submit
psychiatric evidence contextualizing or rebutting that evidence?
3. Can the Seventh Circuit constrain this Court’s holding in Brumfield
v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305 (2015), which endorsed that a federal court
assessing the weight a state court provided certain evidence may be
properly made under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)?
ii
LIST OF PARTIES AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Joseph Corcoran, in the person of his next-friend, Tahina Corcoran, is the
petitioner in this case and was represented in the court below by the Capital Habeas
Unit of the Federal Defender’s Office for the Western District of Missouri.
Ron Neal, Warden of the Indiana State Prison, is the Respondent. He was
represented in the court below by Assistant Indiana Attorney General Tyler Banks.
Pursuant to Rule 29.6, no parties are corporations.
iii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
United States Supreme Court:
Corcoran v. Neal, No. 22-5542 (Mar. 28, 2016) (cert denied from § 2254
proceedings)
Wilson v. Corcoran, No. 91-10 (Nov. 8, 2010) (cert granted from § 2254
proceedings)
Corcoran v. Levenhagen, No. 08-10495 (Oct. 8, 2009) (cert granted from §
2254 proceedings)
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit:
Corcoran v. Wilson, No. 08-2093 & 07-2182 (Dec. 31, 2008; June. 23, 2022,)
(§2254 proceeding)
Corcoran v. Neal, No. 13-1318 (Apr. 15, 2015) (§2254 proceeding)
Corcoran v. Neal, No. 24-3259 (Dec. 16, 2024) (§2254 Ford proceeding)
United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana:
Corcoran v. Wilson, 3:05-cv-389 (Apr. 9, 2007; Jan. 10, 2013) (§ 2254
proceeding)
Corcoran v. Neal, 3:24-cv-970 (Dec. 13, 2024) (§2254 Ford proceeding)
Supreme Court of Indiana:
Corcoran v. State, No. 02S00-9805-DP-293 (Dec. 6, 2000; Sep. 5, 2002) (direct
appeals)
Corcoran v. State, No. 02S00-0304-PD-00143 (Jan. 11, 2005) (post-conviction
appeal)
Corcoran v. State, No. 02S00-0508-PD-350 (Apr. 18, 2006) (post-conviction
appeal)
In re Corcoran, No. 02S00-0508-PD-350, 24S-SD-222 (Dec. 10, 2024) (Ford
proceeding)
Circuit Court of Allen County, Indiana:
State v. Corcoran, No. 02D04-9707-CF-465 (1997) (trial)
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ................................................................... ii
LIST OF PARTIES AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .................... iii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS......................................................................................... iv
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ................................................................... 7
OPINION BELOW......................................................................................................... 7
JURISDICTION............................................................................................................. 7
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED ....................... 8
STATEMENT OF THE CASE....................................................................................... 9
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .................................................................. 28
I.
This Court should hear this case because reasonable jurists could conclude and
have concluded that the significant evidence of Mr. Corcoran’s longstanding
schizophrenia satisfies the Panetti and Madison standards of incompetency –
standards that have never been applied. (Questions 1 & 2)............................29
II.
This Court should hear this case to ensure compliance with this Court’s
precedent regarding evidentiary weight under § 2254(d)................................... 38
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 41
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIESCases
Allen v. Stephan, 42 F.4th 223 (4th Cir. 2022). ............................................................................... 38
Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305 (2015). ........................................................................................ ii, 37
Chestnut v. Allen, 143 S. Ct. 2517 (2023). ........................................................................................ 38
Corcoran v. Buss, 551 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2008). .................................................................. 23, 24, 29
Corcoran v. Neal, 783 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2015). .............................................................................. 37
Corcoran v. State, 820 N.E.2d 655 (Ind. 2005). ............................................................................... 22
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975). ............................................................................................ 32
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). .............................................................................. ii, 25
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). ......................................................................... ii, 24, 33, 35
Gage v. Richardson, 978 F.3d 522 (7th Cir. 2020). ......................................................................... 37
Lopez v. Smith, 574 U.S. 1 (2014). ...................................................................................................... 37
Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 265 (2019). ................................................................................. 24, 28
McManus v. Neal, 779 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2015). ............................................................................. 37
Newman v. Harrington, 726 F.3d 921 (7th Cir. 2013). .................................................................. 38
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 903 (2007). ................................ ii, 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). .............................................................................................. 32
Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966). .............................................................................................. ii, 25
Sarausad v. Porter, 479 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2007)............................................................................ 38
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007)........................................................................................ 38
Smith v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1264 (Ind. 1997). ................................................................................... 26
Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179 (2009)................................................................................. 38
Winston v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2010)................................................................................ 38
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). ................................................................................................................ ii, 37, 38
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). ........................................................................................................................... 37
vi
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner Tahina Corcoran, as next friend on behalf of Jospeh Corcoran,
respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the 2-1 decision of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals entered on December 16, 2024. Appendix at p. 69a-78a.
OPINIONS BELOW
On December 16, 2024, the Seventh Circuit issued a 2-1 opinion denying a stay
and a Ford/Panetti claim. The opinion is to be published and appears in the Appendix
at p. 69a-78a. A December 17, 2024 Seventh Circuit order denying rehearing en banc
is unpublished and appears in the Appendix at p. 109a. A December 13, 2024 opinion
and order from the Northern District of Indiana is unpublished and appears in the
Appendix at p. 38a-68a. The December 10, 2024 Indiana Supreme Court majority and
dissenting opinions denying a stay and the Ford/Panetti claim is to be published and
appears in the Appendix at p. 2a-37a. The December 5, 2024 Indiana Supreme Court
order denying a stay and the Ford/Panetti claim is to be unpublished and appears in
the Appendix at p. 1a.
JURISDICTION
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals entered judgment on December 16,
2024 and denied rehearing en banc on December 17, 2024. Apx. 109a. This Court
has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). This petition is timely under Rule 13.1.
7
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Eighth Amendment of the United Stated Constitution states, “Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United Stated Constitution states in
relevant part, “nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”
It also involves 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which states in relevant part:
(d)An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1)resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2)resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
8
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Long History of Mental Illness – the State concedes seriously mentally ill
On July 26, 1997, a tragedy unfolded when Mr. Corcoran thought people were
talking about him. They weren’t, it was only something he believed due to his
auditory hallucinations. When he confronted them with a weapon, his brother Jim
Corcoran, their sister’s fiancé, Scott Turner, and two of Jim’s friends, Timothy Bricker
and Doug Stillwell, lay dead.
The State of Indiana charged Mr. Corcoran with four counts of murder on July
31, 1997. R. 29-36. Prior to trial, Mr. Corcoran rejected a plea offer for life without
parole—a plea offer the prosecutor left open for acceptance until the very day the trial
began. Mr. Corcoran’s reason for rejecting the plea reveals the extent to which his
mental illness controls him; Mr. Corcoran agreed to accept the plea offer to save his
life only if he could have his vocal cords severed, and which he insisted had to be done
before he came to court to accept the plea. T. 2773.
On May 22, 1999, a jury found Mr. Corcoran guilty of four counts of murder,
and on May 25, 1999, recommended a sentence of death on each count. The trial court
sentenced Mr. Corcoran to death and improperly castigated Mr. Corcoran accusing:
“It’s shameful that you would come into this court, Mr. Corcoran, and try to
characterize your illness as a mental illness to the disrespect of all people in this
country that are in fact mentally ill.” T. 2909.
Mr. Corcoran has consistently been diagnosed with severe mental illness, and
the symptoms and manifestations long predate his 1999 trial. As early as 1992, Mr.
9
Corcoran had already been diagnosed with major depression and schizoid personality
disorder. See, e.g., R. 2607; SR 38 (Def’s Pre-Sent. Memo, Ex. A p. 4). Friends and
neighbors noted his odd behaviors. PC Comp. Tr. at 79, Defense Ex. V ¶ 4 (Russell
Branning Affidavit) (responding/conversing with people not there); PC Comp. Tr. at
78-79, Defense Ex. U ¶ 7 (Jaynee Buss Affidavit) (always insisting he could hear
people talking about him).
Despite clear warnings that Mr. Corcoran was suffering from mental illness,
Mr. Corcoran did not receive mental health services or treatment until he was already
in prison for the current offense. T. 2683-84 (Mr. Corcoran’s prior trial lawyers from
his 1992 trial never told his family about the extent of his mental illness, but if they
had, the family would have pursued treatment).
The crime itself is a result of his mental illness. It was an irrational reaction
to words not actually spoken.—a tragedy driven by the untreated mental illness.
During trial, Mr. Corcoran determinedly attempted to minimize and conceal
his delusions and hallucinations. Dr. Philip Coons, M.D., testified at sentencing that
this was expected: “the person with paranoid schizophrenia generally minimizes their
symptoms and doesn’t bring attention to them . . . unless you know what doors to
open, what question to ask, you may well miss it because they keep it to themselves.
And that was true of Mr. Corcoran. Had I not known about some kind of sleep
problem, I don’t think I would have uncovered this delusional system.” T. 2706.
Another expert, Dr. Eric Engum, a neuropsychologist, also testified during the
10
penalty phase that Mr. Corcoran was “trying to mask it. He’s trying to hide it. He’s
very secretive, again consistent with paranoia and suspiciousness.” Id. at 2318.
Dr. Coons testified that at the time of the 1997 murders, Mr. Corcoran was
suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. Id. at 2729. Dr. Coons and another mental
health experts believed Mr. Corcoran’s was not competent to stand trial because his
mental illness rendered him incapable of assisting counsel in his own defense. Dr.
Coons explained that Mr. Corcoran’s “refusal to accept either a plea bargain or a
bench trial without the death penalty was a product of his mental illness.” SR 78
(Def.’s Pre-Sent. Memo, Ex. C p. 11). Dr. Larry Davis agreed. SR 99-100 (Def.’s PreSent. Memo, Ex. D p. 6-7) (“I believe his underlying psychosis and associated illogic
rendered him incompetent, specifically to work effectively with his own defense
attorney in his defense.”). Trial counsel have recently signed affidavits asserting that
had they fully understood the extent of Mr. Corcoran’s mental illness, and had they
realized how his mental illness prevented them from “consulting with Corcoran in a
rational or logical manner,” they would have requested a competency hearing. Doc.
1-1 (Attachment I (Affidavit of Mark Thoma); Attachment J (Affidavit of John
Nimmo)). But trial counsel did not have this understanding, and the trial proceeded,
even though Mr. Corcoran was so mentally ill that he could not assist in his own
defense to save his life.
At sentencing, Mr. Corcoran revealed his delusion involving a nonexistent
sleep disorder, which he continues to believe he suffers from to this day. The trial
11
court asked Mr. Corcoran about his trial counsel. Mr. Corcoran was unhappy with
their performance and felt they had not assisted him properly:
THE COURT: Is there anything you feel your attorneys have failed to
do in representing you?
THE DEFENDANT: Um, I feel that they’ve failed to get me treatment
for my sleeping disorder. Other than that, no.
THE COURT: You feel they have failed to treat you for what, sir?
THE DEFENDANT: My sleeping disorder.
THE COURT: All right. And what is it that you expected your attorneys
to do for your sleeping disorder, Mr. Corcoran?
THE DEFENDANT: Simply give me a court order so that I could go to a
sleeping disorder clinic.
Id. at 2587-88.
Mr. Corcoran has no grasp on reality and has been living in a fully delusional
world for decades. At the time of the crime and prior to the trial, Mr. Corcoran’s every
decision, and indeed his every thought, was through the lens of his delusional world
and influenced by his hallucinations. He should never have been allowed to stand
trial—he was incompetent because he could not rationally and realistically assist
counsel in defense of his life. His attorneys, however, realized this too late to save
him. Mr. Corcoran was convicted and sentenced to death despite his incompetence
and mental illness, which continued over the next two decades.
At the 2003 post-conviction competency hearing, three mental health experts
examined Mr. Corcoran and unanimously opined he was incompetent to waive his
appeals: Dr. George Parker (a board-certified forensic psychiatrist), Dr. Robert
Kaplan (a clinical psychologist), and Dr. Edmund Haskins (a neuropsychologist). PC
Comp. T. 13, 59, 66. All three experts diagnosed Mr. Corcoran with paranoid
schizophrenia, id. at 11, 48, 66, and all three testified that Mr. Corcoran was not
12
engaging in rational decision-making, but rather, had decided to not pursue state
post-conviction review on the basis of his delusion that the prison was torturing him
with an ultrasound machine. Id. at 14, 53, 66-67.
Dr. Parker testified that Mr. Corcoran experienced delusions and auditory
hallucinations and had negative symptoms of schizophrenia, leading Parker to render
a paranoid schizophrenia diagnosis. Id. at 47-48. He explained that Mr. Corcoran
believes that the prison’s ultrasound machine tortures him with sounds and causes
physical symptoms. Id. at 50. Mr. Corcoran believes that the machine both projects
sounds that he hears and records his thoughts and projects those throughout the
prison. Id. at 51. He believes he can hear people talking about him through the walls
of his prison cell. Id. Dr. Parker also explained that Mr. Corcoran holds the delusional
belief that he “speaks in his sleep and says embarrassing or provocative things that
make people act in strange ways or perhaps hostile ways toward him. When that
delusion is more intensive, he begins to believe that he . . . while awake . . . is
essentially asleep and speaking involuntarily.” Id. at 29.
Dr. Parker determined that these delusions and hallucinations prevented Mr.
Corcoran from making rational decisions about whether to proceed with his appeals.
Id. at 53. Dr. Parker noted that while Mr. Corcoran did recognize that he faced
difficulties, Mr. Corcoran believed they were due “to some physical disorder” and that
he “truly believe[d]” that there was an ultrasound machine in the prison. Id. at 58.
Dr. Parker testified, “[y]ou don’t break though that illogic. That is the nature of the
delusion. You can’t convince the person otherwise.” Id. at 58.
13
Dr. Kaplan characterized Mr. Corcoran’s paranoid schizophrenia as a “severe
mental illness” after reviewing Mr. Corcoran’s records and conducting a clinical
interview and psychological testing. Id. at 9, 11, 16-17 (“[Dr. Kaplan] He is suffering
from a very severe mental disease and defect. [Defense Counsel] What mental disease
is that? [Dr. Kaplan] Paranoid schizophrenia.”). Dr. Kaplan explained:
[H]e has, -- he has a psychosis which is paranoid schizophrenia that is
leading him to believe that, you know, one of the reasons that he wants
to die is because he doesn’t want to continue to suffer with this speech
disorder that he really doesn’t have. And another reason he wants to die
is because he doesn’t want to continue to be a victim of the guards’
ultrasound machine. And that is a highly bizarre belief that it is not
likely to be in existence either.
Id. at 14. Accordingly, Mr. Corcoran did not have the capacity to make a rational
decision.
Dr. Kaplan affirmed that Mr. Corcoran’s “paranoid schizophrenia is creating a
reality in his mind that doesn’t exist, and on the basis of the reality that doesn’t exist,
he is making decisions about whether he wishes to proceed with his defense against
the death penalty or not.” Id. at 17. When Dr. Kaplan administered the MacArthur
Competency Assessment to Mr. Corcoran, it indicated that Mr. Corcoran had a
“barely adequate understanding of . . . and ability to determine what facts were
relevant versus what facts were irrelevant to present to his own Counsel.” Id. at 20.
This was evidenced by Mr. Corcoran’s total inability to think of a single piece of
information that would be needed to make a decision on whether to hypothetically
plead guilty; yet, he would advise such a person to plead guilty. Id. at 20. Notably,
this is “exactly the opposite of what he did in the previous instance.” Id. at 20. In
14
making a critical decision literally about his life, Mr. Corcoran could not conceive of
even one relevant thing he needed to know or consider when making that decision.
Id. at 20-21. Dr. Kaplan repeated on cross that, “for a psychotic reason he told me he
didn’t want to go on with these proceedings. . . .” Id. at 31. As Dr. Kaplan stated
succinctly, Mr. Corcoran “can’t even conceive of reality as a normal person would,”
and “can’t think straight [and] can’t reason logically.” Id. at 32.
Dr. Kaplan testified that while medications might help Mr. Corcoran, they only
have a “variable effect,” and even while medicated, Mr. Corcoran was still paranoid
and experiencing delusions. Id. at 34 (“But, it didn’t appear that any time he was not
paranoid or not delusional.”). In other words, while medications might temporarily
diminish the manifestations of Mr. Corcoran’s mental illness, they do not control or
eliminate them, and he is always suffering some level of delusions and hallucinations.
Finally, Dr. Haskins confirmed that Mr. Corcoran suffers from paranoid
schizophrenia with delusions. Id. at 66. Dr. Haskins described how Mr. Corcoran
suffers from two recurrent delusions: “one, involving the notion that he has, um,
involuntary speech, and the other one involving the notion that the guards in the
prison have an ultrasound machine that they are using to torment him. On both
counts, I believe that this indicates paranoid schizophrenia.” Id.
Dr. Haskins opined that Mr. Corcoran’s “psychoses do not permit him to reason
and make a reasoned decision.” Id. at 67. Dr. Haskins affirmed that Corcoran was
desperate to escape the pain his delusions inflicted upon him. Id. at 68 (“. . . he wants
to escape in whatever way he can. And the only way open to him, is to bring about
15
his own death.”); id. at 69-70 (“wanting to choose the only option that is going to bring
him what he perceives, as being relief, which is his own death.”). Additionally, Dr.
Haskins noticed “the very strong feeling [Mr. Corcoran] was attempting to minimize
the severity of his underlying psychosis.” Id. at 71.
All three experts agreed that Mr. Corcoran’s serious paranoid schizophrenia
prevents him from making rational decisions. Dr. Kaplan testified that Mr.
Corcoran’s decision to waive his appeals was not rational because it was made on “the
basis of a reality that doesn’t exist.” Id. at 17. Dr. Parker testified similarly, stating
that Mr. Corcoran is unable to make a rational decision because his schizophrenia
has “a direct bearing on his thought process” and his delusions are the reason he
wants to be executed. Id. at 55. Dr. Haskins explained that Mr. Corcoran’s “psychoses
do not permit him to reason and make a reasoned decision in that way.” Id. at 67.
All three experts also testified that Mr. Corcoran could not rationally consult
with his counsel. Dr. Parker testified that because of the way Mr. Corcoran
experiences life, “with its delusions and hallucinations and negative symptoms of
schizophrenia, he is unable to process what, for most people would be reasonable
advice regarding his legal proceedings.” Id. at 59. Dr. Haskins noted this
uncooperativeness is not a choice, but a result of his mental illness and “the psychotic
perception that he is being tormented and has this illness.” Id. at 70.
All three experts also testified that Mr. Corcoran wants to be executed because
he wants to be relieved of the pain he experiences from his delusions and
hallucinations, including the “pain and suffering of his involuntary speech disorder
16
which really doesn’t exist.” Id. at 19, 55, 68. Furthermore, all three experts agreed
that after specifically testing for it, Mr. Corcoran was not malingering or feigning his
symptoms. Id. at 28, 56, 68, 71. Medical records from the Indiana Department of
Correction noted that Mr. Corcoran’s “current accepted diagnosis” was schizophrenia.
Id. at 44.
The State agreed Mr. Corcoran is mentally ill and presented no experts or
evidence to contest Drs. Kaplan, Parker, or Haskins’ diagnosis or conclusions as to
Mr. Corcoran’s detachment from reality. The state trial court noted the same:
•
“The State concedes that Petitioner is mentally ill.” PC R. 242;
•
“The State of Indiana has conceded that the Defendant suffers from
mental illness, and I think that is probably a wise concession,
gentlemen, as the evidence that was presented at the competency
hearing as well as the evidence presented at Mr. Corcoran’s trial was
that he suffers from a mental disease or defect of mental illness.” PC
Comp. Dec. Tr. at 4.
Mr. Corcoran remains compromised. Mr. Corcoran’s paranoid schizophrenia, his
delusions, and the pain he suffers as a result have persisted in the two decades since
his post-conviction competency hearing.
Now in 2024, Mr. Corcoran continues to suffer the debilitating symptoms of his
paranoid schizophrenia. As he has for over twenty years, he experiences auditory
hallucinations, psychosis, and the ever-present delusions regarding the ultrasound
machine he believes the prison guards are torturing him with and his sleep disorder.
Although for over two decades, the Indiana Department of Correction has attempted
medicating him with a myriad of psychotropic drugs, including Geodon, Haldol,
Navane, and Cogentin, Mr. Corcoran’s illness has proven to be resistant to treatment,
17
and nothing during his incarceration has cured him of his paranoid schizophrenia. As
recently as March 1, 2024, treating correctional personnel recorded:
Patient then began sharing information about what he believes to be an
ultrasonic machine here at [Indiana State Prison] that can control his
and other’s thoughts, sleep, voice, etc. Patient reports it is ‘top secret’
but it bothers him ‘endlessly all day.’ Patient reports the machine does
put him to sleep at night. Patient stated ‘others think I’m delusional but
I know its here.’ Writer inquired if patient ever recognizes his own
thoughts as delusional, patient avoided the question. . . . Patient denies
MH symptoms and the expressed delusions are the only observable
concern.
Doc. 1-1 (Attachment K (Excerpt of Correction medical records).
Furthermore, just months after the department noted Mr. Corcoran’s
delusions about the ultrasonic machine, Mr. Corcoran published a book titled,
Electronic Harassment: A Whistle-blower Report, and appears in the Appendix at p.
78a-110a. The book provides a glimpse into Mr. Corcoran’s recurring thoughts and
beliefs—and into his continuing delusion. In his book, he writes about his reality:
•
“My goal is to arm people with what victimizers do not want their victims to know:
THE TRUTH.” Apx. 87a;
•
“…that people can be surveilled anywhere, in any place, and from great distances
from a device that sits on a desk.” Apx. 92a;
•
“The answer is that I want to show that what I am describing is not a nut job
conspiracy theory, but is basic electronics… .” Id.;
•
“I suspect that many credentialled MDs do not even know about this phenomenon.
The reason why they likely do not know is because it is undetectable by unaided
observation. No one by simply talking to an individual, looking at them or even
listening to them is able to tell if a person’s throat vibrates when they think. In fact,
it is so faint that it cannot even be felt. For all practical purposes it is undetectable
and would not be an issue unless…” Id.;
•
“So, in essence, a small percentage of people are susceptible to ultrasound
surveillance; someone with one of those devices can pretty much listen to them think.”
Apx. 93a;
18
•
“The same ultrasonic signal that captures audible sounds by modulation can be used
to send audible sound. Furthermore, the modulating signal can also send an electronic
charge.” Id.;
•
“So think of the possibilities with such equipment – and the enormous potential for
abuse! With it an operator could send a quiet voice into someone’s head and make
them think that they are thinking the thought…” Id.;
•
“Or maybe something extremely bad: a screaming, demonic voice in their head that
only they can hear (aside from the operator talking into the box) that tells them to kill
people.” Apx. 93a-94a;
•
“The device can easily be used to make someone seriously paranoid…A person
susceptible to ultrasonic surveillance would be the easiest to make paranoid. Since an
individual can tell what the individual is thinking it would be easy to cause them to
believe false things.” Apx. 94a;
•
“Therefore, using electricity to activate bodily processes is not limited to muscle
movements and sleep cycles. Let’s say, therefore, that there is an unfortunate man
who some bad actor wants to wake up, make stand on his feet, run to a wall, and then
pound on it angrily with a closed fist. After this the bad actor wants the poor man to
feel dizzy, confused and then vomit.” Apx. 95a;
•
“So let’s return to the unfortunate man. To wake him up, delivering an electrostatic
charge to his midbrain via a modulating ultrasonic frequency will do the trick. To
make him stand up, run to the wall, make a fist, and pound on it repeatedly you would
simply target the right muscles, in the right order with the proper electrostatic
charges. Obviously a cascade of functions must be done to accomplish this, which is
very easily done electronically (i.e., a multitude of calculations per second). To make
him angry an electrostatic charge can be delivered to the amygdala. To then make
him dizzy simply target the vestibular apparatus within his inner ear. The prefrontal
cortex would be targeted next to make him confused. For vomit you need only to target
the correct places in the stomach, esophagus, and mouth — being dizzy would also
help the matter. To some people all of this sounds like science fiction. Unfortunately
it is not; it is basic electronics and basic physiology.” Apx. 96a;
•
“They can spy on people and deceive people virtually unnoticed. Moreover, they can
abuse people with anonymity and virtual impunity.” Id.;
•
“[I]t is apparent to me that correctional staff and other individuals and/or agencies
use ultrasonic surveillance devices on susceptible people for sport. However, the fact
that institutions keep their possession of such equipment confidential would make it
extremely difficult for those abused to expose the abuse.” Apx. 97a;
•
“In essence, they would treat the poor soul like a video game avatar rather than a real
person whose life is going to be adversely affected by the nonsense they are afflicting
the victim with.” Apx. 98a;
19
•
“And when you research and find inaccurate information that confirms the
victimizers' deception, and you then put stock in it, it frankly makes you look like a
mental case. Their goal is accomplished. They have a completely plausible cover for
their wrongdoing.” Id.;
•
“The ignorance on the part of mental health professionals about this technology is
taken advantage of by victimizers. If a credentialled medical person says a man is
mentally ill, but he says that he is the victim of electronic harassment, who would
people be more likely to believe? So because of this the victimizer's cover is now
seemingly backed up by medical science….Because of this they will likely be oblivious
to the fact that mental illness can be mimicked electronically.” Apx. 99a;
•
“I recently discovered, by an experiment performed on me, how this is done. Someone
need only to use the device to cause you to scratch yourself in your sleep. If done
correctly you get the equivalent of a rug burn. As I write this I have a burn on my arm
from this method that has been there for over a month.” Apx. 99a-100a;
•
“No one should be forced to live with an electronically simulated mental illness, such
as Tourette’s, tics, auditor- hallucinations, pain, anger, or a host of other abuses.” Apx.
100a.
In short, Mr. Corcoran’s longstanding and documented mental illness
continues to torment him as it did at the time of the 1997 offense. He is completely
unable to think rationally and has no grasp of reality.
Mr. Corcoran sent an affidavit to the Indiana Supreme Court on November 22,
2024, which the court filed on December 3, 2024. In the affidavit, Mr. Corcoran stated,
“I, Joseph Edward Corcoran, do not wish to litigate my case further.” Doc. 1-1 at 164.
He wrote:
I understand that if this Court rejects my counsel’s petition the death
warrant will be carried out. I will then be put to death for the heinous
crime I committed. I understand that the execution will end my life. I
understand medically my heart will stop and all brain activity will
cease. I do now know, however, what will happen metaphysically. (But
neither does anyone else”) I understand the execution, in the interest of
judgment, serves as both a punishment and a deterrent.
Id. at 165.
20
After reviewing Mr. Corcoran’s records, expert reports, and Mr. Corcoran’s
writings, including his book and November 2024 affidavit, Dr. Angeline Stanislaus,
M.D., a board-certified forensic psychiatrist, found that “[Mr. Corcoran] is still very
delusional and has no insight into his illness,” and that “he currently remains
seriously mentally ill due to his untreated psychotic symptoms.” Doc. 1-1 at 261; see
also id. at 262 (“At the present time, he is only prescribed Zoloft 100mg, which is an
antidepressant. This does not treat his symptoms from schizophrenia.”). Dr.
Stanislaus remarked that in his November 2024 affidavit, “[Mr. Corcoran] makes it
sound like his decision to forgo any further litigation is logical,” consistent with other
experts’ opinions that he tries to hide his mental illness. Id. at 253-54, 261. But, she
noted, “[h]e states that in execution his heart will stop, and all brain activity will
cease. This again ties into his delusion of the ultrasonic machine inserting and
broadcasting his thoughts from his brain.” Id. at 261. As a final matter, Dr. Stanislaus
urged, “an in-person psychiatric evaluation to further access his though
processes/beliefs and symptom presentation.”
No Assessment of Current Competency
After the completion of direct appeal proceedings, Mr. Corcoran initially
refused to sign the post-conviction petition counsel prepared and waived postconviction review. It was the unanimous opinion of the three mental health
professionals that Mr. Corcoran was irrational and not competent—he only waived
review to hasten his execution because he hoped to gain relief and escape from the
pain caused by his delusions that he was being tortured. Even though it was the
21
unanimous opinion of the experts that Mr. Corcoran was not thinking rationally or
logically (and was incapable of doing so because of his paranoid schizophrenia) and
was out of touch with reality, the post-conviction court— the same court that had
chastised Mr. Corcoran for faking mental illness—nevertheless found him competent
to waive his appeals.
The Attorney General presented no expert opinion challenging those opinions
and conceded the severe mental illness. When affirming the trial court, the Indiana
Supreme Court noted:
The State also concedes that Corcoran suffers from a mental illness. At the
competency hearing, the State Public Defender presented the testimony of
three mental health experts, each of whom concluded that Corcoran suffers
from paranoid schizophrenia. One of the symptoms of Corcoran’s condition,
according to the three experts, are recurrent delusions that Department of
Correction prison guards are torturing him through the use of an ultrasound
machine, causing him substantial pain and uncontrollable twitching.
Corcoran v. State, 820 N.E.2d 655, 660 (Ind. 2005); id. at 665 (Rucker, J., dissenting)
(“Corcoran is under the paranoid delusion that prison guards are torturing him with
sound waves. As a result, Corcoran wants the State to execute him in order to end
the pain. I am not willing to accommodate him.”) (emphasis added).
The Seventh Circuit passed on this competency-to-waive determination and
upheld the Indiana Supreme Court’s finding. But there were significant gaps in the
majority’s logic, and Judge Williams noted those. In concluding that Mr. Corcoran
was competent to waive postconviction review, the majority in this Court relied on
two assertions: “First, the court reasoned Corcoran never told any of the experts that
he wanted to die to escape his delusions. That is not true. Second, the court stated
that each expert indicated Corcoran’s medication controlled his psychotic symptoms.
22
That also is not true.” Corcoran v. Buss, 551 F.3d 703, 716 (7th Cir. 2008) (Williams,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The record plainly supports Judge Williams’ statements. During the 2003 postconviction hearing, Dr. Kaplan testified that Mr. Corcoran expressly told him he
wanted the State to execute him because “he wanted to be released from the quote,
unquote, pain and suffering of his involuntary speech disorder which really doesn’t
exist.” Doc. 13-2 (PC Comp. Tr. 19). Dr. Kaplan also testified, as did the other two
experts, that Mr. Corcoran wanted to escape the ultrasound machine and the torture
the guards inflicted upon him with the machine—an irrational belief. Mr. Corcoran’s
desire to “escape” is the operative word; in his 2006 signed statements to Judge Sharp
of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana , Mr. Corcoran
wrote that he looked forward to his execution because then, he could “die and escape”
prison. Doc. 1-1 (Attachment D at 125a). Judge Williams was correct—Mr. Corcoran
did in fact tell experts he wanted to die and escape prison, and in fact told a federal
court the same. One of the three reasons the Indiana Supreme Court relied on to find
Mr. Corcoran competent in 2005 has been proven false.
Additionally, while the Indiana Supreme Court in 2005 found that Mr.
Corcoran’s schizophrenia symptoms responded to medication, Dr. Kaplan testified
that Mr. Corcoran’s schizophrenia was medication-resistant. He explained that even
when Mr. Corcoran was on a medication regimen, “it didn’t appear that at any time
he was not paranoid or delusional.” Doc. 13-2 (PC Comp. Tr. 34). The psychotic
23
symptoms persisted. The second of the three reasons the Indiana Supreme Court
relied on to find Mr. Corcoran competent in 2005 has also been proven incorrect.
Finally, in 2005, Mr. Corcoran claimed to have fabricated “stories” of his
delusions and that he lied to doctors to get medication “to help him sleep.” But, as
Judge Williams pointed out that while she “agree[s] that ordinarily, the Indiana
court’s decision to rely on one person’s testimony over other people testimony would
be one to which we would defer, . . . the person whom the court credited was a person
diagnosed with a severe mental illness that causes delusions, who told a doctor and
his sister he wanted to die to escape those delusions.” Corcoran, 551 F.3d at 717. The
third reason the Indiana Supreme Court found Mr. Corcoran competent was also
highly suspect.
On November 15, 2024, Mr. Corcoran raised the newly ripened claim that his
execution would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution
under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 903,
942 (2007), and Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 265, 267 (2019), because he lacks a
rational understanding of the reason for the execution, rendering him incompetent to
be executed. Dt. Ct. Doc. 1-1. On December 5, 2024, the Indiana Supreme Court, by
a razor-close vote of 3-2, denied the request. Apx. 1a. On December 10, 2024, the
Indiana Supreme Court explained the denial and issued its opinions. Apx. 2a-37a.
The majority premised its denial on two things: Mr. Corcoran’s own
statements, relying substantially upon a handwritten affidavit filed with the court
after the competency briefing, and its 2005 determination that Mr. Corcoran was
24
competent to waive his appeals made under the Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402
(1960) and Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966) competency standards. Id. There has
never been a competency determination under the Ford/Panetti standard. Id.
Two Indiana Supreme Court Justices dissented. Justice Goff and joined by
Chief Justice Rush, noted:
The evidence submitted by Corcoran’s attorneys reveals a documented history
of severe mental illness, an inability to cooperate with counsel, and a desire to
be executed to escape prison—all of which raise substantial questions about
his current mental capacity. As a result, we should stay Corcoran’s execution
to allow his attorneys to seek successive post-conviction relief to litigate his
current competency. But at a minimum, we should stay Corcoran’s execution
and order a psychiatric examination.
Apx. 31a. The dissenting justices expressed concern that, “[E]ven if it seems that
Corcoran may understand why the State is seeking execution, the point is that we
simply do not know,” Apx. 35a., observing, “In his mind, Corcoran views execution
not as punishment but as the only path to escaping torment from which he suffers.”
Apx. 34a. After reviewing the evidence of Mr. Corcoran’s mental illness, they opined
that “[t]o ignore these findings now and proceed without a current competency
evaluation amounts to enabling his delusions—a state-sanctioned escape from
suffering rather than a measured act of justice.” Apx. 32a-33a. (citing Panetti, 551
U.S. at 960).
The dissenting judges emphasized, “A competency evaluation is needed not
because Corcoran fails to acknowledge the facts of his case, but because evidence
shows that his mental illness distorts his ability to have the requisite rational
understanding.” Apx. 36a. Finally, the dissenters cautioned, “The death penalty . . .
is not a mechanism for granting reprieve from suffering or a means to expedite escape
25
from incarceration. It is the gravest act the State can undertake, reserved for those
who bear the full weight of their moral culpability.” Id. To proceed with Mr.
Corcoran’s execution, per his wish, would “undermine[] society’s interest ‘in not
allowing the death penalty . . . to be used as a means of state-assisted suicide.’” Id.
(quoting Smith v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1264, 1275 (Ind. 1997)).
The Seventh Circuit was also sharply divided. Apx. 69a-78a. While the panel
affirmed the state court’s denial under AEDPA, the dissent found problems with the
state court’s analysis.
The dissent noted the state court improperly imported the previous
competency determination. “By treating its 2005 decision as conclusive here, the
Indiana Supreme Court effectively substituted the Rees standard in place of the
Ford/Panetti standard.” Apx. 76a (Lee, J., dissenting). This is error because
competency to waive “is markedly different from the standard governing a prisoner’s
competency to be executed . . .” Apx. 75a. As best described by the dissent, “In
Panetti’s parlance, the Indiana Supreme Court determined in 2005 that Corcoran
had the capacity to understand the rationale for his execution, but it did not inquire
(because it had no reason to) whether Corcoran had a rational understanding of it.
And, indeed, to date, no court has conducted such an inquiry.” Apx. 76a.
The dissent noted that the state court’s looking backwards to a two-decade old
competency determination was the incorrect method when the assessment is required
to be premised upon current competency. As noted by the dissent, “Twenty years have
passed since that evaluation, and, as the Supreme Court had recognized, “[p]rior
26
findings of competency do not foreclose a prisoner from proving he is incompetent to
be executed because of his present mental condition.” Panetti, 551 U.S. at 934.” Apx.
76a.
The dissent also faulted the state court for not extending the process required
by both Ford and Panetti. As the dissent noted, “But, because Corcoran filed his
affidavit after briefing had concluded, the Indiana Supreme Court did so without
providing defense counsel an opportunity to respond to it. This is precisely the lack
of due process the Supreme Court condemned in Ford and Panetti.” Apx. 77a.
Significantly, Dr. Parker opined that Mr. Corcoran “would rather be executed than
admit that schizophrenia might be contributing to his desire to die.” Doc. 13-2 (PC
Comp. T. 56-57).
There has not been a current assessment of competence. In a break from its
previous practices, the Indiana Supreme Court denied any process and refused to
permit an evaluation.
27
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
III.
This Court should hear this case because reasonable jurists could conclude and
have concluded that the significant evidence of Mr. Corcoran’s longstanding
schizophrenia satisfies the Panetti and Madison standards of incompetency –
standards that have never been applied. (Questions 1 & 2)
As the opinions of the dissenting Seventh Circuit judge and the 2 Indiana
Supreme Court justices in written dissent show, reasonable jurists could conclude
that the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision finding that Mr. Corcoran did not meet
the minimum threshold standard for incompetency is contrary to or an objectively
unreasonable application of Panetti or Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 265 (2019), or
is based on unreasonable determinations of fact. The dissenting judge explicitly
recognized that: “In Panetti’s parlance, the Indiana Supreme Court determined in
2005 that Corcoran had the capacity to understand the rationale for his execution,
but it did not inquire (because it had no reason to) whether Corcoran had a rational
understanding of it. And, indeed, to date, no court has conducted such an inquiry.”
Apx. 76a (Lee, J., dissenting). Accordingly, this Court should grant review and hear
Mr. Corcoran’s petition.
As noted by the dissent (and not discounted by the Seventh Circuit Panel), “By
treating its 2005 decision as conclusive here, the Indiana Supreme Court effectively
substituted the Rees standard in place of the Ford/Panetti standard.” Apx. 76a. The
state court cannot substitute competency standards—it has to apply the
unambiguously correct one.
This is particularly true when the standard previously employed “is markedly
different from the standard governing a prisoner’s competency to be executed . . .”
28
Apx. 75a. Deference should not be given to state courts when they apply the wrong
standard.
In applying a 20-year-old waiver competency determination, the state court
opinion was contrary to Panetti and Madison. But the application of an incorrect
competency standard is of no import to the competency determination, particularly
at the threshold stage. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 959. This also ignores a bedrock principle
of Panetti that“[p]rior findings of competency do not foreclose a prisoner from proving
he is incompetent to be executed because of his present mental condition.” Panetti,
551 U.S. at 934. The state court improperly applied such a bar.
Relying on the previous competency finding (again utilizing a different
standard) is erroneous because the bases upon which relied were erroneous, a
majority of what the state court relied upon simply was not true. As noted by Judge
Williams, that Mr. Corcoran never said he wanted to escape torture and that medical
i is dampening the impact of the mental illness these bases of the state court opinion
are “not true.” Corcoran, 551 F.3d at 716 (Williams, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
The state’s position amounts to Mr. Corcoran must be competent because he
sounds so. Setting aside past and current experts as well as Panetti say that’s not
enough, Mr. Corcoran’s affidavits were written for the court, whereas the book was
not meant specifically for the court’s eyes. He knows what to tell the court to get his
execution, but the book tells the real story—he’s trying to get out to the world what
he truly thinks is happening.
29
No one disputes that Joseph Corcoran is mentally ill except Joseph Corcoran
himself. His bare assertions of understanding the reason for his execution are tightly
intertwined with his flat denials that he is mentally ill, denials which themselves are
symptoms of his mental illness. And yet, who does the Indiana Supreme Court rely
on to establish Joseph Corcoran’s rational understanding of his execution? Joseph
Corcoran himself, who once again provides a court with the words he knows will carry
the day and hasten his escape from the harsh realities of prison life and, most
important to him, his overwhelming delusions. This nullifies the unanimous
testimony of experts that Mr. Corcoran always tries to present well and avoid his
mental illness- he fakes good, according to Dr. Parker. That is because Mr. Corcoran
“would rather be executed than admit that schizophrenia might be contributing to
his desire to die.” Doc. 13-2 (PC Comp. T. 56-57); see also Apx. 36a (Goff, J., dissenting
) (“The death penalty . . . is not a mechanism for granting reprieve from suffering or
a means to expedite escape from incarceration.”)
In denying relief, the state court improperly conflated Mr. Corcoran’s stated
rationale with being rational. In so doing, the state court ignored clear evidence of
Mr. Corcoran’s mental illness. The court ignored what is blatantly obvious—Mr.
Corcoran lives in a different reality, is completely unable to think rationally or in a
manner that is in any way rooted in reality and is thus incompetent to be executed.
Again, as the Judge Lee in dissent noted, this conflation of the two differing
questions and how rationale is not the test. Apx. 76a; see also Apx. 32a (“The
evidence before us—consisting of prior expert evaluations and contemporary
30
accounts and reports—raise significant concerns about whether Corcoran has the
requisite rational understanding.”) (Goff, J., dissenting).
The Indiana Supreme Court dissenters noted the problem with this,
explaining, “A competency evaluation is needed not because Corcoran fails to
acknowledge the facts of his case, but because evidence shows that his mental
illness distorts his ability to have the requisite rational understanding.” Apx. 36a.
But under Panetti, neither Mr. Corcoran’s purported understanding of the fact of
his execution, nor any awareness of court proceedings, are sufficient to negate Mr.
Corcoran’s lack of rational understanding. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 959 (“A prisoner’s
awareness of the state’s rationale for an execution is not the same as a rational
understanding of it.”).
The state court, as did the Seventh Circuit Panel, improperly defined
competency. It is fluid. Thus, to rely on an earlier competency finding from twenty
years ago to refute a current competency challenge is contrary to and unreasonable
on its face. In short, it is error to bootstrap a prior finding on competency to a current,
and different competency question in that it utterly ignores that competency waxes
and wanes.
As noted by the dissent, “Twenty years have passed since that evaluation, and,
as the Supreme Court had recognized, “[p]rior findings of competency do not foreclose
a prisoner from proving he is incompetent to be executed because of his present
mental condition.” Panetti, 551 U.S. at 934.” Apx. 76a.
31
The Panel’s conclusions ignore the well-established principle that competency
is variable over time—it is not static. The Supreme Court has expressly stated that
competency must be evaluated at the time of the specific occurrence in which
competency is relevant. In Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 (1975), the Court
emphasized that a defendant’s competency must be evaluated at the time of trial.
Similarly, in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966), the Supreme Court also
highlighted the importance of a contemporaneous competency hearing.
The Supreme Court in Panetti, once noted: “Gross delusions stemming from a
severe mental disorder may put an awareness of a link between a crime and its
punishment in a context so far removed from reality that the punishment can serve
no proper purpose. It is therefore error to derive from Ford, and the substantive
standard for incompetency its opinions broadly identify, a strict test for competency
that treats delusional beliefs as irrelevant once the prisoner is aware the State has
identified the link between his crime and the punishment to be inflicted.” Panetti,
551 U.S. at 954. But as the dissent notes, such a determination has never occurred.
Further, the state court’s seeming commingling of the threshold question
with the ultimate merits analysis of Mr. Corcoran’s evidence to hold that he had not
met the minimum required threshold also was an objectively unreasonable
application of Panetti. If Panetti meant for the threshold determination to be
equivalent to a full merits determination, there would have been no reason for the
Court make any distinction between a threshold determination and a subsequent
“fair hearing.” Panetti, 551 U.S. at 949.
32
As in Panetti, “the factfinding procedures upon which the [Indiana Supreme
Court] relied were ‘not adequate for reaching reasonably correct results’ or, at a
minimum, resulted in a process that appeared to be ‘seriously inadequate for the
ascertainment of the truth.’” Id. at 954. Reliance on an affidavit that Petitioner did
not have the opportunity to respond is seriously inadequate for the ascertainment of
the truth. Id.
In relying on Mr. Corcoran’s affidavit, the state court failed to comply with the
directive from Panetti which requires “an adequate means by which to submit
psychiatric evidence in response to the evidence that had been solicited by the state
court.’” Panetti, 551 U.S. at 948. This offends Ford as well. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 415
(noting that the state procedure did not allow a defendant to challenge or impeach
the opinion of the state-appointed psychiatrists who deemed him competent). As the
dissent noted, “But, because Corcoran filed his affidavit after briefing had concluded,
the Indiana Supreme Court did so without providing defense counsel an opportunity
to respond to it. This is precisely the lack of due process the Supreme Court
condemned in Ford and Panetti.” Apx. 75a. The state court unreasonably failed to
provide Petitioner with the required opportunity or means to respond to the recent
affidavit with psychiatric evidence. 1
The dissent correctly noted this approach ultimately minimized Mr. Corcoran’s
delusional writings. While Mr. Corcoran’s affidavits were written for the court, his
Petitioner could have presented the testimony of Board-Certified Forensic
Psychiatrist Dr. Angeline Stanislaus, who could have rebutted and challenged the
solicited evidence.
1
33
book on what he believes are the inner workings of the ultrasound machine was not
meant specifically for the court’s eyes. He knows what to tell the court to get his
execution, which he did in his affidavit, but the book tells the real story of his
delusions—it is his attempt to warn the world of the electronic torture he truly thinks
is happening. As expert testimony from Dr. Parker indicated, Mr. Corcoran “would
rather be executed than admit that schizophrenia might be contributing to his desire
to die.” Doc. 13-2 (PC Comp. T. 56-57); see Apx. 74a (“The Indiana Supreme Court’s
reliance on Corcoran’s untested affidavit is particularly troubling given that defense
counsel’s entire theory is premised on Corcoran’s inability to rationally comprehend
the reasons behind his execution and his efforts to hide his true motivations for
seeking the death penalty.”).
Depriving Petitioner of the opportunity to respond to the affidavit prevented
“[e]xpert evidence which may clarify the extent to which severe delusions may render
a subject’s perception of reality so distorted that he should be deemed incompetent.”
Panetti, 551 U.S. at 960. Consequently, an error occurred because there was no
opportunity to challenge it, as noted by the State to this (and accepted by the Panel),
“the most contemporaneous evidence of his understanding [that] was a substantial
part of the basis of the state court’s opinion (Ex. 15 at 24–25).” State’s Brief p. 33-34
(emphasis in original) (referring to Mr. Corcoran’s 2024 affidavit).
As the Supreme Court stated in Panetti, “[D]ue to the state court’s
unreasonable application of Ford, the factfinding procedures upon which the court
relied were ‘not adequate for reaching reasonably correct results’ or, at a minimum,
34
resulted in a process that appeared to be ‘seriously inadequate for the ascertainment
of the truth. We therefore consider petitioner’s claim on the merits and without
deferring to the state court’s finding of competency.” Panetti, at 954 (quoting Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 423-24 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment)). In his dissent, Judge Lee noted that this denial of an
opportunity to respond to, or in any way address the affidavit, “is precisely the lack
of due process the Supreme Court condemned in Ford and Panetti.” Apx. 77a (citing
Ford, 477 U.S. at 415), and Panetti, 551 U.S. at 948)).
Furthermore, the State’s failure to comply with its own processes and
procedures from Timberlake ensuring a current evaluation—in this case, the effect of
Mr. Corcoran’s long-standing fixed delusions on his competency—was objectively
unreasonable. Id. at 950-51. The state court’s conflation of a merits-type analysis with
threshold minimum showing required for further process was an objectively
unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. Id. at 950. In conclusion, the process
afforded Mr. Corcoran fails to meet minimum procedural due process requirements
under the Constitution where the state court’s credibility determinations were made
by fiat declaration that a single statement is more credible than decades of
documented mental illness. Although the Constitution does not require a full trial, it
does require much more than what happened here.
This history clearly and convincingly establishes that Mr. Corcoran has been
endorsing these same kinds of delusional beliefs about torture and mind-control for
decades, long before an execution date was anywhere in his near future. The state
35
court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts given the
evidence presented, as the record clearly indicates that Mr. Corcoran has a long
history of hallucinations, delusions, and disorganized thinking.
The foregoing shows the state court’s decision finding that Mr. Corcoran did
not meet the minimum threshold standard for incompetency rests on unreasonable
determinations of fact and is contrary to or an objectively unreasonable application
of Panetti or Madison. This Court should grant review and hear Mr. Corcoran’s
petition.
36
IV.
This Court should hear this case to ensure compliance with this Court’s
precedent regarding evidentiary weight under § 2254(d).
This Court in Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314 (2015), has determined that
arguments as to the weight a state court gives certain evidence are properly made
under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). In Brumfield, in which the Court only interpreted and
applied § 2254(d)(2), the court’s “examination of the record before the state court
compels [the Court] to conclude that both of [the state court’s] critical factual
determinations were unreasonable.” Id. at 314. In fact, one of the unreasonable
factual determinations in Brumfield was very similar to the unreasonable factual
determination the court made here regarding criteria related to intellectual
disability. Id.
The Panel improperly indicated:
The next friend argues about the weight they believe the state court
should have given certain evidence, whether it is Corcoran’s November
2024 affidavit or a new expert report by Dr. Angeline Stanislaus. But
arguments as to weight are properly made under 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1), not (d)(2). See Lopez v. Smith, 574 U.S. 1, 8 (2014).
Apx. 72a. This runs counter to multiple Seventh Circuit ruling including a previous
ruling from the court in Mr. Corcoran’s case
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit previously held that a state court’s decision
involves an unreasonable determination of the facts if it “rests upon fact-finding that
ignores the clear and convincing weight of the evidence.” Corcoran v. Neal, 783 F.3d
676, 683 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting McManus v. Neal, 779 F.3d 634, 649 (7th Cir. 2015)).
This is consistent with other precedent from the Seventh Circuit. Gage v. Richardson,
978 F.3d 522, 528 (7th Cir. 2020); Newman v. Harrington, 726 F.3d 921, 928 (7th Cir.
37
2013).Other circuit courts agree that the factual determination is properly made
under § 2254(d)(2). See Winston v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 535, 554 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) and finding when a petitioner alleges
that a state court based its decision on an “unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the [s]tate court proceeding” under § 2254(d)(2),
the question is not whether the state court's determination was incorrect but whether
it is “sufficiently against the weight of the evidence that it is objectively
unreasonable.”); Allen v. Stephan, 42 F.4th 223, 246 (4th Cir. 2022), cert. denied sub
nom., Chestnut v. Allen, 143 S. Ct. 2517 (2023); Sarausad v. Porter, 479 F.3d 671,
677–78 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d and remanded sub nom., Waddington v. Sarausad, 555
U.S. 179 (2009) (under § 2254(d)(2), the federal court must decide whether the state
court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.”) (emphasis added.).
This Court should grant, vacate and remand for a consideration of the Ford
claim without this error.
38
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully asks this Court to grant the
petition for writ of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Laurence E. Komp
_________________________________________
LAURENCE E. KOMP,* MO. Bar #40446
MICHELLE M. LAW, MO. Bar #45487
FAITH J. TAN, IL. Bar #6342729
Capital Habeas Unit
Federal Public Defender
Western District of Missouri
1000 Walnut St., Ste. 600
Kansas City, MO 64106
(816) 675-0923
laurence_komp@fd.org
michelle_law@fd.org
faith_tan@fd.org
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER
*Counsel of Record, Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court
39
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.