Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Tahina Corcoran, as next friend on behalf of Joseph E. Corcoran, Petitioner v. Ron Neal, Warden
Supreme Court briefDec 17, 2024
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
**THIS IS A CAPITAL CASE**
EXECUTION SET FOR
December 18, 2024 (from 12:01 am until Sunrise)
No. _______
_________________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________________________________
TAHINA CORCORAN, next friend for JOSEPH E. CORCORAN, Petitioner,
v.
RON NEAL,
Warden, Indiana State Prison, Respondent.
_________________________________________
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
_________________________________________
APPENDIX
_________________________________________
LAURENCE E. KOMP, MO Bar
#40446
FAITH J. TAN, IL Bar #6342729
MICHELLE M. LAW, MO Bar #45487
Federal Public Defender
Western District of Missouri
1000 Walnut Street, Suite 600
Kansas City, MO 64106
816-675-0923
Laurence_Komp@fd.org
Faith_Tan@fd.org
Michelle_Law@fd.org
Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant
APPENDIX INDEX
1. December 5, 2024, Indiana Supreme Court Order ……………………... 1a – 1a
2. December 10, 2024, Indiana Supreme Court Opinion ……...…………. 2a – 37a
3. December 13, 2024, Northern District of Indiana Opinion and
Order…………………………………………………………………….…… 38a – 68a
4. December 16, 2024, Seventh Circuit Opinion and Order ………….… 69a – 78a
5. Electronic Harassment: A Whistle-blower Report ……….…...……. 79a – 108a
6. December 17, 2024, Seventh Circuit Order Denying Rehearing En Banc
………………………………………………………………………………..… 109a - 109a
In the
Indiana Supreme Court
Joseph E. Corcoran,
Petitioner,
Supreme Court Case Nos.
02S00-0508-PD-350
24S-SD-222
v.
Trial Court Case No.
02D04-9707-CF-465
State of Indiana,
Respondent.
FILED
Dec 05 2024, 4:27 pm
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Published Order
On November 15, 2024, counsel for Joseph E. Corcoran filed two “Motion[s] for Stay of
Execution” and two petitions seeking permission from this Court to litigate on successive postconviction review: (1) whether Corcoran’s execution would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution or Article One, Section 16 of the Indiana
Constitution; and (2) whether he is currently competent to be executed pursuant to Panetti v.
Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). On November 26,
2024, the State filed a response in opposition to all of the motions and petitions filed by
Corcoran’s counsel. On December 3, 2024, the Court received an Affidavit from Corcoran,
postmarked November 22, 2024. That same day, Corcoran’s counsel filed a Reply in Support of
Motions to Stay and Motions for Permission to File Successive Petitions for Post-Conviction
Relief.
Having considered the matter before us, the “Motion[s] for Stay of Execution” and the
petitions seeking permission to litigate successive post-conviction relief claims are DENIED.
The Court will promptly issue a written opinion explaining its reasons.
12/5/2024
Done at Indianapolis, Indiana, on ___________
.
Loretta H. Rush
Chief Justice of Indiana
Massa, Slaughter, and Molter, JJ., concur.
Rush, C.J., and Goff, J., dissent.
1a
FILED
Dec 10 2024, 11:01 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Indiana Supreme Court
Supreme Court Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350
Joseph E. Corcoran,
Petitioner,
–v–
State of Indiana,
Respondent.
Decided: December 10, 2024
On Successive Petitions for Post-Conviction Relief
and Motions to Stay in a Capital Case
Direct Appeal from the Allen Superior Court,
Case No. 02D04-9707-CF-465
Opinion by Justice Molter
Justices Massa and Slaughter concur.
Justice Goff dissents with separate opinion in which Chief Justice Rush joins.
2a
Molter, Justice.
A quarter century ago, an Allen County jury convicted Joseph Corcoran
of a quadruple murder, and the judge sentenced him to death as the jury
recommended. Since then, courts at every level of the state and federal
judiciary have been litigating whether the state and federal constitutions
prohibit Indiana from executing him. That litigation has included multiple
decisions from courts of last resort—five opinions from our Court and two
opinions from the United States Supreme Court. After both judiciaries
resolved all the issues before them, we set an execution date of December
18, 2024.
At this point, Corcoran doesn’t want to petition the courts to challenge
his execution. He recently wrote to us: “I am guilty of the crime I was
convicted of, and accept the findings of all the appellate courts.” Affidavit
at 2. He says “[t]he long drawn out appeal history has addressed all the
issues [he] wished to appeal, such as the issue of competency.” Id. And,
therefore, he does “not wish to proceed with more and/or endless
litigation.” Id. He confirms that he understands he “will then be put to
death for the heinous crime [he] committed,” and that his execution
“serves as both a punishment and a deterrent.” Id.
Contrary to Corcoran’s wishes, the State Public Defender filed two
motions for permission to file two separate successive petitions for postconviction relief and two accompanying motions to stay the execution
while those petitions are litigated. Those submissions argue that
Corcoran’s mental illness precludes his execution. But we can only
disregard Corcoran’s decision to waive post-conviction remedies if he
isn’t competent to make that decision, and our Court previously
concluded that he is. The State Public Defender again questions
Corcoran’s competency to waive post-conviction remedies, but she relies
on the same evidence we considered the last time, and the minimal new
evidence she identifies is offered only to confirm that Corcoran’s
condition is unchanged. Since Corcoran does not authorize the successive
petitions on his behalf, we cannot authorize them either.
Even setting aside the fact that Corcoran has not authorized the
requests for successive petitions, we still must deny the motions because
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
3a
Page 2 of 29
there is no reasonable possibility that Corcoran is entitled to relief. The
State Public Defender has standing only to challenge Corcoran’s
competency to waive post-conviction remedies, and the remaining claims
in the first petition are procedurally defaulted anyway. The second
petition argues that Corcoran is not competent to be executed because he
does not have a rational understanding of why the State will execute him.
But we previously concluded he does; ample evidence, including his
recent affidavit, further illustrates that; and the State Public Defender has
not made the threshold substantial showing that anything has changed.
We therefore agree with the State that we must deny all four of the
State Public Defender’s motions.
Facts and Procedural History
I.
Prior State Court Proceedings
A. Corcoran’s Direct Appeal
Just over twenty-five years ago, an Allen County jury convicted Joseph
Corcoran of four murders. He had been “under stress because his sister’s
upcoming marriage would necessitate his moving out of her house,” and
“his brother said Corcoran could not move in with him.” Corcoran v. State,
774 N.E.2d 495, 497 (Ind. 2002). When he “awoke one afternoon to hear his
brother and others downstairs talking about him,” “he loaded his rifle and
went downstairs to intimidate them, but as Corcoran said later, ‘It just
didn’t happen that way.’” Id. Instead, “Corcoran killed his brother, his
sister’s fiancé, and two other men in the ensuing incident.” Id.
That same jury also recommended that Corcoran be sentenced to death
for the four murders, and the trial judge imposed that sentence. When
imposing the sentence, “the trial judge thoughtfully considered the nine
mitigating circumstances asserted by the defendant,” agreeing with many,
including that “the defendant was under the influence of a mental or
emotional disturbance at the time the murders were committed.” Corcoran
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
4a
Page 3 of 29
v. State, 739 N.E.2d 649, 656 (Ind. 2000). But the judge gave each of the
mitigating factors “medium or low weight,” and she believed the
aggravating circumstances—multiple murders—outweighed the
mitigating circumstances. Id.
Corcoran didn’t appeal his conviction, but he appealed his sentence,
raising eight claims: four independent arguments that Indiana’s death
penalty statute violated the state and federal constitutions; an argument
that the prosecutor committed misconduct in the penalty phase closing
argument; an argument that the death penalty statute was ambiguous and
had to be construed against the State; an argument that the judge
improperly considered a non-statutory aggravator when sentencing; and
an argument that the death sentence in this case is manifestly
unreasonable. Id. at 651.
Our Court considered those arguments and unanimously rejected all
but one; we agreed with Corcoran that the judge may have considered
non-statutory factors when imposing a death sentence because she noted
his future dangerousness to the community, the innocence of the victims,
and the heinousness of the crime. Id. at 657. We remanded for
resentencing based on the evidence already presented. Id. Chief Justice
Shepard concurred with a separate opinion explaining that he agreed with
the remand “largely because meticulous attention to capital cases at an
early stage saves a good deal of effort later on.” Id. at 658 (Shepard, C.J.,
concurring). He read the trial judge’s sentencing statement as simply
elaborating on the statutory factor for committing multiple murders, and
he would have been willing to affirm on that basis. Id. But he nevertheless
agreed it was “worth clarifying now that only statutory aggravating
circumstances are being considered.” Id.
On remand, the trial court reimposed the death sentence after again
assigning “medium weight” to “the mitigating circumstance that
[Corcoran] was under the influence of a mental or emotional disturbance
at the time the murders were committed.” State v. Corcoran, No. 02D049707-CF-465, 2001 WL 36099910 (Allen Superior Ct. Sept. 30, 2001). It
based that conclusion on the opinions of court-appointed experts “that the
Defendant suffered from a personality disorder, either paranoid
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
5a
Page 4 of 29
personality disorder, or schizotypal personality disorder.” Id. Corcoran
again appealed, and our Court affirmed in a 4-1 decision. Corcoran, 774
N.E.2d at 499. The majority rejected Corcoran’s arguments that the trial
judge again considered non-statutory aggravators, that the judge failed to
consider all proffered mitigators, and that the sentence was manifestly
unreasonable. Id. at 499, 500, 502.
As for the reasonableness of the sentence, Corcoran “argue[d]
vehemently that his mental health should be of utmost significance in
determining his sentence.” Id. at 501. Our Court acknowledged that
“[s]even qualified doctors analyzed Corcoran, and while they offered
varying opinions,” it seemed “the consensus was that Corcoran suffered
from schizotypal or paranoid personality disorder.” Id. (citations omitted).
But after carefully reviewing the evidence, our Court was “satisfied that
the trial court’s decision that a quadruple killing was weightier than the
proffered mitigation of Corcoran’s mental health led the trial court to an
appropriate sentence.” Id. at 502.
Justice Rucker dissented because, like the attorneys arguing before us
now, he did not “believe a sentence of death is appropriate for a person
suffering a severe mental illness.” Id. (Rucker, J., dissenting). As the
attorneys now argue again, he thought the Eighth Amendment’s ban on
“cruel and unusual” punishment forecloses executing mentally ill
prisoners like Corcoran for the same reasons the United States Supreme
Court has said the Eighth Amendment prohibits executing the
intellectually disabled. Even if the federal constitution didn’t prohibit
Corcoran’s execution, he concluded—like the attorneys here argue—that
Indiana’s Constitution did. Id. at 503 (“Because Indiana’s constitution
affords even greater protection than its federal counterpart, I would hold
that a seriously mentally ill person is not among those most deserving to
be put to death. To do so in my view violates the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment provision of the Indiana Constitution.”). Corcoran requested
rehearing, but we denied that request.
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
6a
Page 5 of 29
B.
State Court Proceedings to Determine Corcoran’s
Competency to Waive Post-Conviction Remedies
Our rules permitted Corcoran to again challenge his sentence through
procedures for post-conviction remedies, but he elected not to. Corcoran v.
State, 820 N.E.2d 655, 656 (Ind. 2005), aff’d on reh’g, 827 N.E.2d 542 (Ind.
2005). However, the State Public Defender believed Corcoran was
incompetent to make that decision given his mental illness, so she
requested competency proceedings. Id. at 657. The trial court held a
hearing, and the State Public Defender offered “the testimony of three
mental health experts, each of whom concluded that Corcoran suffers
from paranoid schizophrenia.” Id. at 660 (footnote omitted).
They all said that symptomatic of Corcoran’s condition was that he had
“recurrent delusions that Department of Correction prison guards are
torturing him through the use of an ultrasound machine, causing him
substantial pain and uncontrollable twitching.” Id. Based on their
diagnosis, “all three experts concluded Corcoran was unable to make a
rational decision concerning the legal proceedings confronting him.” Id.
They thought “Corcoran’s decision to forgo post-conviction review of his
sentence, thereby hastening his execution, was premised on his desire to
be relieved of the pain that he believes he experiences as a result of his
delusions.” Id. In essence, they reasoned that “Corcoran’s decision to forgo
post-conviction review cannot be rational if based upon his delusions,
which are irrational.” Id.
As in the affidavit Corcoran recently submitted to our Court, in those
earlier proceedings he “spoke directly to his reasons for not pursuing
post-conviction review and the contention that his delusions were
prompting his actions.” Id. Just as he says now, he said then:
See, I want to waive my appeals because I am guilty of murder.
I think that I should be executed for what I have done and not
because I am supposedly tortured with ultrasound or
whatever. I am guilty of murder. I should be executed. That is
all there is to it. That is what I believe. I believe the death
penalty is a just punishment for four counts of murder, and I
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
7a
Page 6 of 29
believe that I should be executed since I am guilty of four
counts of murder.
Id. Dr. George Parker, after evaluating Corcoran for the competency
hearing, explained:
He has a very clear awareness of the status of his case. He is
aware he has been sentenced to death. He is aware that he is in
the appeals process. He has a good memory of the events that
have taken place from the time of the offense to the trial, to the
sentencing phase, and then through the more extensive appeals
phase. He is aware of the attorneys’ positions and how, how
the attorneys have changed over the course of the trial and then
[the] appeals process. So, he has a good understanding of what
is at issue.
Id. at 661.
That was consistent with Dr. Robert Kaplan’s testimony, after
evaluating Corcoran, “that Corcoran was aware that by not continuing
with post-conviction review that he would be executed.” Id. Both the
State’s attorney and the presiding judge questioned Corcoran further and
confirmed his understanding of the legal proceedings and his legal
position. Id. That included the judge questioning “Corcoran with respect
to the entire history of his case,” and Corcoran’s answers reflecting that
“he was aware that he had been convicted of four capital crimes”; that “he
understood the purpose of his initial direct appeal to the Indiana Supreme
Court to review his death sentence and that his appeal had been
unsuccessful”; and that the post-conviction proceedings were his “last
attempt to review [the] case.” Id. He confirmed that he had courtappointed counsel whose judgment he trusted with one exception; he
disagreed with them challenging his competency to waive post-conviction
review. Id. at 662.
After an extensive review of the record, our Court concluded that
“[b]oth the State’s and post-conviction judge’s questioning of Corcoran
reaffirm the testimony of Dr. Parker that Corcoran was able to appreciate
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
8a
Page 7 of 29
the gravity of his legal position and the consequences of his choice to
waive further post-conviction review.” Id. And other portions of the
record were “also sufficient evidence to support the post-conviction
court’s determination that Corcoran made his choice knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently.” Id. We explained:
Corcoran’s explicit denial that his delusions prompted him to
waive his right to post-conviction review and his reasoning
that his death sentence is commensurate with the crime he
committed (the conclusion to which both the original trial court
jury and judge came), makes it impossible for this Court to
conclude that the evidence is without conflict and leads only to
a conclusion contrary to the result of the post-conviction court.
Id. at 661 (brackets and quotations omitted).
The State Public Defender also raised two additional claims: (1) “the
Constitution and the Indiana death penalty statute required this Court’s
review of issues regarding Corcoran’s convictions even though he
affirmatively waived such review”; and (2) “it would be unconstitutional
to execute a severely mentally ill person, such as Corcoran.” Id. at 662
(quotations omitted). We rejected those claims because Corcoran did not
authorize the State Public Defender to make them, “and without his
authority, neither the trial court in this proceeding nor this Court has
jurisdiction to review claims for post-conviction relief.” Id. at 663. We
noted our acknowledgment and appreciation “that the State Public
Defender raises these claims in the sincere belief that Corcoran is
incompetent and did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive
his right to post-conviction review,” but “that belief alone is not sufficient
to overcome the rule’s requirement” that Corcoran authorize the claim. Id.
We also noted that the claims were likely to fail anyway because “both
contentions appear to constitute free-standing claims of error that would
not be available for post-conviction review.” Id.
Justice Rucker again dissented. Like the State Public Defender argues
here, Justice Rucker disagreed with the weight the majority placed on
Corcoran’s explanations of his understanding of his rights and the
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
9a
Page 8 of 29
proceedings and instead gave greater weight to the testimony of the three
mental health experts who concluded Corcoran was not competent. Id. at
666 (Rucker, J., dissenting). Justice Rucker acknowledged “that the
existence of delusions and a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia do not
necessarily preclude rational decision-making and competence.” Id. at 669.
But he believed there was more credence to the experts’ conclusion “that
Corcoran’s decision to welcome and hasten his own death is based on his
delusional perception of reality and has no basis in rational thought
whatsoever.” Id.
We affirmed our judgment on rehearing with a published opinion.
Corcoran v. State, 827 N.E.2d 542, 546 (Ind. 2005).
C. Corcoran’s Untimely Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief
While the appeal of Corcoran’s competency proceedings was pending,
he changed his mind and decided to pursue post-conviction relief. He
then filed a petition for post-conviction relief reflecting his authorization,
but that was after the deadline, so the post-conviction court dismissed his
petition, and we affirmed. Corcoran v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1019, 1020 (Ind.
2006). Only Justice Rucker dissented, this time without a separate opinion.
Our Court’s majority opinion emphasized that by that point, we had
“afforded Corcoran considerable review of his sentence[] and the postconviction court’s competency determination.” Id. (citations omitted). And
“[t]he public interest in achieving finality at [that] stage weigh[ed] heavily
against further review.” Id. at 1023.
II. Federal Court Proceedings
A. District Court Habeas Proceedings
Following those first six years of post-conviction litigation, review of
Corcoran’s conviction and sentence moved to the federal courts when he
filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the Northern
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
10a
Page 9 of 29
District of Indiana. The court began by noting the “unusual and more
convoluted than normal” procedural history. Corcoran v. Buss, 483 F. Supp.
2d 709, 712 (N.D. Ind. 2007), rev’d, 551 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted,
judgment vacated sub nom. Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 558 U.S. 1, 130 S. Ct. 8,
175 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2009), and opinion reinstated sub nom. Corcoran v. Wilson, 651
F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2011), and aff’d as modified sub nom. Corcoran v.
Levenhagen, 593 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2010), as amended on denial of reh’g and
reh’g en banc (Apr. 14, 2010), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Corcoran
v. Wilson, 651 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2011). As the citation for that statement
foreshadows, the procedural history only got more convoluted from there.
Turning to the claims, the district court felt “compelled to note at this
point that this habeas corpus petition is seriously untimely,” but it did not
dismiss because the respondent had not requested dismissal on that basis.
Id. at 716, 718. It then granted the petition in part. It agreed with Corcoran
that the State’s pretrial offer (which he rejected) to waive the death
penalty in exchange for Corcoran agreeing to a bench trial violated his
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, and the court ordered the case
remanded for resentencing without the option of reimposing the death
penalty. Id. at 725–26.
Given this holding, the court declined to address the remaining claims
that the trial judge made errors in the sentencing, that Indiana’s death
penalty statute was unconstitutional, that there was prosecutorial
misconduct during the penalty phase, and that Corcoran was incompetent
to be executed. Id. The court rejected the argument that Corcoran was not
competent to stand trial or waive his direct appeal because those claims
were procedurally defaulted. Id. at 728–29.
Corcoran’s counsel also challenged our Court’s conclusion that he was
competent to waive post-conviction proceedings, and after reviewing the
record, the district court concluded our determination was “neither an
unreasonable application of United State[s’] Supreme Court law nor an
unreasonable determination of the facts.” Id. at 733. The district court
noted that “[t]he state courts acknowledged that the petitioner suffers
from a mental illness and fully confronted this question,” but “[i]n the end
they determined that his mental illness did not substantially affect his
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
11a
Page 10 of 29
capacity to appreciate his position as a death row inmate and that he
understood how and why he was there.” Id. And “[n]either did his mental
illness impact his understanding of his legal position vis-à-vis his appeals.”
Id. The court explained that while “philosophically one can question
whether it can ever be a rational choice to abandon appeals which are the
only means to avoid the death penalty, legally even [United States
Supreme Court precedent] leaves no doubt that it is possible to do so.” Id.
So, “[f]rom a legal perspective, the state court’s determination that the
petitioner made a rational choice [w]as not unreasonable.” Id. It concluded
that on this issue, “[t]he opinion of the Supreme Court of Indiana, as
presented above, is thorough, thoughtful, and reasonable,” so “no relief
can be granted on this ground.” Id. at 733–34.
B.
First Seventh Circuit Appeal
The respondent appealed, and the Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court’s decision granting partial habeas relief and affirmed the district
court’s decision regarding competency. Corcoran v. Buss, 551 F.3d 703, 704
(7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Corcoran v.
Levenhagen, 558 U.S. 1, 130 S. Ct. 8, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2009), and opinion
reinstated sub nom. Corcoran v. Wilson, 651 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2011). As for
our Court’s conclusion that the State’s offer not to pursue the death
penalty in exchange for Corcoran waiving a jury trial did not violate his
constitutional rights, the federal appellate court concluded our decision
“was neither incorrect nor unreasonable to warrant the district court’s
grant of [Corcoran’s] habeas petition.” Id. at 712.
Corcoran cross-appealed the district court’s holding that he was
competent to waive post-conviction proceedings. But the Seventh Circuit
affirmed, observing that our Court “gave careful consideration of all the
evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing.” Id. at 713. The court
recounted our acknowledgment “that the experts testified that Corcoran
suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and his resulting delusions caused
him to waive further review of his sentence, but [we] also found that
Corcoran had a clear awareness of the status of his case and what was at
risk if he waived further review.” Id. And we considered “Corcoran’s own
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
12a
Page 11 of 29
conduct and testimony at the hearing, in which he stated that his decision
to waive further proceedings was based on his remorse for his crime, and
not on any ‘delusions’ he was said to have been experiencing.” Id. In the
end, while “experts believed otherwise, the Indiana Supreme Court was
entitled to accept Corcoran’s contention that his request to waive further
proceedings was based on his belief that death is a just punishment for his
crimes.” Id.
The court also noted our repeated conclusions that a defendant’s
acceptance of the death penalty is not necessarily irrational. Id. at 714
(citing Smith v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1264, 1273 (Ind. 1997) (considering a
defendant’s preference for death over life imprisonment, where there was
an indication of his desire not to spend the rest of his life in prison, and
concluding that to do so is not “per se irrational”). And it noted it had
reached that conclusion in the past too. Id. (citing Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d
1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming a district court’s finding of a death
row inmate’s competency to waive further appeals even though the
inmate was ruled mentally incompetent after considering the inmate’s
unwavering testimony that he was aware of his position and of the federal
review options available to him, and that he based his decision not on the
conditions of his confinement, but on his belief that death was a better
option than life in prison)).
The court further found “no support for Corcoran’s contention that a
petitioner who has been diagnosed with a mental illness is not competent
to waive post-trial proceedings.” Id. As it explained, the question “is
whether a mental illness substantially affects the capacity to appreciate his
options and make a rational choice among them.” Id. The Seventh
Circuit’s “review of the transcripts and the evidence before the Indiana
Supreme Court reveals that it (as well as the two other courts that
considered Corcoran’s competency) thoroughly and conscientiously
examined Corcoran’s claims of incompetency, and its findings that he had
a ‘rational understanding of and [could] appreciate his legal position’ are
factually supported by the record.” Id. The court remanded with
instructions to deny habeas relief, leaving Indiana at liberty to reinstate
the death sentence. Id.
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
13a
Page 12 of 29
Judge Williams dissented in part, disagreeing with the majority on the
competence issue. She saw the issue like Justice Rucker did. She explained
that “[n]o one contests that Corcoran suffers from a mental illness,” and
that “is clear from his delusion that prison guards torture him daily with
an ultrasound machine, his conversations with individuals who are not
there, and his delusion that he suffers from an involuntary speech
disorder.” Id. at 714–15 (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Like Justice Rucker, Judge Williams placed great weight on the fact
that “[t]he three experts who testified in the competency hearing
unanimously concluded that Corcoran suffers from paranoid
schizophrenia that renders waiver of further appeal of his death sentence
impossible because the illness prevents him from making rational
decisions.” Id. at 715. Judge Williams didn’t believe the record supported
some of our Court’s factual statements, and she faulted the Court for
failing “to consider Corcoran’s testimony in light of his delusions.” Id. at
716.
C. First United States Supreme Court Review
The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari and vacated
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in a per curiam opinion. Corcoran v.
Levenhagen, 558 U.S. 1, 3 (2009). It did not quarrel with the analysis of the
Seventh Circuit panel majority for the issues the panel considered, but
Corcoran had raised other issues too. So the Supreme Court remanded for
the Seventh Circuit either to consider the four other grounds for habeas
relief that Corcoran raised or to explain why consideration of those issues
was unnecessary. Id. at 2.
D. Seventh Circuit Remand
On remand, the Seventh Circuit concluded that “all of Corcoran’s
remaining habeas challenges are waived, and that three of them are
frivolous, but that one of the challenges nevertheless entitles him to a new
sentencing hearing.” Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 593 F.3d 547, 549 (7th Cir.), as
amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (Apr. 14, 2010), cert. granted,
judgment vacated sub nom. Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 131 S. Ct. 13, 178 L.
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
14a
Page 13 of 29
Ed. 2d 276 (2010). That one issue was that the Seventh Circuit agreed with
Corcoran that the trial judge again relied on a non-statutory aggravator
when reimposing the death sentence because she said that her statements
about Corcoran’s future dangerousness, the victims’ innocence, and the
heinousness of the murders were part of the explanation for the weight
she gave to the statutory factor for multiple murders. Id. at 551. And, the
Seventh Circuit explained, “factor weighting is part of factor ‘balancing’,
the very process in which the trial court disclaimed reliance on nonstatutory aggravators.” Id.
E.
Second U.S. Supreme Court Review
The case then returned to the United States Supreme Court, and it again
issued a per curiam opinion reversing the Seventh Circuit. Wilson v.
Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 2 (2010). It explained that “[f]ederal courts may not
issue writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners whose confinement does
not violate federal law.” Id. The panel’s discussion of the sentencing
factors addressed a matter of state law, and “the panel’s opinion
contained no hint that it thought the violation of Indiana law it had
unearthed also entailed the infringement of any federal right.” Id. at 5.
F.
Second Seventh Circuit Remand
On remand to the Seventh Circuit, the federal appellate court
concluded that “[i]n hindsight [it] should have returned the case to the
district court after the first remand from the Supreme Court,” which it
went ahead and did on the second remand. Corcoran v. Wilson, 651 F.3d
611, 613 (7th Cir. 2011). It noted, “however, that neither of the Supreme
Court’s decisions casts doubt on [the Seventh Circuit’s] resolution of the
issues raised in the initial appeal, in which [the court] found no basis for
habeas relief on the claimed Sixth Amendment violation or on the issue of
Corcoran’s competency to waive post-conviction remedies.” Id. The court
therefore reinstated and incorporated by reference its earlier opinion in
Corcoran v. Buss, 551 F.3d 703, “to the extent that it (1) reversed the district
court’s judgment granting habeas relief on the basis of the claimed Sixth
Amendment violation; and (2) affirmed the district court’s conclusion that
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
15a
Page 14 of 29
the Indiana courts did not mishandle the issue of Corcoran’s competence
to waive post-conviction remedies.” Corcoran, 651 F.3d at 613. The court
also reinstated Judge Williams’ dissent on the competency issue. Id. at
613–614. And it remanded to the district court to permit it to address
Corcoran’s remaining grounds for habeas relief. Id. at 614.
G. District Court Remand
On remand, the district court considered the remaining habeas claims.
While the habeas petition initially argued eight grounds for relief, only
two remained contested. Corcoran v. Buss, No. 3:05-CV-389, 2013 WL
140378, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 10, 2013), aff’d sub nom. Corcoran v. Neal, 783
F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2015). Corcoran’s counsel claimed “that in imposing the
death penalty the trial court improperly considered non-statutory
aggravating circumstances and failed to consider mitigating evidence, all
in violation of the petitioner’s constitutional rights as secured by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. They also claimed “that
Indiana’s Death Penalty Statute is facially unconstitutional because it does
not distinguish between circumstances that warrant a sentence of death
and circumstances that warrant a sentence of life imprisonment without
parole.” Id. The district court rejected both claims, explaining that “[b]oth
claims were adjudicated on the merits by the Indiana Supreme Court,
which ruled in favor of the State,” and counsel had not demonstrated
error as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Id.
H. Second Seventh Circuit Appeal
Corcoran again appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed.
Corcoran v. Neal, 783 F.3d 676, 677 (7th Cir. 2015). The court explained that
its earlier opinion disagreed with our Court’s assessment that the trial
judge did not in fact rely on nonstatutory aggravating factors, but that
vacated decision “did not adequately grapple with the deference owed to
state-court factual findings under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act.” Id. After “[g]iving the matter a fresh look,” the court
concluded our “factual determination was not unreasonable.” Id. The
court further concluded that our Court “reasonably determined that the
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
16a
Page 15 of 29
trial judge considered all proffered evidence in mitigation,” and “[t]he
sentencer’s obligation to consider mitigating evidence in a capital case
does not require that the evidence be credited or given any particular
weight in the final sentencing decision.” Id. at 677–78.
III. State’s Motion to Set Execution Date
At that point, there was no remaining litigation and no stay of
execution.
On June 26, 2024, the State filed a Verified Motion to Set Execution
Date. It explained that “Corcoran has completed state and federal review
of his convictions and sentence.” Mot. at 1, ¶ 2. And “[n]ow that the
federal courts have denied Corcoran’s federal habeas petition, no further
grounds for review of the validity of his convictions or sentence are
available.” Id. at 3, ¶ 3. Because “[t]his Court has the exclusive jurisdiction
to stay the execution of a death sentence as well as the duty to order a new
execution date when the stay is lifted,” the State requested that we set the
date for Corcoran’s execution. Id. at 3–4, ¶ 5.
The State Public Defender filed a Response to Motion to Set Execution
Date, which began by quoting the dissents from Justice Rucker and Judge
Williams, and then arguing that the Court should deny the motion
because “executing the unquestionably seriously mentally ill Appellant
would violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I, § 16 of the Indiana Constitution.” Resp. at 1. The evidence on
which the State Public Defender relied came from the previous direct
appeal record and the previous competency proceedings record. See id. at
2 n.1, 18.
We granted the State’s motion, explaining our limited role given the
procedural posture. We acknowledged that “a petitioner can raise claims
involving previously undiscovered evidence through a written petition
under Section 35-50-2-9(k), raise constitutional claims through a successive
petition for post-conviction relief under Post-Conviction Rule 1(12), or
raise challenges to an execution protocol through a civil lawsuit.” Order at
2. But Corcoran had not pursued any such claims, and the evidence the
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
17a
Page 16 of 29
State Public Defender cited in the response brief was not new. Id. We
therefore granted the State’s motion on September 11, 2024, and set an
execution date of December 18, leaving over three months for the State to
undertake preparations for an execution and for Corcoran to pursue any
remaining remedies he believed warranted.
IV. State Public Defender’s Current Motions for
Permission to File Successive Petitions
For most of that time, neither Corcoran nor anyone on his behalf
pursued any claims. But on November 15, 2024, the State Public Defender
filed four submissions in our Court: two motions (with proposed
petitions) seeking permission to file two successive post-conviction relief
petitions, and two motions to stay the execution (one motion for each
petition) while those petitions are litigated.
The first proposed Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
argues: (1) that Corcoran’s death sentence violates the ban on “cruel and
unusual” punishments in the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
because he is severely mentally ill, and executing the severely mentally ill
is cruel and unusual; (2) Corcoran’s death sentence violates the ban on
“cruel and unusual punishments” in Article One, Section 16 of the Indiana
Constitution for the same reason; and (3) Corcoran’s death sentence
violates the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution because the State is treating the severely mentally ill
different than the intellectually disabled and juveniles, whom the State
will not execute. The second proposed Successive Petition for PostConviction Relief argues that “Corcoran is not currently competent to be
executed under Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), and Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986),” because the State Public Defender does
not believe Corcoran can “rationally understand his execution or the
reason for it.” [Second] Successive Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 1–2,
15.
We have jurisdiction because of the death sentence, Ind. Appellate Rule
4(A)(1)(a), and we expedited briefing on the motions. That briefing closed
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
18a
Page 17 of 29
on December 3, 2024, fifteen days before the execution date. Each member
of the Court reviewed the submissions as they were filed, and the Court
discussed the submissions at a conference after the briefing concluded. To
afford counsel the benefit of the remaining time before the execution date
to pursue any relief they believe appropriate in the federal courts, we
immediately issued an order reflecting the Court’s decision denying the
motions on December 5, with this opinion explaining the reasoning a few
days later.
Discussion and Decision
“Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime by a
court of this state,” Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(a), ”has the right to
collaterally attack that conviction or sentence through a petition for postconviction relief.” Shaw v. State, 130 N.E.3d 91, 92 (Ind. 2019). “But a
second or successive post-conviction petition cannot be filed without prior
authorization from this Court (in capital appeals) or the Court of Appeals
(in all other appeals), either of which ‘will authorize the filing of the
petition if the petitioner establishes a reasonable possibility’ that the
petitioner is entitled to relief.” Id. (quoting P-C. R. 1(12)). “By permitting
successive post-conviction petitions only when the petitioner makes some
showing of merit, this appellate screening function reduces the burden on
trial courts.” Id.
“In deciding whether a petitioner has made the required showing, we
consider the applicable law, the successive post-conviction papers,
materials from the prior appeals and post-conviction proceedings
including the record, briefs and court decisions, and any other material we
deem relevant.” Wrinkles v. State, 915 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ind. 2009). “Postconviction proceedings are not a ‘super-appeal’; rather, the grounds
enumerated in the Post-Conviction Rules are limited to issues that were
not known at the time of the original trial or that were not available on
direct appeal.” Shaw, 130 N.E.3d at 92–93 (quotations omitted). If we were
to authorize the successive post-conviction petitions proposed here,
Corcoran would have a right to appointed counsel, and the case would
return to the trial court for proceedings consistent with Post-Conviction
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
19a
Page 18 of 29
Rule 1(12)(c). See Baird v. State, 833 N.E.2d 28, 30 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied,
546 U.S. 924 (2005).
Corcoran has informed us that he does not wish to assert any further
claims in the courts, including that he does not wish to file any successive
petitions for post-conviction relief. His affidavit states bluntly: “I, Joseph
Edward Corcoran, do not wish to litigate my case further.” Affidavit at
1—2, ¶ 3; id. (“I am hereby making this statement to the Court through
this affidavit: I do not wish to proceed with more and/or endless
litigation.”). The State Public Defender confirms that remains his wish.
[Second] Mot. for Stay of Execution at 6 (“Indeed, currently, Mr. Corcoran
wants to be executed . . . .”).
Nevertheless, the State Public Defender seeks permission to file two
successive post-conviction relief petitions on his behalf anyway. The State
argues we should not authorize the filings because Corcoran has not
signed them and does not authorize them, and even if he had signed or
authorized them, there is not a reasonable possibility that he is entitled to
post-conviction relief. We agree with the State that we must deny the State
Public Defender’s motions for two independently sufficient reasons.
First, Corcoran does not wish to pursue post-conviction relief. Our
Court has already concluded he is competent to make that decision, and a
key premise of the State Public Defender’s submissions is that nothing has
changed about Corcoran’s condition since then. Second, the submissions
do not demonstrate a reasonable possibility that Corcoran is entitled to
relief.
I.
Corcoran’s Competency to Waive Post-Conviction
Relief
As we held in the previous appeal of the post-conviction court’s
determination that Corcoran is competent to waive post-conviction
remedies, a petitioner seeking those remedies must authorize the petition
unless they are incompetent to do so. Corcoran v. State, 820 N.E.2d 655, 663
(Ind.), aff'd on reh'g, 827 N.E.2d 542 (Ind. 2005) (“Corcoran himself did not
authorize this proceeding within the timeframe required by Criminal Rule
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
20a
Page 19 of 29
24(H) and without his authority, neither the trial court in this proceeding
nor this Court has jurisdiction to review claims for post-conviction
relief.”). The State Public Defender says that, for a couple reasons, it
doesn’t matter that Corcoran didn’t sign the two proposed petitions, but
we disagree with each.
First, the State Public Defender argues that “attorneys are agents of
their clients,” so they can always sign on their client’s behalf. Reply at 13.
This argument misses the more fundamental point: “It is the primary duty
of an agent to obey the instructions given by the principal,” and “[t]he
essence of an agency relation is the right of the principal to give directions
that the agent is under a duty to obey as long as they remain the agent.”
2A C.J.S. Agency § 295; see also Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.09(2)
(Am. Law Inst. 2006) (“An agent has a duty to comply with all lawful
instructions received from the principal and persons designated by the
principal concerning the agent’s actions on behalf of the principal.”). So
even if the attorneys are Corcoran’s agents who can sign filings on his
behalf, he still has to authorize them to file the successive petitions unless
he is incompetent to waive post-conviction relief. Corcoran, 820 N.E.2d at
663.
That competency question has been thoroughly litigated in both state
and federal courts, which have concluded Corcoran is competent to waive
post-conviction remedies after reviewing the same extensive evidentiary
record that the State Public Defender relies on now. As the Seventh Circuit
described, our Court “gave careful consideration of all the evidence
presented at the post-conviction hearing” and then concluded Corcoran
“had a clear awareness of the status of his case and what was at risk if he
waived further review,” and that “his request to waive further
proceedings was based on his belief that death is a just punishment for his
crimes.” Corcoran v. Buss, 551 F.3d 703, 712 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted,
judgment vacated sub nom. Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 558 U.S. 1 (2009), and
opinion reinstated sub nom. Corcoran v. Wilson, 651 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2011).
Second, the State Public Defender argues it would be bad policy “to
deprive a mentally ill person access to the court to litigate competency
simply because they do not sign a petition.” Reply at 14. Depriving that
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
21a
Page 20 of 29
access, the argument goes, would deny the person of “access to the courts
to evaluate their mental illness because of their mental illness.” Id. at 15.
But Corcoran’s competency to waive post-conviction relief has already
been litigated in state and federal courts. And the State Public Defender
does not claim Corcoran’s condition has changed such that while he was
previously competent to waive post-conviction remedies, he is no longer
competent. Instead, the State Public Defender confirmed Corcoran’s
condition is the same as it has been for decades. [Second] Successive Pet.
for Post-Conviction Relief at 14 (“As he has for twenty years, he experiences
auditory hallucinations, psychosis, and the ever-present delusions
. . . .”(emphasis added)).
Because our Court has concluded that Corcoran is competent to waive
post-conviction remedies and he has again elected to do so, we do not
authorize the successive petitions.
II. Appellate Screening
The State Public Defender’s motions fail for another reason: they do not
demonstrate a reasonable possibility that Corcoran is entitled to postconviction relief through either petition.
A. First Proposed Petition
The first proposed petition seeks relief based on arguments that
Corcoran’s death sentence violates: (1) the ban on “cruel and unusual”
punishments in the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because
he is severely mentally ill, and executing the severely mentally ill is cruel
and unusual; (2) the ban on “cruel and unusual punishments” in Article
One, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution for the same reason; and (3)
the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution because the State is treating the severely mentally ill different
than the intellectually disabled and juveniles, whom the State will not
execute. There is no reasonable possibility of success on this petition for at
least two threshold reasons.
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
22a
Page 21 of 29
First, the State Public Defender lacks standing to make these
arguments. As we said the last time these arguments were made on
Corcoran’s behalf contrary to his wishes: “We hold that the State Public
Defender does not have standing to raise the other claims she presents
without Corcoran’s consent.” Corcoran v. State, 820 N.E.2d 655, 664–65
(Ind.), aff’d on reh’g, 827 N.E.2d 542 (Ind. 2005). We agreed with the State
that the State Public Defender’s standing was limited to litigating
Corcoran’s competency to waive post-conviction relief. Id. at 658.
Second, as we also observed in that opinion, these arguments “appear
to constitute free-standing claims of error that would not be available for
post-conviction review.” Id. at 663. “Indiana’s Post-Conviction Rule 1(8)
addresses res judicata and procedural default.” Isom v. State, 235 N.E.3d
150, 151 (Ind. 2024). That rule says: “All grounds for relief available to a
petitioner under this rule must be raised in his original petition.” P-C.R.
1(8). “The petitioner may raise new claims in a successive petition only if
the unraised claims ‘could not have been raised in earlier proceedings.’”
Isom, 235 N.E.3d at 152 (quoting Matheney v. State, 834 N.E.2d 658, 662
(Ind. 2005)).
“Unraised claims that are ‘knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently
waived . . . may not be the basis for a subsequent petition’ absent a
sufficient reason [they were] not asserted.’” Id. (quoting P-C.R. 1(8)).
“Unraised claims that should have been raised previously are waived or
‘procedurally defaulted.’” Id. (quoting Matheney, 834 N.E.2d at 662). “Our
res judicata doctrine bars relitigating post-conviction claims that have
already been decided.” Id. (cleaned up). Claims that it would be
unconstitutional for the State to execute Corcoran because of his mental
illness could have been, and indeed were, raised in the previous
proceedings. Corcoran, 820 N.E.2d at 657, 662 (rejecting the claim that “it
would be unconstitutional to execute a severely mentally ill person, such
as Corcoran” (quotations omitted)).
Because the State Public Defender lacks standing to raise these claims,
and procedurally defaulted claims have no chance of success anyway, the
State Public Defender has not demonstrated a reasonable possibility of
success with the first-filed petition.
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
23a
Page 22 of 29
B.
Second Proposed Petition
The State Public Defender’s second Successive Petition for PostConviction Relief argues Corcoran is not competent to be executed.
Specifically, she argues that “Corcoran is not currently competent to be
executed under Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), and Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986),” because, she says, Corcoran cannot
“rationally understand his execution or the reason for it.” [Second]
Successive Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 1–2. Like the first petition,
this petition does not demonstrate a reasonable possibility that Corcoran
is entitled to relief.
1.
Eighth Amendment Limitations
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits “cruel and
unusual punishments,” U.S. Const. amend. VIII, and that prohibition is
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Jones v.
Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 105 (2021). The United States Supreme Court
interprets that bar on cruel and unusual punishments as prohibiting the
execution of a prisoner who has “lost his sanity” after sentencing, Ford,
477 U.S. at 406, which, in this context, means they “are unaware of the
punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it,” id. at
422 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Timberlake v. State, 858 N.E.2d 625, 628–
29 (Ind. 2006) (explaining that “persons are incompetent to be executed if
they are insane; persons are insane if they are unaware of the punishment
they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it”).
“The critical question is whether a prisoner’s mental state is so
distorted by a mental illness that he lacks a rational understanding of the
State’s rationale for his execution.” Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 265, 269
(2019) (cleaned up). In other words, “the issue is whether a prisoner’s
concept of reality is so impaired that he cannot grasp the execution’s
meaning and purpose or the link between his crime and its punishment.”
Id. (cleaned up). Prisoners are “presumed to be” competent to be executed.
Timberlake, 858 N.E.2d at 628. And to litigate the question of competence to
be executed, the movant must make a “substantial threshold showing,”
Panetti, 551 U.S. at 949, that their mental illness prevents them from
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
24a
Page 23 of 29
“‘rational[ly] understanding’ why the State seeks to impose” the death
penalty, Madison, 586 U.S. at 267.
A couple key considerations inspire the U.S. Supreme Court’s
understanding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits executing those who
lack a rational understanding of the execution even though their mental
illness does not excuse their crime and they were competent to be
convicted. One is “a moral intuition that killing one who has no capacity
to understand his crime or punishment simply offends humanity.” Id. at
268 (quotations omitted). And the other is “the lack of retributive value in
executing a person who has no comprehension of the meaning of the
community’s judgment.” Id.
2.
Corcoran’s Competency to be Executed
We agree with the State that the State Public Defender has not made the
substantial threshold showing that Corcoran’s mental illness prevents him
from rationally understanding why the State seeks to impose the death
penalty. To the contrary, Corcoran has demonstrated that he does have a
rational understanding. As he explained in his recent affidavit, he
“understand[s] that if this Court rejects [his] counsel’s petition the death
warrant will be carried out.” Affidavit at 2, ¶ 4. He “will then be put to
death for the heinous crime [he] committed,” and he understands the
“execution will end [his] life.” Id.
His rational understanding includes the State’s reason for executing
him. He explains: “I understand the execution, in the interest of judgment,
serves as both a punishment and a deterrent.” Id. He also has a
sophisticated, rational understanding of the proceedings. He says in his
affidavit: “I remind this Court that my competence to waive my appeals
has been adjudicated throughout the extensive appeal process.” Id. at 2,
¶ 5. And while he understands counsel’s strategy “to delay any and all
executions through endless litigation” with the “hope to set a precedent so
all future death penalty cases can be endlessly litigated effectively putting
an end to all executions,” id. at 1, ¶ 2, he does “not wish to litigate [his]
case further,” because he is “guilty of the crime [he] was convicted of,”
and he “accept[s] the findings of all the appellate courts,” id. at 1–2, ¶ 3.
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
25a
Page 24 of 29
“The long drawn out appeal history has addressed all the issues [he]
wished to appeal.” Id.
That reaffirms what he has been saying for twenty years, and what
we’ve previously considered to be a rational understanding. In the
competency proceedings to evaluate whether he could waive postconviction review, the courts credited his testimony that he understood
that he was being executed “for what [he had] done,” and he agreed “the
death penalty is a just punishment for four counts of murder.” Corcoran,
820 N.E.2d at 660–61. He said the same thing to the federal courts,
explaining that “since [he is] guilty of murder,” he “should be executed.”
Ex. 2 to Resp. in Opp’n to Mots. at 1. And he still thought “the death
penalty is a just punishment for someone who is guilty of four counts of
murder.” Id.
The State Public Defender argues that while Corcoran has a factual
understanding that the State is going to execute him as punishment for his
crime, that doesn’t necessarily mean he has a rational understanding. And
the State Public Defender points to Panetti to illustrate the distinction. In
Panetti, the prisoner understood the state was saying that it wished to
execute him for his murders, but “he believe[d] in earnest that the stated
reason [was] a ‘sham’ and the State in truth want[ed] to execute him ‘to
stop him from preaching.’” 551 U.S. at 955. The U.S. Supreme Court
explained that “the principles set forth in Ford are put at risk by a rule that
deems delusions relevant only with respect to the State’s announced reason
for a punishment or the fact of an imminent execution, as opposed to the
real interests the State seeks to vindicate.” Id. at 959 (citation omitted)
(emphases added). So if a prisoner is under the delusion that the State’s
stated reasons for punishment are a sham, then the prisoner is
incompetent even though they understand what the State is claiming are
the reasons.
But that isn’t the case here. The State Public Defender doesn’t claim,
and there is no substantial threshold showing that, Corcoran has a
delusional belief that the State has some reason for punishing him other
than the reasons the State claims. No doubt, the State Public Defender
points to evidence that some of Corcoran’s other beliefs are irrational, but
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
26a
Page 25 of 29
his understanding of his execution is not. Virtually all the evidence the
State Public Defender cites is the evidence we previously considered when
determining Corcoran could waive post-conviction remedies. She does
identify minimal new evidence—Corcoran’s recent writings which reflect
continued delusional thinking. But that is offered only to demonstrate that
Corcoran’s condition remains the same, not that it has changed and he is
no longer competent to be executed. [Second] Successive Pet. for PostConviction Relief at 14 (“Now in 2024, Mr. Corcoran continues to suffer
the debilitating symptoms of his paranoid schizophrenia. As he has for
twenty years, he experiences auditory hallucinations, psychosis, and the
ever-present delusions . . . .”); id. at 15 (“In short, Mr. Corcoran’s
longstanding and documented mental illness continues to torment him as
it did at the time of the 1997 offense.” (emphasis added)).
Many capital cases involving prisoners with similar mental illnesses
illustrate that a prisoner can suffer from delusions that do not render them
incompetent for execution. For example, in Timberlake, our court rejected
the Ford claim even though Timberlake suffered from chronic paranoid
schizophrenia because he had “the mental capacity to understand that he
[was] about to be executed and why.” Timberlake, 858 N.E.2d at 626.
Timberlake suffered under “a paranoid delusional system resulting in his
belief that a secret machine, operated by the government, controls,
monitors and tortures people through their brains.” Id. at 629.
Nevertheless, Dr. George F. Parker—who also examined Corcoran,
Corcoran, 820 N.E.2d at 661—explained after examining Timberlake that
while it was “abundantly clear that Mr. Timberlake was severely mentally
ill, and suffers from essentially continuous auditory hallucinations,” he
“remained relatively organized regarding his legal status,” and he
“demonstrated an awareness that he had been convicted of the murder of
a state police officer and had been sentenced to death as a result of his
conviction.” Timberlake, 858 N.E.2d at 629. Thus, “despite abundant
evidence of psychotic systems, including constant auditory hallucinations
and a complex and organized paranoid delusional system, it was clear . . .
that Mr. Timberlake had the mental capacity to understand that he was
about to be executed and why he was to be executed.” Id. at 629–30. Based
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
27a
Page 26 of 29
on that evidence, we denied the request for further review and set an
execution date. Id. at 630.
The State Public Defender has provided plenty of evidence that
Corcoran suffers from a mental illness. But despite his mental illness,
Corcoran has demonstrated he understands why he is being executed, and
the State Public Defender has not provided any evidence suggesting that
Corcoran’s understanding is irrational. When concluding that Corcoran
was competent to waive post-conviction remedies, we concluded that he
has a non-delusional understanding of these legal proceedings. And part
of what we relied on was his “reasoning that his death sentence is
commensurate with the crime he committed (the conclusion to which both
the original trial court jury and judge came).” Corcoran, 820 N.E.2d at 661.
We acknowledge, as the State Public Defender argues, that the inquiries
for competency to waive post-conviction remedies and competency to be
executed are not identical, and a claim challenging competency for
execution is not ripe until the execution is scheduled. But those inquiries
do overlap where it is relevant here. Our determination that Corcoran
could waive his post-conviction remedies included an analysis of whether
his mental illness interfered with his ability to understand why the State
was executing him. And now that a challenge to competency for execution
is ripe, there is no indication that Corcoran’s understanding of why he is
to be executed has changed. Every indication is that it remains the same.
At bottom, the State Public Defender’s arguments are rehashing the
debates between the majorities and the dissents in the previous state and
federal opinions evaluating Corcoran’s competency, and that is not an
adequate basis for further delaying the execution.
There is therefore no substantial threshold showing that Corcoran is not
competent to be executed.
III. Motions for Stay
The two pending motions seek a stay of execution so that the successive
petitions can be litigated. Because we do not authorize those petitions, we
deny both motions for stay.
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
28a
Page 27 of 29
Conclusion
For these reasons, we decline to authorize the petitions for successive
post-conviction relief, and we deny the requests for a stay of execution.
Our rules permit—but do not require—a petition for rehearing. Rehearing
should not be sought if counsel intend to again make the arguments we
have already addressed. But if they do petition for rehearing, the petition
must be filed no later than 12:00 p.m. on Thursday, December 12, 2024.
The State’s response must be filed no later than 12:00 p.m. on Friday,
December 13, 2024. There will be no further responsive briefing, and no
extensions of time for filing will be granted.
Massa and Slaughter, JJ., concur.
Goff, J., dissents with separate opinion in which Rush, C.J., joins.
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER
Amy E. Karozos
Public Defender of Indiana
Joanna L. Green
Laura L. Volk
Deputy Public Defenders
Indianapolis, Indiana
Laurence E. Komp
Federal Public Defender Office
Kansas City, Missouri
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Angela Sanchez
Chief Counsel of Appeals
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
29a
Page 28 of 29
Tyler Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350 | December 10, 2024
30a
Page 29 of 29
Goff, J., dissenting.
There is no penalty more severe—more irrevocable—than death. So,
when reviewing cases imposing this penalty, justice demands not haste
but precision and care. Guaranteeing this demand constitutionally
requires ensuring a prisoner is competent to be executed.
A trio of decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court provides the proper
considerations. In Ford v. Wainwright, the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits executing prisoners “whose mental illness
prevents” them “from comprehending the reasons for the penalty or its
implications.” 477 U.S. 399, 417 (1986). The Court later clarified that the
question is whether the prisoner can “reach a rational understanding of
the reason for the execution.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958
(2007). And, most recently, the Court recognized that execution “lacks
retributive purpose when a mentally ill prisoner cannot understand the
societal judgment underlying [their] sentence.” Madison v. Alabama, 586
U.S. 265, 279 (2019). To that end, “[a] prisoner’s awareness of the State’s
rationale for an execution is not the same as a rational understanding of
it.” Panetti, 551 U.S. at 959. When an evidentiary threshold showing is
made that a prisoner lacks this understanding, a hearing must be held to
evaluate competency. See id. at 949–50; Baird v. State, 833 N.E.2d 28, 29
(Ind. 2005). And this showing can be made through “observations by lay
persons, including a prisoner’s attorney, and older assessments by
experts.” Timberlake v. State, 858 N.E.2d 625, 627 (Ind. 2006).
The evidence submitted by Corcoran’s attorneys reveals a documented
history of severe mental illness, an inability to cooperate with counsel, and
a desire to be executed to escape prison—all of which raise substantial
questions about his current mental capacity. As a result, we should stay
Corcoran’s execution to allow his attorneys to seek successive postconviction relief to litigate his current competency. But at a minimum, we
should stay Corcoran’s execution and order a psychiatric examination.
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350| December 10, 2024
31a
Page 1 of 7
I. Evidence submitted by Corcoran’s attorneys
raises substantial questions about his
competency to be executed.
The critical question under the Eighth Amendment is whether
Corcoran’s “mental state is so distorted by a mental illness that he lacks a
rational understanding of the State’s rationale for his execution.” Madison,
586 U.S. at 269 (cleaned up). In other words, we must ask whether
Corcoran’s “concept of reality is so impaired that he cannot grasp the
execution’s meaning and purpose or the link between his crime and its
punishment.” Id. (cleaned up).
The evidence before us—consisting of prior expert evaluations and
contemporary accounts and reports—raise significant concerns about
whether Corcoran has the requisite rational understanding.
A. Every medical expert to have examined Corcoran has
found him to be seriously mentally ill.
At various points throughout Corcoran’s capital proceedings, at least
five different medical experts have found him incompetent. In 1999, two
psychiatrists—Dr. Philip Coons and Dr. Larry Davis—concluded that
Corcoran’s paranoid schizophrenia prevented “his ability to assist his
attorney in his defense,” effectively rendering him incompetent to stand
trial. Def.’s Pre-Sent. Memo., Supp. R. Vol. 1, pp. 23, 24. And at a 2003
post-conviction competency hearing, three experts—forensic psychiatrist
Dr. George Parker, clinical psychologist Dr. Robert Kaplan, and
neuropsychologist Dr. Edmund Haskins—testified to Corcoran’s
incompetency to waive his appeals. Post-Conviction Comp. Tr., pp. 13, 59,
66. According to these experts, Corcoran was not engaging in rational
decision-making but electing to avoid post-conviction review because of
his delusion that the prison was torturing him with an ultrasound
machine. Id. at 11–12, 14, 50, 53, 66–67.
To ignore these findings now and proceed with execution without a
current competency evaluation amounts to enabling his delusions—a
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350| December 10, 2024
32a
Page 2 of 7
state-sanctioned escape from suffering rather than a measured act of
justice. See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 960 (recognizing that “[t]he beginning of
doubt about competence . . . . is a psychotic disorder”).
B. Corcoran’s mental illness distorts his ability to
rationally engage with the legal process.
Corcoran has consistently displayed an inability to cooperate with
counsel and act rationally throughout his legal proceedings. His trial
counsel recently submitted affidavits confirming that Corcoran’s reasons
for rejecting the State’s plea offer “defied logic” and that they had
“difficulties . . . consulting with Corcoran in a rational or logical manner.”
Affidavit of Mark Thoma, pp. 1, 3; Affidavit of John Nimmo, p. 1. To those
points, Dr. Coons explained at trial that Corcoran’s “refusal to accept
either a plea bargain or a bench trial without the death penalty was a
product of his mental illness.” Def.’s Pre-Sent. Memo., Supp. R. Vol. 1, p.
24. As explained in Section I.A, evidence shows during post-conviction
proceedings that Corcoran continued to lack a rational understanding of
his decisions; the same was true during his federal habeas proceedings.
Corcoran’s Reply Br. at 3–4. And just last week, Corcoran’s attorneys
observed that he has never been able to “assist counsel with his defense”
or “make rational decisions about his case.” Id. at 4–5.
Corcoran’s persistent refusal to cooperate with counsel underscores his
impaired ability to assess and act on his own legal options. This is not a
tactical choice; it is the result of his mental illness, as documented by
expert testimony over decades. Allowing a person to “volunteer” for
execution—whether by choosing to withhold mitigating evidence at
sentencing, waiving the right to appellate review, or electing not to seek
post-conviction relief—threatens to undermine the state’s heightenedreliability interests in death-penalty cases, Anthony J. Casey, Maintaining
the Integrity of Death: An Argument for Restricting a Defendant’s Right to
Volunteer for Execution at Certain Stages in Capital Proceedings, 30 Am. J.
Crim. L. 75, 76–77, 97 (2002), and ultimately “threatens to diminish public
confidence in the integrity of the judicial system,” Wright v. State, 168
N.E.3d 244, 262 (Ind. 2021). Corcoran’s constant irrational behaviors raise
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350| December 10, 2024
33a
Page 3 of 7
constitutional red flags that demand scrutiny. See Richard J. Bonnie,
Mentally Ill Prisoners on Death Row: Unsolved Puzzles for Courts and
Legislatures, 54 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1169, 1181 (2005) (“The possibility,
however slim, that incompetent individuals may not be able to assist
counsel in reconstructing a viable factual or legal claim requires that
executions be barred under these circumstances.”).
Additionally, considering this Court previously recognized counsel’s
standing to litigate Corcoran’s competency to waive post-conviction relief
on his behalf without written consent, see Corcoran v. State, 820 N.E.2d 655,
658, 664–65 (Ind. 2005), I see no reason for depriving counsel of standing
to litigate the question of Corcoran’s current competency on his behalf.
C. Contemporaneous evidence reinforces Corcoran’s
attorneys’ incompetency claim.
Corcoran’s well-documented paranoid schizophrenia and delusions
have persisted for decades. In his world, he suffers from a speech disorder
that causes him to unintentionally disclose his innermost thoughts to
others as he sleeps. Compounding this paranoia, he believes prison
guards perpetually torture him with an ultrasound machine. So pervasive
are these delusions, Corcoran’s attorneys submit, that he simply “cannot
rationally understand the true reason for his execution.” Reply Br. at 7. In
his mind, Corcoran views execution not as punishment but as the only
path to escaping the torment from which he suffers.
Contemporaneous evidence bolsters these observations. In March 2024,
for example, medical records from the Department of Correction reported
an “observable concern” with Corcoran’s “expressed delusions,” noting
his belief that an “ultrasonic machine” perpetually controls his “thoughts,
sleep, voice, etc.” Memo. in Support of Successive PCR, Att. A, pp. 2, 3.
And in a recently published “whistle-blower report,” Corcoran, writing
under a pen name, perpetuates these delusions, describing the use of
“ultrasonic surveillance devices” by “correctional staff and other
individuals and/or agencies” and the effect these devices have on him and
other prisoners. JC Chase, A Whistle-blower Report: Electronic Harassment 18
(July 2024), Memo. in Support of Successive PCR, Att. B.
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350| December 10, 2024
34a
Page 4 of 7
II. Because ample evidence raises uncertainty over
Corcoran’s current competency, a short stay is
warranted for the necessary evaluation.
While “delusions come in many shapes and sizes . . . not all will
interfere with the understanding that the Eighth Amendment requires.”
Madison, 586 U.S. at 279. And here, Corcoran has made several statements
indicating that he understands the true meaning and purpose of his
execution. In a 2005 affidavit, he considered the death penalty “a just
punishment for someone who is guilty of four counts of murder.” State’s
Opp. Resp., Ex. 2. And in a letter to the district court the following year,
he insisted that he “intentionally killed four people knowing that such an
act was wrong,” adding that he “should be executed” for committing such
a crime. Id., Ex. 1. These statements align with sentiments he expressed in
a recently filed affidavit in which he attested to understanding the
execution “as both a punishment and a deterrent.” Affidavit of Joseph
Corcoran (Nov. 22, 2024), p. 2.
But these statements, according to Corcoran’s counsel, reflect only the
dissonance of someone attempting to mask their mental illness. Indeed,
much like his severe mental illness, Corcoran’s attempts to hide his
delusions are well-documented. Dr. Coons testified at trial that a “person
with paranoid schizophrenia generally minimizes their symptoms”—
behavior he found consistent with Corcoran’s attempts to minimize his
symptoms. R. Vol. 13, p. 2076; see also R. Vol. 11, p. 1658 (Dr. Eric Engum,
another trial expert, testifying to Corcoran’s “secretive” behavior, which
he found “consistent with the paranoia and suspiciousness”).
In any event, Corcoran’s statements do not negate the evidentiary
threshold showing that he is incompetent to be executed. They must be
weighed against two-plus decades of evidence apparently establishing
that his delusions about the ultrasound machine and sleep and speech
disorders were and are very real to him. So even if it seems that Corcoran
may understand why the State is seeking execution, the point is that we
simply do not know. Even a “prisoner’s awareness of the State’s rationale
for an execution,” his acknowledgment that “he will be executed,” and his
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350| December 10, 2024
35a
Page 5 of 7
understanding that “the reason the State has given for the execution is his
commission of the crimes in question” does not resolve the inquiry into
whether he has a “rational understanding of the reason for the execution.”
Panetti, 551 U.S. at 956–58. A competency evaluation is needed not
because Corcoran fails to acknowledge the facts of his case, but because
evidence shows that his mental illness distorts his ability to have the
requisite rational understanding.
Additionally concerning is that Corcoran’s writings reflect a desire to
be executed to avoid further imprisonment. In 2006, for example, he
expressed a desire to waive his appeals to “die and escape” prison, which
he characterized as benefit because he didn’t “want to live in prison for
the rest of [his] life.” State’s Opp. Resp., Ex. 1. And the recently filed
affidavit reflects a similar desire. See Affidavit of Joseph Corcoran (Nov.
22, 2024). The death penalty, however, is not a mechanism for granting
reprieve from suffering or a means to expedite escape from incarceration.
It is the gravest act the State can undertake, reserved for those who bear
the full weight of their moral culpability. And thus, honoring Corcoran’s
request undermines society’s interest “in not allowing the death penalty . .
. to be used as a means of state-assisted suicide.” Smith v. State, 686 N.E.2d
1264, 1275 (Ind. 1997). To accommodate Corcoran’s expressed desire and
authorize an execution sought to avoid continued incarceration violates
the dignity of both the defendant and the judicial process.
At a minimum, to comply with constitutional due process
requirements, this Court should appoint a psychiatrist to conduct a
psychiatric examination of Corcoran to render an opinion on his current
mental state. In Timberlake v. State, the petitioner made a competence claim
like the one advanced here. See Timberlake v. State, No. 49S00-0606-SD235
(Ind. Sept. 18, 2006) (unpublished order for mental examination). While
we ultimately found that Timberlake failed to make the requisite showing,
we came to that conclusion only after we ordered contemporaneous
testing—which Corcoran’s attorneys have asked us to do. There is simply
no reason to refuse this request. To the contrary, given the “irreversibility”
of a death sentence, “we should err on the side of caution in carrying out
an execution.” Baird, 833 N.E.2d at 33 (Boehm, J., dissenting).
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350| December 10, 2024
36a
Page 6 of 7
Such caution is particularly warranted here. Twenty-five years elapsed
between Corcoran being sentenced to death and the State filing a petition
asking us to set his execution date. We received that request last June, and
now, less than six months later, Corcoran is scheduled to be executed with
threshold evidence of incompetency. We should reaffirm our commitment
to the Eighth Amendment and the principles it upholds by, at minimum,
ordering a psychiatric examination of Corcoran’s current mental status.
Doing so would ensure that this irrevocable punishment aligns with
moral culpability and that we are not conflating such punishment with
escape.
Conclusion
Corcoran has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia by multiple
experts. Due to that diagnosis, he has persistently displayed an irrational
ability to assess and act on his own legal options. And, by his own words,
he wants to be executed to avoid being incarcerated for the rest of his life.
The bedrock of our constitutional order rests on the premise that
punishment must align with moral culpability. With the evidence before
us, executing Corcoran without first assessing his current mental
competence defies this foundational principle.
For these reasons, and for the reasons above, I dissent from the denial
of Corcoran’s motion to stay and motion to file a successive petition for
post-conviction relief.
Rush, C.J., joins.
Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 24S-SD-222, 02S00-0508-PD-350| December 10, 2024
37a
Page 7 of 7
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 1 of 31
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION
TAHINA CORCORAN,
Petitioner,
v.
CAUSE NO. 3:24-CV-970-JD
RON NEAL,
Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
Tahina Corcoran, by counsel and as a next friend on behalf of Joseph E.
Corcoran, filed a habeas petition challenging the timing of his execution in connection
with his conviction on four counts of murder in State v. Corcoran, Case No. 02D04-9707CF-465 (Allen Sup. Ct. filed July 31, 1997). Pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule
4, the court must dismiss the petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any
attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.”1
The petition asserts a single claim that Corcoran is not competent to be executed,
citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007),
and Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 265 (2019). Before proceeding to the merits, the court
will briefly consider the procedural soundness of this claim. Under Indiana law,
individuals may raise Ford/Panetti claims by seeking authorization to pursue a
1 On December 12, 2024, the Warden filed a response to the habeas petition without prompting
from this court. ECF 17. Except for this footnote, the court prepared this opinion without reviewing the
Warden’s response. The court has now reviewed it but did not make any changes to this opinion based
on that review.
38a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 2 of 31
successive post-conviction petition. Baird v. State, 833 N.E.2d 28, 29 (Ind. 2005) (A
[Wainwright claim] is among those that our post-conviction rule on successive postconviction petitions was designed to address.”). The record indicates that Corcoran has
pursued this avenue, so the court is satisfied that the claim is exhausted. ECF 1-1 at 16768. Panetti instructs that Ford/Panetti claims are not ripe until the execution date is set,
which typically occurs after the adjudication of an initial federal habeas petition. Id. at
943-48. Panetti further interprets the prohibition against unauthorized successive
petitions as not applying to claims that were not ripe at the time of the initial habeas
proceedings. Id. On September 11, 2024, the Indiana Supreme Court set the date of
execution for December 18, 2024. Corcoran v. State, 240 N.E.3d 701 (Ind. Sept. 11, 2024).
The court is thus satisfied that it is not allowing Corcoran to proceed on an
unauthorized successive petition or on an untimely claim.
Additionally, the court considers the related questions of whether Corcoran is
currently competent to litigate this case and whether a next friend is appropriate. These
questions are distinct from the question of whether he is currently competent to be
executed. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 166 (1990) (requiring “meaningful
evidence that [the petitioner] was suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect
that substantially affected his capacity to make an intelligent decision” to demonstrate
that a habeas petitioner is incompetent). Perhaps more critically, the court is not
required to defer to the State courts under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) to allow this case to proceed with a next friend. See 28
U.S.C. 2254(d). As a result, the court finds that Tahina Corcoran has adequately shown
2
39a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 3 of 31
that she is a proper next friend for purposes of the preliminary stages of this habeas
case. Left remaining are the issue of procedural default and the merits of the claim,
which the court will address below.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The complete procedural history of Corcoran’s legal proceedings is lengthy and
was articulated by the Indiana Supreme Court one week ago in admirable detail.
Corcoran v. State, 2024 WL 5052384, 2-8 (Ind. Dec. 10, 2024). Indeed, this court has played
a substantial role in this procedural history by resolving Corcoran’s initial habeas
proceedings. Corcoran v. Buss, 2013 WL 140378 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 10, 2013). As a result, this
court will detail only the procedural history that is particularly relevant to resolving this
habeas petition.
In 1999, a jury convicted Corcoran on four counts of murder, and the Allen
Superior Court sentenced him to death after affording “medium or low weight” to the
mitigating factor of being under the influence of mental or emotional disturbances
during the crime. Corcoran v. State, 739 N.E.2d 649, 651, 656 (Ind. 2000). Corcoran
appealed the sentence, and the Indiana Supreme Court remanded because the Allen
Superior Court might have considered improper aggravating factors. Id. at 657-58. The
Allen Superior Court resentenced Corcoran to death but this time afforded “medium
weight” to the mitigating factor of being under the influence of mental or emotional
disturbances during the crime based on the expert opinions that he suffered paranoid
personality disorder or schizotypal personality disorder. Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d
3
40a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 4 of 31
495, 498-99 (Ind. 2002). The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed this sentence on appeal,
despite Corcoran’s emphasis on the significance of his mental health. Id. at 501-02.
The Indiana Supreme Court ordered Corcoran to file any petition for postconviction relief by September 9, 2003. Corcoran v. State, 820 N.E.2d 655, 657 (Ind. 2005).
Corcoran declined, but counsel requested competency proceedings on the basis that he
was incompetent to waive post-conviction proceedings. Id. The Allen Superior Court
held a hearing, and three mental health experts presented by Corcoran’s counsel,
including Dr. Parker and Dr. Kaplan, opined that Corcoran suffered from paranoid
schizophrenia. Id. at 660. According to the experts, Corcoran had recurring delusions
that correctional officials tortured him through the use of an ultrasound machine. Id.
They opined that he could not make a rational decision regarding legal proceedings and
that his decision to waive post-conviction proceedings was “premised on his desire to
be relieved of the pain that he believes he experiences as a result of his delusions.” Id.
They further opined that his decision to waive post-conviction review could not be
rational if it was based on his irrational delusions. Id. However, Dr. Parker also opined
that Corcoran was aware of the status of his case, his death sentence, the relevant
events, and the positions of counsel. Id. at 661. Further, Dr. Kaplan opined that
Corcoran was aware that waiving post-conviction review would result in his execution.
Id.
At this hearing, Corcoran testified:
See, I want to waive my appeals because I am guilty of murder. I think
that I should be executed for what I have done and not because I am
supposedly tortured with ultrasound or whatever. I am guilty of murder.
4
41a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 5 of 31
I should be executed. That is all there is to it. That is what I believe. I
believe the death penalty is a just punishment for four counts of murder,
and I believe that I should be executed since I am guilty of four counts of
murder.
Id. at 660-61. The State attorney and the judge each questioned and confirmed his
understanding of the legal proceedings and his position, including that post-conviction
proceedings could be his last attempt to challenge his sentence. Id. at 661-62. The Allen
Superior Court found Corcoran sufficiently competent to waive post-conviction review.
Id. at 658.
On the appeal of the competency determination, the Indiana Supreme Court
found substantial evidence to support that Corcoran was “able to appreciate the gravity
of his legal position and the consequences of his choice to waive further post-conviction
review” and to support the “determination that Corcoran made his choice knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently.” Id. at 662. The Indiana Supreme Court found Corcoran’s
express denial that his delusions motivated him to waive post-conviction review and
his reasoning that his death sentence was appropriate for his crimes to be particularly
persuasive in declining to find that the Allen Superior Court’s determination was
clearly contradicted by the evidence. Id. at 661. During the pendency of this appeal,
Corcoran decided to pursue a petition for post-conviction relief, which the State courts
denied as untimely. Corcoran v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1019 (Ind. 2006); Corcoran v. State, 827
N.E.2d 542 (Ind. 2005).
In 2005, Corcoran initiated federal habeas proceedings in this court. Corcoran v.
Buss, 483 F. Supp. 2d 709, 716 (N.D. Ind. 2007). This court granted habeas relief on
5
42a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 6 of 31
grounds not relevant here but rejected the argument that the State courts erred by
finding Corcoran competent to waive post-conviction review. Id. at 729-34. This court
noted that the Indiana Supreme Court applied the standard set forth in Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant is
competent to stand trial if “he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Id. at 729-30. It also noted
reliance on the standard in Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966), in which the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a capital defendant may withdraw a petition for certiorari only after it is
determined whether “he has capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational
choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand
whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may
substantially affect his capacity in the premises.” Id. at 730. This court recounted the
evidence presented at the competency hearing and the Indiana Supreme Court’s
reasoning for affirming the competency finding. Id. at 729-33. This court found that
Corcoran’s arguments merely amounted to a request to reweigh the evidence. Id. at 733.
It concluded that the Indiana Supreme Court fully confronted the competency issue and
that its opinion was “thorough, thoughtful, and reasonable.” Id. at 733-34.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the ruling on the competency argument,
reiterating that the Indiana Supreme Court carefully considered the evidence from the
competency hearing. Corcoran v. Buss, 551 F.3d 703, 713-14. (7th Cir. 2008). It added that
preferring death to life imprisonment is not per se irrational. Id. Though the federal
6
43a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 7 of 31
habeas case was appealed and remanded on multiple occasions thereafter, the Seventh
Circuit’s ruling on this argument remained intact. Corcoran v. Wilson, 651 F.3d 611, 613
(7th Cir. 2011); Corcoran v. Buss, 2013 WL 140378, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 10, 2013). The
initial habeas case concluded only when the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in
March 2016. Corcoran v. Neal, 577 U.S. 1237 (2016).
Corcoran’s legal proceedings laid dormant for more than eight years when the
State of Indiana filed a motion to set an execution date with the Indiana Supreme Court
on June 26, 2024. Corcoran v. State, 240 N.E.3d 701 (Ind. 2024). Corcoran opposed an
execution date on the basis that he was not competent to be executed, but, on September
11, 2024, the Indiana Supreme Court set an execution date for December 18, 2024,
suggesting that Corcoran’s competency argument was more appropriately raised in a
successive petition for post-conviction relief. Id.
On November 15, 2024, Corcoran’s counsel2 filed a successive petition for postconviction relief, asserting that Corcoran was not competent to be executed. ECF 1-1 at
3-7. In the accompanying memorandum,3 counsel briefly addressed Corcoran’s mental
health before trial and at trial, and they recounted the evidence presented at the postconviction competency hearing in 2003. With respect to Corcoran’s mental condition at
the present date, counsel offered the following:
2 Given the disagreements between Corcoran and his counsel on whether to pursue a successive
petition, the court finds it necessary to distinguish between them at various points in this order.
3 In 24S-SD-222, Corcoran’s counsel filed two successive petitions for post-conviction relief each
asserting one claim with accompanying memoranda. Though they appear to have filed the wrong
memorandum in this habeas case (ECF 1-1 at 8-23), the relevant memorandum, quoted in the block text
below, is available on the State court docket.
7
44a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 8 of 31
Now in 2024, Mr. Corcoran continues to suffer the debilitating symptoms
of his paranoid schizophrenia. As he has for twenty years, he experiences
auditory hallucinations, psychosis, and the ever-present delusions
regarding the ultrasound machine he believes the prison guards are
torturing him with and his sleep disorder. For instance, records from the
Department of Correction will establish that he has received psychotropic
medications to treat the symptoms of schizophrenia for two decades;
specifically, Geodon, Haldol, Navane, and Cogentin.
Although the Indiana Department of Corrections has attempted
medicating him, his illness has proven to be resistant to treatment, and
nothing during his incarceration has cured him of his paranoid
schizophrenia. As recently as March 1, 2024, treating correctional
personnel noted:
Patient then began sharing information about what he believes to be
an ultrasonic machine here at ISP that can control his and others
thoughts, sleep, voice, etc. Patient reports it is ‘top secret’ but it
bothers him ‘endlessly all day.’ Patient reports the machine does put
him to sleep at night. Patient stated ‘others’ think I’m delusional but
I know its here.’ Writer inquired if patient ever recognizes his own
thoughts as delusional, patient avoided the question. ...Patient
denies MH symptoms and the expressed delusions are the only
observable concern.”
In short, Mr. Corcoran’s longstanding and documented mental illness
continues to torment him as it did at the time of the 1997 offense.
As exhibits, counsel attached the four-page psychotherapy session record from
which they quoted and a thirty-page document, titled, “A Whistle-blower Report:
Electronic Harassment,” written by Corcoran in June 2024. ECF 1-1 at 170-99, 206-10. In
this book, Corcoran elaborates on a conspiracy theory that government officials use
secret technology to surveil and control individuals, including himself. Id. at 170-99. It
also includes sections in which Corcoran demonstrates his extensive knowledge of
electronics, explaining the frequency and modulation of radio waves, piezoelectric
effects, transducers, and oscillators. Id. In the reply brief to the Indiana Supreme Court,
8
45a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 9 of 31
counsel also attached affidavits from trial counsel attesting that they received opinions
from medical experts in 1999 indicating that Corcoran was not competent to stand trial
but that they did not receive them in time to request a competency hearing. Id. at 200-05.
On November 22, 2024, Corcoran submitted a handwritten affidavit that he
prepared without assistance from counsel, which reads as follows:
1. I am the same Joseph Edward Corcoran who was convicted in Allen
County in 1999 of four counts of murder and sentenced to death. I am
the same Joseph Edward Corcoran who has a very extensive appeal
history. Having lost all appeals this Court has issued a death warrant
to be carried out December 18, 2024, before sunrise.
2. My assigned counsel has petitioned this Court on my behalf. They seek
to further litigate this case. Their goal, which was explained to me by
counsel, is to delay any and all executions through endless litigation.
They hope to set a precedent so all future death penalty cases can be
endlessly litigated effectively putting an end to all executions.
3. I, Joseph Edward Corcoran, do not wish to litigate my case further. I
am guilty of the crime I was convicted of, and accept the findings of all
the appellate courts. The long drawn out appeal history has addressed
all the issues I wished to appeal, such as the issue of competency.
Therefore, I am hereby making this statement to the Court through this
affidavit: I do not wish to proceed with more and/or endless litigation.
Thus, I urge this Court not to accept my counsel’s motion and petition
to litigate further.
4. I understand that if this Court rejects my counsel’s petition, the death
warrant will be carried out. I will then be put to death for the heinous
crime I committed. I understand that the execution will end my life. I
understand medically my heart will stop and all brain activity will
cease. I do not know, however, what will happen metaphysically. (But
neither does anyone else.) I understand the execution, in the interest of
judgment, serves as both a punishment and a deterrent.
5. I, Joseph Edward Corcoran, give this affidavit to the Court of my own
free will. I was not coerced into making this statement, nor was I
promised anything. I remind this Court that my competence to waive
my appeals has been adjudicated throughout the extensive appeal
9
46a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 10 of 31
process. Therefore, of my own free will and completely voluntarily,
without coercion or promise of anything, being adjudicated competent,
withdraw the motion counsel filed on my behalf. I do not wish to
litigate further. However, if this Court refuses to withdraw the motion
outright, I ask this Court to reject it on the basis that I, the appellant,
have no desire nor wish to engage in further appeals or litigation
whatsoever.
Id. at 163-66.
On December 10, 2024, the Indiana Supreme Court denied Corcoran
authorization to pursue a successive post-conviction petition. Corcoran v. State, 2024 WL
5052384 (Ind. Dec. 10, 2024). The Indiana Supreme Court noted that successive petitions
required authorization from an appellate court before they could be litigated in the
lower courts and that such authorization would be granted “if the petitioner establishes
a reasonable possibility that the petitioner is entitled to relief.” Id. at 9. The Indiana
Supreme Court first considered whether the petition was properly before it given that
Corcoran refused to sign it. Id. at 10-11. Under Indiana law, the petitioner must
authorize a post-conviction petition unless they are incompetent to do so. Id. at 10. The
Indiana Supreme Court noted that Corcoran’s counsel substantially relied on the
evidence considered at the 2004 competency hearing and argued that Corcoran
remained as incompetent now as he was then. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court observed
that it had already found Corcoran competent to waive post-conviction review on this
evidence and that the Seventh Circuit had described its analysis as careful. Id. Because
Corcoran competently declined to authorize a successive petition, so too did the Indiana
Supreme Court. Id. at 11.
10
47a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 11 of 31
The Indiana Supreme Court also considered the merits of the claim that Corcoran
was not competent to be executed and found that counsel had not made a substantial
threshold showing that his mental illness prevented him from rationally understanding
the reason for his impending execution. Id. at 12-15. The Indiana Supreme Court cited
Corcoran’s recent affidavit and found it consistent with Corcoran’s statements and the
other evidence presented at the 2004 competency hearing. Id. at 12-13. The Indiana
Supreme Court noted that counsel had submitted new evidence only for the purpose of
showing that Corcoran remained as incompetent as he was in 2004. Id. at 13. The
Indiana Supreme Court distinguished Corcoran’s understanding of his execution from
the Panetti petitioner’s understanding by observing that Panetti believed that the
Texas’s stated reason was a sham. Id. It found that, while some evidence suggested that
Corcoran was irrational and delusional in certain respects, no evidence suggested that
Corcoran was delusional with respect to his execution. Id.
As an analogous case, the Indiana Supreme Court relied on Timberlake v. State,
858 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. 2006), in which Timberlake similarly sought to demonstrate his
incompetency for execution based on his schizophrenic delusions that the government
controlled, monitored, and tortured people through a secret machine. Corcoran, 2024
WL 5052384 at 14. The Indiana Supreme Court noted that Dr. Parker, the same expert
who testified in Corcoran’s competency hearing in 2004, testified that, though
Timberlake was delusional and severely mentally ill, he had the mental capacity to
understand his imminent execution and the reasons for it. Id. Based on this testimony,
the Indiana Supreme Court denied Timberlake leave to pursue a successive petition. Id.
11
48a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 12 of 31
The Indiana Supreme Court found that counsel had similarly established Corcoran’s
severe mental illness but fell short of demonstrating that his understanding of his
execution was irrational. Id.
The Indiana Supreme Court further acknowledged that the standards for
waiving post-conviction review and for competency to be executed are not identical but
noted that their 2005 decision affirming the post-conviction competency determination
included a finding that Corcoran’s mental ability did not interfere with his ability to
understand the reasons for his execution. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court found no
evidence suggesting that Corcoran’s understanding had changed and found no
substantial threshold showing of incompetency to be executed. Id.
PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
The court considers whether the Indiana Supreme Court’s rejection of the
successive petition for lack of authorization by Corcoran constitutes procedural default.
“[A] procedural default [bars] consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas
review [when] the last state court rendering a judgment in the case clearly and
expressly states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.” Harris v. Reed, 489
U.S. 255, 263 (1989). “Accordingly, [the court] will not entertain questions of federal law
in a habeas petition when the state procedural ground relied upon in the state court is
independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Lee v.
Foster, 750 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2014). “An independent state ground will be found
when the court actually relied on the procedural bar as an independent basis for its
12
49a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 13 of 31
disposition of the case.” Id. “A state law ground is adequate when it is a firmly
established and regularly followed state practice at the time it is applied.” Id.
Here, the Indiana Supreme Court expressly denied authorization to pursue a
successive petition because Corcoran, who it found competent, did not authorize it. The
verification requirement on which the Indiana Supreme Court relied is set forth in
Section 3 of the Indiana Rules of Post-Conviction Remedies. As acknowledged by the
Indiana Supreme Court and Corcoran here, the standard for competency to waive postconviction review is a separate, though potentially overlapping, question than the
standard for competency to be executed.
The court is also aware of a single instance in which the Indiana Supreme Court
allowed a petitioner to proceed without complying with the verification requirement:
Isom v. State, 170 N.E.3d 623, 632 (Ind. 2021). Though the Indiana Supreme Court issued
only a summary order in January 2017, Isom’s petition is distinguishable from
Corcocan’s successive petition; Isom initially signed but did not verify his petition due
to mere inadvertence, his subsequent refusal to verify was a consequence of his desire
for new counsel, and he consistently disavowed any intent to waive post-conviction
review. Isom v. State, 45S00-1508-PD-508 (Ind. filed Aug. 31, 2015).4 Isom credibly
argued that his initial offering substantially complied with the verification requirement,
but the same cannot be said for Corcoran. The failure to verify the post-conviction
4 For these details, the court relies on Isom’s appellate brief filed on September 27, 2016.
13
50a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 14 of 31
petition thus appears to be an adequate and independent State ground for procedural
bar.
Further, the Indiana Supreme Court’s consideration of the merits of the
competency to be executed claim does not undermine the lack of verification as a basis
for procedural default. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 264 n.10 (“[A] state court need not fear
reaching the merits of a federal claim in an alternative holding. By its very definition,
the adequate and independent state ground doctrine requires the federal court to honor
a state holding that is a sufficient basis for the state court’s judgment, even when the
state court also relies on federal law.”). Moreover, “a federal habeas court is not the
proper body to adjudicate whether a state court correctly interpreted its own
procedural rules, even if they are the basis for a procedural default.”5 Johnson v. Foster,
786 F.3d 501, 508 (7th Cir. 2015). That said, this court and the Seventh Circuit carefully
reviewed the Indiana Supreme Court’s analysis in the prior habeas case and found it to
be more than adequate. The Indiana Supreme Court’s most recent analysis incorporated
its earlier analysis and reasonably found that the new evidence offered by Corcoran’s
counsel was merely consistent with its earlier understanding of Corcoran’s mental
condition. Therefore, the court cannot grant habeas relief because the claim that
5 Johnson further noted exceptions to this rule in instances of “obvious subterfuge to evade
consideration of a federal issue” or a record where it was “clear that the claim had been properly raised.”
786 F.3d at 508 n.7. But, here, the Indiana Supreme Court considered the underlying federal claim, and
while Corcoran’s counsel reasonably argued that they had properly raised the Ford/Panetti claim, his
competency to waive the opportunity to seek authorization for a successive petition was reasonably
disputed by the State.
14
51a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 15 of 31
Corcoran is incompetent to be executed is procedurally defaulted. Nevertheless, for the
sake of completeness, the court will consider the merits of the claim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Federal habeas review . . . exists as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the
state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through
appeal.” Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015).
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
[This] standard is intentionally difficult to meet. We have explained that
clearly established Federal law for purposes of §2254(d)(1) includes only
the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions. And an
unreasonable application of those holdings must be objectively
unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice. To
satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to show that the state
court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking
in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.
Woods, 575 U.S. at 316. To warrant relief, a state court’s decision must be more than
incorrect or erroneous; it must be objectively unreasonable. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510, 520 (2003). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal
15
52a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 16 of 31
habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state
court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011).
However, “[w]hen a state court’s adjudication of a claim is dependent on an
antecedent unreasonable application of federal law, the requirement set forth in §
2254(d)(1) is satisfied.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007). “A federal court
must then resolve the claim without the deference AEDPA otherwise requires.” Id.
PRECEDENTIAL SUPREME COURT CASES
As detailed above, to obtain habeas relief, Corcoran must demonstrate that the
State court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Consequently, the court will detail the Ford/Panetti line of
opinions issued by the Supreme Court.
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
In 1974, Ford was sentenced to death. In 1982, Ford began to experience
delusions while in prison. Id. at 401. Ford sought the assistance of a psychiatrist, who
evaluated Ford for fourteen months and concluded in 1983 that Ford suffered from a
mental condition resembling paranoid schizophrenia that substantially affected his
“present ability to assist in the defense of his life.” Id. at 402-03. Another physician
examined Ford, who made statements such as, “I know there is some sort of death
penalty, but I’m free to go whenever I want because it would be illegal and the
executioner would be executed,” and, ““I can’t be executed because of the landmark
case. I won. Ford v. State will prevent executions all over.” Id. at 403. The physician
16
53a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 17 of 31
concluded that Ford did not understand that he was being executed or the connection
between his offense of murder and the death penalty. Id.
Ford initiated the Florida procedure for competency determinations for
condemned inmates. Id. Pursuant to that procedure, the Governor appointed three
psychiatrists, who jointly interviewed Ford for thirty minutes and concluded that Ford
understood the death penalty and the reasons for imposing it on him. Id. at 403-04. In
April 1984, the Governor, without explanation, signed a death warrant for Ford. Id. at
404. Though Ford also submitted written materials, the Governor did not indicate that
he had considered them. Id. Ford unsuccessfully sought an evidentiary hearing in State
court before filing a federal habeas petition. Id.
On habeas appeal, the Supreme Court examined the common law and invoked
the evolving standards of decency to hold, “The Eighth Amendment prohibits the State
from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.” Id. at 406-10. It then
considered the adequacy of the Florida procedure used to safeguard this constitutional
right. Id. at 413-16. The Supreme Court found the procedure to be deficient because: (1)
it “preclude[d] the prisoner or his counsel from presenting material relevant to his
sanity or bar[red] consideration of that material by the factfinder;” (2) it failed “to afford
the prisoner’s representative any opportunity to clarify or challenge the state experts’
opinions or methods;” and (3) Florida placed “the decision wholly within the executive
branch.” Id.
In closing, the Supreme Court disavowed any suggestion that the Constitution
required a “full trial on the issue of sanity” but left it to the States to develop
17
54a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 18 of 31
appropriate procedures. Id. at 416-18. It further observed that “[i]t may be that some
high threshold showing on behalf of the prisoner will be found a necessary means to
control the number of nonmeritorious or repetitive claims of insanity.” Id. In his
concurrence,6 Justice Powell echoed these sentiments as follows:
Second, petitioner does not make his claim of insanity against a neutral
background. On the contrary, in order to have been convicted and
sentenced, petitioner must have been judged competent to stand trial, or
his competency must have been sufficiently clear as not to raise a serious
question for the trial court. The State therefore may properly presume that
petitioner remains sane at the time sentence is to be carried out, and may
require a substantial threshold showing of insanity merely to trigger the
hearing process.
Finally, the sanity issue in this type of case does not resemble the basic
issues at trial or sentencing. Unlike issues of historical fact, the question of
petitioner’s sanity calls for a basically subjective judgment. And unlike the
determination of whether the death penalty is appropriate in a particular
case, the competency determination depends substantially on expert
analysis in a discipline fraught with “subtleties and nuances.” This
combination of factors means that ordinary adversarial procedures—
complete with live testimony, cross-examination, and oral argument by
counsel—are not necessarily the best means of arriving at sound,
consistent judgments as to a defendant’s sanity.
We need not determine the precise limits that due process imposes in this
area. In general, however, my view is that a constitutionally acceptable
procedure may be far less formal than a trial. The State should provide an
impartial officer or board that can receive evidence and argument from
the prisoner’s counsel, including expert psychiatric evidence that may
differ from the State's own psychiatric examination. Beyond these basic
requirements, the States should have substantial leeway to determine
what process best balances the various interests at stake. As long as basic
fairness is observed, I would find due process satisfied, and would apply
the presumption of correctness of § 2254(d) on federal habeas corpus.
Id. at 425-27.
6 In Panetti, the Supreme Court characterized Justice Powell’s concurrence as the controlling
opinion in Ford. 551 U.S. 930, 949 (2007).
18
55a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 19 of 31
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007)
In 1995, Panetti was sentenced to death. Id. at 936. Before trial, he was assessed
with “fragmented personality, delusions, and hallucinations,” but the trial court found
him competent to stand trial and to waive counsel. Id. Two months after sentencing, he
was found incompetent to waive appointment of State habeas counsel, which suggested
that his mental condition had deteriorated. Id. at 937. In October 2003, a county court set
his execution for February 2004. Id. Counsel moved to initiate a competency
determination proceeding, but the county court denied the motion without a hearing,
and the Texas appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 938.
Panetti then filed a federal habeas petition, and the district court stayed
execution to allow the Texas courts to consider evidence of Panetti’s mental state. Id.
The county court selected two mental health experts without input from Panetti, and
these experts concluded that he understood that he would be executed and had the
ability to understand the reasons for it. The county court granted Panetti one week to
file a response and then issued a short order finding that Panetti had failed to
demonstrate his incompetency. Id. at 939-41. The federal district court denied habeas
relief on the basis that “the Fifth Circuit test for competency to be executed requires the
petitioner know no more than the fact of his impending execution and the factual
predicate for the execution.” Id. at 941-42.
The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that the failure to provide Panetti
with the procedures set forth in Ford was an unreasonable application of clearly
established Supreme Court law and declined to apply AEDPA deference to the Texas
19
56a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 20 of 31
court decision. Id. at 948. In so concluding, the Supreme Court noted, “It is uncontested
that petitioner made a substantial showing of incompetency.”7 Id. It then reasoned that
the Texas court deprived Panetti of any means “to submit expert psychiatric evidence in
response to the evidence that had been solicited by the state court.” Id.
The Supreme Court also found that the Fifth Circuit’s standard for competency
was too restrictive on the basis that it treated a delusional belief system as irrelevant “if
the prisoner knows the State has identified his crimes as the reason for his execution.”
Id. at 958. The Supreme Court implied that a proper standard should require an
understanding of “the real interests the State seeks to vindicate” rather than merely “the
State’s announced reason” or “the fact of an imminent execution.” Id. at 959. Put
another way, “[a] prisoner’s awareness of the State’s rationale for an execution is not the
same as a rational understanding of it.” Id. The Supreme Court explained, “The critical
question is whether a prisoner’s mental state is so distorted by a mental illness that he
lacks a rational understanding of the State’s rationale for his execution. Or similarly put,
the issue is whether a prisoner’s concept of reality is so impaired that he cannot grasp
the execution’s meaning and purpose or the link between his crime and its
punishment.” Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 265, 269 (2019) (articulating the Panetti
competency standard).
7 Later in the opinion, the Supreme Court found that Panetti had satisfied the substantial
threshold showing, relying on two experts the day before the execution date and evidence of mental
dysfunction considered in prior litigation. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 950 (2007).
20
57a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 21 of 31
Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 265 (2019)
After Madison killed a police officer in 1985, he was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death. Id. at 269. In 2015 and 2016, Madison suffered major strokes and
developed vascular dementia. Id. Madison then asked the county court for a stay of
execution because he no longer understood the facts of his case or the nature of his
conviction or sentence. Id. at 269-70. The county court heard from dueling experts, and
Madison’s expert opined that he understood execution as an abstract concept but did
not comprehend the reason behind Alabama’s effort to execute him. Id. at 270. He
further opined that vascular dementia caused significant cognitive decline and that
Madison had no independent recollection of the murder. Id. By contrast, Alabama’s
expert opined that Madison appeared to understand his legal situation and found no
evidence of psychosis, paranoia, or delusion. Id. at 270-71. At a hearing, Alabama
emphasized that Madison did not experience psychotic episodes or delusions, which
the county court found persuasive in concluding that Madison had not demonstrated
that he did not have a rational understanding of his execution or the reasons for it. Id.
at 271. The county court also credited the testimony of the Alabama expert. Id. at 271-72.
Madison then filed a federal habeas petition, which the Supreme Court applied AEDPA
deference to the Alabama court decision and affirmed the denial of habeas relief on the
basis that “neither Panetti nor Ford clearly established that a prisoner is incompetent to
be executed because of a simple failure to remember his crime.” Id. at 272.
In 2018, Alabama set an execution date, and Madison initiated another challenge
in State court, contending that he had suffered further cognitive decline and that the
21
58a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 22 of 31
Alabama expert had since been suspended from practicing psychology. Id. at 273. The
Alabama court declared him mentally competent, finding no substantial threshold
showing of insanity. Id. at 273-74. Madison then appealed directly to the Supreme
Court, allowing for de novo consideration of his claims rather than consideration
subject to AEDPA deference. Id. at 274.
The Supreme Court considered: (1) “whether Panetti prohibits executing
Madison merely because he cannot remember committing his crime;” and (1) “whether
Panetti permits executing Madison merely because he suffers from dementia, rather
than psychotic delusions.” Id. at 274-75. It answered no to both questions, reasoning that
“[w]hat matters is whether a person has the rational understanding Panetti requires—
not whether he has any particular memory or any particular mental illness.” Id. The
Supreme Court held that “[i]n evaluating competency to be executed, a judge must
therefore look beyond any given diagnosis to a downstream consequence.” Id. at 279. It
explained that “a delusional disorder can be of such severity—can so impair the
prisoner’s concept of reality—that someone in its thrall will be unable to come to grips
with the punishment’s meaning. But delusions come in many shapes and sizes, and not
all will interfere with the understanding that the Eighth Amendment requires.” Id.
The Supreme Court found the brief State court order to be ambiguous as to its
reasoning and that the circumstances suggested that the State court had applied the
incorrect standard for assessing competency. Id. at 280-83. The Supreme Court vacated
the judgment of the State court and remanded for further proceedings, advising that the
22
59a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 23 of 31
sole competency question before the State court was “whether he can reach a rational
understanding of why the State wants to execute him.” Id. at 283.
DISCUSSION
Corcoran argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because he is incompetent to
be executed. Corcoran contends that the AEDPA deference should not apply in this case
because the Indiana courts required him to present his claim in a successive petition for
post-conviction relief and because he must obtain authorization from the Indiana
Supreme Court to further pursue it. He argues that this procedure allowed the Indiana
Supreme Court to improperly conflate the standard for waiving post-conviction review
with the standard for competency to be executed.
The court is not persuaded by this argument. The Indiana Supreme Court
acknowledged that these standards were distinct and explained why it found its
competency determination in 2005 relevant to its threshold determination this month.
This explanation and its assessment of the new evidence were not unreasonable.
Further, there is no reason to suspect that an assertion of incompetency would not have
been similarly challenged if the Indiana courts had allowed him to file a successive
petition without authorization from an appellate court. Additionally, no U.S. Supreme
Court opinion clearly establishes that the threshold determination must be held in a
particular manner or in a particular type of proceeding. This court also sees no
inconsistency with the relevant U.S. Supreme Court opinions; to the contrary, the
authorization requirement to pursue successive petitions is effectively a vehicle for
threshold determinations where the petitioner must demonstrate that his claim has
23
60a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 24 of 31
some merit before he is allowed to proceed. At base, the court perceives no difference of
constitutional magnitude between making this threshold determination before the
Indiana Supreme Court or the Allen Superior Court. Nor does the court perceive such a
difference between the State requirement that a petitioner show a reasonable possibility
that the petitioner is entitled to relief or the constitutional requirement that petitioner
make a substantial threshold showing of insanity. Moreover, the Indiana Supreme
Court framed its ultimate conclusion using the constitutional standard rather than the
State standard for successive petitions.
It also strikes the court that the standards used to adjudicate Corcoran’s
competency to waive post-conviction are more demanding than the standard for
competency to be executed. Recall that the Indiana Supreme Court articulated the
competency to waive post-conviction review standard as follows: “an individual is
competent for purposes of trial if he has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and has a rational as well
as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Corcoran v. State, 820 N.E.2d
655, 658-59 (Ind. 2005). It seems likely that, as a general matter, greater competency is
required to understand ongoing criminal proceedings on serious charges than it is to
understand the reasons for punishment. And even if the trial competency standard does
not subsume the competency to be executed standard in every instance, it does so here.
As the Indiana Supreme Court noted, it specifically found that Corcoran understood the
24
61a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 25 of 31
reasons for his execution in finding that Corcoran was competent to waive postconviction review.8
Corcoran also argues that the Indiana Supreme Court unreasonably determined
that counsel had not made a substantial threshold showing of insanity and made
improper credibility determinations at the threshold stage. A more accurate
characterization is that the Indiana Supreme Court acknowledged its prior credibility
determinations in connection with its prior competency determination and found the
new evidence consistent with those determinations. The U.S. Supreme Court has not
delineated how a threshold determination should be made, but, to Corcoran’s point, it
logically follows that a threshold determination is something other than a hearing
where credibility determinations are ordinarily made. But the Indiana Supreme Court
here did not blatantly violate this principle by, for example, resolving a full-scale battle
of the experts or a straightforward “he said she said” dispute based entirely on evidence
that had been submitted for judicial review for the first time. Consequently, the court
cannot find that the Indiana Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established
federal law by making credibility determinations.
The court also cannot find that the Indiana Supreme Court unreasonably
determined that counsel had not made a substantial threshold showing of insanity on
8 Corcoran argues that the State court concocted barriers based on State-specific standards to
“circularly deny” him an opportunity to present his competency claim to the lower courts. However,
given the history of Corcoran’s legal proceedings, the court does not find that the State court engaged in
circular reasoning by requiring him to provide more compelling evidence to demonstrate his
incompetency to waive post-conviction review and to be executed, such as a recent expert report that
spoke directly to the Corcoran’s competency or recent medical records showing mental deterioration.
25
62a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 26 of 31
behalf of Corcoran. As mentioned above, the U.S. Supreme Court has not instructed the
lower courts on precisely how this standard should be applied by providing a list of
elements or factors for consideration or by otherwise expounding on it. Instead, the U.S.
Supreme Court has provided three examples of showings that satisfy this threshold
determination: (1) in Ford v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court found that Florida should
have provided Ford with a hearing because he had evidence that his mental condition
had deteriorated in recent years and a recent evaluation in which an expert concluded
that Ford did not understand his execution of the reasons for it; (2) in Panetti v.
Quarterman, the Supreme Court found that Texas should have provided Panetti with a
hearing because the fact that he had made a threshold showing was undisputed, but it
further found Panetti had made the threshold showing based on the earlier finding that
he was incompetent to waive appointment of State habeas counsel and recently
obtained expert opinions; and (3) in Madison v. Alabama, the Supreme Court remanded
the case for “renewed consideration of Madison’s competency” because the Alabama
threshold determination did not consider that a lack of rational understanding could be
caused by dementia rather than delusions. In reaching this ruling, the Supreme Court
considered evidence that Madison had recently suffered major strokes and been
recently inflicted with vascular dementia and a recent expert report that Madison did
not understand the reasons for his execution.
Unlike the petitioners in these cases, Corcoran has never been adjudicated
incompetent; to the contrary, he was found competent in 2004 based on evidence that is
substantially similar to the evidence presented to the Indiana Supreme Court this year.
26
63a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 27 of 31
Counsel did not provide evidence that Corcoran’s mental condition has deteriorated
since 2004, nor has he presented a recent expert assessment as to whether Corcoran
understands his execution or the reasons for it; instead, Corcoran, on his own accord,
submitted an affidavit attesting that he did have such an understanding. Further, there
is no indication that the Indiana Supreme Court misconstrued “insanity” as defined by
Panetti and clarified by Madison; instead, it squarely addressed the argument that
Corcoran was only aware of the stated reasons for execution but did not rationally
understand it.
Counsel also faults the Indiana Supreme Court for relying on Corcoran’s
affidavit due to his delusional behavior, but they cite no U.S. Supreme Court case
suggesting that an individual’s own statements should not be considered for purposes
of competency. Counsel essentially argues that Corcoran knows precisely what to say in
order to persuade courts that he is rational but that he does not truly believe it due to
his delusional beliefs. However, assuming that Corcoran is merely imitating rationality,
counsel concedes that it is an especially good imitation, so it is difficult to characterize
the Indiana Supreme Court as unreasonable for relying on it. This is particularly true
when no statement made by Corcoran this decade and no expert finding directly
undermines Corcoran’s rationality toward his execution.9 Moreover, even this
9 As mentioned above, it is not clear that the Indiana Supreme Court credited his affidavit for
purposes of resolving the competency to be executed claim rather than merely assessing the newly
submitted evidence. But, to the extent the Indiana Supreme Court did make a credibility determination,
Corcoran’s counsel has not provided clear and convincing evidence suggesting that this determination
was incorrect, nor have they described what evidence they might present at an evidentiary hearing. The
court considers the other relevant evidence submitted by counsel below.
27
64a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 28 of 31
purported imitation would have some probative value because persuasively imitating
rationality for the purpose of influencing others itself requires a certain degree of
rationality.
The court also cannot find that the State court acted unreasonably by considering
the 2004 competency hearing as part of the threshold determination of insanity. In
Panetti, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically noted that a State court had previously
found Panetti incompetent, signaling that prior competency hearings are relevant to the
question of whether an individual is competent to be executed. That seems even more
true here, where substantial litigation occurred regarding that prior competency
determination and when the new evidence and counsel’s arguments indicate that
Corcoran’s mental condition has remained the same. It was not unreasonable to find
that the evidence from the prior competency hearing was insubstantial given that it had
already been considered and found insufficient.
Similarly, it was not unreasonable to conclude that the newly submitted evidence
was insubstantial in terms of its volume and its significance. As new evidence, counsel
submitted a four-page psychotherapy session record and a thirty-page document, titled,
“A Whistle-blower Report: Electronic Harassment,” written by Corcoran in June 2024,
as well as two affidavits from trial counsel. The affidavits concern Corcoran’s mental
state at and shortly after trial and so predate the 2004 competency hearing. The
psychotherapy record and Corcoran’s writing were offered for the express purpose of
establishing that Corcoran’s mental condition remained as impaired as it was in 2004.
The court further observes that, as far as conspiracy theories go, Corcoran’s writing is
28
65a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 29 of 31
remarkably cogent and a reasonable effort at presenting an irrational theory in a
rational way. His explanation of difficult-to-grasp electricity-related concepts further
reinforces that he is not delusional or irrational in every respect.
The court also considers the psychiatric report completed by Angeline Stanislaus,
M.D., on December 10, 2024. ECF 1-1 at 250-62. Because it was not submitted to the State
courts, it is unclear whether this psychiatric report is properly before this court. See
Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366, 382-84 (2022); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Setting that aside, the
most relevant portion of the report reads as follows:
[Corcoran’s] DOC therapy records from 2023 and 2024 indicates that he is
still very delusional and has no insight into his illness. His book published
in 2024 clearly describes his delusional system which consists of being
controlled by the DOC ultrasound machine, the voices and the torture
from muscle spasms. Therefore, he currently remains seriously mentally
ill due to his untreated psychotic symptoms. Due to his severe paranoid
beliefs and his belief that mental health professionals will diagnose him
with psychiatric illness due to their ignorance of the electronic
surveillance system that exists, he will not cooperate with an evaluation
from a psychiatrist of other mental health professional. He minimizes and
covers up his symptoms.
In the affidavit he filed in 2006 to the court, he denies all mental health
symptoms and eloquently describes them as “stories” he made up. His
writings are organized and well written. His ability to write and speak
eloquently has served him well to cover up his mental health symptoms
and psychosis. Dr. Parker noted in his testimony that in brief interviews
he could easily cover up the symptoms and present as logical. However,
when we look at the full picture longitudinally, we see the signs and
symptoms of schizophrenia, which has influenced his illogical decision
making.
With regards to his November 2024 affidavit, he makes it sound like his
decision to forgo any further litigation is logical. He states that in
execution his heart will stop, and all brain activity will cease. This again
ties into his delusion of the ultrasonic machine inserting and broadcasting
his thoughts from his brain.
29
66a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 30 of 31
ECF 1-1 at 261. Notably, the expert report offers no conclusions that directly address the
credibility of Corcoran’s recent affidavit or whether he currently has a rational
understanding of his execution. Dr. Stanislaus posits that one of Corcoran’s attestations
“ties” into his delusions, but this accurate statement about what will happen to his body
when he dies does not materially undermine that Corcoran understands the reasons for
his execution.
In sum, the court finds that the sole habeas claim that Corcoran is incompetent to
be executed is procedurally defaulted and without merit. Therefore, the court will deny
the habeas petition pursuant to Rule 4 of the Section 2254 Rules Governing Habeas
Cases. Corcoran also filed a motion to stay execution, which the court will deny as moot
in light of this Rule 4 dismissal.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 11, the court must grant or deny a
certificate of appealability. To obtain a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c), the petitioner must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right by establishing “that a reasonable jurist could debate whether (or, for that matter,
agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the
issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Because this case involves the death penalty, the
court will grant a motion for a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether the
State court unreasonably determined that Corcoran or his counsel had failed to
30
67a
USDC IN/ND case 3:24-cv-00970-JD
document 20
filed 12/13/24
page 31 of 31
demonstrate a substantial threshold showing of insanity as required by Panetti v.
Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007). The court will also grant a motion for leave to appeal in
forma pauperis.
For these reasons, the court DENIES the motion to stay execution (ECF 3);
DENIES the habeas corpus petition (ECF 1); GRANTS a certificate of appealability
pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 11; GRANTS leave to appeal in forma
pauperis; and DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment in favor of the Respondent and
against the Petitioner.
SO ORDERED on December 13, 2024
s/ Jon E. DeGuilio
JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
31
68a
Case: 24-3259
Document: 16
Filed: 12/16/2024
Pages: 10
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 16, 2024
Decided December 16, 2024
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3259
TAHINA CORCORAN, as next friend on
behalf of JOSEPH E. CORCORAN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division.
v.
No. 3:24-CV-970-JD
RON NEAL,
Respondent-Appellee.
Jon E. DeGuilio,
Judge.
ORDER
Joseph E. Corcoran was convicted of quadruple murder and sentenced to death
in 1999. Before us is an appeal of the district court order denying a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and a motion to stay his December 18, 2024,
execution. This order assumes familiarity with:
the district court’s December 13, 2024, opinion and order denying the habeas
petition and the motion to stay execution;
69a
Case: 24-3259
Document: 16
Filed: 12/16/2024
No. 24-3259
Pages: 10
Page 2
the Indiana Supreme Court’s December 10, 2024, opinion declining to authorize
the petitions for successive post-conviction relief and denying the requests for
stay of execution; and
the previous decisions of this court, district courts that have ruled on Corcoran’s
cases, and other previous rulings by the Indiana state courts.
I.
Standing
The habeas statutes provide for next-friend standing. 28 U.S.C. § 2242. But a next
friend may not file a petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a detainee if that
detainee could file the petition himself. Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1989)
(citation omitted). Citing various behaviors and writings of Corcoran, his wife submits
that he is not competent to sign an application for habeas corpus and that she and his
attorneys have standing as Corcoran’s next friend.
The district court found that Corcoran’s wife and his attorneys have next-friend
standing to bring this habeas challenge on his behalf. We are somewhat uncomfortable
with that conclusion.
The standard for competency to waive habeas proceedings is that the detainee
“has capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to
continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering
from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in
the premises.” Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966) (per curiam).
Corcoran has submitted a detailed sworn notarized affidavit that articulately sets
forth his desire not to pursue federal relief. 1 His composition and filing of that affidavit
undercuts an assertion of incompetency to pursue a habeas petition. We seriously
question whether Corcoran’s wife and attorneys have proved that he is incompetent to
litigate himself. If not, next-friend status is not proper for him.
This affidavit is dated November 21, 2024, is reproduced on pp. 9–10 of the
district court’s opinion and order, and is Attachment F of the appendix to the habeas
petition as DE 1 in the district court.
1
70a
Case: 24-3259
Document: 16
Filed: 12/16/2024
Pages: 10
No. 24-3259
Page 3
Still, given the expedited manner in which we consider this appeal, 2 we think it
prudent to reach the petition’s merits.
II.
A.
Merits
Habeas Corpus Petition
The habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) on Corcoran’s behalf centers on his
competency to be executed. The district court reviewed the evidence as to Corcoran’s
mental condition, both earlier in this case and recently submitted. Dist. Ct. DE 20 at 7–
10. This evidence includes, among other items, a booklet written by Corcoran with
conspiratorial theories about the government surveilling and controlling him, 3 as well
as Corcoran’s handwritten affidavit referenced above.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
We conclude that Corcoran by his next friend has not satisfied either of these
subsections.
This appeal was docketed three days ago on December 13, 2024. The parties
submitted expedited briefing on December 14 and 15, 2024, and we issue this order on
December 16, 2024.
3 This booklet is Attachment H of the appendix to the habeas petition as DE 1 in
the district court.
2
71a
Case: 24-3259
Document: 16
Filed: 12/16/2024
No. 24-3259
Pages: 10
Page 4
First, the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision was not contrary to clearly
established federal constitutional law. Its decision correctly identified the governing
rule that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a prisoner who has lost his
sanity after sentencing. Its decision also was not contrary to the requirement of
competency elucidated in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), Panetti v. Quarterman,
551 U.S. 930 (2007), and Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 265 (2019).
Corcoran’s next friend tries to show a “contrary-to” application by arguing that
federal courts have not required competency-to-be-executed claims to be subject to the
successive-petition-authorization procedure, yet Indiana courts require successivepetition authorization to proceed to a full evidentiary hearing on a claim under Ford.
But we are not persuaded by this reasoning, as Indiana courts are not required to adopt
federal collateral review procedures.
We do not conclude that the Indiana Supreme Court in its December 10, 2024,
decision unreasonably applied controlling law about incompetency to be executed. That
court correctly identified the governing legal rule. So, the petitioner must show that the
court applied that rule unreasonably to the facts. Yet, Corcoran’s next friend has not
met this requirement. The Indiana Supreme Court’s decision (including at pp. 24–27)
did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court law when holding that the petition did not
make a substantial threshold showing under Ford. We also are not persuaded by an
argument that Corcoran is merely imitating rationality, and thus fails the competency
requirement elucidated in Ford, Panetti, and Madison. The Indiana Supreme Court is not
unreasonable for relying on Corcoran’s affidavit and reaching the conclusions that it
did. The district court correctly recognized this in its well-reasoned opinion and order
at pp. 23–30.
Second, the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision did not rest on an unreasonable
determination of the facts. Our review of the state court’s factual findings is highly
deferential.
The next friend argues about the weight they believe the state court should have
given certain evidence, whether it is Corcoran’s November 2024 affidavit or a new
expert report by Dr. Angeline Stanislaus. But arguments as to weight are properly made
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), not (d)(2). See Lopez v. Smith, 574 U.S. 1, 8 (2014).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), a determination of a factual issue is presumed
correct. The petitioner must rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence.
72a
Case: 24-3259
Document: 16
Filed: 12/16/2024
Pages: 10
No. 24-3259
Page 5
Corcoran’s next friend has not done so here. Corcoran was found competent in 2004,
and he has not ever been adjudicated incompetent. The record does not show evidence
of Corcoran’s mental competency degrading since that earlier finding of competency.
There is also not a recent evaluation that Corcoran does not understand the reasons for
his execution. Indeed, Corcoran’s affidavit attests that he does understand his execution
and the reasons for it. The state court made no unreasonable factual determinations.
Because there has not been an unreasonable application of federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, and not been an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in this lengthy litigation,
we agree with the district court that the habeas petition should be denied.
B.
Motion to Stay
To be granted a stay, Corcoran’s next friend must have made a strong showing
that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that Corcoran will be irreparably injured
absent a stay, that the issuance of the stay will not substantially injure the other parties
interested in the proceeding, and that granting a stay is in the public interest. Nken v.
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). We review the district court’s decision on a motion to
stay for an abuse of discretion. Bourgeois v. Watson, 977 F.3d 620, 628 (7th Cir. 2020)
(citation omitted). The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that “[l]ast-minute
stays [of execution] should be the extreme exception, not the norm.” Bucklew v. Precythe,
587 U.S. 119 (2019).
In reviewing the district court’s decision to deny the motion to stay, we focus
largely on the first factor. As the stay’s proponent, Corcoran’s next friend must make a
“strong showing” of a likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying claim. Nken,
556 U.S. at 434. We have described above the reasons why Corcoran’s next friend has
failed to make that strong showing in this petition. Corcoran’s next friend obviously
satisfies the second stay factor of irreparable harm, but the third and fourth factors are
more in equipoise. We do note that on the third factor, “equity must be sensitive to the
State’s strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments without undue interference
from the federal courts.” Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006). And on the fourth
factor, all share in the timely enforcement of Corcoran’s sentence.
Under the Nken factors, we agree with the district court that a stay is not
warranted.
73a
Case: 24-3259
Document: 16
Filed: 12/16/2024
No. 24-3259
Pages: 10
Page 6
***
We agree in material part with the district court’s decision here to deny the
habeas corpus petition. That court and the Indiana Supreme Court decisions have
correctly resolved the questions raised by Corcoran’s next friend.
For these reasons, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED, and the motion to
stay execution is DENIED.
74a
Case: 24-3259
Document: 16
Filed: 12/16/2024
No. 24-3259
Pages: 10
Page 7
LEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. A federal court may grant habeas relief only if the
state court’s adjudication of the merits of the claim resulted in a decision that is: (1)
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”; or (2) “based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Because the Indiana Supreme Court
unreasonably applied the well-established standard governing competency-forexecution articulated in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Panetti v. Quarterman,
551 U.S. 930 (2007); and Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 265 (2019), I respectfully dissent.
Given the time constraints, I will briefly summarize my reasons below.
The Indiana Supreme Court premised its ruling on Joseph Corcoran’s
competency to be executed on two grounds: (1) its 2005 decision affirming the state trial
court’s determination that Corcoran was competent to waive post-conviction relief; and
(2) Corcoran’s statements in his affidavit filed on November 21, 2024. See Corcoran v.
State, – N.E.3d –, 2024 WL 5052384, at *12–14 (Ind. Dec. 10, 2024). In doing so, the court
violated Ford and Panetti in two ways.
First, the court believed it had already decided Corcoran’s competency for
execution in 2005. See id. at *14 (“When concluding that Corcoran was competent to
waive post-conviction remedies [in 2005], we concluded that he has a non-delusional
understanding of these legal proceedings. And part of what we relied on was his
‘reasoning that his death sentence is commensurate with the crime he committed (the
conclusion to which both the original trial court jury and judge came).’”) (citing
Corcoran v. State, 820 N.E.2d 655, 661 (Ind. 2005)). But the competency standard the
court used in 2005 was based on Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), and Rees v.
Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966), which considers a defendant’s “capacity to appreciate his
position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further
litigation.” Rees, 384 U.S. at 314. This is markedly different from the standard governing
a prisoner’s competency to be executed, which asks “whether a prisoner’s mental state
is so distorted by a mental illness that he lacks a rational understanding of the State’s
rationale for his execution.” Madison, 586 U.S. at 269 (cleaned up). “Or similarly put, the
issue is whether a prisoner’s concept of reality is so impaired that he cannot grasp the
execution’s meaning and purpose or the link between his crime and its punishment.” Id.
(cleaned up).
In 2005, the Indiana Supreme Court held that “Corcoran’s awareness of his legal
position and his ability to formulate a rational justification for forgoing further post75a
Case: 24-3259
Document: 16
Filed: 12/16/2024
No. 24-3259
Pages: 10
Page 8
conviction review make him competent to waive such review under either Rees or
Dusky.” Corcoran, 820 N.E.2d at 662. By treating its 2005 decision as conclusive here, the
Indiana Supreme Court effectively substituted the Rees standard in place of the
Ford/Panetti standard.
The court’s error is perhaps most apparent in the following statement: “Our
determination that Corcoran could waive his post-conviction remedies included an
analysis of whether his mental illness interfered with his ability to understand why the
State was executing him. And now that a challenge to competency for execution is ripe,
there is no indication that Corcoran’s understanding of why he is to be executed has
changed.” Corcoran, 2024 WL 5052384, at *14. In Panetti, however, the United States
Supreme Court was careful to note that “[a] prisoner’s awareness of the State’s rationale
for an execution is not the same as a rational understanding of it.” 551 U.S. at 959. In
Panetti’s parlance, the Indiana Supreme Court determined in 2005 that Corcoran had the
capacity to understand the rationale for his execution, but it did not inquire (because it
had no reason to) whether Corcoran had a rational understanding of it. And, indeed, to
date, no court has conducted such an inquiry.
Putting aside the differing standards, the relevance of Corcoran’s 2003
competency finding to the current inquiry is at best questionable. Twenty years have
passed since that evaluation, and, as the Supreme Court had recognized, “[p]rior
findings of competency do not foreclose a prisoner from proving he is incompetent to
be executed because of his present mental condition.” Panetti, 551 U.S. at 934. The
Indiana Supreme Court, on the other hand, assumed that Corcoran’s condition had not
changed in the last two decades. Corcoran, 2024 WL 5052384, at *13 (“Virtually all the
evidence the State Public Defender cites is the evidence we previously considered when
determining Corcoran could waive post-conviction remedies.”). But Petitioner has
offered new evidence that Corcoran’s severe paranoid schizophrenic delusions not only
continue but also cause him to hide his condition from the world and feign sanity. 1
For example, in his recently published book, Electronic Harassment: A Whistleblower Report, Corcoran states that he wants to show that his belief that prison officials
are using an ultrasound machine to control him and others “is not a nut job conspiracy
theory, but is basic electronics.” DE 1, Appendix, Attachment H at 13 (181a). Later, he
continues, “If a credentialled medical person says a man is mentally ill, but he says that
he is the victim of electronic harassment, who would people be more likely to believe?
So because of this the victimizer’s cover is not seemingly backed up by medical
science.” Id. at 20 (188a).
1
76a
Case: 24-3259
Document: 16
Filed: 12/16/2024
No. 24-3259
Pages: 10
Page 9
This leads to the second point. To support its belief that Corcoran is competent to
be executed and nothing has changed, the Indiana Supreme Court placed much stock in
the statements Corcoran made in his November 21, 2024, affidavit. See id. at *12–14. But,
because Corcoran filed his affidavit after briefing had concluded, the Indiana Supreme
Court did so without providing defense counsel an opportunity to respond to it. This is
precisely the lack of due process the Supreme Court condemned in Ford and Panetti. See
Ford, 477 U.S. at 415 (noting that the state procedure did not allow a defendant to
challenge or impeach the opinion of the state-appointed psychiatrists who deemed him
competent); Panetti, 551 U.S. at 948 (noting that the state court reached its competency
determination after failing to provide petitioner with “an adequate means by which to
submit expert psychiatric evidence in response to the evidence that had been solicited
by the state court”).
The Indiana Supreme Court’s reliance on Corcoran’s untested affidavit is
particularly troubling given that defense counsel’s entire theory is premised on
Corcoran’s inability to rationally comprehend the reasons behind his execution and his
efforts to hide his true motivations for seeking the death penalty. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has found the law “clearly established” that “[o]nce a prisoner seeking a stay of
execution has made a ‘substantial threshold showing of insanity,’ the protection
afforded by procedural due process includes a ‘fair hearing’ in accord with
fundamental fairness.” Panetti, 551 U.S. at 949 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and Ford, 477
U.S. at 426). 2
For these reasons, I believe that the Indiana Supreme Court unreasonably
applied the standard the Supreme Court announced in Ford and Panetti for evaluating a
prisoner’s competency to be executed. Given Corcoran’s long, undisputed history of
severe mental illness and the pervasiveness of his continuing delusions, as evidenced
by his book and recent medical records, Corcoran is entitled to have at least one court
assess his competency to be executed under the proper Ford/Panetti framework.
Turning to Petitioner’s motion for a stay of execution, courts evaluating a stay
must consider an applicant’s likelihood of success on the merits and potential for
irreparable injury, as well as injury to other parties and the public interest. See Nken v.
It bears mentioning that Corcoran has recanted similarly unequivocal
attestations of waiver. See Corcoran, 820 N.E.2d at 657. Because death is irrevocable, this
history should lead us to view his current statements with a skeptical eye.
2
77a
Case: 24-3259
Document: 16
Filed: 12/16/2024
No. 24-3259
Pages: 10
Page 10
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). Here, Petitioner has established a likelihood of success
on her claim that the state court failed to provide an adequate hearing to determine
Corcoran’s competency to be executed. The record contains undisputed and extensive
expert evidence of Corcoran’s paranoid schizophrenia and the resultant pervasive
delusions from which he has long suffered. When recognizing that gross delusions may
render a prisoner incompetent to be executed, the Supreme Court in Panetti accepted
observations by two experts and similarly “extensive evidence of mental dysfunction
considered in earlier legal proceedings” to conclude that “the state court failed to
provide petitioner [there] with the minimum process required by Ford.” Panetti, 551 U.S.
at 950. Here, too, Petitioner is likely to demonstrate a substantial threshold showing of
insanity mandating a fair hearing under Ford.
Additionally, in a death-penalty case like this one, the equities of irreparable
harm tip strongly in Petitioner’s favor. While the harm to the State and the victims may
be delay in the duly imposed sentence (a valid interest), the potential harm to Corcoran
is experiencing the “barbarity of … mindless vengeance,” which serves no public
interest. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 410. Accordingly, I would grant Petitioner’s motion for a
stay so that the state court can evaluate Corcoran’s competency to be executed as
required by Ford and Panetti. 3
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
A couple of additional issues warrant mention. Regarding the district court’s
ruling as to procedural default, as I see it, the Indiana Supreme Court’s determination
regarding Corcoran’s competency to waive post-conviction relief depends primarily on
federal law or is interwoven with federal law. Accordingly, it does not rest on an
independent and adequate state law ground. See Richardson v. Lemke, 745 F.3d 258, 269
(7th Cir. 2014). As to standing, the district court properly found that Tahina Corcoran
has adequately shown that she is a proper next friend for the purposes of the
preliminary stages of this habeas case. My colleagues’ reliance on Corcoran’s recent
affidavit is problematic for the reasons I have explained. Thus, I would affirm that
finding.
3
78a
79a
1
80a
2
81a
ELECTRONIC HARRASSMENT
A Whistle-blower Report
J.C.Chase
3
82a
© 2024 J.C.Chase
July 2024
4
83a
Contents
Introduction
7
A Little Background
8
How Does it Work?
9
Beyond the Science
17
Some Thoughts on Human Psychology
18
For the Victims
19
A Final Plea
21
5
84a
9
85a
Introduction
At the outset I am going to bring to your mind several publicly known and published events. See
if you can guess what this short list has in common:
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.