Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Antonio Shropshire, Petitioner v. United States

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USCA4 Appeal: 22-6642

Doc: 10

Filed: 04/24/2024

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-6642

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ANTONIO SHROPSHIRE, a/k/a Brill, a/k/a B, a/k/a Tony,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Catherine C. Blake, Senior District Judge. (l:16-cr-00051-CCB-3; l:21-cv-00202-CCB)

Submitted: March 4, 2024

Decided: April 24, 2024

Before RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge, and KEENAN and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Antonio Shropshire, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 22-6642

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Filed: 04/24/2024

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PER CURIAM:

Antonio Shropshire seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his

28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge

issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). A certificate of

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists could find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v.

Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115-17 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is

debatable and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right.

Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 140-41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

484 (2000)).

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Shropshire has not

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, although we grant Shropshire’s motion to

supplement his application for a certificate of appealability, we deny his motion for a

certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

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Case l:16-cr-00051-SAG Document 487 Filed 05/09/22 Page 1 of 4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

UNITED STATES

Criminal Action No. CCB-16-051

Civil Action No. CCB-21-202

v.

ANTONIO SHROPSHIRE

MEMORANDUM

Antonio Shropshire was convicted by a jury of several drug-related offenses and on

February 16, 2018, was sentenced to 300 months in prison. (ECF 353) His convictions were

affirmed by the Fourth Circuit on June 24, 2020. (ECF 427-1). He filed a timely motion to vacate

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (ECF 454) The government has filed a response (ECF 479), and

Shropshire has filed a reply (ECF 480). For the reasons explained below, the motion will be

denied.

Shropshire first raises two issues related to the fact that certain papers he says he needed

for trial preparation were removed from his cell: (A) the government interfered with his

attomey/client relationship and his right to prepare for trial, and (B) the government interfered

with his due process and right to choose whether to testify, in violation of his Sixth Amendment

“autonomy” interest. From the representations made during the trial, it appears that jail officials

learned from one or more recorded jail calls that Shropshire was discussing personal

identification information for government witnesses with a third party. Out of concern for the

witnesses’ safety, the papers were removed from Shropshire’s cell by jail officials and reviewed

by a prosecutor in the U.S. Attorney’s Office not connected with the case. These circumstances

1 Shropshire also has filed several related motions for an evidentiary hearing (ECF 466), to disregard the

government’s opposition (ECF 475), and to compel a ruling (ECF 484).

1

Case l:16-cr-00051-SAG Document 487 Filed 05/09/22 Page 2 of 4

are corroborated by Shropshire’s affidavit explaining he was given a summary with names and

dates of birth of witnesses which he later provided to his girlfriend on a phone call asking her to

look them up on Maryland case search. (ECF 454, Ex. 3 at 2-3.)

The government proffered that all the documents were returned to Shropshire’s counsel,

with the exception of a document apparently prepared by a paralegal that contained the

witnesses’ personal information. (ECF 404 at 153.) Trial counsel Alfred Guillaume, who had

been representing Shropshire since July 2017 (ECF 203), agreed that documents had been

returned to him, which he returned to his client, but according to Shropshire, not all his notes

were returned to him until after the trial. Even assuming that to be true, he has demonstrated

nothing specific that would interfere with his due process or Sixth Amendment rights. He was

represented by counsel, who properly had possession of the discovery material and was prepared

to present Shropshire’s case at trial. (ECF 399 at 228-29.) Shropshire has made no specific

showing of any missing document that interfered with trial counsel’s ability to prepare for trial

and to represent Shropshire competently and effectively. He refers to two witnesses that might

have been called (ECF 454 at 13-14) but does not identify them or explain why he would have

waited until the eve of trial to advise his attorney of their names and contact information. Nor has

he shown how any missing document interfered with his choice of whether to testify. The

information he says he wanted to explain to the jury (ECF 454 at 12-13) was all information

known to him at the time. Nor is there any evidence that the prosecutors trying the case against

Shropshire had access to his notes or other documents. In summary, no constitutional violation

has been proven.2

2 The court does not rely on procedural default as a basis for resolving this issue.

2

Case l:16-cr-00051-SAG Document 487 Filed 05/09/22 Page 3 of 4

Shropshire’s third argument (C) is that his trial counsel was ineffective for failure to

object to inadmissible testimony. He appears to focus on out-of-court statements made by co­

conspirators and essentially raises a sufficiency of the evidence argument about the

government’s proof of a conspiracy. But that evidence was extremely strong, and the statements

were admissible. See, e.g., U.S. v. Smith, 441 F.3d 254, 261-62 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming district

court’s admission of statements by co-conspirators). Any objection made by counsel would have

been overruled, and counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise such objections.

Shropshire’s fourth argument (D) is that Christopher Davis, the counsel who represented

him from April 2017 through late July/early August of 2017, when Shropshire had again asked

for a new attorney, failed to explain an “informal” plea offer made by the government. Failure to

convey a plea offer may amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye,

566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012) (“[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate

formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be

favorable to the accused.”); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163 (2012) (“In the context of pleas

a defendant must show the outcome of the plea process would have been different with

competent advice.”) But it is not at all clear there ever was a formal offer from the government,

and in any event the correspondence attached to Shropshire’s motion indicates that Davis had

several discussions with Shropshire about his guidelines, his option for cooperating, and the

likelihood of a lengthy sentence if Shropshire were not willing to cooperate (ECF 454 Exs. 5-8.)

Indeed, Shropshire in his affidavit states that he was dissatisfied with Davis because “all he

wanted to talk about was me going to prison if I didn’t cooperate with the government” and “I

didn’t want to cooperate with the government.” {See ECF 454 Ex. 3, at 1; see also Attorney

Inquiry Hearing Transcript, ECF 391 at 7.) For Shropshire now to assert that, if he had known

3

Case l:16-cr-00051-SAG Document 487 Filed 05/09/22 Page 4 of 4

about the alleged informal offer for 10 years with cooperation,3 he would have taken that deal,

defies belief.

Shropshire’s fifth argument (E) is that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to

raise sentencing issues on direct appeal. He fails, however, to identify any meritorious issue that

should have been raised, instead rearguing the evidence as to his involvement in the conspiracy

and the drug quantity reasonably foreseeable to him.

Finally, as to the ineffective assistance issues, Shropshire has not shown prejudice as

there is no reason to believe that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for

counsels’ alleged errors. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (“The

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”) An evidentiary hearing is not

necessary to resolve the issues raised in this motion. Further, Shropshire has shown no basis for

this court to issue a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (“A certificate of

appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing

of the denial of a constitutional right.”) (emphasis added); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473

483-84 (2000) (describing the “substantial showing” standard).

A separate order follows.

5/9/2022

Date

Is/

Catherine C. Blake

United States District Judge

3 Interestingly, Shropshire says the document setting forth the informal offer was not returned to him although the

cover letter was. (ECF 454 at 25.)

4

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FILED: July 30, 2024

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-6642

(1:16-c®-(iMM)5l-CCB-3)

(1:21-c¥-0O202-CCB)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

¥.

ANTONIO SHROPSHIRE,, a/k/a Brill, a/k/a B, ai/k/a Tony

Defendant - Appellant;

ORDER

The court denies the petition, for rehearing and rehearing en banc. No judge

requested a poll under Fed. R. App. P. 35 on the petition for rehearing en bane.

Entered, at the direetfom of the panel: Judge Richardso n, Senio r Judge Floyd

"9

and. Senior Judge Keenan.

For foe Court

fs/ Nwamaka. Anowi Clerk.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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