Opposition Brief — Andersen Rable, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefJan 29, 2025
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No. 24-5700
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_______________
ANDERSEN RABEL, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
_______________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
_______________
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
_______________
SARAH M. HARRIS
Acting Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
KEVIN O. DRISCOLL
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
KATHERINE TWOMEY ALLEN
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.
Whether
petitioner’s
the
challenges
court
to
of
the
appeals
correctly
sufficiency
of
the
rejected
evidence
supporting his conviction for knowingly possessing an unregistered
firearm silencer, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861(d).
2.
Whether the court of appeals correctly found that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain
evidence proffered by petitioner regarding asserted federal agency
practice and in admitting evidence from petitioner’s cell phone to
show knowledge that the kits he sold were firearm silencers.
(I)
ADDITIONAL RELATED PROCEEDINGS
United States District Court (S.D. Fla.):
United States v. Rabel, No. 22-cr-20058 (Nov. 16, 2022)
United States Court of Appeals (11th Cir.):
United States v. Rabel, No. 22-13854 (July 11, 2024)
(II)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_______________
No. 24-5700
ANDERSEN RABEL, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
_______________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
_______________
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
_______________
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-18a) is not
published in the Federal Reporter but is available at 2024 WL
3373705.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on July 11,
2024.
The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on September
25, 2024.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. 1254(1).
2
STATEMENT
Following a jury trial in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida, petitioner was convicted of
one count of knowingly possessing an unregistered firearm, in
violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861(d).
Judgment 1.
The court sentenced
petitioner to eight months of imprisonment, to be followed by three
years of supervised release.
affirmed.
1.
Judgment 2-3.
The court of appeals
Pet. App. 1a-18a. 1
Petitioner worked at Miami Gun Shops, a federal firearms
licensee in Florida.
Pet. App. 2a.
Petitioner was designated as
a “responsible person” at the store, which meant that he could
direct the business as it relates to firearms at the store.
Ibid.
As a licensed dealer, Miami Gun Shops could manufacture and sell
firearms, including silencers, so long as it complied with federal
law.
Ibid.
The National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. 5801 et seq., prohibits
the possession of certain defined types of firearms unless the
device is properly registered to the possessor in the National
Firearms Registration and Transfer Record and is serialized.
U.S.C. 5861(d) and (i).
26
The term “firearm” includes “any silencer
(as defined in [18 U.S.C. 921]).”
26 U.S.C. 5845(a)(7).
Section
921, in turn, defines a “firearm silencer” as “any device for
The appendix to the petition for a writ of certiorari is
not sequentially paginated. This brief treats it as if it were
and designates the first page of the court of appeals’ opinion as
“1a.”
1
3
silencing, muffling, or diminishing the report of a portable
firearm,
including
any
combination
of
parts,
designed
or
redesigned, and intended for use in assembling or fabricating a
firearm silencer
* * *
and any part intended only for use in
such assembly or fabrication.”
18 U.S.C. 921(a)(25). 2
On January 21, 2022, an undercover agent working for the
Miami-Dade Police Department visited Miami Gun Shops and asked
petitioner for the store’s owner, Manuel Reguiera.
Pet. App. 2a.
Petitioner told the agent that Reguiera was not there, called
Reguiera, and gave the phone to the agent.
Ibid.
In petitioner’s
presence, the agent asked Reguiera if he could purchase “soda
cans,” which is a slang term for silencers.
Ibid.
Petitioner
then spoke with Reguiera and brought the agent to the back of the
store.
Ibid.
In the back room, petitioner showed the agent four packaged
kits labeled “9.5mm Monocore w[ith] Booster.”
(brackets in original).
Pet. App. 2a-3a
The agent asked to buy the kits, which
petitioner told him would cost “five hundred apiece.”
Br. 5 (citation omitted).
Gov’t C.A.
The kits contained a hollow metal tube
that had an open hole on one end and a closed cap on the other
end.
Pet. App. 3a.
The tubes contained monocore “baffling
material” that separated the inside of each tube into multiple
At the time of petitioner’s offense, the relevant
definition was found at 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(24) (2018). On June 25,
2022, the definition was redesignated as Section 921(a)(25),
without any other change. See Bipartisan Safer Communities Act,
Pub. L. No. 117-159, Div. A, Tit. II, § 12002(2), 136 Stat. 1325.
2
4
small chambers.
Ibid.
The open end of the metal tube was attached
to a “Nielsen device” or “recoil booster,” which is an apparatus
that assists with recoil when a firearm equipped with a silencer
is discharged.
Gov’t C.A. Br. 5-6.
The kits also contained a
replacement end cap with a hole drilled through it that could
replace the closed cap that was attached to the tube, as well as
an Allen wrench that the buyer could use to switch the end caps.
Pet.
App.
3a.
Before
making
the
purchase,
the
agent
asked
petitioner if all four kits came with the replacement end cap, and
petitioner confirmed that they did.
Ibid.
Petitioner and the agent completed the sale, but petitioner
did not perform a background check on the agent or record the sale.
Pet. App. 3a.
The kits that petitioner sold did not have serial
numbers on them and were not registered in the National Firearms
Registration and Transfer Record.
2.
Ibid.
A grand jury indicted petitioner, Reguiera, and Miami
Gun Shops on charges related to the unlawful possession and sale
of firearms.
Pet. App. 3a.
Based on his possession and sale of
the kits, petitioner was charged with one count of knowingly
possessing an unregistered silencer, in violation of 26 U.S.C.
5861(d); one count of transferring an unregistered silencer, in
violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861(e); and one count of failure by a
federally licensed dealer to keep proper records, in violation of
18 U.S.C. 922(b)(5).
Pet. App. 3a-4a; Indictment 10-12.
5
After a five-day trial, the jury found petitioner guilty of
knowingly possessing an unregistered silencer, but acquitted him
of the other two charges.
district
court
Pet. App. 8a; Gov’t C.A. Br. 3.
sentenced
petitioner
to
eight
months
The
of
imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release.
Judgment 2-3.
3.
The court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished per
curiam decision.
a.
Pet. App. 1a-18a.
First, the court of appeals determined that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) had
purportedly changed its policy on the legality of “solvent traps”
and silencer-conversion kits.
Pet. App. 9a. 3
The court of appeals observed that to prove a violation of
Section 5861(d), the government must show that (1) the defendant
“possessed a ‘firearm’ within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. [section]
5845(a) of the National Firearms Act; (2) he knew the features of
the firearm that brought it within the scope of the Act; and
(3) the firearm was not registered to the defendant.”
Pet. App.
10a (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in
original).
The court explained that, conversely, the government
“need
prove
not
that
the
defendant
knew
the
weapon
was
unregistered,” “that the defendant knew his possession of the
A solvent trap is a device that can be attached to the
muzzle of a firearm that is designed to collect cleaning solvent
while cleaning the firearm. See Gov’t C.A. Br. 10.
3
6
weapon was unlawful,” or “that he knew what features define a
‘firearm’ under 26 U.S.C. [section] 5845(a).”
omitted; brackets in original).
Ibid. (citation
And the court of appeals agreed
with the district court that even if ATF had in fact changed its
policy regarding solvent traps and silencer-conversion kits -- an
issue the court did not decide -- evidence of such a change would
be irrelevant to whether petitioner had the requisite mens rea
with respect to the kits he sold.
b.
Second,
the
court
of
Id. at 10a-11a.
appeals
determined
that
the
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting text
messages and a video that were extracted from petitioner’s cell
phone.
Pet. App. 11a.
The video, which was sent to petitioner by
text message, showed an unidentified person firing a gun with a
silencer attached.
“Lmao!!!!
Id. at 4a.
Love it!!!
Petitioner had responded via text:
that solvent trap is real quiet too!!!”
C.A. Supp. App. 198; see Pet. App. 4a.
The court of appeals noted
that under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), “[e]vidence of any
other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s
character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character,” but it can be used “for
another purpose, such as
* * *
knowledge.”
Pet. App. 11a-12a
(citations omitted; brackets in original).
The
court
petitioner’s
of
appeals
response
observed
were
that
“clearly
here,
the
relevant
to
[petitioner] knew the kits [he sold] were silencers.”
video
and
whether
Pet. App.
7
12a.
The court explained that because petitioner had argued at
trial that he believed the kits were merely solvent traps used for
cleaning a firearm (see n.3, supra), petitioner’s reference to the
apparent silencer in the video as a “solvent trap” was “directly
relevant to whether [petitioner’s purported] belief was sincere.”
Pet. App. 13a.
The court further noted that petitioner appeared
to concede that the evidence was “relevant.”
Reply Br. 10.
Ibid.; see Pet. C.A.
And the court of appeals agreed with the district
court that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
its
admission,
its
probative
value
was
not
substantially
outweighed by any prejudicial effect of the video’s depiction of
someone discharging a firearm.
c.
Third,
the
court
Pet. App. 13a.
of
appeals
found
no
error
in
the
district court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for judgment of
acquittal.
Pet. App. 13a-18a.
The court of appeals reiterated
that the government only needed to prove that petitioner “‘knew
the features of the firearm that brought it within the scope of
the Act,’” not that petitioner knew “what defines a firearm under
the statute.”
Id. at 14a (citation omitted).
And it agreed with
the district court that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s
finding that the specific kits petitioner sold “were a ‘combination
of
parts,
assembling
designed
or
or
redesigned,
fabricating
a
firearm
and
intended
silencer’
for
to
use
‘silenc[e],
muffl[e], or diminish[] the report of a portable firearm.’”
(quoting 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(25)) (brackets in original).
in
Ibid.
8
The
court
of
appeals
observed
that
the
government
had
presented evidence that the baffling material in the tube and the
Nielsen device served only to muffle the sound of a firearm
discharge and to enable a firearm to operate normally with a
silencer attached.
Pet. App. 14a-15a.
The court also highlighted
trial evidence showing that once the end caps in the kits were
swapped (see p. 4, supra), the device would reduce the sound of a
firearm
by
approximately
14
decibels,
and
emphasized
that
petitioner’s own expert had testified that once the end caps were
swapped the kit operated as a silencer.
Pet. App. 15a.
The court of appeals further found that the government had
presented “extensive evidence” that petitioner knew the kits were
silencers.
Pet. App. 15a.
The court observed that the evidence
showed that petitioner had sold the kits after the agent asked to
buy
“soda
cans,”
which
is
a
slang
term
for
silencers;
that
petitioner knew the contents of the kits, including that their
packaging
stated
that
they
contained
a
“[m]onocore
w[ith]
booster”; that petitioner had assured the agent that the kits
contained
the
swappable
end
caps,
further
demonstrating
that
petitioner knew the kits enabled the buyer to make a functioning
silencer; and finally that petitioner had referred to the apparent
silencer in the text-message video as a “solvent trap,” undermining
his argument that he believed the kits contained mere cleaning
supplies.
Id. at 15a-16a (brackets in original).
9
d.
Fourth,
the
court
of
appeals
rejected
petitioner’s
argument that the kits did not constitute silencers when he sold
them because the end caps had not yet been swapped.
16a.
Pet. App.
The court pointed to the text of the National Firearms Act,
which defines a silencer to include “‘any combination of parts,
designed or redesigned, and intended for use in assembling or
fabricating a firearm silencer’ -- and not just the assembled
product.”
e.
Ibid. (quoting 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(25)).
Finally,
the
court
of
appeals
rejected
petitioner’s
argument that he should have been acquitted because Miami Gun Shops
has a license to manufacture and distribute firearms and petitioner
was a designated responsible person at the store.
18a.
Pet. App. 16a-
The court explained that an unregistered silencer cannot be
legally possessed even by a manufacturer.
further
explained
that
petitioner’s
Id. at 17a.
argument
relied
And it
on
his
previous assertion that the kits were not themselves firearms
because they had not yet been assembled into silencers, which
failed for the reasons the court already stated.
Ibid.
ARGUMENT
Petitioner renews his contention (Pet. 12-23) that he was
entitled to acquittal as a matter of law, either on the theory
that the mens rea evidence was insufficient or on the theory that
he could not commit the offense because was working for a licensed
firearms dealer.
The court of appeals correctly rejected those
theories, and its nonprecedential decision does not conflict with
10
any decision of this Court or of any other court of appeals.
This
Court has previously denied petitions for writs of certiorari
raising similar issues, and the same result is warranted here. 4
Petitioner also renews his contention that the district court
abused its discretion in its evidentiary rulings, by excluding
evidence that ATF allegedly changed its position regarding solvent
traps
and
by
admitting
the
text-message
exchange
in
which
petitioner referred to a silencer as a “solvent trap” and the
related video.
The court of appeals correctly found that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in those evidentiary
rulings;
the
lower
warrant
this
Court’s
harmless.
1.
courts’
fact-bound
review;
and
any
determinations
error
would
do
not
have
been
No further review is warranted.
The court of appeals correctly affirmed the denial of
petitioner’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
a.
The
government
petitioner’s mens rea.
presented
sufficient
evidence
of
Petitioner was convicted of “possess[ing]
a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms
Registration
and
Transfer
Record,”
26
U.S.C.
5861(d),
specifically, a “firearm silencer” under 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(25).
The
term
“firearm
silencer,”
in
turn,
means
“any
device
for
silencing, muffling, or diminishing the report of a portable
See Schieferle v. United States, 2024 WL 5011713 (Dec.
9, 2024) (No. 24-120); Andujo v. United States, 143 S. Ct. 443
(2022) (No. 21-8103); Owens v. United States, 522 U.S. 806 (1997)
(No. 96-1559); Woodbridge v. United States, 516 U.S. 871 (1995)
(No. 95-317).
4
11
firearm,
including
any
combination
of
parts,
designed
or
redesigned, and intended for use in assembling or fabricating a
firearm silencer or firearm muffler, and any part intended only
for use in such assembly or fabrication.”
18 U.S.C. 921(a)(25);
see 26 U.S.C. 5845(a)(7).
The government was thus required to prove that petitioner
knowingly possessed a “firearm silencer”; that the device was not
properly registered to him; and that he knew the characteristics
of the device that rendered it subject to registration.
26 U.S.C.
5845(a)(7) and 5861(d); see Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.
600, 602 (1994) (discussing the analogous knowledge requirement
for machineguns); pp. 13-16, infra.
And as the court of appeals
recognized
the
(Pet.
App.
15a-16a),
government
presented
“extensive evidence” that petitioner knew the kits had the features
that
made
them
silencers
--
i.e.,
that
they
consisted
of
a
“combination of parts” “intended for use in assembling” a “device
for silencing, muffling, or diminishing the report of a portable
firearm,” 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(25).
First, the government presented evidence that petitioner knew
that each kit contained a replacement end cap with a hole drilled
in it that, when swapped with the end cap on the tube in the kit,
enabled the buyer to make a fully functioning silencer.
15a.
Pet. App.
Indeed, when the undercover agent was making the purchase,
he asked petitioner whether all of the kits came with the drilled
12
end caps, and petitioner confirmed that they did.
Gov’t C.A. Br.
15; see Pet. App. 3a, 15a.
Second, the government presented evidence that the packaging
for the kits stated that they contained a “9.5mm Monocore w[ith]
booster.”
Pet. App. 2a-3a (brackets in original); see id. at 15a.
The government presented testimony that a “booster” is a “very
common device” known among gun owners that serves the sole purpose
of “allowing a firearm to shoot properly” by “counteracting the
weight that a firearm silencer puts on the barrel of a firearm.”
D. Ct. Doc. 161, at 97, 105 (Mar. 23, 2023).
And the government
presented testimony that “Monocore baffles” are “some of the most
common types of baffles” and that they serve the sole purpose of
“silencing sound.”
Id. at 90-91.
Third, the government presented evidence that petitioner sold
the kits after the agent asked to buy “soda cans,” which is a slang
term for silencers, and that one of petitioner’s coworkers had
referred to a silencer as a “can” in a text-message conversation
with petitioner.
Pet. App. 15a; see D. Ct. Doc. 161, at 68-69.
And fourth, the government presented evidence that petitioner had
previously referred to an apparent silencer in a video as a
“solvent trap,” calling it “real quiet.”
15a-16a; see also p. 6, supra.
Pet. App. 4a; see id. at
That evidence, in combination with
the other evidence presented at trial, amply proved petitioner’s
mens rea.
13
Nor, in any event, would review be warranted to address
petitioner’s
fact-bound
disagreement
sufficiency determination.
with
the
lower
courts’
This Court does not ordinarily grant
certiorari “to review evidence and discuss specific facts.” United
States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 227 (1925); see Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. 419, 456-457 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[U]nder
what we have called the ‘two-court rule,’ the policy [in Johnston]
has been applied with particular rigor when district court and
court of appeals are in agreement as to what conclusion the record
requires.”) (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods.
Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949)).
Petitioner does not identify any
sound basis for departing from that practice here.
b.
Petitioner asserts (Pet. 13) that the government was
additionally required to prove his knowledge of the law -- namely,
that he knew that the kits fit within the legal definition of
“firearm” under the National Firearm Act.
He acknowledges that
under this Court’s decision in Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.
600 (1994), “the government must prove that [he] knew of the
features of the solvent trap that would make it a silencer under
the [statute].”
Pet. 16; see Pet. 11-12 (agreeing with the
Eleventh Circuit’s similar observation in United States v. Ruiz,
253 F.3d 634, 638 n.4 (2001) (per curiam)); see also Pet. App. 10a
(relying on Ruiz).
But petitioner apparently construes that
requirement to include proof not only that he knew the functional
aspects of the kits, but also that he “kn[ew] that the solvent
14
cans are firearms as defined by the [National Firearms Act]” and
“sought to evade the registration requirements of the [Act].” Pet.
13.
His view of the mens rea requirement is wrong and has been
uniformly rejected by courts.
In Staples, this Court held that even though 26 U.S.C. 5861(d)
is silent as to mens rea, “the usual presumption that a defendant
must know the facts that make his conduct illegal should apply.”
511 U.S. at 605, 619 (emphasis added).
Applying that principle,
the Court concluded that Section 5861(d) requires proof that the
defendant knew the factual “characteristics” of the firearm -there, a machinegun -- “that brought it within the statutory
definition of a machinegun.”
Id. at 602; see id. at 619 (requiring
knowledge “of the features of his AR-15 that brought it within the
scope of the Act”).
Staples’ conclusion that Section 5861(d) requires proof of
the defendant’s knowledge of the relevant facts provides no support
for petitioner’s contention that the statute also requires proof
of the defendant’s knowledge of the law.
Indeed, as Justice
Ginsburg emphasized in her concurrence in Staples, the “mens rea
presumption requires knowledge only of the facts that make the
defendant’s conduct illegal, lest it conflict with the related
presumption, ‘deeply rooted in the American legal system,’ that,
ordinarily, ‘ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense
to criminal prosecution.’”
511 U.S. at 622 n.3 (Ginsburg, J.,
15
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498
U.S. 192, 199 (1991)).
The Court later confirmed Justice Ginsburg’s view in Bryan v.
United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998), where the Court identified
Staples as an exemplar of the general rule that knowledge of
illegality is not required.
See id. at 193.
Bryan quoted the
holding of Staples “that a charge that the defendant’s possession
of an unregistered machinegun was unlawful required proof ‘that he
knew the weapon he possessed had the characteristics that brought
it within the statutory definition of a machinegun.’”
(quoting Staples, 511 U.S. at 602).
Ibid.
And the Court emphasized that
“[i]t was not, however, necessary to prove that the defendant knew
that his possession was unlawful.”
Ibid. (citing Rogers v. United
States, 522 U.S. 252, 254-255 (1998) (plurality opinion)); see
Rogers,
522
“required
U.S.
the
at
jury
to
259
n.7
find
(approving
that
the
of
instruction
defendant
knew
that
that
he
possessed a device having all the characteristics of a silencer”).
The courts of appeals have likewise consistently recognized
that while Section 5861(d) requires proof that the defendant knew
the relevant features of the device that subjected it to the Act,
the statute does not require proof of knowledge of the law.
See,
e.g., United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 448 & n.58 (5th Cir.
2007); United States v. Jamison, 635 F.3d 962, 968-969 (7th Cir.
2011); United States v. Otto, 64 F.3d 367, 369-370 (8th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1133 (1996); United States v. Summers, 268
16
F.3d 683, 688 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1166 (2002);
United States v. Gonzales, 535 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 555 U.S. 1077 (2008); United States v. Owens, 103 F.3d
953, 955-956 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 806 (1997).
Petitioner points to no contrary authority.
This Court’s review
is not warranted.
c.
Petitioner’s contention (Pet. 21-23) that the district
court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the
basis that he was working for a licensed firearms dealer also lacks
merit and does not warrant further review.
Petitioner argues that
because Miami Gun Shops has a license that permits it to purchase,
manufacture, and distribute firearms, and because petitioner was
designated by the store as a “responsible person” under federal
law, he can possess weapons that are being built and tested.
Petitioner further argues that he can order solvent traps and
transform them into firearms, so long as he registers them when he
intends to do so.
As a result, he contends, he and the Miami Gun
Shop “are incapable of illegally possessing the solvent traps.”
Pet. 23.
The court of appeals correctly rejected that mistaken theory.
Pet. App. 16a-17a.
As the court explained, manufacturers cannot
lawfully possess unregistered silencers, and the kits themselves
–- i.e., before any transformation -- constituted silencers.
at 17a.
Id.
As noted above, the statute defines “firearm silencer” to
include “any combination of parts, designed or redesigned, and
17
intended for use in assembling or fabricating a firearm silencer,”
18 U.S.C. 921(a)(25), not just the assembled product.
11, supra.
See pp. 10-
Petitioner does not address the court of appeals’
reasoning or identify a conflict with any decision from this Court
or
another
court
of
appeals.
And
in
any
event,
petitioner
forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the district
court, so it would be subject to plain-error review only.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Gov’t C.A. Br. 20.
See
No further review is
warranted.
2.
Petitioner’s
challenges
to
the
district
court’s
evidentiary rulings also do not warrant this Court’s review.
a.
Petitioner asserts (Pet. 7-12) that the district court
erred in excluding evidence that ATF allegedly changed its position
and did not regard solvent traps as silencers prior to February
2022.
This Court recently denied review of a petition for a writ
of certiorari that similarly challenged a firearm conviction based
in part on a claim that ATF had changed its policy regarding
solvent traps.
See Schieferle v. United States, 2024 WL 5011713
(Dec. 9, 2024) (No. 24-120); see also U.S. Br. in Opp. at 12 in
Schieferle, supra, No. 24-120 (arguing that the contention was
mistaken).
The
Court
should
likewise
decline
to
review
petitioner’s claim here.
Petitioner’s claim of evidentiary error relies (Pet. 10) on
the premise that the excluded ATF documents and expert testimony
are relevant to his knowledge of the legality of the unregistered
18
kits.
But as explained above (see pp. 13-16, supra), that premise
is wrong; Section 5861(d) does not require proof that petitioner
knew that his possession of the kits was unlawful.
And the court
of appeals correctly observed that petitioner’s evidence relating
to the alleged policy change was irrelevant under the applicable
mens rea standard.
Pet. App. 10a-11a.
Moreover, even if the district court erred in excluding
petitioner’s evidence regarding supposed ATF policy, any error was
harmless.
Although the district court excluded certain proffered
documents
and
testimony
on
the
asserted
change
in
policy,
petitioner was able to introduce other evidence relating to his
theory, including a 2017 ATF bulletin regarding solvent traps and
a website extracted from his cell phone stating that a buyer can
legally purchase solvent traps without filling out an ATF Form 1,
but cannot “alter, modify, or redesign” them into silencers without
a Form 1 approval.
See Gov’t C.A. Br. 25-26; D. Ct. Doc. 161, at
116; C.A. Supp. App. 212, 214.
Petitioner relied on that evidence
in closing to argue that he believed it was legal to sell the
unregistered kits.
See Gov’t C.A. Br. 26.
Given the strength of
the government’s evidence, see pp. 11-12, supra, the district
court’s exclusion of petitioner’s additional ATF evidence did not
influence the jury’s verdict.
See Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750, 764-765 (1946).
b.
Finally, petitioner’s highly fact-bound contention (Pet.
23-28) that
the
district
court
erred
under
Federal
Rules
of
19
Evidence 404(b) and 403 in admitting the text-message exchange in
which he referred to a silencer as a “solvent trap” and the related
video does not warrant this Court’s review.
Federal
Rule
of
Evidence
404(b)
bars
“[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act
the
admission
* * *
of
to prove a
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion
the person acted in accordance with the character.”
404(b)(1).
Fed. R. Evid.
But the Rule also makes clear that “[t]his evidence
may be admissible for another purpose,” including “knowledge,
* * *
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”
Fed. R. Evid.
404(b)(2).
In the decision below, the court of appeals stated that
evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) when (1) it is “relevant
to an issue other than the defendant’s character”; (2) there is
“sufficient proof so that a jury could find that the defendant
committed the extrinsic act”; and (3) the evidence’s “probative
value” is not “substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice,”
as required by Rule 403.
Pet. App. 12a (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Petitioner does not disagree with that
framework,
and
see
Pet.
26,
the
court
of
appeals
correctly
recognized that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
applying the framework to the text message and video here.
First, petitioner’s reference to the apparent silencer in the
video as a “solvent trap” was relevant to rebut his defense that
he did not believe the kits were silencers. Pet. App. 13a. Indeed,
20
as the court of appeals observed, petitioner appeared to concede
that the evidence was relevant.
10.
Ibid.; see Pet. C.A. Reply Br.
Second, petitioner does not dispute that he sent the text
message. See Pet. App. 13a. Third, the district court permissibly
exercised its discretion in determining that the probative value
of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by any prejudicial
effect.
Ibid.
Petitioner asserts (Pet. 27) that the jury could have been
misled into believing that one can “simply put a solvent trap on
the end of a rifle and it will be a silencer.”
But the government
did not argue that attaching any solvent trap to a firearm would
create a silencer; instead, the prosecution focused on the specific
features of the kits that petitioner sold.
supra.
See pp. 7-8, 11-12,
Petitioner also asserts (Pet. 27) that the person in the
video may have lawfully modified a solvent trap to become a
silencer.
But the government did not argue to the jury that the
person in the video was committing a crime; instead, the video
simply showed petitioner’s knowledge about the form and function
of silencers.
See Gov’t C.A. Br. 34-35.
Finally, petitioner
asserts (Pet. 28) that “[s]howing a man shooting a high-powered
weapon with a silencer into the earth only inflamed the passions
of the jury against” petitioner.
But shooting a gun into the
ground is not a particularly heinous or violent act.
And as the
court below recognized, the jury acquitted petitioner of more
21
counts than it found him guilty of, undermining the argument that
the jury was inflamed.
Pet. App. 13a.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
SARAH M. HARRIS
Acting Solicitor General
KEVIN O. DRISCOLL
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
KATHERINE TWOMEY ALLEN
Attorney
JANUARY 2025
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.