Opposition Brief — Andersen Rable, Petitioner v. United States

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No. 24-5700

________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_______________

ANDERSEN RABEL, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

_______________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

_______________

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

_______________

SARAH M. HARRIS

Acting Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

KEVIN O. DRISCOLL

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

KATHERINE TWOMEY ALLEN

Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1.

Whether

petitioner’s

the

challenges

court

to

of

the

appeals

correctly

sufficiency

of

the

rejected

evidence

supporting his conviction for knowingly possessing an unregistered

firearm silencer, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861(d).

2.

Whether the court of appeals correctly found that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain

evidence proffered by petitioner regarding asserted federal agency

practice and in admitting evidence from petitioner’s cell phone to

show knowledge that the kits he sold were firearm silencers.

(I)

ADDITIONAL RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (S.D. Fla.):

United States v. Rabel, No. 22-cr-20058 (Nov. 16, 2022)

United States Court of Appeals (11th Cir.):

United States v. Rabel, No. 22-13854 (July 11, 2024)

(II)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_______________

No. 24-5700

ANDERSEN RABEL, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

_______________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

_______________

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

_______________

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-18a) is not

published in the Federal Reporter but is available at 2024 WL

3373705.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on July 11,

2024.

The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on September

25, 2024.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. 1254(1).

2

STATEMENT

Following a jury trial in the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida, petitioner was convicted of

one count of knowingly possessing an unregistered firearm, in

violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861(d).

Judgment 1.

The court sentenced

petitioner to eight months of imprisonment, to be followed by three

years of supervised release.

affirmed.

1.

Judgment 2-3.

The court of appeals

Pet. App. 1a-18a. 1

Petitioner worked at Miami Gun Shops, a federal firearms

licensee in Florida.

Pet. App. 2a.

Petitioner was designated as

a “responsible person” at the store, which meant that he could

direct the business as it relates to firearms at the store.

Ibid.

As a licensed dealer, Miami Gun Shops could manufacture and sell

firearms, including silencers, so long as it complied with federal

law.

Ibid.

The National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. 5801 et seq., prohibits

the possession of certain defined types of firearms unless the

device is properly registered to the possessor in the National

Firearms Registration and Transfer Record and is serialized.

U.S.C. 5861(d) and (i).

26

The term “firearm” includes “any silencer

(as defined in [18 U.S.C. 921]).”

26 U.S.C. 5845(a)(7).

Section

921, in turn, defines a “firearm silencer” as “any device for

The appendix to the petition for a writ of certiorari is

not sequentially paginated. This brief treats it as if it were

and designates the first page of the court of appeals’ opinion as

“1a.”

1

3

silencing, muffling, or diminishing the report of a portable

firearm,

including

any

combination

of

parts,

designed

or

redesigned, and intended for use in assembling or fabricating a

firearm silencer

* * *

and any part intended only for use in

such assembly or fabrication.”

18 U.S.C. 921(a)(25). 2

On January 21, 2022, an undercover agent working for the

Miami-Dade Police Department visited Miami Gun Shops and asked

petitioner for the store’s owner, Manuel Reguiera.

Pet. App. 2a.

Petitioner told the agent that Reguiera was not there, called

Reguiera, and gave the phone to the agent.

Ibid.

In petitioner’s

presence, the agent asked Reguiera if he could purchase “soda

cans,” which is a slang term for silencers.

Ibid.

Petitioner

then spoke with Reguiera and brought the agent to the back of the

store.

Ibid.

In the back room, petitioner showed the agent four packaged

kits labeled “9.5mm Monocore w[ith] Booster.”

(brackets in original).

Pet. App. 2a-3a

The agent asked to buy the kits, which

petitioner told him would cost “five hundred apiece.”

Br. 5 (citation omitted).

Gov’t C.A.

The kits contained a hollow metal tube

that had an open hole on one end and a closed cap on the other

end.

Pet. App. 3a.

The tubes contained monocore “baffling

material” that separated the inside of each tube into multiple

At the time of petitioner’s offense, the relevant

definition was found at 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(24) (2018). On June 25,

2022, the definition was redesignated as Section 921(a)(25),

without any other change. See Bipartisan Safer Communities Act,

Pub. L. No. 117-159, Div. A, Tit. II, § 12002(2), 136 Stat. 1325.

2

4

small chambers.

Ibid.

The open end of the metal tube was attached

to a “Nielsen device” or “recoil booster,” which is an apparatus

that assists with recoil when a firearm equipped with a silencer

is discharged.

Gov’t C.A. Br. 5-6.

The kits also contained a

replacement end cap with a hole drilled through it that could

replace the closed cap that was attached to the tube, as well as

an Allen wrench that the buyer could use to switch the end caps.

Pet.

App.

3a.

Before

making

the

purchase,

the

agent

asked

petitioner if all four kits came with the replacement end cap, and

petitioner confirmed that they did.

Ibid.

Petitioner and the agent completed the sale, but petitioner

did not perform a background check on the agent or record the sale.

Pet. App. 3a.

The kits that petitioner sold did not have serial

numbers on them and were not registered in the National Firearms

Registration and Transfer Record.

2.

Ibid.

A grand jury indicted petitioner, Reguiera, and Miami

Gun Shops on charges related to the unlawful possession and sale

of firearms.

Pet. App. 3a.

Based on his possession and sale of

the kits, petitioner was charged with one count of knowingly

possessing an unregistered silencer, in violation of 26 U.S.C.

5861(d); one count of transferring an unregistered silencer, in

violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861(e); and one count of failure by a

federally licensed dealer to keep proper records, in violation of

18 U.S.C. 922(b)(5).

Pet. App. 3a-4a; Indictment 10-12.

5

After a five-day trial, the jury found petitioner guilty of

knowingly possessing an unregistered silencer, but acquitted him

of the other two charges.

district

court

Pet. App. 8a; Gov’t C.A. Br. 3.

sentenced

petitioner

to

eight

months

The

of

imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release.

Judgment 2-3.

3.

The court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished per

curiam decision.

a.

Pet. App. 1a-18a.

First, the court of appeals determined that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) had

purportedly changed its policy on the legality of “solvent traps”

and silencer-conversion kits.

Pet. App. 9a. 3

The court of appeals observed that to prove a violation of

Section 5861(d), the government must show that (1) the defendant

“possessed a ‘firearm’ within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. [section]

5845(a) of the National Firearms Act; (2) he knew the features of

the firearm that brought it within the scope of the Act; and

(3) the firearm was not registered to the defendant.”

Pet. App.

10a (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in

original).

The court explained that, conversely, the government

“need

prove

not

that

the

defendant

knew

the

weapon

was

unregistered,” “that the defendant knew his possession of the

A solvent trap is a device that can be attached to the

muzzle of a firearm that is designed to collect cleaning solvent

while cleaning the firearm. See Gov’t C.A. Br. 10.

3

6

weapon was unlawful,” or “that he knew what features define a

‘firearm’ under 26 U.S.C. [section] 5845(a).”

omitted; brackets in original).

Ibid. (citation

And the court of appeals agreed

with the district court that even if ATF had in fact changed its

policy regarding solvent traps and silencer-conversion kits -- an

issue the court did not decide -- evidence of such a change would

be irrelevant to whether petitioner had the requisite mens rea

with respect to the kits he sold.

b.

Second,

the

court

of

Id. at 10a-11a.

appeals

determined

that

the

district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting text

messages and a video that were extracted from petitioner’s cell

phone.

Pet. App. 11a.

The video, which was sent to petitioner by

text message, showed an unidentified person firing a gun with a

silencer attached.

“Lmao!!!!

Id. at 4a.

Love it!!!

Petitioner had responded via text:

that solvent trap is real quiet too!!!”

C.A. Supp. App. 198; see Pet. App. 4a.

The court of appeals noted

that under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), “[e]vidence of any

other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s

character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person

acted in accordance with the character,” but it can be used “for

another purpose, such as

* * *

knowledge.”

Pet. App. 11a-12a

(citations omitted; brackets in original).

The

court

petitioner’s

of

appeals

response

observed

were

that

“clearly

here,

the

relevant

to

[petitioner] knew the kits [he sold] were silencers.”

video

and

whether

Pet. App.

7

12a.

The court explained that because petitioner had argued at

trial that he believed the kits were merely solvent traps used for

cleaning a firearm (see n.3, supra), petitioner’s reference to the

apparent silencer in the video as a “solvent trap” was “directly

relevant to whether [petitioner’s purported] belief was sincere.”

Pet. App. 13a.

The court further noted that petitioner appeared

to concede that the evidence was “relevant.”

Reply Br. 10.

Ibid.; see Pet. C.A.

And the court of appeals agreed with the district

court that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

its

admission,

its

probative

value

was

not

substantially

outweighed by any prejudicial effect of the video’s depiction of

someone discharging a firearm.

c.

Third,

the

court

Pet. App. 13a.

of

appeals

found

no

error

in

the

district court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for judgment of

acquittal.

Pet. App. 13a-18a.

The court of appeals reiterated

that the government only needed to prove that petitioner “‘knew

the features of the firearm that brought it within the scope of

the Act,’” not that petitioner knew “what defines a firearm under

the statute.”

Id. at 14a (citation omitted).

And it agreed with

the district court that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s

finding that the specific kits petitioner sold “were a ‘combination

of

parts,

assembling

designed

or

or

redesigned,

fabricating

a

firearm

and

intended

silencer’

for

to

use

‘silenc[e],

muffl[e], or diminish[] the report of a portable firearm.’”

(quoting 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(25)) (brackets in original).

in

Ibid.

8

The

court

of

appeals

observed

that

the

government

had

presented evidence that the baffling material in the tube and the

Nielsen device served only to muffle the sound of a firearm

discharge and to enable a firearm to operate normally with a

silencer attached.

Pet. App. 14a-15a.

The court also highlighted

trial evidence showing that once the end caps in the kits were

swapped (see p. 4, supra), the device would reduce the sound of a

firearm

by

approximately

14

decibels,

and

emphasized

that

petitioner’s own expert had testified that once the end caps were

swapped the kit operated as a silencer.

Pet. App. 15a.

The court of appeals further found that the government had

presented “extensive evidence” that petitioner knew the kits were

silencers.

Pet. App. 15a.

The court observed that the evidence

showed that petitioner had sold the kits after the agent asked to

buy

“soda

cans,”

which

is

a

slang

term

for

silencers;

that

petitioner knew the contents of the kits, including that their

packaging

stated

that

they

contained

a

“[m]onocore

w[ith]

booster”; that petitioner had assured the agent that the kits

contained

the

swappable

end

caps,

further

demonstrating

that

petitioner knew the kits enabled the buyer to make a functioning

silencer; and finally that petitioner had referred to the apparent

silencer in the text-message video as a “solvent trap,” undermining

his argument that he believed the kits contained mere cleaning

supplies.

Id. at 15a-16a (brackets in original).

9

d.

Fourth,

the

court

of

appeals

rejected

petitioner’s

argument that the kits did not constitute silencers when he sold

them because the end caps had not yet been swapped.

16a.

Pet. App.

The court pointed to the text of the National Firearms Act,

which defines a silencer to include “‘any combination of parts,

designed or redesigned, and intended for use in assembling or

fabricating a firearm silencer’ -- and not just the assembled

product.”

e.

Ibid. (quoting 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(25)).

Finally,

the

court

of

appeals

rejected

petitioner’s

argument that he should have been acquitted because Miami Gun Shops

has a license to manufacture and distribute firearms and petitioner

was a designated responsible person at the store.

18a.

Pet. App. 16a-

The court explained that an unregistered silencer cannot be

legally possessed even by a manufacturer.

further

explained

that

petitioner’s

Id. at 17a.

argument

relied

And it

on

his

previous assertion that the kits were not themselves firearms

because they had not yet been assembled into silencers, which

failed for the reasons the court already stated.

Ibid.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner renews his contention (Pet. 12-23) that he was

entitled to acquittal as a matter of law, either on the theory

that the mens rea evidence was insufficient or on the theory that

he could not commit the offense because was working for a licensed

firearms dealer.

The court of appeals correctly rejected those

theories, and its nonprecedential decision does not conflict with

10

any decision of this Court or of any other court of appeals.

This

Court has previously denied petitions for writs of certiorari

raising similar issues, and the same result is warranted here. 4

Petitioner also renews his contention that the district court

abused its discretion in its evidentiary rulings, by excluding

evidence that ATF allegedly changed its position regarding solvent

traps

and

by

admitting

the

text-message

exchange

in

which

petitioner referred to a silencer as a “solvent trap” and the

related video.

The court of appeals correctly found that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in those evidentiary

rulings;

the

lower

warrant

this

Court’s

harmless.

1.

courts’

fact-bound

review;

and

any

determinations

error

would

do

not

have

been

No further review is warranted.

The court of appeals correctly affirmed the denial of

petitioner’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

a.

The

government

petitioner’s mens rea.

presented

sufficient

evidence

of

Petitioner was convicted of “possess[ing]

a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms

Registration

and

Transfer

Record,”

26

U.S.C.

5861(d),

specifically, a “firearm silencer” under 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(25).

The

term

“firearm

silencer,”

in

turn,

means

“any

device

for

silencing, muffling, or diminishing the report of a portable

See Schieferle v. United States, 2024 WL 5011713 (Dec.

9, 2024) (No. 24-120); Andujo v. United States, 143 S. Ct. 443

(2022) (No. 21-8103); Owens v. United States, 522 U.S. 806 (1997)

(No. 96-1559); Woodbridge v. United States, 516 U.S. 871 (1995)

(No. 95-317).

4

11

firearm,

including

any

combination

of

parts,

designed

or

redesigned, and intended for use in assembling or fabricating a

firearm silencer or firearm muffler, and any part intended only

for use in such assembly or fabrication.”

18 U.S.C. 921(a)(25);

see 26 U.S.C. 5845(a)(7).

The government was thus required to prove that petitioner

knowingly possessed a “firearm silencer”; that the device was not

properly registered to him; and that he knew the characteristics

of the device that rendered it subject to registration.

26 U.S.C.

5845(a)(7) and 5861(d); see Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.

600, 602 (1994) (discussing the analogous knowledge requirement

for machineguns); pp. 13-16, infra.

And as the court of appeals

recognized

the

(Pet.

App.

15a-16a),

government

presented

“extensive evidence” that petitioner knew the kits had the features

that

made

them

silencers

--

i.e.,

that

they

consisted

of

a

“combination of parts” “intended for use in assembling” a “device

for silencing, muffling, or diminishing the report of a portable

firearm,” 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(25).

First, the government presented evidence that petitioner knew

that each kit contained a replacement end cap with a hole drilled

in it that, when swapped with the end cap on the tube in the kit,

enabled the buyer to make a fully functioning silencer.

15a.

Pet. App.

Indeed, when the undercover agent was making the purchase,

he asked petitioner whether all of the kits came with the drilled

12

end caps, and petitioner confirmed that they did.

Gov’t C.A. Br.

15; see Pet. App. 3a, 15a.

Second, the government presented evidence that the packaging

for the kits stated that they contained a “9.5mm Monocore w[ith]

booster.”

Pet. App. 2a-3a (brackets in original); see id. at 15a.

The government presented testimony that a “booster” is a “very

common device” known among gun owners that serves the sole purpose

of “allowing a firearm to shoot properly” by “counteracting the

weight that a firearm silencer puts on the barrel of a firearm.”

D. Ct. Doc. 161, at 97, 105 (Mar. 23, 2023).

And the government

presented testimony that “Monocore baffles” are “some of the most

common types of baffles” and that they serve the sole purpose of

“silencing sound.”

Id. at 90-91.

Third, the government presented evidence that petitioner sold

the kits after the agent asked to buy “soda cans,” which is a slang

term for silencers, and that one of petitioner’s coworkers had

referred to a silencer as a “can” in a text-message conversation

with petitioner.

Pet. App. 15a; see D. Ct. Doc. 161, at 68-69.

And fourth, the government presented evidence that petitioner had

previously referred to an apparent silencer in a video as a

“solvent trap,” calling it “real quiet.”

15a-16a; see also p. 6, supra.

Pet. App. 4a; see id. at

That evidence, in combination with

the other evidence presented at trial, amply proved petitioner’s

mens rea.

13

Nor, in any event, would review be warranted to address

petitioner’s

fact-bound

disagreement

sufficiency determination.

with

the

lower

courts’

This Court does not ordinarily grant

certiorari “to review evidence and discuss specific facts.” United

States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 227 (1925); see Kyles v. Whitley,

514 U.S. 419, 456-457 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[U]nder

what we have called the ‘two-court rule,’ the policy [in Johnston]

has been applied with particular rigor when district court and

court of appeals are in agreement as to what conclusion the record

requires.”) (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods.

Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949)).

Petitioner does not identify any

sound basis for departing from that practice here.

b.

Petitioner asserts (Pet. 13) that the government was

additionally required to prove his knowledge of the law -- namely,

that he knew that the kits fit within the legal definition of

“firearm” under the National Firearm Act.

He acknowledges that

under this Court’s decision in Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.

600 (1994), “the government must prove that [he] knew of the

features of the solvent trap that would make it a silencer under

the [statute].”

Pet. 16; see Pet. 11-12 (agreeing with the

Eleventh Circuit’s similar observation in United States v. Ruiz,

253 F.3d 634, 638 n.4 (2001) (per curiam)); see also Pet. App. 10a

(relying on Ruiz).

But petitioner apparently construes that

requirement to include proof not only that he knew the functional

aspects of the kits, but also that he “kn[ew] that the solvent

14

cans are firearms as defined by the [National Firearms Act]” and

“sought to evade the registration requirements of the [Act].” Pet.

13.

His view of the mens rea requirement is wrong and has been

uniformly rejected by courts.

In Staples, this Court held that even though 26 U.S.C. 5861(d)

is silent as to mens rea, “the usual presumption that a defendant

must know the facts that make his conduct illegal should apply.”

511 U.S. at 605, 619 (emphasis added).

Applying that principle,

the Court concluded that Section 5861(d) requires proof that the

defendant knew the factual “characteristics” of the firearm -there, a machinegun -- “that brought it within the statutory

definition of a machinegun.”

Id. at 602; see id. at 619 (requiring

knowledge “of the features of his AR-15 that brought it within the

scope of the Act”).

Staples’ conclusion that Section 5861(d) requires proof of

the defendant’s knowledge of the relevant facts provides no support

for petitioner’s contention that the statute also requires proof

of the defendant’s knowledge of the law.

Indeed, as Justice

Ginsburg emphasized in her concurrence in Staples, the “mens rea

presumption requires knowledge only of the facts that make the

defendant’s conduct illegal, lest it conflict with the related

presumption, ‘deeply rooted in the American legal system,’ that,

ordinarily, ‘ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense

to criminal prosecution.’”

511 U.S. at 622 n.3 (Ginsburg, J.,

15

concurring in the judgment) (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498

U.S. 192, 199 (1991)).

The Court later confirmed Justice Ginsburg’s view in Bryan v.

United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998), where the Court identified

Staples as an exemplar of the general rule that knowledge of

illegality is not required.

See id. at 193.

Bryan quoted the

holding of Staples “that a charge that the defendant’s possession

of an unregistered machinegun was unlawful required proof ‘that he

knew the weapon he possessed had the characteristics that brought

it within the statutory definition of a machinegun.’”

(quoting Staples, 511 U.S. at 602).

Ibid.

And the Court emphasized that

“[i]t was not, however, necessary to prove that the defendant knew

that his possession was unlawful.”

Ibid. (citing Rogers v. United

States, 522 U.S. 252, 254-255 (1998) (plurality opinion)); see

Rogers,

522

“required

U.S.

the

at

jury

to

259

n.7

find

(approving

that

the

of

instruction

defendant

knew

that

that

he

possessed a device having all the characteristics of a silencer”).

The courts of appeals have likewise consistently recognized

that while Section 5861(d) requires proof that the defendant knew

the relevant features of the device that subjected it to the Act,

the statute does not require proof of knowledge of the law.

See,

e.g., United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 448 & n.58 (5th Cir.

2007); United States v. Jamison, 635 F.3d 962, 968-969 (7th Cir.

2011); United States v. Otto, 64 F.3d 367, 369-370 (8th Cir. 1995),

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1133 (1996); United States v. Summers, 268

16

F.3d 683, 688 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1166 (2002);

United States v. Gonzales, 535 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir.), cert.

denied, 555 U.S. 1077 (2008); United States v. Owens, 103 F.3d

953, 955-956 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 806 (1997).

Petitioner points to no contrary authority.

This Court’s review

is not warranted.

c.

Petitioner’s contention (Pet. 21-23) that the district

court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the

basis that he was working for a licensed firearms dealer also lacks

merit and does not warrant further review.

Petitioner argues that

because Miami Gun Shops has a license that permits it to purchase,

manufacture, and distribute firearms, and because petitioner was

designated by the store as a “responsible person” under federal

law, he can possess weapons that are being built and tested.

Petitioner further argues that he can order solvent traps and

transform them into firearms, so long as he registers them when he

intends to do so.

As a result, he contends, he and the Miami Gun

Shop “are incapable of illegally possessing the solvent traps.”

Pet. 23.

The court of appeals correctly rejected that mistaken theory.

Pet. App. 16a-17a.

As the court explained, manufacturers cannot

lawfully possess unregistered silencers, and the kits themselves

–- i.e., before any transformation -- constituted silencers.

at 17a.

Id.

As noted above, the statute defines “firearm silencer” to

include “any combination of parts, designed or redesigned, and

17

intended for use in assembling or fabricating a firearm silencer,”

18 U.S.C. 921(a)(25), not just the assembled product.

11, supra.

See pp. 10-

Petitioner does not address the court of appeals’

reasoning or identify a conflict with any decision from this Court

or

another

court

of

appeals.

And

in

any

event,

petitioner

forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the district

court, so it would be subject to plain-error review only.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Gov’t C.A. Br. 20.

See

No further review is

warranted.

2.

Petitioner’s

challenges

to

the

district

court’s

evidentiary rulings also do not warrant this Court’s review.

a.

Petitioner asserts (Pet. 7-12) that the district court

erred in excluding evidence that ATF allegedly changed its position

and did not regard solvent traps as silencers prior to February

2022.

This Court recently denied review of a petition for a writ

of certiorari that similarly challenged a firearm conviction based

in part on a claim that ATF had changed its policy regarding

solvent traps.

See Schieferle v. United States, 2024 WL 5011713

(Dec. 9, 2024) (No. 24-120); see also U.S. Br. in Opp. at 12 in

Schieferle, supra, No. 24-120 (arguing that the contention was

mistaken).

The

Court

should

likewise

decline

to

review

petitioner’s claim here.

Petitioner’s claim of evidentiary error relies (Pet. 10) on

the premise that the excluded ATF documents and expert testimony

are relevant to his knowledge of the legality of the unregistered

18

kits.

But as explained above (see pp. 13-16, supra), that premise

is wrong; Section 5861(d) does not require proof that petitioner

knew that his possession of the kits was unlawful.

And the court

of appeals correctly observed that petitioner’s evidence relating

to the alleged policy change was irrelevant under the applicable

mens rea standard.

Pet. App. 10a-11a.

Moreover, even if the district court erred in excluding

petitioner’s evidence regarding supposed ATF policy, any error was

harmless.

Although the district court excluded certain proffered

documents

and

testimony

on

the

asserted

change

in

policy,

petitioner was able to introduce other evidence relating to his

theory, including a 2017 ATF bulletin regarding solvent traps and

a website extracted from his cell phone stating that a buyer can

legally purchase solvent traps without filling out an ATF Form 1,

but cannot “alter, modify, or redesign” them into silencers without

a Form 1 approval.

See Gov’t C.A. Br. 25-26; D. Ct. Doc. 161, at

116; C.A. Supp. App. 212, 214.

Petitioner relied on that evidence

in closing to argue that he believed it was legal to sell the

unregistered kits.

See Gov’t C.A. Br. 26.

Given the strength of

the government’s evidence, see pp. 11-12, supra, the district

court’s exclusion of petitioner’s additional ATF evidence did not

influence the jury’s verdict.

See Kotteakos v. United States, 328

U.S. 750, 764-765 (1946).

b.

Finally, petitioner’s highly fact-bound contention (Pet.

23-28) that

the

district

court

erred

under

Federal

Rules

of

19

Evidence 404(b) and 403 in admitting the text-message exchange in

which he referred to a silencer as a “solvent trap” and the related

video does not warrant this Court’s review.

Federal

Rule

of

Evidence

404(b)

bars

“[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act

the

admission

* * *

of

to prove a

person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion

the person acted in accordance with the character.”

404(b)(1).

Fed. R. Evid.

But the Rule also makes clear that “[t]his evidence

may be admissible for another purpose,” including “knowledge,

* * *

absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”

Fed. R. Evid.

404(b)(2).

In the decision below, the court of appeals stated that

evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) when (1) it is “relevant

to an issue other than the defendant’s character”; (2) there is

“sufficient proof so that a jury could find that the defendant

committed the extrinsic act”; and (3) the evidence’s “probative

value” is not “substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice,”

as required by Rule 403.

Pet. App. 12a (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

Petitioner does not disagree with that

framework,

and

see

Pet.

26,

the

court

of

appeals

correctly

recognized that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

applying the framework to the text message and video here.

First, petitioner’s reference to the apparent silencer in the

video as a “solvent trap” was relevant to rebut his defense that

he did not believe the kits were silencers. Pet. App. 13a. Indeed,

20

as the court of appeals observed, petitioner appeared to concede

that the evidence was relevant.

10.

Ibid.; see Pet. C.A. Reply Br.

Second, petitioner does not dispute that he sent the text

message. See Pet. App. 13a. Third, the district court permissibly

exercised its discretion in determining that the probative value

of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by any prejudicial

effect.

Ibid.

Petitioner asserts (Pet. 27) that the jury could have been

misled into believing that one can “simply put a solvent trap on

the end of a rifle and it will be a silencer.”

But the government

did not argue that attaching any solvent trap to a firearm would

create a silencer; instead, the prosecution focused on the specific

features of the kits that petitioner sold.

supra.

See pp. 7-8, 11-12,

Petitioner also asserts (Pet. 27) that the person in the

video may have lawfully modified a solvent trap to become a

silencer.

But the government did not argue to the jury that the

person in the video was committing a crime; instead, the video

simply showed petitioner’s knowledge about the form and function

of silencers.

See Gov’t C.A. Br. 34-35.

Finally, petitioner

asserts (Pet. 28) that “[s]howing a man shooting a high-powered

weapon with a silencer into the earth only inflamed the passions

of the jury against” petitioner.

But shooting a gun into the

ground is not a particularly heinous or violent act.

And as the

court below recognized, the jury acquitted petitioner of more

21

counts than it found him guilty of, undermining the argument that

the jury was inflamed.

Pet. App. 13a.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

SARAH M. HARRIS

Acting Solicitor General

KEVIN O. DRISCOLL

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

KATHERINE TWOMEY ALLEN

Attorney

JANUARY 2025

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Opposition Brief — Andersen Rable, Petitioner v. United States | Frix