Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Solomon Odubajo, Petitioner v. United States

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IN THE

Supre

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATE

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OF AMERICA

OFRceof

SOLOMON ODUBAJO

It!i£LERK

— PETITIONER

(Your Name)

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

. — RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

SOLOMON ODUBAJO.

(Your Name)

P.o. BOX 9000

(Address)

SAFFORD, ARIZONA 85548

(City, State, Zip Code)

(Phone Number)

QUESTIONS PRESENTFH

1. Given Deputy Twombly's admission on the record (PagelD //500, 9-14)

that the only factor establishing reasonable suspicion to seize the

Parcel was its state of origin being a "source state," was this single

factor sufficient? See, Terry v. Ohio, 592 U.S. 1. 21. 88 U.S. S.r.t.

1868 (1968) and United States v. Urrieta. 520 F.5d 569 (6th fir. 2008).

2. Was the warrantless search of the Parcel an illegal search and

seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, given the standard

established in Ex Parte Jackson. 24 LED 877. 96 US 727 (1878)?

LIST OF PARTIES

[ X] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[ ] All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of

all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this

petition is as follows:

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES

Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. Ill 24:L.Ed, 872 £1878)...

PAGE NUMBER

4

Oliver v. United States, 239 F.2d 818, 61 A.L.R.2d

1273 (8th Cir. 1957)................ .. . . ......................................

4

Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1967)4

Katz v. United States, 398 U.S. 347, 357 88 S.Ct.

507 (1967)

4

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961).. 4

United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U;S. 249

S.Ct. 2019 (1970)................................................

252, 90

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 U.S. S.Ct. 1868

(1968)....................................................................................

.4

4-5

United States v. Underwood, 97 F.3d 1453 (6th Cir. 1996) 5

United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2008).5

United States v. Barry, 673 F.2d 912, 917-918 (6th Cir.

1982)...........................................................;................. .

5

United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375

(20.20)....................................

7

Wong Sun v. United States

9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)........

7

371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407,

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW

1

JURISDICTION

2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4-7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

8

CONCLUSION

9

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Opinion of the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

APPENDIX B

Opinion of the United States Sixth Circuit District Court (Document

55)

APPENDIX C

Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee (Document 29)

Denial^of^Extension of Time to File for Petition of Rehearing En Banc

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX F

JURISDICTION

k ] For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case

was 06/12/2024__________

[X] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

Appeals on the following date: ___________

, and a copy of the

order denying rehearing appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including______

(date) on

(date)

in Application No.__ A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix_______

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:

, and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including--------------------- (date) on_______________(date) in

Application No. __ A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

2.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Federal Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const, amend. IV

U.S. Const, amend. V

3.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

THE

APPELLATE

COURT

ERRED

IN

AFFIRMING

THE

DISTRICT

COURT'S

OVERRULING OF ODUBAJO'S MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects

against

unreasonable

searches

and

seizures,

First

class

mail

is

protected by the Fourth Amendment. See, Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727

24 L.

Ed.

877 (1878) and Oliver v.

United States,

239 F.2d 818, 61

A.L.R.2d 1273 (8th Cir. 1957). In Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d

132 (9th Cir. 1967), the Court said*

"The protection against unreasonable search and seizure of one's papers or

other effects, guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment extends.to their presence in

the mail. * * * Thus, first class mail cannot be seized and retained, nor

opened and searched, without the authority of a search warrant." 386 F.2d at

139. (Emphasis added.)

Searches

conducted

without

"subject

to

few

specifically

established

exception." Katz v.

United States,

398 U.S.

(1967).

a

a

warrant

are

per

se

and

347,

unreasonable,

well-delineated

357,

88 S.Ct.

507

Where law enforcement obtains evidence in violation of the

Fourth Amendment,

courts

should exclude

that evidence from use at

trial. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961).

Odubajo moved to suppress M-30 pills

found in

the Parcel, his

personal property and cash found at the home at 1457 Rosewood, and

the

firearm

found

in

the

automobile.

The

Sixth

Circuit

Court

of

Appeals affirmed the District Court's overruling of his motion.

Parcel:

This Court has held that a mail parcel may be detained as long as

there is a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. United States

v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252

90 S.Ct. 2019 (1970). Reasonable

suspicion results from specific and articulable facts,

inferences therefrom,

and rational

that reasonably justify an intrusion. Terry v.

4.

Ohio,

392 U.S. 1,

21,

88 U.S.

S.Ct.

1868 (1968). The Sixth Circuit

has held that a police officer's knowledge that a particular city is

a source of drugs sent through the mail is relevant to determination

of

reasonable

Underwood,

97

suspicion

in

F.3d

(6th

1453

this

Cir.

context.

1996).

See,

United

However,

Twombly testifying that he found the Parcel

States

v.

despite Deputy

suspicious due to its

being sent from the State of Arizona (PagelD #500, 9-14),

the Sixth

Circuit has also held in United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569 (6th

Cir. 2008) that,

• • • travel between population centers is a relatively weak indicator of

illegal activity because there is almost no city in the country that could not

be 'characterize[d] as either a major narcotics distribution center or a city

through which drug couriers pass on their way to a major narcotics

distribution center.

United States v. Andrews . 600 F.2d 563, 567 (6th Cir.

1979); see also United States (520 F.3d 577) v. Townsend, 305 F.3d 537, 5H3

(6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a trip between Chicago, Illinois and Columbus,

Ohio does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the traveler is

transporting drugs); Saperstein, 723 F.2d at 1228 (holding that travel to and

from a source city is such innocent behavior that it is entitled to little

weight in a Fourth Amendment analysis)."

In addition

to this,

Twombly concedes that he did not mention the

destination of the Parcel as a factor for removing it from the postal

queue

in his

affidavit.

The only factor he mentioned was

that he

conducted a CLEAR search (PagelD #500, 4-14), yet prior to conducting

this

he still lacked the reasonable suspicion to place the Parcel

into police custody.

Furthermore,

the opening and inspection of the Parcel by Deputy

Twombly was unlawful because it was conducted without a warrant and

there were no circumstances which might have justified a search; see,

United

States

v.

Barry,

673

F.2d

912,

917-918

(6th

Cir.

1982)

(holding a search and seizure of a package was illegal because the

officers

"unquestionabl[y]" had sufficient

time to seek a warrant)

; likewise, the Parcel was not due to be delivered until 6 PM (PagelD

#484, 17-19). Twombly also relied upon an assumption, stating on the

5.

record, "I believe he said

I'll get this out to you t M (PagelD #482,

11). When directly examined, he was asked by the government, "Based

on that phone call, what was

your understanding of the approval

status

of

your

(PagelD #482,

warrant?"

12-14).

Twombly

replied,

"That

it was

approved" ■

The government further asks why Twombly had

thought so and he further replied, "Because... any other times I ever

had problems with an affidavit...the judge would let me know right

away..." (PagelD #482, 15-20).

Given the record, Twombly thus

actually stated that he assumed the approval status of the warrant

based

on prior experiences

with

the Magistrate,

rather

than on a

case-by-case basis. On April 6th, 2022, at 12:18 PM, Twombly searched

the

Parcel

and

viewed

its

contents

(PagelD

#484,

17-19)

while

Magistrate Baughman did not issue the warrant until 12:56 PM (PagelD

#485,

his

2-5). The record also reflects that Twombly conceded that, in

phone

call with Magistrate

Baughman did

not

specifically

probable cause" (PagelD #502

Baughman,

use

it was

the words

his

"I

belief

am going

that

to find

6-8). He acknowledged that he received

an email from the Magistrate and that he did not have prior judicial

approval due to lack of confirmation that the warrant had been signed

(PagelD #502,

9-16). His "best guess" for the time of the call was

12:10" (PagelD #504, 7-23). Given these discrepancies,

"12:15

or

Deputy

Twombly neither had

the

constitutionally

required

judicial

approval nor issued warrant to search the Parcel and its contents. On

appeal, the government argued that the Good Faith Exception

would

apply to the Parcel search in the alternative,

yet they never made

the argument justifying Inevitable Discovery Doctrine

Pg*

37).

argument

Instead,

for

the

Inevitable

(Appendix A, pg. 5)

Sixth

Circuit

Discovery

on

Court

of

behalf

(Appendix C,

Appeals

made

of

government

the

this

to negate Odubajo's suppression of the evidence

6.

found in the Parcel.

590

U.S.

371,

375

However,

per United States v.

(2020),

the Court

to

it

by

the

principle

of

party

evidence

presented

violating

"the

restraint."

In

Sineneng-Smith,

"has a duty to rely only on

parties"

to

avoid

representation

the government's appellee brief,

the

risk

of

and

judicial

they conceded that

Deputy Twombly executed the "warrant a few minutes too soon ff . .

(Appendix C, pg. 38).

Another pertinent issue to be brought to this Court's attention

for

review

is

the

reluctance

of

the

government

to

subpoena

Mr.

Matyas, Magistrate Baughman's courtroom deputy (PagelD #545-546). The

government had provided statements on the record as to Mr. Matyas's

absence as a witness, with the reasoning, "I think that's something

my

office

is

sensitive

about

and

I'm sensitive about

subpoenaing

judges' employees" (PagelD #546, 10-11), and that Magistrate Baughman

"sort of didn't feel comfortable with Mr. Matyas coming in and being

subjected to cross-examination" (PagelD #546, 19-25). The absence of

witness testimony by Mr. Matyas deprives the record of clarification

regarding

the

specific

facts

surrounding

Magistrate

Baughman's

issuance of the search warrant; this furthermore deprives Mr. Odubajo

of his Fifth Amendment right to due process.

As a result,

the search and seizure of the Parcel violated the

Fourth Amendment. All evidence obtained after the illegal search and

seizure of the Parcel constitutes "Fruits of the Poisonous Tree," per

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441

(1963),

Court

thus, must be suppressed. The judgment by the Sixth Circuit

of

Appeals

affirming

the

reversed.

7.

District

Court's

decision must be

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

If

the

presented

unco.rrected.,

discrepancies

in

this

petition

remain

this, will have far-reaching implications,, Mt only on

future Terry stops, but also on warrantless searches and seizures. To

condone the procedural errors in this matter would allow government

officials to bypass the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement,

thus

allowing

them to rely solely

on an unwritten modus

operandi

based upon prior experiences, rather than upon proper set procedure

on a case-by-case basis.

The Fourth Amendment aims to balance the need for effective law

enforcement with protection of individuals' right to privacy, as well

as

freedom

from

arbitrary

government

intrusion.

This

principle

applies equally to searches conducted on parcels and other property,

The search in this matter was not only unreasonable but also violated

the fundamental protection of the Fourth Amendment.

8.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

Mr.

Odubajo respectfully requests that

this Court reverse.and remand the lower court's judgment.

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

7

Date:

09/23/2024

9.