Opposition Brief — Reginald L. Hopkins, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefDec 12, 2024
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No. 24-5678
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_______________
REGINALD L. HOPKINS, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
_______________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
_______________
ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
NICOLE M. ARGENTIERI
Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
TYLER ANNE LEE
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the court of appeals correctly declined to adopt an
implicit “ruse exception” -- pursuant to which state proceedings
may be treated as though they were federal proceedings -- for the
purpose of assessing the timeliness of a federal prosecution under
the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161 et seq.
(I)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_______________
No. 24-5678
REGINALD L. HOPKINS, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
_______________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
_______________
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. A1-A31) is
reported at 106 F.4th 280.
The order of the district court (Pet.
App. C1c-C34) is not published in the Federal Supplement but is
available at 2023 WL 3077802.
An earlier order of the district
court is not published in the Federal Supplement but is available
at 2023 WL 2385928.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on July 9,
2024.
A petition for rehearing was denied on August 2, 2024 (Pet.
App. B1-B2).
The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on
2
September 25, 2024.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
Following his indictment in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania for distributing cocaine
base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and possessing firearms
and ammunition following a felony conviction, in violation of 18
U.S.C. 922(g)(1); see Indictment 1-2, petitioner moved to dismiss
the indictment.
The district court granted in part and denied in
part the motion to dismiss.
appeals
reversed
indictment.
1.
and
Pet. App. C1-C34.
reinstated
the
dismissed
The court of
count
of
the
Id. at A1-A31.
In early 2021, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives (ATF) received information that petitioner was
selling narcotics in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and that he might
have firearms.
Pet. App. A5.
Officer Darrin Bates -- a police
officer employed by the City of Harrisburg who was also crossdesignated
as
an
ATF
task
force
investigation into petitioner.
agent
Ibid.
--
opened
a
federal
On February 19, 2021,
Officer Bates, local Harrisburg police officers, and ATF agents
executed a federal search warrant at petitioner’s residence.
at A5-A6.
Id.
They recovered several firearms, including at least one
that had been reported stolen.
Id. at A6.
Petitioner was arrested
that same day and charged in Pennsylvania state court with a
3
firearms offense and with receiving stolen property; he was then
detained in state custody.
Id. at A3, A6, C2-C3, C6.
On June 23, 2021, a federal grand jury indicted petitioner
for distributing cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1),
and possessing firearms and ammunition as a felon, in violation of
18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1).
Pet. App. A3; Indictment 1-2.
In July 2021,
petitioner was arraigned on the federal charges and detained. Pet.
App.
A3.
The
withdrawn.
2.
state
charges
against
petitioner
were
later
Id. at A3-A4, C3.
Between June 2021 and October 2022, petitioner “filed
numerous unopposed motions to extend the deadline for filing
pretrial motions under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 and
to continue jury selection and trial.”
Pet. App. A4.
“Six motions
to continue were filed by two different defense counsel, each of
whom also sought and received leave to withdraw from the case.”
Ibid.
Petitioner then moved to dismiss the federal indictment,
asserting, inter alia, that the prosecution violated the Speedy
Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. 3161 et seq.
Pet. App. A6, C5;
D. Ct. Doc. 66 (October 6, 2022).
The Speedy Trial Act provides, in relevant part, that an
“information
or
indictment
charging
an
individual
with
the
commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from
the date on which such individual was arrested * * * in connection
with such charges.”
18 U.S.C. 3161(b).
The Act further provides
that a defendant’s trial “shall commence within seventy days from
4
the filing date” of the indictment or “from the date the defendant
has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such
charge
is
pending,
3161(c)(1).
whichever
date
last
occurs.”
18
U.S.C.
Certain “periods of delay” are “excluded in computing
the time” limits.
18 U.S.C. 3161(h).
Although petitioner did not dispute that a state arrest does
not ordinarily trigger Section 3161(b)’s 30-day charging clock,
petitioner argued that his state arrest started the Speedy Trial
Act clock here, on the theory that “the arrest on state charges
was
merely
a
ruse
D. Ct. Doc. 66, at 6.
to
facilitate
federal
prosecution.”
Petitioner argued, in the alternative, that
the delay in commencing trial had violated Section 3161(c)(1)’s
70-day clock.
Ibid.
After an evidentiary hearing, the district
court denied the motion as to the cocaine-distribution count and
granted the motion as to the firearms-possession count.
Pet. App.
A4-A5, A9-A10, C4-C5.
The district court explained that the timing of the federal
prosecution would violate the Speedy Trial Act only if petitioner’s
February 2021 state arrest started the clock for purposes of the
Act.
Pet. App. C6.
But a state arrest could start the clock only
if -- as petitioner urged -- the court adopted a so-called “ruse”
exception, whereby a state arrest could “trigger the Speedy Trial
Act when the government has knowledge that an individual is held
by state authorities solely to answer to federal charges” and “upon
a showing of collusion or evidence that the detention was for the
5
sole
or
primary
prosecution.”
purpose
Id.
at
of
C7
quotation marks omitted).
preparing
(brackets,
for
federal
citations,
and
criminal
internal
The district court acknowledged that
the Third Circuit had “not yet decided whether to adopt” any such
exception.
Ibid.
But the district court took the view that it
was “reasonably clear that the Third Circuit would adopt” a “ruse”
exception “under the right circumstances.”
Id. at C8.
The district court stated that under the “ruse” exception
that it was adopting, petitioner was required to establish two
elements:
(1) that the “state charges were filed for the sole or
primary purpose of preparing the federal criminal prosecution,”
and
(2) that
authorities.”
there
was
“collusion
between
state
Pet. App. C8-C9; see id. at C10.
and
federal
The court deemed
the first element satisfied because Officer Bates had stated in
his bail recommendation to the state-court judge that petitioner
was “being federally indicted” and “[i]f convicted would be looking
at a 15 year mandatory sentence,” id. at C11 (citation omitted),
and because Officer Bates had spoken with federal prosecutors about
a federal indictment before making the state bail recommendation,
id. at C18; see id. at C21.
And the court deemed the second
element satisfied, emphasizing inconsistencies in Officer Bates’s
testimony.
Id. at C23-C24.
Thus relying on “ruse” exception it had identified, the
district court held that, because the federal indictment postdated
the state arrest by more than 30 days, the federal prosecution
6
violated the Speedy Trial Act.
Pet. App. C24.
Although the remedy
for such a violation is ordinarily dismissal, the court held that
petitioner was entitled to dismissal of only “the offense or
offenses charged in the original [state] complaint.”
C25.
Id. at C24-
The court accordingly dismissed only the federal firearms-
possession count, which the court found to have charged petitioner
with
possessing
the
same
firearms
possessing in the state proceedings.
3.
The
court
of
appeals
that
he
was
charged
with
reinstated
the
Id. at C25.
reversed
and
dismissed firearms-possession count, Pet. App. A1-A31, holding
that the Speedy Trial Act “contains no ruse exception premised on
a state arrest,” id. at A13-A14.
The court of appeals explained that “[o]rdinarily, the time
limits of the [Speedy Trial Act] have not been triggered by an
event other than the commencement of a federal prosecution.”
App. A16.
Pet.
While the court acknowledged that other courts have
suggested that there may be a “ruse” exception under which the
Act’s time limits can also be triggered by a state arrest, the
court emphasized that “[n]o court of appeals has ever applied the
ruse exception to conclude that [a Speedy Trial Act] violation had
occurred and that dismissal of federal charges was therefore
warranted.”
Id. at A20.
And the court observed that statements
by other circuits referring to a potential “ruse” exception “amount
to dicta.”
Id. at A25 (citation omitted).
7
Turning to the question whether a “ruse” exception should be
adopted, the court of appeals emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act
“contains no explicit provision establishing a ruse exception.”
Pet. App. A22; see id. at A16 (observing that “no such exception
is found anywhere in the text of the Act”).
The court noted that
the Act defines “offense” as a “‘Federal criminal offense’” and
that the Act’s protections apply only after an individual has been
“‘arrested
or
served
with
a
summons
charges’ -- i.e., federal charges.”
in
connection
with
such
Id. at A22 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
3172(2) and 3161(b)). The court accordingly observed that “[t]hose
in search of statutory text within the [Act] that might support
even the implication of a ruse exception inevitably come up emptyhanded.”
Id. at A23-A24.
The court of appeals further emphasized that Congress “knows
how to create exceptions within statutes” and “could have included
a ruse exception” in the Speedy Trial Act, but Congress “did not
do so.” Pet. App. A24-A25. Recognizing that “it is not [a court’s]
role to search for ways to ostensibly improve an Act of Congress,”
the court “decline[d] to engraft a ruse exception on to the plain
text of the [Act].”
Id. at A25.
The court of appeals also observed that adopting a ruse
exception would be “inconsistent with principles of federalism and
dual
sovereignty”
discretion.”
ruse
and
“would
Pet. App. A26-A27.
exception
would
severely
hinder
prosecutorial
It additionally noted that a
“penalize[]
much-needed
and
expected
8
coordination between state and federal law enforcement.”
A29 (citation omitted).
“dictate”
that
Congress.”
any
Id. at
And it reasoned that those considerations
ruse
exception
“should
be
a
creation
of
Ibid. (citation omitted).
ARGUMENT
Petitioner renews his contention (Pet. 16-17) that the Speedy
Trial Act contains an atextual “ruse exception” pursuant to which
state proceedings may be treated as though they were federal
proceedings.
The court of appeals correctly declined to create
such an exception, and petitioner has failed to identify any square
conflict of authority warranting this Court’s review.
And this
case would not be a suitable vehicle to address the question
presented in any event.
1.
The Speedy Trial Act requires an indictment “charging an
individual with the commission of an offense” to be filed “within
thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or
served with a summons in connection with such charges.”
18 U.S.C.
3161(b); see generally United States v. Tinklenberg, 563 U.S. 647,
652-656 (2011).
As the Act makes clear, to trigger the 30-day
clock, the arrest must be “in connection with” the same criminal
“offense” charged in the indictment. 18 U.S.C. 3161(b); see United
States v. Cepeda-Luna, 989 F.2d 353, 355-356 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The
thirty-day
requirement
connection
with
the
applies
offense
to
for
an
indictment
which
the
issued
in
defendant
was
arrested.”); United States v. Reme, 738 F.2d 1156, 1162 (11th Cir.
9
1984) (“The time limitation for indicting an accused does not begin
to run if the accused is arrested for an unrelated offense.”)
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1104 (1985).
And the
Act expressly defines “offense” as a “Federal criminal offense.”
18 U.S.C. 3172(2).
An arrest on a state charge therefore does not trigger the
time limits in the Act, even where a defendant is later indicted
on federal charges based on the same underlying conduct.
See,
e.g., United States v. Robertson, 810 F.2d 254, 256 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (“It is beyond dispute that [18 U.S.C.] 3161(b) does not
prevent the government from indicting a defendant on federal
charges more than thirty days after his arrest on similar state
charges.”); United States v. Shahryar, 719 F.2d 1522, 1525 (11th
Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (“[I]f one is held by state officers on a
state charge and subsequently turned over to federal authorities
for federal prosecution, the starting date for purposes of the Act
is
the
date
that
the
defendant
is
delivered
into
federal
custody.”); United States v. Iaquinta, 674 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir.
1982).
Even beyond the text, “[c]ommon sense, as well as deeply
rooted concepts of federalism dictate that the Speedy [Trial] Act
rules relate only to federal and not to state custody.”
Shahryar,
719 F.2d at 1525.
The court of appeals thus correctly recognized that the Speedy
Trial Act does not contain a “ruse” exception under which a state
arrest could sometimes trigger the Act’s time limitations.
Pet.
10
App. A21-A25.
As the court observed, the plain text of the Act
does not admit of any such exception.
clearly
“knows
how
to
create
Id. at A20.
exceptions
within
Congress
statutes”;
Congress’s decision not to include a ruse exception in the Speedy
Trial Act should be the beginning and end of the analysis.
Id. at
A24-A25; see United States v. Rabb, 680 F.2d 294, 296 (3d Cir.)
(“To discern Congress’ intent in [Section] 3161(b), we begin with
the language of the statute itself because we presume that the
words Congress has chosen best reflect the legislative purpose.”),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 873 (1982).
Petitioner asserts (Pet. 17) that “the Ruse Exception serves
Congressional intent by giving effect to the [Speedy Trial Act].”
But the best evidence of Congress’s intent is the text of the Act,
which makes clear that only a federal arrest can trigger the Act’s
time limitations and contains no “ruse” exception.
See pp. 8-10,
supra; Pet. App. A24.
In any event, no “ruse” exception is
necessary
the
“to
protect
administration of justice.”
public’s
interest
in
the
speedy
Pet. 16 (quoting United States v.
Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1158 (9th Cir. 2000)).
States are
sovereigns independent from the federal government for purposes of
criminal prosecution, see, e.g., Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S.
698 (2019), and they administer judge independently.
An arrest
“by one sovereign” cannot “cause the speedy trial guarantees to
become engaged as to possible subsequent indictments by another
sovereign.”
United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 10 n.11
11
(1982).
Moreover, adopting a judge-made “ruse” exception would
“penalize[]
* * *
enforcement”
--
coordination between state and federal law
even
though
such
duplication of effort and resources.”
coordination
“avoid[s]
Pet. App. A29 (citations
omitted).
2.
conflicts
Petitioner asserts (Pet. 14-16) that the decision below
with
decisions
of
other
courts
of
appeals.
But
petitioner fails to identify any court of appeals decision that
has actually applied a “ruse” exception to find that a state arrest
triggered a violation of the Speedy Trial Act.
Indeed, the court
of appeals here found that “[n]o court of appeals has ever applied
the ruse exception to conclude that [a Speedy Trial Act] violation
had occurred and that dismissal of federal charges was therefore
warranted.”
Pet. App. A20.
Multiple courts of appeals have expressly recognized that the
Speedy Trial Act does not contain an atextual “ruse” exception for
arrests on state charges followed by federal arrest and indictment
on federal charges.
See, e.g., United States v. Knight, 824 F.3d
1105, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (explaining that the en banc D.C.
Circuit had declined “to adopt a ruse exception under the Speedy
Trial Act”) (citing United States v. Mills, 964 F.2d 1186, 1189–
1190 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 (1992)); United States
v. Alvarado-Linares, 698 Fed. Appx. 969, 974 (11th Cir. 2017)
(emphasizing
the
lack
of
“Supreme
Court
or
Eleventh
Circuit
authority recognizing a ruse exception in a situation like the
12
present case:
state confinement on state charges followed by
federal arrest and indictment on federal charges”), cert. denied,
584 U.S. 951 (2018).
The Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have suggested that
there may be an exception to the general rule that the Speedy Trial
Act clock begins only upon a federal criminal arrest if a person
is detained in state custody for the purpose of avoiding the Act’s
requirements.
See United States v. Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 590, 596
(4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kelley, 40 F.4th 276, 283 (5th
Cir. 2022); United States v. Mearis, 36 F.4th 649, 653 (5th Cir.
2022); United States v. Benitez, 34 F.3d 1489, 1494 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1197 (1995).
But none of the
identified decisions actually applied such an exception, and the
court of appeals in this case recognized such statements to be
“dicta.”
Pet. App. A25 (citation omitted); see id. at A25-A26.
In United States v. Woolfolk, the Fourth Circuit suggested
that the Speedy Trial Act’s time limits may be triggered “when the
Government has knowledge that an individual is held by state
authorities solely to answer to federal charges.”
(emphasis added).
that
the
399 F.3d at 596
But the Fourth Circuit did not actually find
defendant’s
state
detention
had
triggered
the
Act.
Instead, the Fourth Circuit remanded to the district court to
determine whether the defendant “remained in state custody only to
answer to federal charges” and whether “the restraint was a result
of ‘federal action.’”
Id. at 596-597.
13
Moreover,
the
Fourth
Circuit
did
so
in
“limited
circumstances,” Woolfolk, 399 F.3d at 596, substantially different
from the ones here.
In Woolfolk, unlike here, the defendant’s
state proceedings were terminated after he was federally charged
and a federal detainer was filed, but he continued to be detained
in state custody.
Id. at 593-594.
The Fourth Circuit made clear
that when “a state has valid charges currently pending against an
individual,” an individual held by state authorities is not under
“federal
arrest.”
Id.
at
595–596
(emphasis
added).
Here,
petitioner does not dispute that valid state charges were pending
against
him
until
federally indicted.
July
28,
2021,
after
See Pet. App. C3.
he
had
already
been
There is thus no sound
basis to suppose that the Fourth Circuit would necessarily have
reached a different conclusion from the court of appeals below in
petitioner’s case.
In both United States v. Mearis and United States v. Kelley,
the
Fifth
defendant’s
Circuit
motion
affirmed
to
the
dismiss
district
an
court’s
indictment,
denial
rejecting
defendant’s argument that a “ruse” exception applied.
36 F.4th at 654; Kelley, 40 F.4th at 283-284.
of
a
the
See Mearis,
And although the
Ninth Circuit suggested in United States v. Benitez that “Speedy
Trial Act time periods may be triggered by state detentions that
are merely a ruse to detain the defendant solely for the purpose
of bypassing the requirements of the Act,” 34 F.3d at 1494, the
Ninth Circuit likewise rejected the defendant’s argument that “the
14
state prosecution was merely a ruse,” affirming the district
court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, see id. at 1492, 1495.
Such affirmances are, at best, a tenuous basis for concluding that
another circuit would have decided this case differently.
Petitioner’s
reliance
(Pet.
14)
on
the
Second
Circuit’s
decision in United States v. Jones, 129 F.3d 718 (1997) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 911 (1998), is likewise misplaced.
There, the defendant did not argue that his arrest on state charges
triggered the Speedy Trial Act’s time limit.
Instead, he argued
that his transfer into federal custody pursuant to a writ ad
testificandum was an “arrest” under the Act.
Id. at 721.
The
Second Circuit rejected that claim, stating “[t]he Act does not
afford protection if the deprivation of liberty -- however labelled
-- is for a reason other than requiring the defendant to answer to
federal criminal charges.”
Id. at 722.
The Second Circuit
explained that the defendant’s “transfer to federal custody did
not start the clock under the Act, because he was transferred under
a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum pursuant to his tentative
agreement to cooperate,” and he was “therefore was not taken into
federal custody ‘in connection with’ or ‘for purposes of’ answering
federal charges.”
Id. at 723 (emphasis omitted).
Accordingly,
nothing in Jones -- which was decided in the context of the writ
ad testificandum and rejected the defendant’s Speedy Trial Act
claim -- suggested that an individual’s arrest on state charges
can trigger the Act.
15
3.
At all events, this case would be a poor vehicle to
address the question presented.
First, this case is in an interlocutory posture because the
court of appeals reversed the dismissal of the firearms-possession
count in the indictment and remanded for further proceedings. Pet.
App. A31.
The interlocutory posture of a case ordinarily “alone
furnishe[s]
sufficient
ground
for
the
denial”
of
certiorari.
Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 258
(1916); see Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Bangor
& Aroostook R.R., 389 U.S. 327, 328 (1967) (per curiam) (observing
that a case remanded to the district court “is not yet ripe for
review by this Court”); Abbott v. Veasey, 580 U.S. 1104, 1105
(2017) (statement of Roberts, C.J., respecting the denial of
certiorari).
Consistent
with
that
general
rule,
this
denies interlocutory petitions in criminal cases.
Court
routinely
See Stephen M.
Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice 4-55 n.72 (11th ed. 2019).
That practice promotes judicial efficiency because, among other
things, it enables issues raised at different stages of lower court
proceedings to be consolidated into a single petition.
See Major
League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 508 n.1
(2001) (per curiam) (“[W]e have authority to consider questions
determined in earlier stages of the litigation where certiorari is
sought from the most recent of the judgments of the Court of
16
Appeals.”).
Petitioner offers no reason to deviate from that
practice here.
Second, this would not be a suitable vehicle to address
whether the Speedy Trial Act contains a “ruse” exception because
petitioner’s underlying contention that the state-law prosecution
was a “ruse” (as he would define it) lacks merit.
court’s
contrary
view
rested
primarily
on
The district
Officer
Bates’s
reference to a future federal indictment during the state bail
proceedings. Pet. App. C11, C18, C21. But Officer Bates clarified
that he was expressing his personal “impression” of the case’s
likely
future
and
that
a
federal
prosecution
determined at the time of petitioner’s arrest.
had
not
been
C.A. App. 235-236,
241; see id. at 223-224, 228-230, 234-237.
The officer’s testimony was corroborated by the fact that the
ongoing federal investigation -- and the federal indictment that
eventually issued -– was focused on petitioner’s drug-trafficking
activity, which was not the subject of any state charges.
C.A. App. 82, 116, 119, 164.
See
No evidence of drug offenses was
found during the joint federal-state search of petitioner’s home,
nor was drug-trafficking the basis for his state arrest.
164; Pet. App. C2-C3.
Id. at
Moreover, a state prosecutor testified that
petitioner was arrested on legitimate state charges; that state
authorities handled the prosecution “normally”; and that the State
fully intended at the time to prosecute petitioner for illegally
17
possessing stolen firearms, whether or not federal authorities
also indicted him.
C.A. App. 166-167.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Solicitor General
NICOLE M. ARGENTIERI
Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
TYLER ANNE LEE
Attorney
DECEMBER 2024
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.