Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Palani Karupaiyan, Petitioner v. New York, et al.

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PALANI KARUPAIYAN

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STATE OF NEW YORK, et al

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— Respondents

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for tfie 2ncl Circuit (23-1257)

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List of Appendix

1. United States Court of Appeals -CA2’s

Summary Order May 15 2024..................... 1

2. USCA2’s Order denied for 2nd amend

the Brief. Jan 08 2024.................................. 7

3. US District Court EDNY’s Sua Sponte

Dismissal of Complaint — Sep 08 2023......8

4. Dist Court Dismissed the complaint

without prejudice after mandate. Jun 05

2024

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United States Court of

Appeals -CA2’s Summary

Order May 15 2024

23-1257-cv Karupaiyan v. State of New York

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT

HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER

JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS

GOVERNED

BY

FEDERAL

RULE

OF

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS

COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A

SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED

WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE

EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN

ELECTRONIC

DATABASE

(WITH

THE

NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A

COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT

REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood

Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square,

in the City of New York, on the 15th day of May, two

thousand twenty-four.

Present:

DENNIS JACOBS,

WILLIAM J. NARDINI

2

STEVEN J. MENASHI, Circuit Judges.

PALANI KARUPAIYAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 23-1257-cv

STATE OF NEW YORK, CITY OF NEW

YORK, NEW YORK CITY POLICE

DEPARTMENT (NYPD), JOHN DOES

POLICE OFFICERS OF NYPD, FREDRICK

DSOUZA, PRAVIN PANDEY, RAJA

PANDEY, ADAR MANAGEMENT CORP.,

Defendants-Appellees

For Plaintiff-Appellant:

Palani Karupaiyan, pro se, Philadelphia, PA

For Defendants-Appellees:

No appearance

Appeal from a judgment of the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of New York

(Ann M. Donnelly, District Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS

HEREBY

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED,

AND

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, and

REMANDED for further action consistent with this

order.

Plaintiff-Appellant Palani Karupaiyan, pro se,

sued the State and City of New York, the New York

City Police Department (“NYPD”), unnamed NYPD

officers, three private individuals, and a real estate

company under various federal and state causes of

action. Karupaiyan’s allegations stem from several

disagreements and altercations with his co-tenants

and his apartment’s management company, as well as

purported discrimination by New York City police

officers who allegedly responded to his residence and

3

arrested him after one of his co-tenants called 911

after an altercation. After granting Karupaiyan in

forma pauperis status, the district court dismissed his

complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for

failure to state a claim but permitted him leave to

amend. See Karupaiyan v. New York, No. 23-CV-5424

(AMD) (LB), 2023 WL 9020011 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8,

2023). Instead of amending, Karupaiyan appealed.1

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the case.

I. Forfeiture of Issues on Appeal

While we liberally construe pro se filings to

raise the strongest arguments they suggest, McLeod

v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d

Cir. 2017), pro se appellants must still clearly state

the issues on appeal in their briefs, see Moates v.

Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 1998). We

normally do not decide issues that are not briefed. Id.;

see also LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 93

(2d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e need not manufacture claims of

error for an appellant proceeding pro se

”).2 Nor

will we decide issues that a pro se appellant briefs

only “in passing.” Gerstenbluth v. Credit Suisse Secs. (USA)

LLC, 728 F.3d 139, 142 n.4 (2d Cir. 2013).

Karupaiyan’s brief largely fails to address the

substance of the district court’s decision dismissing his

complaint. The only substantive grounds his brief could be

read to raise are that Defendant-Appellee Fredrick Dsouza

filed a “false charge” against him and that his alleged arrest

* Because the time to amend has long since run despite multiple

extensions, the dismissal without prejudice has ripened into a

final and appealable order over which we may exercise

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Salmon v. Blesser, 802 F.3d

249, 252 n.2 (2d Cir. 2015).

2 Unless otherwise indicated, case quotations omit all internal

quotation marks, alteration marks, footnotes,

4

was discriminatory, which can be read to challenge the

dismissal of his false arrest and malicious prosecution claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We accordingly conclude that he has

forfeited all other issues.

II. Sua Sponte Dismissal

Karupaiyan appears to challenge the district

court’s sua sponte dismissal of his complaint under §

1915(e)(2)(B). While we have cautioned against sua

sponte dismissals without notice and opportunity to

be heard in certain contexts, see Catzin u. Thank You

& Good Luck Corp., 899 F.3d 77, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2018),

the district court granted Karupaiyan leave to amend

his complaint to fix the defects identified, but he did

not take advantage of the offer. We discern no error

in the sua sponte dismissal under these

circumstances.

III. Merits

We review de novo Karupaiyan’s challenge to

the dismissal of his false arrest and malicious

prosecution claims arising out of his alleged arrest.

McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3dl97, 200 (2d Cir.

2004). We conclude that he failed to state a claim for

false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Fredrick

Dsouza and Pravin Pandey because they are private

citizens and did not act under color of state law. A

private individual becomes a state actor for the

purposes of § 1983 only when (1) the state compelled

the conduct, (2) the private party acted jointly with a

state, or (3) the private party fulfilled a role that is

traditionally a public state function. See Sybalski v.

Indep. Group Home Living Program, Inc., 546 F.3d

255, 257 (2d Cir. 2008). Filing a complaint with the

police does not fit within any of these categories. See

Dahlberg v. Becker, 748 F.2d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 1984)

(holding that “mere invocation” of state legal

5

procedures does not amount to state action under §

1983).

Karupaiyan also fails to plead a false arrest or

malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 against

NYPD officers or the City of New York, as he does not

allege any facts showing that the officers lacked

probable cause for the arrest, see Ashley v. City of New

York, 992 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Probable

cause to arrest is a complete defense to an action for

false arrest.”), or that the criminal proceedings

terminated in his favor, see Manganiello v. City of

New York, 612 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2010) (requiring

a plaintiff to plead “termination of the proceeding in

[his] favor”).

The remainder of Karupaiyan’s brief seeks

various remedies that are not related to any of the

claims he raised below—for example, he seeks an

order reorganizing the New York State Unified Court

System. He points to no authority that would permit

such relief, even assuming he had a meritorious

claim.

IV. Prejudice

Although Karupaiyan’s claims against the

State of New York fail, the district court erred by

dismissing them with prejudice. The district court

correctly dismissed these claims because New York is

entitled to state sovereign immunity and has not

waived that immunity. See Karupaiyan, 2023 WL

9020011, at *2. The “constitutional principle of

sovereign immunity” poses “a bar to federal

jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States.”

Alden u. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999). “When

subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, ‘the district

court lacks the power to adjudicate the merits of the

case,’ and accordingly ‘Article III deprives federal

6

courts of the power to dismiss the case with

prejudice.’” Green u. Dep’t of Educ. of City of N.Y., 16

F.4th 1070, 1074 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Carter v.

HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 54-55 (2d Cir.

2016)). Therefore, because the district court lacked

jurisdiction over the claims against the State of New

York, it was erroneous to dismiss those claims with

prejudice rather than without prejudice. The district

court likewise erred by dismissing with prejudice

Karupaiyan’s landlord-tenant claims—other than

those under the Fair Housing Act or 42 U.S.C. §

1981—pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(h)(3). See Karupaiyan, 2023 WL 9020011, at *5.

Because Rule 12(h)(3) provides for dismissal for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction, such a dismissal must

be without prejudice. See Green, 16 F.4th at 1074. We

therefore remand with instructions for the district

court to modify its judgment to dismiss these claims

without prejudice. See Russo v. United States, No. 221869, 2024 WL 726884, at *2 (2d Cir. Feb. 22, 2024).

We have considered Karupaiyan’s remaining

arguments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly,

we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court in

part, VACATE the judgment insofar as the district

court dismissed with prejudice claims over which it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and REMAND for

the district court to amend its judgment to dismiss

these claims without prejudice.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

Is/Catherine O’Hasan Wolfe. Clerk

Under seal of USCA2

7

2.

USCA2’s Order denied for 2nd

AMEND THE BRIEF. JAN 08 2024

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SECOND CIRCUIT

At a Stated Term of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood

Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square,

in the City of New York, on the 8th day of January,

two thousand twenty-four

Palani Karupaiyan, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

State of New York, City of New York, New York

City Police Department, (NYPD), John Does Police

Officers of NYPD, Fredrick Dsouza, Pravin Pandey,

Raja Pandey, ADAR Management Corp., Defendants

- Appellees.

Appellant, pro se, moves for leave to file an amended

brief.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is

DENIED without prejudice to renewal. Any renewed

motion must explain what changes Appellant has

made to the amended brief.

For the Court:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

Clerk of Court

/s/ Catherine O’Hasan Wolfe.

Under Seal ofUSCA2.

8

3.

US District Court EDNTs

Sua Sponte Dismissal of

Complaint - Sep 08 2023

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Docket # 23-CV-5424 (AMD) (LB)

PALANI KARUPAIYAN,

—Plaintiff,

- against STATE OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK CITY

OF NY, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPT.

(NYPD), JOHN DOES-POLICE OFFICERS OF

NYPD, FREDERICK DSOUZA, PRAVIN

PANDEY, RAJA RANDEY, and ADAR

MANAGEMENT CORP.,

—Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this

action under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, the Fair

Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and

related state and federal laws. The plaintiff alleges

several claims that arise out of housing disputes and

his arrest. On July 26, 2023, the Court granted the

plaintiffs request to proceed in forma pauperis

9

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. For the reasons that

follow, the plaintiffs complaint is dismissed, but the

plaintiff may amend his complaint within thirty days

of this Order.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff brings this case against the State

of New York, the City of New York, the New York City

Police Department (“NYPD”), John Doe NYPD

officers, Frederick Dsouza, a private individual who

allegedly squatted in the plaintiffs apartment, Pravin

and Raja Pandey, co-leaseholders of the apartment,

and Adar Management Corp., the apartment’s owner.

The plaintiff alleges that he and Pravin Pandey

shared an apartment in Brooklyn. (ECF No. 1 1 28.)

The plaintiff lived in the bedroom, and Pandey lived

in the living room. (Id.) Pandey also allowed Frederick

Dsouza to squat in the living room. (Id.) According to

the plaintiff, Dsouza repeatedly verbally abused him

and physically assaulted him at least once because of

his ethnicity. (Id. H 42, 45.) Pandey was allegedly

aware of the situation, and he also shouted racial

slurs at the plaintiff. (Id. H 56, 93.) After one

particularly heated interaction, Dsouza called the

police and had the plaintiff arrested. (Id. H 58-64,

91.) The arresting officer (and possibly other officers

at the precinct) similarly discriminated against the

plaintiff: they held him on false charges and refused

to give him diabetes medicine. (Id. f1If 62-73.)

The plaintiff describes several other rental disputes.

For example, the plaintiff claims that Pravin Pandey,

who only eats vegetarian food because of his religion,

would not allow the plaintiff to cook eggs or other non­

vegetarian food, even though the plaintiff needed to

eat non-vegetarian food because of his diabetes. (Id.

11 92-94.) The plaintiff also alleges that Pandey and

Adar Management forced him to sleep on a bug-

10

infested mattress and refused his requests to hire a

pest control service to treat the apartment. {Id. 11 8389.) Finally, the plaintiff alleges that he had no money

for rent because he had to file multiple lawsuits

against the defendants, and that Pandey unlawfully

evicted him. {Id. H 95, 96, 99.) Moreover, Pandey

refused to let him back into the apartment to pick up

his personal belongings, including a debit card, a

digital camera and medication. {Id. H 101, 106-09.)

The plaintiff requests injunctive relief and monetary

damages. He also asks the Court to put some of the

defendants in prison and “to restructure the NY State

courts into 3-tier which is similar to federal courts

structure/hierarchy.” {Id. at 24—25.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To avoid dismissal, a complaint must plead

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd. of Educ.,

631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although “detailed

factual allegations” are not required, a complaint that

includes only “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

Because the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, I construe

his complaint liberally and evaluate it by “less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(per curiam) (citation omitted), to raise “the strongest

arguments” that it suggests, Fowlkes v. Ironworkers

Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 387 (2d Cir. 2015) (cleaned

up). Nevertheless, a district court may sua sponte

11

dismiss an in forma pauperis action if the action “(i)

is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court must also

dismiss any claims over which it lacks subject matter

jurisdiction. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428,

434 (2011) (“federal courts have an independent

obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope

of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise

and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties

either overlook or elect not to press”).

DISCUSSION

I. Claims Against the State of New York

State governments are immune from suits in

federal court under the Eleventh Amendment to the

U.S. Constitution “unless they have waived their . . .

immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated” that

immunity. Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d

Cir. 2009). “It is settled law, however, that Congress

did not abrogate state sovereign immunity by

enacting Section 1983.” Rivera v. Evans, No. 13-CV6341, 2014 WL 4695803, at *10 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,

2014) (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-42

(1979)). “Nor has New York State waived its

immunity with respect to Section 1983 claims” or any

other claims the plaintiff alleges. Id. (citing Trotman

v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 3840 (2d Cir. 1977)). Therefore, the plaintiffs claims

against New York State are dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). The dismissal is with

prejudice, which means that the plaintiff may not re­

file claims against New York State arising out of this

incident.

II. Claims Against the NYPD

12

The New York City Charter provides that “ [a] 11

actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties

for the violation of any law shall be brought in the

name of the City of New York and not in that of any

agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”

N.Y.C. Charter ch. 17 § 396. Because the NYPD is an

agency of the City of New York, it is not a suable

entity. See Johnson v. Dobry, 660 F. App’x 69, 72 (2d

Cir. 2016) (citing N.Y.C. Charter ch. 17 § 396);

Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d

Cir. 2007). Accordingly, all claims against the NYPD

are also dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

III. Claims Against Raja Pandey and Adar

Management

The plaintiff makes no allegations against Raja

Pandey and only mentions Adar Management once,

alleging that it refused to contact pest control

services. To state a claim in federal court, a plaintiff

must explain how each defendant caused him harm;

he may not simply “group” defendants together.

Amiron Dev. Corp. v. Sytner, No. 12-CV-3036, 2013

WL 1332725, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2013).

Accordingly, all claims against Raja Pandey and Adar

Management are dismissed without prejudice. That

means that the plaintiff may amend his complaint to

include specific facts about what these defendants did

wrong. •

IV. Claims Against New York City, NYPD

Officers, Frederick Dsouza and Pravin Pandey

A. False Arrest and False Imprisonment

Federal courts look to state law when

considering § 1983 claims for false arrest and false

imprisonment. See Guan v. City of New York, 37 F.4th

797, 804 (2d Cir. 2022). Because New York does not

distinguish between claims for false arrest and false

13

imprisonment, I treat these as one claim. See Liranzo

u. United States, 690 F.3d 78, 91 n.13 (2d Cir. 2012).

Section 1983 claims for false arrest are subject to a

three-year statute of limitations. Livingston v. Mejia,

No. 20-CV-2009, 2022 WL 976808, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.

Mar. 31, 2022) (citation omitted). Because the

plaintiff does not state the date of his arrest, I cannot

determine whether his claim is timely. This claim is

therefore dismissed without prejudice. If the plaintiff

wishes to amend this claim, he must establish that he

was arrested within the last three years. If the

plaintiff was arrested earlier than that, he can ask the

Court to toll the statute of limitations. However, the

Court may only toll the statute of limitations in “rare

and exceptional circumstances,” if a plaintiff can

demonstrate that he was prevented from filing timely

and “acted with reasonable diligence throughout the

period he [seeks] to toll.” Jones v. City of New York,

846 F. App’x 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Walker v.

Jastremski, 430 F.3d 560, 564 (2d Cir. 2005)).

Moreover, § 1983 only applies to persons “acting

under color of state law.” Matusick v. Erie Cnty. Water

Auth., 757 F.3d 31, 55 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting 42

U.S.C. § 1983). That means § 1983 “constrains only

state conduct, not the ‘acts of private persons or

entities.’” Hooda v. Brookhaven Nat’l Lab., 659 F.

Supp. 2d 382, 393 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting RendellBaker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982)). I thus

interpret the plaintiff to bring false arrest claims only

against individual police officers and the City of New

York3. To the extent the plaintiff also wishes to hold

3 To state a claim against the City of New York under

federal law, the plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) an official

[municipal] policy or custom that (2) cause [d] the plaintiff

to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.”

Torraco v. Port Auth. ofN.Y. & N.J., 615 F.3d 129, 140 (2d

14

Frederick Dsouza and Pravin Pandey—or any other

private defendant—liable for false arrest, he must

show that they were acting under the color of law.

“[Mjerely filing a complaint with the police, reporting

a crime, requesting criminal investigation of a person,

or seeking a restraining order, even if the complaint

or report is deliberately false, does not give rise to a

claim against the complainant for a civil rights

violation.” Vazquez v. Combs, No. 04-CV-4189, 2004

WL 2404224, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2004). Rather,

the private actor must take “a more active role” and

jointly engage in action with the police officers.

Carrillos v. Inc. Vill. of Hempstead, 87 F. Supp. 3d

357, 371 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). Accordingly, if the plaintiff

wishes to hold the private defendants liable, he must

amend his complaint to demonstrate that they can be

considered state actors.

B. Malicious Prosecution Claim

In order to prove a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for

malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove “(1) the

initiation or continuation of a criminal proceeding

against plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in

plaintiffs favor; (3), lack of probable cause for

commencing the proceeding;

Moreover, there, is also a three-year statute of

limitations for § 1983 malicious prosecution claims,

which begins to run when the prosecution terminates

in the plaintiffs favor. Murphy v. Lynn, 53 F.3d 547,

548 (2d Cir. 1995); Spak v. Phillips, 857 F.3d 458, 462

Cir. 2010) (quoting Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189,

195 (2d Cir. 2007)). Under New York law, however,

“municipalities can be liable for the actions of police

officers on false arrest claims under a theory of respondeat

superior” or vicarious liability. Triolo v. Nassau Cnty., 24

F.4th 98, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2022) (collecting cases).

15

(2d Cir. 2017). If the prosecution terminated in the

plaintiffs favor, he must allege when that happened.

C. Obstruction of Justice

The plaintiff brings claims against some of the

defendants for obstruction of justice. However, there

is no private right of action for violations of the

criminal statutes concerning obstruction of justice, 18

U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq. That means that a private

individual like the plaintiff may not invoke these

provisions to obtain damages; they “may be enforced

only by the Department of Justice.” Langella v.

United States, 01-CV-11583, 2002 WL 1218524 at *4

(S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2002), aff’d, 67 F. App’x 659 (2d Cir.

2003) (summary order). The plaintiffs claims for

obstruction of justice are thus dismissed with

prejudice.

D. The Federal Fair Housing Act

The Federal Fair Housing Act “broadly

prohibits discrimination in housing.” Gladstone

Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 93 (1979).

Section 3604(a) prohibits person from “refus[ing] to

sell or rent... or otherwise make unavailable or deny,

a dwelling to any person and (4) actual malice as a

motivation for the defendant’s actions.” Dettelis v.

Sharbaugh, 919 F.3d 161, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2019). The

plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts about his

arrest—for example, what reason police officers gave

for arresting him or whether the ' proceedings

terminated in his favor. His claim for malicious

prosecution is thus dismissed without prejudice; the

plaintiff may amend his allegations to state

additional facts to satisfy all

four prongs of the Dettelis test, because of race, color,

religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42

U.S.C.

§

3604(a).

Section

3604(b)

forbids

discrimination “against any person in the terms,

conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,

i

16

or in the provision of services or facilities” for any of

those same reasons. Id. § 3604(b). And Section

3604(f), which was added in the Fair Housing

Amendments Act of 1988, proscribes discrimination

“in the sale or rental, or . . . otherwise make

unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter

because of’ a disability. Id. § 3604(f)(1), (2).

The

plaintiff claims

that

Pravin

Pandey

discriminated against him when he prevented him

from cooking eggs and other non-vegetarian meals,

which the plaintiff needed to help manage his

diabetes. First, the plaintiff must state under which

section(s) he wishes to proceed. That is, he must

clarify whether he makes a claim based on his

ethnicity or based on his disability.

Second, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to

“permit the conclusion that the complained-of conduct

occurred because of discriminatory animus.” Logan v.

Matveevskii, 175 F. Supp. 3d 209, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)

(citation omitted). On the facts currently pleaded, it

appears just as likely that the defendant prohibited

the plaintiff from cooking non-vegetarian meals

because of the defendant’s own religion and not

because he intended to discriminate against the

plaintiff. While the plaintiff claims that the defendant

“allowed other, people to cook/eat non-veg food in the

apartment” (ECF No. 1 f 94), that allegation is too

vague and requires more detail.

Finally, if the plaintiff wishes to proceed under §

3604(a) or (f), he must establish that the defendant

made the apartment “effectively unavailable to him.”

Gilead Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Town of Cromwell, 432 F.

Supp. 3d 46, 72 (D. Conn. 2019) (citation omitted).

Without additional facts, it is not clear that being

unable to cook certain food satisfies this standard.

The plaintiffs Fair Housing Act claims are

accordingly dismissed without prejudice.

d

17

E. Americans with Disabilities Act

The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 12101 et seq, prohibits discrimination by public

entities based on disability. Quad Enterprises Co.,

LLC v. Town of Southold, 369 F. App’x 202, 205 (2d

Cir. 2010). To the extent the plaintiff wishes to hold

private defendants like Pravin Pandey liable, his

claims must be dismissed with prejudice.

F. Section 1981 Claims

Section 1981 protects the equal right of ‘“all

persons within the jurisdiction of the United States’

to ‘make and enforce contracts’ without respect to

race.” Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470,

474-75 (2006) (cleaned up) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §

1981(a)). “The statute currently defines ‘make and

enforce contracts’ to ‘include the making,

performance, modification, and termination of

contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,

privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual

relationship.’” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting § 1981(b)). To

allege a § 1981 claim, a plaintiff must therefore

establish that he had a contractual relationship with

a defendant. The plaintiff does not allege which

defendant—Pravin Pandey, Raja Pandey or Adar

Management—leased him the room, so his § 1981

claim is dismissed without prejudice.

G. Other Landlord-Tenant Claims

“[FJederal courts, unlike state courts, have no

jurisdiction over landlord-tenant matters.” Cain v.

Rambert, No. 13-CV-5807, 2014 WL 2440596, at *3

(E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2014) (collecting cases); see also

Bey v. Jones, No. 19-CV-2577, 2019 WL 2028703, at

*2 (E.D.N.Y May 8, 2019). Therefore, all of the

plaintiffs landlord-tenant claims besides the

allegations under the Fair Housing Act and § 1981 are

dismissed with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(h)(3).

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V. Claims About Restructuring New York’s

Judicial System

This Court has no jurisdiction over how New

York structures its courts or elects its judges. The

plaintiffs claims related to this issue are dismissed

with prejudice.

LEAVE TO AMEND

The Court will allow the plaintiff thirty days to

amend his complaint. The plaintiff may not re-allege

any claims that are dismissed with prejudice.

Additionally, he may only re-plead claims that are

dismissed without prejudice if he can cure the

deficiencies discussed in this Order. The plaintiff

must provide all the relevant dates and facts

identified above. He must also explain separately how

each defendant harmed him. However, if the plaintiff

does not know the names of individual police officers,

he may identify them as John or Jane Doe and provide

descriptive information about the officers and their

place of employment. For example: Police Officer John

Doe of the [Number] Precinct.

The amended complaint must be captioned as

“Amended Complaint” and bear the docket number

assigned to this case: 23-CV-5424 (AMD) (LB). The

amended complaint will completely replace the

original complaint, so the plaintiff must include all

the allegations in the amended complaint.

The plaintiff may wish to consult the City Bar

Justice Center’s Federal Pro Se Legal Assistance

Project at (212) 382-4729 for free, limited-scope legal

assistance.

CONCLUSION

The plaintiffs complaint is dismissed pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(h)(3). The plaintiff may amend his

19

complaint within thirty days of this Order as

discussed above. No summons will issue at this time.

If the plaintiff does not file an amended complaint

within thirty days or does not cure the deficiencies

discussed above, this action will be dismissed with

prejudice.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good

faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied

for purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States,

369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ ANN M. DONNELLY

ANN M. DONNELLY

United States District Judge

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

September 8, 2023

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4.

Dist Court Dismissed the

COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE

AFTER MANDATE. JUN 05 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Docket# 23-CV-5424 (AMD) (LB)

PALANI KARUPAIYAN,

Plaintiff,

— against STATE OF NEW YORK; NEW YORK CITY OF NY;

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPT. (NYPD); JOHN

DOES-POLICE OFFICERS OF NYPD; FREDERICK

DSOUZA; PRAVIN PANDEY; RAJA RANDEY;

ADAR MANAGEMENT CORP,

Defendants.

ORDER

ANN M. DONNELLY, United States District

Judge:

The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action

under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, 42

U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, the Fair Housing Act, the

Americans with Disabilities Act, and related state

and federal laws, in connection with housing disputes

and an alleged false arrest. (ECF No. 1.)

On September 8, 2023, the Court sua sponte

dismissed the plaintiffs complaint pursuant to 28

U.S.C. % 1915(e)(2)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(h)(3) and granted him leave to amend

1

21

within 30 days of the order. (ECF No. 8.) On

September 11, 2023, instead of filing an amended

complaint, the plaintiff appealed to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. (ECF No. 11.)

On September 13, 2023, the plaintiff filed a

motion “for Writ of Mandamus.” (ECF No. 9.) On

October 12, 2023, the Court construed the plaintiffs

motion as a motion to reconsider or vacate the

September 8, 2023 order, denied the motion, and

granted the plaintiff one final opportunity to amend

his complaint within 30 days of the order. (ECF No.

13.)

On October 16, 2023, the plaintiff filed a motion

seeking a 90-day extension to file an amended

complaint. (ECF No. 14.) On October 19, 2023,

Magistrate Judge Lois Bloom granted the motion in

part, granting him a 30-day extension of time to file

an amended complaint, directing him to file by

November 20, 2023. (ECF No. 15.) Judge Bloom

warned the plaintiff again that if he did not file an

amended complaint as directed, the case would be

dismissed. (Id.) To date, the plaintiff has not filed an

amended complaint.

By Summary Order dated May 15, 2024, the

Circuit disposed of the plaintiffs appeal, affirming the

dismissal, but vacating the judgment insofar as the

Court dismissed with prejudice claims over which it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and remanded for

the Court to amend its judgment to dismiss these

claims without prejudice. (ECF No. 17.)

Accordingly, the Clerk of Court is directed to

enter judgment dismissing the plaintiffs complaint

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without

prejudice, and to close the case.

The Clerk of Court is directed to send electronic

notification of this Order to the plaintiff, in addition

r

22

to mailing a copy of the order to the plaintiffs last

known address.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915 (a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not

be taken in good faith and, therefore, in forma

pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal.

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444—45

(1962).

SO ORDERED.

/S/ANNM. DONNELLY

ANN M. DONNELLY

United States District Judge

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

June 5, 2024