Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Federal Republic of Nigeria, Petitioner v. Zhongshan Fucheng Industrial Investment Co. Ltd.

Supreme Court briefNov 7, 2024

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

APPENDIX A – Court of Appeals Decision

Opinion, U.S. Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit, Case No. 237016 ...............................................................

1a

APPENDIX B – Memorandum Opinion, U.S.

District Court for the District of Columbia,

Case No. 22-170 ............................................

66a

APPENDIX C – Final Arbitration Award.......

92a

APPENDIX D - New York Convention ........... 182a

APPENDIX E - 9 USC §202 ............................ 191a

APPENDIX F – 28 USC §1605(a).................... 192a

1a

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

————

No. 23-7016

————

ZHONGSHAN FUCHENG INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT CO. LTD,

Appellee

v.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA,

Appellant

————

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:22-cv-00170)

————

Argued April 22, 2024

Decided August 9, 2024

————

Keith Bradley argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs was ScheLeese Goudy.

Jovana Crncevic argued the cause and filed the brief

for appellee.

Before: MILLETT, KATSAS, and CHILDS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS.

MILLETT, Circuit Judge: In 2001, China and Nigeria

signed a bilateral investment treaty to encourage

investment between the two countries. As part of that

2a

bargain, each country agreed to treat the other

country’s investors fairly and to protect their investments. The treaty also provided that the countries

would arbitrate any disputes with foreign investors.

Appellant Zhongshan Fucheng Industrial Investment

then invested in Nigeria, participating in a joint

venture with Ogun State, a Nigerian state, to develop

a free-trade zone. After years of development and

millions of dollars in investments, Ogun State abruptly

ended its relationship with Zhongshan, and Nigerian

federal authorities ousted the company’s executives

from the country. Zhongshan initiated arbitration

proceedings. An arbitrator found that Nigeria had

breached its obligations under the bilateral investment treaty and awarded Zhongshan over $55 million

in damages.

Zhongshan now seeks to enforce that arbitral award

against Nigeria. The district court held that it had

jurisdiction over this case, finding that the Foreign

Sovereign Immunities Act’s arbitration exception

applied because the award is governed by an

international arbitration treaty known as the New

York Convention.

We affirm.

I

A

1

Prior to 1952, the United States granted foreign

sovereigns “complete immunity” in courts within the

United States as “a matter of grace and comity[.]”

Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,

486 (1983). For centuries, that rule had been “in

harmony with the then-existing general concepts of

3a

international practice.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena,

912 F.3d 623, 626 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quotation marks

omitted).

Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth

centuries, however, the practice of granting foreign

sovereigns complete immunity was called into question.

In particular, as foreign governments became more

involved in commercial activity, concerns grew over

those governments’ ability to “manipulate their immunity” to gain unfair advantages in the marketplace over

purely private corporations. In re Grand Jury Subpoena,

912 F.3d at 626. In response, a growing number of

countries began to strip foreign sovereigns of immunity

for “private”— typically commercial—acts. Id.

In 1952, the State Department’s Acting Legal

Adviser issued a letter adopting this “restrictive theory

of sovereign immunity.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena,

912 F.3d at 626 (quotation marks omitted). Under that

theory, the United States recognized the immunity of

foreign sovereigns with regard to sovereign or public

acts, but not with regard to private acts. See Republic

of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 690 (2004);

Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487.

Application of the sovereign–private act distinction,

however, “proved troublesome.” Verlinden, 461 U.S. at

487. After 1952, “the State Department continued to

advise courts on a case-by-case basis whether immunity

should be granted[.]” Princz v. Federal Republic of

Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1994). If no

advice was given, courts had to independently determine whether immunity was appropriate (that is,

whether a foreign state’s conduct was private or

sovereign). See id.

4a

In 1976, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign

Immunities Act (“FSIA”), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.

2891 (codified as amended in various sections of 28

U.S.C.), to “free the Government from the[se] case-bycase diplomatic pressures” and to clarify the standards

governing sovereign immunity, Verlinden, 461 U.S.

488. To that end, the FSIA contains a “comprehensive

set of legal standards governing claims of immunity in

every civil action against a foreign state or its political

subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities” brought

in courts within the United States. Id.

Today, the FSIA is the “sole basis for obtaining

jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of [the

United States.]” Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess

Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989). The FSIA’s

“terms are absolute”: Unless a plaintiff shows that a

statutorily enumerated exception to sovereign immunity

applies, “courts of this country lack jurisdiction over

claims against a foreign nation.” Belize Soc. Dev., Ltd.

v. Government of Belize, 794 F.3d 99, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

2

This appeal involves the FSIA’s arbitration exception. That exception provides in relevant part:

A foreign state shall not be immune from the

jurisdiction of courts of the United States or

of the States in any case * * * in which the

action is brought * * * to confirm an award

made pursuant to * * * an agreement to

arbitrate, if * * * [the] award is or may be

governed by a treaty or other international

agreement in force for the United States

calling for the recognition and enforcement of

arbitral awards[.]

5a

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6). To establish jurisdiction under

the arbitration exception, a party must offer “more

than a claim invoking an arbitration award.” LLC SPC

Stileks v. Republic of Moldova, 985 F.3d 871, 877 (D.C.

Cir. 2021). The party must show (1) “the existence of

an arbitration agreement”; (2) “an arbitration award”;

and (3) “a treaty governing the award[.]” Id.

The relevant treaty governing the arbitration award

in this case is the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement

of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature June

10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 (“New York Convention”). The

New York Convention is a multilateral treaty that

provides for signatory states’ “recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a

State other than the State where the recognition and

enforcement of such awards are sought[.]” New York

Convention Art. I(1). The United States is a signatory

and “appl[ies] the Convention, on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and enforcement of only those

awards made in the territory of another Contracting

State.” New York Convention, 21 U.S.T. at 2560; see

New York Convention Art. I(3). Congress implemented

the New York Convention in Chapter 2 of the Federal

Arbitration Act. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208.

In most signatory states, the New York Convention

applies to all arbitral agreements, regardless of subject

matter. Belize Soc. Dev., 794 F.3d at 103. But the

Convention also permits states to adopt a “commercial

reservation” that limits the Convention to disputes

arising from legal relationships that are “considered as

commercial[.]” New York Convention Art. I(3).

The United States adopted the commercial reservation. See New York Convention, 21 U.S.T. at 2560; 9

6a

U.S.C. § 202. As a result, the Federal Arbitration Act

provides both that (1) “[a]n action * * * falling under

the Convention shall be deemed to arise under the

laws and treaties of the United States[,]” 9 U.S.C.

§ 203; and (2) the Convention applies only to an

arbitral award “arising out of a legal relationship,

whether contractual or not, which is considered as

commercial,” id. § 202.

Neither the New York Convention nor the Federal

Arbitration Act defines the term “commercial.”

B

In 2001, China and Nigeria signed a bilateral

investment treaty (“Investment Treaty”) aimed at

promoting commercial investment between the two

countries.1 The Investment Treaty requires each

country to protect investors from the other country

and to treat those foreign investors fairly and

equitably. The Investment Treaty also provides for

arbitration of disputes between an investor and a

treaty signatory. See Investment Treaty Art. 9. It

separately provides for arbitration of disputes between

China and Nigeria. See Investment Treaty Art. 8.

In 2007, Ogun State began contracting with Chinese

companies to develop the Ogun Guangdong Free Trade

Zone near Lagos, Nigeria’s most populous city and an

economic hub. A free-trade zone is a geographic area

in which countries relax trade restrictions to promote

economic activity and investment. Nigerian federal

law, for example, exempts businesses in free-trade

1

We take these facts from the arbitrator’s findings, which are

not challenged here. Cf. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL–

CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (“[A]n arbitrator must

find facts and a court may not reject those findings simply

because it disagrees with them.”).

7a

zones from certain taxes and customs duties. See

Nigeria Export Processing Zones Act 1992 §§ 8, 12,

available at https://perma.cc/SE8Z-NHCN.

Ogun State entered into a joint venture agreement

with a Chinese company and another company to

create the Ogun Guangdong Free Trade Zone Company.

The Nigeria Export Processing Zones Authority, a

Nigerian federal-government entity that oversees

free-trade zones in Nigeria, then delegated control and

operation of the free-trade zone to the company.

In 2010, the Ogun Guangdong Free Trade Zone

Company contracted with Zhongshan’s parent company

to develop an industrial park in the free-trade zone.

The goal was for Zhongshan’s parent company to

develop the park and build factories in it for zone

tenants to use. Zhongshan’s parent company then

“effectively transferred its rights” to Zhongshan, which

conducted its Nigeria operations through its subsidiary,

Zhongfu International Investment (NIG) FZE. J.A.

316. Because the distinctions between the Zhongshanrelated entities are irrelevant to the legal issues in this

case, we refer to them collectively as “Zhongshan.”

Zhongshan invested millions of dollars and significant resources to develop the park. Zhongshan built

out infrastructure in the industrial park, including

roads and utilities. It also opened services such as a

hospital, hotel, supermarket, and bank. The free-trade

zone later amended its charter and made Zhongshan a

part-owner of the zone. By 2016, businesses had moved

into the zone and Nigeria had collected approximately

160 million Nigerian Naira in tax revenue from the

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free-trade zone, which amounts to hundreds of

thousands of U.S. dollars.2

In the first half of 2016, however, Ogun State

terminated its agreements with Zhongshan. Ogun

claimed that a different Chinese company was legally

entitled to Zhongshan’s share of the free-trade zone

and that Zhongshan had defrauded Ogun.

Things continued to deteriorate. One Ogun official

texted a Zhongshan executive urging him “as a friend”

to “leave peacefully when there is opportunity to do so,

and avoid forceful removal, complications[,] and

possible prosecution[.]” J.A. 34. The next month, Ogun

issued an arrest warrant for two executives, alleging

“criminal breach of trust[.]” J.A. 35. Nigerian federal

police arrested one Zhongshan executive at gunpoint

and held him for ten days. During that time, the police

denied the executive food and water, beat him,

intimidated him, and questioned him about the

whereabouts of the other executive.

C

Following Ogun’s sudden termination of the relationship, Zhongshan filed lawsuits in Nigerian federal

and state courts seeking reinstatement of its contractual rights. Those proceedings were discontinued in

Spring 2018.

In August 2018, Zhongshan initiated an arbitration

proceeding against Nigeria under Article 9 of the

2

The arbitrator found that Nigeria collected over 160 million

Nigerian Naira in tax revenue. J.A. 60. Using exchange rates from

2016, the year Zhongshan was evicted, that amount is between

approximately 450,000 and 815,000 United States dollars. See

Nigerian Naira (NGN) to U.S. Dollar (USD) Exchange Rate History

for 2016, EXCHANGE-RATES.ORG, https://perma.cc/VPC9-5XW7.

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Investment Treaty. Nigeria willingly participated in

the arbitration proceeding. Zhongshan alleged that

Nigeria breached the Investment Treaty in five ways:

(1) failure to afford Zhongshan fair and equitable

treatment; (2) unreasonable discrimination; (3) failure

to protect Zhongshan; (4) breach of contract; and

(5) wrongful expropriation of investments without

compensation.

In March 2021, an arbitral tribunal in the United

Kingdom rendered a final award in favor of Zhongshan

(“Final Award”). As relevant here, the tribunal found

that Nigeria’s actions in 2016 “were plainly designed

to deprive, and indeed succeeded in depriving,

[Zhongshan] of its rights under the [development

agreement] in circumstances where there were no

domestic law grounds for doing so,” and did so “in a

way which involved a combination of actual and

threatened illegitimate use of the state’s power to

achieve that end.” J.A. 60. In support of this conclusion,

the tribunal identified violations of four separate

provisions of the Investment Treaty. See J.A. 61–62

(identifying violations of Articles 2(2) (entitlement to

“continuous protection” by Nigeria), 2(3) (protection

against “unreasonable or discriminatory measures” by

Nigeria), 3(1) (guarantee of “fair and equitable

treatment” by Nigeria), and 4 (prohibition against

expropriation by Nigeria)) (emphases omitted).

Based on these findings, the arbitral tribunal found

that Nigeria had breached its obligations under the

Investment Treaty and that Zhongshan was entitled

to $55.6 million in compensation from Nigeria and

10a

$75,000 in moral damages, along with interest and

legal and arbitral fees. J.A. 85–86.3

After nearly a year of nonpayment by Nigeria,

Zhongshan sued in the district court to enforce the

arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act.

Nigeria moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. As relevant

here, Nigeria argued that it was immune from suit

because no FSIA exception applied to Zhongshan’s

petition to enforce the foreign arbitral award.

The district court denied Nigeria’s motion to dismiss,

holding that Nigeria was not immune because the

Final Award was governed by the New York Convention,

and so fell within the FSIA’s arbitration exception.

II

Nigeria timely appealed the district court’s denial of

its motion to dismiss. We have jurisdiction because a

denial of sovereign immunity qualifies for interlocutory appeal under the collateral-order doctrine.

El–Hadad v. United Arab Emirates, 216 F.3d 29, 31

(D.C. Cir. 2000).

We review the district court’s denial of Nigeria’s

motion to dismiss de novo. Transamerica Leasing, Inc.

v. La Republica de Venezuela, 200 F.3d 843, 847 (D.C.

Cir. 2000). When a plaintiff asserts jurisdiction under

the FSIA, the defendant foreign state bears the burden

of proving that the plaintiff’s asserted statutory

3

The arbitral tribunal defined “moral damages” to include

damages for “injury inflicted resulting in mental suffering, injury

to [the claimant’s] feelings, humiliations, shame, [and] degradation[.]”

J.A. 63–64 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Lusitania (United States

v. Germany), 7 R.I.A.A. 1, 40 (Mixed Claims Comm’n 1923)).

11a

exception to immunity does not apply. Belize Soc. Dev.,

794 F.3d at 102.

III

We agree with the district court that the FSIA’s

arbitration exception stripped Nigeria of its sovereign

immunity in this case.

The FSIA’s arbitration exception requires the court

to find the existence of three jurisdictional facts:

(1) “an arbitration agreement”; (2) “an arbitration

award”; and (3) “a treaty governing the award[.]”

Stileks, 985 F.3d at 877. The first two requirements are

not disputed in this case and are plainly established in

the record. Nigeria and Zhongshan had an arbitration

agreement because Nigeria extended an open offer to

arbitrate to all Chinese investors, and Zhongshan was

a qualifying investor. See Investment Treaty Art. 9;

J.A. 44–45. Zhongshan then invoked that agreement to

initiate an arbitration proceeding with Nigeria, and

the arbitral tribunal rendered a final award in

Zhongshan’s favor.

Whether the arbitration exception applies in this

case therefore turns on whether a treaty—specifically,

the New York Convention—governs the Final Award.

We hold that it does because the Final Award arose

from (1) a legal relationship, (2) that is considered as

commercial, and (3) is between persons. See New York

Convention Art. I(1); 9 U.S.C. § 202.

A

The Final Award satisfies the Convention’s requirements that the arbitrated dispute (1) “aris[e] out of a

legal relationship” that is (2) “considered as commercial[.]”

9 U.S.C. § 202.

12a

1

As for the first requirement, Zhongshan and Nigeria

shared a legal relationship because Nigeria owed

Zhongshan legal duties under the Investment Treaty.

Two parties share a legal relationship within the

meaning of the New York Convention if there is an

agreement, whether contractual or not, that (1) “explicitly

contemplate[s] which parties it w[ill] obligate”;

(2) determines “the extent of the obligations”; and

(3) provides “the legal framework to govern the

arrangement.” Diag Human, S.E. v. Czech Republic

Ministry of Health, 824 F.3d 131, 135 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

The Investment Treaty fits that bill. First, the

Investment Treaty expressly obligates Nigeria to protect

investments made by Chinese investors, including

those by Zhongshan. See Investment Treaty Art. 2(2)

(“Investments of the investors of either Contracting

Party shall enjoy the continuous protection in the

territory of the other Contracting Party.”); see also J.A.

44–45 (finding that Zhongshan was an investor under

the Investment Treaty).

Second, the Investment Treaty lays out in precise

terms the duties Nigeria owed to Zhongshan, including

protecting Zhongshan’s investments in Nigeria and

affording Zhongshan the same treatment it would

afford to Nigerian investors. Investment Treaty Arts.

2, 3; see also id. Art. 5 (providing that signatory states

must compensate investors for certain kinds of losses);

id. Art. 6 (requiring signatory states to ensure that

investors can transfer their investments and returns).

Third, the Investment Treaty provides that the signatory states will arbitrate any disputes “connect[ed]

with an investment” in the signatory states and

13a

specifies the governing law that the tribunal shall

apply. Investment Treaty Art. 9(1), (3), (7).

To be sure, the direct agreement was between China

and Nigeria, not Nigeria and Zhongshan. But the

Investment Treaty, on its face, committed to protect

foreign investors and to treat them fairly. In that way,

Nigeria assumed legally enforceable duties to Chinese

investors, including Zhongshan.

More specifically, “a treaty is a contract,” albeit one

entered into between nations. BG Group PLC v.

Republic of Argentina, 572 U.S. 25, 37 (2014); Stileks,

985 F.3d at 879 (quoting BG Group, 572 U.S. at 37). As

relevant here, contract law has long permitted parties

to contract for the benefit of a third party. Such “[a]

promise in a contract creates a duty in the promisor to

any intended beneficiary to perform the promise, and

the intended beneficiary may enforce the duty.” See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (AM. L.

INST. 1981).

For that reason, the Supreme Court has “analyzed a

similar bilateral investment treaty as if it were a

contract between the sovereign and the investor

corporation seeking to confirm an arbitral award.”

Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, 795 F.3d 200, 207 (D.C. Cir.

2015) (citing BG Group, 572 U.S. at 33–34).

So too for the Investment Treaty. China and Nigeria

negotiated a treaty that was intended to confer

specified benefits upon investors. The Investment Treaty

expressly guarantees Chinese investors protection of

their investments and fair and equal treatment.

Investment Treaty Arts. 2–4. Underscoring the point,

the duties owed to investors are distinct from those

owed to the signatory states. That is evidenced by the

fact that the Investment Treaty provides two distinct

14a

dispute-resolution mechanisms: one for investor-state

arbitrations, found in Article 9, and one for arbitrations between the signatory states, found in Article 8.

If the Investment Treaty did not create rights in thirdparty investors, there would be no point to the distinct

investor-state arbitration provision. Accordingly, as an

investor, Zhongshan is an intended beneficiary of the

Investment Treaty. Nigeria therefore owes Zhongshan

a duty to perform Nigeria’s promises, and Zhongshan

has the right to enforce those promises through

arbitration.

2

As for the second component of the commercial

reservation, the legal relationship the Investment

Treaty created between Zhongshan and Nigeria is

commercial in nature. The relationship exists because

Zhongshan made a commercial investment, in a freetrade zone designed to facilitate commerce, under a

bilateral treaty aimed at promoting commercial

investment and protecting commercial investors.

The Federal Arbitration Act and circuit precedent

corroborate that straightforward reading of the

Investment Treaty’s character. Under the Federal

Arbitration Act, the New York Convention applies to

an arbitral award only if the award “aris[es] out of a

legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which

is considered as commercial[.]” 9 U.S.C. § 202.

The requirement that the relationship be considered

commercial has a broad scope. A relationship “may be

commercial even though it does not arise out of or

relate to a contract, so long as it has a connection with

commerce[.]” Belize Soc. Dev., 794 F.3d at 104 (quoting

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMM.

& INV.–STATE ARBITRATION § 1.1 cmt. e (AM. L. INST.

15a

2012)). That reading of “considered as commercial”

maps onto the phrase’s “established meaning as a term

of art * * * [i]n the field of international arbitration[.]”

Diag Human, 824 F.3d at 136.

Zhongshan and Nigeria’s relationship has at least

five commercial features.

First, Zhongshan’s investment in a money-making

enterprise is itself commercial.

Second, Zhongshan invested in a free-trade zone

intended to promote commercial activity.

Third, Nigeria relaxed tariffs in the free-trade zone.

Its decision to “forgo[] charging” those “duties” is connected to commerce. Belize Soc. Dev., 794 F.3d at 104.

Fourth, Nigeria collected hundreds of thousands of

dollars in tax revenue from Zhongshan’s investment.

See J.A. 60. “The[se] taxes * * * also have a connection

with commerce[.]” Belize Soc. Dev., 794 F.3d at 104.

Fifth, the Investment Treaty, under which Nigeria

owed duties to Zhongshan, is expressly designed to

promote commerce. By its own terms, the treaty is

meant to “stimulat[e] business initiative of the investors

and * * * increase prosperity in both States[.]” Investment

Treaty preamble. In that same vein, the treaty ensures

that investors can profit off their investments by

guaranteeing them the ability to transfer “returns” on

investments—including “profits, dividends, interests

and other legitimate income” of a commercial character—

back to their home countries. Id. Art. 6.

Nigeria does not dispute that the above connections

to commerce exist. Instead, Nigeria argues that the

commercial reservation limits the New York Convention

to arbitral awards arising from direct transactions

between a signatory state and a private party. See

16a

Nigeria Opening Br. 44–47. Nigeria relies principally

on the Federal Arbitration Act’s requirement that the

parties’ relationship be “considered as commercial,

including a transaction, contract, or agreement described

in section 2 of this title[.]” 9 U.S.C. § 202. Section 2 of

the Federal Arbitration Act, in turn, provides that “[a]

written provision in any maritime transaction or a

contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce”

providing for arbitration “shall be valid, irrevocable,

and enforceable[.]” 9 U.S.C. § 2; see AT&T Mobility

LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). Nigeria

argues that, since Section 2 requires a “maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction,” and the

commercial reservation cross-references Section 2,

then the commercial reservation must also require a

transaction. Because the Investment Treaty itself is

not a commercial transaction, and Zhongshan did not

directly transact with Nigeria itself, Nigeria argues

that the relationship between Zhongshan and Nigeria

is not considered as commercial for purposes of the

commercial reservation.

Nigeria’s proposed reading would artificially and

extra-textually confine the commercial reservation to

the scope of Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act.

Specifically, Nigeria would replace the commercial

reservation’s use of the word “including” with the

words “limited to,” so that the reservation would read:

“An * * * arbitral award arising out of a legal

relationship * * * which is considered as commercial,

limited to a transaction, contract, or agreement described

in section 2 of this title, falls under the Convention.”

See 9 U.S.C. § 202.

But that is not what Congress wrote. Because “the

use of the word ‘includes’ indicates that [a statute’s]

list * * * is non-exhaustive[,]” Congress intended for

17a

the commercial reservation to be broader than Section

2’s reference to transactions. United States v. Philip

Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

Nigeria’s argument also overlooks that Congress

used the phrase “considered as commercial,” not

“considered as transactional.” “When a statute uses a

term of art” like the word “commercial[,]” “Congress

intended it to have its established meaning.” Belize

Soc. Dev., 794 F.3d at 103 (formatting modified). In the

international arbitration context, the established

meaning of “commercial” is anything that “has a

connection with commerce,” whether transactional or

not. Id. at 104 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE

U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMM. & INV.–STATE ARBITRATION

§ 1.1 cmt. e). For that reason, we have held that the

commercial reservation is not confined to “state

commercial and private acts[.]” Id. at 105 (quotation

marks omitted). It instead has a “broad compass” and

reaches anything with a connection to commerce. Id.

at 104–105.

Without a foothold in the statutory text or this

court’s precedent, Nigeria argues that “considered as

commercial” must be narrow because otherwise it

would have little work to do, given that “[t]he vast

majority of treaties are connected to commerce in one

way or another.” Nigeria Opening Br. 50– 51. According

to Nigeria, holding that the Investment Treaty is a

commercial relationship covered by the Convention

would mean that, “in all those treaties among sovereign

nations that involve economic topics, the dispute resolution processes would lead to Convention enforcement.”

Nigeria Opening Br. 51.

Nigeria is mistaken for three reasons.

18a

First, nothing in this opinion suggests that the

Investment Treaty is itself a commercial relationship.

Instead, the Investment Treaty created a relationship

between Nigeria and the commercial investor Zhongshan

to promote commercial development. It is that

relationship between Nigeria and Zhongshan that is

considered as commercial.

Second, not every treaty contains an agreement to

arbitrate. Without a valid arbitration agreement, the

FSIA’s arbitration exception does not apply. See

Stileks, 985 F.3d at 877. Countries that do not wish to

arbitrate or to be subject to enforcement proceedings

in foreign courts do not have to extend to commercial

investors a standing offer to arbitrate like Nigeria did.

Third, not every treaty confers enforceable rights

upon third parties. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 572

U.S. 844, 850–851 (2014) (The Convention on Chemical

Weapons “creates obligations only for State Parties” to

ban chemical weapons.). Treaties that do not confer

such rights will not create relationships between third

parties and foreign sovereigns like the one that

Zhongshan had with Nigeria.

Our holding in this case therefore does not, as

Nigeria worries, reach “all those treaties among sovereign

nations that involve economic topics[.]” Nigeria Opening

Br. 51. Rather, our holding is limited to cases involving

a treaty that (1) is connected with commerce; (2) confers

third-party rights upon commercial investors; and

(3) makes a standing offer to those commercial

investors to arbitrate disputes involving their thirdparty rights. In those cases, the treaty creates a legal

relationship between the parties that is commercial in

nature, and an arbitral award arising from that

relationship satisfies the commercial reservation.

19a

B

The remaining requirement for the New York

Convention to apply in this case—that the Final

Award arise from a dispute between “persons”—is also

met. See New York Convention Art. I(1). Under the

Convention, the term “persons” includes a foreign

state that has entered into a bilateral investment

treaty under which it assumes treaty obligations owed

to third parties that are connected to commerce.

Extensive precedent, from this court and others, has

long enforced under the New York Convention arbitral

awards involving foreign states charged with breaching

investment and commercial treaty obligations. See,

e.g., Tatneft v. Ukraine, 21 F.4th 829, 832–834 (D.C. Cir.

2021) (affirming confirmation of arbitral award in

favor of third-party investor arising from Ukraine’s

breach of bilateral investment treaty with Russia);

Stileks, 985 F.3d at 874–876 (affirming confirmation of

arbitral award in favor of third-party energy provider

arising from Moldova’s breach of multilateral treaty);

Chevron Corp., 795 F.3d at 202–203 (affirming confirmation of arbitral award in favor of third-party

investor arising from Ecuador’s breach of bilateral

investment treaty with the United States); Olin

Holdings Ltd. v. State of Libya, 73 F.4th 92, 96–101 (2d

Cir. 2023) (affirming confirmation of arbitral award in

favor of third-party investor based on Libya’s breaches

of bilateral investment treaty with the Republic of

Cyprus); Schneider v. Kingdom of Thailand, 688 F.3d

68, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming confirmation of

arbitral award in favor of third-party investor based

on Thailand’s breaches of bilateral investment treaty

with Germany); cf. BG Group, 572 U.S. at 28–31

(involving arbitral award in favor of third-party

20a

investor arising from Argentina’s breach of bilateral

investment treaty with the United Kingdom).

In each of those cases, enforcement was possible only

if the breaching state was a “person” for purposes of

the Convention. So too here. Nigeria, like the foreign

states in each of those cases, signed a treaty and

assumed obligations to private, third-party beneficiaries that are connected to commerce. And Nigeria, just

like those foreign states, is a “person” under the

Convention.

Nigeria argues that the Final Award does not fall

within the scope of the New York Convention because

“[a] sovereign is a ‘person’ for Convention purposes

only when it engages in private activity.” Nigeria

Opening Br. 21. Claiming that it “acted solely as a

sovereign with respect to Zhongshan[,]” Nigeria

Opening Br. 30, Nigeria argues that the Final Award

is not enforceable under the New York Convention.

Nigeria’s proposed private-act limitation is without

basis in the New York Convention’s text or precedent,

and it contradicts the position of the Executive Branch.

First, the Convention affords no textual footing for

including foreign states as “persons” only when acting

in a purportedly “private” capacity. The “interpretation

of a treaty is like the interpretation of a statute,” and

so we “first look to the treaty’s text.” Rodriguez v. Pan

American Health Org., 29 F.4th 706, 717 (D.C. Cir.

2022) (formatting modified). Here, the plain text of the

New York Convention leaves no room for a private-act

limitation. Article I provides broadly that the Convention

applies to all arbitral awards “arising out of differences between persons[.]” New York Convention Art.

I(1). There is no dispute that the term “persons”

includes foreign states, at least when they are acting

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in a commercial capacity. See Report of the Comm. on

the Enf’t of Int’l Arbitral Awards ¶ 24, U.N. Doc.

E/AC.42/4 (Mar. 21, 1955) (“1955 Report”); see also

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

OF THE U.S., Part II Introductory Note (AM. L. INST.

1987) (“The principal persons under international law

are states.”). And that commercial-activity limitation

is expressly provided for in the Convention itself. New

York Convention Art. I(3). That commercial reservation accomplishes much of what Nigeria’s proposed

“private-versus-public” distinction would but, unlike

Nigeria’s atextual distinction, it does so explicitly.

So Nigeria’s position must be that, although the

word “persons” encompasses foreign states, it does so

only when those states act in a private capacity. Yet

nothing in the Convention’s text provides for such a

bespoke limitation on signatory states’ coverage.

The same is true for the Federal Arbitration Act.

Section 202 of the Act provides: “An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal

relationship, whether contractual or not, which is

considered as commercial, * * * falls under the

Convention.” 9 U.S.C. § 202. Apart from the requirement that the legal relationship be commercial, that

provision does not place any additional private-act

precondition on the enforcement of an arbitral award

against a foreign state.

Nigeria, for its part, has identified no internationallaw basis for reading its additional private-act qualification into the Convention’s text, nor has it pointed

to any other signatory state that has asserted that

cramped understanding of “persons” in the 66 years

since the Convention’s ratification. The dissenting

opinion, meanwhile, offers dictionary definitions that

cut against reading the word “persons” to encompass

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sovereigns at all. See infra at 7. But unwilling to bite

that bullet, the dissenting opinion instead urges a nondictionary reading of “persons” to mean “sovereigns

sometimes, depending on how exactly the sovereign is

behaving.” Absent any explicit textual indication, we

hesitate to read such a partially-in and occasionallyout definition into the Convention’s single use of the

word “persons.”

The dissenting opinion asserts that reading the

Convention as-written would mean that foreign states

“have no immunity” for their sovereign acts. See infra

at 11. Not at all. What the dissenting opinion overlooks

is that one essential attribute of sovereign immunity

is foreign states’ ability voluntarily to consent to a suit

or proceeding. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Calif. v. Hyatt,

587 U.S. 230, 237–241 (2019) (describing founding-era

principles of international law under which states

could be sued only with their consent); see also

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAW OF THE U.S. § 70 (AM. L. INST. 1965). The

Convention applies to the enforcement only of arbitral

awards resulting from arbitral proceedings in which

the parties have voluntarily contracted to resolve a

dispute through arbitration. See New York Convention

Arts. II, IV(1)(b), V(1)(a).

Consistent with that long-established principle of

foreign states’ ability to consent to suits, the FSIA’s

arbitration exception requires that there have been an

agreement by the foreign state to arbitrate and a final

arbitral award. Stileks, 985 F.3d at 877. When those

conditions are met, as they are here, then it is the

FSIA’s arbitration exception—not the Convention—

that strips states of their immunity.

Nigeria did not have to agree to arbitrate with

investors like Zhongshan. That was its decision to

23a

make. Had it not so agreed, it would be immune to this

lawsuit. But Nigeria signed a treaty that expressly

obligated it to arbitrate disputes with Chinese investors

and arbitrated this dispute with Zhongshan. Nigeria

also committed itself via the New York Convention to

the enforcement of arbitral awards. While the Convention

covers an arbitral award regardless of whether the

parties have acceded to the Convention, see infra at

13–14, accession to the Convention in part determines

whether a state has consented to an award’s enforcement in foreign courts. See Creighton Ltd. v. Government

of State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1999)

(holding that Qatar had not waived its sovereign

immunity because it had not signed the New York

Convention). Because Nigeria has twice consented to

the enforcement of this award, our reading of the New

York Convention is consistent with long-established

principles of sovereign immunity.4

The dissenting opinion also reasons that our reading

of the Convention would undercut “[b]ackground principles of espousal[.]” See infra at 12. That is incorrect.

Espousal requirements generally prohibit private

parties from asserting claims arising under international law directly against foreign states (rather than

petitioning their own governments to raise the claims

state-to-state). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., § 174 cmt. b. But

that prohibition does not apply where an international

agreement expressly provides a mechanism for the

resolution of disputes between a government and

foreign nationals, or where a government agrees to

resolve a dispute directly with a private party. Simon

v. Republic of Hungary, 77 F.4th 1077, 1097 (D.C. Cir.

4

We do not address whether the district court had jurisdiction

under the FSIA’s waiver exception.

24a

2023) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN

RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., § 175); see also infra at

12 (Espousal requirements do not apply “where the

sovereign itself ha[s] agreed to engage directly with

the aggrieved individual.”).

This case fits within both of those exceptions.

Nigeria signed an investment treaty with China that

expressly provided for either state’s nationals to

directly arbitrate against the other state. And Nigeria

stood by that promise by arbitrating with Zhongshan.

Enforcing the Final Award is therefore entirely

consistent with espousal requirements.

Second, circuit precedent corroborates our straightforward reading of the Convention, as this court has

found the New York Convention to be fully applicable

to arbitral awards arising from sovereign acts. In

Tatneft v. Ukraine, 21 F.4th 829 (D.C. Cir. 2021), we

affirmed under the New York Convention the confirmation of an arbitral award in favor of a third-party

investor arising from Ukraine’s breach of a bilateral

investment treaty with Russia, id. at 832–834. Ukraine’s

breaching conduct went far beyond any private conduct and involved core sovereign activity. The Russian

company that initiated arbitration alleged that

“Ukrainian courts, prosecutors, and court officials” had

improperly facilitated a Ukrainian conglomerate’s

acquisition of the Russian company’s shares in another

company. Tatneft v. Ukraine, 301 F. Supp. 3d 175, 193

(D.D.C. 2018) (quotation marks omitted); see Tatneft,

21 F.4th at 832–833. Similarly, in Chevron Corp. v.

Ecuador, 795 F.3d 200 (D.C. Cir. 2015), we confirmed

an arbitral award against Ecuador for purely sovereign

conduct—violating a bilateral investment treaty by

“failing to resolve” lawsuits pending in Ecuadorian

courts. Id. at 202–203; cf. BG Group, 572 U.S. at 28–31

25a

(theory of arbitral award was not based on private

conduct, but instead on finding that Argentina had

enacted laws that denied company fair and equitable

treatment as required by an investment treaty); Olin

Holdings, 73 F.4th at 96–100 (arbitration award based

in part on Libya’s expropriation of factory).

Nigeria’s breaching conduct in this case—including

its expropriation of Zhongshan’s investments—is no

less sovereign than Ukraine’s conduct in Tatneft, or

Ecuador’s conduct in Chevron. Those cases demonstrate that, contrary to the dissenting opinion’s view,

enforcing the Final Award would not mark a departure

from settled norms or expectations. If anything,

declining to enforce the Final Award would be a sharp

break from past decisions. Notably, Nigeria makes no

argument that those prior cases were wrongly decided

even though the breaching conduct at issue involved

sovereign, not private, acts.

Third, the United States government has agreed

that the New York Convention governs the enforcement of an arbitral award even when the breaching

conduct arises out of a foreign state’s sovereign, rather

than private, activities. In Libyan American Oil Co. v.

Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 684 F.2d

1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (table), this court vacated without

opinion a district court decision declining to enforce an

arbitral award rendered against Libya. See Libyan

American Oil Co. v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab

Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175, 1179 (D.D.C. 1980). The

subject arbitration award had been rendered in favor

of the Libyan American Oil Company under an

arbitration clause contained in agreements into which

the company had entered with Libya in 1955. Id. at

1176. Nearly two decades later, Libya nationalized the

company’s rights under the agreements, along with

26a

some of the company’s oil-drilling equipment. Id.

When negotiations for compensation faltered, the oil

company rejected the terms of the nationalization and

initiated arbitration proceedings, ultimately securing

an arbitration award in its favor. Id.

In an amicus brief submitted to this court in Libyan

American Oil, the United States argued that Libya’s

Convention-related “objections to enforcement [could]

be briefly dismissed.” Brief for the United States as

Amicus Curiae at 20 n.16, Libyan American Oil Co. v.

Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nos. 801207, 80-1252 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 1980). The United

States explained that the fact that a party seeks to

enforce an arbitral award against a “sovereign state

rather than a private party does not affect the

enforceability of an award * * * under the New York

Convention.” Id. The government explained that the

“negotiating history of the Convention clearly reflects

the interpretation that states are legal persons for the

purposes of the Convention.” Id.

In so arguing, the United States endorsed enforcement of the arbitral award against Libya as a covered

“person” under the Convention even though Libya’s

breaching conduct involved sovereign acts committed

within its own territory. See Brief for the United States

as Amicus Curiae at 4, 6–8, Libyan American Oil Co. v.

Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nos. 801207, 80-1252 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 1980). The United

States also perceived no separation-of-powers concerns

with enforcement because enforcement “solely concern[ed]

Libya’s undertaking to submit disputes under freely

negotiated concession contracts to final and binding

arbitration outside of its territory, and to honor any

ensuing awards.” Id. at 7. In giving effect to such

awards, the United States explained, courts simply

27a

“enforce a judgment to which the foreign state has

consented in advance,” consistent with longstanding

principles allowing litigation in which the sovereign

has agreed to participate. Id. at 8. That “element of

consent, coupled with the neutrality of the arbitral

tribunal, removes any concern that domestic courts

might venture into the political arena, or hinder the

United States’ pursuit of foreign policy goals.” Id.

Given the Executive Branch’s constitutional expertise

in matters of foreign affairs and diplomacy, we afford

the United States’ interpretation of the Convention

“great weight.” Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S.

331, 355 (2006) (quotation marks omitted); see id.

(“[W]hile courts interpret treaties for themselves, the

meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and

enforcement is given great weight.”) (quotation marks

omitted).

Fourth, subsequent treaties involving foreign states

signatory to the New York Convention have treated

the New York Convention as encompassing arbitral

awards arising from sovereign acts. For example, the

Energy Charter Treaty, opened for signature Dec. 17,

1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95, is a multilateral treaty that

establishes a framework to “promote long-term cooperation in the energy field,” Energy Charter Treaty

Art. 2. The Energy Charter Treaty includes an

arbitration provision for disputes “between a Contracting

Party and an Investor of another Contracting Party

relating to an Investment of the latter in the Area of

the former[.]” Id. Art. 26(1); see id. Art. 26(2)–(8). The

treaty further provides that claims submitted to

arbitration under the treaty “shall be considered to

arise out of a commercial relationship or transaction

for the purposes of article I of th[e New York]

28a

Convention.” Id. Art. 26(5)(b). While certain disputes

between a contracting state and an investor could

involve foreign states’ private acts, see, e.g., id. Art.

10(1) (“Each Contracting Party shall observe any

obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an

Investment of an Investor of any other Contracting

Party.”), other covered disputes explicitly involve

foreign states acting in their sovereign capacity, see,

e.g., id. Art. 13(1) (prohibiting signatory states from

engaging in certain forms of expropriation and

nationalization).

That over 50 of the state signatories to the New York

Convention entered a treaty that contemplates that

arbitral awards fall within the New York Convention

even when they plainly arise from a state’s sovereign

acts underscores that the Convention does not impose

a private-act precondition on a foreign state qualifying

as a covered “person.” Even if the Energy Charter

Treaty did not amend the New York Convention, see

infra at 25, it evidences “[t]he postratification understanding of other contracting states” that “may * * *

serve as an aid to our interpretation of a treaty’s

meaning[.]” GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS,

Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 590 U.S. 432,

442 (2020) (quotation marks omitted); see also Zhongshan

Br. 28 & n.9 (noting that 51 of 53 states signatory to

the Energy Charter Treaty are also parties to the New

York Convention).

Nigeria’s arguments in support of its position that

foreign states are “persons” under the New York

Convention only when they act in their private

capacity do not hold up.

To start, Nigeria contends that, “[a] mere eight years

after the Convention, many countries adopted the

International Centre for Settlement of Investment

29a

Disputes Convention [(“ICSID”)] specifically for investorstate disputes.” Nigeria Reply Br. 8. Nigeria argues

that “[f]or so many Convention signatories to develop

a new and different treaty on this point suggests

investor-state disputes were not generally subject to

the Convention—which would have made the new

treaty unnecessary.” Nigeria Reply Br. 8–9.

Not so. ICSID promotes international investment by

establishing a dispute-resolution process for investorstate disputes. See Valores Mundiales, S.L. v. Bolivarian

Republic of Venezuela, 87 F.4th 510, 513 (D.C. Cir.

2023). The New York Convention, on the other hand,

provides for the recognition and enforcement of a

broad array of foreign arbitral awards. The two

agreements accordingly serve distinct functions in the

arbitration of investment disputes. In any event, any

supposed redundancy between the Convention and

ICSID would persist even under Nigeria’s reading:

Nigeria agrees that the New York Convention applies

to awards arising out of foreign states’ private acts,

Nigeria Opening Br. 21, even though the ICSID itself

covers such awards.

Nigeria also argues that the drafting history (travaux

préparatoires) of the New York Convention shows that

the countries developing the Convention intended the

treaty to “appl[y] to government bodies only to the

extent they are engaged in the private sphere.” Nigeria

Opening Br. 22; see Nigeria Opening Br. 22–25.

That is incorrect. The “clear import of treaty

language controls unless application of the words of

the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a

result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of

its signatories.” Rodriguez, 29 F.4th at 718 (quotation

marks omitted); cf. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392,

399 (1985) (“[I]t is our responsibility to give the specific

30a

words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the

shared expectations of the contracting parties.”). Here,

nothing in the text of the New York Convention even

hints at the private-act prerequisite that Nigeria

proposes.

In addition, the handful of quotes from a 1955

Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of

International Arbitral Awards on which Nigeria bases

its travaux préparatoires argument does not suggest

that the signatories intended that arbitral awards

against states be covered only when those awards

arise from private state acts.

Nigeria first notes that the 1955 report explained

that the New York Convention would “go[] further

than the Geneva Convention in facilitating the

enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, [while] at the

same time * * * respect[ing] the sovereign rights of

States.” 1955 Report ¶ 14; see Nigeria Opening Br. 23.

But that broad reference to sovereign “rights” is too

general to import a drastic and categorical limitation

on enforcement whenever the breaching conduct

underlying an arbitral award is sovereign action. After

all, the Convention already protects sovereign rights

in multiple respects, including by allowing for commercial reservations. In addition, as the United States

has explained, sovereign rights are safeguarded where, as

here, a sovereign voluntarily joins the New York

Convention and then freely consents to arbitrate with

third parties, and any subsequent arbitration proceeds

before a neutral arbitral tribunal. See Brief for the

United States as Amicus Curiae at 7–8, Libyan American

Oil Co. v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Nos. 80-1207, 80-1252 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 1980).

Nigeria next points to language in the 1955 report

stating that the New York Convention “does not deal

31a

with arbitration between States[.]” 1955 Report ¶ 17;

see Nigeria Opening Br. 23. From that, Nigeria reasons

that “[i]f sovereign governments were ‘persons’ for all

purposes under the Convention, an arbitration between

States would be a dispute between ‘persons,’ so this

statement * * * would have been contrary to the

committee’s own drafting work.” Nigeria Opening Br.

23–24.

Nigeria’s argument, however, omits relevant context.

The relevant paragraph reads in full:

The Committee considered that the expression

“International Arbitral Awards” used by the

International Chamber of Commerce (E/C.2/373)

normally referred to arbitration between

States. Since this Draft Convention does not

deal with arbitration between States, but

deals with the recognition and enforcement in

one country of arbitral awards made in

another country, the Committee adopted the

title “Draft Convention on the Recognition

and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards”

which reflects more accurately the object of

the Convention.

1955 Report ¶ 17.

When read in full, then, the language that Nigeria

references is indeterminate. It is not clear whether the

New York Convention’s drafters were explaining that

the Convention is not focused on arbitrations between

states or were noting that the Convention specifically

excludes such arbitrations. We do not resolve that

ambiguity here, for there are at least two things that

may distinguish arbitration between states and this

arbitration between Nigeria and Zhongshan.

32a

For one, as the dissenting opinion points out, there

is other evidence from the drafting history suggesting

that the Convention does not apply to disputes

between states over violations of international law. See

infra at 14–17.

For another, disputes between states are ordinarily

governed by public international law, while disputes

between states and individuals are not. See Federal

Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 592 U.S. 169, 176

(2021); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAW OF THE U.S. § 487 cmt. f; id. § 904 cmt. a. To that

point, the arbitration between Nigeria and Zhongshan

was governed by “the law of Nigeria as supplemented

by international law as provided by article 9.7” of the

Investment Treaty. J.A. 40; see J.A. 60 (finding Nigeria

liable because “there were no domestic law grounds”

for Nigeria’s actions against Zhongshan); Investment

Treaty Art. 9(7) (“The tribunal shall adjudicate in

accordance with the law of the Contracting Party to

the dispute * * * as well as the generally recognized

principles of international law[.]”); see also id. Art.

4(1)(b) (prohibiting expropriation by Nigeria and

China without “domestic legal procedure”). Nothing in

the travaux préparatoires bars enforcement of arbitral

awards resulting from state–private disputes that are

governed in material part by domestic law.

So regardless of whether a dispute between two

sovereign states governed purely by public international law falls under the New York Convention, for

our purposes, it is sufficient that nothing in the

Convention’s drafting history establishes that the

Convention is categorically inapplicable to an arbitration that implicates a single state’s sovereign activity

directed at a non-state entity and that is governed, in

part or in whole, by domestic law.

33a

Nigeria next points to part of the 1955 report that,

in Nigeria’s view, “specifically explained what the

‘differences between persons’ clause means, with respect

to governmental bodies.” Nigeria Opening Br. 24. In

particular, Nigeria notes that Belgium had “proposed

that the clause ‘should expressly provide that public

enterprises and public utilities should be deemed to be

legal persons for purposes of this article if their

activities were governed by private law.’” Nigeria

Opening Br. 24 (quoting 1955 Report ¶ 24). Nigeria

then notes that “[t]he Committee was of the opinion

that such a provision would be superfluous and that a

reference in the [1955 Report] would suffice.” Nigeria

Opening Br. 24 (quoting 1955 Report ¶ 24). In Nigeria’s

view, this “‘reference’ * * * makes clear that governmental bodies can be legal persons but only to the

extent they are operating in the private sphere[.]”

Nigeria Opening Br. 24.

But Nigeria overlooks other statements in the travaux

préparatoires that contradict its proposed reading. For

example, a 1956 report by the Secretary General about

an early draft of the Convention contained the

following statement from Austria:

Since the term ‘legal persons’ includes States,

the draft convention seems admittedly to

cover arbitral wards [sic] made in their favour

or against them in cases of disputes with

subjects of private law. Nevertheless, it would

be desirable to provide expressly that the

convention is also applicable in cases in which

corporate bodies under public law, and particularly States, in their capacity as entities

having rights and duties under private law,

have entered into an arbitration convention

for the purpose of the settlement of disputes.

34a

Report by the Secretary-General on the Recognition

and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, at Annex

I, 11, U.N. Doc. E/2822 (Jan. 31, 1956).

Viewed from Austria’s perspective, the Final Award

qualifies for enforcement. Nigeria has “entered into an

arbitration convention for the purpose of the settlement of disputes” with private, third-party beneficiaries.

Report by the Secretary-General on the Recognition

and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, at Annex

I, 11. An arbitral proceeding under that convention

resulted in an arbitral award arising from Nigeria’s

dispute with Zhongshan, a “subject[] of private law.” Id.

Austria’s commentary thus refutes Nigeria’s claim

that the New York Convention excludes arbitral

awards arising under arbitration conventions simply

because “[a] treaty is obviously a sovereign, not a

commercial, act.” Nigeria Opening Br. 32; see Nigeria

Opening Br. 32–33. And nothing in Austria’s comment

suggests that such awards fall outside of the

Convention when the breaching conduct on which they

are based is sovereign in nature.5

The same 1956 Secretary General report also

contains the following statement from the Society of

Comparative Legislation:

5

The dissenting opinion notes that Austria was not part of the

drafting committee that first drafted the New York Convention.

Infra at 17. But Austria was a member of the committee that

drafted the final version of the Convention. See Final Act and

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign

Arbitral Awards, at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/8/Rev.1 (1958).

Indeed, the dissenting opinion cites to materials from the

committee of which Austria was a member. See, e.g., infra at 17

(citing Summary Record of the Sixteenth Meeting, at 5, U.N. Doc.

E/CONF.26/SR.16 (June 3, 1958)).

35a

The following words should be added after the

words ‘persons whether physical or legal’ at

the end of paragraph 1: ‘this expression to

include States, public bodies and undertakings

(collectivités publiques), public establishments

and establishments serving the public interest,

on the condition that the said differences

arose out of a commercial contract or a private

business operation (acte de gestion privée).’

Id. at Annex II, 9; see id. at Annex II, 10. This

commentary appears to express the broad view that

the Convention encompasses arbitral awards involving

foreign states so long as those awards are based on

disputes arising out of private business operations. It

does not, on its face, require that the state itself

entered into a commercial contract. And, like the

commentary from Austria, it does not require that the

breaching conduct be non-sovereign in nature. As such,

under the Society of Comparative Legislation’s view,

the New York Convention would encompass the award

at issue here, which involved a dispute related to

Zhongshan’s private business operations.6

In short, contrary to Nigeria’s claim, the Convention’s

drafters did not “plainly” state an “intent[]” to carve

sovereign-act breaches against a private entity out of

the New York Convention’s scope and to categorically

constrict the Convention’s coverage to private acts.

Nigeria Opening Br. 25. The “[c]herry-picked generalizations from the negotiating and drafting history”

that Nigeria cites “cannot be used to create a rule that

6

Nigeria’s other drafting-history arguments—some of which

are raised for the first time only in its reply brief, see, e.g., Nigeria

Reply Br. 13–16—fail for similar reasons. Each of the passages to

which Nigeria points is subject to multiple interpretations, and

none announces a categorical private-act limitation.

36a

finds no support in the treaty’s text.” GE Energy Power

Conversion France SAS, 590 U.S. at 442 (formatting

modified). In the absence of a contrary consensus, the

New York Convention’s uncabined text controls. See

Rodriguez, 29 F.4th at 718 (“[T]he clear import of

treaty language controls unless application of the

words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning

effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its signatories.”) (quotation marks omitted).

Lastly, Nigeria’s reliance on non–New York Convention

case law does not help its cause. Nigeria marches

through a series of cases in which federal courts have

interpreted the term “persons” to exclude states acting

in their sovereign capacity. See, e.g., Nigeria Opening

Br. 21–22, 25–26 (discussing False Claims Act and

Sherman Act cases). But the meaning of the term in

domestic statutes does not provide insight into the

“shared expectations” of contracting states regarding

the meaning of a term in an international treaty. Air

France, 470 U.S. at 399. Moreover, any domestic-law

presumption against treating states as persons fades

when a state consents to a suit, like Nigeria did when

it consented to arbitration after having already joined

the New York Convention. Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.

706, 755 (1999) (State “sovereign immunity bars suits

only in the absence of consent.”).

Nigeria’s act-of-state-doctrine cases are particularly

inapposite. Under the act-of-state doctrine, “the courts

of one state will not question the validity of public acts

(acts jure imperii) performed by other sovereigns

within their own borders, even when such courts have

jurisdiction over a controversy in which one of the

litigants has standing to challenge those acts.”

Altmann, 541 U.S. at 700. Cases invoking that doctrine

are of no relevance in a suit to enforce an arbitral

37a

award under the New York Convention because the

Federal Arbitration Act specifically provides that

“[e]nforcement of arbitral agreements * * * shall not

be refused on the basis of the Act of State doctrine.” 9

U.S.C. § 15. Although the relevant provision of the Act

is not located in the chapter implementing the New

York Convention, it applies to actions brought under

the Convention unless it is “in conflict” with the

Convention as ratified. Id. § 208. No such conflict

exists. Moreover, in extending that part of the Federal

Arbitration Act to the codification of the New York

Convention, the Political Branches further evidenced

that arbitral awards against foreign states for their

sovereign acts— their acts of state—would be enforced

in United States courts, including in disputes with

private parties. See Altmann, 541 U.S. at 700; see also,

e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.

398, 439 (1964) (holding, in a dispute between a Cuban

government instrumentality and a private party, that

the act-of-state doctrine barred a challenge to a Cuban

expropriation decree); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168

U.S. 250, 253–254 (1897) (holding, in a suit by a private

citizen against a foreign state’s military officer, that

the act-of-state doctrine barred a challenge to the

state’s military operations).

In sum, this court has repeatedly enforced under the

New York Convention arbitral awards arising from

foreign states’ sovereign acts that breach obligations

owed to a third-party investor under an investment

treaty. Neither the New York Convention nor the

Federal Arbitration Act textually imposes a privateact qualification on the scope of “persons” against

whom an arbitral award can be enforced. And both the

United States government and subsequent treaties

have taken the position that the Convention imposes

no such limitation. Against those headwinds, Nigeria

38a

and the dissenting opinion offer only vague and

indeterminate passages from the Convention’s travaux

préparatoires. Those passages are insufficient to

impose a limitation not found in the New York

Convention’s plain text or this court’s history of

enforcing arbitral awards under the Convention.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Final

Award is enforceable under the New York Convention

because it arose out of differences between “persons”

that share a legal, commercial relationship. The

district court therefore has jurisdiction over this case

under the FSIA’s arbitration exception. The judgment

of the district court is affirmed.

So ordered.

39a

KATSAS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: The Convention

on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign

Arbitral Awards, commonly known as the New York

Convention, requires signatory countries to enforce

foreign arbitral awards arising out of “differences

between persons, whether physical or legal.” In its

typical applications, the New York Convention governs

awards arising from disputes between private parties.

This case presents the question whether the Convention

also governs awards arising from public-law disputes

involving the sovereign acts of governments. In my

view, the Convention’s reference to “persons” does not

extend to states acting in their sovereign capacity.

Because my colleagues conclude otherwise, I respectfully dissent.

I

A

The New York Convention is a multilateral treaty

that was adopted in 1958. It requires state parties to

recognize and enforce arbitral awards made in other

countries and “arising out of differences between

persons, whether physical or legal.” N.Y. Convention

art. I(1). Its “goal” was “to encourage the recognition

and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts.” Scherk v. AlbertoCulver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974). Parties may

limit the Convention to disputes “considered as

commercial” under their domestic law. N.Y. Convention

art. I(3). Parties also may limit the Convention to

awards made in the territory of another contracting

state. See id. In 1970, the United States acceded to the

Convention subject to both reservations. See An Act to

Implement the Convention on the Recognition and

Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Pub. L. 91368, 84 Stat. 692 (July 31, 1970).

40a

Before 1976, federal courts deferred to executivebranch determinations of foreign sovereign immunity.

See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943).

Although foreign sovereigns could raise immunity

themselves, they often would request the Department

of State to file suggestions of immunity. Restatement

(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United

States § 71(1)–(2) & cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1965) (Second

Restatement). In the absence of any such suggestion,

courts decided whether immunity applied in light of

previous executive-branch determinations. See Republic

of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34–35 (1945). Making

these determinations taxed the State Department,

and courts struggled in cases where it was not

involved. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign

Relations Law of the Unites States Part IV.5.A intro.

note (Am. L. Inst. 1987) (Third Restatement).

In 1976, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign

Immunities Act (FSIA), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.

2891, which requires courts to determine immunity

under uniform standards. Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S.

v. United States, 598 U.S. 264, 272 (2023). The FSIA

provides that “a foreign state shall be immune from

the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States,”

subject to specific exceptions. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. One of

the exceptions addresses arbitral awards. As relevant

here, it withdraws immunity in actions brought to

confirm awards made under arbitration agreements if

“the agreement or award is or may be governed by a

treaty ... in force for the United States calling for the

recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.” Id.

§ 1605(a)(6). All agree that the New York Convention

is such a treaty. So, if the Convention applies to an

arbitral award, then the FSIA abrogates sovereign

immunity in an action to recognize and enforce the award.

41a

B

This case arises out of a 2001 bilateral investment

treaty (BIT) between the Federal Republic of Nigeria

and the People’s Republic of China. Each country

promised to encourage investments in its territory

from investors of the other country. See Agreement

Between the Government of the People’s Republic of

China and the Government of the Federal Republic of

Nigeria for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of

Investments art. 2(1) (2001) (Nigeria-China BIT).

Each country also made various promises about how it

would treat such investments. As relevant here,

Nigeria promised to afford “continuous protection” to

investments of Chinese investors, id. art. 2(2); to

refrain from taking “unreasonable or discriminatory

measures” against such investments, id. art. 2(3); to

afford “fair and equitable treatment” to such

investments, id. art. 3(1); and to not “expropriate” such

investments without fair compensation, id. art. 4(1).

China made reciprocal promises.

The BIT also provided for the arbitration of two

categories of disputes. Article 8 governed disputes

between Nigeria and China over the interpretation or

application of the BIT. It required such disputes to be

settled through diplomatic channels or, if diplomacy

failed, through arbitration. Nigeria-China BIT art.

8(1)–(2). Article 9 governed investment disputes

between one of the signatories and investors of the

other. It required disputes to be settled through

negotiations or, if they failed, through domestic courts

of the allegedly offending state or through arbitration.

Id. art. 9(1)–(3). Nigeria and China agreed that any

arbitral decision would be “final and binding” and that

both countries would “commit themselves to [its]

enforcement.” Id. art. 9(6).

42a

C

Ogun State is a Nigerian state, and Zhongshan

Fucheng Industrial Investment Co. Ltd. was a Chinese

investor in Nigeria. Through various contracts, Ogun

State granted Zhongshan’s predecessor-in-interest the

right to develop and operate a large industrial park.

Zhongshan developed the park.

Ogun State and Zhongshan then had a falling out.

Ogun State claimed that Zhongshan had not validly

acquired any interest in the project. It warned two

Zhongshan executives to leave the country or else face

“forceful removal, complications, and possible prosecution.” J.A. 34 (cleaned up). It asked Nigeria to collect

the immigration papers of Zhongshan employees. And

it obtained arrest warrants against two Zhongshan

executives. Id. at 35. One executive was “arrested at

gunpoint, ... deprived initially of food and water, intimidated, physically beaten, and detained for a total of ten

days.” Id. Eventually, both executives fled the country.

Zhongshan sued Ogun State and others in Nigerian

courts. The defendants never responded, and the

courts dismissed the cases. Zhongshan also sought

arbitration with Ogun State in Singapore, but the

High Court of Ogun State enjoined it.

Zhongshan then sought arbitration with Nigeria

under the BIT. A London tribunal unanimously ruled

in Zhongshan’s favor and awarded it around $70

million plus interest. The tribunal reasoned that Ogun

State’s sovereign actions were attributable to Nigeria

under international law. J.A. 42–44. It concluded that

Zhongshan’s previous lawsuits did not preclude

arbitration, in part because they had raised contract

claims, whereas the arbitration rested solely on the

BIT. Id. at 46–49. The tribunal then determined that

43a

Nigeria’s actions—actual and imputed—violated the

BIT. Id. at 60–62. An English court recognized the

award, but Nigeria refused to pay it.

Zhongshan petitioned the district court to recognize

and enforce the award under the New York Convention.

To overcome immunity, Zhongshan invoked the arbitration exception to the FSIA. Nigeria moved to dismiss and claimed that the Convention did not govern

the award.

The district court denied the motion to dismiss. It

held that the Convention covered the award because

the BIT gave Zhongshan rights against Nigeria and

because the award was connected to Zhongshan’s

commercial investment. Zhongshan Fucheng Indus.

Inv. Co. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, No. 22-170,

2023 WL 417975, *8–9 (D.D.C. Jan. 26, 2023). Nigeria

objected that the New York Convention applied to

contract claims, but not treaty claims, against sovereigns. Rejecting that argument, the court invoked

what it called “the common practice of confirming

arbitral awards” based on “a sovereign state’s violation

of a treaty created under public international law.” Id.

at *7.

II

When interpreting treaties, “we begin with the text

of the treaty and the context in which the written

words are used.” Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 581 U.S.

271, 276 (2017) (cleaned up). We are further “guided by

principles similar to those governing statutory interpretation.” Collins v. NTSB, 351 F.3d 1246, 1251 (D.C.

Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). And “other general rules of

construction may be brought to bear on difficult or

ambiguous passages.” E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S.

530, 535 (1991) (cleaned up). Interpreting an old legal

44a

text requires us to “orient ourselves to the time of ...

adoption,” here 1958. Bostock v. Clayton County, 590

U.S. 644, 655 (2020).

Nigeria argues that the FSIA’s immunity exception

does not apply because the New York Convention does

not govern arbitral awards against sovereigns for the

alleged violation of treaties or other public international law. In the arbitration, Zhongshan alleged that

Nigeria, either directly or through Ogun State, violated the BIT by denying it protection, discriminating

against it, denying it fair and equitable treatment, and

expropriating its property without fair compensation.

The tribunal concluded that the public, treaty-violating actions taken by Ogun State were attributable to

Nigeria under international law, and Nigeria does not

contest that conclusion here. Ogun State also acted

in a commercial capacity with Zhongshan, but the

tribunal did not attribute Ogun State’s private acts to

Nigeria. Under international law, those private acts

would not be attributable to Nigeria absent either

an agency relationship or a need to prevent fraud or

injustice. See First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El

Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 622, 628–30

(1983). There is no evidence that either of these

exceptions applies here. See AG Abia v. AG Federation,

(2006) 16 NWLR part 1005, 265 (Nigeria) (state and

federal governments in Nigeria are “autonomous” and

thus “free from direction” by one another). In any

event, Zhongshan bore the burden of establishing a

basis for attributing Ogun State’s private acts to

Nigeria, see GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat’l Port Auth. of Liberia,

822 F.3d 598, 605 (D.C. Cir. 2016), and it expressly

disclaimed this point, see Zhongshan Br. at 35 n.10.

Because Ogun State’s private acts cannot be attributed to Nigeria, the award arises solely out of

45a

Nigeria’s sovereign acts governed by public international law. So the immunity question boils down to

whether the New York Convention applies to awards

based exclusively on such sovereign acts. That in turn

depends on whether the term “persons,” as used in the

New York Convention, includes governments acting in

their sovereign capacity under public law. The common

meaning of that term, the legal context in which the

Convention was written, and its drafting history all

indicate that “persons” does not cover governments

acting as sovereigns.

A

When the Convention was drafted, the word “person”

did not typically include sovereigns. It always included

natural persons, sometimes included juridical persons

such as corporations or state-created entities like

counties, and did not usually include sovereign states

themselves. Black’s Law Dictionary explained that, as

a general matter, a “county is a person in a legal sense,

but a sovereign is not.” Person, Black’s Law Dictionary

1300 (4th rev. ed. 1968) (emphasis added) (citation

omitted). Webster’s Dictionary likewise stated that

“person” generally includes “any individual or incorporated group having certain legal rights and responsibilities”—a formulation that does not encompass sovereigns. Person, Webster’s New World Dictionary 1092

(College ed. 1960) (emphasis added). And Congress

codified a similar interpretive presumption across all

federal statutes. It specified that “unless the context

indicates otherwise,” the word person “include[s] corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships,

societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.” 1 U.S.C. § 1; see Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L.

No. 80-772 § 6, 62 Stat. 683, 859. That is a long list

46a

of included entities, from which governments are

conspicuously absent.

The Supreme Court confirmed this understanding

around the time of the New York Convention. In

United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330

U.S. 258 (1947), it explained that “[i]n common usage,”

the word persons “does not include the sovereign,” so

“statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed

to do so.” Id. at 275. This linguistic usage had settled

long before the Convention was adopted, see, e.g.,

United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 603–05

(1941); United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 321 (1877),

and it has persisted ever since, see, e.g., Return Mail,

Inc. v. USPS, 587 U.S. 618, 626–27 (2019); Vermont

Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529

U.S. 765, 780–81 (2000); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989).1

That said, “there is no hard and fast rule” excluding

sovereigns from the meaning of “person.” Cooper, 312

U.S. at 604–05. But the presumption against including

sovereigns “may be disregarded only upon some affirmative showing of ... intent to the contrary.” Stevens,

529 U.S. at 781; see Cooper, 312 U.S. at 606. Standing

alone, the word “person” in a legal text “applies to

natural persons, and also to artificial persons,” but it

“cannot be so extended as to include within its

meaning” a sovereign without “an express definition to

that effect.” Fox, 94 U.S. at 321.

The presumption against including sovereigns is

strongest for official acts. When sovereigns act in their

1

British usage was similar. A prominent legal dictionary

explained that in the legal context, “person” presumptively included

corporations but excluded the Crown and other official offices.

Person, Stroud’s Legal Dictionary 1463–65 (2d ed. 1903).

47a

private capacity, context is more likely to indicate that

they are included in the word “person.” See Georgia v.

Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 161–62 (1942); see also California

v. United States, 320 U.S. 577, 585–86 (1944). But for

public acts, the presumption against including sovereigns

is stronger—especially when the statute at issue

imposes burdens as opposed to benefits. Parker v.

Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351–52 (1943); see also Wilson v.

Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 667 (1979); United

States v. Knight, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 301, 315 (1840). So,

courts sometimes construe words like “person” to cover

sovereigns acting in a proprietary capacity but not in

a sovereign capacity. For example, the Supreme Court

has held that states are “persons” under the Sherman

Act when buying goods, Evans, 316 U.S. at 161–62, or

when conducting “private anticompetitive behavior”

and thus not “acting as sovereign,” Goldfarb v. Va.

State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790–92 (1975). In contrast,

states are not “persons” under the Sherman Act when

acting as regulators, Parker, 317 U.S. at 351–52, or

otherwise “wielding the State’s power,” Bates v. State

Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977). Likewise, construing the

Robinson-Patman Act, the Court has held that states

are “persons” when “competing against private enterprise,” but has reserved whether they are “persons”

when performing public acts. Jefferson Cnty. Pharm.

Ass’n v. Abbott Lab’ys, 460 U.S. 150, 153–154 (1983);

see also Will, 491 U.S. at 64 n.5.

My colleagues brush aside this “series of cases” as

involving only “domestic statutes” rather than treaties.

Ante at 35–36. But in interpreting treaties, “general

rules of construction may be brought to bear on

difficult or ambiguous passages.” Volkswagenwerk

Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988).

And here, ordinary English usage is particularly

relevant because the Convention was drafted in

48a

English and finalized in New York City. Despite

invoking the assertedly “plain text” of the Convention,

ante at 20, my colleagues offer no affirmative textual

argument that it uses “persons” in an unusual way to

include governments acting as sovereigns. So while

legal and historical context may show that the Convention

covers foreign states acting in a private capacity—a

point addressed below—text strongly indicates that it

does not cover foreign states acting as sovereigns.

B

The legal context in which the Convention was

adopted, including background international-law

understandings of sovereign immunity and espousal,

make it especially implausible that the Convention’s

use of “persons” sweeps in foreign states acting in their

sovereign capacity.

1

In 1958, countries disagreed about how broadly to

grant immunity to foreign sovereigns. The traditional

theory was that one sovereign should be immune from

the domestic courts of another for all of its acts—public

and private. See The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S.

(7 Cranch) 116, 136–37 (1812). The United States took

this position, extending “virtually absolute immunity

to foreign sovereigns,” for more than a century and a

half. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.

480, 486 (1983). But a few countries—including Belgium

and Italy—had already rejected it. They believed that

a sovereign should be treated as a private party when

it acts as a private party, such as when it engages in

commercial transactions. Letter from Jack B. Tate,

Acting Legal Adviser of the U.S. Dep’t of State, to

Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19,

1952) (Tate Letter), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of

49a

London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 713

(1976); Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S.

607, 614–15 (1992). Yet they still granted immunity for

governmental acts—those only a sovereign may undertake, such as operating military or police forces. See

Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 360–62 (1993);

Tate Letter, 425 U.S. at 711. This view is known as

the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. See

Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487.

Throughout the 1900s, as sovereigns increasingly

became involved in international commerce, more

countries adopted the restrictive theory. See Tate

Letter, 425 U.S. at 711–14. In 1952, the Acting Legal

Adviser of the State Department embraced it. See id.

at 714–15. Even so, the United States continued in

some cases to recognize immunity for the private acts

of foreign sovereigns. See Third Restatement, supra,

Part IV.5.A intro. note & n.11 (collecting cases). As late

as 1965, this immunity question remained unsettled

in U.S. courts. See Second Restatement, supra, § 69 n.1.

And Congress did not adopt the restrictive theory until

1976, nearly two decades after the New York Convention.

See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.

Other countries lagged farther behind. Many still

recognized absolute immunity during the 1950s—

including Poland and the Soviet Union, original signatories of the Convention. See Tate Letter, 425 U.S. at

712, 714. Only decades later did the Council of Europe

and the International Law Commission officially embrace

the restrictive theory, in 1972 and 1986 respectively.

See Third Restatement, supra, Part IV.5.A. intro. note.

In sum, when the Convention was drafted, there was

an ongoing worldwide debate about whether countries

should always be immune from the domestic courts of

other countries or whether they should be immune

50a

only for their sovereign acts. Nobody suggested that

states should have no immunity. And some countries

that still embraced the traditional, absolute theory of

immunity also signed the Convention. In this legal and

historical context, with no clear text or contemporaneous mention of fundamentally altering the scope of

foreign sovereign immunity, mere use of the word

“persons” cannot be deemed to reach the governmental

acts of foreign sovereigns. Just as Congress does not

hide elephants in mouseholes, Whitman v. Am. Trucking

Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001), neither do treaty

negotiators. And if the Convention did have the

revolutionary effect that Zhongshan claims, then

surely someone, from among the many nations and

individuals negotiating the treaty, would have at least

mentioned it. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS,

484 U.S. 9, 17–18 (1987).

2

Background principles of espousal, like background

principles of immunity, are also instructive. Zhongshan

posits that the Convention permits enforcement of

claims against one sovereign by private parties who

are nationals of another. But the “traditional view of

international law is that it establishes substantive

principles for determining whether one country has

wronged another.” Federal Republic of Germany v.

Philipp, 592 U.S. 169, 176–77 (2021) (quoting Banco

Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 422

(1964)). Thus, if one sovereign violated public international law and thereby harmed a national of another,

it committed a legal wrong against the second sovereign.

See id. The aggrieved private party could have asked

its home country to espouse a claim against the

offending sovereign, but it could not have pursued any

international claim itself. Second Restatement, supra,

51a

§ 174 cmt. b; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary

International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of

the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815, 831–32

& n.106 (1997), quoted in Philipp, 592 U.S. at 176–78.

The only exceptions to this general rule—allowing

private individuals to raise international claims

against offending sovereigns— involved rare instances

where the sovereign itself had agreed to engage directly

with the aggrieved individual. See Second Restatement,

supra, § 175. Moreover, these rare instances mostly

involved early treaties in the discrete area that we now

call international humanitarian law. See Philipp, 592

U.S. at 177–78; Second Restatement, supra, § 175 cmt.

b; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra, at 831–32 & n.109.

They did not involve disputes under BITs or multilateral investment treaties, which did not become

common until the 1970s. See Azubuike, The Place of

Treaties in International Investment, 19 Ann. Surv. of

Int’l & Compar. L. 155, 161–62 (2013).

Again, Zhongshan’s position would hide elephants in

mouseholes. By the time of the New York Convention

in 1958, there was already support for domestic courts

to resolve disputes between private parties and foreign

sovereigns under private law. But for disputes between

private parties and foreign sovereigns under public

law, applying the Convention would have not only

eliminated bedrock immunity protections but also

undercut espousal requirements, in broad fields where

both would otherwise be required. Again, it is highly

unlikely that treaty drafters would have effected such

sweeping changes through an unadorned reference to

“persons,” in a Convention focused mainly on private

commercial trade. And it is highly unlikely, if such

sweeping changes were under consideration, that none

of the negotiating countries, interested parties, or

commenters would have even noted the issue.

52a

3

My colleagues object to this analysis based on what

they view as two separate acts of consent by Nigeria—

signing a BIT requiring certain disputes to be arbitrated

and signing the New York Convention calling for

certain arbitral awards to be enforced. Ante at 22–24.

As for the Convention, Zhongshan’s interpretation

requires contracting parties to enforce awards against

other sovereigns that have not signed the Convention.

For covered commercial disputes between covered

persons, all that matters is that the award was made

outside the territory of the signatory country where

enforcement is sought and inside the territory of

another signatory country. N.Y. Convention art. 1(1),

(3). Because the award here was made in the United

Kingdom, which has acceded to the Convention, the

fact that Nigeria also has acceded to the Convention

makes no difference to the analysis whether the

Convention covers Zhongshan’s award. My colleagues

stress that Nigeria has signed the Convention, ante at

22–23, but its construction of the treaty would apply

regardless. Moreover, even as to signatory countries,

Zhongshan construes the Convention to override what

would otherwise have been bedrock principles of

immunity and espousal in 1958. My colleagues explain

that sovereigns may waive these basic protections.

Ante at 22–24; see also id. at 36 (any presumption

“against treating states as persons fades when a state

consents to a suit”). True enough, but they still have

no persuasive account of why the Convention’s mere

reference to “persons” should be understood to have

such a dramatic yet unnoticed consequence, despite

the strong interpretive presumption against reading

that general term to restrict the public acts of governments.

53a

As for the BIT, my colleagues stress that Article 9

reflects Nigeria’s consent to arbitrate directly with

Chinese investors. Ante at 22–24. Again true enough,

but an agreement to arbitrate is a far cry from consent

to enforcement in the domestic courts of a co-equal

sovereign. The same is true for a general commitment

“to the enforcement of the award,” Nigeria-China BIT

art. 9(6), which most naturally means enforcement

through diplomatic processes or international tribunals.

See Third Restatement, supra, § 906 & cmt. b.

* * * *

In sum, the relevant historical and legal background

cuts strongly against Zhongshan’s expansive interpretation of the Convention.

C

Because treaties are agreements, courts may consider “negotiation and drafting history” to determine

“the shared understanding” of the parties. GE Energy

Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu

Stainless USA, LLC, 590 U.S. 432, 441 (2020) (cleaned

up). And while text is of course the best evidence of

that understanding, courts should strive to avoid conflict with the “intent or expectations of its signatories.”

Rodriguez v. Pan Am. Health Org., 29 F.4th 706, 717–

18 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). Here, drafting history

confirms what text and context strongly suggest—that

the Convention does not extend to disputes arising

from sovereign acts governed by public law.

Consider the report of the committee charged with

drafting the Convention. It included representatives

from nine different countries, ranging from Belgium to

the Soviet Union and including five of the original

24 signatories. See Report of the Committee on the

Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, at 2,

54a

U.N. Doc. E/AC.42/4 (Mar. 21, 1955) (Drafting Committee

Report). The Drafting Committee decided to change

the name of the Convention from one about enforcing

“International” arbitral awards to one about enforcing

“Foreign” awards, out of concern that “International”

might suggest coverage of state-state arbitrations. See

id. at 5. As the Committee explained, the Convention

“does not deal with arbitration between States, but

deals with recognition and enforcement in one country

of arbitral awards made in another country.” Id. My

colleagues read this statement as possibly meaning

that the Convention does not deal exclusively with

arbitration between States, but also deals with the

recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards,

see ante at 30–31, but that reading is surely strained.

And if the Convention “does not deal with arbitration

between States,” then Zhongshan’s position must be

wrong: There is no colorable basis, in linguistic usage

or background legal context, to make one party’s

personhood under the Convention turn on the identity

of the other party. If “persons” extends to governments

acting in their sovereign capacity in disputes with

private parties, then it also extends to governments

acting in their sovereign capacity in disputes with

other governments. My colleagues formally reserve the

question whether their interpretation would sweep in

state-state disputes under public international law.

See id. at 31–32. Yet that is the clear implication of

their position, and it is inconsistent with this drafting

history.2

2

To distinguish state-state disputes, my colleagues characterize the investor-state dispute here as one governed “in material

part by domestic law.” Ante at 31–32. But the claims here arise

under the BIT, an international agreement governed by public

international law. See Third Restatement, supra, § 487 cmt. f. To

55a

The report of the Drafting Committee supports

Nigeria in another important respect. The Belgian

representative on the Committee proposed that the

Convention “should expressly provide that public

enterprises and public utilities should be deemed to be

legal persons ... if their activities were governed by

private law.” Drafting Committee Report, supra, at 7

(emphasis added). But even the representative from

Belgium, which had already adopted the restrictive

theory of sovereign immunity, did not seek to extend

the Convention to disputes governed by public law.

Nor did the Drafting Committee itself. It rejected

Belgium’s proposal as “superfluous” but decided that a

“reference in [its] report would suffice” to note its

agreement with Belgium. See id.

Other parts of the drafting history reinforce these

points. In supporting a different change to the Convention’s title, Switzerland pressed its view that the

Convention covers “international awards in private

law,” but not “international awards in public law.” See

U.N. Secretary-General, Recognition and Enforcement

of Foreign Arbitral Awards, at annex I, 8–9, U.N. Doc.

E/2822 (Jan. 31, 1956) (Secretary-General Report). A

representative of Italy—another early adopter of the

be sure, the BIT itself recognizes that domestic law as well as

international law will be relevant to any investor-state dispute.

Art. 9(7). But questions of public international law frequently

turn in part on domestic public law; for instance, the question

whether a government’s treatment of aliens violates international law often turns on how the government treats similarly

situated citizens. See, e.g., id. arts. 2(3), 3(2); Phillip, 592 U.S. at

176–77. So the fact that domestic law sets the backdrop for the

international claims at issue here is hardly unusual. Nor would

it distinguish a state-state arbitration under Article 8 of the BIT

if China had chosen to espouse the claims that Zhongshan raised

here under Article 9.

56a

restrictive theory of immunity—expressed concern that

the reference to “disputes between legal persons” could

be misconstrued to encompass “a dispute between

States.” U.N. Conf. on Int’l Com. Arb., Summary Record

of the Sixteenth Meeting, at 5, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.26/

SR.16 (June 3, 1958) (cleaned up). But the President of

the Conference at which the Convention was finalized

responded that the Drafting Committee “had had no

such intention when it had prepared the draft

Convention.” Id. Finally, a representative of the United

States stressed the importance of the Convention to the

efficient settlement of “private disputes arising out

of international trade,” suggesting no extension to

disputes under public international law. U.N. Conf.

on Int’l Com. Arb., Summary Record of the Second

Meeting, at 8, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.2 (May 21, 1958).

Against all of this, including a written report of the

Drafting Committee itself, my colleagues highlight a

two-sentence comment by Austria, which neither

participated on the Committee nor was an original

signatory of the Convention, and comments by one

private party. Ante at 33–35. Neither of these comments

produced any response from either the Drafting Committee or any of the contracting parties. In the Convention’s overall drafting history, these comments do

not count for much. But even on their own terms, the

comments help Nigeria more than Zhongshan.

Start with Austria. First, it asserted that the

Convention covers awards for or against states made

“in cases of disputes with subjects of private law.”

Secretary-General Report, at annex I, 11. The garbled

reference to “disputes with subjects of private law”

most likely meant private-law disputes, which would

simply reiterate that the Convention covers awards

against sovereigns arising from their private acts. And

57a

even if “disputes with subjects of private law” meant

government disputes with private parties, as my

colleagues suggest, that still would not clearly pick up

investment disputes between governments and private

parties arising from sovereign acts governed by public

law—a legal category that would have been unrecognizable in 1958. Moreover, Austria’s second sentence

confirms that it meant no such thing: “Nevertheless, it

would be desirable to provide expressly that the convention is also applicable in cases in which corporate

bodies under public law, and particularly states, in

their capacity as entities having rights and duties

under private law, have entered into an arbitration

convention for the purpose of the settlement of disputes.” Id. (emphasis added). Taken as a whole,

Austria’s comments do not suggest that the Convention

reaches sovereign acts regulated by public law. And in

any event, we should not “dissect” one garbled phrase

from Austria’s comment as if it were treaty text. See

Saint Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993).

Comments by the Society of Comparative Legislation

are also helpful to Nigeria. The Society proposed an

amendment to provide that governments are covered

persons “on the condition” that the dispute “arose out

of a commercial contract or a private business operation.” Society-General Report, at Annex II, 9. That is

consistent with the Convention covering sovereigns

acting in a private but not governmental capacity.

Moreover, the Society further proposed changing the

title of the Convention to cover international disputes

“in private law,” to make even clearer that it does not

cover “arbitration in public international law.” Id. at 4.

Far from ambiguous or messy, the drafting history

reveals a consensus that the word “persons” includes

governments acting as private parties under private

58a

law but does not include governments acting as

sovereigns under public law.

D

My colleagues offer five further arguments based on

post-ratification evidence, but none moves the needle.

First, my colleagues characterize Nigeria’s interpretation of the Convention as novel and unsupported.

Ante at 21. But many commentators have supported

it. See, e.g., Third Restatement, supra, § 487 cmt. f

(“Ordinarily, arbitration of a controversy of a public

international law character, such as ... a dispute about

the interpretation of or performance under an international agreement ... , is not subject to the New York

Convention ....”); ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation of

the 1958 New York Convention: A Handbook for Judges

85 (Int’l Council for Comm. Arbitration 2011) (“The

expression ‘persons, whether physical or legal’ in

Article I(1) of the Convention is generally deemed to

include public law entities entering into commercial

contracts with private parties. Courts ... frequently

invoke the distinction between acta de jure gestionis

[private acts] and acta de jure imperii [public acts] ....”);

M. Sornarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment

Disputes 309–10 (2000) (“The New York Convention

was not designed for enforcement of arbitral awards

against state parties.... [T]he fact that [a] dispute

was caused by a sovereign act, usually an act of

nationalization[,] makes enforcement under the

Convention highly unlikely.”).

In any event, it is no surprise that the question

presented has not produced litigated decisions. For

many investment disputes between host countries and

foreign investors, the New York Convention applies

because the host and the investor have a commercial

59a

relationship, and the dispute involves breaches of

the governing contracts or other private-law disputes.

See, e.g., Diag Human v. Czech Republic—Ministry of

Health, 824 F.3d 131, 132–34 (D.C. Cir. 2016); TermRio

S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 929–31

(D.C. Cir. 2007); Creighton Ltd. v. Government of the

State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

Moreover, most investment disputes between host

countries and foreign investors are resolved under the

Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes

between States and Nationals of Other States, opened

for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1291 (entered

into force Oct. 14, 1966) (ICSID Convention), a multilateral treaty that became effective eight years after

the New York Convention. The ICSID Convention

established procedures for arbitrating such disputes,

id. art. 25, and it truncated enforcement issues by

granting awards the status of domestic judgments, id.

arts. 53–54. Over 160 nations have signed the ICSID

Convention. Many foreign investors insist on both

ICSID dispute-resolution processes and underlying

treaty protection against sovereign acts such as discrimination, denial of protection or fair treatment, and

uncompensated expropriation. So, because the ICSID

Convention requires only that signatory states agree

in writing to submit investment disputes to ICSID, id.

art. 25(1), ICSID arbitrations typically cover claims by

an aggrieved investor that a foreign state has breached

treaty obligations through sovereign acts. See, e.g., The

Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID No.

ARB(AF)/98/3, Award at 9–10 (June 26, 2003) (claims

under Chapter 11 of North American Free Trade

Agreement). In this case, arbitration through ICSID

was unavailable because, although Article 9 of the

Nigeria-China BIT envisioned ICSID involvement in

making any “necessary appointments” to an “ad hoc

60a

arbitral tribunal,” art. 9(4)–(5), Nigeria did not give the

necessary consent to submit disputes under the BIT

to ICSID. In short, the usual availability of ICSID

arbitration for disputes like this one—not the novelty

of Nigeria’s reading on the New York Convention—

explains why there is scant caselaw on whether

the older, private-focused treaty applies to disputes

arising from sovereign acts governed by public law.

Second, my colleagues invoke precedent that they

say “corroborates” the conclusion that the New York

Convention “fully appli[es] to arbitral awards arising

from sovereign acts.” Ante at 24–25; see also id. at 19

(Convention cases “involving foreign states charged

with breaching investment and commercial treaty

obligations”). None of these cases addresses either

the scope of the FSIA’s arbitration exception or the

underlying question whether the Convention applies

to awards arising from sovereign acts that violate

treaties. And if “a potential jurisdictional defect is

neither noted nor discussed in a federal decision, the

decision does not stand for the proposition that no

defect existed.” Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v.

Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 144 (2011). Accordingly, the cited

cases are not “persuasive, much less binding” on the

overlooked issue whether the Convention applies to

disputes arising from sovereign acts governed by

public international law. Schindler Elevator Corp. v.

WMATA, 16 F.4th 294, 299 (D.C. Cir. 2021); see also

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91

(1998) (“We have often said that drive-by jurisdictional

rulings ... have no precedential effect.”).

For example, consider Tatneft v. Ukraine, 21 F.4th

829 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (Tatneft II), the case that my

colleagues discuss most fully. True, it involved public

acts that allegedly breached treaty obligations. See id.

61a

at 832–33. But our decision addressed only merits

defenses under the Convention: whether the dispute

fell outside the governing BIT, whether the district

court impermissibly modified the award, whether

enforcement would violate United States public policy,

and whether the arbitral tribunal was improperly

composed. See id. at 835–40. An earlier decision in

the case, Tatneft v. Ukraine, 771 Fed. App’x 9 (D.C.

Cir. 2019) (Tatneft I), did address jurisdiction and

immunity issues under the FSIA. But Tatneft I is an

unpublished ruling that does not bind this panel. See

In re Grant, 635 F.3d 1227, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2011). And

in any event, Tatneft I did not address whether the

New York Convention applies to disputes arising

from sovereign acts, thus triggering application of the

FSIA’s arbitration exception. Instead, Tatneft I held

only that the FSIA’s waiver exception applied because

the allegedly breaching sovereign in that case had

signed the New York Convention. 771 Fed. App’x at 10.

So, even if Tatneft I had been a published opinion, it

still would not bind us here.3

Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, 795 F.3d 200 (D.C. Cir.

2015), is similarly inapposite. There, the arbitral

award was based on the failure of Ecuadorean courts

to resolve pending contract claims. Id. at 202–03. But

3

The FSIA waiver ruling in Tatneft I is especially shaky. In

Process & Industrial Developments Ltd. v. Federal Republic of

Nigeria, 962 F.3d 576 (D.C. Cir. 2020), we specifically noted that

because Tatneft I “was an unpublished decision,” its waiver

holding “does not bind future panels.” Id. at 583–84. Later in the

same case, we expressly declined to apply Tatneft I after the

Executive Branch expressed “significant policy concerns” with the

view that merely signing the New York Convention, and agreeing

to arbitrate in a signatory country, amounts to a waiver of

sovereign immunity. Process & Indus. Devs. Ltd. v. Federal

Republic of Nigeria, 27 F.4th 771, 775 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2022).

62a

our decision did not address whether the New York

Convention covers awards governed by public law; we

explained that Ecuador had agreed to arbitrate the

dispute and rejected its various merits defenses to

enforcement. See id. at 203–09.

Or consider BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina,

572 U.S. 25 (2013), the Supreme Court decision cited

by my colleagues. That case too involved public acts

that allegedly breached treaty obligations. Id. at 29–

31. But it addressed only the question whether an

arbitrator had permissibly construed a “local litigation

requirement” in the governing BIT. Id. at 30– 32. The

Court did not address whether the New York Convention

applies to public acts that allegedly violate treaties.

Nor could that question have even arisen: The arbitration in BG Group took place in the United States,

which triggered a prong of the FSIA’s arbitration

exception different from the one at issue here. See 28

U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (arbitration exception applies to

actions to confirm arbitral awards if “(A) the arbitration takes place ... in the United States, [or] (B) the

agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty

or other international agreement in force for the

United States calling for the recognition and enforcement

of arbitral awards”).

One final point about our caselaw. Zhongshan

heavily relies on Belize Social Development, Ltd. v.

Government of Belize, 794 F.3d 99 (D.C. Cir. 2015),

which construed the commercial reservation in the

New York Convention to preserve coverage for

“matters which have a connection to commerce.” Id. at

105. We also declined to construe the reservation as

limiting the Convention to disputes arising from acts

that would qualify as commercial for immunity

purposes. See id. at 104–05. Those rulings at least

63a

suggest that the defendant sovereign qualified as a

“person[]” under the Convention, though we did not

directly address the issue. But the case involved only

contract claims: Belize sold real property to a private

company to develop a telecommunications facility and

promised to give the company tax and regulatory

relief. See id. at 100. The case thus straddles the

boundary of public and private international law, with

duties grounded in private contract law but involving

public acts. Perhaps private law should govern

sovereigns in these circumstances, subject to whatever

limits public law may impose on their ability to

contract away governmental prerogatives. Cf. United

States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (breach-ofcontract liability for sovereign acts). Regardless, this

case is different: Nigeria engaged in no private conduct

with and had no private-law obligations to Zhongshan,

which brought a treaty claim based solely on Nigeria’s

sovereign acts, actual or imputed, for breaching its

duties under public international law. That falls

squarely on the public side of the line, today as well as

in the late 1950s.

Third, the majority points to a footnote in an amicus

brief that the government filed some 44 years ago. Ante

at 25–26. The brief opined that the New York

Convention does not prevent enforcement of an arbitral

award based on contract claims arising from an

expropriation. Brief for the United States as Amicus at

20 n.16, Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People’s Libyan

Arab Jamahiriya, Nos. 80-1207, 80-1252 (D.C. Cir.

June 16, 1980) (LIAMCO). LIAMCO is thus similar to

Belize, with a private-law claim predicated on a public

act. So it seems to me unclear what position the United

States might take here, where the claim cannot be

grounded in any contract governed by private law. In

any event, the government filed its amicus brief

64a

22 years after the Convention. And post-ratification

conduct “decades after the finalization of the New York

Convention’s text in 1958” is at best weak “evidence of

the original shared understanding of the treaty’s

meaning.” See GE Energy, 590 U.S. at 443.

Fourth, my colleagues point to the Energy Charter

Treaty (ECT), opened for signature Dec. 17, 1994, 2080

U.N.T.S. 95, which they say “treated the New York

Convention” as covering awards “arising from sovereign

acts.” Ante at 27–28. But the ECT did not amend the

Convention. Instead, it decreed that certain claims

governed by the ECT “shall be considered to arise out

of a commercial relationship” for purposes of the

Convention, art. 26(5)(b), thus prohibiting ECT signatories from applying the commercial reservation to

covered claims. At most, this provision obligates ECT

signatories to enforce ECT arbitral awards as if they

arose under the New York Convention, which says

nothing for non-ECT signatories such as the United

States. Moreover, the ECT was not opened for signature

until some 36 years after the Convention was adopted.

So this post-ratification conduct is of little value “as

evidence of the original shared understanding of the

treaty’s meaning.” See GE Energy, 590 U.S. at 443.

Finally, my colleagues claim support from Congress’s

command that “[e]nforcement of arbitral agreements

... shall not be refused on the basis of the Act of State

doctrine.” Ante at 36–37; see 9 U.S.C. § 15. But the Act

of State doctrine affords a substantive rule of decision—

United States courts may not “declare invalid the

official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its

own territory.” W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Env’t Tectonics

Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990). It can apply in

litigation between private parties no less than in

litigation between private parties and the foreign

65a

sovereigns themselves. See id. at 405–06. So, barring

its application does not signal a congressional desire

to extend the New York Convention to disputes in

which the foreign sovereign itself is charged with

violating public international law. In any event,

Congress did not enact the provision until 1988. Again,

the views of a non-signatory party three “decades after

the finalization of the New York Convention’s text in

1958,” are of little interpretive significance. See GE

Energy, 590 U.S. at 443.

III

Text, legal context, and drafting history all indicate

that the word “persons,” as used in the New York

Convention, does not include signatory nations acting

as sovereigns. I respectfully dissent.

66a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

————

Civil Action No. 22-170 (BAH)

————

ZHONGSHAN FUCHENG INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT CO., LTD.,

Petitioner,

v.

FEDERAL REPULIC OF NIGERIA,

Respondent.

————

Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell

————

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner Zhongshan Fucheng Industrial Investment

Co., Ltd. (“Zhongshan”) instituted this suit against

Respondent, the Federal Republic of Nigeria (“Nigeria”),

to enforce an arbitration award that—nearly two years

after issuance—Nigeria has failed to pay. Nigeria now

moves to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)–(2), on the

grounds of sovereign immunity not exempted under

the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28

U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. See Resp’t’s Mot. Dismiss for Lack

of Jurisdiction Under the FSIA (“Resp’t’s Mot.”), ECF

No. 24. Petitioner counters that the requirements of

the FSIA’s arbitration exception are met, and jurisdiction may therefore be exercised. See Pet’r’s Mem.

67a

Opp’n Resp’t’s Mot. Dismiss (“Pet’r’s Opp’n”), ECF No.

26. For the reasons explained below, petitioner has the

better of the arguments under the binding precedent

of the D.C. Circuit, requiring denial of Nigeria’s motion

to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Nigeria’s Seizure of Zhongshan’s Assets

The present dispute emerges from a Chinese business

investment in Nigeria—once successful enough to

have garnered coverage by the Economist Intelligence

Unit as an example of “China’s economic model in

Africa”—that ended in the expropriation of the company’s

assets, the flight of its executives from Nigeria after

one executive was arrested at gunpoint and physically

beaten by the police, and, ultimately, a $55-millionplus arbitration award against Nigeria.1 The locus

of the saga is a free-trade zone, called the Ogun

Guangdong Free Trade Zone, in Nigeria’s southwestern

region in Ogun State, not far from Lagos.

As set forth in the arbitral tribunal’s findings of facts

in its Final Award, ECF No. 2-1, starting in 2007, Ogun

State contracted with various Chinese companies,

including petitioner, to develop the subject free-trade

zone. Specifically, Ogun State entered an agreement

with Guangdong Xinguang International China-Africa

Investment Ltd. (“CAI”) and CCNC Group, Ltd., pur1

The Economist Intelligence Unit’s profile of the Ogun

Guangdong Free Trade Zone was referenced by the arbitral

tribunal in its final award decision. See Decl. of Hussein Haeri

Supp. Pet. Recognize & Enforce Foreign Arbitral Award (“Haeri

Decl. Supp. Pet.”), Ex. A, Final Arbitration Award dated March 26,

2021 (“Final Award”) ¶ 127, ECF No. 2-1; Economist Intelligence

Unit, Zones of Influence (last accessed January 21, 2023), https://

growthcrossings.economist.com/video/zones-of-influence/.

68a

suant to which the three entities would jointly own the

Ogun Guangdong Free Trade Zone Company (“OGFTZ”)

for a period of 99 years, and CAI would lead the

development of the Zone, encompassing nearly 8

square miles of land. See Decl. of Hussein Haeri Supp.

Pet. Recognize & Enforce Foreign Arbitral Award

(“Haeri Decl. Supp. Pet.”), Ex. A, Final Arbitration

Award dated March 26, 2021 (“Final Award”) ¶¶ 4–5,

ECF No. 2-1. After three years of limited progress, on

June 29, 2010, OGFTZ entered an agreement with

petitioner’s parent company, Zhuhai Zhongfu Industrial

Group Co. Ltd. (“Zhuhai”), giving Zhuhai control of

developing and operating a fraction of the Zone’s area

into Fucheng Industrial Park. Id. ¶¶ 6–8. That year,

Zhuhai effectively transferred its rights to petitioner,

which operated in Nigeria through its wholly-owned

Nigerian subsidiary Zhongfu International Investment

(NIG) FZE (“Zhongfu”). Id. ¶¶ 3, 9.2

From 2010 until the breakdown of the relationship

in 2016, Zhongfu invested substantial assets into

developing Fucheng Industrial Park. For example, to

attract industrial lessees to the Park, Zhongfu built

roads, upgraded communications, sewage, and power

systems, and opened community services including a

hospital, hotel, supermarket, and bank. Id. ¶¶ 21–22.

By early 2014, the Park had attracted approximately

sixteen businesses. Id. ¶ 23. During this period,

CAI’s management of the overall Zone had apparently

broken down, resulting in Ogun State’s termination of

2

The tribunal noted in its Final Award that, although Zhongfu

had apparently assumed Zhuhai’s interests in the Zone by 2010—

as reflected in an October 10, 2010-dated deed entitling Zhuhai

to delegate its rights and obligations to third parties—the assignment of interests between Zhuhai and Zhongfu was formalized in

a January 15, 2013 document. Final Award ¶ 16, ECF No. 2-1.

69a

the company’s participation in the OGFTZ in 2012 and

appointment of Zhongfu to take its place as part owner

of the OGFTZ in 2013. Id. ¶¶ 13–20.

Zhongfu’s woes began in April 2016, when the

Secretary of Ogun State indicated in a letter to

OGFTZ—apparently on the advice of the Chinese

Consulate in Lagos—that CAI had been acquired by

Guangdong New South Group (“NSG”), and that this

transfer may have somehow entitled NSG, rather than

Zhongfu, to ownership of the Zone. Id. ¶¶ 33–34. Ogun

State had received a note verbale, a diplomatic note,

from the Economic and Commercial Section of the

Chinese consulate in Lagos, dated March 11, 2016,

which stated that the acquisition of CAI “will legally

lead to the replacement of the management rights of

the OGFTZ which is now in the hands of [Zhongfu] to

Guangdong New South Group.” Id. ¶ 33.3 In May 2016,

3

This detail of the Chinese government’s involvement in—if

not outright instigation of—Ogun State’s ejection of Zhongfu from

the Zone did not detain the arbitral tribunal for long, and Nigeria

apparently did not call, or even “suggest[],” that any agents of the

Chinese government could be identified to provide evidence of the

underlying reasons for replacement of petitioner with NSG as

manager of the Zone. Final Award ¶¶ 93–94. The tribunal’s

admitted lack of clarity on this element of the underlying facts is

unsettling in light of the whisper in the Final Award’s pages that

Zhongfu’s administration of the Zone might have fallen short of

expectations. See, e.g., id. ¶ 29 (noting a May 18, 2015-dated letter

from the Secretary of Ogun State complaining about Zhongfu’s

performance); id. ¶¶ 115–120 (noting that the parent companies

of CAI and Zhongfu signed an “entrustment of equity management

agreement” in March 2012, in which CAI’s share of the Zone

would be “entrusted” to Zhongfu—a detail that the arbitral

tribunal apparently found perplexing and about which it “had an

initial degree of concern about the accuracy” of Zhongfu’s

witness’s testimony, but that it ultimately found irrelevant). The

factual findings by the arbitral tribunal, however, are not

reviewable by this Court, nor are they presently challenged by

70a

according to petitioner, Ogun State purported to

terminate its 2013 agreement that appointed Zhongfu

as part owner of the Zone, and reneged on the 2010

agreement that had given Zhongfu and Zhongshan

management rights of the Fucheng Industrial Park.

Pet’r’s Pet. to Recognize & Enforce Foreign Arbitral

Award (“Pet.”) ¶¶ 18–19, ECF No. 1. In July 2016,

Ogun State’s Secretary texted Zhongshan’s managing

director Jianxin Han, urging him to “leave peacefully

when there is opportunity to do so,” and the following

month, warrants were issued for the arrest of Han and

Wenxiao Zhao, who had served as the Chief Financial

Officer of the OGFTZ. Final Award ¶¶ 37, 39. Zhao

was arrested at gunpoint, physically beaten, and

detained for ten days by police before he and Han could

flee the country—unceremoniously closing the book on

Zhongshan’s management of the OGFTZ and Fucheng

Industrial Park. Id. ¶¶ 39–40.

B. Subsequent Arbitration Proceedings

Petitioner commenced an arbitration proceeding

against Nigeria on August 30, 2018 pursuant to a bilateral

treaty between Nigeria and China. Pet. ¶ 22–23.4 The

Nigeria. See Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of

Venezuela, 244 F. Supp. 3d 100, 110 (D.D.C. 2017) (describing

courts’ deferential standard in reviewing foreign arbitral awards

as “allowing vacatur of an award not if ‘the panel committed an

error—or even a serious error’ but ‘only when [an] arbitrator

strays from interpretation and application of the agreement and

effectively dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice’”

(quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S.

662, 671–72 (2010))).

4

Petitioner, via Zhongfu, initially sought relief through the

Nigerian courts, initiating one lawsuit in the Federal High Court

in Abuja, Nigeria, against Nigeria’s Export Processing Zones

Authority (“NEPZA”), the Attorney-General of Ogun State, and

another company that was a partner of the OGFTZ, see Final

71a

bilateral investment treaty, called the Agreement

Between the Government of the People’s Republic of

China and the Government of the Federal Republic of

Nigeria for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of

Investments (“China-Nigeria BIT”), represents an

agreement between the countries to promote bilateral

investment by guaranteeing that the other country’s

investors would be treated equally and protected from

the nationalization of their investments. See generally

Haeri Decl. Supp. Pet., Ex. B, China-Nigeria BIT, ECF

No. 2-2. Article 9 of the China-Nigeria BIT provides

that, when any dispute arises between one of the

countries and an investor from the other country—

e.g., a dispute between Nigeria and a Chinese

investor—that cannot be resolved by the parties,

either party may request that an ad hoc arbitral

tribunal settle the dispute with a binding decision. See

id. at Art. 9.

Petitioner brought five claims against Nigeria for

breaches of the China-Nigeria BIT in the arbitral

action. First, petitioner claimed that Nigeria violated

its obligation of fair and equitable treatment of

Chinese investors under Art. 3(1). Pet. ¶ 23. Second,

petitioner claimed that Nigeria unreasonably discriminated against it, violating Art. 2(3), and third, that

Nigeria failed to provide the “continuous protection”

afforded by Art. 2(2). Id. Fourth, petitioner claimed

Award ¶ 42, and another lawsuit in Ogun State High Court

against OGFTZ, Ogun State, and the Attorney-General of Ogun

State, id. The lawsuits sought reinstatement of Zhongfu’s

management and possession of the Zone based on the 2010 and

2013 contracts, id. ¶ 43, but both proceedings “were discontinued”

in March and April 2018, id. ¶ 44. Zhongfu also began arbitration

proceedings in the Singapore International Arbitration Center

against, inter alia, Ogun State, but that proceeding was enjoined

by the Ogun State High Court. Id. ¶ 45.

72a

that Nigeria violated its contract with petitioner,

violating Art. 10(2). Id. Finally, petitioner claimed that

Nigeria wrongfully expropriated Zhongshan’s investments without compensation, in violation of Art. 4. Id.

The London, United Kingdom-located arbitral

tribunal rendered its Final Award on March 26, 2021,

finding that Nigeria had violated Zhongshan’s rights

under the China-Nigeria BIT. Specifically, the tribunal

determined that Nigeria took actions that were

“plainly designed to deprive, and indeed succeeded in

depriving, Zhongfu of its rights” under the 2010 and

2013 agreements. Final Award ¶¶ 125–26. In addition,

the tribunal found that Ogun State, Nigeria’s Export

Processing Zones Authority (“NEPZA”), and the police—

all state actors—took discriminatory and coercive

steps against Zhongfu that resulted in Nigeria taking

possession of Zhongfu’s investment in the country. Id.

¶¶ 125–32. Nigeria was ordered to pay Zhongshan

approximately $55.6 million in compensation for the

expropriation, $75,000 in “moral damages,” $9.4

million in interest calculated between the July 22,

2016-dated expropriation and rendering of the award,

approximately $3 million in legal fees and costs

related to the arbitration, approximately $430,000 in

other costs, and post-Award interest on the preceding

sums—a total figure approaching $70 million, and

growing. Pet. ¶ 33.5

Nigeria has already tried and failed to shirk this

arbitration award in the United Kingdom. Approximately

5

The Award enumerated certain of the damages—namely, the

compensation, moral damages, and pre-Award interest on both—

in U.S. dollars, and the legal fees and costs related to the

arbitration in British pounds. As a result, the Court’s calculation

of the total figure, which converted all sums into U.S. dollars, is a

mere estimate.

73a

one month after the Award’s rendering, Nigeria filed

an arbitration claim form in the English High Court,

collaterally challenging the Award under the English

Arbitration Act on the basis that the tribunal lacked

jurisdiction. Although Nigeria later discontinued this

challenge, petitioner was still not paid the sums

awarded by the tribunal. Id. ¶¶ 35–41. On December

8, 2021, petitioner commenced enforcement proceedings in the United Kingdom, and the English court

issued an order that recognized the Award. Id. ¶ 42.

C. Instant Litigation

On January 25, 2022, Zhongshan initiated the

instant lawsuit, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration

Act (the “FAA”), which provides for confirmation of

arbitral awards falling under the Convention on the

Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral

Awards of June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 (the “New York

Convention”), see 9 U.S.C. § 201–207. See Pet. ¶ 1. The

FAA provides that the New York Convention is

enforceable in the courts of the United States, to which

courts a party may apply for an order confirming an

arbitral award issued under the Convention. Id.

§§ 201, 207. In response, Nigeria filed the pending

motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter and

personal jurisdiction under the FSIA, contending that

no exception to the FSIA applies because the award

does not fall under the New York Convention, Resp’t’s

Mot., ECF No. 24, which motion petitioner opposes,

Pet’r’s Opp’n, ECF No. 26. With briefing now complete,

see Resp’t’s Reply, ECF No. 27, Nigeria’s motion to

dismiss is now ripe for review.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,”

Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quoting

74a

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.

375, 377 (1994)), and “have only the power that is

authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the

statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto,” Johnson

v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 869 F.3d 976, 980

(D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area

Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)). To survive a

motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1), plaintiff thus “bears the burden of invoking

the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” Arpaio v.

Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Lujan

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).

“Where a plaintiff has asserted jurisdiction under the

FSIA and the defendant foreign state has asserted ‘the

jurisdictional defense of immunity,’ the defendant

state ‘bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff's

allegations do not bring its case within a statutory

exception to immunity.’” Belize Social Dev. Ltd. v. Gov’t

of Belize, 794 F.3d 99, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting

Phoenix Consulting Inc. v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d

36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). Further, in deciding a motion

to dismiss on the basis of the FSIA, courts’ subjectmatter and personal jurisdictional inquiries often

collapse into the same question: “If none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity set forth in the Act

applies, the District Court lacks both statutory subject

matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.” Verlinden

B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 485

n.5 (1983). See also Schubarth v. Federal Republic

of Germany, 891 F.3d 392, 397 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2018)

(“Under the FSIA, personal jurisdiction exists where

(1) subject matter jurisdiction has been satisfied, and

(2) proper service has been effected.” (citing 28 U.S.C.

§ 1330(b))). Nigeria does not contend that service was

improper, so the jurisdictional challenges merge.

75a

When a jurisdictional skirmish “present[s] a dispute

over the factual basis of the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction . . . the court must go beyond the pleadings

and resolve” any dispute necessary to the disposition

of the motion to dismiss. Feldman v. F.D.I.C., 879 F.3d

347, 351 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Phoenix Consulting,

216 F.3d at 40). In such situations, the “court may

properly consider allegations in the complaint and

evidentiary material in the record,” affording plaintiff

“the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Id.; see also

Am. Freedom Law Ctr. v. Obama, 821 F.3d 44, 49 (D.C.

Cir. 2016) (“In considering a motion to dismiss for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction . . . we ‘may consider

materials outside the pleadings in deciding whether

to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.’”

(quoting Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402

F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005))). Absent “evidentiary

offering[s],” Feldman, 879 F.3d at 351, however, courts

must seek jurisdictional assurance by accepting as

true all material “factual allegations in the complaint

and contru[ing] the complaint liberally,” and again

“granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can

be derived from the facts alleged.” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v.

F.D.I.C., 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

For this Court to have subject matter jurisdiction

over a petition to enforce a foreign arbitral award

against a foreign sovereign, two inter-related requirements must be satisfied: (1) “there must be a basis

upon which a court in the United States may enforce a

foreign arbitral award,” and (2) the foreign state “must

not enjoy sovereign immunity from such an enforcement.”

Creighton Ltd. v. Gov’t of State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118,

76a

121 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Both requirements are addressed

in turn.

A. Jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration

Act

The New York Convention is an international treaty

ratified by the United States that provides for signatory

states’ recognition of arbitral awards “made in the

territory of a State other than the State where the

recognition and enforcement of such awards are

sought.” Process & Indus. Dev. Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of

Nigeria (“P&ID”), 27 F.4th 771, 774 (D.C. Cir. 2022)

(quoting New York Convention, art. I(1)). The FAA

codified the New York Convention into law, providing

that “[a]n action . . . falling under the Convention shall

be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the

United States,” and granted district courts original

jurisdiction over such actions. 9 U.S.C. § 203.

For an arbitral award to “fall[] under the Convention,”

two requirements—both optional elements of the New

York Convention that the United States adopted at

ratification—must be satisfied. See Restatement (Third)

of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States

§ 487 cmts. b, f (Am. L. Inst. 1987). First, the arbitral

award must be “rendered within the jurisdiction of

a signatory country,” pursuant to the reciprocity

reservation of the Convention. Creighton, 181 F.3d

at 123. The United Kingdom, where the at-issue

arbitration award was rendered, is a member of the

New York Convention. See New York Arbitration

Convention, Contracting States, http://www.newyork

convention.org/countries (last visited Jan. 22, 2023).

Second, pursuant to the Convention’s commercial

reservation, which the United States adopted as a

part of a minority of the Convention’s signatories,

the award must “aris[e] out of a legal relationship,

77a

whether contractual or not, which is considered

as commercial.” 9 U.S.C. § 202; Belize Social Dev. Ltd.,

794 F.3d at 103. This commercial reservation is the

basis for Nigeria’s instant motion.

Nigeria argues that petitioner is “precluded from

relying on the New York Convention to recognize and

enforce the Award in this Court,” because the ChinaNigeria BIT giving rise to petitioner’s arbitral award

“does not establish a ‘legal relationship . . . which

is considered as commercial.’” Resp’t’s Mot. at 8, 13

(quoting Diag Human, S.E. v. Czech Republic Ministry

of Health, 824 F.3d 131, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). The FAA

does not define the term “commercial,” but the D.C.

Circuit has interpreted the term expansively. “In the

context of international arbitration, ‘commercial’ refers

to ‘matters or relationships, whether contractual or

not, that arise out of or in connection with commerce.’”

Belize Social Dev. Ltd., 794 F.3d at 103–104 (quoting

Restatement (Third) of U.S. Law of Int’l Comm.

Arbitration § 1–1 (2012)); see also id. at 104 (noting the

relationship between the “term’s broad compass” and

“the more familiar term ‘affecting commerce’—words

of art that ordinarily signal the broadest permissible

exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power” (quoting

Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003))).

Nigeria’s attempts to cast the Final Award as arising

from a non-commercial relationship lack support

in D.C. Circuit precedent. According to Nigeria, the

China-Nigeria BIT is “quintessentially sovereign” and

cannot form the basis for a commercial relationship

between a private investor and either country. See

Resp’t’s Mot. at 13–15; Resp’t’s Reply at 13–15. Next,

Nigeria contends that Zhongshan conceded the noncommercial character of its relationship with Nigeria

by litigating initially against Ogun State, as reflected

78a

in the arbitral record. See Resp’t’s Mot. at 15–18;

Resp’t’s Reply at 10–12; see also supra n.4. Finally,

Nigeria challenges the Final Award as being “unlike

other arbitration awards routinely enforced in this

Circuit” because this Award did not arise from a

business relationship between Nigeria and Zhongshan,

but solely from the China-Nigeria BIT. Resp’t’s Reply

at 5.

Each argument is considered in turn and none is

persuasive.

1. The Award’s Basis in the China-Nigeria

BIT Does Not Render the Parties’ Legal

Relationship Per Se Non-Commercial

Nigeria asserts the bold argument that, as a matter

of law, the China-Nigeria BIT cannot form the basis of

an arbitral award that falls within the coverage of the

New York Convention’s commercial reservation. Resp’t’s

Mot. at 13–15. Nigeria urges a distinction between

“certain direct contractual arrangements between

sovereigns and investors, which are subject to the New

York Convention, and international treaties, which are

not.” Resp’t’s Reply at 17. The parties do not dispute

that the China-Nigeria BIT is a treaty and, under

Nigeria’s reasoning, falls in the latter category. See

Resp’t’s Mot. at 14 (observing that “the Nigeria-China

Treaty is comprehensively focused on regulating state

conduct in the protection of investments” and is not “a

commercial agreement between Petitioner and Nigeria”).

Nigeria claims to derive this hardline distinction

from the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations

Law. Resp’t’s Reply at 17–18; Resp’t’s Mot. at 14 (“‘international agreements,’ like the Nigeria-China Treaty,

that involve ‘two or more states’ and are ‘governed

by international law’ are ‘not subject to the New York

Convention’ because they are not commercial” (quot-

79a

ing, barely, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations

Law §§ 301, 487 cmt. f)).

Nigeria, however, has cherry-picked the quoted text

out of context. The relevant portion of § 487 comment

f from the Restatement reads in full as follows:

Ordinarily, arbitration of a controversy of a

public international law character, such as a

boundary dispute or a dispute about interpretation of or performance under an international agreement (see § 301), is not subject

to the New York Convention, and an award

resulting from such an arbitration is not

subject to enforcement through civil courts.

See § 904 and Comment e thereto.

Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 487

cmt. f. Nigeria reasons that, as an “international

agreement” under Restatement (Third) of Foreign

Relations Law § 301, the China-Nigeria BIT is “‘not

subject to the New York Convention’ because [it is] not

commercial.” Resp.’s Mot. at 14 (quoting Restatement

(Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 487). Yet, this

comment does not broadly exclude all international

agreements from the Convention’s scope, as Nigeria

apparently reads the text. Rather, the comment only

excludes controversies “of a public international law

character,” citing § 904 of the Restatement (“interstate

arbitration”), which concerns only arbitrations between

states. Of course, this arbitration took place between

Nigeria and Zhongshan, a private actor—not two states.

Moreover, the remainder of the comment makes

clear the extremely narrow scope of the commercial

reservation’s exclusion, which as noted does not cover

all arbitrations arising under international agreements.

Indeed, earlier in the same comment, the Restatement

80a

expressly advises that “[d]isputes arising out of investment agreements are not excluded by” the commercial

reservation. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations

Law § 487 cmt. f. The Restatement goes on to explain

that this reservation merely “excludes arbitration

agreements and awards arising out of matrimonial or

custody disputes, disputes concerning succession to

property, and labor disputes, and for the United States

also other disputes excluded from the United States

Arbitration Act under 9 U.S.C. § 1.” Id. (emphasis

added). See also Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron

Devices, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)

(“Research has developed nothing to show what the

purpose of the ‘commercial’ limitation was. We may

logically speculate that it was to exclude matrimonial

and other domestic relations awards, political awards,

and the like.”).6

Nigeria’s novel argument contradicts U.S. courts’

regular confirmation of arbitral awards rendered under

similar treaties. According to the logic of Nigeria’s

argument, any arbitral award rendered pursuant to a

sovereign state’s violation of a treaty created under

public international law would be “per se noncommercial,” Resp’t’s Mot. at 17, and fall outside of the New

York Convention. See also Resp’t’s Mot. at 15 (arguing

that BITs, “as international agreement[s] governed by

and applying public international law, fall[] outside

6

Nor does Nigeria’s citation to the Restatement on International Commercial Arbitration support its argument, since this

Restatement likewise embraces a broad definition of arbitral

agreements, disputes, and awards that are “commercial” in

nature. See Restatement (Third) of the U.S. Law of Int'l Comm.

and Inv'r-State Arbitration § 1.1, cmt. e (Am. Law Inst., Proposed

Final Draft 2019) (“[A] dispute or award may be commercial even

though one of the parties to it is a sovereign State and even

though the dispute arises out of public regulatory acts.”).

81a

the ambit of the New York Convention as a matter of

U.S. foreign relations law”). The D.C. Circuit has

confirmed many arbitral awards in which sovereign

nations have been found to breach treaty—rather than

contract—obligations. See, e.g., Tatneft v. Ukraine, 21

F.4th 829 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (confirming arbitral award

rendered pursuant to Ukraine-Russia BIT); Chevron

Corp. v. Ecuador, 795 F.3d 200, 203–204 (D.C. Cir.

2015) (confirming arbitral award rendered pursuant

to BIT between United States and Ecuador); LLC

Komstroy v. Republic of Moldova, 2019 WL 3997385,

*1–2 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2019) (confirming arbitral award

pursuant to multilateral Energy Charter Treaty);

Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,

244 F. Supp. 3d 100, 105–108 (D.D.C. 2017) (confirming

arbitral award resulting from Venezuelan expropriation of

investments pursuant to BIT between Canada and

Venezuela); Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of

Venezuela, 146 F. Supp. 3d 112, 118–120 (D.D.C. 2015)

(confirming arbitral award rendered pursuant to BIT

between Canada and Venezuela). This Court declines

to swim upstream against the common practice of confirming arbitral awards rendered pursuant to violations of treaties based on respondent’s cherry-picked

and partial quotation from a Restatement.

Nigeria attempts to explain away courts’ application

of the New York Convention in other cases involving

treaties similar to the China-Nigeria BIT by arguing

that many of those treaties explicitly reference the

New York Convention, and that the parties in other

cases agreed that the Convention applied to their

dispute. See Resp’t’s Mot. at 15. Neither of these

scattershot attempts to distinguish those cases is

persuasive. First, Nigeria does not explain why a

treaty’s mere reference to the New York Convention

rescues an arbitral award from the treaty’s “public

82a

international law character” that Nigeria claims

would exclude such a treaty-based arbitral award from

confirmation. Referencing the New York Convention,

after all, does not transform a treaty into a contract

between a state and private actor. This argument is

particularly perplexing given that, in one of the cases

upon which Nigeria relies as support for this point,

the treaty at issue merely refers to the New York

Convention to discuss the Convention’s requirement

that parties agree in writing to arbitration, rather

than the Convention’s commercial reservation. See

Resp’t’s Mot. at 15 (citing Chevron Corp. v. Republic

of Ecuador, 949 F. Supp. 2d 57, 70 (D.D.C. 2013));

Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, Case No. 12-cv1247 (JEB), Decl. of Edward G. Kehoe, Ex. 1, U.S.Ecuador BIT at art. VI(4)(b), ECF No. 4-1.7 Second,

respondent cites to Crystallex Int’l Corp., 244 F. Supp.

3d at 109, seeming to argue that the New York

Convention applied in this case because the respondent did not object to the court’s jurisdiction. Resp’t’s

Mot. at 15. This argument ignores that, in Crystallex,

as here, the applicability of the New York Convention

folded into the question of the court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction and, thus, whether Venezuela consented to

jurisdiction is irrelevant since “[i]t is axiomatic that

subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived” and

“a federal court must raise the issue because it is

‘forbidden—as a court of limited jurisdiction—from

acting beyond [its] authority.’” Diag Human S.E. v.

Czech Republic, Ministry of Health, 64 F. Supp. 3d 22,

7

Further, as petitioner notes, not all arbitral awards that have

been confirmed in the D.C. Circuit arise from treaties that

expressly reference the New York Convention. See Pet’r’s Opp’n

at 17 (noting that the Russia-Ukraine BIT at issue in Tatneft, 21

F.4th 829, “does not mention that the New York Convention

applies to enforcements of awards arising under it”).

83a

27 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting NetworkIP, LLC v. F.C.C.,

548 F.3d 116, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2008)), rev’d o other

grounds, 824 F.3d 131 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Nigeria makes

no convincing argument to explain away the crush of

cases that undercut its theory.

2. The Arbitration Record Does Not Prove That

the Dispute was Non-Commercial

Nigeria next turns to the record of the underlying

arbitration to argue that the dispute was non-commercial,

asserting a new distinction between what it calls

“Treaty Claims” and “Commercial Claims.” In support

of this argument, Nigeria recounts that petitioner had

initially brought claims in the Nigerian courts and the

Singapore International Arbitration Center (SIAC)—

the latter pursuant to a clause in the 2013 agreement—

alleging breach of contract claims under its series

of agreements with Ogun State. See Resp’t’s Reply at

10; see also Final Award ¶¶ 43–45. Nigeria describes

petitioner’s discontinuance of both proceedings as a

“tactical[]” decision to “proceed exclusively with the

Treaty Claims” and “abandon the Commercial Claims.”

Resp’t’s Reply at 10. As a result, as Nigeria’s argument

goes, the Final Award was based on Nigeria’s sovereign,

rather than commercial, conduct—or, by way of analogy to

the limits of the Commerce Clause, the country’s use

of its police power, rather than commerce power. See

Resp’t’s Mot. at 15–18; Resp’t’s Reply at 11–12.

The flaw in this argument stems from predication on

a false dichotomy between sovereign and commercial

conduct in the context of the New York Convention.

A similar argument was considered and rejected by

the D.C. Circuit in Belize Social Dev. Ltd. v. Government of Belize, 794 F.3d 99, 104–105 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

There, Belize argued that, in granting a private

telecommunications company tax and duty exemp-

84a

tions pursuant to an agreement, “it exercised ‘powers

peculiar to sovereigns’ as opposed to ‘powers that can

also be exercised by private citizens,’ and thus its

actions were not commercial.” Id. at 105 (quoting

Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607,

614 (1992)). This argument attempted to define the

commercial reservation by reference to the FSIA’s

“commercial activity” exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2),

under which a foreign state is only held to “engage[] in

commercial activities when it acts in the manner of a

private player within the market.” Belize Social Dev.

Ltd., 794 F.3d at 104. The D.C. Circuit rejected this

narrow view of the commercial reservation, holding

that “[u]nlike with the FSIA, Congress was not codifying the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity

when it ratified and implemented the New York

Convention.” Id. at 105. Instead, because the Convention’s

“purpose was to ‘encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in

international contracts’ . . . ‘commercial’ in the context

of international arbitration refers to matters which

have a connection to commerce.” Id. (quoting TermoRio

S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 933 (D.C.

Cir. 2007)). Accordingly, as Zhongshan correctly posits,

“there can be no debate that the multimillion-dollar

investment that Petitioner made in Nigeria to develop,

manage and operate a free trade zone near Lagos was

connected with commerce.” Pet’r’s Opp’n at 5–6. See

Belize Social Dev. Ltd., 794 F.3d at 104 (holding that

“taxes Belize levies against a company . . . have a

connection with commerce . . . as do the duties Belize

charges”).

85a

3. No Underlying Contract Between Nigeria

and Zhongshan is Required

Finally, Nigeria urges that the “Award at issue is

unlike other arbitration awards routinely enforced in

this Circuit” because “it arose neither from a commercial

agreement between Petitioner and Nigeria, nor from a

contractual or other business relationship between

them.” Resp’t’s Reply at 5. To be sure, nearly every

case enforcing an arbitration award against a foreign

sovereign in this Circuit has involved an underlying

contract or business agreement between the petitioner

and foreign sovereign. See, e.g., P&ID, 27 F.4th at 772

(describing underlying twenty-year natural gas supply

and processing agreement between Irish engineering

company and Nigeria); Diag Human, 824 F.3d at 135

(describing underlying “Framework Agreement” between

arbitration parties Czech Republic and foreign blood

plasma company by which company supported modernization of Czech Republic’s blood plasma supply and

services in exchange for share of the total volume of

plasma produced); Belize Social Dev. Ltd., 794 F.3d

at 100–01 (involving underlying agreement between

Belize and petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, a telecommunications company, pursuant to which

company would purchase property from Belize); Gebre

LLC v. Kyrgyz Republic, 2022 WL 2132481, *2 (D.D.C.

June 14, 2022) (foreign company signed series of

license agreements with Kyrgyz authorities to mine

rare earth elements). In contrast, Nigeria is correct—

and petitioner does not dispute, see Pet’r’s Opp’n at 15

n.8—that the underlying agreements leading to

Zhongshan’s investments in the Zone and Industrial

Park “[were] formed with OGFTZ and Ogun State, not

Nigeria.” Resp’t’s Reply at 7 (emphasis in original).

86a

This distinction drawn by Nigeria between the

parties involved in the facts underlying the arbitral

award at issue (i.e., involving a business arrangement

between a private party and part of a sovereign

country) versus previous awards confirmed in this

Circuit (i.e., involving business arrangements between

a private party and a sovereign country), falls short of

showing that the instant parties’ legal relationship

is therefore not commercial. As the FAA provides, a

legal relationship need not arise from contract to be

commercial, see 9 U.S.C. § 202, with the crucial factor

being that “the subject matter [of the arbitration] is

commercial.” Stati v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 199 F.

Supp. 3d 179, 184 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting U.S. Titan,

Inc. v. Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co., 241 F.3d

135, 146 (2d Cir. 2001)). Here, the subject matter of the

underlying arbitration related to commerce: Zhongshan’s

status as a foreign investor in Nigeria, pouring

millions of dollars into developing the free trade

zone, “has an obvious connection to commerce.” Diag

Human, 824 F.3d at 136 (describing “the provision of

healthcare technology and medical services” as having

“an obvious connection to commerce” based on health

care’s role in the “global economy”).

Notably, Nigeria focuses principally on urging adoption of its characterization of the parties’ relationship

as non-commercial. See, e.g., Resp’t’s Mot. at 15 (“The

record of the arbitration confirms the non-commercial

nature of the parties’ legal relationship that is the

foundation for the Award.”) (emphasis added); Resp’t’s

Reply at 14–15 (arguing that petitioner’s agreements

with Ogun State cannot “dictate whether the extrinsic

legal relationship between Nigeria and Petitioner is

commercial for purposes of the New York Convention”

and urging that “[t]he conditions in question here . . .

rendered the legal relationship between Nigeria

87a

and Petitioner fundamentally noncommercial”). Only

passingly, in reply, does Nigeria allude to the absence

of a direct contractual or business relationship between

Zhongshan and Nigeria as precluding the existence a

“legal relationship” between the parties—a condition

precedent to the requirement that the arbitral award

“aris[e] out of a legal relationship, whether contractual

or not, which is considered as commercial.” 9 U.S.C.

§ 202; see Resp’t’s Reply at 14 (noting that “no independent legal relationship existed between Nigeria

and Petitioner regarding [the latter’s] investments” in

service of its argument that Nigeria’s conduct was

“sovereign” rather than commercial).

Regardless, the parties plainly shared a “defined

legal relationship, whether contractual or not,”

Diag Human, 824 F.3d at 135, based on the ChinaNigeria BIT. In Diag Human, the D.C. Circuit held

that, even if failing to qualify as a contract, a “Framework Agreement” between a blood plasma company

and the Czech Republic created a legal relationship,

because the Agreement “explicitly contemplated which

parties it would obligate, the extent of the obligations,

the remuneration exchanged for meeting the obligations, and the legal framework to govern the arrangement.” Diag Human, 824 F.3d at 135. The ChinaNigeria BIT, too, creates a legal framework “entitling

[Chinese investors] to the standards of treatment

guaranteed by” Nigeria. Pet’r’s Opp’n at 7. Further,

the treaty constitutes “an already-binding arbitration

contract” between Nigeria and China, with investors

from both countries, including petitioner, acting as the

equivalent of third-party beneficiaries, BG Group, PLC

v. Republic of Argentina, 572 U.S. 25, 41 (2014), or

at the very least, the treaty operates as Nigeria’s

“standing offer to all potential [Chinese] investors to

arbitrate investment disputes,” Chevron, 795 F.3d at

88a

206. Nigeria cannot and does not explicitly dispute

that the BIT thus creates a legal relationship— even

if not a contractual one—between the parties.

B. Nigeria Is Not Immune Under the FSIA.

Having established that this matter falls under the

New York Convention, and thereby the FAA, the next

question is whether Nigeria is immune from suit

under the FSIA. The FSIA is “a comprehensive statute

containing a ‘set of legal standards governing claims of

immunity in every civil action against a foreign state

or its political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities.’” Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 691

(2004) (quoting Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488). The FSIA

“provides, with specified exceptions, that a ‘foreign

state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the

courts of the United States . . . .” Bolivarian Republic

of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co.,

581 U.S. 170, 173 (2017) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1604).

Accordingly, “subject matter jurisdiction in any [FSIA]

action depends on the existence of one of the specified

exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.” Verlinden,

461 U.S. at 493.

At issue here is the arbitration exception, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1605(a)(6), which permits U.S. courts to confirm an

arbitration award rendered outside of the United

States in certain instances.8 The exception provides, in

pertinent part:

8

Congress amended the FSIA in 1988 to include the arbitration exception, ensuring that foreign agreements to arbitrate and

arbitral awards governed by certain treaties would be enforceable

in U.S. courts, even against sovereigns. See Process & Indus. Dev.

Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 506 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C.

2020), aff’d on other grounds, 27 F.4th 771 (D.C. Cir. 2022). This

exception facilitated the participation of U.S. courts in upholding

89a

A foreign state shall not be immune from the

jurisdiction of courts of the United States or

of the States in any case . . . in which the action

is brought . . . to confirm an award made

pursuant to . . . an agreement to arbitrate,

if . . . the agreement or award is or may be

governed by a treaty or other international

agreement in force . . . calling for the

recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6). For the Court’s jurisdiction to

attach pursuant to the arbitration exception, “the

existence of an arbitration agreement, an arbitration

award and a treaty governing the award are all

jurisdictional facts that must be established.” LLC

SPC Stileks v. Republic of Moldova, 985 F.3d 871, 877

(D.C. Cir. 2021) (citing Chevron, 795 F.3d at 204). As to

the international arbitration system that has flourished since the

post-World War II era, designed to facilitate cross-border investments and business dealings. The conventional wisdom undergirding the international arbitration system is that promising

foreign investors an efficient and fair alternative dispute-resolution mechanism outside of potentially biased local courts would

encourage foreign direct investment, insulated from the uncertainties created by the host country’s domestic politics and law.

See generally Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do

BITS Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment

Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 Harv. Int’l L. J. 67, 68–79

(2005) (arguing that arbitration provisions in BITs are a “mechanism that gives important, practical significance to BITs, a

mechanism that truly enables these bilateral treaties to afford

protection to foreign investment,” and that BITs have promoted

foreign direct investment in developing countries and the United

States); Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the

United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement

of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 Yale L. J. 1049 (June 1961)

(detailing the reasons for the United States’ ratification of the

New York Convention).

90a

these three requirements, petitioner bears “a burden

of production” to support a claim that the arbitration

exception applies; “the burden of persuasion rests with

the foreign sovereign claiming immunity, which must

establish the absence of the factual basis by a preponderance of the evidence.” Chevron, 795 F.3d at 204.

Petitioner has met its burden of production as to all

three requirements under the arbitration exception.

First, as to the existence of the arbitration agreement,

petitioner has alleged, without dissent from Nigeria,

that both parties consented to the arbitration—

Nigeria via Art. 9 of the China-Nigeria BIT, which

provided that either party may submit a dispute to an

ad hoc tribunal, and Zhongshan via filing a Request

for Arbitration. Pet. ¶¶ 24–25. See Stati, 199 F. Supp.

3d at 188 (“All that is required is that the petitioner

make a ‘prima facie showing that there was an

arbitration agreement by producing the [treaty] and

the notice of arbitration.’” (quoting Chevron, 795 F.3d

at 205)). Petitioner has also met its burden as to the

second and third requirements by producing the Final

Award and referring to the New York Convention. See

Final Award, ECF No. 2-1; see also Creighton, 181 F.3d

at 123–24 (describing the “New York Convention [as]

‘exactly the sort of treaty Congress intended to include

in the arbitration exception’” (quoting Cargill Int’l S.A.

v. M/T Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012, 1018 (2d Cir.

1993))). Nigeria, meanwhile, has failed to discharge its

burden of persuasion to establish that this arbitral

award falls outside the scope of the New York

Convention, for the reasons stated supra, in Part III.A.

Resultantly, the Court finds that the arbitration

exception to the FSIA applies, stripping Nigeria of

sovereign immunity and establishing the Court’s

subject-matter and personal jurisdiction over the case.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Federal Republic of

Nigeria’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. An order

consistent with the Memorandum Opinion will be

entered contemporaneously.

Date: January 26, 2023

/s/ Beryl A. Howell

BERYL A. HOWELL

Chief Judge

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APPENDIX C

IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION

PURSUANT TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S

REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE GOVERNMENT

OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA FOR

THE RECIPROCAL PROMOTION AND

PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS

BETWEEN:

ZHONGSHAN FUCHENG INDUSTRIAL

INVESTMENT CO. LTD.

Claimant

-ANDTHE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

Respondent

FINAL AWARD

Arbitral Tribunal:

Mr Rotimi Oguneso SAN, co-arbitrator

Mr Matthew Gearing QC, co-arbitrator

Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, presiding arbitrator

Place of arbitration: London, United Kingdom

Date of Award: 26 March 2021

Date of Hearing: 9th to 13th November 2020

FINAL AWARD

A. Introduction

1. The Claimant, Zhongshan Fucheng Industrial

Investment Co. Ltd (“Zhongshan”), contends that, in

the summer of 2016, entities for whose actions the

Respondent, the Federal Republic of Nigeria (“Nigeria”),

is liable in international law, deprived it of a substan-

93a

tial investment contrary to the provisions of articles 2,

3 and/or 4 of a Bilateral Investment Treaty (“the Treaty”)

between (0 the People’s Republic of China (“the PRC”)

and (ii) Nigeria, and that Zhongshan is entitled to

compensation from Nigeria to be assessed by an

arbitration tribunal pursuant to article 9 of the Treaty.

2. In the next section of this Award, Section B, we

explain the basic relevant facts as advanced in this

arbitration by Zhongshan on the basis of documents

and oral evidence, Then, in Section C, we set out the

relevant provisions of the Treaty, In Section D, we

describe the relevant procedural history of this

arbitration. Following that, in Section E, we address

various jurisdictional and preliminary points raised by

Nigeria. In Section F, we discuss misrepresentation

and concealment arguments raised by Nigeria. Next,

in Section G, we address the issue of Nigeria’s liability.

In Section H, we consider the appropriate level of

compensation to be awarded. Section I deals with

questions of interest and Section J with costs. Finally,

in Section K, we make our award.

3. Before setting out the history as described by

Zhongshan, it is convenient to record that Zhongshan’s

claim relates to rights in the Ogun Guangdong Free

Trade Zone (“the Zone”), a substantial area of land in

Ogun State in Nigeria, which is owned by the Ogun

State Government (“Ogun State”) and which is not far

from Lagos, Agapa Port and Lagos Airport. The history

‘involves three companies in the Chinese-owned

Zhuhai Zhongfu Industrial Group Co Ltd group of

companies, Zhuhai Zhongfu Industrial Group Co Ltd

(“Zhuhai”), Zhongfu International Investment (MG)

FZE (Zhongfu”) and Zhongshan. The unchallenged

evidence of Dr Jianxin Han, the manging d

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

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