Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Federal Republic of Nigeria, Petitioner v. Zhongshan Fucheng Industrial Investment Co. Ltd.
Supreme Court briefNov 7, 2024
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
APPENDIX A – Court of Appeals Decision
Opinion, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, Case No. 237016 ...............................................................
1a
APPENDIX B – Memorandum Opinion, U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia,
Case No. 22-170 ............................................
66a
APPENDIX C – Final Arbitration Award.......
92a
APPENDIX D - New York Convention ........... 182a
APPENDIX E - 9 USC §202 ............................ 191a
APPENDIX F – 28 USC §1605(a).................... 192a
1a
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
————
No. 23-7016
————
ZHONGSHAN FUCHENG INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT CO. LTD,
Appellee
v.
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA,
Appellant
————
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:22-cv-00170)
————
Argued April 22, 2024
Decided August 9, 2024
————
Keith Bradley argued the cause for appellant. With
him on the briefs was ScheLeese Goudy.
Jovana Crncevic argued the cause and filed the brief
for appellee.
Before: MILLETT, KATSAS, and CHILDS, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT.
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS.
MILLETT, Circuit Judge: In 2001, China and Nigeria
signed a bilateral investment treaty to encourage
investment between the two countries. As part of that
2a
bargain, each country agreed to treat the other
country’s investors fairly and to protect their investments. The treaty also provided that the countries
would arbitrate any disputes with foreign investors.
Appellant Zhongshan Fucheng Industrial Investment
then invested in Nigeria, participating in a joint
venture with Ogun State, a Nigerian state, to develop
a free-trade zone. After years of development and
millions of dollars in investments, Ogun State abruptly
ended its relationship with Zhongshan, and Nigerian
federal authorities ousted the company’s executives
from the country. Zhongshan initiated arbitration
proceedings. An arbitrator found that Nigeria had
breached its obligations under the bilateral investment treaty and awarded Zhongshan over $55 million
in damages.
Zhongshan now seeks to enforce that arbitral award
against Nigeria. The district court held that it had
jurisdiction over this case, finding that the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act’s arbitration exception
applied because the award is governed by an
international arbitration treaty known as the New
York Convention.
We affirm.
I
A
1
Prior to 1952, the United States granted foreign
sovereigns “complete immunity” in courts within the
United States as “a matter of grace and comity[.]”
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,
486 (1983). For centuries, that rule had been “in
harmony with the then-existing general concepts of
3a
international practice.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena,
912 F.3d 623, 626 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quotation marks
omitted).
Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, however, the practice of granting foreign
sovereigns complete immunity was called into question.
In particular, as foreign governments became more
involved in commercial activity, concerns grew over
those governments’ ability to “manipulate their immunity” to gain unfair advantages in the marketplace over
purely private corporations. In re Grand Jury Subpoena,
912 F.3d at 626. In response, a growing number of
countries began to strip foreign sovereigns of immunity
for “private”— typically commercial—acts. Id.
In 1952, the State Department’s Acting Legal
Adviser issued a letter adopting this “restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena,
912 F.3d at 626 (quotation marks omitted). Under that
theory, the United States recognized the immunity of
foreign sovereigns with regard to sovereign or public
acts, but not with regard to private acts. See Republic
of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 690 (2004);
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487.
Application of the sovereign–private act distinction,
however, “proved troublesome.” Verlinden, 461 U.S. at
487. After 1952, “the State Department continued to
advise courts on a case-by-case basis whether immunity
should be granted[.]” Princz v. Federal Republic of
Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1994). If no
advice was given, courts had to independently determine whether immunity was appropriate (that is,
whether a foreign state’s conduct was private or
sovereign). See id.
4a
In 1976, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (“FSIA”), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.
2891 (codified as amended in various sections of 28
U.S.C.), to “free the Government from the[se] case-bycase diplomatic pressures” and to clarify the standards
governing sovereign immunity, Verlinden, 461 U.S.
488. To that end, the FSIA contains a “comprehensive
set of legal standards governing claims of immunity in
every civil action against a foreign state or its political
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities” brought
in courts within the United States. Id.
Today, the FSIA is the “sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of [the
United States.]” Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989). The FSIA’s
“terms are absolute”: Unless a plaintiff shows that a
statutorily enumerated exception to sovereign immunity
applies, “courts of this country lack jurisdiction over
claims against a foreign nation.” Belize Soc. Dev., Ltd.
v. Government of Belize, 794 F.3d 99, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
2
This appeal involves the FSIA’s arbitration exception. That exception provides in relevant part:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or
of the States in any case * * * in which the
action is brought * * * to confirm an award
made pursuant to * * * an agreement to
arbitrate, if * * * [the] award is or may be
governed by a treaty or other international
agreement in force for the United States
calling for the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards[.]
5a
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6). To establish jurisdiction under
the arbitration exception, a party must offer “more
than a claim invoking an arbitration award.” LLC SPC
Stileks v. Republic of Moldova, 985 F.3d 871, 877 (D.C.
Cir. 2021). The party must show (1) “the existence of
an arbitration agreement”; (2) “an arbitration award”;
and (3) “a treaty governing the award[.]” Id.
The relevant treaty governing the arbitration award
in this case is the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 (“New York Convention”). The
New York Convention is a multilateral treaty that
provides for signatory states’ “recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a
State other than the State where the recognition and
enforcement of such awards are sought[.]” New York
Convention Art. I(1). The United States is a signatory
and “appl[ies] the Convention, on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and enforcement of only those
awards made in the territory of another Contracting
State.” New York Convention, 21 U.S.T. at 2560; see
New York Convention Art. I(3). Congress implemented
the New York Convention in Chapter 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208.
In most signatory states, the New York Convention
applies to all arbitral agreements, regardless of subject
matter. Belize Soc. Dev., 794 F.3d at 103. But the
Convention also permits states to adopt a “commercial
reservation” that limits the Convention to disputes
arising from legal relationships that are “considered as
commercial[.]” New York Convention Art. I(3).
The United States adopted the commercial reservation. See New York Convention, 21 U.S.T. at 2560; 9
6a
U.S.C. § 202. As a result, the Federal Arbitration Act
provides both that (1) “[a]n action * * * falling under
the Convention shall be deemed to arise under the
laws and treaties of the United States[,]” 9 U.S.C.
§ 203; and (2) the Convention applies only to an
arbitral award “arising out of a legal relationship,
whether contractual or not, which is considered as
commercial,” id. § 202.
Neither the New York Convention nor the Federal
Arbitration Act defines the term “commercial.”
B
In 2001, China and Nigeria signed a bilateral
investment treaty (“Investment Treaty”) aimed at
promoting commercial investment between the two
countries.1 The Investment Treaty requires each
country to protect investors from the other country
and to treat those foreign investors fairly and
equitably. The Investment Treaty also provides for
arbitration of disputes between an investor and a
treaty signatory. See Investment Treaty Art. 9. It
separately provides for arbitration of disputes between
China and Nigeria. See Investment Treaty Art. 8.
In 2007, Ogun State began contracting with Chinese
companies to develop the Ogun Guangdong Free Trade
Zone near Lagos, Nigeria’s most populous city and an
economic hub. A free-trade zone is a geographic area
in which countries relax trade restrictions to promote
economic activity and investment. Nigerian federal
law, for example, exempts businesses in free-trade
1
We take these facts from the arbitrator’s findings, which are
not challenged here. Cf. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL–
CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (“[A]n arbitrator must
find facts and a court may not reject those findings simply
because it disagrees with them.”).
7a
zones from certain taxes and customs duties. See
Nigeria Export Processing Zones Act 1992 §§ 8, 12,
available at https://perma.cc/SE8Z-NHCN.
Ogun State entered into a joint venture agreement
with a Chinese company and another company to
create the Ogun Guangdong Free Trade Zone Company.
The Nigeria Export Processing Zones Authority, a
Nigerian federal-government entity that oversees
free-trade zones in Nigeria, then delegated control and
operation of the free-trade zone to the company.
In 2010, the Ogun Guangdong Free Trade Zone
Company contracted with Zhongshan’s parent company
to develop an industrial park in the free-trade zone.
The goal was for Zhongshan’s parent company to
develop the park and build factories in it for zone
tenants to use. Zhongshan’s parent company then
“effectively transferred its rights” to Zhongshan, which
conducted its Nigeria operations through its subsidiary,
Zhongfu International Investment (NIG) FZE. J.A.
316. Because the distinctions between the Zhongshanrelated entities are irrelevant to the legal issues in this
case, we refer to them collectively as “Zhongshan.”
Zhongshan invested millions of dollars and significant resources to develop the park. Zhongshan built
out infrastructure in the industrial park, including
roads and utilities. It also opened services such as a
hospital, hotel, supermarket, and bank. The free-trade
zone later amended its charter and made Zhongshan a
part-owner of the zone. By 2016, businesses had moved
into the zone and Nigeria had collected approximately
160 million Nigerian Naira in tax revenue from the
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free-trade zone, which amounts to hundreds of
thousands of U.S. dollars.2
In the first half of 2016, however, Ogun State
terminated its agreements with Zhongshan. Ogun
claimed that a different Chinese company was legally
entitled to Zhongshan’s share of the free-trade zone
and that Zhongshan had defrauded Ogun.
Things continued to deteriorate. One Ogun official
texted a Zhongshan executive urging him “as a friend”
to “leave peacefully when there is opportunity to do so,
and avoid forceful removal, complications[,] and
possible prosecution[.]” J.A. 34. The next month, Ogun
issued an arrest warrant for two executives, alleging
“criminal breach of trust[.]” J.A. 35. Nigerian federal
police arrested one Zhongshan executive at gunpoint
and held him for ten days. During that time, the police
denied the executive food and water, beat him,
intimidated him, and questioned him about the
whereabouts of the other executive.
C
Following Ogun’s sudden termination of the relationship, Zhongshan filed lawsuits in Nigerian federal
and state courts seeking reinstatement of its contractual rights. Those proceedings were discontinued in
Spring 2018.
In August 2018, Zhongshan initiated an arbitration
proceeding against Nigeria under Article 9 of the
2
The arbitrator found that Nigeria collected over 160 million
Nigerian Naira in tax revenue. J.A. 60. Using exchange rates from
2016, the year Zhongshan was evicted, that amount is between
approximately 450,000 and 815,000 United States dollars. See
Nigerian Naira (NGN) to U.S. Dollar (USD) Exchange Rate History
for 2016, EXCHANGE-RATES.ORG, https://perma.cc/VPC9-5XW7.
9a
Investment Treaty. Nigeria willingly participated in
the arbitration proceeding. Zhongshan alleged that
Nigeria breached the Investment Treaty in five ways:
(1) failure to afford Zhongshan fair and equitable
treatment; (2) unreasonable discrimination; (3) failure
to protect Zhongshan; (4) breach of contract; and
(5) wrongful expropriation of investments without
compensation.
In March 2021, an arbitral tribunal in the United
Kingdom rendered a final award in favor of Zhongshan
(“Final Award”). As relevant here, the tribunal found
that Nigeria’s actions in 2016 “were plainly designed
to deprive, and indeed succeeded in depriving,
[Zhongshan] of its rights under the [development
agreement] in circumstances where there were no
domestic law grounds for doing so,” and did so “in a
way which involved a combination of actual and
threatened illegitimate use of the state’s power to
achieve that end.” J.A. 60. In support of this conclusion,
the tribunal identified violations of four separate
provisions of the Investment Treaty. See J.A. 61–62
(identifying violations of Articles 2(2) (entitlement to
“continuous protection” by Nigeria), 2(3) (protection
against “unreasonable or discriminatory measures” by
Nigeria), 3(1) (guarantee of “fair and equitable
treatment” by Nigeria), and 4 (prohibition against
expropriation by Nigeria)) (emphases omitted).
Based on these findings, the arbitral tribunal found
that Nigeria had breached its obligations under the
Investment Treaty and that Zhongshan was entitled
to $55.6 million in compensation from Nigeria and
10a
$75,000 in moral damages, along with interest and
legal and arbitral fees. J.A. 85–86.3
After nearly a year of nonpayment by Nigeria,
Zhongshan sued in the district court to enforce the
arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act.
Nigeria moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. As relevant
here, Nigeria argued that it was immune from suit
because no FSIA exception applied to Zhongshan’s
petition to enforce the foreign arbitral award.
The district court denied Nigeria’s motion to dismiss,
holding that Nigeria was not immune because the
Final Award was governed by the New York Convention,
and so fell within the FSIA’s arbitration exception.
II
Nigeria timely appealed the district court’s denial of
its motion to dismiss. We have jurisdiction because a
denial of sovereign immunity qualifies for interlocutory appeal under the collateral-order doctrine.
El–Hadad v. United Arab Emirates, 216 F.3d 29, 31
(D.C. Cir. 2000).
We review the district court’s denial of Nigeria’s
motion to dismiss de novo. Transamerica Leasing, Inc.
v. La Republica de Venezuela, 200 F.3d 843, 847 (D.C.
Cir. 2000). When a plaintiff asserts jurisdiction under
the FSIA, the defendant foreign state bears the burden
of proving that the plaintiff’s asserted statutory
3
The arbitral tribunal defined “moral damages” to include
damages for “injury inflicted resulting in mental suffering, injury
to [the claimant’s] feelings, humiliations, shame, [and] degradation[.]”
J.A. 63–64 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Lusitania (United States
v. Germany), 7 R.I.A.A. 1, 40 (Mixed Claims Comm’n 1923)).
11a
exception to immunity does not apply. Belize Soc. Dev.,
794 F.3d at 102.
III
We agree with the district court that the FSIA’s
arbitration exception stripped Nigeria of its sovereign
immunity in this case.
The FSIA’s arbitration exception requires the court
to find the existence of three jurisdictional facts:
(1) “an arbitration agreement”; (2) “an arbitration
award”; and (3) “a treaty governing the award[.]”
Stileks, 985 F.3d at 877. The first two requirements are
not disputed in this case and are plainly established in
the record. Nigeria and Zhongshan had an arbitration
agreement because Nigeria extended an open offer to
arbitrate to all Chinese investors, and Zhongshan was
a qualifying investor. See Investment Treaty Art. 9;
J.A. 44–45. Zhongshan then invoked that agreement to
initiate an arbitration proceeding with Nigeria, and
the arbitral tribunal rendered a final award in
Zhongshan’s favor.
Whether the arbitration exception applies in this
case therefore turns on whether a treaty—specifically,
the New York Convention—governs the Final Award.
We hold that it does because the Final Award arose
from (1) a legal relationship, (2) that is considered as
commercial, and (3) is between persons. See New York
Convention Art. I(1); 9 U.S.C. § 202.
A
The Final Award satisfies the Convention’s requirements that the arbitrated dispute (1) “aris[e] out of a
legal relationship” that is (2) “considered as commercial[.]”
9 U.S.C. § 202.
12a
1
As for the first requirement, Zhongshan and Nigeria
shared a legal relationship because Nigeria owed
Zhongshan legal duties under the Investment Treaty.
Two parties share a legal relationship within the
meaning of the New York Convention if there is an
agreement, whether contractual or not, that (1) “explicitly
contemplate[s] which parties it w[ill] obligate”;
(2) determines “the extent of the obligations”; and
(3) provides “the legal framework to govern the
arrangement.” Diag Human, S.E. v. Czech Republic
Ministry of Health, 824 F.3d 131, 135 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
The Investment Treaty fits that bill. First, the
Investment Treaty expressly obligates Nigeria to protect
investments made by Chinese investors, including
those by Zhongshan. See Investment Treaty Art. 2(2)
(“Investments of the investors of either Contracting
Party shall enjoy the continuous protection in the
territory of the other Contracting Party.”); see also J.A.
44–45 (finding that Zhongshan was an investor under
the Investment Treaty).
Second, the Investment Treaty lays out in precise
terms the duties Nigeria owed to Zhongshan, including
protecting Zhongshan’s investments in Nigeria and
affording Zhongshan the same treatment it would
afford to Nigerian investors. Investment Treaty Arts.
2, 3; see also id. Art. 5 (providing that signatory states
must compensate investors for certain kinds of losses);
id. Art. 6 (requiring signatory states to ensure that
investors can transfer their investments and returns).
Third, the Investment Treaty provides that the signatory states will arbitrate any disputes “connect[ed]
with an investment” in the signatory states and
13a
specifies the governing law that the tribunal shall
apply. Investment Treaty Art. 9(1), (3), (7).
To be sure, the direct agreement was between China
and Nigeria, not Nigeria and Zhongshan. But the
Investment Treaty, on its face, committed to protect
foreign investors and to treat them fairly. In that way,
Nigeria assumed legally enforceable duties to Chinese
investors, including Zhongshan.
More specifically, “a treaty is a contract,” albeit one
entered into between nations. BG Group PLC v.
Republic of Argentina, 572 U.S. 25, 37 (2014); Stileks,
985 F.3d at 879 (quoting BG Group, 572 U.S. at 37). As
relevant here, contract law has long permitted parties
to contract for the benefit of a third party. Such “[a]
promise in a contract creates a duty in the promisor to
any intended beneficiary to perform the promise, and
the intended beneficiary may enforce the duty.” See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (AM. L.
INST. 1981).
For that reason, the Supreme Court has “analyzed a
similar bilateral investment treaty as if it were a
contract between the sovereign and the investor
corporation seeking to confirm an arbitral award.”
Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, 795 F.3d 200, 207 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (citing BG Group, 572 U.S. at 33–34).
So too for the Investment Treaty. China and Nigeria
negotiated a treaty that was intended to confer
specified benefits upon investors. The Investment Treaty
expressly guarantees Chinese investors protection of
their investments and fair and equal treatment.
Investment Treaty Arts. 2–4. Underscoring the point,
the duties owed to investors are distinct from those
owed to the signatory states. That is evidenced by the
fact that the Investment Treaty provides two distinct
14a
dispute-resolution mechanisms: one for investor-state
arbitrations, found in Article 9, and one for arbitrations between the signatory states, found in Article 8.
If the Investment Treaty did not create rights in thirdparty investors, there would be no point to the distinct
investor-state arbitration provision. Accordingly, as an
investor, Zhongshan is an intended beneficiary of the
Investment Treaty. Nigeria therefore owes Zhongshan
a duty to perform Nigeria’s promises, and Zhongshan
has the right to enforce those promises through
arbitration.
2
As for the second component of the commercial
reservation, the legal relationship the Investment
Treaty created between Zhongshan and Nigeria is
commercial in nature. The relationship exists because
Zhongshan made a commercial investment, in a freetrade zone designed to facilitate commerce, under a
bilateral treaty aimed at promoting commercial
investment and protecting commercial investors.
The Federal Arbitration Act and circuit precedent
corroborate that straightforward reading of the
Investment Treaty’s character. Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, the New York Convention applies to
an arbitral award only if the award “aris[es] out of a
legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which
is considered as commercial[.]” 9 U.S.C. § 202.
The requirement that the relationship be considered
commercial has a broad scope. A relationship “may be
commercial even though it does not arise out of or
relate to a contract, so long as it has a connection with
commerce[.]” Belize Soc. Dev., 794 F.3d at 104 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMM.
& INV.–STATE ARBITRATION § 1.1 cmt. e (AM. L. INST.
15a
2012)). That reading of “considered as commercial”
maps onto the phrase’s “established meaning as a term
of art * * * [i]n the field of international arbitration[.]”
Diag Human, 824 F.3d at 136.
Zhongshan and Nigeria’s relationship has at least
five commercial features.
First, Zhongshan’s investment in a money-making
enterprise is itself commercial.
Second, Zhongshan invested in a free-trade zone
intended to promote commercial activity.
Third, Nigeria relaxed tariffs in the free-trade zone.
Its decision to “forgo[] charging” those “duties” is connected to commerce. Belize Soc. Dev., 794 F.3d at 104.
Fourth, Nigeria collected hundreds of thousands of
dollars in tax revenue from Zhongshan’s investment.
See J.A. 60. “The[se] taxes * * * also have a connection
with commerce[.]” Belize Soc. Dev., 794 F.3d at 104.
Fifth, the Investment Treaty, under which Nigeria
owed duties to Zhongshan, is expressly designed to
promote commerce. By its own terms, the treaty is
meant to “stimulat[e] business initiative of the investors
and * * * increase prosperity in both States[.]” Investment
Treaty preamble. In that same vein, the treaty ensures
that investors can profit off their investments by
guaranteeing them the ability to transfer “returns” on
investments—including “profits, dividends, interests
and other legitimate income” of a commercial character—
back to their home countries. Id. Art. 6.
Nigeria does not dispute that the above connections
to commerce exist. Instead, Nigeria argues that the
commercial reservation limits the New York Convention
to arbitral awards arising from direct transactions
between a signatory state and a private party. See
16a
Nigeria Opening Br. 44–47. Nigeria relies principally
on the Federal Arbitration Act’s requirement that the
parties’ relationship be “considered as commercial,
including a transaction, contract, or agreement described
in section 2 of this title[.]” 9 U.S.C. § 202. Section 2 of
the Federal Arbitration Act, in turn, provides that “[a]
written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce”
providing for arbitration “shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable[.]” 9 U.S.C. § 2; see AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). Nigeria
argues that, since Section 2 requires a “maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction,” and the
commercial reservation cross-references Section 2,
then the commercial reservation must also require a
transaction. Because the Investment Treaty itself is
not a commercial transaction, and Zhongshan did not
directly transact with Nigeria itself, Nigeria argues
that the relationship between Zhongshan and Nigeria
is not considered as commercial for purposes of the
commercial reservation.
Nigeria’s proposed reading would artificially and
extra-textually confine the commercial reservation to
the scope of Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act.
Specifically, Nigeria would replace the commercial
reservation’s use of the word “including” with the
words “limited to,” so that the reservation would read:
“An * * * arbitral award arising out of a legal
relationship * * * which is considered as commercial,
limited to a transaction, contract, or agreement described
in section 2 of this title, falls under the Convention.”
See 9 U.S.C. § 202.
But that is not what Congress wrote. Because “the
use of the word ‘includes’ indicates that [a statute’s]
list * * * is non-exhaustive[,]” Congress intended for
17a
the commercial reservation to be broader than Section
2’s reference to transactions. United States v. Philip
Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Nigeria’s argument also overlooks that Congress
used the phrase “considered as commercial,” not
“considered as transactional.” “When a statute uses a
term of art” like the word “commercial[,]” “Congress
intended it to have its established meaning.” Belize
Soc. Dev., 794 F.3d at 103 (formatting modified). In the
international arbitration context, the established
meaning of “commercial” is anything that “has a
connection with commerce,” whether transactional or
not. Id. at 104 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMM. & INV.–STATE ARBITRATION
§ 1.1 cmt. e). For that reason, we have held that the
commercial reservation is not confined to “state
commercial and private acts[.]” Id. at 105 (quotation
marks omitted). It instead has a “broad compass” and
reaches anything with a connection to commerce. Id.
at 104–105.
Without a foothold in the statutory text or this
court’s precedent, Nigeria argues that “considered as
commercial” must be narrow because otherwise it
would have little work to do, given that “[t]he vast
majority of treaties are connected to commerce in one
way or another.” Nigeria Opening Br. 50– 51. According
to Nigeria, holding that the Investment Treaty is a
commercial relationship covered by the Convention
would mean that, “in all those treaties among sovereign
nations that involve economic topics, the dispute resolution processes would lead to Convention enforcement.”
Nigeria Opening Br. 51.
Nigeria is mistaken for three reasons.
18a
First, nothing in this opinion suggests that the
Investment Treaty is itself a commercial relationship.
Instead, the Investment Treaty created a relationship
between Nigeria and the commercial investor Zhongshan
to promote commercial development. It is that
relationship between Nigeria and Zhongshan that is
considered as commercial.
Second, not every treaty contains an agreement to
arbitrate. Without a valid arbitration agreement, the
FSIA’s arbitration exception does not apply. See
Stileks, 985 F.3d at 877. Countries that do not wish to
arbitrate or to be subject to enforcement proceedings
in foreign courts do not have to extend to commercial
investors a standing offer to arbitrate like Nigeria did.
Third, not every treaty confers enforceable rights
upon third parties. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 572
U.S. 844, 850–851 (2014) (The Convention on Chemical
Weapons “creates obligations only for State Parties” to
ban chemical weapons.). Treaties that do not confer
such rights will not create relationships between third
parties and foreign sovereigns like the one that
Zhongshan had with Nigeria.
Our holding in this case therefore does not, as
Nigeria worries, reach “all those treaties among sovereign
nations that involve economic topics[.]” Nigeria Opening
Br. 51. Rather, our holding is limited to cases involving
a treaty that (1) is connected with commerce; (2) confers
third-party rights upon commercial investors; and
(3) makes a standing offer to those commercial
investors to arbitrate disputes involving their thirdparty rights. In those cases, the treaty creates a legal
relationship between the parties that is commercial in
nature, and an arbitral award arising from that
relationship satisfies the commercial reservation.
19a
B
The remaining requirement for the New York
Convention to apply in this case—that the Final
Award arise from a dispute between “persons”—is also
met. See New York Convention Art. I(1). Under the
Convention, the term “persons” includes a foreign
state that has entered into a bilateral investment
treaty under which it assumes treaty obligations owed
to third parties that are connected to commerce.
Extensive precedent, from this court and others, has
long enforced under the New York Convention arbitral
awards involving foreign states charged with breaching
investment and commercial treaty obligations. See,
e.g., Tatneft v. Ukraine, 21 F.4th 829, 832–834 (D.C. Cir.
2021) (affirming confirmation of arbitral award in
favor of third-party investor arising from Ukraine’s
breach of bilateral investment treaty with Russia);
Stileks, 985 F.3d at 874–876 (affirming confirmation of
arbitral award in favor of third-party energy provider
arising from Moldova’s breach of multilateral treaty);
Chevron Corp., 795 F.3d at 202–203 (affirming confirmation of arbitral award in favor of third-party
investor arising from Ecuador’s breach of bilateral
investment treaty with the United States); Olin
Holdings Ltd. v. State of Libya, 73 F.4th 92, 96–101 (2d
Cir. 2023) (affirming confirmation of arbitral award in
favor of third-party investor based on Libya’s breaches
of bilateral investment treaty with the Republic of
Cyprus); Schneider v. Kingdom of Thailand, 688 F.3d
68, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming confirmation of
arbitral award in favor of third-party investor based
on Thailand’s breaches of bilateral investment treaty
with Germany); cf. BG Group, 572 U.S. at 28–31
(involving arbitral award in favor of third-party
20a
investor arising from Argentina’s breach of bilateral
investment treaty with the United Kingdom).
In each of those cases, enforcement was possible only
if the breaching state was a “person” for purposes of
the Convention. So too here. Nigeria, like the foreign
states in each of those cases, signed a treaty and
assumed obligations to private, third-party beneficiaries that are connected to commerce. And Nigeria, just
like those foreign states, is a “person” under the
Convention.
Nigeria argues that the Final Award does not fall
within the scope of the New York Convention because
“[a] sovereign is a ‘person’ for Convention purposes
only when it engages in private activity.” Nigeria
Opening Br. 21. Claiming that it “acted solely as a
sovereign with respect to Zhongshan[,]” Nigeria
Opening Br. 30, Nigeria argues that the Final Award
is not enforceable under the New York Convention.
Nigeria’s proposed private-act limitation is without
basis in the New York Convention’s text or precedent,
and it contradicts the position of the Executive Branch.
First, the Convention affords no textual footing for
including foreign states as “persons” only when acting
in a purportedly “private” capacity. The “interpretation
of a treaty is like the interpretation of a statute,” and
so we “first look to the treaty’s text.” Rodriguez v. Pan
American Health Org., 29 F.4th 706, 717 (D.C. Cir.
2022) (formatting modified). Here, the plain text of the
New York Convention leaves no room for a private-act
limitation. Article I provides broadly that the Convention
applies to all arbitral awards “arising out of differences between persons[.]” New York Convention Art.
I(1). There is no dispute that the term “persons”
includes foreign states, at least when they are acting
21a
in a commercial capacity. See Report of the Comm. on
the Enf’t of Int’l Arbitral Awards ¶ 24, U.N. Doc.
E/AC.42/4 (Mar. 21, 1955) (“1955 Report”); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE U.S., Part II Introductory Note (AM. L. INST.
1987) (“The principal persons under international law
are states.”). And that commercial-activity limitation
is expressly provided for in the Convention itself. New
York Convention Art. I(3). That commercial reservation accomplishes much of what Nigeria’s proposed
“private-versus-public” distinction would but, unlike
Nigeria’s atextual distinction, it does so explicitly.
So Nigeria’s position must be that, although the
word “persons” encompasses foreign states, it does so
only when those states act in a private capacity. Yet
nothing in the Convention’s text provides for such a
bespoke limitation on signatory states’ coverage.
The same is true for the Federal Arbitration Act.
Section 202 of the Act provides: “An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, which is
considered as commercial, * * * falls under the
Convention.” 9 U.S.C. § 202. Apart from the requirement that the legal relationship be commercial, that
provision does not place any additional private-act
precondition on the enforcement of an arbitral award
against a foreign state.
Nigeria, for its part, has identified no internationallaw basis for reading its additional private-act qualification into the Convention’s text, nor has it pointed
to any other signatory state that has asserted that
cramped understanding of “persons” in the 66 years
since the Convention’s ratification. The dissenting
opinion, meanwhile, offers dictionary definitions that
cut against reading the word “persons” to encompass
22a
sovereigns at all. See infra at 7. But unwilling to bite
that bullet, the dissenting opinion instead urges a nondictionary reading of “persons” to mean “sovereigns
sometimes, depending on how exactly the sovereign is
behaving.” Absent any explicit textual indication, we
hesitate to read such a partially-in and occasionallyout definition into the Convention’s single use of the
word “persons.”
The dissenting opinion asserts that reading the
Convention as-written would mean that foreign states
“have no immunity” for their sovereign acts. See infra
at 11. Not at all. What the dissenting opinion overlooks
is that one essential attribute of sovereign immunity
is foreign states’ ability voluntarily to consent to a suit
or proceeding. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Calif. v. Hyatt,
587 U.S. 230, 237–241 (2019) (describing founding-era
principles of international law under which states
could be sued only with their consent); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE U.S. § 70 (AM. L. INST. 1965). The
Convention applies to the enforcement only of arbitral
awards resulting from arbitral proceedings in which
the parties have voluntarily contracted to resolve a
dispute through arbitration. See New York Convention
Arts. II, IV(1)(b), V(1)(a).
Consistent with that long-established principle of
foreign states’ ability to consent to suits, the FSIA’s
arbitration exception requires that there have been an
agreement by the foreign state to arbitrate and a final
arbitral award. Stileks, 985 F.3d at 877. When those
conditions are met, as they are here, then it is the
FSIA’s arbitration exception—not the Convention—
that strips states of their immunity.
Nigeria did not have to agree to arbitrate with
investors like Zhongshan. That was its decision to
23a
make. Had it not so agreed, it would be immune to this
lawsuit. But Nigeria signed a treaty that expressly
obligated it to arbitrate disputes with Chinese investors
and arbitrated this dispute with Zhongshan. Nigeria
also committed itself via the New York Convention to
the enforcement of arbitral awards. While the Convention
covers an arbitral award regardless of whether the
parties have acceded to the Convention, see infra at
13–14, accession to the Convention in part determines
whether a state has consented to an award’s enforcement in foreign courts. See Creighton Ltd. v. Government
of State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(holding that Qatar had not waived its sovereign
immunity because it had not signed the New York
Convention). Because Nigeria has twice consented to
the enforcement of this award, our reading of the New
York Convention is consistent with long-established
principles of sovereign immunity.4
The dissenting opinion also reasons that our reading
of the Convention would undercut “[b]ackground principles of espousal[.]” See infra at 12. That is incorrect.
Espousal requirements generally prohibit private
parties from asserting claims arising under international law directly against foreign states (rather than
petitioning their own governments to raise the claims
state-to-state). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., § 174 cmt. b. But
that prohibition does not apply where an international
agreement expressly provides a mechanism for the
resolution of disputes between a government and
foreign nationals, or where a government agrees to
resolve a dispute directly with a private party. Simon
v. Republic of Hungary, 77 F.4th 1077, 1097 (D.C. Cir.
4
We do not address whether the district court had jurisdiction
under the FSIA’s waiver exception.
24a
2023) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., § 175); see also infra at
12 (Espousal requirements do not apply “where the
sovereign itself ha[s] agreed to engage directly with
the aggrieved individual.”).
This case fits within both of those exceptions.
Nigeria signed an investment treaty with China that
expressly provided for either state’s nationals to
directly arbitrate against the other state. And Nigeria
stood by that promise by arbitrating with Zhongshan.
Enforcing the Final Award is therefore entirely
consistent with espousal requirements.
Second, circuit precedent corroborates our straightforward reading of the Convention, as this court has
found the New York Convention to be fully applicable
to arbitral awards arising from sovereign acts. In
Tatneft v. Ukraine, 21 F.4th 829 (D.C. Cir. 2021), we
affirmed under the New York Convention the confirmation of an arbitral award in favor of a third-party
investor arising from Ukraine’s breach of a bilateral
investment treaty with Russia, id. at 832–834. Ukraine’s
breaching conduct went far beyond any private conduct and involved core sovereign activity. The Russian
company that initiated arbitration alleged that
“Ukrainian courts, prosecutors, and court officials” had
improperly facilitated a Ukrainian conglomerate’s
acquisition of the Russian company’s shares in another
company. Tatneft v. Ukraine, 301 F. Supp. 3d 175, 193
(D.D.C. 2018) (quotation marks omitted); see Tatneft,
21 F.4th at 832–833. Similarly, in Chevron Corp. v.
Ecuador, 795 F.3d 200 (D.C. Cir. 2015), we confirmed
an arbitral award against Ecuador for purely sovereign
conduct—violating a bilateral investment treaty by
“failing to resolve” lawsuits pending in Ecuadorian
courts. Id. at 202–203; cf. BG Group, 572 U.S. at 28–31
25a
(theory of arbitral award was not based on private
conduct, but instead on finding that Argentina had
enacted laws that denied company fair and equitable
treatment as required by an investment treaty); Olin
Holdings, 73 F.4th at 96–100 (arbitration award based
in part on Libya’s expropriation of factory).
Nigeria’s breaching conduct in this case—including
its expropriation of Zhongshan’s investments—is no
less sovereign than Ukraine’s conduct in Tatneft, or
Ecuador’s conduct in Chevron. Those cases demonstrate that, contrary to the dissenting opinion’s view,
enforcing the Final Award would not mark a departure
from settled norms or expectations. If anything,
declining to enforce the Final Award would be a sharp
break from past decisions. Notably, Nigeria makes no
argument that those prior cases were wrongly decided
even though the breaching conduct at issue involved
sovereign, not private, acts.
Third, the United States government has agreed
that the New York Convention governs the enforcement of an arbitral award even when the breaching
conduct arises out of a foreign state’s sovereign, rather
than private, activities. In Libyan American Oil Co. v.
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 684 F.2d
1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (table), this court vacated without
opinion a district court decision declining to enforce an
arbitral award rendered against Libya. See Libyan
American Oil Co. v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175, 1179 (D.D.C. 1980). The
subject arbitration award had been rendered in favor
of the Libyan American Oil Company under an
arbitration clause contained in agreements into which
the company had entered with Libya in 1955. Id. at
1176. Nearly two decades later, Libya nationalized the
company’s rights under the agreements, along with
26a
some of the company’s oil-drilling equipment. Id.
When negotiations for compensation faltered, the oil
company rejected the terms of the nationalization and
initiated arbitration proceedings, ultimately securing
an arbitration award in its favor. Id.
In an amicus brief submitted to this court in Libyan
American Oil, the United States argued that Libya’s
Convention-related “objections to enforcement [could]
be briefly dismissed.” Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 20 n.16, Libyan American Oil Co. v.
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nos. 801207, 80-1252 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 1980). The United
States explained that the fact that a party seeks to
enforce an arbitral award against a “sovereign state
rather than a private party does not affect the
enforceability of an award * * * under the New York
Convention.” Id. The government explained that the
“negotiating history of the Convention clearly reflects
the interpretation that states are legal persons for the
purposes of the Convention.” Id.
In so arguing, the United States endorsed enforcement of the arbitral award against Libya as a covered
“person” under the Convention even though Libya’s
breaching conduct involved sovereign acts committed
within its own territory. See Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae at 4, 6–8, Libyan American Oil Co. v.
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nos. 801207, 80-1252 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 1980). The United
States also perceived no separation-of-powers concerns
with enforcement because enforcement “solely concern[ed]
Libya’s undertaking to submit disputes under freely
negotiated concession contracts to final and binding
arbitration outside of its territory, and to honor any
ensuing awards.” Id. at 7. In giving effect to such
awards, the United States explained, courts simply
27a
“enforce a judgment to which the foreign state has
consented in advance,” consistent with longstanding
principles allowing litigation in which the sovereign
has agreed to participate. Id. at 8. That “element of
consent, coupled with the neutrality of the arbitral
tribunal, removes any concern that domestic courts
might venture into the political arena, or hinder the
United States’ pursuit of foreign policy goals.” Id.
Given the Executive Branch’s constitutional expertise
in matters of foreign affairs and diplomacy, we afford
the United States’ interpretation of the Convention
“great weight.” Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S.
331, 355 (2006) (quotation marks omitted); see id.
(“[W]hile courts interpret treaties for themselves, the
meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and
enforcement is given great weight.”) (quotation marks
omitted).
Fourth, subsequent treaties involving foreign states
signatory to the New York Convention have treated
the New York Convention as encompassing arbitral
awards arising from sovereign acts. For example, the
Energy Charter Treaty, opened for signature Dec. 17,
1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95, is a multilateral treaty that
establishes a framework to “promote long-term cooperation in the energy field,” Energy Charter Treaty
Art. 2. The Energy Charter Treaty includes an
arbitration provision for disputes “between a Contracting
Party and an Investor of another Contracting Party
relating to an Investment of the latter in the Area of
the former[.]” Id. Art. 26(1); see id. Art. 26(2)–(8). The
treaty further provides that claims submitted to
arbitration under the treaty “shall be considered to
arise out of a commercial relationship or transaction
for the purposes of article I of th[e New York]
28a
Convention.” Id. Art. 26(5)(b). While certain disputes
between a contracting state and an investor could
involve foreign states’ private acts, see, e.g., id. Art.
10(1) (“Each Contracting Party shall observe any
obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an
Investment of an Investor of any other Contracting
Party.”), other covered disputes explicitly involve
foreign states acting in their sovereign capacity, see,
e.g., id. Art. 13(1) (prohibiting signatory states from
engaging in certain forms of expropriation and
nationalization).
That over 50 of the state signatories to the New York
Convention entered a treaty that contemplates that
arbitral awards fall within the New York Convention
even when they plainly arise from a state’s sovereign
acts underscores that the Convention does not impose
a private-act precondition on a foreign state qualifying
as a covered “person.” Even if the Energy Charter
Treaty did not amend the New York Convention, see
infra at 25, it evidences “[t]he postratification understanding of other contracting states” that “may * * *
serve as an aid to our interpretation of a treaty’s
meaning[.]” GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS,
Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 590 U.S. 432,
442 (2020) (quotation marks omitted); see also Zhongshan
Br. 28 & n.9 (noting that 51 of 53 states signatory to
the Energy Charter Treaty are also parties to the New
York Convention).
Nigeria’s arguments in support of its position that
foreign states are “persons” under the New York
Convention only when they act in their private
capacity do not hold up.
To start, Nigeria contends that, “[a] mere eight years
after the Convention, many countries adopted the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment
29a
Disputes Convention [(“ICSID”)] specifically for investorstate disputes.” Nigeria Reply Br. 8. Nigeria argues
that “[f]or so many Convention signatories to develop
a new and different treaty on this point suggests
investor-state disputes were not generally subject to
the Convention—which would have made the new
treaty unnecessary.” Nigeria Reply Br. 8–9.
Not so. ICSID promotes international investment by
establishing a dispute-resolution process for investorstate disputes. See Valores Mundiales, S.L. v. Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, 87 F.4th 510, 513 (D.C. Cir.
2023). The New York Convention, on the other hand,
provides for the recognition and enforcement of a
broad array of foreign arbitral awards. The two
agreements accordingly serve distinct functions in the
arbitration of investment disputes. In any event, any
supposed redundancy between the Convention and
ICSID would persist even under Nigeria’s reading:
Nigeria agrees that the New York Convention applies
to awards arising out of foreign states’ private acts,
Nigeria Opening Br. 21, even though the ICSID itself
covers such awards.
Nigeria also argues that the drafting history (travaux
préparatoires) of the New York Convention shows that
the countries developing the Convention intended the
treaty to “appl[y] to government bodies only to the
extent they are engaged in the private sphere.” Nigeria
Opening Br. 22; see Nigeria Opening Br. 22–25.
That is incorrect. The “clear import of treaty
language controls unless application of the words of
the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a
result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of
its signatories.” Rodriguez, 29 F.4th at 718 (quotation
marks omitted); cf. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392,
399 (1985) (“[I]t is our responsibility to give the specific
30a
words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the
shared expectations of the contracting parties.”). Here,
nothing in the text of the New York Convention even
hints at the private-act prerequisite that Nigeria
proposes.
In addition, the handful of quotes from a 1955
Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of
International Arbitral Awards on which Nigeria bases
its travaux préparatoires argument does not suggest
that the signatories intended that arbitral awards
against states be covered only when those awards
arise from private state acts.
Nigeria first notes that the 1955 report explained
that the New York Convention would “go[] further
than the Geneva Convention in facilitating the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, [while] at the
same time * * * respect[ing] the sovereign rights of
States.” 1955 Report ¶ 14; see Nigeria Opening Br. 23.
But that broad reference to sovereign “rights” is too
general to import a drastic and categorical limitation
on enforcement whenever the breaching conduct
underlying an arbitral award is sovereign action. After
all, the Convention already protects sovereign rights
in multiple respects, including by allowing for commercial reservations. In addition, as the United States
has explained, sovereign rights are safeguarded where, as
here, a sovereign voluntarily joins the New York
Convention and then freely consents to arbitrate with
third parties, and any subsequent arbitration proceeds
before a neutral arbitral tribunal. See Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 7–8, Libyan American
Oil Co. v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Nos. 80-1207, 80-1252 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 1980).
Nigeria next points to language in the 1955 report
stating that the New York Convention “does not deal
31a
with arbitration between States[.]” 1955 Report ¶ 17;
see Nigeria Opening Br. 23. From that, Nigeria reasons
that “[i]f sovereign governments were ‘persons’ for all
purposes under the Convention, an arbitration between
States would be a dispute between ‘persons,’ so this
statement * * * would have been contrary to the
committee’s own drafting work.” Nigeria Opening Br.
23–24.
Nigeria’s argument, however, omits relevant context.
The relevant paragraph reads in full:
The Committee considered that the expression
“International Arbitral Awards” used by the
International Chamber of Commerce (E/C.2/373)
normally referred to arbitration between
States. Since this Draft Convention does not
deal with arbitration between States, but
deals with the recognition and enforcement in
one country of arbitral awards made in
another country, the Committee adopted the
title “Draft Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards”
which reflects more accurately the object of
the Convention.
1955 Report ¶ 17.
When read in full, then, the language that Nigeria
references is indeterminate. It is not clear whether the
New York Convention’s drafters were explaining that
the Convention is not focused on arbitrations between
states or were noting that the Convention specifically
excludes such arbitrations. We do not resolve that
ambiguity here, for there are at least two things that
may distinguish arbitration between states and this
arbitration between Nigeria and Zhongshan.
32a
For one, as the dissenting opinion points out, there
is other evidence from the drafting history suggesting
that the Convention does not apply to disputes
between states over violations of international law. See
infra at 14–17.
For another, disputes between states are ordinarily
governed by public international law, while disputes
between states and individuals are not. See Federal
Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 592 U.S. 169, 176
(2021); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE U.S. § 487 cmt. f; id. § 904 cmt. a. To that
point, the arbitration between Nigeria and Zhongshan
was governed by “the law of Nigeria as supplemented
by international law as provided by article 9.7” of the
Investment Treaty. J.A. 40; see J.A. 60 (finding Nigeria
liable because “there were no domestic law grounds”
for Nigeria’s actions against Zhongshan); Investment
Treaty Art. 9(7) (“The tribunal shall adjudicate in
accordance with the law of the Contracting Party to
the dispute * * * as well as the generally recognized
principles of international law[.]”); see also id. Art.
4(1)(b) (prohibiting expropriation by Nigeria and
China without “domestic legal procedure”). Nothing in
the travaux préparatoires bars enforcement of arbitral
awards resulting from state–private disputes that are
governed in material part by domestic law.
So regardless of whether a dispute between two
sovereign states governed purely by public international law falls under the New York Convention, for
our purposes, it is sufficient that nothing in the
Convention’s drafting history establishes that the
Convention is categorically inapplicable to an arbitration that implicates a single state’s sovereign activity
directed at a non-state entity and that is governed, in
part or in whole, by domestic law.
33a
Nigeria next points to part of the 1955 report that,
in Nigeria’s view, “specifically explained what the
‘differences between persons’ clause means, with respect
to governmental bodies.” Nigeria Opening Br. 24. In
particular, Nigeria notes that Belgium had “proposed
that the clause ‘should expressly provide that public
enterprises and public utilities should be deemed to be
legal persons for purposes of this article if their
activities were governed by private law.’” Nigeria
Opening Br. 24 (quoting 1955 Report ¶ 24). Nigeria
then notes that “[t]he Committee was of the opinion
that such a provision would be superfluous and that a
reference in the [1955 Report] would suffice.” Nigeria
Opening Br. 24 (quoting 1955 Report ¶ 24). In Nigeria’s
view, this “‘reference’ * * * makes clear that governmental bodies can be legal persons but only to the
extent they are operating in the private sphere[.]”
Nigeria Opening Br. 24.
But Nigeria overlooks other statements in the travaux
préparatoires that contradict its proposed reading. For
example, a 1956 report by the Secretary General about
an early draft of the Convention contained the
following statement from Austria:
Since the term ‘legal persons’ includes States,
the draft convention seems admittedly to
cover arbitral wards [sic] made in their favour
or against them in cases of disputes with
subjects of private law. Nevertheless, it would
be desirable to provide expressly that the
convention is also applicable in cases in which
corporate bodies under public law, and particularly States, in their capacity as entities
having rights and duties under private law,
have entered into an arbitration convention
for the purpose of the settlement of disputes.
34a
Report by the Secretary-General on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, at Annex
I, 11, U.N. Doc. E/2822 (Jan. 31, 1956).
Viewed from Austria’s perspective, the Final Award
qualifies for enforcement. Nigeria has “entered into an
arbitration convention for the purpose of the settlement of disputes” with private, third-party beneficiaries.
Report by the Secretary-General on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, at Annex
I, 11. An arbitral proceeding under that convention
resulted in an arbitral award arising from Nigeria’s
dispute with Zhongshan, a “subject[] of private law.” Id.
Austria’s commentary thus refutes Nigeria’s claim
that the New York Convention excludes arbitral
awards arising under arbitration conventions simply
because “[a] treaty is obviously a sovereign, not a
commercial, act.” Nigeria Opening Br. 32; see Nigeria
Opening Br. 32–33. And nothing in Austria’s comment
suggests that such awards fall outside of the
Convention when the breaching conduct on which they
are based is sovereign in nature.5
The same 1956 Secretary General report also
contains the following statement from the Society of
Comparative Legislation:
5
The dissenting opinion notes that Austria was not part of the
drafting committee that first drafted the New York Convention.
Infra at 17. But Austria was a member of the committee that
drafted the final version of the Convention. See Final Act and
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/8/Rev.1 (1958).
Indeed, the dissenting opinion cites to materials from the
committee of which Austria was a member. See, e.g., infra at 17
(citing Summary Record of the Sixteenth Meeting, at 5, U.N. Doc.
E/CONF.26/SR.16 (June 3, 1958)).
35a
The following words should be added after the
words ‘persons whether physical or legal’ at
the end of paragraph 1: ‘this expression to
include States, public bodies and undertakings
(collectivités publiques), public establishments
and establishments serving the public interest,
on the condition that the said differences
arose out of a commercial contract or a private
business operation (acte de gestion privée).’
Id. at Annex II, 9; see id. at Annex II, 10. This
commentary appears to express the broad view that
the Convention encompasses arbitral awards involving
foreign states so long as those awards are based on
disputes arising out of private business operations. It
does not, on its face, require that the state itself
entered into a commercial contract. And, like the
commentary from Austria, it does not require that the
breaching conduct be non-sovereign in nature. As such,
under the Society of Comparative Legislation’s view,
the New York Convention would encompass the award
at issue here, which involved a dispute related to
Zhongshan’s private business operations.6
In short, contrary to Nigeria’s claim, the Convention’s
drafters did not “plainly” state an “intent[]” to carve
sovereign-act breaches against a private entity out of
the New York Convention’s scope and to categorically
constrict the Convention’s coverage to private acts.
Nigeria Opening Br. 25. The “[c]herry-picked generalizations from the negotiating and drafting history”
that Nigeria cites “cannot be used to create a rule that
6
Nigeria’s other drafting-history arguments—some of which
are raised for the first time only in its reply brief, see, e.g., Nigeria
Reply Br. 13–16—fail for similar reasons. Each of the passages to
which Nigeria points is subject to multiple interpretations, and
none announces a categorical private-act limitation.
36a
finds no support in the treaty’s text.” GE Energy Power
Conversion France SAS, 590 U.S. at 442 (formatting
modified). In the absence of a contrary consensus, the
New York Convention’s uncabined text controls. See
Rodriguez, 29 F.4th at 718 (“[T]he clear import of
treaty language controls unless application of the
words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning
effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its signatories.”) (quotation marks omitted).
Lastly, Nigeria’s reliance on non–New York Convention
case law does not help its cause. Nigeria marches
through a series of cases in which federal courts have
interpreted the term “persons” to exclude states acting
in their sovereign capacity. See, e.g., Nigeria Opening
Br. 21–22, 25–26 (discussing False Claims Act and
Sherman Act cases). But the meaning of the term in
domestic statutes does not provide insight into the
“shared expectations” of contracting states regarding
the meaning of a term in an international treaty. Air
France, 470 U.S. at 399. Moreover, any domestic-law
presumption against treating states as persons fades
when a state consents to a suit, like Nigeria did when
it consented to arbitration after having already joined
the New York Convention. Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 755 (1999) (State “sovereign immunity bars suits
only in the absence of consent.”).
Nigeria’s act-of-state-doctrine cases are particularly
inapposite. Under the act-of-state doctrine, “the courts
of one state will not question the validity of public acts
(acts jure imperii) performed by other sovereigns
within their own borders, even when such courts have
jurisdiction over a controversy in which one of the
litigants has standing to challenge those acts.”
Altmann, 541 U.S. at 700. Cases invoking that doctrine
are of no relevance in a suit to enforce an arbitral
37a
award under the New York Convention because the
Federal Arbitration Act specifically provides that
“[e]nforcement of arbitral agreements * * * shall not
be refused on the basis of the Act of State doctrine.” 9
U.S.C. § 15. Although the relevant provision of the Act
is not located in the chapter implementing the New
York Convention, it applies to actions brought under
the Convention unless it is “in conflict” with the
Convention as ratified. Id. § 208. No such conflict
exists. Moreover, in extending that part of the Federal
Arbitration Act to the codification of the New York
Convention, the Political Branches further evidenced
that arbitral awards against foreign states for their
sovereign acts— their acts of state—would be enforced
in United States courts, including in disputes with
private parties. See Altmann, 541 U.S. at 700; see also,
e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 439 (1964) (holding, in a dispute between a Cuban
government instrumentality and a private party, that
the act-of-state doctrine barred a challenge to a Cuban
expropriation decree); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250, 253–254 (1897) (holding, in a suit by a private
citizen against a foreign state’s military officer, that
the act-of-state doctrine barred a challenge to the
state’s military operations).
In sum, this court has repeatedly enforced under the
New York Convention arbitral awards arising from
foreign states’ sovereign acts that breach obligations
owed to a third-party investor under an investment
treaty. Neither the New York Convention nor the
Federal Arbitration Act textually imposes a privateact qualification on the scope of “persons” against
whom an arbitral award can be enforced. And both the
United States government and subsequent treaties
have taken the position that the Convention imposes
no such limitation. Against those headwinds, Nigeria
38a
and the dissenting opinion offer only vague and
indeterminate passages from the Convention’s travaux
préparatoires. Those passages are insufficient to
impose a limitation not found in the New York
Convention’s plain text or this court’s history of
enforcing arbitral awards under the Convention.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Final
Award is enforceable under the New York Convention
because it arose out of differences between “persons”
that share a legal, commercial relationship. The
district court therefore has jurisdiction over this case
under the FSIA’s arbitration exception. The judgment
of the district court is affirmed.
So ordered.
39a
KATSAS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: The Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, commonly known as the New York
Convention, requires signatory countries to enforce
foreign arbitral awards arising out of “differences
between persons, whether physical or legal.” In its
typical applications, the New York Convention governs
awards arising from disputes between private parties.
This case presents the question whether the Convention
also governs awards arising from public-law disputes
involving the sovereign acts of governments. In my
view, the Convention’s reference to “persons” does not
extend to states acting in their sovereign capacity.
Because my colleagues conclude otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
I
A
The New York Convention is a multilateral treaty
that was adopted in 1958. It requires state parties to
recognize and enforce arbitral awards made in other
countries and “arising out of differences between
persons, whether physical or legal.” N.Y. Convention
art. I(1). Its “goal” was “to encourage the recognition
and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts.” Scherk v. AlbertoCulver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974). Parties may
limit the Convention to disputes “considered as
commercial” under their domestic law. N.Y. Convention
art. I(3). Parties also may limit the Convention to
awards made in the territory of another contracting
state. See id. In 1970, the United States acceded to the
Convention subject to both reservations. See An Act to
Implement the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Pub. L. 91368, 84 Stat. 692 (July 31, 1970).
40a
Before 1976, federal courts deferred to executivebranch determinations of foreign sovereign immunity.
See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943).
Although foreign sovereigns could raise immunity
themselves, they often would request the Department
of State to file suggestions of immunity. Restatement
(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 71(1)–(2) & cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1965) (Second
Restatement). In the absence of any such suggestion,
courts decided whether immunity applied in light of
previous executive-branch determinations. See Republic
of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34–35 (1945). Making
these determinations taxed the State Department,
and courts struggled in cases where it was not
involved. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the Unites States Part IV.5.A intro.
note (Am. L. Inst. 1987) (Third Restatement).
In 1976, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.
2891, which requires courts to determine immunity
under uniform standards. Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S.
v. United States, 598 U.S. 264, 272 (2023). The FSIA
provides that “a foreign state shall be immune from
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States,”
subject to specific exceptions. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. One of
the exceptions addresses arbitral awards. As relevant
here, it withdraws immunity in actions brought to
confirm awards made under arbitration agreements if
“the agreement or award is or may be governed by a
treaty ... in force for the United States calling for the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.” Id.
§ 1605(a)(6). All agree that the New York Convention
is such a treaty. So, if the Convention applies to an
arbitral award, then the FSIA abrogates sovereign
immunity in an action to recognize and enforce the award.
41a
B
This case arises out of a 2001 bilateral investment
treaty (BIT) between the Federal Republic of Nigeria
and the People’s Republic of China. Each country
promised to encourage investments in its territory
from investors of the other country. See Agreement
Between the Government of the People’s Republic of
China and the Government of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments art. 2(1) (2001) (Nigeria-China BIT).
Each country also made various promises about how it
would treat such investments. As relevant here,
Nigeria promised to afford “continuous protection” to
investments of Chinese investors, id. art. 2(2); to
refrain from taking “unreasonable or discriminatory
measures” against such investments, id. art. 2(3); to
afford “fair and equitable treatment” to such
investments, id. art. 3(1); and to not “expropriate” such
investments without fair compensation, id. art. 4(1).
China made reciprocal promises.
The BIT also provided for the arbitration of two
categories of disputes. Article 8 governed disputes
between Nigeria and China over the interpretation or
application of the BIT. It required such disputes to be
settled through diplomatic channels or, if diplomacy
failed, through arbitration. Nigeria-China BIT art.
8(1)–(2). Article 9 governed investment disputes
between one of the signatories and investors of the
other. It required disputes to be settled through
negotiations or, if they failed, through domestic courts
of the allegedly offending state or through arbitration.
Id. art. 9(1)–(3). Nigeria and China agreed that any
arbitral decision would be “final and binding” and that
both countries would “commit themselves to [its]
enforcement.” Id. art. 9(6).
42a
C
Ogun State is a Nigerian state, and Zhongshan
Fucheng Industrial Investment Co. Ltd. was a Chinese
investor in Nigeria. Through various contracts, Ogun
State granted Zhongshan’s predecessor-in-interest the
right to develop and operate a large industrial park.
Zhongshan developed the park.
Ogun State and Zhongshan then had a falling out.
Ogun State claimed that Zhongshan had not validly
acquired any interest in the project. It warned two
Zhongshan executives to leave the country or else face
“forceful removal, complications, and possible prosecution.” J.A. 34 (cleaned up). It asked Nigeria to collect
the immigration papers of Zhongshan employees. And
it obtained arrest warrants against two Zhongshan
executives. Id. at 35. One executive was “arrested at
gunpoint, ... deprived initially of food and water, intimidated, physically beaten, and detained for a total of ten
days.” Id. Eventually, both executives fled the country.
Zhongshan sued Ogun State and others in Nigerian
courts. The defendants never responded, and the
courts dismissed the cases. Zhongshan also sought
arbitration with Ogun State in Singapore, but the
High Court of Ogun State enjoined it.
Zhongshan then sought arbitration with Nigeria
under the BIT. A London tribunal unanimously ruled
in Zhongshan’s favor and awarded it around $70
million plus interest. The tribunal reasoned that Ogun
State’s sovereign actions were attributable to Nigeria
under international law. J.A. 42–44. It concluded that
Zhongshan’s previous lawsuits did not preclude
arbitration, in part because they had raised contract
claims, whereas the arbitration rested solely on the
BIT. Id. at 46–49. The tribunal then determined that
43a
Nigeria’s actions—actual and imputed—violated the
BIT. Id. at 60–62. An English court recognized the
award, but Nigeria refused to pay it.
Zhongshan petitioned the district court to recognize
and enforce the award under the New York Convention.
To overcome immunity, Zhongshan invoked the arbitration exception to the FSIA. Nigeria moved to dismiss and claimed that the Convention did not govern
the award.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss. It
held that the Convention covered the award because
the BIT gave Zhongshan rights against Nigeria and
because the award was connected to Zhongshan’s
commercial investment. Zhongshan Fucheng Indus.
Inv. Co. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, No. 22-170,
2023 WL 417975, *8–9 (D.D.C. Jan. 26, 2023). Nigeria
objected that the New York Convention applied to
contract claims, but not treaty claims, against sovereigns. Rejecting that argument, the court invoked
what it called “the common practice of confirming
arbitral awards” based on “a sovereign state’s violation
of a treaty created under public international law.” Id.
at *7.
II
When interpreting treaties, “we begin with the text
of the treaty and the context in which the written
words are used.” Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 581 U.S.
271, 276 (2017) (cleaned up). We are further “guided by
principles similar to those governing statutory interpretation.” Collins v. NTSB, 351 F.3d 1246, 1251 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). And “other general rules of
construction may be brought to bear on difficult or
ambiguous passages.” E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S.
530, 535 (1991) (cleaned up). Interpreting an old legal
44a
text requires us to “orient ourselves to the time of ...
adoption,” here 1958. Bostock v. Clayton County, 590
U.S. 644, 655 (2020).
Nigeria argues that the FSIA’s immunity exception
does not apply because the New York Convention does
not govern arbitral awards against sovereigns for the
alleged violation of treaties or other public international law. In the arbitration, Zhongshan alleged that
Nigeria, either directly or through Ogun State, violated the BIT by denying it protection, discriminating
against it, denying it fair and equitable treatment, and
expropriating its property without fair compensation.
The tribunal concluded that the public, treaty-violating actions taken by Ogun State were attributable to
Nigeria under international law, and Nigeria does not
contest that conclusion here. Ogun State also acted
in a commercial capacity with Zhongshan, but the
tribunal did not attribute Ogun State’s private acts to
Nigeria. Under international law, those private acts
would not be attributable to Nigeria absent either
an agency relationship or a need to prevent fraud or
injustice. See First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El
Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 622, 628–30
(1983). There is no evidence that either of these
exceptions applies here. See AG Abia v. AG Federation,
(2006) 16 NWLR part 1005, 265 (Nigeria) (state and
federal governments in Nigeria are “autonomous” and
thus “free from direction” by one another). In any
event, Zhongshan bore the burden of establishing a
basis for attributing Ogun State’s private acts to
Nigeria, see GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat’l Port Auth. of Liberia,
822 F.3d 598, 605 (D.C. Cir. 2016), and it expressly
disclaimed this point, see Zhongshan Br. at 35 n.10.
Because Ogun State’s private acts cannot be attributed to Nigeria, the award arises solely out of
45a
Nigeria’s sovereign acts governed by public international law. So the immunity question boils down to
whether the New York Convention applies to awards
based exclusively on such sovereign acts. That in turn
depends on whether the term “persons,” as used in the
New York Convention, includes governments acting in
their sovereign capacity under public law. The common
meaning of that term, the legal context in which the
Convention was written, and its drafting history all
indicate that “persons” does not cover governments
acting as sovereigns.
A
When the Convention was drafted, the word “person”
did not typically include sovereigns. It always included
natural persons, sometimes included juridical persons
such as corporations or state-created entities like
counties, and did not usually include sovereign states
themselves. Black’s Law Dictionary explained that, as
a general matter, a “county is a person in a legal sense,
but a sovereign is not.” Person, Black’s Law Dictionary
1300 (4th rev. ed. 1968) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). Webster’s Dictionary likewise stated that
“person” generally includes “any individual or incorporated group having certain legal rights and responsibilities”—a formulation that does not encompass sovereigns. Person, Webster’s New World Dictionary 1092
(College ed. 1960) (emphasis added). And Congress
codified a similar interpretive presumption across all
federal statutes. It specified that “unless the context
indicates otherwise,” the word person “include[s] corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships,
societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.” 1 U.S.C. § 1; see Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L.
No. 80-772 § 6, 62 Stat. 683, 859. That is a long list
46a
of included entities, from which governments are
conspicuously absent.
The Supreme Court confirmed this understanding
around the time of the New York Convention. In
United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330
U.S. 258 (1947), it explained that “[i]n common usage,”
the word persons “does not include the sovereign,” so
“statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed
to do so.” Id. at 275. This linguistic usage had settled
long before the Convention was adopted, see, e.g.,
United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 603–05
(1941); United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 321 (1877),
and it has persisted ever since, see, e.g., Return Mail,
Inc. v. USPS, 587 U.S. 618, 626–27 (2019); Vermont
Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529
U.S. 765, 780–81 (2000); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989).1
That said, “there is no hard and fast rule” excluding
sovereigns from the meaning of “person.” Cooper, 312
U.S. at 604–05. But the presumption against including
sovereigns “may be disregarded only upon some affirmative showing of ... intent to the contrary.” Stevens,
529 U.S. at 781; see Cooper, 312 U.S. at 606. Standing
alone, the word “person” in a legal text “applies to
natural persons, and also to artificial persons,” but it
“cannot be so extended as to include within its
meaning” a sovereign without “an express definition to
that effect.” Fox, 94 U.S. at 321.
The presumption against including sovereigns is
strongest for official acts. When sovereigns act in their
1
British usage was similar. A prominent legal dictionary
explained that in the legal context, “person” presumptively included
corporations but excluded the Crown and other official offices.
Person, Stroud’s Legal Dictionary 1463–65 (2d ed. 1903).
47a
private capacity, context is more likely to indicate that
they are included in the word “person.” See Georgia v.
Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 161–62 (1942); see also California
v. United States, 320 U.S. 577, 585–86 (1944). But for
public acts, the presumption against including sovereigns
is stronger—especially when the statute at issue
imposes burdens as opposed to benefits. Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351–52 (1943); see also Wilson v.
Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 667 (1979); United
States v. Knight, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 301, 315 (1840). So,
courts sometimes construe words like “person” to cover
sovereigns acting in a proprietary capacity but not in
a sovereign capacity. For example, the Supreme Court
has held that states are “persons” under the Sherman
Act when buying goods, Evans, 316 U.S. at 161–62, or
when conducting “private anticompetitive behavior”
and thus not “acting as sovereign,” Goldfarb v. Va.
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790–92 (1975). In contrast,
states are not “persons” under the Sherman Act when
acting as regulators, Parker, 317 U.S. at 351–52, or
otherwise “wielding the State’s power,” Bates v. State
Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977). Likewise, construing the
Robinson-Patman Act, the Court has held that states
are “persons” when “competing against private enterprise,” but has reserved whether they are “persons”
when performing public acts. Jefferson Cnty. Pharm.
Ass’n v. Abbott Lab’ys, 460 U.S. 150, 153–154 (1983);
see also Will, 491 U.S. at 64 n.5.
My colleagues brush aside this “series of cases” as
involving only “domestic statutes” rather than treaties.
Ante at 35–36. But in interpreting treaties, “general
rules of construction may be brought to bear on
difficult or ambiguous passages.” Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988).
And here, ordinary English usage is particularly
relevant because the Convention was drafted in
48a
English and finalized in New York City. Despite
invoking the assertedly “plain text” of the Convention,
ante at 20, my colleagues offer no affirmative textual
argument that it uses “persons” in an unusual way to
include governments acting as sovereigns. So while
legal and historical context may show that the Convention
covers foreign states acting in a private capacity—a
point addressed below—text strongly indicates that it
does not cover foreign states acting as sovereigns.
B
The legal context in which the Convention was
adopted, including background international-law
understandings of sovereign immunity and espousal,
make it especially implausible that the Convention’s
use of “persons” sweeps in foreign states acting in their
sovereign capacity.
1
In 1958, countries disagreed about how broadly to
grant immunity to foreign sovereigns. The traditional
theory was that one sovereign should be immune from
the domestic courts of another for all of its acts—public
and private. See The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 116, 136–37 (1812). The United States took
this position, extending “virtually absolute immunity
to foreign sovereigns,” for more than a century and a
half. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
480, 486 (1983). But a few countries—including Belgium
and Italy—had already rejected it. They believed that
a sovereign should be treated as a private party when
it acts as a private party, such as when it engages in
commercial transactions. Letter from Jack B. Tate,
Acting Legal Adviser of the U.S. Dep’t of State, to
Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19,
1952) (Tate Letter), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of
49a
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 713
(1976); Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S.
607, 614–15 (1992). Yet they still granted immunity for
governmental acts—those only a sovereign may undertake, such as operating military or police forces. See
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 360–62 (1993);
Tate Letter, 425 U.S. at 711. This view is known as
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. See
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487.
Throughout the 1900s, as sovereigns increasingly
became involved in international commerce, more
countries adopted the restrictive theory. See Tate
Letter, 425 U.S. at 711–14. In 1952, the Acting Legal
Adviser of the State Department embraced it. See id.
at 714–15. Even so, the United States continued in
some cases to recognize immunity for the private acts
of foreign sovereigns. See Third Restatement, supra,
Part IV.5.A intro. note & n.11 (collecting cases). As late
as 1965, this immunity question remained unsettled
in U.S. courts. See Second Restatement, supra, § 69 n.1.
And Congress did not adopt the restrictive theory until
1976, nearly two decades after the New York Convention.
See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.
Other countries lagged farther behind. Many still
recognized absolute immunity during the 1950s—
including Poland and the Soviet Union, original signatories of the Convention. See Tate Letter, 425 U.S. at
712, 714. Only decades later did the Council of Europe
and the International Law Commission officially embrace
the restrictive theory, in 1972 and 1986 respectively.
See Third Restatement, supra, Part IV.5.A. intro. note.
In sum, when the Convention was drafted, there was
an ongoing worldwide debate about whether countries
should always be immune from the domestic courts of
other countries or whether they should be immune
50a
only for their sovereign acts. Nobody suggested that
states should have no immunity. And some countries
that still embraced the traditional, absolute theory of
immunity also signed the Convention. In this legal and
historical context, with no clear text or contemporaneous mention of fundamentally altering the scope of
foreign sovereign immunity, mere use of the word
“persons” cannot be deemed to reach the governmental
acts of foreign sovereigns. Just as Congress does not
hide elephants in mouseholes, Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001), neither do treaty
negotiators. And if the Convention did have the
revolutionary effect that Zhongshan claims, then
surely someone, from among the many nations and
individuals negotiating the treaty, would have at least
mentioned it. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS,
484 U.S. 9, 17–18 (1987).
2
Background principles of espousal, like background
principles of immunity, are also instructive. Zhongshan
posits that the Convention permits enforcement of
claims against one sovereign by private parties who
are nationals of another. But the “traditional view of
international law is that it establishes substantive
principles for determining whether one country has
wronged another.” Federal Republic of Germany v.
Philipp, 592 U.S. 169, 176–77 (2021) (quoting Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 422
(1964)). Thus, if one sovereign violated public international law and thereby harmed a national of another,
it committed a legal wrong against the second sovereign.
See id. The aggrieved private party could have asked
its home country to espouse a claim against the
offending sovereign, but it could not have pursued any
international claim itself. Second Restatement, supra,
51a
§ 174 cmt. b; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of
the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815, 831–32
& n.106 (1997), quoted in Philipp, 592 U.S. at 176–78.
The only exceptions to this general rule—allowing
private individuals to raise international claims
against offending sovereigns— involved rare instances
where the sovereign itself had agreed to engage directly
with the aggrieved individual. See Second Restatement,
supra, § 175. Moreover, these rare instances mostly
involved early treaties in the discrete area that we now
call international humanitarian law. See Philipp, 592
U.S. at 177–78; Second Restatement, supra, § 175 cmt.
b; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra, at 831–32 & n.109.
They did not involve disputes under BITs or multilateral investment treaties, which did not become
common until the 1970s. See Azubuike, The Place of
Treaties in International Investment, 19 Ann. Surv. of
Int’l & Compar. L. 155, 161–62 (2013).
Again, Zhongshan’s position would hide elephants in
mouseholes. By the time of the New York Convention
in 1958, there was already support for domestic courts
to resolve disputes between private parties and foreign
sovereigns under private law. But for disputes between
private parties and foreign sovereigns under public
law, applying the Convention would have not only
eliminated bedrock immunity protections but also
undercut espousal requirements, in broad fields where
both would otherwise be required. Again, it is highly
unlikely that treaty drafters would have effected such
sweeping changes through an unadorned reference to
“persons,” in a Convention focused mainly on private
commercial trade. And it is highly unlikely, if such
sweeping changes were under consideration, that none
of the negotiating countries, interested parties, or
commenters would have even noted the issue.
52a
3
My colleagues object to this analysis based on what
they view as two separate acts of consent by Nigeria—
signing a BIT requiring certain disputes to be arbitrated
and signing the New York Convention calling for
certain arbitral awards to be enforced. Ante at 22–24.
As for the Convention, Zhongshan’s interpretation
requires contracting parties to enforce awards against
other sovereigns that have not signed the Convention.
For covered commercial disputes between covered
persons, all that matters is that the award was made
outside the territory of the signatory country where
enforcement is sought and inside the territory of
another signatory country. N.Y. Convention art. 1(1),
(3). Because the award here was made in the United
Kingdom, which has acceded to the Convention, the
fact that Nigeria also has acceded to the Convention
makes no difference to the analysis whether the
Convention covers Zhongshan’s award. My colleagues
stress that Nigeria has signed the Convention, ante at
22–23, but its construction of the treaty would apply
regardless. Moreover, even as to signatory countries,
Zhongshan construes the Convention to override what
would otherwise have been bedrock principles of
immunity and espousal in 1958. My colleagues explain
that sovereigns may waive these basic protections.
Ante at 22–24; see also id. at 36 (any presumption
“against treating states as persons fades when a state
consents to a suit”). True enough, but they still have
no persuasive account of why the Convention’s mere
reference to “persons” should be understood to have
such a dramatic yet unnoticed consequence, despite
the strong interpretive presumption against reading
that general term to restrict the public acts of governments.
53a
As for the BIT, my colleagues stress that Article 9
reflects Nigeria’s consent to arbitrate directly with
Chinese investors. Ante at 22–24. Again true enough,
but an agreement to arbitrate is a far cry from consent
to enforcement in the domestic courts of a co-equal
sovereign. The same is true for a general commitment
“to the enforcement of the award,” Nigeria-China BIT
art. 9(6), which most naturally means enforcement
through diplomatic processes or international tribunals.
See Third Restatement, supra, § 906 & cmt. b.
* * * *
In sum, the relevant historical and legal background
cuts strongly against Zhongshan’s expansive interpretation of the Convention.
C
Because treaties are agreements, courts may consider “negotiation and drafting history” to determine
“the shared understanding” of the parties. GE Energy
Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu
Stainless USA, LLC, 590 U.S. 432, 441 (2020) (cleaned
up). And while text is of course the best evidence of
that understanding, courts should strive to avoid conflict with the “intent or expectations of its signatories.”
Rodriguez v. Pan Am. Health Org., 29 F.4th 706, 717–
18 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). Here, drafting history
confirms what text and context strongly suggest—that
the Convention does not extend to disputes arising
from sovereign acts governed by public law.
Consider the report of the committee charged with
drafting the Convention. It included representatives
from nine different countries, ranging from Belgium to
the Soviet Union and including five of the original
24 signatories. See Report of the Committee on the
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, at 2,
54a
U.N. Doc. E/AC.42/4 (Mar. 21, 1955) (Drafting Committee
Report). The Drafting Committee decided to change
the name of the Convention from one about enforcing
“International” arbitral awards to one about enforcing
“Foreign” awards, out of concern that “International”
might suggest coverage of state-state arbitrations. See
id. at 5. As the Committee explained, the Convention
“does not deal with arbitration between States, but
deals with recognition and enforcement in one country
of arbitral awards made in another country.” Id. My
colleagues read this statement as possibly meaning
that the Convention does not deal exclusively with
arbitration between States, but also deals with the
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards,
see ante at 30–31, but that reading is surely strained.
And if the Convention “does not deal with arbitration
between States,” then Zhongshan’s position must be
wrong: There is no colorable basis, in linguistic usage
or background legal context, to make one party’s
personhood under the Convention turn on the identity
of the other party. If “persons” extends to governments
acting in their sovereign capacity in disputes with
private parties, then it also extends to governments
acting in their sovereign capacity in disputes with
other governments. My colleagues formally reserve the
question whether their interpretation would sweep in
state-state disputes under public international law.
See id. at 31–32. Yet that is the clear implication of
their position, and it is inconsistent with this drafting
history.2
2
To distinguish state-state disputes, my colleagues characterize the investor-state dispute here as one governed “in material
part by domestic law.” Ante at 31–32. But the claims here arise
under the BIT, an international agreement governed by public
international law. See Third Restatement, supra, § 487 cmt. f. To
55a
The report of the Drafting Committee supports
Nigeria in another important respect. The Belgian
representative on the Committee proposed that the
Convention “should expressly provide that public
enterprises and public utilities should be deemed to be
legal persons ... if their activities were governed by
private law.” Drafting Committee Report, supra, at 7
(emphasis added). But even the representative from
Belgium, which had already adopted the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity, did not seek to extend
the Convention to disputes governed by public law.
Nor did the Drafting Committee itself. It rejected
Belgium’s proposal as “superfluous” but decided that a
“reference in [its] report would suffice” to note its
agreement with Belgium. See id.
Other parts of the drafting history reinforce these
points. In supporting a different change to the Convention’s title, Switzerland pressed its view that the
Convention covers “international awards in private
law,” but not “international awards in public law.” See
U.N. Secretary-General, Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, at annex I, 8–9, U.N. Doc.
E/2822 (Jan. 31, 1956) (Secretary-General Report). A
representative of Italy—another early adopter of the
be sure, the BIT itself recognizes that domestic law as well as
international law will be relevant to any investor-state dispute.
Art. 9(7). But questions of public international law frequently
turn in part on domestic public law; for instance, the question
whether a government’s treatment of aliens violates international law often turns on how the government treats similarly
situated citizens. See, e.g., id. arts. 2(3), 3(2); Phillip, 592 U.S. at
176–77. So the fact that domestic law sets the backdrop for the
international claims at issue here is hardly unusual. Nor would
it distinguish a state-state arbitration under Article 8 of the BIT
if China had chosen to espouse the claims that Zhongshan raised
here under Article 9.
56a
restrictive theory of immunity—expressed concern that
the reference to “disputes between legal persons” could
be misconstrued to encompass “a dispute between
States.” U.N. Conf. on Int’l Com. Arb., Summary Record
of the Sixteenth Meeting, at 5, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.26/
SR.16 (June 3, 1958) (cleaned up). But the President of
the Conference at which the Convention was finalized
responded that the Drafting Committee “had had no
such intention when it had prepared the draft
Convention.” Id. Finally, a representative of the United
States stressed the importance of the Convention to the
efficient settlement of “private disputes arising out
of international trade,” suggesting no extension to
disputes under public international law. U.N. Conf.
on Int’l Com. Arb., Summary Record of the Second
Meeting, at 8, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.2 (May 21, 1958).
Against all of this, including a written report of the
Drafting Committee itself, my colleagues highlight a
two-sentence comment by Austria, which neither
participated on the Committee nor was an original
signatory of the Convention, and comments by one
private party. Ante at 33–35. Neither of these comments
produced any response from either the Drafting Committee or any of the contracting parties. In the Convention’s overall drafting history, these comments do
not count for much. But even on their own terms, the
comments help Nigeria more than Zhongshan.
Start with Austria. First, it asserted that the
Convention covers awards for or against states made
“in cases of disputes with subjects of private law.”
Secretary-General Report, at annex I, 11. The garbled
reference to “disputes with subjects of private law”
most likely meant private-law disputes, which would
simply reiterate that the Convention covers awards
against sovereigns arising from their private acts. And
57a
even if “disputes with subjects of private law” meant
government disputes with private parties, as my
colleagues suggest, that still would not clearly pick up
investment disputes between governments and private
parties arising from sovereign acts governed by public
law—a legal category that would have been unrecognizable in 1958. Moreover, Austria’s second sentence
confirms that it meant no such thing: “Nevertheless, it
would be desirable to provide expressly that the convention is also applicable in cases in which corporate
bodies under public law, and particularly states, in
their capacity as entities having rights and duties
under private law, have entered into an arbitration
convention for the purpose of the settlement of disputes.” Id. (emphasis added). Taken as a whole,
Austria’s comments do not suggest that the Convention
reaches sovereign acts regulated by public law. And in
any event, we should not “dissect” one garbled phrase
from Austria’s comment as if it were treaty text. See
Saint Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993).
Comments by the Society of Comparative Legislation
are also helpful to Nigeria. The Society proposed an
amendment to provide that governments are covered
persons “on the condition” that the dispute “arose out
of a commercial contract or a private business operation.” Society-General Report, at Annex II, 9. That is
consistent with the Convention covering sovereigns
acting in a private but not governmental capacity.
Moreover, the Society further proposed changing the
title of the Convention to cover international disputes
“in private law,” to make even clearer that it does not
cover “arbitration in public international law.” Id. at 4.
Far from ambiguous or messy, the drafting history
reveals a consensus that the word “persons” includes
governments acting as private parties under private
58a
law but does not include governments acting as
sovereigns under public law.
D
My colleagues offer five further arguments based on
post-ratification evidence, but none moves the needle.
First, my colleagues characterize Nigeria’s interpretation of the Convention as novel and unsupported.
Ante at 21. But many commentators have supported
it. See, e.g., Third Restatement, supra, § 487 cmt. f
(“Ordinarily, arbitration of a controversy of a public
international law character, such as ... a dispute about
the interpretation of or performance under an international agreement ... , is not subject to the New York
Convention ....”); ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation of
the 1958 New York Convention: A Handbook for Judges
85 (Int’l Council for Comm. Arbitration 2011) (“The
expression ‘persons, whether physical or legal’ in
Article I(1) of the Convention is generally deemed to
include public law entities entering into commercial
contracts with private parties. Courts ... frequently
invoke the distinction between acta de jure gestionis
[private acts] and acta de jure imperii [public acts] ....”);
M. Sornarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment
Disputes 309–10 (2000) (“The New York Convention
was not designed for enforcement of arbitral awards
against state parties.... [T]he fact that [a] dispute
was caused by a sovereign act, usually an act of
nationalization[,] makes enforcement under the
Convention highly unlikely.”).
In any event, it is no surprise that the question
presented has not produced litigated decisions. For
many investment disputes between host countries and
foreign investors, the New York Convention applies
because the host and the investor have a commercial
59a
relationship, and the dispute involves breaches of
the governing contracts or other private-law disputes.
See, e.g., Diag Human v. Czech Republic—Ministry of
Health, 824 F.3d 131, 132–34 (D.C. Cir. 2016); TermRio
S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 929–31
(D.C. Cir. 2007); Creighton Ltd. v. Government of the
State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Moreover, most investment disputes between host
countries and foreign investors are resolved under the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States, opened
for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1291 (entered
into force Oct. 14, 1966) (ICSID Convention), a multilateral treaty that became effective eight years after
the New York Convention. The ICSID Convention
established procedures for arbitrating such disputes,
id. art. 25, and it truncated enforcement issues by
granting awards the status of domestic judgments, id.
arts. 53–54. Over 160 nations have signed the ICSID
Convention. Many foreign investors insist on both
ICSID dispute-resolution processes and underlying
treaty protection against sovereign acts such as discrimination, denial of protection or fair treatment, and
uncompensated expropriation. So, because the ICSID
Convention requires only that signatory states agree
in writing to submit investment disputes to ICSID, id.
art. 25(1), ICSID arbitrations typically cover claims by
an aggrieved investor that a foreign state has breached
treaty obligations through sovereign acts. See, e.g., The
Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID No.
ARB(AF)/98/3, Award at 9–10 (June 26, 2003) (claims
under Chapter 11 of North American Free Trade
Agreement). In this case, arbitration through ICSID
was unavailable because, although Article 9 of the
Nigeria-China BIT envisioned ICSID involvement in
making any “necessary appointments” to an “ad hoc
60a
arbitral tribunal,” art. 9(4)–(5), Nigeria did not give the
necessary consent to submit disputes under the BIT
to ICSID. In short, the usual availability of ICSID
arbitration for disputes like this one—not the novelty
of Nigeria’s reading on the New York Convention—
explains why there is scant caselaw on whether
the older, private-focused treaty applies to disputes
arising from sovereign acts governed by public law.
Second, my colleagues invoke precedent that they
say “corroborates” the conclusion that the New York
Convention “fully appli[es] to arbitral awards arising
from sovereign acts.” Ante at 24–25; see also id. at 19
(Convention cases “involving foreign states charged
with breaching investment and commercial treaty
obligations”). None of these cases addresses either
the scope of the FSIA’s arbitration exception or the
underlying question whether the Convention applies
to awards arising from sovereign acts that violate
treaties. And if “a potential jurisdictional defect is
neither noted nor discussed in a federal decision, the
decision does not stand for the proposition that no
defect existed.” Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v.
Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 144 (2011). Accordingly, the cited
cases are not “persuasive, much less binding” on the
overlooked issue whether the Convention applies to
disputes arising from sovereign acts governed by
public international law. Schindler Elevator Corp. v.
WMATA, 16 F.4th 294, 299 (D.C. Cir. 2021); see also
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91
(1998) (“We have often said that drive-by jurisdictional
rulings ... have no precedential effect.”).
For example, consider Tatneft v. Ukraine, 21 F.4th
829 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (Tatneft II), the case that my
colleagues discuss most fully. True, it involved public
acts that allegedly breached treaty obligations. See id.
61a
at 832–33. But our decision addressed only merits
defenses under the Convention: whether the dispute
fell outside the governing BIT, whether the district
court impermissibly modified the award, whether
enforcement would violate United States public policy,
and whether the arbitral tribunal was improperly
composed. See id. at 835–40. An earlier decision in
the case, Tatneft v. Ukraine, 771 Fed. App’x 9 (D.C.
Cir. 2019) (Tatneft I), did address jurisdiction and
immunity issues under the FSIA. But Tatneft I is an
unpublished ruling that does not bind this panel. See
In re Grant, 635 F.3d 1227, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2011). And
in any event, Tatneft I did not address whether the
New York Convention applies to disputes arising
from sovereign acts, thus triggering application of the
FSIA’s arbitration exception. Instead, Tatneft I held
only that the FSIA’s waiver exception applied because
the allegedly breaching sovereign in that case had
signed the New York Convention. 771 Fed. App’x at 10.
So, even if Tatneft I had been a published opinion, it
still would not bind us here.3
Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, 795 F.3d 200 (D.C. Cir.
2015), is similarly inapposite. There, the arbitral
award was based on the failure of Ecuadorean courts
to resolve pending contract claims. Id. at 202–03. But
3
The FSIA waiver ruling in Tatneft I is especially shaky. In
Process & Industrial Developments Ltd. v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 962 F.3d 576 (D.C. Cir. 2020), we specifically noted that
because Tatneft I “was an unpublished decision,” its waiver
holding “does not bind future panels.” Id. at 583–84. Later in the
same case, we expressly declined to apply Tatneft I after the
Executive Branch expressed “significant policy concerns” with the
view that merely signing the New York Convention, and agreeing
to arbitrate in a signatory country, amounts to a waiver of
sovereign immunity. Process & Indus. Devs. Ltd. v. Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 27 F.4th 771, 775 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
62a
our decision did not address whether the New York
Convention covers awards governed by public law; we
explained that Ecuador had agreed to arbitrate the
dispute and rejected its various merits defenses to
enforcement. See id. at 203–09.
Or consider BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina,
572 U.S. 25 (2013), the Supreme Court decision cited
by my colleagues. That case too involved public acts
that allegedly breached treaty obligations. Id. at 29–
31. But it addressed only the question whether an
arbitrator had permissibly construed a “local litigation
requirement” in the governing BIT. Id. at 30– 32. The
Court did not address whether the New York Convention
applies to public acts that allegedly violate treaties.
Nor could that question have even arisen: The arbitration in BG Group took place in the United States,
which triggered a prong of the FSIA’s arbitration
exception different from the one at issue here. See 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (arbitration exception applies to
actions to confirm arbitral awards if “(A) the arbitration takes place ... in the United States, [or] (B) the
agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty
or other international agreement in force for the
United States calling for the recognition and enforcement
of arbitral awards”).
One final point about our caselaw. Zhongshan
heavily relies on Belize Social Development, Ltd. v.
Government of Belize, 794 F.3d 99 (D.C. Cir. 2015),
which construed the commercial reservation in the
New York Convention to preserve coverage for
“matters which have a connection to commerce.” Id. at
105. We also declined to construe the reservation as
limiting the Convention to disputes arising from acts
that would qualify as commercial for immunity
purposes. See id. at 104–05. Those rulings at least
63a
suggest that the defendant sovereign qualified as a
“person[]” under the Convention, though we did not
directly address the issue. But the case involved only
contract claims: Belize sold real property to a private
company to develop a telecommunications facility and
promised to give the company tax and regulatory
relief. See id. at 100. The case thus straddles the
boundary of public and private international law, with
duties grounded in private contract law but involving
public acts. Perhaps private law should govern
sovereigns in these circumstances, subject to whatever
limits public law may impose on their ability to
contract away governmental prerogatives. Cf. United
States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (breach-ofcontract liability for sovereign acts). Regardless, this
case is different: Nigeria engaged in no private conduct
with and had no private-law obligations to Zhongshan,
which brought a treaty claim based solely on Nigeria’s
sovereign acts, actual or imputed, for breaching its
duties under public international law. That falls
squarely on the public side of the line, today as well as
in the late 1950s.
Third, the majority points to a footnote in an amicus
brief that the government filed some 44 years ago. Ante
at 25–26. The brief opined that the New York
Convention does not prevent enforcement of an arbitral
award based on contract claims arising from an
expropriation. Brief for the United States as Amicus at
20 n.16, Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People’s Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, Nos. 80-1207, 80-1252 (D.C. Cir.
June 16, 1980) (LIAMCO). LIAMCO is thus similar to
Belize, with a private-law claim predicated on a public
act. So it seems to me unclear what position the United
States might take here, where the claim cannot be
grounded in any contract governed by private law. In
any event, the government filed its amicus brief
64a
22 years after the Convention. And post-ratification
conduct “decades after the finalization of the New York
Convention’s text in 1958” is at best weak “evidence of
the original shared understanding of the treaty’s
meaning.” See GE Energy, 590 U.S. at 443.
Fourth, my colleagues point to the Energy Charter
Treaty (ECT), opened for signature Dec. 17, 1994, 2080
U.N.T.S. 95, which they say “treated the New York
Convention” as covering awards “arising from sovereign
acts.” Ante at 27–28. But the ECT did not amend the
Convention. Instead, it decreed that certain claims
governed by the ECT “shall be considered to arise out
of a commercial relationship” for purposes of the
Convention, art. 26(5)(b), thus prohibiting ECT signatories from applying the commercial reservation to
covered claims. At most, this provision obligates ECT
signatories to enforce ECT arbitral awards as if they
arose under the New York Convention, which says
nothing for non-ECT signatories such as the United
States. Moreover, the ECT was not opened for signature
until some 36 years after the Convention was adopted.
So this post-ratification conduct is of little value “as
evidence of the original shared understanding of the
treaty’s meaning.” See GE Energy, 590 U.S. at 443.
Finally, my colleagues claim support from Congress’s
command that “[e]nforcement of arbitral agreements
... shall not be refused on the basis of the Act of State
doctrine.” Ante at 36–37; see 9 U.S.C. § 15. But the Act
of State doctrine affords a substantive rule of decision—
United States courts may not “declare invalid the
official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its
own territory.” W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Env’t Tectonics
Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990). It can apply in
litigation between private parties no less than in
litigation between private parties and the foreign
65a
sovereigns themselves. See id. at 405–06. So, barring
its application does not signal a congressional desire
to extend the New York Convention to disputes in
which the foreign sovereign itself is charged with
violating public international law. In any event,
Congress did not enact the provision until 1988. Again,
the views of a non-signatory party three “decades after
the finalization of the New York Convention’s text in
1958,” are of little interpretive significance. See GE
Energy, 590 U.S. at 443.
III
Text, legal context, and drafting history all indicate
that the word “persons,” as used in the New York
Convention, does not include signatory nations acting
as sovereigns. I respectfully dissent.
66a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
————
Civil Action No. 22-170 (BAH)
————
ZHONGSHAN FUCHENG INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT CO., LTD.,
Petitioner,
v.
FEDERAL REPULIC OF NIGERIA,
Respondent.
————
Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell
————
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner Zhongshan Fucheng Industrial Investment
Co., Ltd. (“Zhongshan”) instituted this suit against
Respondent, the Federal Republic of Nigeria (“Nigeria”),
to enforce an arbitration award that—nearly two years
after issuance—Nigeria has failed to pay. Nigeria now
moves to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)–(2), on the
grounds of sovereign immunity not exempted under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28
U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. See Resp’t’s Mot. Dismiss for Lack
of Jurisdiction Under the FSIA (“Resp’t’s Mot.”), ECF
No. 24. Petitioner counters that the requirements of
the FSIA’s arbitration exception are met, and jurisdiction may therefore be exercised. See Pet’r’s Mem.
67a
Opp’n Resp’t’s Mot. Dismiss (“Pet’r’s Opp’n”), ECF No.
26. For the reasons explained below, petitioner has the
better of the arguments under the binding precedent
of the D.C. Circuit, requiring denial of Nigeria’s motion
to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Nigeria’s Seizure of Zhongshan’s Assets
The present dispute emerges from a Chinese business
investment in Nigeria—once successful enough to
have garnered coverage by the Economist Intelligence
Unit as an example of “China’s economic model in
Africa”—that ended in the expropriation of the company’s
assets, the flight of its executives from Nigeria after
one executive was arrested at gunpoint and physically
beaten by the police, and, ultimately, a $55-millionplus arbitration award against Nigeria.1 The locus
of the saga is a free-trade zone, called the Ogun
Guangdong Free Trade Zone, in Nigeria’s southwestern
region in Ogun State, not far from Lagos.
As set forth in the arbitral tribunal’s findings of facts
in its Final Award, ECF No. 2-1, starting in 2007, Ogun
State contracted with various Chinese companies,
including petitioner, to develop the subject free-trade
zone. Specifically, Ogun State entered an agreement
with Guangdong Xinguang International China-Africa
Investment Ltd. (“CAI”) and CCNC Group, Ltd., pur1
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s profile of the Ogun
Guangdong Free Trade Zone was referenced by the arbitral
tribunal in its final award decision. See Decl. of Hussein Haeri
Supp. Pet. Recognize & Enforce Foreign Arbitral Award (“Haeri
Decl. Supp. Pet.”), Ex. A, Final Arbitration Award dated March 26,
2021 (“Final Award”) ¶ 127, ECF No. 2-1; Economist Intelligence
Unit, Zones of Influence (last accessed January 21, 2023), https://
growthcrossings.economist.com/video/zones-of-influence/.
68a
suant to which the three entities would jointly own the
Ogun Guangdong Free Trade Zone Company (“OGFTZ”)
for a period of 99 years, and CAI would lead the
development of the Zone, encompassing nearly 8
square miles of land. See Decl. of Hussein Haeri Supp.
Pet. Recognize & Enforce Foreign Arbitral Award
(“Haeri Decl. Supp. Pet.”), Ex. A, Final Arbitration
Award dated March 26, 2021 (“Final Award”) ¶¶ 4–5,
ECF No. 2-1. After three years of limited progress, on
June 29, 2010, OGFTZ entered an agreement with
petitioner’s parent company, Zhuhai Zhongfu Industrial
Group Co. Ltd. (“Zhuhai”), giving Zhuhai control of
developing and operating a fraction of the Zone’s area
into Fucheng Industrial Park. Id. ¶¶ 6–8. That year,
Zhuhai effectively transferred its rights to petitioner,
which operated in Nigeria through its wholly-owned
Nigerian subsidiary Zhongfu International Investment
(NIG) FZE (“Zhongfu”). Id. ¶¶ 3, 9.2
From 2010 until the breakdown of the relationship
in 2016, Zhongfu invested substantial assets into
developing Fucheng Industrial Park. For example, to
attract industrial lessees to the Park, Zhongfu built
roads, upgraded communications, sewage, and power
systems, and opened community services including a
hospital, hotel, supermarket, and bank. Id. ¶¶ 21–22.
By early 2014, the Park had attracted approximately
sixteen businesses. Id. ¶ 23. During this period,
CAI’s management of the overall Zone had apparently
broken down, resulting in Ogun State’s termination of
2
The tribunal noted in its Final Award that, although Zhongfu
had apparently assumed Zhuhai’s interests in the Zone by 2010—
as reflected in an October 10, 2010-dated deed entitling Zhuhai
to delegate its rights and obligations to third parties—the assignment of interests between Zhuhai and Zhongfu was formalized in
a January 15, 2013 document. Final Award ¶ 16, ECF No. 2-1.
69a
the company’s participation in the OGFTZ in 2012 and
appointment of Zhongfu to take its place as part owner
of the OGFTZ in 2013. Id. ¶¶ 13–20.
Zhongfu’s woes began in April 2016, when the
Secretary of Ogun State indicated in a letter to
OGFTZ—apparently on the advice of the Chinese
Consulate in Lagos—that CAI had been acquired by
Guangdong New South Group (“NSG”), and that this
transfer may have somehow entitled NSG, rather than
Zhongfu, to ownership of the Zone. Id. ¶¶ 33–34. Ogun
State had received a note verbale, a diplomatic note,
from the Economic and Commercial Section of the
Chinese consulate in Lagos, dated March 11, 2016,
which stated that the acquisition of CAI “will legally
lead to the replacement of the management rights of
the OGFTZ which is now in the hands of [Zhongfu] to
Guangdong New South Group.” Id. ¶ 33.3 In May 2016,
3
This detail of the Chinese government’s involvement in—if
not outright instigation of—Ogun State’s ejection of Zhongfu from
the Zone did not detain the arbitral tribunal for long, and Nigeria
apparently did not call, or even “suggest[],” that any agents of the
Chinese government could be identified to provide evidence of the
underlying reasons for replacement of petitioner with NSG as
manager of the Zone. Final Award ¶¶ 93–94. The tribunal’s
admitted lack of clarity on this element of the underlying facts is
unsettling in light of the whisper in the Final Award’s pages that
Zhongfu’s administration of the Zone might have fallen short of
expectations. See, e.g., id. ¶ 29 (noting a May 18, 2015-dated letter
from the Secretary of Ogun State complaining about Zhongfu’s
performance); id. ¶¶ 115–120 (noting that the parent companies
of CAI and Zhongfu signed an “entrustment of equity management
agreement” in March 2012, in which CAI’s share of the Zone
would be “entrusted” to Zhongfu—a detail that the arbitral
tribunal apparently found perplexing and about which it “had an
initial degree of concern about the accuracy” of Zhongfu’s
witness’s testimony, but that it ultimately found irrelevant). The
factual findings by the arbitral tribunal, however, are not
reviewable by this Court, nor are they presently challenged by
70a
according to petitioner, Ogun State purported to
terminate its 2013 agreement that appointed Zhongfu
as part owner of the Zone, and reneged on the 2010
agreement that had given Zhongfu and Zhongshan
management rights of the Fucheng Industrial Park.
Pet’r’s Pet. to Recognize & Enforce Foreign Arbitral
Award (“Pet.”) ¶¶ 18–19, ECF No. 1. In July 2016,
Ogun State’s Secretary texted Zhongshan’s managing
director Jianxin Han, urging him to “leave peacefully
when there is opportunity to do so,” and the following
month, warrants were issued for the arrest of Han and
Wenxiao Zhao, who had served as the Chief Financial
Officer of the OGFTZ. Final Award ¶¶ 37, 39. Zhao
was arrested at gunpoint, physically beaten, and
detained for ten days by police before he and Han could
flee the country—unceremoniously closing the book on
Zhongshan’s management of the OGFTZ and Fucheng
Industrial Park. Id. ¶¶ 39–40.
B. Subsequent Arbitration Proceedings
Petitioner commenced an arbitration proceeding
against Nigeria on August 30, 2018 pursuant to a bilateral
treaty between Nigeria and China. Pet. ¶ 22–23.4 The
Nigeria. See Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, 244 F. Supp. 3d 100, 110 (D.D.C. 2017) (describing
courts’ deferential standard in reviewing foreign arbitral awards
as “allowing vacatur of an award not if ‘the panel committed an
error—or even a serious error’ but ‘only when [an] arbitrator
strays from interpretation and application of the agreement and
effectively dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice’”
(quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S.
662, 671–72 (2010))).
4
Petitioner, via Zhongfu, initially sought relief through the
Nigerian courts, initiating one lawsuit in the Federal High Court
in Abuja, Nigeria, against Nigeria’s Export Processing Zones
Authority (“NEPZA”), the Attorney-General of Ogun State, and
another company that was a partner of the OGFTZ, see Final
71a
bilateral investment treaty, called the Agreement
Between the Government of the People’s Republic of
China and the Government of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments (“China-Nigeria BIT”), represents an
agreement between the countries to promote bilateral
investment by guaranteeing that the other country’s
investors would be treated equally and protected from
the nationalization of their investments. See generally
Haeri Decl. Supp. Pet., Ex. B, China-Nigeria BIT, ECF
No. 2-2. Article 9 of the China-Nigeria BIT provides
that, when any dispute arises between one of the
countries and an investor from the other country—
e.g., a dispute between Nigeria and a Chinese
investor—that cannot be resolved by the parties,
either party may request that an ad hoc arbitral
tribunal settle the dispute with a binding decision. See
id. at Art. 9.
Petitioner brought five claims against Nigeria for
breaches of the China-Nigeria BIT in the arbitral
action. First, petitioner claimed that Nigeria violated
its obligation of fair and equitable treatment of
Chinese investors under Art. 3(1). Pet. ¶ 23. Second,
petitioner claimed that Nigeria unreasonably discriminated against it, violating Art. 2(3), and third, that
Nigeria failed to provide the “continuous protection”
afforded by Art. 2(2). Id. Fourth, petitioner claimed
Award ¶ 42, and another lawsuit in Ogun State High Court
against OGFTZ, Ogun State, and the Attorney-General of Ogun
State, id. The lawsuits sought reinstatement of Zhongfu’s
management and possession of the Zone based on the 2010 and
2013 contracts, id. ¶ 43, but both proceedings “were discontinued”
in March and April 2018, id. ¶ 44. Zhongfu also began arbitration
proceedings in the Singapore International Arbitration Center
against, inter alia, Ogun State, but that proceeding was enjoined
by the Ogun State High Court. Id. ¶ 45.
72a
that Nigeria violated its contract with petitioner,
violating Art. 10(2). Id. Finally, petitioner claimed that
Nigeria wrongfully expropriated Zhongshan’s investments without compensation, in violation of Art. 4. Id.
The London, United Kingdom-located arbitral
tribunal rendered its Final Award on March 26, 2021,
finding that Nigeria had violated Zhongshan’s rights
under the China-Nigeria BIT. Specifically, the tribunal
determined that Nigeria took actions that were
“plainly designed to deprive, and indeed succeeded in
depriving, Zhongfu of its rights” under the 2010 and
2013 agreements. Final Award ¶¶ 125–26. In addition,
the tribunal found that Ogun State, Nigeria’s Export
Processing Zones Authority (“NEPZA”), and the police—
all state actors—took discriminatory and coercive
steps against Zhongfu that resulted in Nigeria taking
possession of Zhongfu’s investment in the country. Id.
¶¶ 125–32. Nigeria was ordered to pay Zhongshan
approximately $55.6 million in compensation for the
expropriation, $75,000 in “moral damages,” $9.4
million in interest calculated between the July 22,
2016-dated expropriation and rendering of the award,
approximately $3 million in legal fees and costs
related to the arbitration, approximately $430,000 in
other costs, and post-Award interest on the preceding
sums—a total figure approaching $70 million, and
growing. Pet. ¶ 33.5
Nigeria has already tried and failed to shirk this
arbitration award in the United Kingdom. Approximately
5
The Award enumerated certain of the damages—namely, the
compensation, moral damages, and pre-Award interest on both—
in U.S. dollars, and the legal fees and costs related to the
arbitration in British pounds. As a result, the Court’s calculation
of the total figure, which converted all sums into U.S. dollars, is a
mere estimate.
73a
one month after the Award’s rendering, Nigeria filed
an arbitration claim form in the English High Court,
collaterally challenging the Award under the English
Arbitration Act on the basis that the tribunal lacked
jurisdiction. Although Nigeria later discontinued this
challenge, petitioner was still not paid the sums
awarded by the tribunal. Id. ¶¶ 35–41. On December
8, 2021, petitioner commenced enforcement proceedings in the United Kingdom, and the English court
issued an order that recognized the Award. Id. ¶ 42.
C. Instant Litigation
On January 25, 2022, Zhongshan initiated the
instant lawsuit, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration
Act (the “FAA”), which provides for confirmation of
arbitral awards falling under the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards of June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 (the “New York
Convention”), see 9 U.S.C. § 201–207. See Pet. ¶ 1. The
FAA provides that the New York Convention is
enforceable in the courts of the United States, to which
courts a party may apply for an order confirming an
arbitral award issued under the Convention. Id.
§§ 201, 207. In response, Nigeria filed the pending
motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter and
personal jurisdiction under the FSIA, contending that
no exception to the FSIA applies because the award
does not fall under the New York Convention, Resp’t’s
Mot., ECF No. 24, which motion petitioner opposes,
Pet’r’s Opp’n, ECF No. 26. With briefing now complete,
see Resp’t’s Reply, ECF No. 27, Nigeria’s motion to
dismiss is now ripe for review.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,”
Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quoting
74a
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994)), and “have only the power that is
authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the
statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto,” Johnson
v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 869 F.3d 976, 980
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area
Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)). To survive a
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1), plaintiff thus “bears the burden of invoking
the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” Arpaio v.
Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).
“Where a plaintiff has asserted jurisdiction under the
FSIA and the defendant foreign state has asserted ‘the
jurisdictional defense of immunity,’ the defendant
state ‘bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff's
allegations do not bring its case within a statutory
exception to immunity.’” Belize Social Dev. Ltd. v. Gov’t
of Belize, 794 F.3d 99, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting
Phoenix Consulting Inc. v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d
36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). Further, in deciding a motion
to dismiss on the basis of the FSIA, courts’ subjectmatter and personal jurisdictional inquiries often
collapse into the same question: “If none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity set forth in the Act
applies, the District Court lacks both statutory subject
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.” Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 485
n.5 (1983). See also Schubarth v. Federal Republic
of Germany, 891 F.3d 392, 397 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(“Under the FSIA, personal jurisdiction exists where
(1) subject matter jurisdiction has been satisfied, and
(2) proper service has been effected.” (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1330(b))). Nigeria does not contend that service was
improper, so the jurisdictional challenges merge.
75a
When a jurisdictional skirmish “present[s] a dispute
over the factual basis of the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction . . . the court must go beyond the pleadings
and resolve” any dispute necessary to the disposition
of the motion to dismiss. Feldman v. F.D.I.C., 879 F.3d
347, 351 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Phoenix Consulting,
216 F.3d at 40). In such situations, the “court may
properly consider allegations in the complaint and
evidentiary material in the record,” affording plaintiff
“the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Id.; see also
Am. Freedom Law Ctr. v. Obama, 821 F.3d 44, 49 (D.C.
Cir. 2016) (“In considering a motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction . . . we ‘may consider
materials outside the pleadings in deciding whether
to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.’”
(quoting Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402
F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005))). Absent “evidentiary
offering[s],” Feldman, 879 F.3d at 351, however, courts
must seek jurisdictional assurance by accepting as
true all material “factual allegations in the complaint
and contru[ing] the complaint liberally,” and again
“granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can
be derived from the facts alleged.” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v.
F.D.I.C., 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
For this Court to have subject matter jurisdiction
over a petition to enforce a foreign arbitral award
against a foreign sovereign, two inter-related requirements must be satisfied: (1) “there must be a basis
upon which a court in the United States may enforce a
foreign arbitral award,” and (2) the foreign state “must
not enjoy sovereign immunity from such an enforcement.”
Creighton Ltd. v. Gov’t of State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118,
76a
121 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Both requirements are addressed
in turn.
A. Jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration
Act
The New York Convention is an international treaty
ratified by the United States that provides for signatory
states’ recognition of arbitral awards “made in the
territory of a State other than the State where the
recognition and enforcement of such awards are
sought.” Process & Indus. Dev. Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of
Nigeria (“P&ID”), 27 F.4th 771, 774 (D.C. Cir. 2022)
(quoting New York Convention, art. I(1)). The FAA
codified the New York Convention into law, providing
that “[a]n action . . . falling under the Convention shall
be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the
United States,” and granted district courts original
jurisdiction over such actions. 9 U.S.C. § 203.
For an arbitral award to “fall[] under the Convention,”
two requirements—both optional elements of the New
York Convention that the United States adopted at
ratification—must be satisfied. See Restatement (Third)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 487 cmts. b, f (Am. L. Inst. 1987). First, the arbitral
award must be “rendered within the jurisdiction of
a signatory country,” pursuant to the reciprocity
reservation of the Convention. Creighton, 181 F.3d
at 123. The United Kingdom, where the at-issue
arbitration award was rendered, is a member of the
New York Convention. See New York Arbitration
Convention, Contracting States, http://www.newyork
convention.org/countries (last visited Jan. 22, 2023).
Second, pursuant to the Convention’s commercial
reservation, which the United States adopted as a
part of a minority of the Convention’s signatories,
the award must “aris[e] out of a legal relationship,
77a
whether contractual or not, which is considered
as commercial.” 9 U.S.C. § 202; Belize Social Dev. Ltd.,
794 F.3d at 103. This commercial reservation is the
basis for Nigeria’s instant motion.
Nigeria argues that petitioner is “precluded from
relying on the New York Convention to recognize and
enforce the Award in this Court,” because the ChinaNigeria BIT giving rise to petitioner’s arbitral award
“does not establish a ‘legal relationship . . . which
is considered as commercial.’” Resp’t’s Mot. at 8, 13
(quoting Diag Human, S.E. v. Czech Republic Ministry
of Health, 824 F.3d 131, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). The FAA
does not define the term “commercial,” but the D.C.
Circuit has interpreted the term expansively. “In the
context of international arbitration, ‘commercial’ refers
to ‘matters or relationships, whether contractual or
not, that arise out of or in connection with commerce.’”
Belize Social Dev. Ltd., 794 F.3d at 103–104 (quoting
Restatement (Third) of U.S. Law of Int’l Comm.
Arbitration § 1–1 (2012)); see also id. at 104 (noting the
relationship between the “term’s broad compass” and
“the more familiar term ‘affecting commerce’—words
of art that ordinarily signal the broadest permissible
exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power” (quoting
Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003))).
Nigeria’s attempts to cast the Final Award as arising
from a non-commercial relationship lack support
in D.C. Circuit precedent. According to Nigeria, the
China-Nigeria BIT is “quintessentially sovereign” and
cannot form the basis for a commercial relationship
between a private investor and either country. See
Resp’t’s Mot. at 13–15; Resp’t’s Reply at 13–15. Next,
Nigeria contends that Zhongshan conceded the noncommercial character of its relationship with Nigeria
by litigating initially against Ogun State, as reflected
78a
in the arbitral record. See Resp’t’s Mot. at 15–18;
Resp’t’s Reply at 10–12; see also supra n.4. Finally,
Nigeria challenges the Final Award as being “unlike
other arbitration awards routinely enforced in this
Circuit” because this Award did not arise from a
business relationship between Nigeria and Zhongshan,
but solely from the China-Nigeria BIT. Resp’t’s Reply
at 5.
Each argument is considered in turn and none is
persuasive.
1. The Award’s Basis in the China-Nigeria
BIT Does Not Render the Parties’ Legal
Relationship Per Se Non-Commercial
Nigeria asserts the bold argument that, as a matter
of law, the China-Nigeria BIT cannot form the basis of
an arbitral award that falls within the coverage of the
New York Convention’s commercial reservation. Resp’t’s
Mot. at 13–15. Nigeria urges a distinction between
“certain direct contractual arrangements between
sovereigns and investors, which are subject to the New
York Convention, and international treaties, which are
not.” Resp’t’s Reply at 17. The parties do not dispute
that the China-Nigeria BIT is a treaty and, under
Nigeria’s reasoning, falls in the latter category. See
Resp’t’s Mot. at 14 (observing that “the Nigeria-China
Treaty is comprehensively focused on regulating state
conduct in the protection of investments” and is not “a
commercial agreement between Petitioner and Nigeria”).
Nigeria claims to derive this hardline distinction
from the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law. Resp’t’s Reply at 17–18; Resp’t’s Mot. at 14 (“‘international agreements,’ like the Nigeria-China Treaty,
that involve ‘two or more states’ and are ‘governed
by international law’ are ‘not subject to the New York
Convention’ because they are not commercial” (quot-
79a
ing, barely, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law §§ 301, 487 cmt. f)).
Nigeria, however, has cherry-picked the quoted text
out of context. The relevant portion of § 487 comment
f from the Restatement reads in full as follows:
Ordinarily, arbitration of a controversy of a
public international law character, such as a
boundary dispute or a dispute about interpretation of or performance under an international agreement (see § 301), is not subject
to the New York Convention, and an award
resulting from such an arbitration is not
subject to enforcement through civil courts.
See § 904 and Comment e thereto.
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 487
cmt. f. Nigeria reasons that, as an “international
agreement” under Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law § 301, the China-Nigeria BIT is “‘not
subject to the New York Convention’ because [it is] not
commercial.” Resp.’s Mot. at 14 (quoting Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 487). Yet, this
comment does not broadly exclude all international
agreements from the Convention’s scope, as Nigeria
apparently reads the text. Rather, the comment only
excludes controversies “of a public international law
character,” citing § 904 of the Restatement (“interstate
arbitration”), which concerns only arbitrations between
states. Of course, this arbitration took place between
Nigeria and Zhongshan, a private actor—not two states.
Moreover, the remainder of the comment makes
clear the extremely narrow scope of the commercial
reservation’s exclusion, which as noted does not cover
all arbitrations arising under international agreements.
Indeed, earlier in the same comment, the Restatement
80a
expressly advises that “[d]isputes arising out of investment agreements are not excluded by” the commercial
reservation. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law § 487 cmt. f. The Restatement goes on to explain
that this reservation merely “excludes arbitration
agreements and awards arising out of matrimonial or
custody disputes, disputes concerning succession to
property, and labor disputes, and for the United States
also other disputes excluded from the United States
Arbitration Act under 9 U.S.C. § 1.” Id. (emphasis
added). See also Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron
Devices, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(“Research has developed nothing to show what the
purpose of the ‘commercial’ limitation was. We may
logically speculate that it was to exclude matrimonial
and other domestic relations awards, political awards,
and the like.”).6
Nigeria’s novel argument contradicts U.S. courts’
regular confirmation of arbitral awards rendered under
similar treaties. According to the logic of Nigeria’s
argument, any arbitral award rendered pursuant to a
sovereign state’s violation of a treaty created under
public international law would be “per se noncommercial,” Resp’t’s Mot. at 17, and fall outside of the New
York Convention. See also Resp’t’s Mot. at 15 (arguing
that BITs, “as international agreement[s] governed by
and applying public international law, fall[] outside
6
Nor does Nigeria’s citation to the Restatement on International Commercial Arbitration support its argument, since this
Restatement likewise embraces a broad definition of arbitral
agreements, disputes, and awards that are “commercial” in
nature. See Restatement (Third) of the U.S. Law of Int'l Comm.
and Inv'r-State Arbitration § 1.1, cmt. e (Am. Law Inst., Proposed
Final Draft 2019) (“[A] dispute or award may be commercial even
though one of the parties to it is a sovereign State and even
though the dispute arises out of public regulatory acts.”).
81a
the ambit of the New York Convention as a matter of
U.S. foreign relations law”). The D.C. Circuit has
confirmed many arbitral awards in which sovereign
nations have been found to breach treaty—rather than
contract—obligations. See, e.g., Tatneft v. Ukraine, 21
F.4th 829 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (confirming arbitral award
rendered pursuant to Ukraine-Russia BIT); Chevron
Corp. v. Ecuador, 795 F.3d 200, 203–204 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (confirming arbitral award rendered pursuant
to BIT between United States and Ecuador); LLC
Komstroy v. Republic of Moldova, 2019 WL 3997385,
*1–2 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2019) (confirming arbitral award
pursuant to multilateral Energy Charter Treaty);
Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
244 F. Supp. 3d 100, 105–108 (D.D.C. 2017) (confirming
arbitral award resulting from Venezuelan expropriation of
investments pursuant to BIT between Canada and
Venezuela); Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, 146 F. Supp. 3d 112, 118–120 (D.D.C. 2015)
(confirming arbitral award rendered pursuant to BIT
between Canada and Venezuela). This Court declines
to swim upstream against the common practice of confirming arbitral awards rendered pursuant to violations of treaties based on respondent’s cherry-picked
and partial quotation from a Restatement.
Nigeria attempts to explain away courts’ application
of the New York Convention in other cases involving
treaties similar to the China-Nigeria BIT by arguing
that many of those treaties explicitly reference the
New York Convention, and that the parties in other
cases agreed that the Convention applied to their
dispute. See Resp’t’s Mot. at 15. Neither of these
scattershot attempts to distinguish those cases is
persuasive. First, Nigeria does not explain why a
treaty’s mere reference to the New York Convention
rescues an arbitral award from the treaty’s “public
82a
international law character” that Nigeria claims
would exclude such a treaty-based arbitral award from
confirmation. Referencing the New York Convention,
after all, does not transform a treaty into a contract
between a state and private actor. This argument is
particularly perplexing given that, in one of the cases
upon which Nigeria relies as support for this point,
the treaty at issue merely refers to the New York
Convention to discuss the Convention’s requirement
that parties agree in writing to arbitration, rather
than the Convention’s commercial reservation. See
Resp’t’s Mot. at 15 (citing Chevron Corp. v. Republic
of Ecuador, 949 F. Supp. 2d 57, 70 (D.D.C. 2013));
Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, Case No. 12-cv1247 (JEB), Decl. of Edward G. Kehoe, Ex. 1, U.S.Ecuador BIT at art. VI(4)(b), ECF No. 4-1.7 Second,
respondent cites to Crystallex Int’l Corp., 244 F. Supp.
3d at 109, seeming to argue that the New York
Convention applied in this case because the respondent did not object to the court’s jurisdiction. Resp’t’s
Mot. at 15. This argument ignores that, in Crystallex,
as here, the applicability of the New York Convention
folded into the question of the court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction and, thus, whether Venezuela consented to
jurisdiction is irrelevant since “[i]t is axiomatic that
subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived” and
“a federal court must raise the issue because it is
‘forbidden—as a court of limited jurisdiction—from
acting beyond [its] authority.’” Diag Human S.E. v.
Czech Republic, Ministry of Health, 64 F. Supp. 3d 22,
7
Further, as petitioner notes, not all arbitral awards that have
been confirmed in the D.C. Circuit arise from treaties that
expressly reference the New York Convention. See Pet’r’s Opp’n
at 17 (noting that the Russia-Ukraine BIT at issue in Tatneft, 21
F.4th 829, “does not mention that the New York Convention
applies to enforcements of awards arising under it”).
83a
27 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting NetworkIP, LLC v. F.C.C.,
548 F.3d 116, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2008)), rev’d o other
grounds, 824 F.3d 131 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Nigeria makes
no convincing argument to explain away the crush of
cases that undercut its theory.
2. The Arbitration Record Does Not Prove That
the Dispute was Non-Commercial
Nigeria next turns to the record of the underlying
arbitration to argue that the dispute was non-commercial,
asserting a new distinction between what it calls
“Treaty Claims” and “Commercial Claims.” In support
of this argument, Nigeria recounts that petitioner had
initially brought claims in the Nigerian courts and the
Singapore International Arbitration Center (SIAC)—
the latter pursuant to a clause in the 2013 agreement—
alleging breach of contract claims under its series
of agreements with Ogun State. See Resp’t’s Reply at
10; see also Final Award ¶¶ 43–45. Nigeria describes
petitioner’s discontinuance of both proceedings as a
“tactical[]” decision to “proceed exclusively with the
Treaty Claims” and “abandon the Commercial Claims.”
Resp’t’s Reply at 10. As a result, as Nigeria’s argument
goes, the Final Award was based on Nigeria’s sovereign,
rather than commercial, conduct—or, by way of analogy to
the limits of the Commerce Clause, the country’s use
of its police power, rather than commerce power. See
Resp’t’s Mot. at 15–18; Resp’t’s Reply at 11–12.
The flaw in this argument stems from predication on
a false dichotomy between sovereign and commercial
conduct in the context of the New York Convention.
A similar argument was considered and rejected by
the D.C. Circuit in Belize Social Dev. Ltd. v. Government of Belize, 794 F.3d 99, 104–105 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
There, Belize argued that, in granting a private
telecommunications company tax and duty exemp-
84a
tions pursuant to an agreement, “it exercised ‘powers
peculiar to sovereigns’ as opposed to ‘powers that can
also be exercised by private citizens,’ and thus its
actions were not commercial.” Id. at 105 (quoting
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607,
614 (1992)). This argument attempted to define the
commercial reservation by reference to the FSIA’s
“commercial activity” exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2),
under which a foreign state is only held to “engage[] in
commercial activities when it acts in the manner of a
private player within the market.” Belize Social Dev.
Ltd., 794 F.3d at 104. The D.C. Circuit rejected this
narrow view of the commercial reservation, holding
that “[u]nlike with the FSIA, Congress was not codifying the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity
when it ratified and implemented the New York
Convention.” Id. at 105. Instead, because the Convention’s
“purpose was to ‘encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in
international contracts’ . . . ‘commercial’ in the context
of international arbitration refers to matters which
have a connection to commerce.” Id. (quoting TermoRio
S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 933 (D.C.
Cir. 2007)). Accordingly, as Zhongshan correctly posits,
“there can be no debate that the multimillion-dollar
investment that Petitioner made in Nigeria to develop,
manage and operate a free trade zone near Lagos was
connected with commerce.” Pet’r’s Opp’n at 5–6. See
Belize Social Dev. Ltd., 794 F.3d at 104 (holding that
“taxes Belize levies against a company . . . have a
connection with commerce . . . as do the duties Belize
charges”).
85a
3. No Underlying Contract Between Nigeria
and Zhongshan is Required
Finally, Nigeria urges that the “Award at issue is
unlike other arbitration awards routinely enforced in
this Circuit” because “it arose neither from a commercial
agreement between Petitioner and Nigeria, nor from a
contractual or other business relationship between
them.” Resp’t’s Reply at 5. To be sure, nearly every
case enforcing an arbitration award against a foreign
sovereign in this Circuit has involved an underlying
contract or business agreement between the petitioner
and foreign sovereign. See, e.g., P&ID, 27 F.4th at 772
(describing underlying twenty-year natural gas supply
and processing agreement between Irish engineering
company and Nigeria); Diag Human, 824 F.3d at 135
(describing underlying “Framework Agreement” between
arbitration parties Czech Republic and foreign blood
plasma company by which company supported modernization of Czech Republic’s blood plasma supply and
services in exchange for share of the total volume of
plasma produced); Belize Social Dev. Ltd., 794 F.3d
at 100–01 (involving underlying agreement between
Belize and petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, a telecommunications company, pursuant to which
company would purchase property from Belize); Gebre
LLC v. Kyrgyz Republic, 2022 WL 2132481, *2 (D.D.C.
June 14, 2022) (foreign company signed series of
license agreements with Kyrgyz authorities to mine
rare earth elements). In contrast, Nigeria is correct—
and petitioner does not dispute, see Pet’r’s Opp’n at 15
n.8—that the underlying agreements leading to
Zhongshan’s investments in the Zone and Industrial
Park “[were] formed with OGFTZ and Ogun State, not
Nigeria.” Resp’t’s Reply at 7 (emphasis in original).
86a
This distinction drawn by Nigeria between the
parties involved in the facts underlying the arbitral
award at issue (i.e., involving a business arrangement
between a private party and part of a sovereign
country) versus previous awards confirmed in this
Circuit (i.e., involving business arrangements between
a private party and a sovereign country), falls short of
showing that the instant parties’ legal relationship
is therefore not commercial. As the FAA provides, a
legal relationship need not arise from contract to be
commercial, see 9 U.S.C. § 202, with the crucial factor
being that “the subject matter [of the arbitration] is
commercial.” Stati v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 199 F.
Supp. 3d 179, 184 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting U.S. Titan,
Inc. v. Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co., 241 F.3d
135, 146 (2d Cir. 2001)). Here, the subject matter of the
underlying arbitration related to commerce: Zhongshan’s
status as a foreign investor in Nigeria, pouring
millions of dollars into developing the free trade
zone, “has an obvious connection to commerce.” Diag
Human, 824 F.3d at 136 (describing “the provision of
healthcare technology and medical services” as having
“an obvious connection to commerce” based on health
care’s role in the “global economy”).
Notably, Nigeria focuses principally on urging adoption of its characterization of the parties’ relationship
as non-commercial. See, e.g., Resp’t’s Mot. at 15 (“The
record of the arbitration confirms the non-commercial
nature of the parties’ legal relationship that is the
foundation for the Award.”) (emphasis added); Resp’t’s
Reply at 14–15 (arguing that petitioner’s agreements
with Ogun State cannot “dictate whether the extrinsic
legal relationship between Nigeria and Petitioner is
commercial for purposes of the New York Convention”
and urging that “[t]he conditions in question here . . .
rendered the legal relationship between Nigeria
87a
and Petitioner fundamentally noncommercial”). Only
passingly, in reply, does Nigeria allude to the absence
of a direct contractual or business relationship between
Zhongshan and Nigeria as precluding the existence a
“legal relationship” between the parties—a condition
precedent to the requirement that the arbitral award
“aris[e] out of a legal relationship, whether contractual
or not, which is considered as commercial.” 9 U.S.C.
§ 202; see Resp’t’s Reply at 14 (noting that “no independent legal relationship existed between Nigeria
and Petitioner regarding [the latter’s] investments” in
service of its argument that Nigeria’s conduct was
“sovereign” rather than commercial).
Regardless, the parties plainly shared a “defined
legal relationship, whether contractual or not,”
Diag Human, 824 F.3d at 135, based on the ChinaNigeria BIT. In Diag Human, the D.C. Circuit held
that, even if failing to qualify as a contract, a “Framework Agreement” between a blood plasma company
and the Czech Republic created a legal relationship,
because the Agreement “explicitly contemplated which
parties it would obligate, the extent of the obligations,
the remuneration exchanged for meeting the obligations, and the legal framework to govern the arrangement.” Diag Human, 824 F.3d at 135. The ChinaNigeria BIT, too, creates a legal framework “entitling
[Chinese investors] to the standards of treatment
guaranteed by” Nigeria. Pet’r’s Opp’n at 7. Further,
the treaty constitutes “an already-binding arbitration
contract” between Nigeria and China, with investors
from both countries, including petitioner, acting as the
equivalent of third-party beneficiaries, BG Group, PLC
v. Republic of Argentina, 572 U.S. 25, 41 (2014), or
at the very least, the treaty operates as Nigeria’s
“standing offer to all potential [Chinese] investors to
arbitrate investment disputes,” Chevron, 795 F.3d at
88a
206. Nigeria cannot and does not explicitly dispute
that the BIT thus creates a legal relationship— even
if not a contractual one—between the parties.
B. Nigeria Is Not Immune Under the FSIA.
Having established that this matter falls under the
New York Convention, and thereby the FAA, the next
question is whether Nigeria is immune from suit
under the FSIA. The FSIA is “a comprehensive statute
containing a ‘set of legal standards governing claims of
immunity in every civil action against a foreign state
or its political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities.’” Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 691
(2004) (quoting Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488). The FSIA
“provides, with specified exceptions, that a ‘foreign
state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States . . . .” Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co.,
581 U.S. 170, 173 (2017) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1604).
Accordingly, “subject matter jurisdiction in any [FSIA]
action depends on the existence of one of the specified
exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.” Verlinden,
461 U.S. at 493.
At issue here is the arbitration exception, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(6), which permits U.S. courts to confirm an
arbitration award rendered outside of the United
States in certain instances.8 The exception provides, in
pertinent part:
8
Congress amended the FSIA in 1988 to include the arbitration exception, ensuring that foreign agreements to arbitrate and
arbitral awards governed by certain treaties would be enforceable
in U.S. courts, even against sovereigns. See Process & Indus. Dev.
Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 506 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C.
2020), aff’d on other grounds, 27 F.4th 771 (D.C. Cir. 2022). This
exception facilitated the participation of U.S. courts in upholding
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A foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or
of the States in any case . . . in which the action
is brought . . . to confirm an award made
pursuant to . . . an agreement to arbitrate,
if . . . the agreement or award is or may be
governed by a treaty or other international
agreement in force . . . calling for the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6). For the Court’s jurisdiction to
attach pursuant to the arbitration exception, “the
existence of an arbitration agreement, an arbitration
award and a treaty governing the award are all
jurisdictional facts that must be established.” LLC
SPC Stileks v. Republic of Moldova, 985 F.3d 871, 877
(D.C. Cir. 2021) (citing Chevron, 795 F.3d at 204). As to
the international arbitration system that has flourished since the
post-World War II era, designed to facilitate cross-border investments and business dealings. The conventional wisdom undergirding the international arbitration system is that promising
foreign investors an efficient and fair alternative dispute-resolution mechanism outside of potentially biased local courts would
encourage foreign direct investment, insulated from the uncertainties created by the host country’s domestic politics and law.
See generally Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do
BITS Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 Harv. Int’l L. J. 67, 68–79
(2005) (arguing that arbitration provisions in BITs are a “mechanism that gives important, practical significance to BITs, a
mechanism that truly enables these bilateral treaties to afford
protection to foreign investment,” and that BITs have promoted
foreign direct investment in developing countries and the United
States); Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 Yale L. J. 1049 (June 1961)
(detailing the reasons for the United States’ ratification of the
New York Convention).
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these three requirements, petitioner bears “a burden
of production” to support a claim that the arbitration
exception applies; “the burden of persuasion rests with
the foreign sovereign claiming immunity, which must
establish the absence of the factual basis by a preponderance of the evidence.” Chevron, 795 F.3d at 204.
Petitioner has met its burden of production as to all
three requirements under the arbitration exception.
First, as to the existence of the arbitration agreement,
petitioner has alleged, without dissent from Nigeria,
that both parties consented to the arbitration—
Nigeria via Art. 9 of the China-Nigeria BIT, which
provided that either party may submit a dispute to an
ad hoc tribunal, and Zhongshan via filing a Request
for Arbitration. Pet. ¶¶ 24–25. See Stati, 199 F. Supp.
3d at 188 (“All that is required is that the petitioner
make a ‘prima facie showing that there was an
arbitration agreement by producing the [treaty] and
the notice of arbitration.’” (quoting Chevron, 795 F.3d
at 205)). Petitioner has also met its burden as to the
second and third requirements by producing the Final
Award and referring to the New York Convention. See
Final Award, ECF No. 2-1; see also Creighton, 181 F.3d
at 123–24 (describing the “New York Convention [as]
‘exactly the sort of treaty Congress intended to include
in the arbitration exception’” (quoting Cargill Int’l S.A.
v. M/T Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012, 1018 (2d Cir.
1993))). Nigeria, meanwhile, has failed to discharge its
burden of persuasion to establish that this arbitral
award falls outside the scope of the New York
Convention, for the reasons stated supra, in Part III.A.
Resultantly, the Court finds that the arbitration
exception to the FSIA applies, stripping Nigeria of
sovereign immunity and establishing the Court’s
subject-matter and personal jurisdiction over the case.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Federal Republic of
Nigeria’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. An order
consistent with the Memorandum Opinion will be
entered contemporaneously.
Date: January 26, 2023
/s/ Beryl A. Howell
BERYL A. HOWELL
Chief Judge
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APPENDIX C
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION
PURSUANT TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA FOR
THE RECIPROCAL PROMOTION AND
PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS
BETWEEN:
ZHONGSHAN FUCHENG INDUSTRIAL
INVESTMENT CO. LTD.
Claimant
-ANDTHE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
Respondent
FINAL AWARD
Arbitral Tribunal:
Mr Rotimi Oguneso SAN, co-arbitrator
Mr Matthew Gearing QC, co-arbitrator
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, presiding arbitrator
Place of arbitration: London, United Kingdom
Date of Award: 26 March 2021
Date of Hearing: 9th to 13th November 2020
FINAL AWARD
A. Introduction
1. The Claimant, Zhongshan Fucheng Industrial
Investment Co. Ltd (“Zhongshan”), contends that, in
the summer of 2016, entities for whose actions the
Respondent, the Federal Republic of Nigeria (“Nigeria”),
is liable in international law, deprived it of a substan-
93a
tial investment contrary to the provisions of articles 2,
3 and/or 4 of a Bilateral Investment Treaty (“the Treaty”)
between (0 the People’s Republic of China (“the PRC”)
and (ii) Nigeria, and that Zhongshan is entitled to
compensation from Nigeria to be assessed by an
arbitration tribunal pursuant to article 9 of the Treaty.
2. In the next section of this Award, Section B, we
explain the basic relevant facts as advanced in this
arbitration by Zhongshan on the basis of documents
and oral evidence, Then, in Section C, we set out the
relevant provisions of the Treaty, In Section D, we
describe the relevant procedural history of this
arbitration. Following that, in Section E, we address
various jurisdictional and preliminary points raised by
Nigeria. In Section F, we discuss misrepresentation
and concealment arguments raised by Nigeria. Next,
in Section G, we address the issue of Nigeria’s liability.
In Section H, we consider the appropriate level of
compensation to be awarded. Section I deals with
questions of interest and Section J with costs. Finally,
in Section K, we make our award.
3. Before setting out the history as described by
Zhongshan, it is convenient to record that Zhongshan’s
claim relates to rights in the Ogun Guangdong Free
Trade Zone (“the Zone”), a substantial area of land in
Ogun State in Nigeria, which is owned by the Ogun
State Government (“Ogun State”) and which is not far
from Lagos, Agapa Port and Lagos Airport. The history
‘involves three companies in the Chinese-owned
Zhuhai Zhongfu Industrial Group Co Ltd group of
companies, Zhuhai Zhongfu Industrial Group Co Ltd
(“Zhuhai”), Zhongfu International Investment (MG)
FZE (Zhongfu”) and Zhongshan. The unchallenged
evidence of Dr Jianxin Han, the manging d
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