Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Nicholas Nassif Hayek, Petitioner v. United States

No._______________

____________________________________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_____________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

RESPONDANT,

V.

NICHOLAS HAYEK,

PETITIONER.

_____________________________________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_____________________________________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_____________________________________

APPENDIX

United States v. Nicholas Hayek, ____ F. 3d _____ (6th Cir. 2024)

(opinion affirming district court judgment)

United States v. Nicholas Hayek, No. 2:18-cr-00160-1 (E.D. Tennessee February 25, 2022)

___________________________________________________

Manuel B. Russ

340 21st Avenue North

Nashville, Tennessee 37203

(615) 329-1919

1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED MR.

HAYEK’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS STATEMENT AND

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE

DISTRICT COURT

2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)….12

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)…….12

California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 103 S.Ct. 3517 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275

(1983)…………………………………………………………………………………………12

Clark v. Mitchell, 425 F.3d 270, (6th Cir. 2005)…………………………………..13, 17

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986)………..15

Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987)………12, 17

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)………..16

Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975)……………..13

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966)………………..........11, 13-15

Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)….......12, 17

North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979)……13

Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985)…………….11

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980)………11

Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961)……......12, 16

Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293

(1994)…………………………………………………………………………………………..12

United States v. Mahan, 190 F.3d 416, (6th Cir. 1999)………………………….........15

United States v. Montgomery, 621 F.3d 568, (6th Cir. 2010)………………........13, 17

United States v. Newman, 889 F.2d 88, (6th Cir. 1989)……………………………….13

United States v. Quinney, 583 F.3d 891, (6th Cir. 2009)………………………………10

United States v. Sanford, 476 F.3d 391, (6th Cir. 2007)……………………………….10

STATUTES

United States Code 18 § 1470………………………...……………………………………5

United States Code 18 § 2422………………………...……………………………………5

United States Code 18 § 2251………………………...……………….............................5

3

United States Code 18 § 2252………………………...……………………………………5

United States Code 28 § 1254……………………………………………………..............5

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution…………………………………..11

APPENDICES

6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion………………………..………………..Appendix A

District Court Judgment………………………………………………………...Appendix B

4

I. OPINIONS BELOW

The reported opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the

judgment of conviction in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Tennessee are attached to this petition as the Appendix.

II. JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was entered on May

7th, 2024. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1), the

petitioner having asserted below and asserting in this petition the deprivation of

rights secured by the United States Constitution.

III.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This matter involves violations of the United States Code, specifically, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1470, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) & (4), and 18 U.S.C §2422(b).

IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Procedural Background

The matter was briefed for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and, after

considering the matter on the briefs and oral argument, the Court issued an Opinion,

with a concurring Opinion from Judge Readler, dated May 7th, 2024, denying all

relief, which has been appended to this Petition below. Mr. Hayek now makes this

timely application.

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B.

Statement of Facts

Mr. Hayek has confined his application to the issue of the denial of his motion

to suppress and the facts presented here are summaries of the trial testimony from

both the defense and the Government relating to the issue of the circumstances of his

inculpatory statement.

Both the Government and the defense presented

substantially more proof at trial that is not summarized below but has been

summarized in the Sixth Circuit’s Opinion that is appended below.

i. Nicholas Nassif Hayek

When being interrogated by Agent Bisceglia, one of the investigating agents in

this case, Mr. Hayek described the situation with multiple armed agents in his

family’s home as terrifying. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III, PageID#983) The

evening prior, to celebrate his father’s beginning in the auto repair business, Mr.

Hayek stated that he began drinking vodka the night before the search at about 11

P.M. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III, PageID#1000) He stated he consumed a large,

but indeterminate amount of vodka that evening. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III,

PageID#1003-1004) This took him approximately four hours though he was not

entirely sure of the time and he was not entirely sure what time he took the

Nyquil. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III, PageID#1006-1008) When he combined

Nyquil with the alcohol, he became lethargic but there had been occasions when he

had done this and participated in school the following day. (R.173, Trial Transcript

Vol. III, PageID#1009-1011)

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The next morning he was surprised by law enforcement and he had a “panic

attack”. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III, PageID#986-987) One of the female agents

said she needed to talk to him and, when he requested a lawyer, she refused. (R.173,

Trial Transcript Vol. III, PageID#988) When he attempted to leave his bedroom, he

was struck on the side of the head, his glasses broke and he was forced to remain in

his bedroom. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III, PageID#989) He stated that there

were officers that had body cameras that he saw. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III,

PageID#991) Mr. Hayek stated that Agent Bisceglia was aware that his family

immigrated from Lebanon and Mr. Hayek was left with the clear impression that if

he did not cooperate, the agents could create immigration problems for his family,

particularly his mother, and this was in light of his father’s prior deportation. (R.173,

Trial Transcript Vol. III, PageID#991-993) He stated that, when he refused to sign

the waiver forms prior to making a statement, the agents signed them for him

regardless. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III, PageID#993)

During the interrogation, Mr. Hayek described being weak kneed, barely able to

stand and his brain was “clogged” when he was awoken in his room. (R.173, Trial

Transcript Vol. III, PageID#1013) Mr. Hayek said he asked the agents for an

attorney multiple times. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III, PageID#1016) He stated

he recalled hearing the recording of his interview with law enforcement and in it he

might have been asked about telephone numbers and accounts he had on the

internet. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III, PageID#1017-1018) He reiterated that he

was never allowed to leave his bedroom during the interview and references in the

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interview to the contrary were inaccurate. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III,

PageID#1020) Mr. Hayek stated, again, that he saw “ICE” agents in his room and

believed that if he did not cooperate, there would negative immigration consequences

for his family. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III, PageID#1021-1022) He also stated

that the contents of his statement were not his own and he was told what to say prior

to the recording beginning and, further, the statement was involuntarily

obtained.

(R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III, PageID#1022-1024)

This was

accomplished by the agents writing statements on their phone, showing this to Mr.

Hayek, and having him repeat it for the recording. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III,

PageID#1025-1026) Mr. Hayek’s recollection of the interview was unclear, but he did

recall the agents prompting him on what to say. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III,

PageID#1030) He did not agree that he had been adding detail and information

beyond the scope of the agents’ inquiry, but, alternatively, Mr. Hayek made certain

statements that were not scripted which he thought would be useful to the agents out

of fear for his family. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III, PageID#1032-1039)

ii. Brian Bisceglia

When Agent Bisceglia interrogated Mr. Hayek, he took him to an isolated portion

of the residence and conducted a recorded interview with another agent. (R.172, Trial

Transcript Vol. II, PageID#803-804) The recording device was clearly visible and Mr.

Hayek did not request an attorney nor did he decline to speak with them. (R.172,

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Trial Transcript Vol. II, PageID#804-805) The audio recording was played for the

jury. (R.172, Trial Transcript Vol. II, PageID#806-808)

When he interrogated Mr. Hayek, Agent Bisceglia had not previously spoken

with him, or with alleged minor victim, and he denied Mr. Hayek asked for counsel

prior to the interview beginning. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III, PageID#825826) He said he was unaware that Mr. Hayek’s father had previously been deported

from the United States prior to the interview. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III,

PageID#827) The search warrant was executed early in the morning before light with

multiple agencies involved and many officers wearing tactical vests. (R.173, Trial

Transcript Vol. III, PageID#828-829) Mr. Hayek’s entire family was placed in a

central location within the residence, but Agent Bisceglia did not recall any law

enforcement member drawing their firearm. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III,

PageID#831-833) He did not recall any officers wearing a body camera during the

search. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III, PageID#833-834)

Agent Bisceglia did not check Mr. Hayek for impairment prior to the interview

other than observing him. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III, PageID#835-836) He was

also unaware that Mr. Hayek had been awake until 3 A.M. the previous night

consuming alcohol. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III, PageID#838) He identified a

bottle in Mr. Hayek’s bedroom that purportedly contained juice and an alcoholic

beverage and, had he known that, Agent Bisceglia would have inquired about it prior

to the interview. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III, PageID#840-842) He agreed that

9

the bottle of juice was not preserved after the investigation. (R.173, Trial Transcript

Vol. III, PageID#847)

Mr. Hayek never told Agent Bisceglia that he was intoxicated during their

interview and he did not believe him to be intoxicated during the interview. (R.173,

Trial Transcript Vol. III, PageID#849-850) He was also unaware that, in the

transcript of Mr. Hayek’s interview, he was deemed “unintelligible” on thirty-seven

different occasions. (R.173, Trial Transcript Vol. III, PageID#851)

V.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

When a defendant seeks appellate review of the District Court’s denial of a

motion to suppress evidence, the Sixth Circuit “review[s] the district court’s findings

of fact under the clear-error standard and its conclusions of law de novo.” United

States v. Quinney, 583 F.3d 891, 893 (6th Cir. 2009). “A factual finding is clearly

erroneous when, although there may be evidence to support it, the reviewing court,

utilizing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been committed.” United States v. Sanford, 476 F.3d 391, 394 (6th Cir.

2007)

VII.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The District Court erred when it determined that the Mr. Hayek’s pretrial

statement to law enforcement was lawfully obtain in keeping Constitutional

requirements when it was, in fact, procured while Mr. Hayek was both partially

intoxicated and in a state of panic making his waiver involuntary and he did not know

10

the full ramifications of the waiver when he gave it. The Sixth Circuit erred when it

affirmed this decision.

VIII. ARGUMENT

A.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED MR.

HAYEK’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS STATEMENT AND THE

SIXTH CIRCUIT ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DISTRICT

COURT

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right

against self-incrimination. The Government must use procedural safeguards to

insure that an accused is informed of his/her rights under the Fifth Amendment prior

to any custodial interrogation by law enforcement. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,

444, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966). Miranda also stated that these safeguards were triggered

when a suspect was taken into custody or he was “otherwise deprived of his freedom

of action in any significant way”. Id. at 444.

Specifically, Miranda further provides:

[Accordingly,] [h]e must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right

to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law,

that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an

attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the

interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded

him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree

to answer questions or make a statement.

Miranda 384 U.S. at 478–79, 86 S.Ct. 1602; see also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.

291, 298, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). “A Miranda violation does not

constitute coercion but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion,

requiring suppression of all unwarned statements.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,

11

306 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) “[C]onvictions following the

admission into evidence of confessions which are involuntary, i.e., the product of

coercion, either physical or psychological, cannot stand.” Rogers v. Richmond, 365

U.S. 534, 540, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499

U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)

A person is in custody if he/she has either been formally arrested, or there is a

“restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal

arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d

1275 (1983) In reviewing the circumstances surrounding an interrogation “courts

must consider the totality of the objective circumstances surrounding the

interrogation, ‘not the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers

or the person being questioned.’” Id., 511 U.S. at 322-23, 114 S.Ct. at 1529; quoting

Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322-323, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1529, 128 L.Ed.2d

293 (1994); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82

L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).

The defendant’s waiver of rights must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent

to be valid:

First the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that

it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,

coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full

awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences

of the decision to abandon it.

Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987); quoting

Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) The

12

question of whether a Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent is a separate

question from whether it was voluntary. Clark v. Mitchell, 425 F.3d 270, 283 (6th Cir.

2005). In determining the voluntariness, the reviewing court should consider the

“age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and … capacity to

understand the warnings give him, the nature of the Fifth Amendment rights, and

the consequences of waiving those rights” as part of its analysis. United States v.

Montgomery, 621 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 2010) Further, “[e]vidence that a defendant

suffered, at the relevant time, from a condition or deficiency that impaired his

cognitive or volitional capacity is never, by itself, sufficient to warrant the conclusion

that his confession was involuntary for purposes of due process; some element of

police coercion is always necessary.” United States v. Newman, 889 F.2d 88, 94 (6th

Cir. 1989).

Once a defendant has invoked his/her rights, the police are required “to end

the interrogation at once.” See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46

L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602). The invocation

of these rights do not need to be express, but may also be “inferred from the actions

and words of the person interrogated.” North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373,

99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). Law enforcement “must ‘scrupulously hono[r]’

this ‘critical safeguard’ when the accused invokes his or her ‘right to cut off

questioning.’” Mosley, 423 U.S., at 103, 96 S.Ct. 321.

Mr. Hayek’s pretrial statement to law enforcement was played for the jury at

his trial and it contained numerous statements that could be considered inculpatory,

13

therefore, it admission at trial engendered prejudice. The statement Mr. Hayek gave

to law enforcement was recorded and, prior to making it, he received Miranda

warnings. However, the District Court took note that the officers entered Mr.

Hayek’s residence at approximately 6:15 A.M. but the recorded interview did not

begin until 7:06 A.M., a time span of approximately fifty minutes and, during that

time, Mr. Hayek stated that the interrogating agents talked to him for

“approximately an hour” prior to the beginning of the recorded interview attempting

to convince him to give a statement. (R.103, Order Denying Motion to Suppress,

PageID#246&251&254)

Mr. Hayek testified that the waiver of his Miranda rights was not voluntary

because, when he signed the waiver, law enforcement had entered his room and three

of agents had weapons pointed at him. (R.110, Transcript of Suppression Hearing,

PageID#297) Mr. Hayek testified that this induced a “panic attack” and, at the tim

he signed the waiver, he was still under the influence of having consumed alcohol the

night before. (R.110, Transcript of Suppression Hearing, PageID#298) Despite, Mr.

Hayek “repeatedly” telling law enforcement that he wanted an attorney, none was

ever provided prior to signing the waiver, or during the interview. (R.110, Transcript

of Suppression Hearing, PageID#298) Additionally, Mr. Hayek testified that officers

interrogating him were aware his family had immigrated to the United States from

Lebanon and informed him that if he refused to talk, they would be required to look

through his “family’s papers” which he took to be a veiled threat against his family

14

and stating this was the primary inducement leading him to giving a

statement. (R.110, Transcript of Suppression Hearing, PageID#299-300)

The Circuit Court acknowledges that, for Miranda purposes, Mr. Hayek was in

custody when he was interrogated. See Opinion, United States v. Nicholas Hayek,

22-5177, P.5 (6th Cir. May 7th, 2024) However, the District Court was erroneous

when it determined Mr. Hayek’s waiver of rights was voluntary and that his waiver

was knowingly and intelligently given and this Court should accept his application to

provide guidance to courts throughout the nation in interpreting these issues.

ii.

Voluntariness of the Waiver

Mr. Hayek also did not waive his rights voluntarily. “[C]oercive police activity

is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the

meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Colorado v.

Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). A three-step test

has been developed in the Sixth Circuit to assist in determining if a statement was

induced by police coercion: “(i) the police activity was objectively coercive; (ii) the

coercion in question was sufficient to overbear the defendant’s will; (iii) and the

alleged police misconduct was the crucial motivating factor in the defendant’s

decision to offer the statements.” United States v. Mahan, 190 F.3d 416, 422 (6th Cir.

1999).

In Mr. Hayek’s case, he testified clearly that he believed law enforcement when

they told him if he did not cooperate, they would investigate his family more

15

thoroughly which was prefaced by the acknowledgement that his family were

immigrants. These were threats against his family’s immigration status and this was

the inducement for him to waive his rights under the Fifth Amendment. (R.110,

Transcript of Suppression Hearing, PageID#299-300). Under Rogers and Mahon,

these facts demonstrate the police coercion used in the interrogation of Mr. Hayek

was sufficient to overbear his will and that the coercion was the catalyst for the

statement. Further, though subtle, the statements of law enforcement were

“objectively coercive”. Mr. Hayek testified his father had previously been deported

and had only recently returned to the United States and, since he was asked about

the immigration status of his family as residents of the United States by law

enforcement prior to the waiver, there could be no other legitimate reason for this

inquiry by law enforcement, particularly when it was linked to the “need” to get a

statement from him, other than an insinuation that his failure to give a statement

would have a negative impact on his family. Mr. Hayek’s waiver was not voluntarily

given. (R.110, Transcript of Suppression Hearing, PageID#299-300)

iii.

Knowing and Intelligent Waiver

Mr. Hayek did not agree to waive his rights knowingly and intelligently due to his

state at the time he did so. “[W]aivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but

must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a

known right or privilege”. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68

L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) The defendant bears the burden of showing, under the totality of

the circumstances, that his/her waiver was not knowingly and intelligently

16

given. Clark, 425 F.3d at 283. The Court must determine if the “suspect [knew] that

he [could] choose not to talk to law enforcement officers, to talk only with counsel

present, or to discontinue talking at any time.” Spring, 479 U.S. at 574. A waiver is

knowingly and intelligently given when it is “made with a full awareness of both the

nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon

it.” Moran, 475 U.S. at 421; see also United States v. Ramamoorthy, 949 F.3d 955,

965 (6th Cir. 2020).

Mr. Hayek noted that, into the early hours of the morning the day that law

enforcement interrogated him, he had consumed a significant amount of vodka and

took Nyquil. (R.110, Transcript of Suppression Hearing, PageID#295-297) Various

cases note that intoxication is a factor used to determine if a waiver was either

knowing and intelligent, or voluntary. Montgomery, 621 F.3d at 573. Additionally,

Mr. Hayek testified to being in a state of panic at the time he agreed to waive his

rights, both because of the situation and out of fear for his family. The totality of the

circumstances support the contention that his waiver was not knowingly and

intelligently given. Without question, Mr. Hayek’s statement was highly prejudicial

for him and the error in admitting it could not have been harmless. For all of these

reasons, Mr. Hayek is entitled to relief in the form of a new trial and this Court should

grant his petition in order to provide guidance to lower courts on these issues.

17

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, Mr. Hayek prays that this Honorable Court

will grant his request for a writ of certiorari in order to review the question presented

relating the erroneous and prejudicial factual and legal rulings by the District Court,

affirmed by the Circuit Court, that created reversible error. This issue is one that

presents an important issue that this Court grant review.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Manuel B. Russ

Manuel B. Russ

340 21st Avenue North

Nashville, Tennessee 37203

(615) 329-1919

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that the foregoing writ of certiorari and the accompanying appendix

has been served via electronic mail upon counsel for the Respondent, Assistant

United States Attorney Ms. Meghan Lynn Gomez Office of the U.S. Attorney 220 W.

Depot Street Suite 423 Greeneville, TN 37743, and Ms. Elizabeth Prelogar, Acting

Solicitor General of the United States, Room 5614, Department of Justice, 950

Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington D.C. 20530-0001, this 18th day of July,

2024.

/s/ Manuel B. Russ

Manuel B. Russ

18