Reply Brief — Thomas J. Dart, Sheriff, Cook County, Illinois, et al., Petitioners v. Quintin Scott
Supreme Court briefJan 27, 2025
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No. 24-464
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
__________
THOMAS J. DART, SHERIFF, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
QUINTIN SCOTT,
__________
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
__________
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
__________
EILEEN O’NEILL BURKE
COOK COUNTY STATE’S
ATTORNEY
CATHY MCNEIL STEIN
LYLE HENRETTY
JONATHON D. BYRER*
JOHN POWER
CHRISTINA FAKLIS ADAIR
500 Richard J. Daley Center
Chicago, IL 60602
(312) 603-4366
jonathon.byrer@cookcountysao.org
Counsel for Petitioners
*Counsel of Record
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS ............... 1
I.
II.
Scott’s Response Does Not Avoid A Circuit
Split – It Triples Them. ................................. 2
A.
The Ruppert Cost-Shifting Conflict ....... 3
B.
The Lewis Private-Attorney-General
Conflict. .................................................. 4
C.
Only This Court Can Resolve This
Tripartite Circuit Conflict. .................... 6
This Case Is An Excellent Vehicle. ............... 7
III. Scott Has No Real Response On The
Merits Of This Case. .................................. 11
CONCLUSION ......................................................... 15
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page
Alioto v. Town of Lisbon,
651 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2011) ................................. 9
Am. Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. R. Co.,
148 U.S. 372 (1893) ............................................. 10
Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez,
577 U.S. 153 (2016) ............................................... 1
Central R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus,
113 U.S. 116 (1885) ....................................... 12, 13
Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper,
445 U.S. 326 (1980) ......................................... 1, 12
Ex parte McCardle,
74 U.S. 506 (1869) ............................................... 10
Isaacson v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,
No. 24-269 ........................................................... 13
Jin v. Shanghai Original, Inc.,
990 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 2021) .............................. 5, 6
Johnson v. Levy Org. Dev. Co.,
789 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1986) ................................. 8
Kern v. Huidekoper,
103 U.S. 485 (1880) ........................................... 8, 9
Lewis v. Becerra,
111 F.4th 65 (D.C. Cir. 2024) ...................... 3-6, 11
Love v. Turlington,
733 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1984) ......................... 3, 6
iii
Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk,
567 U.S. 944 (2012) ............................................... 9
Preiser v. Newkirk,
422 U.S. 395 (1975) ............................................... 9
Richards v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
453 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ............................... 4
Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger,
No. 23-677,
2025 U.S. LEXIS 365 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2025) ........ 14
Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co.,
705 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2013) ................... 3, 4, 6, 11
Ry. Co. v. Ramsey,
89 U.S. 322 (1874) ............................................... 10
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26 (1976) ............................................... 11
Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc.,
581 U.S. 433 (2017) ............................................... 8
Trustees v. Greenough,
105 U.S. 527 (1882) ....................................... 12, 13
United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty,
445 U.S. 388 (1980) ..................................... 6, 7, 11
Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v.
United States ex rel. Stevens,
529 U.S. 765 (2000) ............................................... 1
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,
337 U.S. 535 (1949) ............................................... 4
Wright v. Calumet City,
848 F.3d 814 (7th Cir. 2017) ............................... 10
iv
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const. art. III.......................................... 1-7, 9-14
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 23(e) ................................ 1, 5, 12
Rules Enabling Act ................................................. 1, 5
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
The County’s arguments regarding standing are
undisputed in all material respects. Most
significantly, Scott does not dispute that Roper must
be overruled because it cannot be reconciled with
modern Article III jurisprudence. Pet. 28-29. Rather,
he admits that, under modern precedent, Article III
standing would be a “nullity” if litigation costs
conferred standing. Opp. 20. That admission only
confirms the Chief Justice’s conclusion that
individuals lack Article III standing to pursue
incentive awards, Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez, 577
U.S. 153, 178 n.1 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting),
since incentive awards “compensate named plaintiffs
for the costs incurred” litigating class actions, App.
11a, and litigation costs are not Article III injuries-infact, Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772-73 (2000).
Scott also does not dispute that neither law nor
equity grants federal courts authority to compel
defendants to pay incentive awards to class
representatives. Pet. 30-36; App. 46a. Nor does he
dispute that Rule 23(e) cannot grant such authority
without running afoul of the Rules Enabling Act. Pet.
23. The undisputed absence of any authority to compel
defendants to pay incentive awards deprives Scott of
standing, App. 36a, because Article III requires
redressability, which is absent when the federal
courts lack authority to grant the requested relief.
The responses Scott does muster only dig the hole
2
deeper. First, Scott’s response literally triples the
number of circuit splits at issue here, only confirming
that the inconsistencies in this Court’s precedents
have left the lower courts in complete disarray
regarding Article III jurisdiction to appeal denials of
class certification. Second, Scott’s meritless vehicle
objections disregard rudimentary principles of federal
jurisdiction. Third, Scott’s scant arguments regarding
standing show that this case can be easily resolved by
simply reiterating that normal, settled Article III
principles apply to class actions and individual suits
alike, disavowing the stray statements to the contrary
in this Court’s early precedent, and applying those
settled Article III principles here. We address these
failings in turn.
I.
Scott’s Response Does Not Avoid A Circuit
Split – It Triples Them.
Notably, Scott does not dispute the existence of an
entrenched circuit split regarding the federal courts’
authority to grant incentive awards, Pet. 12-17, nor
does he dispute that a lack of authority to grant
incentive awards negates redressability and, thus,
Article III standing, id. at 37; App. 36a.
Rather, he flees from that conflict and its
consequences by claiming that he seeks to shift
litigation expenses to the class, declaring that he
“know[s] of no circuit case holding that a similarly
situated plaintiff lacks standing to appeal a denial of
3
class certification.” Opp. 12; accord id. at 13 (claiming
“no split on whether Scott has standing”). Scott
further claims that he would have had standing in the
Eleventh Circuit, which recognizes a privateattorney-general theory. Id. at 12-13 (citing Love v.
Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1984)).
In fleeing one circuit conflict, Scott has plunged
headlong into the jaws of two others – indeed, Scott
cites the very cases creating those conflicts. Opp. 10
n.3 (citing Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 705 F.3d
839, 844 (8th Cir. 2013); id. at 11 n.4 (citing Lewis v.
Becerra, 111 F.4th 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2024)). Those
additional circuit conflicts directly result from
uncertainties arising out of ambiguities in this Court’s
precedents, confirming that review is warranted.
A. The Ruppert Cost-Shifting Conflict.
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Ruppert shows
that the circuits are in direct conflict on whether a
supposed interest in shifting litigation costs to class
members can support Article III standing to appeal.
There, the district court denied class certification,
then entered judgment pursuant to a settlement
agreement which “purport[ed] to reserve Ruppert’s
right to appeal the denial of class certification.” 705
F.3d at 840. Despite that agreement, Ruppert held it
was “require[d]” to address whether the “interest in
shifting litigation costs to a class if the certification
ruling is reversed” afforded him standing to appeal,
4
and concluded that he lacked “a case or controversy,
because his individual claims have become moot in the
Article III sense.” Id. at 844 (cleaned up).
This decision created a direct conflict among the
circuits. In concluding standing was lacking, Ruppert
specifically rejected the D.C. Circuit’s holding that a
putative class representative has Article III standing
to appeal a denial of class certification for the purpose
of “shifting the fees and expenses of class litigation”
705 F.3d at 844 (citing Richards v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 453 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
Attempting to get around this circuit split, Scott
declares Ruppert not “a precedential opinion,” and its
discussion of Article III mere “dicta.” Opp. 10, n. 4.
This is wrong, twice over. First, Ruppert’s publication
info speaks for itself, confirming it was a published,
precedential opinion. Second, Ruppert’s discussion of
Article III was an alternative jurisdictional holding,
on an issue the court was “require[d]” to address. 705
F.3d at 844. It is long settled that, in such
circumstances, “where a decision rests on two or more
grounds, none can be relegated to the category of
obiter dictum.” Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337
U.S. 535, 537 (1949).
B. The
Lewis
Conflict.
Private-Attorney-General
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Lewis creates
5
another direct circuit conflict regarding whether
putative class representatives have Article III
standing to appeal under a private-attorney-general
theory. Like Scott, the Lewis plaintiffs “won. But they
nevertheless appeal[ed], seeking to challenge the
district court’s earlier denial of class certification.”
111 F.4th at 68. And like Scott, the plaintiffs rested
their Article III standing to appeal on a privateattorney-general theory that they had a “right to
represent the interests of absent class members.” Id.
at 71.
The D.C. Circuit rejected that theory. As the court
explained, the plaintiffs’ “discontent with the denial of
class certification” was “a generally available
grievance about the government” and thus “does not
state an Article III case or controversy.” 111 F.4th at
71-72. This was particularly true for “any alleged
misapplication of Rule 23”, the court went on, because
“Rule 23 creates no substantive right to serve as a
class representative” and could not legally do so under
the Rules Enabling Act. Id. at 72. Absent any personal
stake in the matter, Lewis concluded, the court lacked
appellate jurisdiction. Ibid.
This conclusion is in direct conflict with the
holdings of other circuits. Indeed, Lewis expressly
rejected the Second Circuit’s contrary holding that
“the interest of the private attorney general” is
“sufficient to satisfy the personal stake requirement”
of Article III. 111 F.4th at 72-73 (quoting Jin v.
6
Shanghai Original, Inc., 990 F.3d 251, 258-59 (2d Cir.
2021)). Lewis also directly conflicts with Eleventh
Circuit precedent recognizing a private-attorneygeneral theory of Article III. Love, 733 F.2d at 1565.
Indeed, the Second Circuit relied on Love when
adopting that theory. Jin, 990 F.3d at 260.
C. Only This Court Can Resolve
Tripartite Circuit Conflict.
This
It should go without saying that a case involving
three
separate,
dispositive
circuit
conflicts
implicating federal jurisdiction strongly necessitates
this Court’s review. The necessity is made even more
paramount by the fact that these conflicts stem from
uncertainties arising from this Court’s precedent. As
already explained, the conflict over judicial authority
to grant incentive awards arises out of an interpretive
conflict regarding this Court’s precedents. Pet. 17.
Similarly, the additional conflicts Scott interjects into
this case arose because the lower courts are uncertain
how to reconcile United States Parole Comm’n v.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 390 (1980), with modern
Article III jurisprudence. See Lewis, 111 F.4th at 73
(rejecting Second Circuit’s reliance on Geraghty
because it “does not reflect current law” of standing);
Ruppert, 705 F.3d at 844 (rejecting D.C. Circuit’s
reading of Geraghty). That uncertainty stems, in large
part, from the fact that Geraghty expressly reserved
the question at issue here: “whether a named plaintiff
who settles the individual claim after denial of class
7
certification may, consistent with Art. III, appeal from
the adverse ruling on class certification.” 445 U.S. at
404 n.10. Only this Court can answer that question
and resolve the conflicts that arise from ambiguities
in its precedents, making review particularly
appropriate.
II. This Case Is An Excellent Vehicle.
Although Scott deems this case a poor vehicle, this
contention is easily disposed of.
Scott begins by insisting that resolution of the
question presented does not affect the result of this
case because he “had standing to appeal.” Opp. 13;
accord id. at 14 (claiming “Scott has standing”). But
the question presented concerned whether he had
standing to appeal, Pet. i, so Scott’s argument is
nothing but a circular claim that answering the
question presented will not affect the outcome of this
case if this Court resolves that question in his favor.
That shows only that the question presented is
outcome-determinative, not that this is a poor vehicle.
Next, Scott claims that his pending “routine
motion” to amend his complaint and add plaintiffs
could make the resolution of the question presented
unimportant, by allowing the “case” to proceed
8
regardless of Scott’s standing. Opp. 14.1
This fundamentally misunderstands federal
jurisdiction in at least two respects. First, standing is
not dispensed in gross, Town of Chester v. Laroe
Estates, Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 439 (2017), so merely
adding other plaintiffs cannot negate Scott’s personal
lack of standing. Nor could it moot the County’s
financial interest in dismissing Scott to end his quest
to force the County to pay him an incentive award.
Second, no amendment of Scott’s complaint can
possibly moot the question whether Scott had
standing to appeal. If the Seventh Circuit lacked
jurisdiction to reverse the district court’s final
judgment, that judgment would deprive the district
court of jurisdiction to allow amendment of the
complaint. Johnson v. Levy Org. Dev. Co., 789 F.2d
601, 611 (7th Cir. 1986). Since orders entered without
jurisdiction are void ab initio, depriving the district
court of jurisdiction would not leave an amendment
order unscathed, but rather require it be vacated,
along with any subsequent proceedings. Kern v.
Scott’s counsel’s focus on their larger “case” is telling, because
it reveals their concern is not about protecting Scott’s claims, but
about protecting their “case” and their attorney’s fees. That only
emphasizes the dangers of elevating class attorneys to the status
of real principals in class litigation – it only incentivizes counsel
to jettison the class representatives they represent.
1
9
Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 485, 493 (1880).2
Scott next claims that the question presented is
“advisory” because he has not yet requested an
incentive award. Opp. 14-15. This forgets that the
question here concerns Article III jurisdiction – a
question of which the power to issue incentive awards
is only one part, because it goes to redressability. That
issue is hardly advisory, since answering it in the
negative would require the Seventh Circuit’s
judgment be vacated, on the ground that Article III
standing “must be extant at all stages of review.”
Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975). Again,
vacating that judgment would restore the judgment of
the district court, requiring vacatur of all subsequent
district court orders and proceedings for want of
jurisdiction. Kern, 103 U.S. at 493.
Even assuming Scott means to claim this case
arises in an interlocutory posture, see Opp. 14-15
(citing Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 567 U.S.
944, 945-46 (2012) (Alito, J.)), his argument fails.
Questions of Article III jurisdiction can never be
rendered interlocutory by the possibility of further
proceedings on the merits, because a court lacking
In characterizing his motion as “routine,” Scott neglects to
mention it is six years overdue, see R. 31 (scheduling order), and
thus cannot be granted absent a showing of diligence despite the
passage of so much time, Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F. 3d 715,
720 (7th Cir. 2011).
2
10
jurisdiction has no power to adjudicate a claim
meritless or meritorious. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S.
506, 514 (1869). Put another way, the merits are
ultimately irrelevant because the loser can always
undo its loss by challenging jurisdiction.
That said, even if litigation on the merits could
render
jurisdiction
interlocutory,
review
is
appropriate if it avoids “extraordinary inconvenience
and embarrassment.” Am. Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville,
T. & K. W. R. Co., 148 U.S. 372, 384 (1893). That
requirement is easily satisfied by the extensive
additional litigation Scott contemplates – amending
the complaint, class discovery regarding his new
plaintiffs, class certification, merits discovery,
summary judgment proceedings, and a trial – all
before a district court having no jurisdiction to begin
with.
Finally, Scott declares that “[f]airness” makes
this case a poor vehicle because the County
supposedly committed “inequitable conduct” by
questioning his Article III standing to appeal after he
accepted its offer of judgment. Opp. 15. This argument
is baseless, because nothing in the offer of judgment
states that the County agreed that Scott had standing
to appeal. Nor could Scott have reasonably believed
the County implicitly consented to his standing, since
parties may not consent to jurisdiction. Ry. Co. v.
Ramsey, 89 U.S. 322, 327 (1874); Wright v. Calumet
City, 848 F.3d 814, 817 (7th Cir. 2017) (agreement
11
reserving right to appeal certification denial “is
insufficient to establish the concrete interest
necessary under Article III”). Nor could he have
reasonably thought the County agreed to acquiesce to
jurisdiction, since the offer of judgment contains no
such agreement, which also could not prevent
consideration of jurisdiction. E.g., Ruppert, 705 F.3d
at 840. Such an agreement would have been illegal,
because attorneys cannot contract away their ethical
duty to candidly advise federal courts of jurisdictional
defects.
III. Scott Has No Real Response On The Merits
Of This Case.
Regarding his standing, Scott has little to say;
what little he says is meritless. For instance, Scott
claims he had standing to appeal because certification
would make him an assignee of the class recovery.
Opp. 21. This argument is irreconcilable with the rule
that putative class representatives must have
individual standing. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976). That rule also
conclusively disposes of Scott’s private-attorneygeneral theory. Opp. 12-13. To the extent Geraghty
endorses that theory, it must be overruled. See Lewis,
111 F.4th at 73 (Geraghty “does not reflect current
law” of standing).
Scott’s theories of standing based on cost-shifting,
Opp. 10, and incentive awards, id. at 11, are also
12
easily disposed of. Scott admits Article III would be a
“nullity” if litigation costs conferred standing, Opp.
20, and does not dispute that Roper must be
overruled, Pet. 28-29. Nor does he dispute that Rule
23(e) is invalid if interpreted to supersede this Court’s
rulings and create a cost-shifting remedy. Pet. 30-31.
Rather, Scott claims only that the Seventh Circuit
neither treated incentive awards as litigation costs,
nor held that Rule 23(e) supersedes this Court’s
precedents, Opp. 20-21. Both arguments are
irreconcilable with the unambiguous statements
below that incentive awards “compensate named
plaintiffs for the costs incurred,” App. 11a (emphasis
added), and that “Greenough and Pettus have been
superseded . . . by Rule 23,” App. 17a (cleaned up;
emphasis added).3
Recognizing that he cannot prevail on Article III
standing, Scott focuses on an issue not presented here
– namely, whether incentive awards may be
incorporated into settlement agreements or paid out
from common funds. Opp. 16-18, 20. But this case
involves no class settlement authorizing an incentive
award; it could not, since no class has been certified.
In making the former argument, Scott claims – without
elaboration – that incentive awards are “like costs and fees” but
also somehow “akin to a damages payment.” Opp. 20 (cleaned
up). In other words, he effectively concedes they are a legal
fiction, a “jackalope” stitched together from disparate pieces of
other laws. Pet. 30.
3
13
Pet. 31.4 Nor does it involve claims against a common
fund – indeed, Judge Wood, who authored the decision
below, emphasized this fact seven times at oral
argument. CA7 Arg. at 15:29; 17:20; 18:54; 19:30;
19:48; 21:15; 21:28. Rather, as Judge Easterbrook
observed, this case concerns the entirely different
question of Article III standing when a putative class
representative
who
received
full
damages
nevertheless wants the court to “order [the
defendants] to hand over more.” App. 46a.
On that issue, Scott has tellingly little to say, none
of it persuasive. Scott’s primary argument is that
Greenough restricts only the amount of incentive
awards. Opp. 18-19. But Greenough expressed no
concern about the amount sought, as confirmed by
Cent. R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, which describes
Greenough as categorically rejecting compensation for
“personal services and private expenses,” without any
mention of the amount sought. 113 U.S. 116, 122
(1885). In other words, as Judge Easterbrook
recognized, Greenough and Pettus “say that litigants
cannot be paid for their efforts—that their reward
must be damages for harm done, not a salary for
services as plaintiffs.” App. 43a.
This differentiates this case from the earlier petitions Scott
notes, Opp. 16, as well as the petition in Isaacson v. Meta
Platforms, Inc., No. 24-269, which all involve settlements.
4
14
That leaves Scott to invoke the China Agritech
footnote mentioning incentive awards, Opp. 17, but
that case arose under the securities laws, in which
Congress expressly allows incentive awards, Pet. 21
n.3. If extended to other contexts, that footnote must
be rejected as unreasoned dicta. This Court just made
clear it “need not follow” such a “footnote just because
it exists; our adherence instead depends on whether it
withstands analysis.” Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v.
Wullschleger, No. 23-677, 2025 U.S. LEXIS 365 at
*23-*24 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2025). As explained, the China
Agritech footnote flunks careful analysis because
nothing in federal law or equity authorizes courts to
force defendants to pay incentive awards outside the
securities context. Pet. 30-37.
Scott lacked Article III standing to appeal to force
on County taxpayers relief unauthorized by law. The
Seventh Circuit’s judgment must be vacated, and over
seven years of litigation finally brought to a close.
15
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted,
EILEEN O’NEILL BURKE
COOK COUNTY STATE’S ATTORNEY
CATHY MCNEIL STEIN
LYLE HENRETTY
JONATHON D. BYRER*
JOHN POWER
CHRISTINA FAKLIS ADAIR
500 Richard J. Daley Center
Chicago, IL 60602
(312) 603-4366
jonathon.byrer@cookcountysao.org
Counsel for Petitioners
*Counsel of Record
January 27, 2025
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