Reply Brief — Thomas J. Dart, Sheriff, Cook County, Illinois, et al., Petitioners v. Quintin Scott

Supreme Court briefJan 27, 2025

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No. 24-464

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

__________

THOMAS J. DART, SHERIFF, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

QUINTIN SCOTT,

__________

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

__________

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

__________

EILEEN O’NEILL BURKE

COOK COUNTY STATE’S

ATTORNEY

CATHY MCNEIL STEIN

LYLE HENRETTY

JONATHON D. BYRER*

JOHN POWER

CHRISTINA FAKLIS ADAIR

500 Richard J. Daley Center

Chicago, IL 60602

(312) 603-4366

jonathon.byrer@cookcountysao.org

Counsel for Petitioners

*Counsel of Record

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS ............... 1

I.

II.

Scott’s Response Does Not Avoid A Circuit

Split – It Triples Them. ................................. 2

A.

The Ruppert Cost-Shifting Conflict ....... 3

B.

The Lewis Private-Attorney-General

Conflict. .................................................. 4

C.

Only This Court Can Resolve This

Tripartite Circuit Conflict. .................... 6

This Case Is An Excellent Vehicle. ............... 7

III. Scott Has No Real Response On The

Merits Of This Case. .................................. 11

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 15

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page

Alioto v. Town of Lisbon,

651 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2011) ................................. 9

Am. Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. R. Co.,

148 U.S. 372 (1893) ............................................. 10

Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez,

577 U.S. 153 (2016) ............................................... 1

Central R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus,

113 U.S. 116 (1885) ....................................... 12, 13

Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper,

445 U.S. 326 (1980) ......................................... 1, 12

Ex parte McCardle,

74 U.S. 506 (1869) ............................................... 10

Isaacson v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,

No. 24-269 ........................................................... 13

Jin v. Shanghai Original, Inc.,

990 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 2021) .............................. 5, 6

Johnson v. Levy Org. Dev. Co.,

789 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1986) ................................. 8

Kern v. Huidekoper,

103 U.S. 485 (1880) ........................................... 8, 9

Lewis v. Becerra,

111 F.4th 65 (D.C. Cir. 2024) ...................... 3-6, 11

Love v. Turlington,

733 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1984) ......................... 3, 6

iii

Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk,

567 U.S. 944 (2012) ............................................... 9

Preiser v. Newkirk,

422 U.S. 395 (1975) ............................................... 9

Richards v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,

453 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ............................... 4

Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger,

No. 23-677,

2025 U.S. LEXIS 365 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2025) ........ 14

Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co.,

705 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2013) ................... 3, 4, 6, 11

Ry. Co. v. Ramsey,

89 U.S. 322 (1874) ............................................... 10

Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,

426 U.S. 26 (1976) ............................................... 11

Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc.,

581 U.S. 433 (2017) ............................................... 8

Trustees v. Greenough,

105 U.S. 527 (1882) ....................................... 12, 13

United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty,

445 U.S. 388 (1980) ..................................... 6, 7, 11

Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v.

United States ex rel. Stevens,

529 U.S. 765 (2000) ............................................... 1

Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,

337 U.S. 535 (1949) ............................................... 4

Wright v. Calumet City,

848 F.3d 814 (7th Cir. 2017) ............................... 10

iv

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. art. III.......................................... 1-7, 9-14

STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS

Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 23(e) ................................ 1, 5, 12

Rules Enabling Act ................................................. 1, 5

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

The County’s arguments regarding standing are

undisputed in all material respects. Most

significantly, Scott does not dispute that Roper must

be overruled because it cannot be reconciled with

modern Article III jurisprudence. Pet. 28-29. Rather,

he admits that, under modern precedent, Article III

standing would be a “nullity” if litigation costs

conferred standing. Opp. 20. That admission only

confirms the Chief Justice’s conclusion that

individuals lack Article III standing to pursue

incentive awards, Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez, 577

U.S. 153, 178 n.1 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting),

since incentive awards “compensate named plaintiffs

for the costs incurred” litigating class actions, App.

11a, and litigation costs are not Article III injuries-infact, Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel.

Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772-73 (2000).

Scott also does not dispute that neither law nor

equity grants federal courts authority to compel

defendants to pay incentive awards to class

representatives. Pet. 30-36; App. 46a. Nor does he

dispute that Rule 23(e) cannot grant such authority

without running afoul of the Rules Enabling Act. Pet.

23. The undisputed absence of any authority to compel

defendants to pay incentive awards deprives Scott of

standing, App. 36a, because Article III requires

redressability, which is absent when the federal

courts lack authority to grant the requested relief.

The responses Scott does muster only dig the hole

2

deeper. First, Scott’s response literally triples the

number of circuit splits at issue here, only confirming

that the inconsistencies in this Court’s precedents

have left the lower courts in complete disarray

regarding Article III jurisdiction to appeal denials of

class certification. Second, Scott’s meritless vehicle

objections disregard rudimentary principles of federal

jurisdiction. Third, Scott’s scant arguments regarding

standing show that this case can be easily resolved by

simply reiterating that normal, settled Article III

principles apply to class actions and individual suits

alike, disavowing the stray statements to the contrary

in this Court’s early precedent, and applying those

settled Article III principles here. We address these

failings in turn.

I.

Scott’s Response Does Not Avoid A Circuit

Split – It Triples Them.

Notably, Scott does not dispute the existence of an

entrenched circuit split regarding the federal courts’

authority to grant incentive awards, Pet. 12-17, nor

does he dispute that a lack of authority to grant

incentive awards negates redressability and, thus,

Article III standing, id. at 37; App. 36a.

Rather, he flees from that conflict and its

consequences by claiming that he seeks to shift

litigation expenses to the class, declaring that he

“know[s] of no circuit case holding that a similarly

situated plaintiff lacks standing to appeal a denial of

3

class certification.” Opp. 12; accord id. at 13 (claiming

“no split on whether Scott has standing”). Scott

further claims that he would have had standing in the

Eleventh Circuit, which recognizes a privateattorney-general theory. Id. at 12-13 (citing Love v.

Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1984)).

In fleeing one circuit conflict, Scott has plunged

headlong into the jaws of two others – indeed, Scott

cites the very cases creating those conflicts. Opp. 10

n.3 (citing Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 705 F.3d

839, 844 (8th Cir. 2013); id. at 11 n.4 (citing Lewis v.

Becerra, 111 F.4th 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2024)). Those

additional circuit conflicts directly result from

uncertainties arising out of ambiguities in this Court’s

precedents, confirming that review is warranted.

A. The Ruppert Cost-Shifting Conflict.

The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Ruppert shows

that the circuits are in direct conflict on whether a

supposed interest in shifting litigation costs to class

members can support Article III standing to appeal.

There, the district court denied class certification,

then entered judgment pursuant to a settlement

agreement which “purport[ed] to reserve Ruppert’s

right to appeal the denial of class certification.” 705

F.3d at 840. Despite that agreement, Ruppert held it

was “require[d]” to address whether the “interest in

shifting litigation costs to a class if the certification

ruling is reversed” afforded him standing to appeal,

4

and concluded that he lacked “a case or controversy,

because his individual claims have become moot in the

Article III sense.” Id. at 844 (cleaned up).

This decision created a direct conflict among the

circuits. In concluding standing was lacking, Ruppert

specifically rejected the D.C. Circuit’s holding that a

putative class representative has Article III standing

to appeal a denial of class certification for the purpose

of “shifting the fees and expenses of class litigation”

705 F.3d at 844 (citing Richards v. Delta Air Lines,

Inc., 453 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).

Attempting to get around this circuit split, Scott

declares Ruppert not “a precedential opinion,” and its

discussion of Article III mere “dicta.” Opp. 10, n. 4.

This is wrong, twice over. First, Ruppert’s publication

info speaks for itself, confirming it was a published,

precedential opinion. Second, Ruppert’s discussion of

Article III was an alternative jurisdictional holding,

on an issue the court was “require[d]” to address. 705

F.3d at 844. It is long settled that, in such

circumstances, “where a decision rests on two or more

grounds, none can be relegated to the category of

obiter dictum.” Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337

U.S. 535, 537 (1949).

B. The

Lewis

Conflict.

Private-Attorney-General

The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Lewis creates

5

another direct circuit conflict regarding whether

putative class representatives have Article III

standing to appeal under a private-attorney-general

theory. Like Scott, the Lewis plaintiffs “won. But they

nevertheless appeal[ed], seeking to challenge the

district court’s earlier denial of class certification.”

111 F.4th at 68. And like Scott, the plaintiffs rested

their Article III standing to appeal on a privateattorney-general theory that they had a “right to

represent the interests of absent class members.” Id.

at 71.

The D.C. Circuit rejected that theory. As the court

explained, the plaintiffs’ “discontent with the denial of

class certification” was “a generally available

grievance about the government” and thus “does not

state an Article III case or controversy.” 111 F.4th at

71-72. This was particularly true for “any alleged

misapplication of Rule 23”, the court went on, because

“Rule 23 creates no substantive right to serve as a

class representative” and could not legally do so under

the Rules Enabling Act. Id. at 72. Absent any personal

stake in the matter, Lewis concluded, the court lacked

appellate jurisdiction. Ibid.

This conclusion is in direct conflict with the

holdings of other circuits. Indeed, Lewis expressly

rejected the Second Circuit’s contrary holding that

“the interest of the private attorney general” is

“sufficient to satisfy the personal stake requirement”

of Article III. 111 F.4th at 72-73 (quoting Jin v.

6

Shanghai Original, Inc., 990 F.3d 251, 258-59 (2d Cir.

2021)). Lewis also directly conflicts with Eleventh

Circuit precedent recognizing a private-attorneygeneral theory of Article III. Love, 733 F.2d at 1565.

Indeed, the Second Circuit relied on Love when

adopting that theory. Jin, 990 F.3d at 260.

C. Only This Court Can Resolve

Tripartite Circuit Conflict.

This

It should go without saying that a case involving

three

separate,

dispositive

circuit

conflicts

implicating federal jurisdiction strongly necessitates

this Court’s review. The necessity is made even more

paramount by the fact that these conflicts stem from

uncertainties arising from this Court’s precedent. As

already explained, the conflict over judicial authority

to grant incentive awards arises out of an interpretive

conflict regarding this Court’s precedents. Pet. 17.

Similarly, the additional conflicts Scott interjects into

this case arose because the lower courts are uncertain

how to reconcile United States Parole Comm’n v.

Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 390 (1980), with modern

Article III jurisprudence. See Lewis, 111 F.4th at 73

(rejecting Second Circuit’s reliance on Geraghty

because it “does not reflect current law” of standing);

Ruppert, 705 F.3d at 844 (rejecting D.C. Circuit’s

reading of Geraghty). That uncertainty stems, in large

part, from the fact that Geraghty expressly reserved

the question at issue here: “whether a named plaintiff

who settles the individual claim after denial of class

7

certification may, consistent with Art. III, appeal from

the adverse ruling on class certification.” 445 U.S. at

404 n.10. Only this Court can answer that question

and resolve the conflicts that arise from ambiguities

in its precedents, making review particularly

appropriate.

II. This Case Is An Excellent Vehicle.

Although Scott deems this case a poor vehicle, this

contention is easily disposed of.

Scott begins by insisting that resolution of the

question presented does not affect the result of this

case because he “had standing to appeal.” Opp. 13;

accord id. at 14 (claiming “Scott has standing”). But

the question presented concerned whether he had

standing to appeal, Pet. i, so Scott’s argument is

nothing but a circular claim that answering the

question presented will not affect the outcome of this

case if this Court resolves that question in his favor.

That shows only that the question presented is

outcome-determinative, not that this is a poor vehicle.

Next, Scott claims that his pending “routine

motion” to amend his complaint and add plaintiffs

could make the resolution of the question presented

unimportant, by allowing the “case” to proceed

8

regardless of Scott’s standing. Opp. 14.1

This fundamentally misunderstands federal

jurisdiction in at least two respects. First, standing is

not dispensed in gross, Town of Chester v. Laroe

Estates, Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 439 (2017), so merely

adding other plaintiffs cannot negate Scott’s personal

lack of standing. Nor could it moot the County’s

financial interest in dismissing Scott to end his quest

to force the County to pay him an incentive award.

Second, no amendment of Scott’s complaint can

possibly moot the question whether Scott had

standing to appeal. If the Seventh Circuit lacked

jurisdiction to reverse the district court’s final

judgment, that judgment would deprive the district

court of jurisdiction to allow amendment of the

complaint. Johnson v. Levy Org. Dev. Co., 789 F.2d

601, 611 (7th Cir. 1986). Since orders entered without

jurisdiction are void ab initio, depriving the district

court of jurisdiction would not leave an amendment

order unscathed, but rather require it be vacated,

along with any subsequent proceedings. Kern v.

Scott’s counsel’s focus on their larger “case” is telling, because

it reveals their concern is not about protecting Scott’s claims, but

about protecting their “case” and their attorney’s fees. That only

emphasizes the dangers of elevating class attorneys to the status

of real principals in class litigation – it only incentivizes counsel

to jettison the class representatives they represent.

1

9

Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 485, 493 (1880).2

Scott next claims that the question presented is

“advisory” because he has not yet requested an

incentive award. Opp. 14-15. This forgets that the

question here concerns Article III jurisdiction – a

question of which the power to issue incentive awards

is only one part, because it goes to redressability. That

issue is hardly advisory, since answering it in the

negative would require the Seventh Circuit’s

judgment be vacated, on the ground that Article III

standing “must be extant at all stages of review.”

Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975). Again,

vacating that judgment would restore the judgment of

the district court, requiring vacatur of all subsequent

district court orders and proceedings for want of

jurisdiction. Kern, 103 U.S. at 493.

Even assuming Scott means to claim this case

arises in an interlocutory posture, see Opp. 14-15

(citing Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 567 U.S.

944, 945-46 (2012) (Alito, J.)), his argument fails.

Questions of Article III jurisdiction can never be

rendered interlocutory by the possibility of further

proceedings on the merits, because a court lacking

In characterizing his motion as “routine,” Scott neglects to

mention it is six years overdue, see R. 31 (scheduling order), and

thus cannot be granted absent a showing of diligence despite the

passage of so much time, Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F. 3d 715,

720 (7th Cir. 2011).

2

10

jurisdiction has no power to adjudicate a claim

meritless or meritorious. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S.

506, 514 (1869). Put another way, the merits are

ultimately irrelevant because the loser can always

undo its loss by challenging jurisdiction.

That said, even if litigation on the merits could

render

jurisdiction

interlocutory,

review

is

appropriate if it avoids “extraordinary inconvenience

and embarrassment.” Am. Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville,

T. & K. W. R. Co., 148 U.S. 372, 384 (1893). That

requirement is easily satisfied by the extensive

additional litigation Scott contemplates – amending

the complaint, class discovery regarding his new

plaintiffs, class certification, merits discovery,

summary judgment proceedings, and a trial – all

before a district court having no jurisdiction to begin

with.

Finally, Scott declares that “[f]airness” makes

this case a poor vehicle because the County

supposedly committed “inequitable conduct” by

questioning his Article III standing to appeal after he

accepted its offer of judgment. Opp. 15. This argument

is baseless, because nothing in the offer of judgment

states that the County agreed that Scott had standing

to appeal. Nor could Scott have reasonably believed

the County implicitly consented to his standing, since

parties may not consent to jurisdiction. Ry. Co. v.

Ramsey, 89 U.S. 322, 327 (1874); Wright v. Calumet

City, 848 F.3d 814, 817 (7th Cir. 2017) (agreement

11

reserving right to appeal certification denial “is

insufficient to establish the concrete interest

necessary under Article III”). Nor could he have

reasonably thought the County agreed to acquiesce to

jurisdiction, since the offer of judgment contains no

such agreement, which also could not prevent

consideration of jurisdiction. E.g., Ruppert, 705 F.3d

at 840. Such an agreement would have been illegal,

because attorneys cannot contract away their ethical

duty to candidly advise federal courts of jurisdictional

defects.

III. Scott Has No Real Response On The Merits

Of This Case.

Regarding his standing, Scott has little to say;

what little he says is meritless. For instance, Scott

claims he had standing to appeal because certification

would make him an assignee of the class recovery.

Opp. 21. This argument is irreconcilable with the rule

that putative class representatives must have

individual standing. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights

Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976). That rule also

conclusively disposes of Scott’s private-attorneygeneral theory. Opp. 12-13. To the extent Geraghty

endorses that theory, it must be overruled. See Lewis,

111 F.4th at 73 (Geraghty “does not reflect current

law” of standing).

Scott’s theories of standing based on cost-shifting,

Opp. 10, and incentive awards, id. at 11, are also

12

easily disposed of. Scott admits Article III would be a

“nullity” if litigation costs conferred standing, Opp.

20, and does not dispute that Roper must be

overruled, Pet. 28-29. Nor does he dispute that Rule

23(e) is invalid if interpreted to supersede this Court’s

rulings and create a cost-shifting remedy. Pet. 30-31.

Rather, Scott claims only that the Seventh Circuit

neither treated incentive awards as litigation costs,

nor held that Rule 23(e) supersedes this Court’s

precedents, Opp. 20-21. Both arguments are

irreconcilable with the unambiguous statements

below that incentive awards “compensate named

plaintiffs for the costs incurred,” App. 11a (emphasis

added), and that “Greenough and Pettus have been

superseded . . . by Rule 23,” App. 17a (cleaned up;

emphasis added).3

Recognizing that he cannot prevail on Article III

standing, Scott focuses on an issue not presented here

– namely, whether incentive awards may be

incorporated into settlement agreements or paid out

from common funds. Opp. 16-18, 20. But this case

involves no class settlement authorizing an incentive

award; it could not, since no class has been certified.

In making the former argument, Scott claims – without

elaboration – that incentive awards are “like costs and fees” but

also somehow “akin to a damages payment.” Opp. 20 (cleaned

up). In other words, he effectively concedes they are a legal

fiction, a “jackalope” stitched together from disparate pieces of

other laws. Pet. 30.

3

13

Pet. 31.4 Nor does it involve claims against a common

fund – indeed, Judge Wood, who authored the decision

below, emphasized this fact seven times at oral

argument. CA7 Arg. at 15:29; 17:20; 18:54; 19:30;

19:48; 21:15; 21:28. Rather, as Judge Easterbrook

observed, this case concerns the entirely different

question of Article III standing when a putative class

representative

who

received

full

damages

nevertheless wants the court to “order [the

defendants] to hand over more.” App. 46a.

On that issue, Scott has tellingly little to say, none

of it persuasive. Scott’s primary argument is that

Greenough restricts only the amount of incentive

awards. Opp. 18-19. But Greenough expressed no

concern about the amount sought, as confirmed by

Cent. R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, which describes

Greenough as categorically rejecting compensation for

“personal services and private expenses,” without any

mention of the amount sought. 113 U.S. 116, 122

(1885). In other words, as Judge Easterbrook

recognized, Greenough and Pettus “say that litigants

cannot be paid for their efforts—that their reward

must be damages for harm done, not a salary for

services as plaintiffs.” App. 43a.

This differentiates this case from the earlier petitions Scott

notes, Opp. 16, as well as the petition in Isaacson v. Meta

Platforms, Inc., No. 24-269, which all involve settlements.

4

14

That leaves Scott to invoke the China Agritech

footnote mentioning incentive awards, Opp. 17, but

that case arose under the securities laws, in which

Congress expressly allows incentive awards, Pet. 21

n.3. If extended to other contexts, that footnote must

be rejected as unreasoned dicta. This Court just made

clear it “need not follow” such a “footnote just because

it exists; our adherence instead depends on whether it

withstands analysis.” Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v.

Wullschleger, No. 23-677, 2025 U.S. LEXIS 365 at

*23-*24 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2025). As explained, the China

Agritech footnote flunks careful analysis because

nothing in federal law or equity authorizes courts to

force defendants to pay incentive awards outside the

securities context. Pet. 30-37.

Scott lacked Article III standing to appeal to force

on County taxpayers relief unauthorized by law. The

Seventh Circuit’s judgment must be vacated, and over

seven years of litigation finally brought to a close.

15

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

EILEEN O’NEILL BURKE

COOK COUNTY STATE’S ATTORNEY

CATHY MCNEIL STEIN

LYLE HENRETTY

JONATHON D. BYRER*

JOHN POWER

CHRISTINA FAKLIS ADAIR

500 Richard J. Daley Center

Chicago, IL 60602

(312) 603-4366

jonathon.byrer@cookcountysao.org

Counsel for Petitioners

*Counsel of Record

January 27, 2025

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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