Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jennifer Tom, Petitioner v. Martin J. O'Malley, Commissioner of Social Security

Supreme Court briefSep 13, 2024

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In The

Supreme Court of The United States

Jennifer Tom - Petitioner in pro se,

vs.

Martin O'Malley Commissioner of The SOCIAL

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (SSA) - Respondent

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Jennifer Tom

Petitioner in pro se

2101 Mangrove Court

Antioch, CA 94509

(925) 698-5028

Date: September 9, 2024

QUESTION PRESENTED

Federal Rule 50 requires a court to make a decision

when a party has presented all their evidence on an

issue, and there is not enough legal evidence for a

reasonable jury to find in favor of that party on that

issue. The standard for making this decision under

Federal Rule 50 is similar to the standard for

summary judgment under Federal Rule 56.

Federal Rule 56 the court must carefully review all

the evidence in the record, drawing all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, but

making no credibility determinations or weighing

any evidence. Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.

S. 545, 554-555. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("In all actions

tried upon the facts without a jury ..., the court shall

find facts specifically and state separately its

i

conclusions of law thereon"). Addressing all

conflicting evidence in the court’s findings and

conclusions.

The Americans with Disabilities Act became law in

1990 and provides civil rights to all individuals with

disabilities and guarantees equal access to

opportunity in employment and all benefits of

employment, transportation, public accommodations,

state and local government, and telecommunications

for individuals with disabilities.

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was the United

States' first major federal disability rights law. The

law opened doors for many qualified individuals with

disabilities to enter, for the first time, the federal

workforce. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as

Amended (Rehab Act) prohibits discrimination on the

basis of disability in programs conducted and funded

li

by the Federal government (504) and it covers

discrimination in Federal employment, and in the

employment practices (501 & 503).

Cir. Rule 30-1.3: No Excerpts Required for Pro Se

Party: A party proceeding without counsel need not

file excerpts. If such a party does not file excerpts,

counsel for appellee or respondent must file

Supplemental Excerpts of Record that contain all of

the documents that are cited in the pro se opening

brief or otherwise required by Rule 30-1.4, as well as

the documents that are cited in the answering brief.

1) Can the Court allow the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit decision to stand in Tom v. Social

Security Administration where the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Ninth. Circuit found that an employer

can fire a qualified disabled employee for taking

leave while waited for the Social Security

Administration to approve Tom’s (Appellant in pr se)

requests for an effective reasonable accommodation

for example full-time telework, the Social Security

Administration fired Tom (Appellant in pro se) for

taking sick leave while working with Social Security

m

Administration in the Reasonable Accommodation

interactive process for the conduct of taking sick

leave that results from her disabilities despite the

fact the courts have found ruled that “terminate an

employee for conduct that results from a disability is

equivalent to terminating an employee based on the

disability itself because ‘conduct resulting from a

disability is considered to be part of the disability,

rather than a separate basis for termination.’

Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128,

1139-40 (9th Cir. 2001).”?

2) Can the Court allow the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit decision to stand in Tom v. Social

Security Administration where the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that an employer

need not provide an effective reasonable

accommodation just an accommodation rendering of

the protection provided by the Americans With

Disabilities Act and the protections under of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehab Act) worthless,

ineffective and powerless to protect qualified disabled

employees thus hindering qualified disabled

employees from gainful employment?

3. Can the Court allow the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit) decision in Tom

(Appellant in pro se) v. Social Security

Administration (SSA) to stand, when the Ninth

Circuit, allowed SSA to violate rule Cir. Rule 30-1.3

and Cir. Rule 30-1.4 when SSA chose to withhold

evidence Tom cited in her Informal Opening Brief in

the joint excerpts of record per Cir. Rule 30-1.3 SSA

IV

is responsible/obligated to add all of Tom’s evidence

cited in her Informal Opening Brief, in the joint

excerpts of record or allow the Ninth Circuit to not

enforce Cir. Rule 30-1.3 and Cir. Rule 30-1.4 or allow

Ninth Circuit's improper handling of Tom's motion to

compel filed September 2, 2023 only two days after

the Social Security Administration filed the

incomplete excerpts of record filed on July 31, 2023

or allow the Ninth Circuit’s decision to denied Tom’s

motion to compel (without notifying Tom at all) 10

months later on May 2, 2024 at 10:59am and five

minutes later on May 2, 2024 at 11:04am rewarded

SSA for the willfully violation of Cir. Rule 30-1.3 and

Cir. Rule 30-1.4 by withholding Tom’s evidence from

the excerpts of record by issuing judgment in favor of

the Social Security Administration on the grounds

Tom (Appellant in Pro Se) failed to provide evidence

to support her claims?

LIST OF PARTIES

All the parties appear in the caption of the case on

the cover page.

RELATED CASES

Jennifer Tom v. Social Security Administration,

Hearing No. 550-2015-00104X, Agency No. SF-140624-SSA, EEOC ALJ Virginia Mellema MaGee

(April 7, 2017).

Jennifer Tom v. Social Security Administration,

Hearing No. 550-2015-00104X, Agency No. SF-140624-SSA, SSA Final Order, EEOC Director Kojuan

Almond (May 18, 2017).

Jennifer Tom v. Social Security Administration,

Appeal No. 0120172221, Hearing No. 550-201500104X, Agency No. SF-14-0624-SSA, Office of

Federal Operation, Director Carlton Hadden

(February 15, 2019).

Jennifer Tom v. Social Security Administration,

Reconsideration Request No. 2019002750, Appeal No.

0120172221, Hearing No. 550-2015-00104X, Agency

No. SF-14-0624-SSA, Office of Federal Operation,

Director Carlton Hadden (June 25, 2019).

vi

Jennifer Tom v. Kilolo Kijakazi Acting

Commissioner of Social Security Administration,

Civil Case No. 19-cv-07914-JST, MSPB Case No. SF0752-19-0286-1-1, Reconsideration Request No.

2020000730, Appeal No. 20190000982, Agency No.

SF-19-0924-SSA, filed December 3, 2019.

Jennifer Tom v. Kilolo Kijakazi Acting

Commissioner of Social Security Administration,

Civil Case No. 19-CV-06322-JST, Reconsideration

Request No. 2019002750, Appeal No. 0120172221,

Hearing No. 550-2015-00104X, Agency No. SF-140624-SSA, filed September 27, 2019.

Jennifer Tom v. Kilolo Kijakazi Acting

Commissioner of Social Security Administration,

Civil Case No. 19-cv-06322-JST, Reconsideration

Request No. 2019002750, Appeal No. 0120172221,

Hearing No. 550-2015-00104X, Agency No. SF-140624-SSA, and Jennifer Tom v. Kilolo Kijakazi Acting

Commissioner of Social Security Administration,

Civil Case No. 19-cv-07914-JST, MSPB Case No. SF0752-19-0286-1-1, Reconsideration Request No.

2020000730, Appeal No. 20190000982, Agency No.

SF-19-0924-SSA, Judge Jon S. Tiger Ordered the

consolidation of all claims from Civil Case No. 19-cv06322-JST and Civil Case No. 19-cv-07914-JST

under Jennifer Tom v. Kilolo Kijakazi Acting

Commissioner of Social Security Administration,

Civil Case Civil Case No. 19-CV-06322-JST Civil

Court Docket ECF 33 (February 26, 2020).

vm

Jennifer Tom v. Social Security Administration,

Agency No. SF-18-0924-SSA aka SF-19-0924-SSA,

Final Agency Decision, November 5, 2018 the Social

Security Administration dismissed the EEOC case

incorrectly on December 17, 2018 the EEOC ALJ

Virginia Mellema MaGee advised SSA to rescind the

dismissal of SF-18-0924-SSA on December 20, 2018

SSA reopened claims under SF-18-0924-SSA and SF19-0942-SSA.

Jennifer Tom v. Social Security Administration,

Agency No. SF-18-0924-SSA aka SF-19-0924-SSA,

Final Agency Decision, EEOC Director Claudia

Postell (January 30, 2019).

Jennifer Tom v. Social Security Administration,

Appeal No. 20190000982, Agency No. SF-19-0924SSA, Office of Federal Operation Director Carlton

Hadden (September 24, 2019).

Jennifer Tom v. Social Security Administration,

Reconsideration Request No. 2020000730, Appeal No.

20190000982, Agency No. SF-19-0924-SSA, Office of

Federal Operation Director Carlton Hadden (March

12, 2020).

Jennifer Tom v. Social Security Administration,

MSPB Case No. SF-0752-19-0286-I-1,

Reconsideration Request No. 2020000730, Appeal No.

20190000982, Agency No. SF-19-0924-SSA, MSPB

ALJ Tamara Ribas (September 30, 2019).

vn

Jennifer Tom v. Kilolo Kijakazi Acting

Commissioner of Social Security Administration,

Civil Case No. 19- cv-06322-JST, Summary

Judgment by Judge Jon S. Tiger Civil Court Docket

ECF 125 (December 13, 2021).

Jennifer Tom v. Kilolo Kijakazi Acting

Commissioner of Social Security Administration,

Civil Case No. 19-cv-06322-JST Order Denying

Plaintiff Motion for Leave to File Motion for

Reconsideration, by Judge Jon S. Tiger Civil Court

Docket ECF 130 (January 21, 2022).

Jennifer Tom v. Kilolo Kijakazi Acting

Commissioner of Social Security Administration,

Civil Case No. 19-CV-06322-JST, Finding of Fact and

Conclusion of law and Amended Finding of Fact and

Conclusion of law (they are identical after the word

Amended), by Judge Jon S. Tiger Civil Court Docket

ECF 155 and 156 (November 28, 2022).

Jennifer Tom v. Kilolo Kijakazi Acting

Commissioner of Social Security Administration,

Civil Case No. 19-cv-06322-JST, Judgment, by Judge

Jon S. Tiger Civil Court Docket ECF 159 (December

13, 2022)

Jennifer Tom v. Martin O’Malley Commissioner of

Social Security Administration, United States Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Case No. 22-16977

District Case No. 4:19-cv-06322-JST Docketed

December 22, 2022.

IX

Jennifer Tom v. Martin O’Malley Commissioner of

Social Security Administration, United States Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Case No. 22-16977

District Case No. 4:19-cv-06322-JST, Appellant

Motion to Compel Social Security Administration to

provide all of Appellant’s exhibits per Ninth Circuit

Rule 30-1.3 and Ninth Circuit Rule 30-1.4 see Ninth

Circuit Court Dkt. No. 12 filed August 4, 2023.

Jennifer Tom u. Martin O’Malley Commissioner of

Social Security Administration, United States Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Case No. 22-16977

District Case No. 4:19-cv-06322-JST, Motion to

compel denied and Memorandum Disposition

Affirming lower Court Decision, Judges Mark

Bennett, Bridget Bade, Daniel Collins both on May 2,

2024 Ninth Circuit Court Dkt. No. 20 and Ninth

Circuit Court Dkt. No. 21.

Jennifer Tom u. Martin O’Malley Commissioner of

Social Security Administration, United States Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Case No. 22-16977

District Case No. 4:19-cv-06322-JST, Order denying

petition for panel rehearing June 18, 2024 Ninth

Circuit Court Dkt. No. 24.

x

RELATED CASES- Continued

Jennifer Torn v. Martin O’Malley Commissioner of

Social Security Administration there are other

cases1.

1Ther6 are additional cases related to SSA s failure to effectively

accommodate Ms. Tom held in abeyance EEOC Case No. 5502021-00313X 05-07-2021 Agency No. SF-16-0264-SSA, EEOC

Case No 550-2021-00314X 05-07-2021 Agency No. SF-17-0039SSA, 550-2021-00315X 05-07-2021 Agency No. SF-17-0411-SSA,

EEOC Case No. 550-2021-00316X 05-07-2021 Agency No. SF17-0526-SSA, EEOC Case No. 550-2021-00317X 05-07-2021

Agency No. SF-17-0799-SSA, EEOC Case No. 550-2021-00318X

05-07-2021 Agency No. SF-18-0328-SSA, EEOC Case No. 5502021-00319X 05-07-2021 Agency No. SF-18-0604-SSA.

xi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED

l-V

LIST OF PARTIES

vi

RELATED CASES

Vl-Xl

TABLE OF CONTENTS

xn-xvm

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

.X1X-XX

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

1

OPINIONS BELOW

1

JURISDICTION

1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED........................

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

I.

Factual Background...................................... 2-12

II. The District Court's ruling allowed the Social

Security Administration to take back admitted facts

and permit misrepresented material facts to stand

despite overwhelming evidence that disproved SSA

claims and supported Tom's claims

12-23

III. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's

ruling, stating that Tom failed to provide evidence to

Xll

support her claims. However, the Ninth Circuit failed

to enforce Circuit Rules 30-1.3 and 30-1.4, which

made the Social Security Administration responsible

for providing Tom's evidence to the Court in the

excerpts of record and improperly handled Tom's

Motion to Compel Social Security Administration to

comply with Circuit Rules 30-1.3 and 30-1.4 ....23-36

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

36

I. The Court Should Grant Certiorari to address the

erosion of the protections under the Americans with

Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act of 1973

(Rehab Act) by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit decision in Tom v. Social Security

36-39

Administration

II. The Court of Appeals are divided on the Questions

39-43

Presented

III. The Questions Presented Are Exceptionally

Important.................................................................. 43-49

49

CONCLUSION

INDEX TO APPENDICIES

APPENDIX A

Memorandum from the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit of California, Jennifer

Tom v. Social Security Administration No. 22-16977

D.C. No. 4-19-cv-06322-JST affirming Civil Court

xiii

decision (signed May 2, 2024 Judges Mark Bennett,

Bridget Blade, Daniel Collins docketed December 22.

2022) Ninth Circuit Dkt. No. 21 (May 2, 2024)

.................................................................................. la-9a

Civil Court Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law,

Summary Judgment, and Judgment in Jennifer Tom

v. Kilolo Kijakazi Acting Commissioner of Social

Security Administration, Civil Case No. 19-cv-06322JST, Finding of Fact and Conclusion of law and

Amended Finding of Fact and Conclusion of

law (they are identical after the word Amended), by

Judge Jon S. Tiger Civil Court Docket ECF 155 and

156 (November 28, 2022), Summary Judgment

(December 13, 2013) ECF 125 and Judgment, by

Judge Jon S. Tiger Civil Court Docket ECF 159

(December 13, 2022)

10a-61a

Order from the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit of California, Jennifer Tom v. Social

Security Administration No. 22-16977 D.C. No. 4-19cv-06322-JST Denying petition for panel rehearing

Judges Mark Bennett, Bridget Blade, Daniel Collins

Ninth Circuit Dkt. No. 24 (June 18, 2024)

62a

STATUTES

28U.S.C. § 1254(1)

63a

29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(m), 1630.2(o), 1630.2(p)...63a-68a

xiv

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)

68a-69a

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)

69a-70a

Section 12940(a) of FEHA,

70a-71a

18 U.S. Code § 1519

71a-72a

RULES

Cir. Rule 30-1.3

72a

Cir. Rule 30-1.4

72a-76a

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)

76a-77a

Fed. R. 50

77a-78a

Fed. R. 56

78a-83a

PACER docket For United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit of California, Jennifer Tom v.

Social Security Administration Case No. 22-16977

84a-90a

D.C. No. 4-19-cv-06322-JST

Appellant’s Informal Opening Brief to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit of

California, Jennifer Tom v. Social Security

Administration Case No. 22-16977 D.C. No. 4-19-cv06322-JST Ninth Circuit Dkt. No. 2 (March 3, 2014)

.......................................91a-181a

xv

Appellant’s Motion to Compel the Social Security

Administration to abide by the Ninth Circuit Rules

30 1.3 and 30-1.4, in Jennifer Tom v. Social Security

Administration Case No. 22-16977 D.C. No. 4-19-cv06322-JST - notifying the Nonth Circuit Court that

Social Security Administration did not include all

Appellants exhibits in the joint excerpts of record

Ninth Circuit Dkt. No. 12(August 2, 2023). 182a-187a

Appellee’s Response to Appellant’s Motion to Compel

the Social Security Administration to abide by the

Ninth Circuit Rules 30-1.3 and 30-1.4, in Jennifer

Tom v. Social Security Administration Case No. 2216977 D.C. No. 4-19-CV-06322-JST - Social Security

Administration admit not including all Appellants

exhibits in the joint excerpts of record Ninth Circuit

Dkt. No. 15 (August 14, 2023)

188a-191a

Appellant’s Reply to Appellee’s Response to

Appellant’s Motion to Compel the Social Security

Administration to abide by the Ninth Circuit Rules

30-1.3 and 30-1.4, in Jennifer Tom v. Social Security

Administration Case No. 22-16977 D.C. No. 4-19-cv06322-JST- listing the missing excerpts of record

cited in Appellants Informal Opening Brief left out of

the excerpts of record SSA submitted to the Ninth

Circuit which the Ninth Circuit Court relied on for

their decision Ninth Circuit Dkt. No. 16 (August 15,

2023)

192a-204a

xvi

Civil Court Discovery Decision ECF 84 finding Spike

is not an essential function and that SSA will be held

account for their admissions in Jennifer Tom v.

Kilolo Kijakazi Acting Commissioner of Social

Security Administration, Civil Case No. 19-cv-06322205a-211a

JST (April 6, 2021)

Defendant’s Answer to Consolidated Amended

Complaint Admissions to claims in Jennifer Tom u.

Kilolo Kijakazi Acting Commissioner of Social

Security Administration, Civil Case No. 19-cv-06322JST, Civil Court Docket ECF 47 (July 2, 2020)

........................................212a-313a

Social Security Administration RA Policy for

Employees with Sensitivity to Fragrances (March

314a-319a

16, 2016)

Indoor Air Quality Report Completed for The Social

Security Administration Survey date: January 29,

2016 - Report Date: February 15, 2016 Prepared by:

United States Public Health Service Federal

Occupational Health Program Support Center U.S.

Department of Health & Human Services 320a-332a

Email about Indoor Air Quality Inspection (January,

25, 2016) Civil Court Docket ECF 114-1... 333a-335a

Social Security Memorandum - From: Nadeem S.

Siddiqui, MD, MPH Medical Officer To: Gina Portillo

SF CREO Manager Region IX San Francisco Subject:

Ms. Jennifer Tom (July 28, 2014) Civil Court Docket

336a-339a

ECF 114-1

340a-342a

Letter from Co-worker

XVII

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Alpha Distrib. Co. v. Jack Daniel Distillery,

454 F.2d 442, 453 (9th Cir. 1972)................

13,42

Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc.,

228 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000)

18,32,33,41

Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents,

lb F.3d 1130, 1137 (7th Cir. 1996).

42

Complainant v. Department of Housing and Urban

Development, 0720130029, 115 LRP 9436 (EEOC

OFO 02/12/15)

22

E.E.O.C. v. Yellow Freight Sys. Inc.,

253 F.3d 943, 951 (7th Cir. 2001)...

18,33,41

Fisher v. Roe,

263 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2001)

14,34,43

Gamez v. Social Security Administration,

103 LRP 49900 , EEOC No. 07A20129 (EEOC

2003)..... ....................................................................

9

Gilberto S. u. Homeland Security,

EEOC Petition No. 0320110053 (Jul. 10, 2014).....20

Humphrey v. Mem 'l Hosps. Ass 'n,

239 F.3d 1128, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2001)

XVlll

iv, 19,40

Irina T. v. Robert Wilkie, Secretary, Department of

Veterans Affairs, Appeal No. 0120180568 Agency

19-20,29-30

No. 2001-0614-2016101883

Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc.,

494 U. S. 545, 554-555.........

i-ii, 13

Mancuso v. Olivarez,

292 F.3d 939, 944 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002)

14, 43

Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U. S. 574, 587.....................................

13

Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc.,

166 Cal. App. 4th 952, 962 (2008)......................

19

Norris v. City and County of San Francisco,

900 F.2d 1326, 1329, 1332 (9th Cir. 1990)...13,42-43

Ralph Villalobos V. TWC Administration,

No.16-55288 (9th Cir. 2017).........................

19,40

Reynolds v. Royal Mail Lines, Ltd.,

254 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1958).................... 14,34,43

U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, U.S.,

122 S.Ct. 1516, 152 L.Ed.2d 589 (2002).....

18, 41

Zivkovic v. Southern California Edison Co.,

302 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002)..........

32,40

STATUTES

1

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)

xix

29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(m), 1630.2(o), 1630.2(p)

20

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(3)

20

42 U.S.U. § 12112(a)

41

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)

41

EEOC ’ s guidance Employer-Provided Leave and the

Americans with Disabilities Act (May 9, 2016) ......30

Section 12940(a) of FEHA

19,40

18U.S. Code § 1519

26-27

RULES

Cir. Rule 30-1.4

Cir. Rule 30-1.3

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)..

Fed. R. 50

Fed. R. 56

OTHER

American with Disabilities Act

ii, iv,37,41

Rehabilitation Act of 1973(Rehab Act), ii, iv,20,3638,44-45

xx

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari

be issued to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

appears at Appendix la-9a to the petition and is

unpublished.

JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals decided my case

on May 2, 2024 at App. la-9. A timely petition for

rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

Appeals on June 18, 2024, at App. 62a. This Court

has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The statutory provisions are reproduced in the

appendix to this petition App. 63a-83a.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Factual Background

Jennifer Tom has sensitivity to environmental

irritants, migraines with aura, and vertigo. Job

responsibilities as a Benefit Authorizer (BA) include

creating, updating, and maintaining Social Security

title two records. In 2013, per Social Security

Administration (SSA) policy Tom informed her co­

worker, about her perfume triggering Tom disability

sensitivity before going to management for help.

Despite attempts to resolve the issue, the co-worker

increased perfume usage and refused to speak with

Tom. Sought help from her first line Rolanda Carter,

Carter did not take any action. In December 2013,

while Carter was on vacation Tom sought help from

her second line, Mireille Hanft, who only provided

temporary relief. Despite Tom’s requests for help,

2 ,

Carter did not take any action but assured Tom that

she was working on it. On May 5, 2014, chemicals

sprayed on her cubicle overwhelmed Tom, leading

her to seek medical attention and file a workers'

compensation claim.

When Tom returned on May 6, 2024, she found her

cubicle still contaminated and asked it he cleaned.

She requested to sit in a different cubicle which was

allowed, but Tom continued to experience issues with

fragrances and chemicals. On May 12, 2014, Tom

learned Carter suddenly moved modules and that

Tammie Doan would take over as her first line. Tom

went directly to Doan asked about her worker's

compensation and stopping harassment, but Doan

was unaware of the situation. Tom informed Doan

about the coworker contaminating her workstation

3

since 2013. Tom offered to provide medical

documentation, but Doan said it would not be

necessary.

However, Ms. Doan delayed taking action until she

had heard the coworker's side of the story. On May

30, 2014, Doan met with harasser and then with

Tom. In a May 30, 2014, harasser demanded Doan

provide Tom’s medical documentation. It is clear

after Doan's meeting with the harasser; Doan’s

actions protected the harasser from Tom’s complaints

rather than following official policy that protects the

harassed not the harasser. During the meeting with

Tom, Doan requested medical documentation before

taking further action and prioritized staff rights to

wear perfume over Tom's need for a safe working

environment. Doan told Tom to keep away from her

harasser and to move, despite already sitting in a

4

different cubicle since her workstation was

contaminated on May 5, 2014 and still uncleaned.

Doan told Tom that it was her responsibility to

protect her health, not SSA's. She also said that if

Tom were sick, she would move. Tom had already

moved cubicles after her cubical was contaminated

on May 5, 2014.Tom expressed concern about moving

the assaulted employee away from the harassing

employee, but Doan insisted it was the right thing to

do.

On June 3, 2014, Doan asked Tom to walk around

the module with her to find a replacement temporary

cubicle, but Doan denied the cubicles away from

perfume and fragrances. Important to note that

during the June 3, 2014 meeting was the first time

Doan wore perfume to work, and Doan continued to

5

wear perfume to work from June 3, 2014 on. Tom told

Doan, her perfume triggered her disability, but Doan

continued wearing it to work.

From May 12-30, 2014, Tom contacted Doan via

email and SKYPE, asking for her help due to ongoing

contamination in her workspace, causing her harm

and required medical attention. Despite Doan being

her main contact for assistance until she left, Tom's

pleas for assistance were fruitless. All of Tom's

efforts to get Doan and CREO to address the ongoing

harassment and their failure to provide an effective

RA were fruitless which resulted in her wrongful

termination in 2018.

From 2013-2018, Tom tried to get SSA to provide

her with a healthy and safe working environment, by

filing EEOC complaints. There are 10 EEOC

complaints, 7 are in abeyance. Tom always worked in

6

good faith with SSA to find an effective RA enabling

her to work full time. However, SSA chose to approve

RA liberal leave claiming it was just as effective as

full-time telework. Since 2014, SSA continued to

claim full-time telework as a possible RA, but SSA

needed Tom to try just one more location before they

would allow telework. Tom in good faith, tried more

than 26 different locations, used gloves, masks, and

an air purifier, moving around in the building was

not effective because SSA could not control what was

used in the public buildings which SSA’s own medical

Officer told SSA (app.339a, 240a and 314a-319a).

Social Security Administration was able to provide

Tom with two clean laptops but because SSA

required that Tom leave the laptops in SSA’s

buildings unprotected they eventually became

contaminated had SSA allowed Tom to keep the

7

laptops with her there would have been no need for

replacement laptops, the third laptop was

contaminated since day one because SSA failed to

take the steps to ensure they provided Tom with a

new laptop handled by the one computer tech that

was fragrance free see app. 156a-159a,171a-172a.

Every time Tom asked for an effective reasonable

accommodation like telework SSA was never

satisfied that there was sufficient proof that SSA

buildings could not provide Tom with a healthy and

safe working environment and continued to require

Tom try more spaces within SSA buildings even

though SSA’s own medical officer told SSA it would

be impractical for Tom to find scent free environment

in public areas which would include transportation:

“Even if Ms. Tom is eventually found to be an

individual with a disability per the RA, the

requested accommodation of scent free work

environment is impractical in most public buildings.

8

Furthermore, Ms. Tom is unlikely to avoid similar

exposures if she visits public places such as

shopping malls, restaurants, grocery stores and

numerous others.” (app. 339a)

There is no lawful reason SSA refused to provide

Tom with telework five days a week Tom’s first line

testified he would have approved Tom for telework

five days a week see app 102a-103a his claim SPIKE

was an essential function is not true per Civil Court

Discovery Decision ECF 84 where SSA admitted

SPIKE was not an essential function of Tom’s job see

app. 205a-211a. SSA approved full time telework as a

reasonable accommodation (RA) to BAs (app. 258a).

SSA failed to act in good faith to effectively RA Tom

see Gamez v. Social Security Administration, 103

LRP 49900, EEOC No. 07A20129 (EEOC 2003).

Tom brought to SSA's attention SSA policy

"Reasonable Accommodation Requests Involving

Fragrance Sensitivity," listing accommodations such

9

as eliminating offending odors and chemicals.

alerting employee to fragrances, changing desk

location, and allowing the employee to work

from home (app. 314a-319a) (emphasis) because of

SSA’s own policy for employees with fragrance

sensitivity and that SSA approved full time telework

as a reasonable accommodation (RA) to BA’s (app.

258a) is definitive evidence Tom’s request for

telework is reasonable on is face against the Ninth

Circuits ruling app. la-9a.

. Due to SSA's failure to provide Tom with effective

RA since 2013, her disabilities expanded in 2015 to

include sensitivity to environmental irritants,

migraines with aura, and vertigo app.253a. These

disabilities noted in return-to-duty notice dated

September 25, 2017 which noted:

“Since July 21, 2016 due to a variety of medical

10

issues including but not limited to: chemical

sensitivity, migraines with aura and vertigo. Since

July 21, 2016, you have been approved on LeaveWithout-Pay (LWOP) based on medical

documentation that you have provided and

permitted to telework one day a week.” (app. 217a218a and app. 277a-278a)

Proof SSA is aware of Tom's disabilities and that

Tom known to be a qualified disabled employee, who

is entitled to RA’s. Instead, SSA voided Tom's

medical documents and revoked the only reasonable

accommodation SSA gave Tom the RA of Liberal

Leave given in lieu of full time telework RA in an

attempt to legitimize AWOL posted to Tom s record.

Clearly, SSA fired Tom for taking sick leave due to

her disabilities (app. 216a-218a). If SSA had

approved full-time telework in 2014, Tom could have

worked full-time. Tom's successful performance

appraisals and awards in the ten years with SSA

proved she is fully capable of performing the

11

essential functions of her job. SSA admits firing Tom

for being out sick due to her disabilities not due to

her job performance “Defendant admits that the

agency removed Plaintiff for conduct (AWOL) and not

her performance.” See app. 218a, app. 220a, and app.

258a.

II. The District Court's ruling allowed the

Social Security Administration to take back

admitted facts and permit misrepresented

material facts to stand despite overwhelming

evidence that disproved SSA claims and

supported Tom's claims.

The District Court's summary judgment decision

(SMJ) did not address the fact that Tom proved that

129 out of 138 "undisputed facts" cited by the SSA in

their Motion for Summary Judgment were false and

contradicted facts admitted to by the SSA in ECF 47

12

Defendant's Answer to Consolidated Amended

Complaint, see app. 212a-313 or that SSA's reply to

Tom's Opposition to SMJ did not dispute Tom's

evidence proving the falsity of their SMJ facts or

claim harassing events did not occur.

The District Court's decision conflicts with SMJ

processing case law:

Therefore, the Court must carefully review all the

evidence in the record, cf., e. g., Matsushita Elec.

Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S.

574, 587, drawing all reasonable inferences in

favor of the nonmoving party, but making no

credibility determinations or weighing any

evidence, e. g., Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494

U. S. 545, 554-555. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("In all

actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . ., the

court shall find facts specifically and state

separately its conclusions of law thereon").

Alpha Distrib. Co. v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 454

F.2d 442, 453 (9th Cir. 1972), that held: Rule 52(a)

requires the district court's findings to

"be explicit enough to give the appellate court a

clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's

13

decision, and to enable it to determine the ground

on which the trial court reached its decision." See

also Norris v. City and County of San Francisco,

900 F.2d 1326, 1329, 1332 (9th Cir. 1990)

(applying the same rule in a discrimination case).

Reynolds v. Royal Mail Lines, Ltd., 254 F.2d 55, 57

(9th Cir. 1958) (holding that in a bench trial, it is

the trial judge's responsibility to resolve disputes

arising from conflicting testimony); Fisher u. Roe,

263 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Trial courts

find facts. \Ve do not."), abrogated on other

grounds, Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 944 n.

1 (9th Cir. 2002).

During the summary judgment process, it is not

appropriate to make credibility determinations or

weigh any evidence; however, that is precisely what

the District Court did in its SMJ decision. The

District Court did not acknowledge Tom's

contradicting evidence, which consisted of 616 pages

of evidence; instead, the District Court claimed that

Tom failed to provide evidence. Because there were

genuine issues of material facts and conflicting

evidence, dismissing claims that required a full

14

review of the evidence was inappropriate.

The District Court's Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law mirrored the same facts used in

SSA's SMJ, which Tom had disproved. Examples of

misrepresented material facts found by the District

Court is that Tom did not demonstrate she performed

the essential functions of her job (app. 45a) and that

Tom did not and could not work on SSA's laptop (app.

46a). Still, SSA admitted that Tom was not fired for

her performance see app.218a, 220a, 258a, 288a-289a

and 289a. SSA admitted that Tom continued to work

earning credit hours and over time until SSA

wrongfully terminated her on August 15, 2018

"Defendant admits that Plaintiff teleworked one

day a week. Defendant admits that from July 2016

through the date of her termination, Plaintiff

reported to work only on her assigned telework

day. Defendant admits that Plaintiff worked credit

hours or over time hours, but only on her assigned

telework day." (app. 298a)

15

SSA also admitted that Tom had no disciplinaryrecord before being removed, which means Tom was

performing the essential functions of her job while

using SSA's laptop see app. 298a.

The fact that SSA admits that Tom was not fired

for her performance and, that SSA approved Tom to

earn credit hours and work overtime and that Tom

had no disciplinary record is proof that Tom was

successfully performing her job while using SSA's

laptop. This proves that Tom was more than capable

of performing her duties while at home, with or

without a reasonable accommodation. Tom was

teleworking under SSA’s Pilot telework program, not

SSA’s RA of telework.

The District Court failed to give any credit to

Tom's successful performance appraisals throughout

her 10-year career or to the fact that SSA specifically

16

noted Tom was a qualified disabled employee with

whom SSA was in RA talks, see app. 167a-168a and

172a. Additionally, the fact that Tammie Doan's

testimony changed each of the three days (174a-175a)

during the trial and was ignored by the District

Judge when he found Doan a credible witness over

Tom and Tom's evidence. It is difficult to understand

how the judge found Doan's testimony credible

despite these inconsistencies. The District Court

ignored that SSA's medical officer told SSA that

"scent free work environment is impractical in most

public buildings" (app.339a) and ignored the fact that

SSA admitted the EEOC AJ told SSA the RA's SSA

provided Tom are ineffective:

"If Complainant is credible and her symptoms are

genuine, then the current accommodations are not

working, and the Agency must consider full-time

teleworking. To justify not allowing Complainant

to telework full-time, the Agency must

demonstrate undue hardship. In its MSJ,

17

SSA did not address the undue hardship of full­

time telework because the Agency contends the

other accommodations provided are effective."

The District Court also ignored the fact that SSA

admitted during the trial that SSA found Tom is a

qualified disabled employee see app. 170a and app.

297a. The District Court failed to recognize that SSA

needs to provide qualified disabled employees with

effective reasonable accommodations for the

employees' particular disability, not just an

accommodation see U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,

U.S., 122 S. Ct. 1516, 152 L.Ed.2d 589 (2002)

"... (3) offering an accommodation that is

reasonable and effective. Id. at 1114-15."

(Emphasis added) and E.E.O.C. v. Yellow Freight

Sys. Inc., 253 F.3d 943, 951 (7th Cir. 2001) (en

banc) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Barnett,228 F.3d at 1115

(requiring the selected accommodation to be

reasonable and effective)." (Emphasis added)

The District Court decision failed to note Tom

18

asserted and provided evidence that the AWOL

posted to Tom's record was fake and actually because

of sick leave taken by Tom, a known qualified

disabled employee, while waiting for SSA to provide

an available effective RA is not separate a issue from

Tom's disabilities and conflicts with case law Ralph

Villalobos V. TWC Administration, No. 16-55288 (9th

Cir. 2017)

"Section 12940(a) of FEHA prohibits employers

from firing an employee 'because of disability.

Nadaf-Rahrou v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 166

Cal. App. 4th 952, 962 (2008)." And "'Terminating

an employee for conduct that results from a

disability is equivalent to terminating an employee

based on the disability itself because 'conduct

resulting from a disability is considered to be part

of the disability, rather than a separate basis for

termination.' Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n,

239 F.3d 1128, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2001)."

and conflicts with Irina T. v. Robert Wilkie,

Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Appeal No.

19

0120180568 Agency No. 2001-0614-2016101883

finding:

"In determining whether an individual is qualified

for a job, the Commission asks whether that

person can perform the essential functions of the

job when at work. Gilberto S. v. Homeland

Security, EEOC Petition No. 0320110053 (Jul. 10,

2014)." And "Under the Rehabilitation Act and the

Commission's regulations, an agency is required to

make reasonable accommodation to the known

physical and mental limitations of a qualified

individual with a disability unless the agency can

show that accommodation would cause an undue

hardship. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o), 1630.2(p)." and

“Complainant requested a reasonable

accommodation - continued LWOP for her

disability-related absences from work. To

determine an appropriate reasonable

accommodation, it is often necessary for an agency

to initiate an informal, interactive process with the

individual with a disability who needs

accommodation. This process should identify the

precise limitations resulting from the disability

and potential reasonable accommodations that

could overcome those limitations. 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(3)." and "Instead, the Agency simply

applied its blanket leave policy to charge

Complainant AWOL because she exhausted all her

available paid leave and her FMLA coverage ran

out."

20

Tom had a right to continued LWOP instead of

AWOL being posted to her record because it was SSA

who revoked Tom's RA Liberal Leave without

justification while at the same time voiding all of

Tom's medical documentation while claiming to work

with Tom to find her an effective RA see app. 167a168a, 172a. SSA chose to use a blanket leave policy

and forced AWOL on Tom's record claiming Tom's

being out sick was a separate issue form Tom's

continued request for an effective RA to replace the

RA of liberal leave SSA revoked. Tom never stopped

asking for more telework days so that the need for

additional sick leave would no longer be an issue.

The record shows that Tom performed the

essential functions of her job when at work, as

evidenced by her successful performance appraisals.

There is no indication in the record that, in

21

anticipation of cutting off Tom's LWOP under its

blanket leave policy, that SSA initiated or engaged in

any sort of interactive process with Tom to explore

means of accommodating her disabilities, even

though her management is well aware of her

disabilities, (app. 253a, 275a, 296a). Also, in

Complainant v. Department of Housing and Urban

Development, 0720130029, 115 LRP 9436 (EEOC

OFO 02/12/15) which found

"It found that EEOC "precedent clearly has

established that a request for telecommuting or a

shorter commuting time because of a disability

triggers an Agency's responsibility under the

Rehabilitation Act. "Further, modifying where

work is performed can be a reasonable

accommodation if it's not an undue hardship,

which the agency failed to show in this case. The

EEOC pointed out that the "federal government is

charged with the goal of being a 'model employer'

of individuals with disabilities, which may require

it to consider innovation, fresh approaches, and

technology as effective methods of providing

reasonable accommodations."

22

The District Court's decisions did not properly

discuss the conflicts of evidence presented by both

parties there was no attempt to discuss the legal

cases presented by both parties to determine who

proved their case based on the evidence the decision

made it appear as though Tom made complaints

without evidence which the record does not support

also failing to hold SSA to what SSA admitted to in

Defendant's Answer to Consolidated Amended

Complaint, see app. 212a-313a.

III. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District

Court's ruling, stating that Tom failed to

provide evidence to support her claims.

However, the Ninth Circuit failed to enforce

Circuit Rules 30-1.3 and 30-1.4, which made the

Social Security Administration responsible for

providing Tom's evidence to the Court in the

23

excerpts of record and improperly handled

Tom's Motion to Compel the Social Security

Administration to comply with Circuit Rules

30-1.3 and 30-1.4.

The record shows that the Ninth Circuit judges did

not rule on a motion to compel Social Security to

abide by Cir. Rule 30-1.3 and Cir. Rule 30-1.4 and

provide the Ninth Circuit with both parties' excerpts

of record Tom filed within two days of SSA's filing the

incomplete excerpts of record. Whoever Tom's

motion to compel SSA to abide by Cir. Rule 30-1.3

and Cir. Rule 30-1.4 sat untouched for 10 months

and was dismissed by the court clerk five minutes

before posting the Ninth Circuit's decision (app.

87a) to uphold the District Court's decision on the

grounds Tom failed to provide evidence to

support her claims which is not true Tom cited

24

evidence located in the District Court's Docket as

allowed. SSA was responsible for including all of

Tom's (appellant in pro se) evidence in the excerpts of

the record SSA submitted to the courts per Cir. Rule

30-1.3 and Cir. Rule 30-1.4 (app. 72a). The Ninth

Circuit did not rule on Tom’s Motion to Compel SSA

to provide the complete excerpts of record, nor did the

Court send Tom any decision on her motion to compel

as the decision to dismiss was not on any of the

decisions mailed to Tom who is pro se and is a paper

filer. In Ninth Circuit Dkt. No. 15 (app. 188a-191a),

SSA admitted, "Defendant-Appellee excluded only

material not relevant to the issues on appeal..." It is

clear that SSA intentionally omitted specific evidence

cited by Tom in her Informal Opening Brief that

should have been included in the excerpts of record.

The missing exhibits include trial exhibits and

25

evidence from later filings is also necessary.

especially with regard to the SMJ decision also being

appealed. SSA's claim that it could choose what

evidence Tom had a right to have included in the

excerpts of record is not in accordance with Cir Rule

30-1.3 or 30-1.4 noting memoranda and briefs "They

may be relevant if a party asserts that an issue

was waived, forfeited, or not exhausted, to

support disputed assertions of procedural

history, or in other similar circumstances." the rule

does not give any party the right to decide for the

opposing party or the Court what exhibits are or are

not relevant to support their opponents claims before

the Court (app. 72a-76a). SSA's willful act of

withholding Tom's exhibits from the Ninth Circuit

amounts to evidence tampering per 18 U.S, Code §

1519

26

"prohibits tampering with evidence related to a

federal investigation or bankruptcy proceeding.

The elements of the crime include: Acting with

knowledge. To alter, destroy, mutilate, conceal,

cover up, falsify, or to make a false entry in any

record, document, or tangible object", (emphasis)

For a list of Tom's missing exhibits, see app. 204a.

Some of the missing exhibits are trial exhibits. The

Ninth Circuit decision cannot stand because SSA

intentionally withheld Tom's exhibits. Tom notified

the Ninth Circuit within two days of SSA

withholding Tom's exhibits from the excerpts of

record, giving the Ninth Circuit time to address the

concealing of Tom’s exhibits and allowing the

decision to stand rewards SSA for willfully concealing

Tom's evidence from the courts and causing further

insult to injury.

The Ninth Circuit Court rendered its decision

solely on the evidence SSA provided in their excerpts

27

of record, which excluded Tom's (Appellant in pro se)

evidence cited in her Informal Opening Brief even

though SSA asked for and was granted a 90-day

extension for the sole purpose to give SSA time to

include Tom's exhibits in the joint excerpts of record

per Cir. Rule 30-1.3 and 30-1.4 see app. 186a-187a.

Tom's Informal Opening Brief cites evidence found

in the District Court's docket proving claims of

disability discrimination, including ineffective

accommodations provided by SSA, resulting in an

increase in Tom's disabilities from one to three.

Citing evidence telework was effective RA, Tom

successfully performing her job, AWOL was fake and

placed on Tom's record for taking sick leave due to

her disabilities not being effectively accommodated,

SSA wrongfully terminated Tom, and disparate

treatment occurred. Doan worked with Tom's

28

harasser, not with Tom, and knew or should have

known behaviors such as wearing perfume to work.

forcing Tom into meetings, and following her onto

elevators would trigger her disability, creating a

hostile work environment due to Doan's authority

over Tom. SSA excluded Tom's evidence from the

excerpts of record against Cir. Rule 30-1.3 and Cir.

Rule 30-1.4: As Tom is pro se, she did not have to

provide excerpts of the record. SSA is responsible for

providing both parties complete excerpts of the

record when they filed because they are not pro se.

The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with Irina T.

v. Robert Wilkie, Secretary, Department of Veterans

Affairs, Appeal No. 0120180568 Agency No. 20010614-2016101883 finding on LWOP as an RA

"The Commission has taken a clear position that,

absent proof of undue hardship, reasonable

accommodation includes "making modifications to

existing leave policies and providing leave when

29

needed for a disability even where an employer

does not offer leave to other employees. See EEOC

s guidance Employer-Provided Leave and the

Americans with Disabilities Act (May 9, 2016)

(footnote 1 indicates that this guidance applies to

federal employees). Relevant to this case, the

guidance indicates that granting leave as a

reasonable accommodation may be required even

when the employee has exhausted the leave the

employer provides as a benefit, including leave

exhausted under the FMLA."

Therefore, Tom had a legal right to request

continued LWOP as an RA, while SSA refused full­

time telework as an RA. Despite Tom providing

medical documentation every three months, SSA

failed to engage in an individualized RA discussion of

Tom's need for more LWOP RA. SSA failure to meet

its obligations to prove continued LWOP was an

undue hardship. SSA cannot justify refusing to

IReasonable accommodation does not require the employer to

provide paid leave beyond what it provides as part of its paid

leave policy. We note in this case, Petitioner was requesting

leave without pay.

30

approve additional LWOP requests as an RA for

Tom's disabilities and cannot justify revoking RA

Liberal Leave and posting only AWOL on Tom's

record on days Tom is forced to take off sick due to

her disabilities not being effectively accommodated.

SSA admits firing Tom due to being out sick

because of her disabilities that prevented her from

commuting to work, even though she successfully

performed her job on SSA pilot telework days (app.

218a, 220a, 258a, 274a, 288a, 298a.). Tom's

managers testified Tom was in good standing during

her employment app. 101a-102a. The evidence

supports that Tom was fired because of her

disabilities and not legitimate AWOL (app. 218a,

220a, 258a, 274a, 288a, 298a.) In 2018, Kris

Chamrernlaska testified he recommended allowing

Tom to telework full-time instead of terminating her

31

due to the quality of her work. See the Informal

Opening brief at the bottom of the app. 102a top page

and app. 103a Claims SPIKE is an essential function,

but it is a lie per SSA admissions during District

Court Discovery Dispute decision; see app. 205a211a. SSA had no lawful reason to deny Tom

telework as a reasonable accommodation.

The Ninth Circuit's decision misapplied Zivkovic v.

Southern California Edison 302 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th

Cir. 2002) and Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1115 claiming

the belief that the case law above found:

“not obligated to provide an employee the

accommodation he requests or prefers”—it need

“only provide some reasonable accommodation.”

The complete ruling requires reasonable

accommodations to be effective:

"An 'employer is not obligated to provide an

32

employee the accommodation he requests or

prefers, the employer need only provide some

reasonable accommodation.' E.E.O.C. v. Yellow

Freight Sys. Inc., 253 F.3d 943, 951 (7th Cir. 2001)

(en banc) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1115

(requiring the selected accommodation to be

reasonable and effective)." (Emphasis added)

The omission of "requiring the selected

accommodation to be reasonable and effective" is a

critical element to leave out because it alters an

employer's obligation, increasing SSA's obligation

beyond just providing any one-size-fits-all

accommodation; it requires SSA to provide effective

RAs tailored to each employee's individual disability

needs. SSA was well aware that the RAs they

provided Tom were ineffective (app. 240a, 267a,

33

314a-319a, 339a-342a).

The Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts with rule 50,

and rule 56; the Court must review all of the

evidence in the record and with Reynolds v. Royal

Mail Lines, Ltd., 254 F,2d 55, 57 (9th Cir, 1958)

holding that in a bench trial, it is the trial judge's

responsibility to resolve disputes arising from

conflicting testimony. And Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d

906, 912 (9th Cir. 2001) finding "Trial courts find

facts. We do not."

The Ninth Circuit overlooked the facts presented

by Tom in the Informal Opening Brief, which notes

numerous conflicts in evidence and testimony,

including the fact Doan's testimony changed all three

days see Informal Opening Brief No. 112 app.l74a175a. The air test was not relevant to whether SSA

effectivity accommodated Tom; the test was only

34

testing for human comfort Debby Ellis was aware of

the fact the test would not provide answers as to

where SSA provided Tom with fragrance and

chemical-free environment prior to the test a fact she

shared with other staff that it would provide no

information relevant to Tom's sensitivity to

fragrances and chemicals but SSA has used the test

to blind the Court to the truth that SSA knowingly

failed to effectively accommodate Tom

"P.S. I have some concern about the "air quality"

survey because I can't get a straight answer as to

exactly what the air quality survey tests for.

According to the FOH website, it seems more

geared to carbon dioxide (dangerous stuff) and not

to the "chemical odors" Ms. Tom is complaining

about. I guess there is still value in determining

that the air quality is of acceptable level from a

health & safety perspective just to have that info"

(app. 335a)

The air quality test is only for human comfort

"At the time of the assessment,

temperature/relative humidity and carbon dioxide

levels were within the comfort parameters

established by ASHRAE" and "ASHRAE indicates

35

that carbon dioxide concentrations of l,000ppm

can be used as a reference for human comfort

levels in indoor spaces. This is a standard

relating to human comfort and not health."

(app.33ia-332a) (emphasis added)

Tom meticulously reviewed the District Court

record to gather evidence supporting her claims and

demonstrate discrepancies between testimony and

evidence provided by SSA, proving that the physical

evidence does not support SSA's version of events.

The fact that SSA is a Federal Agency should not

automatically grant SSA blind credibility on their

word over the evidence Tom provided to prove her

claims and disprove SSA's claims.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. The Court Should Grant Certiorari to

address the erosion of the protections under

the Americans with Disabilities Act and

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehab Act) by the

36

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

decision in Tom v. Social Security

Administration.

This Court should grant a review in this case to

restore the protections of the Americans with

Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act of 1973

(Rehab Act) that ensures that a qualified disabled

employee will be given an effective reasonable

accommodation for their specific disability needs and

not just a blanket one size fits all accommodation and

to ensure qualified disabled employees are not fired

because of their disability under false charges of

AWOL and that an employer must show undue

hardship to support the refusal of an accommodation

requested by a qualified disabled employee when

other accommodations prove ineffective. In Tom v

Social Security Administration, the Ninth Circuit

37

Court's ruling not only reduced protections of the

Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation

Act of 1973 (Rehab Act) by changing employers'

requirements to provide a qualified employed with an

effective reasonable accommodation, removal of an

employer’s responsibility to prove undue hardship

when refusing to provide a qualified disabled

employee an accommodation the employer provides

to other qualified disabled employees, allow an

employer to post false charges of AWOL to blacken a

qualified disabled employees unjustly record to fire

an otherwise pristine employment record of a

qualified disabled employees for the sole purpose of

firing them instead of providing the qualified

disabled employee with the requested reasonable

accommodation. This Court cannot allow case law to

stand that removes the right of a qualified disabled

38

employee to receive an effective reasonable

accommodation that enables them to return to work

full time. This Court cannot allow case law that

enables an employer to force an employee to exhaust

their leave while pretending to work with the

employee to find a reasonable accommodation other

than the accommodation the employee is asking for

and fire the qualified disabled employee because of

the leave the employer forced them to take because

their disability was not being effectively

accommodated under false AWOL charges.

II. The Court of Appeals are divided on the

Questions Presented.

The Ninth Circuit decision to uphold the District

Court decision in Tom v Social Security

Administration allowing SSA to fire Tom for the

forced sick leave Tom took while she tried working

39

with SSA from 2014-2018 in the interactive process

for an effective RA when SSA chose to void Tom's

medical documentation and revoked the RA leave

without pay (LWOP) and refused to approve telework

RA or more LWOP SSA chose to post AWOL knowing

SSA failed to provide a Tom with an RA that would

enable her to return to work full time.

The Ninth Circuit Case law created in Tom v.

Social Security Administration contradicts the

standing case law in Ralph Villalobos V. TWC

Administration, No. 16-55288 (9th Cir. 2017)

"Section 12940(a) of FEHA prohibits employers

from firing an employee 'because of disability.

Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 166

Cal. App. 4th 952, 962 (2008)." And '"Terminating

an employee for conduct that results from a

disability is equivalent to terminating an employee

based on the disability itself because 'conduct

resulting from a disability is considered to be part

of the disability, rather than a separate basis for

termination.' Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n,

239 F.3d 1128, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2001)."

40

And conflicts with the full finding in Zivkovic v.

Southern California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1089

(9th Cir. 2002) findings:

"The ADA prohibits discrimination against a

"qualified individual with a disability because of

the disability of such individual in regard to job

application procedures, the hiring, advancement,

or discharge of employees, employee

compensation, job training, and other terms,

conditions, and privileges of employment." 42

U.S.C. § 12112(a)" and "An employer discriminates

against a qualified individual with a disability by

"not making reasonable accommodations to the

known physical or mental limitations of an

otherwise qualified individual with a disability

who is an applicant or employee, unless [the

employer] can demonstrate that the

accommodation would impose an undue hardship

on the operation of the business of [the employer]."

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added).”

"In Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1112

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated on other

grounds, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, U.S., 122

S.Ct. 1516, 152 L.Ed.2d 589 (2002), we held that

once an employee requests an accommodation or

an employer recognizes the employee needs an

accommodation" and" the employer must engage in

an interactive process with the employee to

determine the appropriate reasonable

accommodation." "The interactive process requires:

41

(1) direct communication between the employer

and employee to explore in good faith the

possible accommodations; (2) consideration of

the employee’s request; and (3) offering an

accommodation that is reasonable and

effective. Id. At 1114-15. “Liability for failure

to provide reasonable accommodations ensues

only where the employer bears responsibility

for the breakdown” in the interactive process.

Beck v. Univ. ofWis. Bd. Of Regents, 75 F.3d

1130, 1137 (7th Cir. 1996). An “employer is not

obligated to provide an employee the

accommodation he requests or prefers, the

employer need only provide some reasonable

accommodation.” E.E.O.C. v. Yellow Freight

Sys. Inc., 253 F.3d 943, 951 (7th Cir. 2001) (en

banc) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1115

(requiring the selected accommodation to

be reasonable and effective).” (Emphasis

added)

And conflicts with conflicts with Alpha Distrib. Co.

v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 454 F.2d 442, 453 (9th Cir.

1972), that held:

Rule 52(a) requires the district court's findings to

"be explicit enough to give the appellate court a

clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's

decision, and to enable it to determine the ground

on which the trial court reached its decision." See

also Norris v. City and County of San Francisco,

42

900 F.2d 1326, 1329, 1332 (9th Cir. 1990)

(applying the same rule in a discrimination case).

And conflicts with Reynolds v. Royal Mail Lines,

Ltd., 254 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1958) (holding that

in a bench trial, it is the trial judge's responsibility

to resolve disputes arising from conflicting

testimony); Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906, 912 (9th

Cir. 2001) ("Trial courts find facts. We do not."),

abrogated on other grounds, Mancuso v. Olivarez,

292 F.3d 939, 944 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002). The district

court ruled without resolving the conflicting

testimony between SSA and Tom, yet it is the

obligation of the trier of fact to do just that.

III. The Questions Presented Are Exceptionally

Important.

This Court cannot allow any court to give up the

Court's authority to one party in a court case to

decide what evidence their opponent can use to

support their claims and determine what evidence

can be used to disprove their opponent's defense. Nor

can the courts allow one party of a court case to alter

the requirements in Civil Court Rules or any court

43

rules they don't wish to follow to the letter of the law.

By allowing Tom v. Social Security Administration to

stand, the courts will open the floodgates to unethical

behavior. And make it appear the courts are allowing

parties to govern themselves under a broken honor

system where the courts are unwilling to force the

law or hold those who violate the law accountable for

their actions, thus eroding the confidence and faith

the people have in the justice system. The Courts

must enforce Circuit Rules to restore the rule of law

and secure equality and equal protection for all

under the law

This Court cannot allow the demolishing of the

Americans with Disabilities Act and the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehab Act) by allowing

Tom v. Social Security Administration to stand

taking away qualified disabled employees right to an

44

effective reasonable accommodation and give

absolute authority to employers to say what

accommodation an employee can have removing the

employer's responsibility to engage in an

individualized RA discussion of each employee and

not just provide a blanket one size fits all approach to

accommodating qualified disabled employees. By

allowing this decision to stand, the Court is gutting

the Americans with Disabilities Act and the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehab Act), leaving it an

empty shell with full authority to employers and

none to qualified disabled employees.

This Court should grant review in this case to

guide on how to properly apply the protections of

American with Disabilities Act and the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehab Act) that enable

qualified disabled employees to receive effective

45

reasonable accommodations that are individualized

to that employees' disabilities needs since no two

people are alike and no two people disabilities can be

resolved every time by the same reasonable

accommodation. This Court need also make sure that

all courts enforce the laws equally and that no party

in a court case can pick and choose for their opponent

what evidence the Court can review and ensure that

the courts retain authority to decide what evidence

they will use to render judgment.

The Ninth Circuit's first mistake was not acting on

Tom's Motion to Compel SSA to provide both parties’

full evidence. Allowing the Motion to Compel for 10

months failing to mention Tom's Motion to Compel in

the Ninth Circuit's decision to affirm the District

Court decision on the grounds Tom failed to provide

evidence to support her claims on the same day the

46

Ninth Circuit Court Clerk dismissed Tom's Motion to

Compel five minutes before posting the decision to

affirm. (Emphasis)

This mistake, in turn, led the Court to affirm the

district court's conclusion that Tom failed to provide

evidence to prove her claims and disprove SSA's

defense. This reasoning is unfounded and rests on a

misunderstanding of whose responsibility it was to

provide Tom's evidence to the Ninth Circuit and the

belief that the District Court followed proper

Summary Judgment processing procedures and drew

all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving

party and made no credibility determinations or

weighing any evidence and that the District Court

Judge looked at both parties evidence to determine

whose claims were supported by the physical

evidence. However, a review of the record and the

47

decisions issued by the District Court will show that

the District Court claimed that Tom provided no

evidence and the decisions issued are carbon copies of

the Social Security Administration's filings despite

the fact Tom provided that the facts the District

Court used to rule in Social Security Administrations

favor contradicting facts SSA admitted to in their

Defendant's Answer to Consolidated Amended

Complaint app. 212a-313a. In Tom's Informal

Opening Brief to the Ninth Circuit Court, she again

shows that the facts relied on by the District Court

are misrepresented material facts; see My Informal

Opening Brief app. 91a-181a.

Because the lower courts are not properly

reviewing all the evidence provided before issuing

their decisions and have allowed the Social Security

Administration to withhold Tom's evidence and tell

48

the courts what evidence Tom can use to support her

claims, this Court's review is warranted to restore

the courts' sole authority to decide what evidence is

and is not evidence that the courts will use.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner in pro se Jennifer Tom respectfully

requests that a writ of certiorari be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Jennifer Tom

Petitioner in pro se

September 9, 2024

49

APPENDIX A

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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