Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jennifer Tom, Petitioner v. Martin J. O'Malley, Commissioner of Social Security
Supreme Court briefSep 13, 2024
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In The
Supreme Court of The United States
Jennifer Tom - Petitioner in pro se,
vs.
Martin O'Malley Commissioner of The SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (SSA) - Respondent
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Jennifer Tom
Petitioner in pro se
2101 Mangrove Court
Antioch, CA 94509
(925) 698-5028
Date: September 9, 2024
QUESTION PRESENTED
Federal Rule 50 requires a court to make a decision
when a party has presented all their evidence on an
issue, and there is not enough legal evidence for a
reasonable jury to find in favor of that party on that
issue. The standard for making this decision under
Federal Rule 50 is similar to the standard for
summary judgment under Federal Rule 56.
Federal Rule 56 the court must carefully review all
the evidence in the record, drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, but
making no credibility determinations or weighing
any evidence. Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.
S. 545, 554-555. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("In all actions
tried upon the facts without a jury ..., the court shall
find facts specifically and state separately its
i
conclusions of law thereon"). Addressing all
conflicting evidence in the court’s findings and
conclusions.
The Americans with Disabilities Act became law in
1990 and provides civil rights to all individuals with
disabilities and guarantees equal access to
opportunity in employment and all benefits of
employment, transportation, public accommodations,
state and local government, and telecommunications
for individuals with disabilities.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was the United
States' first major federal disability rights law. The
law opened doors for many qualified individuals with
disabilities to enter, for the first time, the federal
workforce. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as
Amended (Rehab Act) prohibits discrimination on the
basis of disability in programs conducted and funded
li
by the Federal government (504) and it covers
discrimination in Federal employment, and in the
employment practices (501 & 503).
Cir. Rule 30-1.3: No Excerpts Required for Pro Se
Party: A party proceeding without counsel need not
file excerpts. If such a party does not file excerpts,
counsel for appellee or respondent must file
Supplemental Excerpts of Record that contain all of
the documents that are cited in the pro se opening
brief or otherwise required by Rule 30-1.4, as well as
the documents that are cited in the answering brief.
1) Can the Court allow the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit decision to stand in Tom v. Social
Security Administration where the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth. Circuit found that an employer
can fire a qualified disabled employee for taking
leave while waited for the Social Security
Administration to approve Tom’s (Appellant in pr se)
requests for an effective reasonable accommodation
for example full-time telework, the Social Security
Administration fired Tom (Appellant in pro se) for
taking sick leave while working with Social Security
m
Administration in the Reasonable Accommodation
interactive process for the conduct of taking sick
leave that results from her disabilities despite the
fact the courts have found ruled that “terminate an
employee for conduct that results from a disability is
equivalent to terminating an employee based on the
disability itself because ‘conduct resulting from a
disability is considered to be part of the disability,
rather than a separate basis for termination.’
Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128,
1139-40 (9th Cir. 2001).”?
2) Can the Court allow the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit decision to stand in Tom v. Social
Security Administration where the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that an employer
need not provide an effective reasonable
accommodation just an accommodation rendering of
the protection provided by the Americans With
Disabilities Act and the protections under of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehab Act) worthless,
ineffective and powerless to protect qualified disabled
employees thus hindering qualified disabled
employees from gainful employment?
3. Can the Court allow the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit) decision in Tom
(Appellant in pro se) v. Social Security
Administration (SSA) to stand, when the Ninth
Circuit, allowed SSA to violate rule Cir. Rule 30-1.3
and Cir. Rule 30-1.4 when SSA chose to withhold
evidence Tom cited in her Informal Opening Brief in
the joint excerpts of record per Cir. Rule 30-1.3 SSA
IV
is responsible/obligated to add all of Tom’s evidence
cited in her Informal Opening Brief, in the joint
excerpts of record or allow the Ninth Circuit to not
enforce Cir. Rule 30-1.3 and Cir. Rule 30-1.4 or allow
Ninth Circuit's improper handling of Tom's motion to
compel filed September 2, 2023 only two days after
the Social Security Administration filed the
incomplete excerpts of record filed on July 31, 2023
or allow the Ninth Circuit’s decision to denied Tom’s
motion to compel (without notifying Tom at all) 10
months later on May 2, 2024 at 10:59am and five
minutes later on May 2, 2024 at 11:04am rewarded
SSA for the willfully violation of Cir. Rule 30-1.3 and
Cir. Rule 30-1.4 by withholding Tom’s evidence from
the excerpts of record by issuing judgment in favor of
the Social Security Administration on the grounds
Tom (Appellant in Pro Se) failed to provide evidence
to support her claims?
LIST OF PARTIES
All the parties appear in the caption of the case on
the cover page.
RELATED CASES
Jennifer Tom v. Social Security Administration,
Hearing No. 550-2015-00104X, Agency No. SF-140624-SSA, EEOC ALJ Virginia Mellema MaGee
(April 7, 2017).
Jennifer Tom v. Social Security Administration,
Hearing No. 550-2015-00104X, Agency No. SF-140624-SSA, SSA Final Order, EEOC Director Kojuan
Almond (May 18, 2017).
Jennifer Tom v. Social Security Administration,
Appeal No. 0120172221, Hearing No. 550-201500104X, Agency No. SF-14-0624-SSA, Office of
Federal Operation, Director Carlton Hadden
(February 15, 2019).
Jennifer Tom v. Social Security Administration,
Reconsideration Request No. 2019002750, Appeal No.
0120172221, Hearing No. 550-2015-00104X, Agency
No. SF-14-0624-SSA, Office of Federal Operation,
Director Carlton Hadden (June 25, 2019).
vi
Jennifer Tom v. Kilolo Kijakazi Acting
Commissioner of Social Security Administration,
Civil Case No. 19-cv-07914-JST, MSPB Case No. SF0752-19-0286-1-1, Reconsideration Request No.
2020000730, Appeal No. 20190000982, Agency No.
SF-19-0924-SSA, filed December 3, 2019.
Jennifer Tom v. Kilolo Kijakazi Acting
Commissioner of Social Security Administration,
Civil Case No. 19-CV-06322-JST, Reconsideration
Request No. 2019002750, Appeal No. 0120172221,
Hearing No. 550-2015-00104X, Agency No. SF-140624-SSA, filed September 27, 2019.
Jennifer Tom v. Kilolo Kijakazi Acting
Commissioner of Social Security Administration,
Civil Case No. 19-cv-06322-JST, Reconsideration
Request No. 2019002750, Appeal No. 0120172221,
Hearing No. 550-2015-00104X, Agency No. SF-140624-SSA, and Jennifer Tom v. Kilolo Kijakazi Acting
Commissioner of Social Security Administration,
Civil Case No. 19-cv-07914-JST, MSPB Case No. SF0752-19-0286-1-1, Reconsideration Request No.
2020000730, Appeal No. 20190000982, Agency No.
SF-19-0924-SSA, Judge Jon S. Tiger Ordered the
consolidation of all claims from Civil Case No. 19-cv06322-JST and Civil Case No. 19-cv-07914-JST
under Jennifer Tom v. Kilolo Kijakazi Acting
Commissioner of Social Security Administration,
Civil Case Civil Case No. 19-CV-06322-JST Civil
Court Docket ECF 33 (February 26, 2020).
vm
Jennifer Tom v. Social Security Administration,
Agency No. SF-18-0924-SSA aka SF-19-0924-SSA,
Final Agency Decision, November 5, 2018 the Social
Security Administration dismissed the EEOC case
incorrectly on December 17, 2018 the EEOC ALJ
Virginia Mellema MaGee advised SSA to rescind the
dismissal of SF-18-0924-SSA on December 20, 2018
SSA reopened claims under SF-18-0924-SSA and SF19-0942-SSA.
Jennifer Tom v. Social Security Administration,
Agency No. SF-18-0924-SSA aka SF-19-0924-SSA,
Final Agency Decision, EEOC Director Claudia
Postell (January 30, 2019).
Jennifer Tom v. Social Security Administration,
Appeal No. 20190000982, Agency No. SF-19-0924SSA, Office of Federal Operation Director Carlton
Hadden (September 24, 2019).
Jennifer Tom v. Social Security Administration,
Reconsideration Request No. 2020000730, Appeal No.
20190000982, Agency No. SF-19-0924-SSA, Office of
Federal Operation Director Carlton Hadden (March
12, 2020).
Jennifer Tom v. Social Security Administration,
MSPB Case No. SF-0752-19-0286-I-1,
Reconsideration Request No. 2020000730, Appeal No.
20190000982, Agency No. SF-19-0924-SSA, MSPB
ALJ Tamara Ribas (September 30, 2019).
vn
Jennifer Tom v. Kilolo Kijakazi Acting
Commissioner of Social Security Administration,
Civil Case No. 19- cv-06322-JST, Summary
Judgment by Judge Jon S. Tiger Civil Court Docket
ECF 125 (December 13, 2021).
Jennifer Tom v. Kilolo Kijakazi Acting
Commissioner of Social Security Administration,
Civil Case No. 19-cv-06322-JST Order Denying
Plaintiff Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Reconsideration, by Judge Jon S. Tiger Civil Court
Docket ECF 130 (January 21, 2022).
Jennifer Tom v. Kilolo Kijakazi Acting
Commissioner of Social Security Administration,
Civil Case No. 19-CV-06322-JST, Finding of Fact and
Conclusion of law and Amended Finding of Fact and
Conclusion of law (they are identical after the word
Amended), by Judge Jon S. Tiger Civil Court Docket
ECF 155 and 156 (November 28, 2022).
Jennifer Tom v. Kilolo Kijakazi Acting
Commissioner of Social Security Administration,
Civil Case No. 19-cv-06322-JST, Judgment, by Judge
Jon S. Tiger Civil Court Docket ECF 159 (December
13, 2022)
Jennifer Tom v. Martin O’Malley Commissioner of
Social Security Administration, United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Case No. 22-16977
District Case No. 4:19-cv-06322-JST Docketed
December 22, 2022.
IX
Jennifer Tom v. Martin O’Malley Commissioner of
Social Security Administration, United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Case No. 22-16977
District Case No. 4:19-cv-06322-JST, Appellant
Motion to Compel Social Security Administration to
provide all of Appellant’s exhibits per Ninth Circuit
Rule 30-1.3 and Ninth Circuit Rule 30-1.4 see Ninth
Circuit Court Dkt. No. 12 filed August 4, 2023.
Jennifer Tom u. Martin O’Malley Commissioner of
Social Security Administration, United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Case No. 22-16977
District Case No. 4:19-cv-06322-JST, Motion to
compel denied and Memorandum Disposition
Affirming lower Court Decision, Judges Mark
Bennett, Bridget Bade, Daniel Collins both on May 2,
2024 Ninth Circuit Court Dkt. No. 20 and Ninth
Circuit Court Dkt. No. 21.
Jennifer Tom u. Martin O’Malley Commissioner of
Social Security Administration, United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Case No. 22-16977
District Case No. 4:19-cv-06322-JST, Order denying
petition for panel rehearing June 18, 2024 Ninth
Circuit Court Dkt. No. 24.
x
RELATED CASES- Continued
Jennifer Torn v. Martin O’Malley Commissioner of
Social Security Administration there are other
cases1.
1Ther6 are additional cases related to SSA s failure to effectively
accommodate Ms. Tom held in abeyance EEOC Case No. 5502021-00313X 05-07-2021 Agency No. SF-16-0264-SSA, EEOC
Case No 550-2021-00314X 05-07-2021 Agency No. SF-17-0039SSA, 550-2021-00315X 05-07-2021 Agency No. SF-17-0411-SSA,
EEOC Case No. 550-2021-00316X 05-07-2021 Agency No. SF17-0526-SSA, EEOC Case No. 550-2021-00317X 05-07-2021
Agency No. SF-17-0799-SSA, EEOC Case No. 550-2021-00318X
05-07-2021 Agency No. SF-18-0328-SSA, EEOC Case No. 5502021-00319X 05-07-2021 Agency No. SF-18-0604-SSA.
xi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED
l-V
LIST OF PARTIES
vi
RELATED CASES
Vl-Xl
TABLE OF CONTENTS
xn-xvm
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
.X1X-XX
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
1
OPINIONS BELOW
1
JURISDICTION
1
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED........................
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
2
I.
Factual Background...................................... 2-12
II. The District Court's ruling allowed the Social
Security Administration to take back admitted facts
and permit misrepresented material facts to stand
despite overwhelming evidence that disproved SSA
claims and supported Tom's claims
12-23
III. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's
ruling, stating that Tom failed to provide evidence to
Xll
support her claims. However, the Ninth Circuit failed
to enforce Circuit Rules 30-1.3 and 30-1.4, which
made the Social Security Administration responsible
for providing Tom's evidence to the Court in the
excerpts of record and improperly handled Tom's
Motion to Compel Social Security Administration to
comply with Circuit Rules 30-1.3 and 30-1.4 ....23-36
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
36
I. The Court Should Grant Certiorari to address the
erosion of the protections under the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Rehab Act) by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit decision in Tom v. Social Security
36-39
Administration
II. The Court of Appeals are divided on the Questions
39-43
Presented
III. The Questions Presented Are Exceptionally
Important.................................................................. 43-49
49
CONCLUSION
INDEX TO APPENDICIES
APPENDIX A
Memorandum from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit of California, Jennifer
Tom v. Social Security Administration No. 22-16977
D.C. No. 4-19-cv-06322-JST affirming Civil Court
xiii
decision (signed May 2, 2024 Judges Mark Bennett,
Bridget Blade, Daniel Collins docketed December 22.
2022) Ninth Circuit Dkt. No. 21 (May 2, 2024)
.................................................................................. la-9a
Civil Court Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law,
Summary Judgment, and Judgment in Jennifer Tom
v. Kilolo Kijakazi Acting Commissioner of Social
Security Administration, Civil Case No. 19-cv-06322JST, Finding of Fact and Conclusion of law and
Amended Finding of Fact and Conclusion of
law (they are identical after the word Amended), by
Judge Jon S. Tiger Civil Court Docket ECF 155 and
156 (November 28, 2022), Summary Judgment
(December 13, 2013) ECF 125 and Judgment, by
Judge Jon S. Tiger Civil Court Docket ECF 159
(December 13, 2022)
10a-61a
Order from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit of California, Jennifer Tom v. Social
Security Administration No. 22-16977 D.C. No. 4-19cv-06322-JST Denying petition for panel rehearing
Judges Mark Bennett, Bridget Blade, Daniel Collins
Ninth Circuit Dkt. No. 24 (June 18, 2024)
62a
STATUTES
28U.S.C. § 1254(1)
63a
29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(m), 1630.2(o), 1630.2(p)...63a-68a
xiv
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
68a-69a
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)
69a-70a
Section 12940(a) of FEHA,
70a-71a
18 U.S. Code § 1519
71a-72a
RULES
Cir. Rule 30-1.3
72a
Cir. Rule 30-1.4
72a-76a
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)
76a-77a
Fed. R. 50
77a-78a
Fed. R. 56
78a-83a
PACER docket For United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit of California, Jennifer Tom v.
Social Security Administration Case No. 22-16977
84a-90a
D.C. No. 4-19-cv-06322-JST
Appellant’s Informal Opening Brief to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit of
California, Jennifer Tom v. Social Security
Administration Case No. 22-16977 D.C. No. 4-19-cv06322-JST Ninth Circuit Dkt. No. 2 (March 3, 2014)
.......................................91a-181a
xv
Appellant’s Motion to Compel the Social Security
Administration to abide by the Ninth Circuit Rules
30 1.3 and 30-1.4, in Jennifer Tom v. Social Security
Administration Case No. 22-16977 D.C. No. 4-19-cv06322-JST - notifying the Nonth Circuit Court that
Social Security Administration did not include all
Appellants exhibits in the joint excerpts of record
Ninth Circuit Dkt. No. 12(August 2, 2023). 182a-187a
Appellee’s Response to Appellant’s Motion to Compel
the Social Security Administration to abide by the
Ninth Circuit Rules 30-1.3 and 30-1.4, in Jennifer
Tom v. Social Security Administration Case No. 2216977 D.C. No. 4-19-CV-06322-JST - Social Security
Administration admit not including all Appellants
exhibits in the joint excerpts of record Ninth Circuit
Dkt. No. 15 (August 14, 2023)
188a-191a
Appellant’s Reply to Appellee’s Response to
Appellant’s Motion to Compel the Social Security
Administration to abide by the Ninth Circuit Rules
30-1.3 and 30-1.4, in Jennifer Tom v. Social Security
Administration Case No. 22-16977 D.C. No. 4-19-cv06322-JST- listing the missing excerpts of record
cited in Appellants Informal Opening Brief left out of
the excerpts of record SSA submitted to the Ninth
Circuit which the Ninth Circuit Court relied on for
their decision Ninth Circuit Dkt. No. 16 (August 15,
2023)
192a-204a
xvi
Civil Court Discovery Decision ECF 84 finding Spike
is not an essential function and that SSA will be held
account for their admissions in Jennifer Tom v.
Kilolo Kijakazi Acting Commissioner of Social
Security Administration, Civil Case No. 19-cv-06322205a-211a
JST (April 6, 2021)
Defendant’s Answer to Consolidated Amended
Complaint Admissions to claims in Jennifer Tom u.
Kilolo Kijakazi Acting Commissioner of Social
Security Administration, Civil Case No. 19-cv-06322JST, Civil Court Docket ECF 47 (July 2, 2020)
........................................212a-313a
Social Security Administration RA Policy for
Employees with Sensitivity to Fragrances (March
314a-319a
16, 2016)
Indoor Air Quality Report Completed for The Social
Security Administration Survey date: January 29,
2016 - Report Date: February 15, 2016 Prepared by:
United States Public Health Service Federal
Occupational Health Program Support Center U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services 320a-332a
Email about Indoor Air Quality Inspection (January,
25, 2016) Civil Court Docket ECF 114-1... 333a-335a
Social Security Memorandum - From: Nadeem S.
Siddiqui, MD, MPH Medical Officer To: Gina Portillo
SF CREO Manager Region IX San Francisco Subject:
Ms. Jennifer Tom (July 28, 2014) Civil Court Docket
336a-339a
ECF 114-1
340a-342a
Letter from Co-worker
XVII
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Alpha Distrib. Co. v. Jack Daniel Distillery,
454 F.2d 442, 453 (9th Cir. 1972)................
13,42
Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc.,
228 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000)
18,32,33,41
Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents,
lb F.3d 1130, 1137 (7th Cir. 1996).
42
Complainant v. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 0720130029, 115 LRP 9436 (EEOC
OFO 02/12/15)
22
E.E.O.C. v. Yellow Freight Sys. Inc.,
253 F.3d 943, 951 (7th Cir. 2001)...
18,33,41
Fisher v. Roe,
263 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2001)
14,34,43
Gamez v. Social Security Administration,
103 LRP 49900 , EEOC No. 07A20129 (EEOC
2003)..... ....................................................................
9
Gilberto S. u. Homeland Security,
EEOC Petition No. 0320110053 (Jul. 10, 2014).....20
Humphrey v. Mem 'l Hosps. Ass 'n,
239 F.3d 1128, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2001)
XVlll
iv, 19,40
Irina T. v. Robert Wilkie, Secretary, Department of
Veterans Affairs, Appeal No. 0120180568 Agency
19-20,29-30
No. 2001-0614-2016101883
Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc.,
494 U. S. 545, 554-555.........
i-ii, 13
Mancuso v. Olivarez,
292 F.3d 939, 944 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002)
14, 43
Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U. S. 574, 587.....................................
13
Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc.,
166 Cal. App. 4th 952, 962 (2008)......................
19
Norris v. City and County of San Francisco,
900 F.2d 1326, 1329, 1332 (9th Cir. 1990)...13,42-43
Ralph Villalobos V. TWC Administration,
No.16-55288 (9th Cir. 2017).........................
19,40
Reynolds v. Royal Mail Lines, Ltd.,
254 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1958).................... 14,34,43
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, U.S.,
122 S.Ct. 1516, 152 L.Ed.2d 589 (2002).....
18, 41
Zivkovic v. Southern California Edison Co.,
302 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002)..........
32,40
STATUTES
1
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)
xix
29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(m), 1630.2(o), 1630.2(p)
20
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(3)
20
42 U.S.U. § 12112(a)
41
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)
41
EEOC ’ s guidance Employer-Provided Leave and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (May 9, 2016) ......30
Section 12940(a) of FEHA
19,40
18U.S. Code § 1519
26-27
RULES
Cir. Rule 30-1.4
Cir. Rule 30-1.3
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)..
Fed. R. 50
Fed. R. 56
OTHER
American with Disabilities Act
ii, iv,37,41
Rehabilitation Act of 1973(Rehab Act), ii, iv,20,3638,44-45
xx
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari
be issued to review the judgment below.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
appears at Appendix la-9a to the petition and is
unpublished.
JURISDICTION
The United States Court of Appeals decided my case
on May 2, 2024 at App. la-9. A timely petition for
rehearing was denied by the United States Court of
Appeals on June 18, 2024, at App. 62a. This Court
has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The statutory provisions are reproduced in the
appendix to this petition App. 63a-83a.
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Factual Background
Jennifer Tom has sensitivity to environmental
irritants, migraines with aura, and vertigo. Job
responsibilities as a Benefit Authorizer (BA) include
creating, updating, and maintaining Social Security
title two records. In 2013, per Social Security
Administration (SSA) policy Tom informed her co
worker, about her perfume triggering Tom disability
sensitivity before going to management for help.
Despite attempts to resolve the issue, the co-worker
increased perfume usage and refused to speak with
Tom. Sought help from her first line Rolanda Carter,
Carter did not take any action. In December 2013,
while Carter was on vacation Tom sought help from
her second line, Mireille Hanft, who only provided
temporary relief. Despite Tom’s requests for help,
2 ,
Carter did not take any action but assured Tom that
she was working on it. On May 5, 2014, chemicals
sprayed on her cubicle overwhelmed Tom, leading
her to seek medical attention and file a workers'
compensation claim.
When Tom returned on May 6, 2024, she found her
cubicle still contaminated and asked it he cleaned.
She requested to sit in a different cubicle which was
allowed, but Tom continued to experience issues with
fragrances and chemicals. On May 12, 2014, Tom
learned Carter suddenly moved modules and that
Tammie Doan would take over as her first line. Tom
went directly to Doan asked about her worker's
compensation and stopping harassment, but Doan
was unaware of the situation. Tom informed Doan
about the coworker contaminating her workstation
3
since 2013. Tom offered to provide medical
documentation, but Doan said it would not be
necessary.
However, Ms. Doan delayed taking action until she
had heard the coworker's side of the story. On May
30, 2014, Doan met with harasser and then with
Tom. In a May 30, 2014, harasser demanded Doan
provide Tom’s medical documentation. It is clear
after Doan's meeting with the harasser; Doan’s
actions protected the harasser from Tom’s complaints
rather than following official policy that protects the
harassed not the harasser. During the meeting with
Tom, Doan requested medical documentation before
taking further action and prioritized staff rights to
wear perfume over Tom's need for a safe working
environment. Doan told Tom to keep away from her
harasser and to move, despite already sitting in a
4
different cubicle since her workstation was
contaminated on May 5, 2014 and still uncleaned.
Doan told Tom that it was her responsibility to
protect her health, not SSA's. She also said that if
Tom were sick, she would move. Tom had already
moved cubicles after her cubical was contaminated
on May 5, 2014.Tom expressed concern about moving
the assaulted employee away from the harassing
employee, but Doan insisted it was the right thing to
do.
On June 3, 2014, Doan asked Tom to walk around
the module with her to find a replacement temporary
cubicle, but Doan denied the cubicles away from
perfume and fragrances. Important to note that
during the June 3, 2014 meeting was the first time
Doan wore perfume to work, and Doan continued to
5
wear perfume to work from June 3, 2014 on. Tom told
Doan, her perfume triggered her disability, but Doan
continued wearing it to work.
From May 12-30, 2014, Tom contacted Doan via
email and SKYPE, asking for her help due to ongoing
contamination in her workspace, causing her harm
and required medical attention. Despite Doan being
her main contact for assistance until she left, Tom's
pleas for assistance were fruitless. All of Tom's
efforts to get Doan and CREO to address the ongoing
harassment and their failure to provide an effective
RA were fruitless which resulted in her wrongful
termination in 2018.
From 2013-2018, Tom tried to get SSA to provide
her with a healthy and safe working environment, by
filing EEOC complaints. There are 10 EEOC
complaints, 7 are in abeyance. Tom always worked in
6
good faith with SSA to find an effective RA enabling
her to work full time. However, SSA chose to approve
RA liberal leave claiming it was just as effective as
full-time telework. Since 2014, SSA continued to
claim full-time telework as a possible RA, but SSA
needed Tom to try just one more location before they
would allow telework. Tom in good faith, tried more
than 26 different locations, used gloves, masks, and
an air purifier, moving around in the building was
not effective because SSA could not control what was
used in the public buildings which SSA’s own medical
Officer told SSA (app.339a, 240a and 314a-319a).
Social Security Administration was able to provide
Tom with two clean laptops but because SSA
required that Tom leave the laptops in SSA’s
buildings unprotected they eventually became
contaminated had SSA allowed Tom to keep the
7
laptops with her there would have been no need for
replacement laptops, the third laptop was
contaminated since day one because SSA failed to
take the steps to ensure they provided Tom with a
new laptop handled by the one computer tech that
was fragrance free see app. 156a-159a,171a-172a.
Every time Tom asked for an effective reasonable
accommodation like telework SSA was never
satisfied that there was sufficient proof that SSA
buildings could not provide Tom with a healthy and
safe working environment and continued to require
Tom try more spaces within SSA buildings even
though SSA’s own medical officer told SSA it would
be impractical for Tom to find scent free environment
in public areas which would include transportation:
“Even if Ms. Tom is eventually found to be an
individual with a disability per the RA, the
requested accommodation of scent free work
environment is impractical in most public buildings.
8
Furthermore, Ms. Tom is unlikely to avoid similar
exposures if she visits public places such as
shopping malls, restaurants, grocery stores and
numerous others.” (app. 339a)
There is no lawful reason SSA refused to provide
Tom with telework five days a week Tom’s first line
testified he would have approved Tom for telework
five days a week see app 102a-103a his claim SPIKE
was an essential function is not true per Civil Court
Discovery Decision ECF 84 where SSA admitted
SPIKE was not an essential function of Tom’s job see
app. 205a-211a. SSA approved full time telework as a
reasonable accommodation (RA) to BAs (app. 258a).
SSA failed to act in good faith to effectively RA Tom
see Gamez v. Social Security Administration, 103
LRP 49900, EEOC No. 07A20129 (EEOC 2003).
Tom brought to SSA's attention SSA policy
"Reasonable Accommodation Requests Involving
Fragrance Sensitivity," listing accommodations such
9
as eliminating offending odors and chemicals.
alerting employee to fragrances, changing desk
location, and allowing the employee to work
from home (app. 314a-319a) (emphasis) because of
SSA’s own policy for employees with fragrance
sensitivity and that SSA approved full time telework
as a reasonable accommodation (RA) to BA’s (app.
258a) is definitive evidence Tom’s request for
telework is reasonable on is face against the Ninth
Circuits ruling app. la-9a.
. Due to SSA's failure to provide Tom with effective
RA since 2013, her disabilities expanded in 2015 to
include sensitivity to environmental irritants,
migraines with aura, and vertigo app.253a. These
disabilities noted in return-to-duty notice dated
September 25, 2017 which noted:
“Since July 21, 2016 due to a variety of medical
10
issues including but not limited to: chemical
sensitivity, migraines with aura and vertigo. Since
July 21, 2016, you have been approved on LeaveWithout-Pay (LWOP) based on medical
documentation that you have provided and
permitted to telework one day a week.” (app. 217a218a and app. 277a-278a)
Proof SSA is aware of Tom's disabilities and that
Tom known to be a qualified disabled employee, who
is entitled to RA’s. Instead, SSA voided Tom's
medical documents and revoked the only reasonable
accommodation SSA gave Tom the RA of Liberal
Leave given in lieu of full time telework RA in an
attempt to legitimize AWOL posted to Tom s record.
Clearly, SSA fired Tom for taking sick leave due to
her disabilities (app. 216a-218a). If SSA had
approved full-time telework in 2014, Tom could have
worked full-time. Tom's successful performance
appraisals and awards in the ten years with SSA
proved she is fully capable of performing the
11
essential functions of her job. SSA admits firing Tom
for being out sick due to her disabilities not due to
her job performance “Defendant admits that the
agency removed Plaintiff for conduct (AWOL) and not
her performance.” See app. 218a, app. 220a, and app.
258a.
II. The District Court's ruling allowed the
Social Security Administration to take back
admitted facts and permit misrepresented
material facts to stand despite overwhelming
evidence that disproved SSA claims and
supported Tom's claims.
The District Court's summary judgment decision
(SMJ) did not address the fact that Tom proved that
129 out of 138 "undisputed facts" cited by the SSA in
their Motion for Summary Judgment were false and
contradicted facts admitted to by the SSA in ECF 47
12
Defendant's Answer to Consolidated Amended
Complaint, see app. 212a-313 or that SSA's reply to
Tom's Opposition to SMJ did not dispute Tom's
evidence proving the falsity of their SMJ facts or
claim harassing events did not occur.
The District Court's decision conflicts with SMJ
processing case law:
Therefore, the Court must carefully review all the
evidence in the record, cf., e. g., Matsushita Elec.
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S.
574, 587, drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party, but making no
credibility determinations or weighing any
evidence, e. g., Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494
U. S. 545, 554-555. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("In all
actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . ., the
court shall find facts specifically and state
separately its conclusions of law thereon").
Alpha Distrib. Co. v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 454
F.2d 442, 453 (9th Cir. 1972), that held: Rule 52(a)
requires the district court's findings to
"be explicit enough to give the appellate court a
clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's
13
decision, and to enable it to determine the ground
on which the trial court reached its decision." See
also Norris v. City and County of San Francisco,
900 F.2d 1326, 1329, 1332 (9th Cir. 1990)
(applying the same rule in a discrimination case).
Reynolds v. Royal Mail Lines, Ltd., 254 F.2d 55, 57
(9th Cir. 1958) (holding that in a bench trial, it is
the trial judge's responsibility to resolve disputes
arising from conflicting testimony); Fisher u. Roe,
263 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Trial courts
find facts. \Ve do not."), abrogated on other
grounds, Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 944 n.
1 (9th Cir. 2002).
During the summary judgment process, it is not
appropriate to make credibility determinations or
weigh any evidence; however, that is precisely what
the District Court did in its SMJ decision. The
District Court did not acknowledge Tom's
contradicting evidence, which consisted of 616 pages
of evidence; instead, the District Court claimed that
Tom failed to provide evidence. Because there were
genuine issues of material facts and conflicting
evidence, dismissing claims that required a full
14
review of the evidence was inappropriate.
The District Court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law mirrored the same facts used in
SSA's SMJ, which Tom had disproved. Examples of
misrepresented material facts found by the District
Court is that Tom did not demonstrate she performed
the essential functions of her job (app. 45a) and that
Tom did not and could not work on SSA's laptop (app.
46a). Still, SSA admitted that Tom was not fired for
her performance see app.218a, 220a, 258a, 288a-289a
and 289a. SSA admitted that Tom continued to work
earning credit hours and over time until SSA
wrongfully terminated her on August 15, 2018
"Defendant admits that Plaintiff teleworked one
day a week. Defendant admits that from July 2016
through the date of her termination, Plaintiff
reported to work only on her assigned telework
day. Defendant admits that Plaintiff worked credit
hours or over time hours, but only on her assigned
telework day." (app. 298a)
15
SSA also admitted that Tom had no disciplinaryrecord before being removed, which means Tom was
performing the essential functions of her job while
using SSA's laptop see app. 298a.
The fact that SSA admits that Tom was not fired
for her performance and, that SSA approved Tom to
earn credit hours and work overtime and that Tom
had no disciplinary record is proof that Tom was
successfully performing her job while using SSA's
laptop. This proves that Tom was more than capable
of performing her duties while at home, with or
without a reasonable accommodation. Tom was
teleworking under SSA’s Pilot telework program, not
SSA’s RA of telework.
The District Court failed to give any credit to
Tom's successful performance appraisals throughout
her 10-year career or to the fact that SSA specifically
16
noted Tom was a qualified disabled employee with
whom SSA was in RA talks, see app. 167a-168a and
172a. Additionally, the fact that Tammie Doan's
testimony changed each of the three days (174a-175a)
during the trial and was ignored by the District
Judge when he found Doan a credible witness over
Tom and Tom's evidence. It is difficult to understand
how the judge found Doan's testimony credible
despite these inconsistencies. The District Court
ignored that SSA's medical officer told SSA that
"scent free work environment is impractical in most
public buildings" (app.339a) and ignored the fact that
SSA admitted the EEOC AJ told SSA the RA's SSA
provided Tom are ineffective:
"If Complainant is credible and her symptoms are
genuine, then the current accommodations are not
working, and the Agency must consider full-time
teleworking. To justify not allowing Complainant
to telework full-time, the Agency must
demonstrate undue hardship. In its MSJ,
17
SSA did not address the undue hardship of full
time telework because the Agency contends the
other accommodations provided are effective."
The District Court also ignored the fact that SSA
admitted during the trial that SSA found Tom is a
qualified disabled employee see app. 170a and app.
297a. The District Court failed to recognize that SSA
needs to provide qualified disabled employees with
effective reasonable accommodations for the
employees' particular disability, not just an
accommodation see U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,
U.S., 122 S. Ct. 1516, 152 L.Ed.2d 589 (2002)
"... (3) offering an accommodation that is
reasonable and effective. Id. at 1114-15."
(Emphasis added) and E.E.O.C. v. Yellow Freight
Sys. Inc., 253 F.3d 943, 951 (7th Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Barnett,228 F.3d at 1115
(requiring the selected accommodation to be
reasonable and effective)." (Emphasis added)
The District Court decision failed to note Tom
18
asserted and provided evidence that the AWOL
posted to Tom's record was fake and actually because
of sick leave taken by Tom, a known qualified
disabled employee, while waiting for SSA to provide
an available effective RA is not separate a issue from
Tom's disabilities and conflicts with case law Ralph
Villalobos V. TWC Administration, No. 16-55288 (9th
Cir. 2017)
"Section 12940(a) of FEHA prohibits employers
from firing an employee 'because of disability.
Nadaf-Rahrou v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 166
Cal. App. 4th 952, 962 (2008)." And "'Terminating
an employee for conduct that results from a
disability is equivalent to terminating an employee
based on the disability itself because 'conduct
resulting from a disability is considered to be part
of the disability, rather than a separate basis for
termination.' Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n,
239 F.3d 1128, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2001)."
and conflicts with Irina T. v. Robert Wilkie,
Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Appeal No.
19
0120180568 Agency No. 2001-0614-2016101883
finding:
"In determining whether an individual is qualified
for a job, the Commission asks whether that
person can perform the essential functions of the
job when at work. Gilberto S. v. Homeland
Security, EEOC Petition No. 0320110053 (Jul. 10,
2014)." And "Under the Rehabilitation Act and the
Commission's regulations, an agency is required to
make reasonable accommodation to the known
physical and mental limitations of a qualified
individual with a disability unless the agency can
show that accommodation would cause an undue
hardship. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o), 1630.2(p)." and
“Complainant requested a reasonable
accommodation - continued LWOP for her
disability-related absences from work. To
determine an appropriate reasonable
accommodation, it is often necessary for an agency
to initiate an informal, interactive process with the
individual with a disability who needs
accommodation. This process should identify the
precise limitations resulting from the disability
and potential reasonable accommodations that
could overcome those limitations. 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(3)." and "Instead, the Agency simply
applied its blanket leave policy to charge
Complainant AWOL because she exhausted all her
available paid leave and her FMLA coverage ran
out."
20
Tom had a right to continued LWOP instead of
AWOL being posted to her record because it was SSA
who revoked Tom's RA Liberal Leave without
justification while at the same time voiding all of
Tom's medical documentation while claiming to work
with Tom to find her an effective RA see app. 167a168a, 172a. SSA chose to use a blanket leave policy
and forced AWOL on Tom's record claiming Tom's
being out sick was a separate issue form Tom's
continued request for an effective RA to replace the
RA of liberal leave SSA revoked. Tom never stopped
asking for more telework days so that the need for
additional sick leave would no longer be an issue.
The record shows that Tom performed the
essential functions of her job when at work, as
evidenced by her successful performance appraisals.
There is no indication in the record that, in
21
anticipation of cutting off Tom's LWOP under its
blanket leave policy, that SSA initiated or engaged in
any sort of interactive process with Tom to explore
means of accommodating her disabilities, even
though her management is well aware of her
disabilities, (app. 253a, 275a, 296a). Also, in
Complainant v. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 0720130029, 115 LRP 9436 (EEOC
OFO 02/12/15) which found
"It found that EEOC "precedent clearly has
established that a request for telecommuting or a
shorter commuting time because of a disability
triggers an Agency's responsibility under the
Rehabilitation Act. "Further, modifying where
work is performed can be a reasonable
accommodation if it's not an undue hardship,
which the agency failed to show in this case. The
EEOC pointed out that the "federal government is
charged with the goal of being a 'model employer'
of individuals with disabilities, which may require
it to consider innovation, fresh approaches, and
technology as effective methods of providing
reasonable accommodations."
22
The District Court's decisions did not properly
discuss the conflicts of evidence presented by both
parties there was no attempt to discuss the legal
cases presented by both parties to determine who
proved their case based on the evidence the decision
made it appear as though Tom made complaints
without evidence which the record does not support
also failing to hold SSA to what SSA admitted to in
Defendant's Answer to Consolidated Amended
Complaint, see app. 212a-313a.
III. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District
Court's ruling, stating that Tom failed to
provide evidence to support her claims.
However, the Ninth Circuit failed to enforce
Circuit Rules 30-1.3 and 30-1.4, which made the
Social Security Administration responsible for
providing Tom's evidence to the Court in the
23
excerpts of record and improperly handled
Tom's Motion to Compel the Social Security
Administration to comply with Circuit Rules
30-1.3 and 30-1.4.
The record shows that the Ninth Circuit judges did
not rule on a motion to compel Social Security to
abide by Cir. Rule 30-1.3 and Cir. Rule 30-1.4 and
provide the Ninth Circuit with both parties' excerpts
of record Tom filed within two days of SSA's filing the
incomplete excerpts of record. Whoever Tom's
motion to compel SSA to abide by Cir. Rule 30-1.3
and Cir. Rule 30-1.4 sat untouched for 10 months
and was dismissed by the court clerk five minutes
before posting the Ninth Circuit's decision (app.
87a) to uphold the District Court's decision on the
grounds Tom failed to provide evidence to
support her claims which is not true Tom cited
24
evidence located in the District Court's Docket as
allowed. SSA was responsible for including all of
Tom's (appellant in pro se) evidence in the excerpts of
the record SSA submitted to the courts per Cir. Rule
30-1.3 and Cir. Rule 30-1.4 (app. 72a). The Ninth
Circuit did not rule on Tom’s Motion to Compel SSA
to provide the complete excerpts of record, nor did the
Court send Tom any decision on her motion to compel
as the decision to dismiss was not on any of the
decisions mailed to Tom who is pro se and is a paper
filer. In Ninth Circuit Dkt. No. 15 (app. 188a-191a),
SSA admitted, "Defendant-Appellee excluded only
material not relevant to the issues on appeal..." It is
clear that SSA intentionally omitted specific evidence
cited by Tom in her Informal Opening Brief that
should have been included in the excerpts of record.
The missing exhibits include trial exhibits and
25
evidence from later filings is also necessary.
especially with regard to the SMJ decision also being
appealed. SSA's claim that it could choose what
evidence Tom had a right to have included in the
excerpts of record is not in accordance with Cir Rule
30-1.3 or 30-1.4 noting memoranda and briefs "They
may be relevant if a party asserts that an issue
was waived, forfeited, or not exhausted, to
support disputed assertions of procedural
history, or in other similar circumstances." the rule
does not give any party the right to decide for the
opposing party or the Court what exhibits are or are
not relevant to support their opponents claims before
the Court (app. 72a-76a). SSA's willful act of
withholding Tom's exhibits from the Ninth Circuit
amounts to evidence tampering per 18 U.S, Code §
1519
26
"prohibits tampering with evidence related to a
federal investigation or bankruptcy proceeding.
The elements of the crime include: Acting with
knowledge. To alter, destroy, mutilate, conceal,
cover up, falsify, or to make a false entry in any
record, document, or tangible object", (emphasis)
For a list of Tom's missing exhibits, see app. 204a.
Some of the missing exhibits are trial exhibits. The
Ninth Circuit decision cannot stand because SSA
intentionally withheld Tom's exhibits. Tom notified
the Ninth Circuit within two days of SSA
withholding Tom's exhibits from the excerpts of
record, giving the Ninth Circuit time to address the
concealing of Tom’s exhibits and allowing the
decision to stand rewards SSA for willfully concealing
Tom's evidence from the courts and causing further
insult to injury.
The Ninth Circuit Court rendered its decision
solely on the evidence SSA provided in their excerpts
27
of record, which excluded Tom's (Appellant in pro se)
evidence cited in her Informal Opening Brief even
though SSA asked for and was granted a 90-day
extension for the sole purpose to give SSA time to
include Tom's exhibits in the joint excerpts of record
per Cir. Rule 30-1.3 and 30-1.4 see app. 186a-187a.
Tom's Informal Opening Brief cites evidence found
in the District Court's docket proving claims of
disability discrimination, including ineffective
accommodations provided by SSA, resulting in an
increase in Tom's disabilities from one to three.
Citing evidence telework was effective RA, Tom
successfully performing her job, AWOL was fake and
placed on Tom's record for taking sick leave due to
her disabilities not being effectively accommodated,
SSA wrongfully terminated Tom, and disparate
treatment occurred. Doan worked with Tom's
28
harasser, not with Tom, and knew or should have
known behaviors such as wearing perfume to work.
forcing Tom into meetings, and following her onto
elevators would trigger her disability, creating a
hostile work environment due to Doan's authority
over Tom. SSA excluded Tom's evidence from the
excerpts of record against Cir. Rule 30-1.3 and Cir.
Rule 30-1.4: As Tom is pro se, she did not have to
provide excerpts of the record. SSA is responsible for
providing both parties complete excerpts of the
record when they filed because they are not pro se.
The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with Irina T.
v. Robert Wilkie, Secretary, Department of Veterans
Affairs, Appeal No. 0120180568 Agency No. 20010614-2016101883 finding on LWOP as an RA
"The Commission has taken a clear position that,
absent proof of undue hardship, reasonable
accommodation includes "making modifications to
existing leave policies and providing leave when
29
needed for a disability even where an employer
does not offer leave to other employees. See EEOC
s guidance Employer-Provided Leave and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (May 9, 2016)
(footnote 1 indicates that this guidance applies to
federal employees). Relevant to this case, the
guidance indicates that granting leave as a
reasonable accommodation may be required even
when the employee has exhausted the leave the
employer provides as a benefit, including leave
exhausted under the FMLA."
Therefore, Tom had a legal right to request
continued LWOP as an RA, while SSA refused full
time telework as an RA. Despite Tom providing
medical documentation every three months, SSA
failed to engage in an individualized RA discussion of
Tom's need for more LWOP RA. SSA failure to meet
its obligations to prove continued LWOP was an
undue hardship. SSA cannot justify refusing to
IReasonable accommodation does not require the employer to
provide paid leave beyond what it provides as part of its paid
leave policy. We note in this case, Petitioner was requesting
leave without pay.
30
approve additional LWOP requests as an RA for
Tom's disabilities and cannot justify revoking RA
Liberal Leave and posting only AWOL on Tom's
record on days Tom is forced to take off sick due to
her disabilities not being effectively accommodated.
SSA admits firing Tom due to being out sick
because of her disabilities that prevented her from
commuting to work, even though she successfully
performed her job on SSA pilot telework days (app.
218a, 220a, 258a, 274a, 288a, 298a.). Tom's
managers testified Tom was in good standing during
her employment app. 101a-102a. The evidence
supports that Tom was fired because of her
disabilities and not legitimate AWOL (app. 218a,
220a, 258a, 274a, 288a, 298a.) In 2018, Kris
Chamrernlaska testified he recommended allowing
Tom to telework full-time instead of terminating her
31
due to the quality of her work. See the Informal
Opening brief at the bottom of the app. 102a top page
and app. 103a Claims SPIKE is an essential function,
but it is a lie per SSA admissions during District
Court Discovery Dispute decision; see app. 205a211a. SSA had no lawful reason to deny Tom
telework as a reasonable accommodation.
The Ninth Circuit's decision misapplied Zivkovic v.
Southern California Edison 302 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th
Cir. 2002) and Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1115 claiming
the belief that the case law above found:
“not obligated to provide an employee the
accommodation he requests or prefers”—it need
“only provide some reasonable accommodation.”
The complete ruling requires reasonable
accommodations to be effective:
"An 'employer is not obligated to provide an
32
employee the accommodation he requests or
prefers, the employer need only provide some
reasonable accommodation.' E.E.O.C. v. Yellow
Freight Sys. Inc., 253 F.3d 943, 951 (7th Cir. 2001)
(en banc) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1115
(requiring the selected accommodation to be
reasonable and effective)." (Emphasis added)
The omission of "requiring the selected
accommodation to be reasonable and effective" is a
critical element to leave out because it alters an
employer's obligation, increasing SSA's obligation
beyond just providing any one-size-fits-all
accommodation; it requires SSA to provide effective
RAs tailored to each employee's individual disability
needs. SSA was well aware that the RAs they
provided Tom were ineffective (app. 240a, 267a,
33
314a-319a, 339a-342a).
The Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts with rule 50,
and rule 56; the Court must review all of the
evidence in the record and with Reynolds v. Royal
Mail Lines, Ltd., 254 F,2d 55, 57 (9th Cir, 1958)
holding that in a bench trial, it is the trial judge's
responsibility to resolve disputes arising from
conflicting testimony. And Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d
906, 912 (9th Cir. 2001) finding "Trial courts find
facts. We do not."
The Ninth Circuit overlooked the facts presented
by Tom in the Informal Opening Brief, which notes
numerous conflicts in evidence and testimony,
including the fact Doan's testimony changed all three
days see Informal Opening Brief No. 112 app.l74a175a. The air test was not relevant to whether SSA
effectivity accommodated Tom; the test was only
34
testing for human comfort Debby Ellis was aware of
the fact the test would not provide answers as to
where SSA provided Tom with fragrance and
chemical-free environment prior to the test a fact she
shared with other staff that it would provide no
information relevant to Tom's sensitivity to
fragrances and chemicals but SSA has used the test
to blind the Court to the truth that SSA knowingly
failed to effectively accommodate Tom
"P.S. I have some concern about the "air quality"
survey because I can't get a straight answer as to
exactly what the air quality survey tests for.
According to the FOH website, it seems more
geared to carbon dioxide (dangerous stuff) and not
to the "chemical odors" Ms. Tom is complaining
about. I guess there is still value in determining
that the air quality is of acceptable level from a
health & safety perspective just to have that info"
(app. 335a)
The air quality test is only for human comfort
"At the time of the assessment,
temperature/relative humidity and carbon dioxide
levels were within the comfort parameters
established by ASHRAE" and "ASHRAE indicates
35
that carbon dioxide concentrations of l,000ppm
can be used as a reference for human comfort
levels in indoor spaces. This is a standard
relating to human comfort and not health."
(app.33ia-332a) (emphasis added)
Tom meticulously reviewed the District Court
record to gather evidence supporting her claims and
demonstrate discrepancies between testimony and
evidence provided by SSA, proving that the physical
evidence does not support SSA's version of events.
The fact that SSA is a Federal Agency should not
automatically grant SSA blind credibility on their
word over the evidence Tom provided to prove her
claims and disprove SSA's claims.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I. The Court Should Grant Certiorari to
address the erosion of the protections under
the Americans with Disabilities Act and
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehab Act) by the
36
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
decision in Tom v. Social Security
Administration.
This Court should grant a review in this case to
restore the protections of the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Rehab Act) that ensures that a qualified disabled
employee will be given an effective reasonable
accommodation for their specific disability needs and
not just a blanket one size fits all accommodation and
to ensure qualified disabled employees are not fired
because of their disability under false charges of
AWOL and that an employer must show undue
hardship to support the refusal of an accommodation
requested by a qualified disabled employee when
other accommodations prove ineffective. In Tom v
Social Security Administration, the Ninth Circuit
37
Court's ruling not only reduced protections of the
Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (Rehab Act) by changing employers'
requirements to provide a qualified employed with an
effective reasonable accommodation, removal of an
employer’s responsibility to prove undue hardship
when refusing to provide a qualified disabled
employee an accommodation the employer provides
to other qualified disabled employees, allow an
employer to post false charges of AWOL to blacken a
qualified disabled employees unjustly record to fire
an otherwise pristine employment record of a
qualified disabled employees for the sole purpose of
firing them instead of providing the qualified
disabled employee with the requested reasonable
accommodation. This Court cannot allow case law to
stand that removes the right of a qualified disabled
38
employee to receive an effective reasonable
accommodation that enables them to return to work
full time. This Court cannot allow case law that
enables an employer to force an employee to exhaust
their leave while pretending to work with the
employee to find a reasonable accommodation other
than the accommodation the employee is asking for
and fire the qualified disabled employee because of
the leave the employer forced them to take because
their disability was not being effectively
accommodated under false AWOL charges.
II. The Court of Appeals are divided on the
Questions Presented.
The Ninth Circuit decision to uphold the District
Court decision in Tom v Social Security
Administration allowing SSA to fire Tom for the
forced sick leave Tom took while she tried working
39
with SSA from 2014-2018 in the interactive process
for an effective RA when SSA chose to void Tom's
medical documentation and revoked the RA leave
without pay (LWOP) and refused to approve telework
RA or more LWOP SSA chose to post AWOL knowing
SSA failed to provide a Tom with an RA that would
enable her to return to work full time.
The Ninth Circuit Case law created in Tom v.
Social Security Administration contradicts the
standing case law in Ralph Villalobos V. TWC
Administration, No. 16-55288 (9th Cir. 2017)
"Section 12940(a) of FEHA prohibits employers
from firing an employee 'because of disability.
Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 166
Cal. App. 4th 952, 962 (2008)." And '"Terminating
an employee for conduct that results from a
disability is equivalent to terminating an employee
based on the disability itself because 'conduct
resulting from a disability is considered to be part
of the disability, rather than a separate basis for
termination.' Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n,
239 F.3d 1128, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2001)."
40
And conflicts with the full finding in Zivkovic v.
Southern California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1089
(9th Cir. 2002) findings:
"The ADA prohibits discrimination against a
"qualified individual with a disability because of
the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement,
or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment." 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a)" and "An employer discriminates
against a qualified individual with a disability by
"not making reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability
who is an applicant or employee, unless [the
employer] can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on the operation of the business of [the employer]."
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added).”
"In Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1112
(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated on other
grounds, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, U.S., 122
S.Ct. 1516, 152 L.Ed.2d 589 (2002), we held that
once an employee requests an accommodation or
an employer recognizes the employee needs an
accommodation" and" the employer must engage in
an interactive process with the employee to
determine the appropriate reasonable
accommodation." "The interactive process requires:
41
(1) direct communication between the employer
and employee to explore in good faith the
possible accommodations; (2) consideration of
the employee’s request; and (3) offering an
accommodation that is reasonable and
effective. Id. At 1114-15. “Liability for failure
to provide reasonable accommodations ensues
only where the employer bears responsibility
for the breakdown” in the interactive process.
Beck v. Univ. ofWis. Bd. Of Regents, 75 F.3d
1130, 1137 (7th Cir. 1996). An “employer is not
obligated to provide an employee the
accommodation he requests or prefers, the
employer need only provide some reasonable
accommodation.” E.E.O.C. v. Yellow Freight
Sys. Inc., 253 F.3d 943, 951 (7th Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1115
(requiring the selected accommodation to
be reasonable and effective).” (Emphasis
added)
And conflicts with conflicts with Alpha Distrib. Co.
v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 454 F.2d 442, 453 (9th Cir.
1972), that held:
Rule 52(a) requires the district court's findings to
"be explicit enough to give the appellate court a
clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's
decision, and to enable it to determine the ground
on which the trial court reached its decision." See
also Norris v. City and County of San Francisco,
42
900 F.2d 1326, 1329, 1332 (9th Cir. 1990)
(applying the same rule in a discrimination case).
And conflicts with Reynolds v. Royal Mail Lines,
Ltd., 254 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1958) (holding that
in a bench trial, it is the trial judge's responsibility
to resolve disputes arising from conflicting
testimony); Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906, 912 (9th
Cir. 2001) ("Trial courts find facts. We do not."),
abrogated on other grounds, Mancuso v. Olivarez,
292 F.3d 939, 944 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002). The district
court ruled without resolving the conflicting
testimony between SSA and Tom, yet it is the
obligation of the trier of fact to do just that.
III. The Questions Presented Are Exceptionally
Important.
This Court cannot allow any court to give up the
Court's authority to one party in a court case to
decide what evidence their opponent can use to
support their claims and determine what evidence
can be used to disprove their opponent's defense. Nor
can the courts allow one party of a court case to alter
the requirements in Civil Court Rules or any court
43
rules they don't wish to follow to the letter of the law.
By allowing Tom v. Social Security Administration to
stand, the courts will open the floodgates to unethical
behavior. And make it appear the courts are allowing
parties to govern themselves under a broken honor
system where the courts are unwilling to force the
law or hold those who violate the law accountable for
their actions, thus eroding the confidence and faith
the people have in the justice system. The Courts
must enforce Circuit Rules to restore the rule of law
and secure equality and equal protection for all
under the law
This Court cannot allow the demolishing of the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehab Act) by allowing
Tom v. Social Security Administration to stand
taking away qualified disabled employees right to an
44
effective reasonable accommodation and give
absolute authority to employers to say what
accommodation an employee can have removing the
employer's responsibility to engage in an
individualized RA discussion of each employee and
not just provide a blanket one size fits all approach to
accommodating qualified disabled employees. By
allowing this decision to stand, the Court is gutting
the Americans with Disabilities Act and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehab Act), leaving it an
empty shell with full authority to employers and
none to qualified disabled employees.
This Court should grant review in this case to
guide on how to properly apply the protections of
American with Disabilities Act and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehab Act) that enable
qualified disabled employees to receive effective
45
reasonable accommodations that are individualized
to that employees' disabilities needs since no two
people are alike and no two people disabilities can be
resolved every time by the same reasonable
accommodation. This Court need also make sure that
all courts enforce the laws equally and that no party
in a court case can pick and choose for their opponent
what evidence the Court can review and ensure that
the courts retain authority to decide what evidence
they will use to render judgment.
The Ninth Circuit's first mistake was not acting on
Tom's Motion to Compel SSA to provide both parties’
full evidence. Allowing the Motion to Compel for 10
months failing to mention Tom's Motion to Compel in
the Ninth Circuit's decision to affirm the District
Court decision on the grounds Tom failed to provide
evidence to support her claims on the same day the
46
Ninth Circuit Court Clerk dismissed Tom's Motion to
Compel five minutes before posting the decision to
affirm. (Emphasis)
This mistake, in turn, led the Court to affirm the
district court's conclusion that Tom failed to provide
evidence to prove her claims and disprove SSA's
defense. This reasoning is unfounded and rests on a
misunderstanding of whose responsibility it was to
provide Tom's evidence to the Ninth Circuit and the
belief that the District Court followed proper
Summary Judgment processing procedures and drew
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party and made no credibility determinations or
weighing any evidence and that the District Court
Judge looked at both parties evidence to determine
whose claims were supported by the physical
evidence. However, a review of the record and the
47
decisions issued by the District Court will show that
the District Court claimed that Tom provided no
evidence and the decisions issued are carbon copies of
the Social Security Administration's filings despite
the fact Tom provided that the facts the District
Court used to rule in Social Security Administrations
favor contradicting facts SSA admitted to in their
Defendant's Answer to Consolidated Amended
Complaint app. 212a-313a. In Tom's Informal
Opening Brief to the Ninth Circuit Court, she again
shows that the facts relied on by the District Court
are misrepresented material facts; see My Informal
Opening Brief app. 91a-181a.
Because the lower courts are not properly
reviewing all the evidence provided before issuing
their decisions and have allowed the Social Security
Administration to withhold Tom's evidence and tell
48
the courts what evidence Tom can use to support her
claims, this Court's review is warranted to restore
the courts' sole authority to decide what evidence is
and is not evidence that the courts will use.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner in pro se Jennifer Tom respectfully
requests that a writ of certiorari be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Jennifer Tom
Petitioner in pro se
September 9, 2024
49
APPENDIX A
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.