Petition for Writ of Certiorari — San Carlos Apache Tribe, Petitioner v. Arizona, et al.
Supreme Court briefSep 25, 2024
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SAN CARLOS APACHE TRIBE
v.
STATE OF ARIZONA, ET AL.,
Petitioner,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
ARIZONA SUPREME COURT
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
ALEXANDER B. RITCHIE
BERNARDO M. VELASCO (application pending)
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SAN CARLOS APACHE TRIBE
Post Office Box 40
16 San Carlos Avenue
San Carlos, Arizona 85550
(928) 475-3344
alex.ritchie@scat-nsn.gov
bern.velasco@scat-nsn.gov
Counsel for Petitioners
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Queen Creek is sacred to members of the San
Carlos Apache Tribe. For over a century, nearby
mines have discharged copper into Queen Creek,
causing it to fail water quality standards, harming
Apache Holy Beings (Ga’an), and interfering with
traditional Apache religious beliefs. The policy of the
United States is that the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of Queen Creek be restored and
maintained. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). Accordingly,
federal regulations impose strict requirements on new
sources of pollution before they discharge into
impaired waterways. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i),
Part 440.
In 2007, Resolution Copper Mining, LLC
(“Resolution”) began constructing one of the largest
copper mines in modern history near an old mine that
had been exhausted in 1996. In 2017, Resolution
applied to the Arizona Department of Environmental
Quality (“ADEQ”) to renew the old mine’s discharge
permit and included the new mine with it.
Rather than conduct a “new source analysis” as
required by governing regulations, ADEQ capitulated
and renewed the permit, treating the new mine as
part of the existing source. The Arizona Supreme
Court affirmed, also departing from the regulation’s
plain text, thereby committing an error of law. Rather
than consider whether the new mine is operationally
independent, as 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b) requires, the
court invented a “material connection” test out of
whole cloth and determined that the gargantuan new
mine is merely an extension of the exhausted mine.
By departing from the regulation’s plain text, the
Arizona Supreme Court failed to apply the method of
interpretation this Court requires. See Cty. of Maui v.
ii
Haw. Wildlife Fund, 590 U.S. 590, 140 S. Ct. 1462
(2020); R. Sup. Ct. 10(c). As the only published
opinion explaining how to perform a new source
analysis, the state court opinion will have
catastrophic consequences not only on Queen Creek,
but also on waterways throughout the Nation. This
Court should grant certiorari and direct regulators
and courts across the Nation how to determine when
newly constructed sources of pollution may be
included within an existing discharge permit and
when, like here, they must be treated as new sources.
The questions presented are:
(1) Did the Arizona Supreme Court err by
determining that 40 C.F.R § 122.29(b)’s new source
analysis is satisfied by merely finding a “material
connection” between a newly constructed source of
polluted discharge and an existing source rather than
considering whether the new source operationally
depends on the existing source?
(2) Did the Arizona Supreme Court err by
determining that new source performance standards
for copper mines in 40 C.F.R. § 440.104 do not
“independently apply” to Resolution’s new mine?
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner, the San Carlos Apache Tribe, a
federally recognized Indian Tribe, was the appellant
before the Arizona Superior Court, appellant before
the Arizona Court of Appeals, and respondent before
the Arizona Supreme Court.
Respondents the State of Arizona and Arizona
Department of Environmental Quality were
respondents before the Arizona Superior Court,
Appellees before the Arizona Court of Appeals, and
Petitioners before the Arizona Supreme Court.
iii
Respondent Resolution Copper Mining, LLC was
an intervenor before the Arizona Superior Court,
Intervenor/Appellee before the Arizona Court of
Appeals, and Petitioner before the Arizona Supreme
Court.
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6, Petitioner
the San Carlos Apache Tribe represents that it does
not have any parent entities and does not issue stock.
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
The following proceedings are directly related to
this case within the meaning of Rule 14.1(b)(iii):
•
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. State of Arizona, et
al., Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa
County, No. LC2019-00264-001. Judgment
entered March 25, 2021.
•
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. State of Arizona, et
al., Arizona Court of Appeals, No. 1 CA-CV 210295. Opinion filed November 15, 2022.
•
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. State of Arizona, et
al., Arizona Supreme Court, No. CV-22-0290PR. Opinion filed June 27, 2024.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED........................................... i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS.......................... ii
CORPORATE DISCLSOURE STATEMENT .......... iii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS ..................................... iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................ v
INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1
OPINIONS BELOW .................................................... 3
JURISDICTION .......................................................... 4
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED .................................... 4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 4
A. Development and Exploitation of the Magma
and Resolution Mines ....................................... 4
B. ADEQ Erroneously Treats the Resolution
Mine as an Existing Source and the Tribe
Files Its Challenge ............................................ 7
REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI ........... 10
THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT
DISREGARDED THE THREE-PRONG TEST IN
THE PLAIN TEXT OF SUBSECTION 122.29 AND
ADOPTED AN UNSUPPORTED “MATERIAL
CONNECTION” TEST ............................................. 12
A. First Prong: Do Performance Standards
Predate Construction? .................................... 14
B. Second Prong: Is the New Source
Operationally Independent? .......................... 15
C. Third Prong: Do Regulations Independently
Apply to the New Source? .............................. 25
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 28
APPENDIX
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 590 U.S.
165, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020) ...................ii, 1, 14, 20
Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547 (2016) .............. 13, 14
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) ......................... 4
Manasota-88, Inc. v. Thomas, 799 F.2d 687 (11th Cir.
1986) .................................................................... 11
National Wildlife Federation v. E.P.A., 286 F.3d 554,
568-70 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ....................................... 11
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. State of Arizona
(“SCAT II”), 550 P.3d 1096 (2024)
............................. iii, 3-7, 9-12, 14, 19-20, 23, 26-28
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. State of Arizona
(“SCAT I”) , 254 Ariz. 179, 520 P.3d 670
(App. 2022). ............................................... iii, 3, 8-9
S.D. Warren Company v. Maine Board of
Environmental. Protection, 547 U.S. 370 (2006).13
Statutes & Regulations
28 U.S.C. § 1257 .......................................................... 4
33 U.S.C. § 1251 ....................................................... i, 1
40 C.F.R. § 122.2 ................................................... 4, 14
vi
40 C.F.R. § 122.4 ...................................................... i, 1
40 C.F.R. § 122.29 ....... i, ii, 2-4, 8, 10-18, 21-22, 25-28
40 C.F.R. § 440.102 ................................................... 27
40 C.F.R. § 440.103 ................................................... 27
40 C.F.R. § 440.104 ..................................... ii, 4, 25-28
40 C.F.R. § 440.132 .............................. 4, 16, 17, 26-28
A.R.S. § 49-201 ............................................................ 7
A.R.S. § 49-221 ............................................................ 7
A.R.S. § 49-255 ............................................................ 7
Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States
Rule 10 .............................................................. ii, 9, 12
Rule 14 ..................................................................... ii, 4
Rule 29 ........................................................................ X
Other Sources
Ore Mining and Dressing Point Source Category
Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source
Performance Standards, 47 Fed. Reg. 54598–600
(Dec. 3, 1982) ............................................. 11, 14-16
vii
New Source Criteria (40 C.F.R. 122.29(b), 49 Fed.
Reg. at 38,044 (Sept. 26, 1984) ................ 18, 21, 23
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 167 (2012)
................................................................... 16, 17, 20
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
Queen Creek is a tributary of the Gila River that
flows east to west from the Superstition Mountains
through the central Phoenix Basin. Since time
immemorial, Queen Creek and its surrounding
streams, creeks, springs, and seeps have been
considered sacred to members of the San Carlos
Apache Tribe (“Tribe”) and their ancestors. To this
day, Queen Creek bears tremendous cultural and
religious importance in traditional Apache religious
practice, because spiritual beings (Ga’an) reside in its
waters.1 Queen Creek is also a source of Apache food
and medicine.
For over a century, nearby mines have discharged
copper into Queen Creek, causing it to fail water
quality standards under the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”), harming Apache Ga’an, and thus,
threatening traditional Apache religion and
spirituality. The express policy of the CWA is to
“restore and maintain the chemical, physical and
biological integrity” of the Nation’s navigable waters,
including Queen Creek. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a); see
Cnty. of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 590 U.S. 165,
140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020).
Consequently, federal
regulation imposes strict regulations on new sources
that would discharge pollution into impaired
waterways. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i), Part 440.
In 2007, Resolution Copper, LLC (“Resolution”)
began constructing a new copper mine near Queen
Creek. While new copper mines are hardly
1See Testimony of Chairman Terry Rambler, San Carlos
Apache Tribe, Hearing before the Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources, United States Senate (Feb. 9, 2012),
https://www.congress.gov/event/112th-congress/senateevent/LC3611/text; Goodwin, Grenville, White Mountain Apache
Religion, American Anthropologist, 40:24-37, 1938, at 24, 27.
2
uncommon in Arizona, this massive copper mine will
be unlike any ever constructed in the United
States. Resolution anticipates that over the mine’s
forty-year lifespan it will produce 20 million tons of
copper—equivalent to 25 percent of the United States’
copper demand. It will also cause the land above the
mine to subside up to 1,000 feet and drain the entire
Apache Leap tuff aquifer that has stood above the ore
body for eons.2 Water that flows into this new mine
will become contaminated with copper, and
Resolution seeks authorization to discharge that
copper-contaminated water into Queen Creek.
The Clean Water Act does not outright prohibit
Resolution from obtaining a permit to do so, but it first
imposes strict requirements. The threshold issues—
and subjects of this petition—are (1) how to perform
the new source analysis required by 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.29(b); and (2) whether the Resolution Mine is a
new source.
By its plain text, subsection 122.29(b) establishes
a three-prong test: a source is a new source if (1) its
construction began after applicable new source
performance standards were promulgated; (2) it is
operationally independent from existing sources; and
(3) new source performance standards “independently
apply” to it.
ADEQ, Arizona’s regulatory agency charged by
Environmental Protection Agency with administering
discharge permits, misinterpreted and misapplied
this simple test, allowing Resolution to completely
2Wells, James, The Proposed Resolution Copper Mine and
Arizona’s Water Future, September 21, 2021, available at
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/556e05ade4b0b54303ce35
44/t/6470ef67e2f78b310b8f56b1/1685122922028/Dr.+Wells+Rep
ort+on+Water+Impacts+from+Resolution+Copper+Mine+%28928-21%29+%28003%29.pdf (last visited, September 21, 2024).
3
bypass the CWA’s protections. ADEQ, and later the
Arizona Supreme Court, determined that this
unprecedented new mine was a mere extension of the
nearby Magma Mine, which has been shuttered for
nearly 30 years.
Under subsection 122.29(b), the Resolution Mine
is not an “existing source” of copper-contaminated
discharge, but a “new source” because (1) its
construction began after new source performance
standards for copper mines were promulgated; (2) it is
operationally independent of the Magma Mine; and
(3) new source performance standards independently
apply to its discharge. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b).
Queen Creek is worthy of protection, and the Tribe
seeks no more protection than what the CWA provides
to all waterways across the country. Yet, the Arizona
Supreme Court in SCAT II sets a bad precedent that
threatens to undo federal regulation and the intent of
Congress under the CWA. This Court should grant
certiorari to provide definitive, final guidance on
Subsection 122.29(b)’s “new source” analysis, which
governs the challenging balance between government
efforts to protect and develop two of our Nations’ most
vital natural resources: copper and clean water.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Arizona Supreme Court’s opinion is published
at 550 P.3d 1096 (“SCAT II”). The Arizona Court of
Appeals’ opinion is published at 254 Ariz. 179, 520
P.3d 670 (“SCAT I”).
JURISDICTION
The Arizona Supreme Court filed its opinion on
June 27, 2024. See R. Sup. Ct. 13.1. That opinion
turns on the interpretation of federal statutes and
regulations that the Tribe pressed below, particularly
40 C.F.R. §§ 122.2, 122.29, 440.104 and 440.132. This
4
Court has jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257; Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 216-217 (1983).
Supreme
Court Rule 14.1(e)(v) does not apply.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The pertinent text of the federal statutes and
regulations cited in this petition, including 40 C.F.R.
§§ 122.2, 122.29, 440.104 and 440.132, are reproduced
at APP-156-66.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Development and Exploitation of the
Magma and Resolution Mines.
The Magma and Resolution mines and the ore
bodies they exploit are vastly separate and distinct;
the mines are built centuries apart, utilize different
mining methods, and the new mine will outproduce
the old mine fifteen times over.
The facts are not in material dispute. SCAT II,
550 P.3d 1096, ¶ 70. In 1911, the Magma Copper
Company (“Magma”) began constructing a mine on
the West Plant Site northwest of Superior that would
yield 1.3 million tons of copper by the time it was
exhausted in 1996. Id. at ¶ 4; APP-109-10. The
Magma Mine chased the vein of the high-grade
Magma Ore Body using the “adit” (tunnel) mining
method accessed through eight mine shafts that
Magma drilled around the West Plant Site. APP-10910. In 1971, Magma constructed “Shaft 9” on the East
Plant Site, a non-contiguous parcel two miles east of
Superior, to mine the Magma Ore Body from the east.
APP-110. At that time, Magma also constructed the
Never Sweat Tunnel to connect the East and West
Plant Sites. Id.
5
In 1996, all operations related to the Magma Mine
ceased when its ore body was depleted, and BHP
Copper, Inc. (“BHP”) succeeded Magma. Id. BHP
allowed the Magma Mine to flood and backfilled much
of its underground workings including Shafts 1
through 7. Id. This marked the end of the Magma
Mine.
In 1994, Magma discovered what would become
known as the Resolution Ore Body—a new, large,
virgin lode of low-grade copper ore sitting beneath
Tonto National Forest. See SCAT II, 550 P.3d 1096,
¶¶ 9-13. The Resolution Ore Body lies 4,500 to 7,000
feet below the surface, far deeper than the Magma
Ore Body and so deep that it can only be mined by
robots due to temperatures that exceed 150 degrees.
APP-109.
The Resolution Ore Body sits south and east of the
East Plant Site and is separate from, and unrelated
to, the Magma Ore Body. APP-108-09.
6
In 2004, BHP and Rio Tinto formed Resolution as
a joint venture and transferred to it all interests and
rights they held in the West Plant Site, East Plant
Site, and the Resolution Ore Body.3 SCAT II, 550
3Because the Resolution Ore Body sits beneath Tonto
National Forest, Resolution began lobbying Congress to transfer
that land to it in exchange for far less valuable land elsewhere
in Southeastern Arizona. Those efforts resulted in hearings
before Congress in which members of the Tribe testified about
the sacred character of Oak Flat and the devastating impact of
its destruction by Resolution’s mine. Resolution’s efforts to
obtain the land failed eight times between 2005 and 2013 until
the land exchange was appended at the last minute to a mustpass National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015
without being reviewed and considered by Congress at the time
of voting. See 2005 H.R. 2618, 2005 S.1122; 2006 H.R. 6373, 2006
7
P.3d 1096, ¶ 12. In 2007, Resolution began
constructing active mining areas that will support the
Resolution Mine, including Shaft 10, which extends
7,000 feet below ground, as well as cooling towers, a
wash bay, and water treatment plant. Id.; APP-11011.
Once completed, the Resolution Mine will consist
of a complex network of underground mineworks that
will extract ore using the panel caving method. APP109.
The Resolution complex will include the
Resolution Mine and numerous facilities on the East
and West Plant Sites, some of which were formerly
associated with the Magma Mine. Resolution projects
that over its 40-year production life, the new mine will
yield 20 million tons of copper and consume some
750,000 acre-feet of water, most of which will be
discharged as copper effluent in one form or another.
B. ADEQ Erroneously Treats the Resolution
Mine as an Existing Source, and the
Tribe’s Files Its Challenge
In 2017, Resolution applied to renew the discharge
permit4 that ADEQ previously issued for the
shuttered Magma Mine and included active mining
areas that will exclusively serve the new Resolution
Mine. This includes the newly drilled “Shaft 10” on
the East Plant Site and the beginnings of a complex
network of automated mineworks that Resolution is
S.2466; 2007 H.R. 3301, 2007 S.1862; 2008 S.3157; 2009
H.R.2509; 2010 H.R. 4880; 2011 H.R.1904; 2013 H.R. 687, 2013
S.339; and 2014 H.R.39979.
4The Environmental Protection Agency authorized ADEQ to
administer the National Pollution Discharge Elimination
Systems within Arizona on December 5, 2002. Arizona Statute
applies the federal standards to all tributaries and reaches of the
Gila River, among others.
See A.R.S. §§ 29-201-38, 49221(G)(1)(b), 49-255(2)(a).
8
constructing beneath the Resolution Ore Body.
ADEQ renewed the permit—without conducting a
“new source” analysis—treating the Resolution Mine
as an existing source and part of the old, defunct
Magma Mine. SCAT I, 520 P.3d 670, ¶ 15-16.
The Tribe challenged ADEQ’s decision before the
Water Quality Appeals Board (“Board”) arguing that
the Resolution Mine is a “new source” under 40 C.F.R.
§§ 122.2 and 122.29.
Id.; APP-98, 101-02.
In
November 2018, the Board remanded the matter to
ADEQ instructing it to conduct a “new source”
analysis. Id. ¶ 17.
In 2019, ADEQ completed a truncated new source
analysis, in which it determined that the Resolution
Mine was an existing source. Id. ADEQ erroneously
reasoned that because performance standards apply
to “the mine as a whole” (i.e., the combination of all
“active mining areas” on both sites), the analysis
begins and ends with the date that Magma began
constructing its original “mine”—1911. Id. The Tribe
appealed this decision to the Board, which affirmed.
Id. ¶ 18.
The Tribe appealed the Board’s 2019 decision to
the Arizona Superior Court arguing under 40 C.F.R.
§§ 122.2 and 122.29 that the Resolution Mine is a new
source and that the Board’s erroneous new source
analysis was inconsistent with federal regulations.
Id. ¶ 20; APP-83-83. However, the Superior Court
deferred to ADEQ and affirmed the Board’s decision.
SCAT I, 520 P.3d 670, ¶ 20.
The Tribe appealed to the Arizona Court of
Appeals, which reversed, determining that the
Resolution Mine was a new source under 40 C.F.R.
§§ 122.2 and 122.29. Id. ¶ 72. The Court of Appeals
rejected ADEQ’s erroneous “mine-as-a-whole”
9
interpretation, which had confused the regulatory
definitions of “mine,” “active mining area,” and “site.”5
Id.¶¶ 30-61; see 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.2, 440.132(a), (g).
The Court of Appeals correctly determined the
Resolution Mine is a “new source” because its
construction began after 1982, it is “substantially
independent” of the Magma Mine, and new source
performance standards independently apply to it.
SCAT I, 520 P.3d 670, ¶¶ 52-61.
Resolution and ADEQ sought review with the
Arizona Supreme Court, which accepted review,
reversed the Court of Appeals, and determined that
the Resolution Mine is not a “new source.” Although
the court agreed with the Tribe that §§ 122.2 and
122.29(b) require regulators to consider only newly
constructed items and not “the mine as a whole,” it
determined that the Resolution Mine was not
independent of the Magma Mine because the two
shared a “material connection.” SCAT II, 550 P.3d
1096, ¶ 63. Further, the court failed to analyze the
mineworks that Resolution is constructing under the
Resolution Ore Body, but instead focused its analysis
on a solitary mineshaft, “Shaft 10”—a term that the
Parties and lower courts used as shorthand for all the
new active mining areas associated with the
Resolution Mine. Id. ¶¶ 69-71. In other words, the
5In short, an “active mining area” is a place where
“extraction, removal, or recovery of metal ore” takes place. 40
C.F.R. § 440.132(a). A “mine” is a type of active mining area; it
is defined as “an active mining area . . . used in or resulting from
the work of extracting metal ore . . . from [its] natural deposits.”
40 C.F.R. 440.132(g). A “site” is the broadest term and means
“the land or water area where any ‘facility or activity’ is
physically located or conducted, including adjacent land used in
connection with the facility or activity.” Thus, any mining site
may include multiple active mining areas some of which may be
mines.
10
court failed to analyze the mine itself that will be the
source of copper-contaminated discharge.
REASONS TO GRANT CERTIORARI
This Court provides the definitive and final
interpretation of federal law to guide lower courts and
agencies fulfilling federal mandates. Presently, the
only published opinion interpreting how agencies
must perform a new source analysis is the Arizona
Supreme Court’s erroneous decision that departs from
the plain text of the very regulation establishing that
analysis. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b). See R. Sup. Ct.
10(c) (certiorari warranted when “a state court . . . has
decided an important question of federal law that has
not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has
decided an important federal question in a way that
conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court”).
Further, because new source analyses are
frequently the domain of state administrative
function, federal judicial review is not only rare, but
often subject to the factual determinations of agency
officials. As such, published opinions presenting pure
legal questions on undisputed facts are infrequent
and this Court should take the opportunity to weigh
in and provide a consistent framework for Subsection
122.29(b)’across the various jurisdictions in the
country.
Moreover, the undisputed facts of the case warrant
asking this Court to take a fresh look and definitively
interpret the governing regulations.
The new
Resolution Mine is a colossal undertaking that is
legally, factually, and facially independent of the
Magma Mine. Resolution projects that its new mine
will supply the equivalent of 25% of the Nation’s
11
copper demand,6 making it one of the most profitable
copper mines in the world and a project that
Resolution would pursue apart from any connection to
the Magma Mine. Further, the Resolution Mine will
mine an entirely separate, virgin ore body, use a
different extraction method, and will out-produce the
Magma Mine fifteen times over in half the time.
Presently, SCAT II is the only published authority
instructing regulators how to perform a “new source”
analysis under 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b). Cf. National
Wildlife Federation v. E.P.A., 286 F.3d 554, 568-70
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (determining specific regulation
categorizing new fiber lines as a “new source” did not
create an irrebuttable presumption); Manasota-88,
Inc. v. Thomas, 799 F.2d 687 (11th Cir. 1986)
6This is a projection of volume, not a commitment to deliver
copper to producers or consumers in the United States.
Resolution Copper Mining Limited Liability Company is owned
by Rio Tinto (Australia/England) and BHP (Australia). Rio Tinto
owns 55% of Resolution Copper, and BHP owns 45%. Shining
Prospect Private Limited Company, based in Singapore, is a
holding company that owns over 14% of Rio Tinto, making it the
single
largest
shareholder
of
Rio
Tinto,
see
https://www.sharecafe.com.au/2024/04/05/rio-tintos-annualshare-buyback-battle/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2024). Shining
Prospect PLC is wholly owned by Chinalco, a holding company
of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission of the State Council (SASAC) of the People’s
Republic
of
China,
see
https://www.chinalco.com.cn/en/en_gywm/en_qyjj/ (last visited
Sept. 23, 2024).
Resolution has long been exploring expansion at the Port of
Guaymas to ship its copper to China. See Port of Guaymas Set
to
Expand,
Arizona
Daily
Star
(Apr.
5,
2012),
https://tucson.com/business/local/port-of-guaymas-set-toexpand/article_1faea8eb-20bf-5fa3-b22c-95d98727a374.html
(last visited Sept. 23, 2024).
12
(summarily determining disposal area “cannot
logically be viewed apart” from its source).
Allowing SCAT II to stand would not only have
grave consequences for Queen Creek and the Tribe,
but it would also jeopardize all impaired waterways
across the country, as the Arizona Supreme Court’s
opinion is the only authority on the subject. Most
importantly, SCAT II’s test completely undermines
Congress’ intent for the CWA to restore Queen Creek
and other similarly situated waters faced with the
discharge from new mines and other new sources of
pollution.
This Court must provide definitive, final guidance
to regulators and courts by establishing how to
perform a new source analysis under 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.29(b). See R. Sup. Ct. 10(c). This Court should
not allow this erroneous state court decision to stand
because it involves an important question of federal
law and has been decided in a manner that conflicts
with relevant decisions of this Court. See id.
THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT
DISREGARDED THE THREE-PRONG TEST IN
THE PLAIN TEXT OF SUBSECTION 122.29
AND ADOPTED AN UNSUPPORTED
“MATERIAL CONNECTION” TEST
Federal regulation establishes a three-prong test
to determine whether new construction constitutes a
new source.
See 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b).
New
construction is a new source if:
(1) . . . it meets the definition of “new
source” in § 122.2,[7] and
740 C.F.R § 122.2 defines a new source, in relevant part, as:
“any building, structure, facility, or installation from which
13
(i)
It is constructed at a site at
which no other source is located; or
(ii)
It totally replaces the
process or production equipment that
causes the discharge of pollutants at
an existing source; or
(iii) Its processes are substantially
independent of an existing source at
the same site. . . .
(2) A
source
meeting
the
requirements of paragraphs (b)(1) (i), (ii),
or (iii) of this section is a new source only
if a new source performance standard is
independently applicable to it. If there is
no such independently applicable
standard, the source is a new discharger.
Put in simpler terms, new construction is a “new
source” when (1) its construction begins after EPA
promulgates new source performance standards, see
40 C.F.R. § 122.2; (2) it is operationally independent
of other sources, see 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(1)(i)-(iii);
and (3) it is independent for regulation. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.29(b)(2).
Rather than interpret and apply the plain text of
these regulations in context, the Arizona Supreme
Court departed from it, cutting a new “material
connection” test out of whole cloth. This contradicts
this Court’s precedent regarding the interpretation of
federal regulations. See Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S.
547, 553 (2016) (“we begin our interpretation of the
regulation with its text”); also, S.D. Warren Co. v.
there is or may be a ‘discharge of pollutants,’ the construction of
which commenced . . . [a]fter promulgation of standards of
performance under section 306 of CWA which are applicable to
such source . . . .”
14
Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 376 (2006)
(absent regulatory definition, courts must construe
terms “in accordance with [their] ordinary or natural
meaning”). Only when the text is unclear does this
Court turn to other canons of construction. Green, 578
U.S. at 553; Cty. of Maui, 150 S. Ct. at 1468
(determining plain text of “from” in statute did not
mean “fairly traceable” or proximately caused).
A.
First Prong: Do Performance
Standards Predate Construction?
The first prong of the new source analysis requires
determination of whether the new construction meets
the definition of a “new source” in 40 C.F.R. § 122.2.
Section 122.2 defines a “new source” as “any building,
structure, facility or installation from which there is
or may be a ‘discharge of pollutants,’ the construction
of which commenced . . . [a]fter promulgation of
standards of performance . . . which are applicable to
such source.” Under § 122.2, the newly constructed
facilities alone are at issue and nothing else.
The Arizona Supreme Court correctly determined
that the first prong focuses solely on the new
construction and not the date that construction began
on an entire site. SCAT II, 550 P.3d 1096, ¶¶ 41-50.
Thus, the court properly rejected ADEQ’s
interpretation of this prong that focused on the date
that Magma originally began construction on the
West Plant Site in 1911.8 Under 40 C.F.R. § 122.2,
8Below, ADEQ and Resolution advanced an erroneous “mineas-a-whole” interpretation that would render § 122.2 and
§ 122.29(b) meaningless surplusage. They argued that because
construction of the Magma Mine began in 1911, no copper mine
on site could ever have a later date. If the inquiry began and
ended with whether operations existed on site (or a related site)
before 1982, there would be no need to evaluate the remaining
prongs. A new source analysis would only occur on vacant sites.
15
the Resolution Mine is a “new source” because its
construction began in 2007, a quarter century after
new source performance standards for copper mines
were promulgated. See Ore Mining and Dressing
Point Source Category Effluent Limitations
Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards,
47 Fed. Reg. 54598–600 (Dec. 3, 1982).
B.
Second Prong: Is the New Source
Operationally Independent.
Section 122.29(b)(1) provides three paths to
establishing that new construction is operationally
independent. It states, in part:
[A] source is a ‘new source’ if . . . :
(i) it is constructed at a site at which
no other source is located; or
(ii) it totally replaces the process or
production equipment that causes the
discharge of pollutants at an existing
source; or
(iii) its processes are substantially
independent of an existing source at
the same site.
Here, the Resolution Mine either totally replaces
the Magma Mine or is substantially independent from
the Magma Mine. Either way, the Arizona Supreme
Court, applying its “material connection” test, failed
to analyze the Resolution Mine with an eye toward
whether it is operationally independent of the
depleted Magma Mine.
1. The Resolution Mine Totally Replaces
the Magma Mine.
The Resolution Mine is operationally independent
of the Magma Mine because it totally replaces it. A
new source is independent in fact when it “totally
16
replaces the process or production equipment that
causes the discharge of pollutants at an existing
source.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(1)(ii). Within a mine,
the source of pollution is the mine drainage that is
“drained, pumped, or siphoned” from extraction areas.
See 40 C.F.R. § 440.132(g), (h). In a mine, the process
or production equipment associated with extraction is
the same equipment which causes a discharge, as
opposed to equipment associated with removal or
recovery of metal ore. See 40 C.F.R. § 440.132(a), (g).
Here, neither Resolution, Magma, nor any other
person or entity extracts metal ore from the Magma
Mine.
Accordingly, the Resolution Mine’s new
mineworks will totally replace the process and
production equipment formerly used in the Magma
Mine, which has not extracted metal ore since 1996.
2. The Resolution Mine is “Substantially
Independent” of the Magma Mine.
Even if the Resolution Mine does not totally
replace the Magma Mine, it is nevertheless
“substantially independent” of the Magma Mine. See
40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(1)(iii). Whether a new source is
“substantially independent” is determined under the
totality of the circumstances. Section 122.29(b)(1)(iii)
directs courts and regulators to “consider such factors
as [(1)] the extent to which the new facility is
integrated with the existing plant; and [(2)] the extent
to which the new facility is engaged in the same
general type of activity as the existing source.”
(Emphasis supplied). The phrase “such factors as”
compels that these two factors are not exclusive.
Therefore, regulators and courts must, on a caseby-case basis and under the totality of the
circumstances: consider all the relevant factors;
determine how to evaluate them; and decide how
17
much weight each one deserves.
In doing so,
regulators and courts must interpret the plain text of
these factors in context. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan
A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts, 167 (2012) (explaining that courts must
interpret a statute’s plain language in context).
Here, the necessary context for interpreting each
factor is to ascertain whether a dependent
relationship exists between the new and existing
sources, such that the new depends upon the existing.
Further, because the test considers all the
circumstances, regulators and courts, in simplest
terms, “just need to look at it.” The Arizona Supreme
Court erroneously interpreted the two express factors
and failed to consider any others.
On the undisputed facts, the Resolution Mine is
“substantially independent” from the Magma Mine
because (1) the Resolution Mine operationally
replaces the exhausted Magma Mine; (2) Resolution’s
repurposing of vestigial active mining areas does not
show integration between the two mines; (3) by using
a different mining method, the Resolution Mine will
engage in a different type of activity than the Magma
Mine; and (4) several more factors indicate that the
Resolution Mine does not depend at all on the Magma
Mine. Indeed, if one “just looks at” the Resolution
Mine, it is obvious that it is substantially independent
of the Magma Mine.
a. The Resolution Mine Replaces the
Exhausted Magma Mine.
Even if the Resolution Mine does not totally
replace the Magma Mine within the meaning of
Subsection 122.29(b)(1)(ii), the facts supporting that
ground are strong evidence that the Resolution Mine
is “substantially independent” of the Magma Mine.
18
Again, the Magma Mine has been exhausted and it no
longer creates mining discharge consequent to
extraction of any ore. As such, all activity occurring
in the Resolution Mine—and all discharge produced
thereby—occurs independent of what may occur or
formerly occurred in the Magma Mine.
The Resolution Mine is complete in and of itself
and it does not depend on or owe its existence or
operations to the Magma Mine. The convenient reuse of active mining areas that formerly supported the
Magma Mine is merely an accident of history and a
beneficial economic advantage that does not show a
dependent relationship. This factor heavily weighs in
favor of the conclusion that the Resolution Mine is
“substantially independent” of the Magma Mine.
b. The Resolution Mine Is Not Integrated into
the Magma Mine; Vestiges of the Magma
Mine Are Integrated into It.
The first express factor in Subsection
122.29(b)(1)(iii) is “the extent to which the new facility
is integrated with the existing plant.” EPA guidance
states that minor additions like “a new purification
step” are highly integrated, while sharing “utilities”
or a “treatment plant” constitutes nominal
integration. New Source Criteria (40 CF 122.29(b)),
49 Fed. Reg. at 38,044 (Sept. 26, 1984).
As a starting point, the Resolution Mine is not a
“minor addition” to the Magma Mine. Even if the
Magma Mine were still in its heyday, the Resolution
Mine with its thirty-fold increase in annual
production would utterly dwarf it.
Moreover, the examples provided in the Federal
Register are illustrative. A new purification step
depends on the existing source. If an existing mine
does not produce copper ore, the new step would have
19
nothing to purify. Such integration is strong evidence
of dependence. Shared support facilities, however,
such as utilities or a treatment plant, constitute
nominal integration. If two mines draw electricity
from a common power plant or send discharge to a
common treatment plant, the shared plants do not
place the mines in a dependent relationship with one
another.
Each mine will otherwise operate
independently of the other and curtailing or
expanding one will not impact the other.
The direction of any integration is also critical. If
a new source is integrated into a dominant existing
source, the new source is most likely dependent. By
contrast, if vestiges of an existing source are
subsumed into a new source such that the new
dominates, then the new source is independent.
Connections, borne out of mere convenience or
economic prudence, do not evidence meaningful
integration and do not show that a new source
depends on an existing source.
Here, the undisputed evidence overwhelmingly
demonstrates that the Resolution Mine is not
integrated with the Magma Mine and that any
integration is either nominal or shows that vestiges of
the Magma Mine have been integrated into the
Resolution Mine’s operations. This includes the
repurposing of the Never Sweat Tunnel and Shafts 8
and 9, which have not facilitated any extraction in the
Magma Mine since 1996 but will be repurposed to
support the Resolution Mine. The continued use of
these vestiges depends on operations within the
Resolution Mine. Any integration between them
shows that the Resolution Mine dominates useful
vestiges of the Magma Mine.
The Arizona Supreme Court failed to consider
whether any integration between the mines shows a
20
dependent or independent relationship. Instead, the
court simply asked whether the two mines shared a
“material connection,” which it found in the Never
Sweat Tunnel and Shafts 8 and 9. SCAT II, 550 P.3d
1096, ¶¶ 53-56. By doing so, the court set a much
lower bar. The “material connection” test the court
invented falls short the plain text of the regulation by
shifting the inquiry away from one focused on
operational independence to one of mere physical
connection.
The court’s test contradicts the
regulation’s text which requires determination of
whether the new mine is “substantially independent.”
The Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretive shift is
not permitted by the text of Subsection 122.29(b)(iii)
and contradicts the method of interpretation required
by this Court. In County of Maui, this Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit when it similarly departed from the
statutory text. See 140 S. Ct. at 1470. There, the
lower court interpreted “from” in the CWA’s
prohibition on adding any pollutant to navigable
waters “from any point source” not as a direct
discharge or its “functional equivalent,” but merely as
“fairly traceable.”9
Id.; see also Scalia &
Garner, Reading Law, 167 (2012) (explaining that
courts must interpret a statute’s plain language in
context). Here, “material connection” does not fairly
rise from regulatory text requiring analysis of
whether a new source is so integrated into an existing
source that it is operationally dependent on that
existing source.
Further, the Arizona Supreme Court’s new test is
so unbounded that no new source may ever be
9In County of Maui, a wastewater treatment facility pumped
partially treated sewage through four wells hundreds of feet
underground, which then traveled half a mile or more through
groundwater to the ocean. 140 S. Ct. 1469.
21
regarded substantially independent when located on
site with another source—unless, of course, it meets
the express examples of shared utilities or shared
treatment facilities. See 49 Fed. Reg. at 38,044. The
Resolution Mine is not in any way integrated with the
shuttered Magma Mine, and this factor compels the
conclusion that the Resolution Mine is “substantially
independent” of the Magma Mine. This Court should
grant certiorari lest other courts follow this flatly
erroneous test.
c. Adit Mining Is Not the Same General Type
of Activity as Panel Cave Mining.
The second nonexclusive factor is “the extent to
which the new facility is engaged in the same general
type of activity as the existing source.” 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.29(b)(1)(iii) (emphasis added).
By the
regulation’s plain text, the inquiry is not binary; i.e.
the question is not whether both mines extract copper.
Rather, regulators and courts are directed to consider
the “extent” to which new and old “engage[] in the
same general type of activity.” Id. (emphasis
supplied). The regulation begins with the premise
that new and existing sources may engage in the same
general type of activity (e.g. copper mining) but
directs regulators and courts to consider the degree of
similarity. This is a qualitative analysis aimed at
facts that are material to whether a dependent
relationship exists.
As with integration, EPA provides an explanation
and example: if a plant “producing a final product . . .
adds new equipment to produce the raw materials for
that product . . . the proposed structure would likely
constitute a new source.” 49 Fed. Reg. at 38,043-44.
Nevertheless, even if the new construction is engaged
in the same type of activity, but “essentially
replicates, without replacing, the existing source,” it
22
too would be a new source.10 Id. While this second
example seems to counter the second express factor
because the activities are identical, the thrust of the
test is consistent. Like integration, the question is
whether the operational characteristics of the new
and existing sources evince a dependent relationship
between them.
In other words, this factor is not a procrustean bed
that allows a willing regulator to stretch the analysis
to meet the requisite level of abstraction that will
yield the desired result (e.g. copper mines become
mines become exploitation of natural resources
becomes economic activity). Rather, the factor must
illuminate whether an otherwise new source is
operationally independent of an existing source.
Here, the Magma Mine and Resolution Mine both
mine copper but they are entirely dissimilar. The
Magma Mine was an adit mine. While active, it
chased a high-grade vein through tunnels in a manner
that prevented collapse of the overburden.
Consequently, it had a comparatively lower impact on
the surface and aquifers that lie above.
By contrast, the Resolution Mine will use panel
caving—a brute-force method that collapses an ore
body from below along with the entire earth above it.
As panels of ore collapse, a subsidence zone will form
on the surface a thousand feet deep, and the
depression will drain the entire Apache Leap tuff
aquifer lying above. That aquifer, fed by rainwater
and streams from time immemorial, will drain into
the Resolution Mine in volumes far exceeding
discharges from the Magma Mine. These mining
methods are sharply different.
10Note that total replacement is an independent ground for
establishing independence in fact. See 40 C.F.R. 122.29(b)(1)(ii).
23
Additionally, the Resolution mine will more than
replicate the production of the Magma Mine. See 49
Fed. R. 38,044. Indeed, the new mine is thirty times
larger in terms of its projected annual production.
The Resolution Mine is not a continuation of the
Magma Mine, but a new, entirely separate mine that
will produce additional discharge on top of any
dewatering that occurs in the Magma Mine.
The Arizona Supreme Court erroneously
characterized the Resolution Mine as a mere increase
in capacity that results from adding equipment in one
or two production steps. SCAT II, 550 P.3 1096, ¶ 59
(quoting 49 Fed. Reg. at 38,044). Further, the court
analyzed only Shaft 10 and ignored the entire
mineworks where extraction will occur. Id. ¶¶ 59-60.
In other words, the court failed to analyze the
Resolution Mine itself, and instead focused on a single
mineshaft. Id. Worse, the court viewed the factor at
a high level of abstraction—“the mining process”—
and missed the forest for the trees. Id. ¶ 61.
To the extent the Magma Mine is engaged in any
kind of activity (it is not), the difference in mining
method between the two mines demonstrates that
that they are not engaged in the same general type of
activity. This factor weighs heavily in favor of
substantial independence and warrants a new source
designation. This Court should grant certiorari to
articulate the correct test under this factor as well.
d. Several Other Factors Demonstrate that the
Resolution Mine is Substantially
Independent of the Magma Mine.
Several other factors support that the Resolution
Mine is substantially independent of the Magma
Mine. These include the extraordinary size and scale
of the Resolution Mine and tremendous investment
24
that Resolution has made in constructing it. Whereas
the Magma Mine produced 1.3 million tons of copper
in eighty years from a high-grade ore body, the
Resolution Mine will produce 20 million tons of copper
in forty years from a separate, low-grade body.11 This
thirty-fold increase in annual production only
represents the copper yield. Because the Resolution
Mine will target a low-grade ore, it will extract more
material per ton of copper produced.
Additionally, Resolution has invested over $2
billion in constructing the new mine since 2004.12
Final construction will still take an additional ten
years, and Resolution remains uncertain when the
final stages will begin.13
Further, Resolution must also acquire title to U.S.
Forest Service land through a land exchange.14 To
accomplish this, Resolution invested untold sums
lobbying Congress for ten years before it passed
legislation authorizing a land exchange that would
allow it to exploit the Resolution Ore Body.15 Indeed,
the land exchange shows the Resolution Mine is
completely disjoined from the Magma Mine insofar as
it lies beneath Tonto National Forest and such areas
as Oak Flat and Apache Leap. These areas are
11See
https://resolutioncopper.com/project-overview/ (last
visited Sept. 23, 2024).
12See
https://resolutioncopper.com/rio-tinto-approves-anadditional-302-million-investment-in-resolution-copper-project/)
(last visited Sept. 23, 2024).
13https://www.riotinto.com/en/news/releases/2021/
Resolution-Copper-project-enters-next-phase-of-publicconsultation (last visited Sept. 23, 2024).
14This land exchange is the subject of a separate, unrelated
petition for certiorari filed with this court in Apache Stronghold
v. U.S., No. 24-291.
15 See fn. 4, supra.
25
spiritually, culturally, and historically significant to
members of the Tribe.16
Resolution’s extraordinary investment and the
obstacles it seeks to overcome shows that the new
mine is so valuable that Resolution would pursue it
regardless of any supposed connection to the depleted
Magma Mine. Instead, the proper lens to view any
connection between the two is that in Arizona’s
Copper Triangle, exploration is the norm, and active
mining areas associated with old mines often present
beneficial opportunities for those looking to start new
mines. Simply put, the Resolution Mine is not a
continuation of the depleted Magma Mine.
The enormous size, cost, and complexity of the
Resolution Mine are additional compelling factors
demonstrating substantial independence. The
Arizona Supreme Court failed to consider any of them
despite that the regulatory text demands that
regulators and courts consider all relevant factors.
See 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(1)(iii). Applying the text as
written, all the relevant factors that one can conjure,
including those expressly stated in Subsection
122.29(b)(1)(iii), show that the Resolution Mine is
operationally independent of the Magma Mine and
that it is a new source.
C.
Third Prong: Do Regulations
Independently Apply to the New
Source?
Whether a “new source” is independent for
regulation turns on whether a new source
performance standard is “independently applicable”
to it. 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(2). If not, “the source is a
new discharger.” Id. The analysis begins with the
new construction and simply considers whether that
16 See fn. 1, supra.
26
construction—standing alone—would be subject to a
“new source” performance standard. Here, 40 C.F.R.
§ 440.104(a) establishes new source performance
standards for mine drainage. Subsection 440.132(h)
defines “mine drainage” as “any water drained,
pumped, or siphoned from a mine.” Subsection
440.132(g) defines a mine as “an active mining area
. . . used in or resulting from the work of extracting
metal ore . . . from [its] natural deposits.”
The Resolution Mine consists of all the new
mineworks that Resolution is constructing below the
Resolution Ore Body to extract copper ore from
natural deposits. This new construction in and of
itself independently meets the regulatory definition of
a “mine.” Further, Resolution will discharge mine
drainage “drained, pumped, or siphoned” from those
mineworks into Queen Creek. Accordingly, new
source performance standards independently apply to
the Resolution Mine; it is a “new source” for all
purposes under § 122.29(b).
The Arizona Supreme Court made three legal
errors in evaluating whether new source performance
standards independently apply to the Resolution
Mine. First, the court transformed the test into one
that considers whether the performance standards at
issue also apply to other sources on site; i.e., whether
the standards only apply to the new source and no
other sources. See SCAT II, 550 P.3d 1096, ¶¶ 67-68.
This is not the question. Rather, looking only to the
new construction, the question is whether
performance standards apply to that new
construction.
Indeed, evaluating whether the same standards
apply to other sources on a site would duplicate the
analysis of the second prong (operational
independence) by focusing on whether (1) the new
27
source is the only source on site; (2) the new source
totally replaces an existing source; or (3) the new
source is engaged in the same type of activity as an
existing source.
Second, even if the regulation directed regulators
and courts to evaluate all sources on site, the Arizona
Supreme Court applied the test incorrectly. The
Magma Mine is not subject to new source performance
standards but standards for existing sources.
Compare 40 C.F.R. § 440.102-03 (establishing “best
practicable control technology” and “best available
technology economically achievable” for existing
sources) with 40 C.F.R. § 440-104 (new source
performance standards). Even applying the court’s
erroneous test, new source performance standards
only apply to the Resolution Mine.
Third, the Arizona Supreme Court constrained its
analysis to Shaft 10 as a simple mineshaft and
ignored all the new mineworks that Resolution is
constructing that will extract copper ore and that will
be the source of the mine drainage. SCAT II, 550 P.3d
1096, ¶¶ 69-71; see 40 C.F.R. § 440.132(g), (h) (“mine
drainage” means “any water drained, pumped, or
siphoned from a mine”; “mine” means “active mining
area . . . used in or resulting from work of removing
metal ore . . . from [its] natural deposits”). In other
words, the court entirely failed to analyze the
Resolution Mine itself, as the regulation requires.
This analysis conflicts with ADEQ’s stipulation that
Shaft 10 and the other items under construction—i.e.,
the Resolution Mine—are sources of mine drainage,
and therefore, must be a mine. APP-146-47.
In summary, the Resolution Mine meets all three
prongs of the “new source” analysis. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.29(b). First, Resolution began constructing its
new mine in 2007, long after EPA promulgated
28
performance standards for copper mines. Second, the
Resolution Mine is “independent in fact” either as a
total replacement of the Magma Mine or as
substantially independent of the Magma Mine. Third,
the Resolution Mine is “independent for regulation”
because it is a “mine” as defined in the regulations
and will discharge mine drainage. See 40 C.F.R.
§§ 440.104, 440.132(g), (h). This Court should grant
certiorari, announce the proper method of conducting
a new source analysis, and expressly determine that
the Resolution Mine is new source under the CWA.
CONCLUSION
Few things are as important to the American
Southwest as water and mining; and both often stand
in conflict. While the mining sector plays a critical role
in supplying essential minerals like copper, the CWA
balances those interests against the need to maintain
the quality of the Nation’s waters. Congress’ intent
under the CWA is that common law principles alone
cannot effectively control pollution and that
waterways like Queen Creek must be restored and
maintained; without review, the unchecked
precedence of SCAT II will undermine that intent.
This Court should grant certiorari and establish the
proper interpretation of the new source analysis
required by 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b). Further, this Court
should determine that the Resolution Mine is a new
source.
Respectfully Submitted,
Alexander B. Ritchie
Bernardo M. Velasco
Counsel for Petitioners
September 25, 2024
APPENDIX
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. State of Arizona
APPENDIX
Opinion Sought to Be Reviewed
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. State of Arizona
(“SCAT II”), ___ Ariz. ___, 550 P.3d 1096
(2024) ........................................................ APP-1
Other Relevant Opinions and Decisions
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. State of Arizona
(SCAT I), 254 Ariz. 179, 520 P.3d 670 (App.
2022) ....................................................... APP-33
San Carlos Apache Tribe, et al. v. State of
Arizona, et al., Superior Court of Arizona,
Maricopa County, LC2019-00264-001 DT
(Mar. 25, 2021). ...................................... APP-79
San Carlos Apache Tribe, et al. v. State of Arizona,
et al. Office of Administrative Hearing, No. 17001-WQAB.
APP-97
Statutes and Regulations
28 U.S.C. § 1257 ........................................ APP-156
33 U.S.C. § 1251 ........................................ APP-156
40 C.F.R. § 122.2 ........................................ APP158
40 C.F.R. § 122.4 ........................................ APP160
40 C.F.R. § 122.29 ..................................... APP-161
40 C.F.R. § 440.102 ................................... APP-163
40 C.F.R. § 440.103 ................................... APP-164
40 C.F.R. § 440.104 ................................... APP-165
40 C.F.R. 440.132 ...................................... APP-166
APP-1
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. State of Arizona
(“SCAT II”), ___ Ariz. ___, 550 P.3d 1096 (July 27,
2024).
JUSTICE KING authored the Opinion of the Court,
in which CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL, VICE CHIEF
JUSTICE TIMMER, and JUSTICES BOLICK,
LOPEZ, BEENE, and MONTGOMERY joined.
Opinion
JUSTICE KING, Opinion of the Court:
¶1 Copper mining began at the Magma Copper Mine
near Superior, Arizona, over a century ago. In 1975,
the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(the “EPA”) *1099 issued the mine its first permit
authorizing the discharge of water pursuant to the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1389 (the
“CWA”). See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (tasking the EPA
with administering the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit program,
which includes issuing permits that authorize the
discharge of pollutants when certain conditions are
met). The EPA later renewed the mine's discharge
permit every five to eight years.
¶2 In 2002, the EPA delegated its administrative
authority over the CWA permit program to the
Arizona Department of Environmental Quality
(“ADEQ”). See Approval of Application by Arizona to
Administer the NPDES Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 79629,
79630 (Dec. 30, 2002); A.R.S. §§ 49-255 to -265.
Thereafter, ADEQ periodically renewed the mine's
permit, as required by the CWA.
¶3 In 2014, the mine's owner, Resolution Copper
Mining, LLC (“Resolution”), completed construction of
a new mine shaft (“Shaft 10”). Shaft 10 is a vertical
APP-2
excavation about thirty feet wide that descends nearly
7,000 feet underground. The issue before us is
whether Shaft 10 is a “new source” under the CWA. A
“new source” is subject to the generally more stringent
new source performance standards under § 306 of the
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1316. Based on the record before us,
we conclude that the sinking of Shaft 10 did not create
a “new source” under the CWA. Thus, ADEQ acted
within its discretion when it issued the discharge
permit renewal to Resolution in 2017.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History And Development Of The Mine
¶4
In
1910–1911,
Magma Copper Company
(“Magma”) purchased and began developing the mine
to extract copper ore. Part of Magma's development
included deepening an existing mine shaft (Shaft 1)
and constructing other underground workings,
including additional mine shafts (Shafts 2 through 8).
A “shaft is the surface opening to the mine which
provides a means of entry to or exit from the mine for
men and materials, and for the removal of ore or
waste from underground to the surface. It may be
vertical
or
inclined.” See EPA, Development
Document for Final Effluent Limitations Guidelines
and New Source Performance Standards for the Ore
Mining
and
Dressing
Point
Source
Category (“Development Document”) 29–30 (Nov.
1982), https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/201510/documents/ore-mining_dd_1982.pdf. The mine
shafts were used for a variety of purposes, including
the removal of water to keep the mine workings dry (a
process known as dewatering) and ventilating and
improving air quality below the surface of the mine.
Magma also installed equipment at the mine, such as
a local concentrator to process ore and a smelter. In
addition, the mining operation included underground
APP-3
tunnels that connected the shafts and facilitated ore
extraction.
¶5 The development of a mine may expand as new ore
deposits are located. In this case, as active extraction
depleted copper ore in the original area, Magma
turned its attention to other exploratory efforts. New
copper-ore deposits were discovered, and Magma's
operations consequently expanded in an eastward
direction.
¶6 In 1971, Magma constructed Shaft 9 on noncontiguous property located approximately two miles
east of the original workings of the mine. The purpose
of Shaft 9 was to identify copper-ore bodies within
that area and improve access to ore.
¶7 Magma also constructed an underground tunnel
extending about two miles in length that connected
the eastern portion of the mine (including Shaft 9)
with the western portion. This tunnel was known as
the “Never Sweat Tunnel.” Magma used the Never
Sweat Tunnel to transport copper ore from Shaft 9 to
the western portion of the mine, where extracted ore
was processed and stored.
¶8
As
mining
operations
continued
depleting copper ore,
Magma
began
drilling
underground exploratory holes in an effort to locate
new ore. Magma discovered some new copper ore near
Shaft 9 but ceased further exploratory drilling in
1982. With no operating pumps, Magma allowed the
underground workings to flood with infiltrating
groundwater.
*1100 ¶9 In 1989, Magma began the process of
dewatering the mine. Magma also resumed ore
production and underground exploratory drilling. The
results of the exploratory drilling suggested the
possibility of undiscovered copper. In 1994–1995,
APP-4
Magma discovered a new, large copper-ore body
beneath the eastern portion of the mine (the “Eastern
Deposit”).
Magma,
however,
did
not
extract copper ore from the Eastern Deposit at that
time.
¶10 In 1996, a new entity, Broken Hill Proprietary
Company Ltd. (“BHP”), acquired the mine, forming a
wholly owned subsidiary, BHP Copper, Inc. (“BHP
Copper”). BHP Copper continued mining operations
from Shaft 9, depleting the remaining reserves in that
area. BHP Copper ceased mining operations but
continued exploration efforts by drilling deep holes in
the area of the Eastern Deposit. In 1998,
BHP Copper ceased all operations and turned off its
dewatering pumps, allowing the mine's underground
workings to flood with water. In addition, some of the
underground workings at the mine were backfilled.
¶11 In 2001, BHP entered into an exploration
agreement with an entity that was a wholly owned
subsidiary of Rio Tinto (collectively “Rio Tinto”).
Thereafter, Rio Tinto commenced a deep exploratory
drilling program focused on outlining the Eastern
Deposit.
¶12 In 2004, Rio Tinto acquired a majority interest in
the mine. Rio Tinto then formed Resolution as a joint
venture with BHP's successor, BHP Billiton, to
continue efforts aimed at extracting copper ore from
the Eastern Deposit. Beginning in 2005, Resolution
resumed exploratory drilling and conducted a study to
assess viable methods of extracting copper ore from
the Eastern Deposit. Resolution also decided to
construct a new mine shaft and other support
structures that would enable it to access and study
the Eastern Deposit. Through years of exploration
efforts, it was determined that the Eastern Deposit
begins around 4,500 feet below ground surface level
APP-5
and proceeds down to about 7,000 feet. It covers an
area of about one square mile, and the ore body is
approximately 1,600 feet in thickness.
¶13 From 2007 to 2009, Resolution began developing
and sinking Shaft 10. Shaft 10 is located about 300
feet from Shaft 9 in the eastern portion of the mine.
Shaft 10 descends nearly 7,000 feet underground; in
contrast, Shaft 9 descends roughly 5,000 feet. Shaft
10 is not drilled directly into the Eastern Deposit. In
2014, Resolution completed construction of Shaft 10
and its surface components, including a hoist and
structural supports that enable the transport of
supplies to and from the base of Shaft 10.
¶14 During Shaft 10's construction, Shaft 9 was used
for support purposes (e.g., ventilation and dewatering
underground mine workings). Resolution plans to
continue to use Shaft 9 for support but not for ore
extraction.1
¶15 Around the time of Shaft 10's construction,
Resolution performed other work at the mine: (1)
rehabilitating and extending the Never Sweat
Tunnel; and (2) constructing a new cooling tower,
additional rock stockpiles, wash bays, and a mine
water treatment plant.2 Resolution used the Never
Sweat Tunnel to transport development rock from its
activities to the western portion of the mine for
storage and future processing. Shaft 9 and the eastern
portion of the mine remain connected with the
western portion of the mine via the Never Sweat
Tunnel.
¶16 Resolution uses Shaft 10 to explore and study the
Eastern Deposit, ventilate and dewater the
underground workings, and transport supplies. Shaft
10 also provides another point of entry and exit for
individuals working at the mine. Resolution has not
APP-6
used Shaft 10 or other new features for the
commercial extraction of copper ore from the Eastern
Deposit. Resolution uses preexisting infrastructure at
the mine to support Shaft 10's functions. Resolution's
operation requires it to control stormwater and other
water used in the mining process, as well as remove
groundwater from the underground *1101 workings
of the mine through dewatering. To accomplish this,
Resolution drains water from Shaft 9 to the base of
Shaft 10 and then pumps the water up to and through
the Never Sweat Tunnel to the western portion of the
mine. From there, it is combined with water that has
been collected from Shaft 8, which is used to dewater
the western portion of the mine. Then, Resolution
sends all combined water west to the water treatment
plant for treatment and storage.3
¶17 According to Resolution's General Plan of
Operations, after water is treated at the water
treatment plant, Resolution will attempt to reuse the
water internally for ore processing, dust suppression,
equipment washing, drinking water, cooling, or fire
protection. In the event of excess treated water,
Resolution has a contract with the New Magma
Irrigation and Drainage District, thirty miles
southwest of the mine, to pipe that water to the
irrigation district. If the irrigation district does not
have capacity, Resolution is authorized to pipe the
treated water into a tributary that flows into Queen
Creek. To date, however, Resolution has not
discharged any water into Queen Creek; instead, it
has sent all excess treated water to the irrigation
district. Although circumstances could change,
Resolution intends to continue sending its treated
water to the irrigation district, rather than
discharging it into Queen Creek.
APP-7
¶18 Many of the originally constructed shafts and
tunnels are no longer in operation or accessible. But
Shaft 6 is used to ventilate the Never Sweat Tunnel.
And, as noted, Shafts 8 and 9 and the Never Sweat
Tunnel remain in use, and Resolution plans to
continue their use. Resolution may use other
preexisting shafts in the future, but not other tunnels.
¶19 Resolution's plan is to access the Eastern Deposit
using a technique called panel caving. This method
involves cutting the rock underneath the ore deposit,
removing its ability to support the overlying rock
material and causing it to collapse into a collection
zone. As the ore is extracted from the bottom of the
mine, the deposit will continue to collapse in on itself,
thereby continuing to replenish the extractable ore.
Occurring entirely underground, a series of
conveyors, rail lines, tunnels, hoists, and other
equipment will then transport the ore from beneath
the deposit up and to the western portion of the mine
for storage and processing. This method differs from
that previously implemented at the mine through the
use of adits and tunnels. See Development
Document, supra, at 29–30 (describing an “adit” as a
“passageway or opening driven horizontally into the
side of a hill generally for the purpose of exploring or
otherwise opening a mineral deposit,” and it “is open
to the atmosphere at one end”); see also Development
Document, supra, at 557.
B. The Distinction Between A “New Source” And
“Existing Source”
¶20 We must determine whether Resolution's sinking
of Shaft 10 created a “new source” under the CWA.
The CWA treats “new sources” differently from
“existing
sources.” See 40
C.F.R.
§
122.29(a)(3) (“Existing source means any source
which is not a new source or a new discharger.”). A
APP-8
“new source” is subject to the CWA's new source
performance
standards. See 33
U.S.C.
§
1316(a)(1) (defining “standard of performance” as “a
standard for the control of the discharge of pollutants
which reflects the greatest degree of effluent
reduction which [the EPA] determines to be
achievable through application of the best available
demonstrated
control
technology,
processes,
operating methods, or other alternatives, including,
where practicable, a standard permitting no
discharge of pollutants”); see also Ore Mining and
Dressing Point Source Category Effluent Limitations
Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards,
47 Fed. Reg. 54598–600 (Dec. 3, 1982) (referring to
the standards as “new source performance
standards”).
*1102 ¶21 “The classification of a facility as a new or
existing source is important because under the CWA
existing sources are subject to best available
technology (BAT) and best conventional technology
(BCT) requirements, while new sources are subject to
the generally more stringent new source performance
standards ... under section 306 of the CWA.”
NPDES Permit Regulations, 49 Fed. Reg. 37998,
38043 (Sept. 26, 1984). The distinction between a
“new source” and an “existing source” “is based on the
concept that new facilities have the opportunity to
install the best and most efficient production
processes
and
wastewater
treatment
technologies.” Id.
C. Water Discharge Permits
¶22 Since the CWA began requiring discharge
permits, all past and present owners of the mine have
obtained the necessary permit and permit renewals to
discharge water from the mine. The permit renewal
at issue here is the “Authorization to Discharge under
APP-9
the Arizona Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System,” which ADEQ issued to Resolution on
January 19, 2017 (Permit No. AZ0020389) (the “2017
Permit Renewal”). The 2017 Permit Renewal became
effective on January 23, 2017 and expired on January
22, 2022.
¶23 The 2017 Permit Renewal subjected Resolution to
certain requirements for purposes of complying with
the CWA's water quality standards. If Resolution
complied with such requirements, the 2017 Permit
Renewal authorized Resolution
to discharge mine site stormwater
runoff from Outfall 001 and treated mine
water, industrial water and seepage
pumping from Outfall 002 from the
Superior Operations in Pinal County,
Arizona to an unnamed wash, tributary
to Queen Creek in the Middle Gila River
Basin ... in accordance with discharge
limitations, monitoring requirements
and other conditions set forth herein,
and in the attached “Standard [Arizona
Pollutant
Discharge
Elimination
System] Permit Conditions.”
¶24 As noted, the 2017 Permit Renewal authorized
the discharge of waters “to an unnamed wash,
tributary to Queen Creek in the Middle Gila River
Basin.” Queen Creek has been designated an
“impaired
waterway”
due
to
the
levels
of copper present
in
it. See 33
U.S.C.
§
1313(d)(1)(C) (requiring states to identify waters that
do not meet water quality standards and establish for
those waters a “total maximum daily load ... at a level
necessary to implement the applicable water quality
standards”); see also 40 C.F.R. § 131.31(b); Ariz.
Admin. Code tit. 18, ch. 11, art. 1, app. B. ADEQ's
APP-10
2017 Permit Renewal subjected Resolution to effluent
limitations for copper that are more stringent than
federal
new
source
performance
standards
for copper. See 40 C.F.R. § 440.104.
D. Procedural History
¶25 The San Carlos Apache Tribe (the “Tribe”)
challenged ADEQ's issuance of the 2017 Permit
Renewal with the Arizona Water Quality Appeals
Board (the “Board”). The Tribe claimed that the
construction of Shaft 10 and other new features
created a “new source,” 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.2, 122.29(b),
rather than an “existing source,” 40 C.F.R. §
122.29(a)(3), under the CWA. The Tribe maintained
that, as a “new source,” Shaft 10 needed to satisfy
additional provisions of the CWA before ADEQ could
properly issue a permit renewal.
¶26 An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) from the
office of administrative hearings conducted a sevenday hearing and issued findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The ALJ determined that ADEQ
generally did not act arbitrarily and capriciously
when it issued the 2017 Permit Renewal, but ADEQ
should have first analyzed whether Shaft 10 and the
other new features were a “new source” under §
122.29(b). The ALJ, therefore, concluded that “the
matter should be remanded to ADEQ to allow it to
conduct an analysis as required by 40 C.F.R. §
122.29(b).”
¶27 In response to the ALJ's decision, the Board
entered an order remanding the matter to ADEQ to
conduct a “new source” analysis. ADEQ did so and
concluded that Shaft 10 and the new features were
“existing sources” (not “new sources”) under the CWA.
The Board issued a final administrative decision,
which adopted all the ALJ's *1103 findings of fact and
APP-11
affirmed ADEQ's issuance of the 2017 Permit
Renewal.
¶28 The Tribe appealed the Board's decision to the
superior court under A.R.S. § 12-905. The superior
court affirmed the Board's decision, concluding that
Shaft 10 and the new features did not constitute a
“new source” under the CWA.
¶29 The court of appeals reversed the superior court
in a split opinion. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. State,
254 Ariz. 179, 193 ¶ 61, 195 ¶ 72, 520 P.3d 670, 684,
686 (App. 2022). The majority concluded that “[t]he
CWA treats the new mine shaft as a ‘new source’
because it is substantially independent of the noncontiguous original deposit at the mining site.” Id. at
183 ¶ 1, 520 P.3d at 674. Thus, Shaft 10 “is a new
source and Resolution's mining site is subject to [new
source performance standards] under 40 C.F.R. §
440.104(a).” Id. at 193 ¶ 61, 520 P.3d at 684. The
majority also determined that because Shaft 10 is a
“new source” and Queen Creek is an “impaired
waterway,” ADEQ may not renew Resolution's
discharge permit until (1) ADEQ finalizes a total
maximum daily load plan for Resolution's discharge
of water into Queen Creek, and (2) Resolution
demonstrates other requirements prescribed in 40
C.F.R. § 122.4(i). Id. at 183 ¶¶ 2, 4, 193 ¶¶ 62–63, 520
P.3d at 674, 684.
¶30 The dissent disagreed with the order in which the
majority approached the CWA regulations for the
“new source” determination, explaining that the
regulations should be evaluated “in the order they are
presented in the text of the regulation.” Id. at 197–98
¶¶ 74–76, 520 P.3d at 688–89 (Paton, J., dissenting).
Conducting the analysis in that order, the dissent
concluded that “Shaft 10 is not a new source that
would require ADEQ to issue [a total maximum daily
APP-12
load plan] before permitting discharge from Shaft
10.” Id. at 202 ¶ 99, 520 P.3d at 693.
¶31 We granted review because this case presents an
issue of statewide importance. Although the 2017
Permit Renewal has expired, the issue presented is
one that is likely to arise again and evade review. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of
the Arizona Constitution.
II. DISCUSSION
¶32 “We interpret statutes and administrative rules
de novo, ‘apply[ing] the same rules in construing both
statutes and rules.’ ” Saguaro Healing LLC v. State,
249 Ariz. 362, 364 ¶ 10, 470 P.3d 636, 638
(2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Gutierrez v.
Indus. Comm'n, 226 Ariz. 395, 396 ¶ 5, 249 P.3d 1095,
1096 (2011)). “We do not defer to the agency's
interpretation of a rule or statute.” Id. We “affirm the
agency action unless the court concludes that the
agency's action is contrary to law, is not supported by
substantial evidence, is arbitrary and capricious or is
an abuse of discretion.” A.R.S. § 12-910(F).
A. What Is The Test For Determining Whether A
Construction Is A “New Source” Under The
CWA?
¶33 In 1972, Congress passed the CWA with the
“objective ... to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). The CWA prohibits the
“addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from
any point source” without a permit. 33 U.S.C. §
1362(12)(A); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); 40 C.F.R. §
122.1(b)(1). The CWA also requires the EPA to
establish “standards of performance” for “new
sources” from which there are or may be discharges of
APP-13
pollutants for
1316(b)(1)(B).
certain
industries. 33
U.S.C.
§
¶34 The Tribe claims that Shaft 10 is a “new source”
under the CWA. According to the Tribe, this
designation matters because Queen Creek is an
“impaired waterway” and the CWA regulations
provide:
No permit may be issued ... [t]o a new
source ... if the discharge from its
construction or operation will cause or
contribute to the violation of water
quality standards. The owner or operator
of a new source ... proposing to discharge
into a water segment which does not
meet applicable water quality standards
or is not expected to meet those
standards even after the application of
the effluent limitations required by ...
[the] CWA, and for which the State or
interstate agency has performed a
pollutants load allocation for *1104 the
pollutant to be discharged, must
demonstrate ... that: (1) There are
sufficient remaining pollutant load
allocations to allow for the discharge;
and (2) The existing dischargers into
that segment are subject to compliance
schedules designed to bring the segment
into compliance with applicable water
quality standards.
40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i). The Tribe maintains that the
2017 Permit Renewal was improper because ADEQ
issued it before a copper total maximum daily load for
Queen Creek was finalized and before Resolution met
its burden under § 122.4(i)(1) and (2). Conversely,
Resolution and ADEQ contend that Shaft 10 is not a
APP-14
“new source” that would trigger these requirements,
and therefore ADEQ properly issued the 2017 Permit
Renewal.
¶35 At the outset, we must determine the proper
framework for determining whether a construction is
a “new source” under the CWA.4 Section
122.29(b) provides the “[c]riteria for new source
determination.” We agree with the court of appeals’
dissent that we should “approach the CWA
regulations in the order they are presented in the text
of the regulation.” San Carlos Apache Tribe, 254 Ariz.
at 197 ¶ 74, 520 P.3d at 688; see also Antonin Scalia
& Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation
of Legal Texts 167 (2012) (discussing the “whole-text
canon” that “calls on the judicial interpreter to
consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of
the physical and logical relation of its many parts”).
¶36 Section 122.29(b)(1) begins: “Except as otherwise
provided in an applicable new source performance
standard, a source is a ‘new source’ if it meets the
definition of ‘new source’ in § 122.2.” See also 40
C.F.R. § 122.29(a)(1) (providing that “[n]ew source” is
“defined
in §
122.2”).
Therefore,
the
test first examines the definition of “new source” in §
122.2, which states:
New source means any building,
structure, facility, or installation from
which there is or may be a “discharge of
pollutants,” the construction of which
commenced: (a) After promulgation of
standards of performance under section
306 of CWA which are applicable to such
source, or (b) After proposal of standards
of performance in accordance with
section 306 of CWA which are applicable
to such source, but only if the standards
APP-15
are promulgated in accordance with
section 306 within 120 days of their
proposal.
See also 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(3) (defining “source” as
“any building, structure, facility, or installation from
which there is or may be the discharge of
pollutants”); 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(a)(2) (same); 33
U.S.C. § 1316(a)(2) (“The term ‘new source’ means any
source, the construction of which is commenced after
the publication of proposed regulations prescribing a
standard of performance under this section which will
be applicable to such source, if such standard is
thereafter promulgated in accordance with this
section.”).
¶37 If
that
provision
is
satisfied, §
122.29(b)(1) instructs that we next evaluate the three
criteria in § 122.29(b)(1)(i)–(iii):
[A] source is a “new source” if it meets
the definition of “new source” in §
122.2, and (i) It is constructed at a site at
which no other source is located; or (ii) It
totally replaces the process or production
equipment that causes the discharge of
pollutants at an existing source; or (iii)
Its
processes
are
substantially
independent of an existing source at the
same site.
40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(1) (emphasis added); see
also Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 568
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (explaining that the new source
performance standards apply “only to sources that
meet the ‘new source’ definition in 40 C.F.R. §
122.2, as well as one of the following three criteria”
in § 122.29(b)(1)(i)–(iii)).
APP-16
¶38 If those provisions are satisfied, the “new source”
test concludes with an evaluation *1105 of §
122.29(b)(2): “A source meeting the requirements of
paragraphs (b)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section is a new
source only if a new source performance standard is
independently applicable to it. If there is no such
independently applicable standard, the source is a
new discharger. See § 122.2.”5
¶39 The “new source” test, therefore, begins with the
broadest criteria—identifying both the general
physical characteristics of the construction (whether
it is a “building, structure, facility, or installation”)
and when its construction commenced. See 40 C.F.R.
§§ 122.2, 122.29(b)(1). The test then evaluates
additional criteria that are narrower in scope (e.g., the
source's relationship with other features where the
source is located). See 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(1)(i)–
(iii), (b)(2). See also Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 286 F.3d at
568 (“If new construction does not satisfy 40 C.F.R. §
122.2 and one of the three criteria set forth in 40
C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(1), then the construction is
generally classified as a ‘modification’ and is not
subject to the [new source performance standards].”).
¶40 Accordingly, the following three-step test should
be used to determine whether a construction is a “new
source” under the CWA:
1. Step One: Does the construction
meet the definition of “new source”
under 40 C.F.R. § 122.2? 40 C.F.R. §
122.29(b)(1); see
also 33
U.S.C.
§
1316(a)(2), (3).
a. Has there been a construction of a
building,
structure,
facility,
or
installation from which there is or may
be the discharge of pollutants? 40 C.F.R.
APP-17
§
122.2; see
also 33
U.S.C.
1316(a)(3); 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(a)(2).
§
b. Has construction commenced? 40
C.F.R. § 122.2; see also 33 U.S.C. §
1316(a)(2).
c. Did construction commence after
the promulgation (or proposal) of
standards of performance under section
306 of the CWA that are applicable to
such source? 40 C.F.R. § 122.2; see
also 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(2).
If the answer to any subpart is no, the
construction is not a new source.
2. Step Two: If the answer to all
subparts of step one is yes, does the
construction meet any of the following
definitions of a “new source” in 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.29(b)(1)?
a. Is the construction at a site at
which no other source is located? 40
C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(1)(i).
b. Does the construction totally
replace the process or production
equipment that causes the discharge of
pollutants at an existing source? 40
C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(1)(ii).
c. Are its processes substantially
independent of an existing source at the
same site? 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(1)(iii).
If the answer to all subparts is no, the
construction is not a new source.
3. Step Three: If the answer to all
subparts of step one and any subpart of
step two is yes, is there a new source
APP-18
performance
standard
that
“independently applicable” to
source? 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(2).
is
the
a. If yes, the source is a new
source. Id.
b. If no, the source is not a new
source. Id.
This three-step test is consistent with the text and
sequence of the “criteria for new source
determination” expressly set forth in § 122.29(b). See,
e.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 286 F.3d at 568.
B. Is Shaft 10 A “New Source” Under The ThreeStep Test?
¶41 We must now apply the three-step test to
determine whether Shaft 10 is a “new source” under
the CWA.
*1106 1. Step One
a. Is Shaft 10 a building, structure, facility, or
installation from which there is or may be a
discharge of pollutants?
¶42 The Board found that Shaft 10 and other mine
features are “facilities” under § 122.2. In this Court,
the parties do not dispute that Shaft 10 is a “building,
structure, facility, or installation from which there is
or may be a ‘discharge of pollutants.’ ” See 40 C.F.R. §
122.2; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(3); 40 C.F.R. §
122.29(a)(2). Copper effluent is a pollutant under the
CWA. 40 C.F.R. § 401.15(22).
b. Has construction of Shaft 10 commenced?
¶43 It is undisputed that construction of Shaft 10 has
commenced. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2; see also 33 U.S.C.
§ 1316(a)(2).
APP-19
c. What was
construction?
the
timing
of
Shaft
10's
¶44 The final issue at step one is whether the
construction of Shaft 10 commenced after the
promulgation (or proposal) of standards of
performance under “section 306 of CWA which are
applicable to such source.” See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2; see
also 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(2).
¶45 We begin by determining the meaning of
“applicable to such source”—does “such source” refer
to the mine or to the new construction at issue? We do
not interpret this specific text in isolation, but instead
read it within the context of the CWA “new source”
criteria. See Columbus Life Ins. v. Wilmington Tr.,
N.A., 255 Ariz. 382, 385 ¶ 11, 532 P.3d 757, 760
(2023) (stating that we “determine the plain meaning
of the words the legislature chose to use, viewed in
their broader statutory context”); Silver v. Pueblo Del
Sol Water Co., 244 Ariz. 553, 558 ¶ 16, 423 P.3d 348,
353 (2018) (“We interpret agency regulations
according to principles of statutory construction.”); see
also Scalia & Garner, supra, at 167 (explaining that
courts must interpret a statute's plain language in
context because “[c]ontext is a primary determinant of
meaning”).
¶46 There are noteworthy differences in the text of
the “new source” criteria that assist in our
interpretation. Step one considers whether new
source performance standards “are applicable to such
source.” See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (emphasis added); see
also 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(2). Step three provides that
“[a] source ... is a new source only if a new source
performance standard is independently applicable to
it.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(2) (emphasis added). We
cannot ignore the text of “independently applicable”
at step three when determining the meaning of
APP-20
“applicable” at step one. See Columbus Life Ins., 255
Ariz. at 385 ¶ 11, 532 P.3d at 760 (noting “we view ‘the
statute as a whole’ to ‘give meaningful operation to all
of its provisions’ ” (quoting Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 167
Ariz. 281, 284, 806 P.2d 870, 873 (1991))); Silver, 244
Ariz. at 558 ¶ 16, 423 P.3d at 353.
45¶47 This textual distinction reveals that
“applicable to such source” at step one addresses
whether a new source performance standard is
applicable to the mine. And “independently applicable
to” the source at step three addresses whether a new
source performance standard applies independently
to the shaft. This interpretation gives meaning to each
term and ensures that the criteria in step one and step
three are not redundant. See State v. Eddington, 228
Ariz. 361, 363 ¶ 9, 266 P.3d 1057, 1059 (2011) (“[I]f
the terms mean the same thing, then one subsection
is redundant, and we generally construe statutes so
that no part is rendered redundant or
meaningless.”); see also Scalia & Garner, supra, at
174 (stating that no provision “should needlessly be
given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate
another provision or have no consequence”).
¶48 Moreover, this interpretation that step one
addresses general applicability to the mine is
consistent with the fact that the “new source” test
begins with the broadest criteria at step one. See Part
II(A) ¶ 39. The subsequent steps evaluate criteria that
are narrower in scope. Id.
¶49 Next, we must identify (1) when the construction
of Shaft 10 commenced, and (2) when the new source
performance standards were promulgated that would
be applicable to Shaft 10 as part of the
regulated copper *1107 mine. See 40
C.F.R.
§
122.2; 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(2). And finally, we must
determine whether the construction of Shaft 10
APP-21
commenced after the promulgation of the new source
performance standards that would be applicable to
Shaft 10 as part of the regulated copper mine. Id.
6¶50 Resolution began developing and sinking Shaft
10 between 2007 and 2009. The EPA promulgated the
new source performance standards for the Ore Mining
and Dressing Point Source Category on December 3,
1982. See Ore Mining and Dressing Point Source
Category Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New
Source Performance Standards, 47 Fed. Reg. at
54598–621; see also 40 C.F.R. § 440.100(a)(1) (stating
that provisions in Subpart J of Part 440 for Ore
Mining and Dressing Point Source Category are
applicable to “discharges from ... [m]ines that
produce copper” by “open-pit or underground
operations”); 40 C.F.R. §§ 440.100 to .105 (providing
effluent limitation guidelines for certain mines and
mills).6 The construction of Shaft 10 commenced after
the promulgation of new source performance
standards that are applicable to Shaft 10 as part of
the regulated copper mine. Therefore, step one of the
“new source” test is met.
2. Step Two
¶51 In order to meet step two, one of the three criteria
in § 122.29(b)(1)(i)–(iii) must apply to Shaft 10. Here,
we only consider the applicability of one subsection: §
122.29(b)(1)(iii) (evaluating whether “[i]ts processes
are substantially independent of an existing source at
the same site”). We accepted review on §
122.29(b)(1)(iii), which was presented in ADEQ's
petition for review. Further, the Tribe's briefing in
this Court focused on whether Shaft 10 met the
criteria in § 122.29(b)(1)(iii). The Tribe did not
develop an argument under § 122.29(b)(1)(i) or (ii).
Accordingly, we decline to consider whether §
122.29(b)(1)(i) or (ii) are satisfied. See State v.
APP-22
Johnson, 247 Ariz. 166, 180 ¶ 13, 447 P.3d 783, 797
(2019) (declining to consider an argument that a party
failed to develop).7
¶52 Section 122.29(b)(1)(iii) requires us to determine
whether Shaft 10's “processes are substantially
independent of an existing source at the same site.”
As § 122.29(b)(1)(iii) instructs, “[i]n determining
whether
these
processes
are
substantially
independent, the Director shall consider such factors
as the extent to which the new facility is integrated
with the existing plant; and the extent to which the
new facility is engaged in the same general type of
activity as the existing source.”
a. To what extent is the new facility integrated
with the existing plant?
¶53 The record demonstrates that Shaft 10 is
integrated with existing sources and operations of the
mine. Shaft 10 works with existing infrastructure,
including Shaft 9 and the Never Sweat Tunnel, to
ventilate and dewater the underground workings of
the mine.
¶54 The “management of mine drainage is an
integral part of most mining systems.” Ore Mining
and Dressing Point Source Category; Effluent
Limitations Guidelines and New Source Performance
Standards, 47 Fed. Reg. 25682, 25684 (June 14, 1982).
Without proper mine drainage management, water
will flood the mine's underground workings and
disrupt operations. See id. at 25685 (“Water is a
natural feature that interferes with mining
activities.”). To that end, Resolution drains water
from Shaft 9 to the base of Shaft 10, pumps the water
up to and through the Never Sweat Tunnel, combines
that water with water collected from Shaft 8, and
sends the water west to the water treatment plant for
APP-23
treatment and storage. Resolution has integrated
these functions of Shafts 8, 9, *1108 and 10 and the
Never Sweat Tunnel. Shaft 10 depends on existing
infrastructure to serve the essential functions of
ventilation and dewatering, which it does not do
independently.
¶55 The Tribe claims that “Shaft 10 is not integrated
into prior operations; those facilities are integrated
into Shaft 10.” But § 122.29(b)(1)(iii) does not draw
this fine distinction. Instead, it expressly provides
that we consider “the extent to which the new facility
is integrated with the existing plant.” 40 C.F.R. §
122.29(b)(1)(iii). And the record here demonstrates
that Shaft 10 is materially integrated with existing
infrastructure for purposes of performing the
essential functions of ventilating and dewatering
underground workings, which are necessary for the
continued pursuit of copper ore. There is no evidence
that Shaft 10 alone can ventilate and dewater the
underground workings in the manner necessary for
exploration and extraction of copper ore at the mine.
Shaft 10 is integrated with existing features of the
mine for its proper functioning. And the mere fact
that Resolution extended the Never Sweat Tunnel
does not change this determination. Shaft 10 is also
substantially integrated with Shaft 9, which provides
further support for the integrated workings. Thus,
existing features and Shaft 10 facilitate the continued
and integrated workings necessary for the pursuit
of copper ore.
¶56 The Tribe points to a provision in the Federal
Register where the EPA notes that “a minor change”
to a process (like “a new purification step”) does not
make a facility a “new source”; but “if the only
connection between the new and old facility is that
they are supplied utilities such as steam, electricity,
APP-24
or cooling water from the same source or that their
wastewater effluents are treated in the same
treatment plant, then the new facility will be a new
source.” See NPDES Permit Regulations, 49 Fed. Reg.
at 38043. This provision does not support Shaft 10
being a “new source” in this case. Shaft 10 is
integrated with existing infrastructure—the Never
Sweat Tunnel and Shaft 9—to provide ventilation and
dewatering, which are essential components of the
mining process. These interconnected systems of
ventilation and drainage are essential physical
features of the mine structure. Thus, the integration
here materially differs from a situation where
the only connection between facilities is that “they are
supplied utilities ... from the same source” or that
their water is “treated in the same treatment
plant.” Id.
b. To what extent is the new facility engaged in
the same general type of activity as the existing
source?
¶57 We now consider the extent to which Shaft 10 “is
engaged in the same general type of activity as the
existing source.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(1)(iii). Shaft 10
supports the ventilation and dewatering of
underground workings, which are necessary for the
exploration, study, and extraction of copper ore.
These are the same general types of activities as the
existing source (i.e., the original workings of the mine
that also supported ventilation and dewatering).
¶58 The Tribe argues that Shaft 10's activity is
different from prior activity at the existing mine. In
particular, the Tribe claims that dewatering Shaft 10
will be independent of the dewatering that previously
took place at a different point of extraction; the mine
has not been used to excavate copper ore for a period
of time; and Resolution plans to extract from a new,
APP-25
untouched ore body using a different mining
technique (panel caving) that will produce lower
grade copper ore and increase the amount of ore
production.
¶59 But these arguments miss the mark. The issue is
whether Shaft 10 “is engaged in the same general type
of activity as the existing source.” 40 C.F.R. §
122.29(b)(1)(iii) (emphasis added). It is not focused on
the specific manner by which “the same general type
of activity as the existing source” is conducted, such
as a precise mining technique, volume of production,
time period, or location. See also NPDES Permit
Regulations, 49 Fed. Reg. at 38044 (noting there is not
a new source “if a facility increases capacity merely by
adding additional equipment in one or two production
steps”). Here, the historical mining operation in
existence for over a century sunk new shafts and
provided the ventilation and dewatering necessary to
discover,
study,
and
extract
new
bodies *1109 of copper ore as the mine expanded in
an eastward direction. Shaft 10 is engaged in that
“same general type of activity”—providing ventilation
and dewatering necessary to discover, study, and at
some point extract copper ore (i.e., copper mining). 40
C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(1)(iii); see also NPDES Permit
Regulations, 49 Fed. Reg. at 38044 (“The second
clarifying factor that EPA has added is the extent to
which the construction results in facilities or
processes that are engaged in the same general type
of activity as the existing source. Under this second
factor, if the proposed facility is engaged in a
sufficiently similar type of activity as the existing
source, it will not be treated as a new source.”).
¶60 The Tribe also points to the following language
from the EPA's guidance: “Of course, to the extent the
construction results in facilities engaged in the same
APP-26
type of activity because it essentially replicates,
without replacing, the existing source, the new
construction would result in a new source.”
NPDES Permit Regulations, 49 Fed. Reg. at 38044.
But Resolution's sinking of a new shaft 300 feet from
Shaft 9 to pursue more ore does not “replicate” the
existing source. This is unlike the situation described
in the Federal Register where “a power company
builds a new, but identical and completely separate
power generation unit at the site of a similar existing
unit,” in which case “the new unit will be a new
source.” Id. Resolution constructed Shaft 10 and the
mine's other new features to mine copper ore adjacent
to the copper-ore deposits that were exhausted. There
is no “replication” in this case where those ore
deposits were exhausted. Merely pursuing a new ore
deposit in a mining area (as mines often do) does not
make a construction a “new source” by default—
instead, the “new source” criteria must be evaluated.
¶61 A construction is not a “new source” if it
merely could operate substantially independently of
the existing facility. The focus is on whether it
actually does operate
substantially
independently. See id. (noting the EPA's agreement
that it “should consider whether the new
facility actually operates substantially independently
of the existing facility, not whether it could operate
substantially independently” (emphasis added)). The
record does not establish that Shaft 10 does anything
on its own. It is instead fully integrated into the
mining process.
¶62 Ultimately, § 122.29(b)(1)(iii) requires us to
determine whether Shaft 10's “processes are
substantially independent of an existing source at the
same site.” “Site” is broadly defined as “the land or
water area where any ‘facility or activity’ is physically
APP-27
located or conducted, including adjacent land used in
connection with the facility or activity.” 40 C.F.R. §
122.2. Shaft 10, the mine water treatment plant, and
the other new features, such as the cooling tower, rock
stockpiles, and wash bays, are included in and
integrated into the same “site.” With Shaft 10 being
just 300 feet from Shaft 9, Resolution will continue
operating in the area where copper-ore mining
previously took place within the confines of an earlier
permit renewal.
¶63 We agree with ADEQ's explanation in its “new
source” analysis: “The new features added to the mine
are supporting the same process that has always
existed at the site, which is extracting ore by any
means or methods. Therefore, there are no processes
that are substantially independent of the existing
process to extract ore.” The record before us supports
this determination. Shaft 10 does not meet the
criteria in § 122.29(b)(1)(iii), and it therefore fails to
meet the definition of “new source” at step two.
3. Step Three
¶64 Although we conclude that Shaft 10 is not a “new
source” at step two, we proceed to apply the remainder
of the test at step three to clarify this issue of
statewide importance.
¶65 Section 122.29(b)(2) provides that “[a] source
meeting the requirements of paragraphs (b)(1)(i), (ii),
or (iii) of this section is a new source only if a new
source performance standard is independently
applicable to it.” Thus, step three requires us to
consider whether a new source performance standard
is “independently applicable” to Shaft 10. In essence,
this step differentiates between a *1110 “new source”
and a “new discharger,” because “[i]f there is no such
APP-28
independently applicable standard, the source is a
new discharger.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(2).
¶66 The CWA sets forth new source performance
standards that apply to “discharges from ... [m]ines
that produce copper.” 40 C.F.R. § 440.100(a)(1); see
also 40 C.F.R. § 440.104(a) (explaining that the
effluent limitations in the new source performance
standards apply to “pollutants discharged in mine
drainage from mines that produce copper”). The CWA
does not provide a new source performance standard
for a single “shaft.” But the Tribe argues that Shaft 10
is “in and of itself a mine” under the CWA.
¶67 A “mine” is “an active mining area, including all
land and property placed under, or above the surface
of such land, used in or resulting from the work of
extracting metal ore or minerals from their natural
deposits by any means or method.” 40 C.F.R. §
440.132(g). “ ‘Active mining area’ is a place where
work or other activity related to the extraction,
removal, or recovery of metal ore is being conducted
....” 40 C.F.R. § 440.132(a).
¶68 These definitional provisions describe a “mine”
as a broader geographic area made up of “all land and
property” used in or resulting from the work of
extracting ore by any means or method.8 See All,
Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/all (last
visited June 10, 2024) (defining “all” as “the whole
amount, quantity, or extent of; as much as possible;
every member or individual component of; the whole
number or sum of”). The descriptions of “all land and
property” and “a place where work or other activity
related to the extraction, removal, or recovery of metal
ore is being conducted” include Shafts 9 and 10, the
Never Sweat Tunnel, and other features that work
together to ventilate and dewater the underground
APP-29
workings necessary for Resolution to explore the
Eastern Deposit and extract copper ore. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 440.132(a), (g) (emphasis added). These provisions
do not describe a single shaft which “is the surface
opening
to
the
mine.” See
Development
Document, supra, at 49–50.
¶69 The Tribe claims that “Resolution will use Shaft
10 to extract copper ore from an untouched ore body.”
Resolution, however, asserts that “Shaft 10 would be
used for dewatering and ventilation, not to remove
ore.” The Tribe has not introduced any evidence to
support a finding that Resolution plans to excavate or
remove copper ore in the Eastern Deposit from Shaft
10. According to Resolution's General Plan of
Operations, in the event of future ore extraction, two
new shafts “will be production shafts dedicated to
hoisting ore and other rock material from the Mine”—
these will be Shafts 11 and 12. The Plan of Operations
does not state that Shaft 10 will be used for ore
extraction. Thus, we cannot speculate about such
alleged future use of Shaft 10. But even if Shaft 10 is
at some point used to extract a new ore deposit, this
does not automatically make it a “new source.” The
CWA's “new source” criteria applicable to mines could
have stated that a construction used to extract a new
ore deposit is a “new source.” But the CWA does not
take this rigid approach. Instead, when ADEQ
considers a discharge permit renewal, it must
consider each step of the “new source” criteria and the
evidence relevant to each step during the applicable
time period.
¶70 The ALJ's findings of fact—which the parties do
not challenge here—include testimony describing
Shaft 10 as a structure “related to the extraction,
removal or recovery of metal ore.”9 Shaft 10 is not
drilled directly into an ore body; it works with other
APP-30
features to conduct activities related to ventilating
and dewatering underground workings. It is therefore
a component of the mine and is not itself a “mine”
under § 440.132(g).
*1111 ¶71 Shaft 10 does not have a new source
performance standard “independently applicable” to
it. See, e.g., Mahelona v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 418 F.
Supp. 1328, 1335 (D. Haw. 1976) (“[W]hile there are
standards of performance governing steam electric
generating plants, there are no regulations applicable
solely to discharge facilities.” (internal citation
omitted)). Because Shaft 10 does not meet step three
of the “new source” test, for this additional reason, it
is not a “new source” under the CWA. See 40 C.F.R. §
122.29(b)(2).
III. CONCLUSION
¶72 We vacate paragraphs 1–20 and 30–72 of the
court of appeals’ opinion.10 We affirm the superior
court's decision that Shaft 10 is not a “new source” and
that ADEQ acted within its discretion by issuing the
2017 Permit Renewal to Resolution.
Footnotes
1
Resolution plans to extend Shaft 9 to about the same
depth as Shaft 10 at some point.
2
Resolution also has plans to build a concentrator at
the western portion of the mine, as well as another
tunnel connecting the western and eastern portions of
the mine.
3
APP-31
Resolution also captures stormwater runoff using a
channeling system that diverts the water to a specific
area. From there, it can be pumped to another location
for evaporation or to the water treatment plant. The
main source of water sent to the water treatment
plant is from dewatering the underground mine
workings, but small volumes of industrial water and
stormwater are sent as well.
4
The federal CWA statutes and regulations at issue
here may have a corresponding state statute or
regulation due to implementation of the Arizona
Pollutant
Discharge
Elimination
System
Program. See, e.g., Ariz. Admin. Code R18-9A905(A)(1)(e) (incorporating by reference 40 C.F.R. §
122.29 (“New sources and new dischargers”) for the
Arizona Program Standards). In this Court, however,
the parties exclusively relied upon federal statutes
and regulations rather than citing any corresponding
state statute or regulation. Thus, we cite to the federal
provisions. No party has challenged the validity,
enforceability, or applicability of the CWA
regulations.
5
As the ALJ noted, the Tribe originally contended
Resolution developed a “new discharger” but later
withdrew that allegation and presented no
substantial evidence on the issue. We were not asked
to determine whether Shaft 10 is a “new discharger”
under the CWA, see, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (providing
a definition of “new discharger”). We therefore do not
address that issue or any requirement applicable to a
“new discharger.”
6
APP-32
At step one, we do not determine whether Shaft 10 is
itself a “mine” because new source performance
standards are applicable to copper mines in Subpart
J, 40 C.F.R. §§ 440.100 to .105.
7
The Tribe suggests that this “Court might remand for
a determination of whether Shaft 10 totally replaces
the prior mine(s) under subsection (b)(1)(ii).” We will
not do so for the reasons stated. But even if we were
inclined to do so, any remand would be futile because
we conclude that the “new source” test fails at both
steps two and three, see Part II(B)(2), (3) ¶¶ 63, 71.
8
The fact that a new mining method will be used for
the Eastern Deposit—panel caving—does not change
the analysis because the definition of “mine” includes
extraction “by any means or method.” 40 C.F.R. §
440.132(g).
9
The court of appeals explained that “the Tribe did not
challenge any specific factual determinations below”
and “[g]iven the parties have not raised any factual
issues on appeal, we need not resolve any questions of
fact.” San Carlos Apache Tribe, 254 Ariz. at 186 ¶ 28,
520 P.3d at 677. The same is true in this Court.
10
Paragraphs 21–29 address issues of mootness,
timeliness, and deference to factual determinations
below that no party challenged before this Court.
APP-33
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. State of Arizona
(SCAT I), 254 Ariz. 179, 520 P.3d 670 (App. Nov.
15, 2022).
Vice Chief Judge David B. Gass delivered the opinion
of the court, in which Presiding Judge Paul J.
McMurdie joined. Judge Angela K. Paton dissented.
OPINION
GASS, Vice Chief Judge:
*183 **674 ¶1 San Carlos Apache Tribe (the Tribe)
argues Resolution Copper Mining LLC's (Resolution)
copper-mining site is a new source under the Clean
Water Act (CWA) because Resolution recently sank
shaft 10. The CWA treats the new mine shaft as a
“new source” because it is substantially independent
of the non-contiguous original deposit at the mining
site. In short, Resolution radically changed the nature
of its existing mining site when it added the new mine
shaft—a 7,000-foot-deep shaft designed to use a
different mining technique to access a previously
untouched,
massive copper ore
deposit
that
Resolution predicts will “supply more than 25% of
America's demand for [copper] over the next 40
years.”
¶2 As a result, before the Arizona Department of
Environmental Quality (ADEQ) issues a permit to
allow Resolution to operate the new mine shaft,
ADEQ must adopt Total Maximum Daily Loads
(TMDLs) for Resolution's discharge of stormwater
and non-stormwater—including treated mine water,
industrial water, and seepage pumping—into Queen
Creek near the town of Superior because Queen Creek
is “impaired” for copper under the CWA.
APP-34
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3 The controversy arises because ADEQ renewed
Resolution's Arizona Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (AZPDES) Permit No. AZ0020389 (the
permit). The permit ensures Resolution complies with
CWA water quality standards for copper mining. The
permit authorizes Resolution to discharge (1)
stormwater and (2) non-stormwater, including
treated mine water, industrial water, and seepage
pumping.
¶4 The permit also authorizes Resolution to discharge
those waters into an unnamed tributary to Queen
Creek near the town of Superior. Queen Creek is
“impaired” for copper under § 303(d) of the
CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d). When discharging into
an impaired waterway, mines may not exceed
TMDLs. See infra ¶ 64–68. As such, Resolution and
ADEQ began drafting TMDLs for pollutants for the
impaired waterway, but the TMDLs remain in draft
form. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.7. The issue here is which
comes first: the permit or the TMDL. We conclude it
is the TMDL.
I. Historical Mining At The Superior Site
¶5 Resolution's mining site occupies a broad area of
land in and near Superior, and Resolution uses it for
underground copper mining activities. This area
includes the Superior Operations Mine, located along
Superior's northern boundary. Resolution's mining
site also includes surface facilities located 0.22 miles
north of Queen Creek in two non-contiguous areas
identified as the West Plant Site (the WPS) and the
East Plant Site (the EPS). The WPS is located
immediately northwest of Superior. The EPS is
located two miles east of Superior near the
intersection of Highway 177 and U.S. Highway 60.
APP-35
The mining site included two large copper-ore
deposits. The first was the now-exhausted ore body,
originally owned by Magma, located in the WPS. The
second is the recently discovered and untouched
Resolution ore body located in the EPS.
¶6 Resolution's mining site has a deep history.
Resolution acquired the mining site from a long line
of owners, stemming back to Magma, which built the
first iteration of the mining site at the WPS in 1912.
Magma constructed shafts Nos. 1 through 8 on the
WPS as part of its original mining site. In the 1970s,
Magma constructed shaft 9 on the EPS to facilitate
better access to the Magma ore body. Before that, the
Magma ore body was not accessible via the
EPS. Magma also constructed shaft 9 to identify other
ore bodies in the EPS. Magma connected the EPS to
the WPS through a tunnel facility called the Never
Sweat Tunnel. Magma used the Never Sweat Tunnel
to transport copper ore from shaft 9 to processing
facilities at the WPS.
II. Modern Development of the Superior Site
¶7 At one time, the owners extracted ore from the
Magma ore body. For extended periods, the owners
left the site all but destitute *184 **675 aside from
doing the bare minimum to maintain the site,
including groundwater pumping and exploration. In
the early-to-mid 1990s, the owner at the time, Broken
Hill Proprietary Company, Ltd. (BHP), discovered the
untouched Resolution ore body in the EPS.
¶8 Even after BHP discovered the Resolution ore
body, BHP ceased actively mining ore at the Superior
mining site in 1996 when it depleted the remaining
mineable reserves out of the Magma ore body. Two
years later, BHP ceased all other ore mining
activities—except for applying to renew the permit—
APP-36
for a variety of reasons, including the costs of
maintaining the mining site, falling copper prices,
limited data on the Resolution ore body, and a lack of
suitable infrastructure to exploit the Resolution ore
body. Since discovering the Resolution ore body more
than two decades ago, no mine owner has extracted
ore.
¶9 Starting in 2000, the Superior mining site
ownership changed hands, and Resolution began
exploring. In 2004, Resolution began planning new
additions at its mining site, including shaft 10, a
cooling tower, rock stockpiles, wash bays, and a Mine
Water Treatment Plant (MWTP). In 2008, Resolution
began constructing shaft 10—the most significant
addition. Around this time, Resolution also resumed
dewatering at the existing Magma facilities to help
facilitate a study for its new construction plans.
Dewatering uses water through a system of pumps,
pipes, and conveyances to process and access ore and
mine discharge drainage.
¶10 By December 2014, Resolution spent
approximately $500 million to complete shaft 10.
Shaft 10 is 30 feet in diameter and extends 6,943 feet
below ground surface (bgs). Resolution built shaft 10
about 300 feet away from shaft 9. Shaft 9, by contrast,
only extends 4,882 feet bgs—more than 2,000 feet shy
of shaft 10's depth. Resolution rehabilitated and
extended the Never Sweat Tunnel as part of
constructing shaft 10.
¶11 Since Resolution constructed shaft 10, the only
parts of the original mining site remaining
operational are the Never Sweat Tunnel and shafts 8
and 9. Resolution uses shaft 8 to dewater the WPS.
Resolution uses shaft 9 to support shaft 10, such as
for ventilation and flowing mine drainage from shaft
9 to shaft 10. Resolution still actively uses the Never
APP-37
Sweat Tunnel to pump mine drainage from shaft 10
to the WPS, where the MWTP processes it.
Resolution's focus with building the new facilities, like
shaft 10, has been to target the yet untouched
Resolution ore body.
¶12 Resolution plans to access the Resolution ore body
using panel caving. Panel caving is a variation of the
high-volume technique known as block caving.
Previously, the Superior site owners used adits and
tunnels. With panel caving, Resolution will access the
ore by caving in the ore zone and causing it to
collapse—which will eventually cause ground
subsidence. Resolution predicts the Resolution ore
body will “supply more than 25% of America's demand
for [copper] over the next 40 years.”
III. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) And AZPDES Permitting
Activities
¶13 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
issued the original permit in 1975. The EPA issued
the permit, including its renewals, until 2002, when
the State of Arizona took primacy over the CWA and
the NPDES permitting. Since then, ADEQ has issued
permits to individuals, including Resolution for its
copper-mining site.
¶14 In 2015, Resolution applied to renew the permit.
In 2017, ADEQ issued the renewed permit, which had
an effective date of January 23, 2017, and an
expiration date of January 22, 2022. The renewed
permit allowed Resolution to operate its mining site,
including shaft 10 and the other new facilities at the
site, and treated them as existing sources.
IV. Procedural
Challenges
Posture
and
Permitting
APP-38
¶15 Several months after the renewal, the Tribe
challenged ADEQ's treatment of shaft 10 and several
other new facilities before the Water Quality Appeals
Board (the Board). The Tribe argued those facilities
were
new
sources,
not
existing
sources,
under *185 **676 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.2, 122.29. The
Board referred the matter to the Office of
Administrative Hearings (OAH) for an evidentiary
hearing. In February 2018, OAH held the hearing
before an OAH administrative law judge (ALJ). And
on October 15, 2018, the ALJ issued findings of fact
and conclusions of law, deciding ADEQ generally did
not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it renewed
the permit in 2017. The ALJ, however, took exception
to ADEQ's failure to consider whether Resolution's
new facilities, including shaft 10, were new sources
under 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.2, 122.29(b). See infra ¶ 37.
The ALJ, thus, recommended the Board remand the
matter to ADEQ to conduct a new source analysis
under 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b). The ALJ did not decide
whether Resolution's site was a new source.
¶16 In November 2018, the Board remanded the
matter to ADEQ to conduct a new source analysis.
The Board's remand order also allowed ADEQ to
ignore some of the ALJ's findings of fact and
conclusions of law when ADEQ conducted the new
source analysis.
¶17 In 2019, ADEQ issued its new source analysis.
ADEQ's new source analysis concluded Resolution's
mining site was not subject to new source
performance standards (NSPS) because the site was
an
existing
source
under 40
C.F.R.
§§
122.2, 122.29(b) and did not contain new sources
under the CWA. See infra ¶ 37. ADEQ reasoned new
source standards must apply to “the mine as a whole”
and not to discrete facilities, such as shaft 10 because
APP-39
the regulations only provide independently applicable
standards for copper mines and not for any of the new
features.
¶18 In March 2019, the Tribe challenged the Board's
November 2018 order remanding the matter for
ADEQ to conduct a new source analysis, arguing it
was error for the Board to allow ADEQ to ignore
certain portions of the ALJ's findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
¶19 In June 2019, the Board issued its final
administrative decision, upholding ADEQ's issuance
of the permit to Resolution. The Board also denied the
Tribe's challenge to the Board's November 2018 order.
In doing so, the Board adopted all the ALJ's findings
of fact, including those it allowed ADEQ to ignore in
its November 2018 order.
¶20 The Tribe appealed the Board's 2019 decision to
the superior court under A.R.S. § 12-905. The superior
court upheld the Board's decision, including its
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Tribe
timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction
under article VI, section 9, of the Arizona
Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-913, 12-120.21.A.1,
and 12-2101.A.1.
ANALYSIS
V. The Validity Of The Permit Is Not Moot.
¶21 Because the permit at issue here expired on
January 22, 2022, this appeal appears to lack a live
controversy. See Kondaur Cap. Corp. v. Pinal Cnty.,
235 Ariz. 189, 192–93, ¶¶ 8–9, 330 P.3d 379, 382–83
(App. 2014) (issues involving a corporation's ability to
seek enforcement of a writ of restitution allowing it to
evict occupants of its property became moot when the
occupants already were evicted by other means). The
parties did not raise mootness. We questioned the
APP-40
parties about mootness at oral argument, and,
therefore, exercise our discretion to decide whether
this matter has become moot. See Big D Constr. Corp.
v. Court of Appeals for State of Ariz., Div. One, 163
Ariz. 560, 562–63, 789 P.2d 1061, 1063–64 (1990).
¶22 The issue here presents a live controversy despite
the appearance to the contrary. ADEQ is authorized
to administratively extend expired AZPDES permits
if: (1) the owner of the mining site applies for a
renewal of its permit 180 days before the permit
expires and (2) ADEQ has not yet issued a new permit
to the owner. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.6(d) (“States
authorized to administer the NPDES program may
continue either EPA or State-issued permits until the
effective date of the new permits, if State law
allows.”); A.A.C. R18-9-B904.B.1 (AZPDES permittee
must apply to renew its permit 180 days before the
permit
expiration
date); A.A.C.
R18-9B904.C (continuation beyond the AZPDES permit
date is permitted if: (1) *186 **677 the permittee has
timely applied before the permit expires and the
permitted activity is continuing; and (2) ADEQ “is
unable, through no fault of the permittee, to issue an
AZPDES permit on or before the expiration date of the
existing permit”). Here, we take judicial notice of
Resolution applying to renew the permit on July 23,
2021—180 days before the permit expired. Draft Fact
Sheet: Arizona Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (AZPDES), Ariz. Dep't of Env't Quality 1,
https://static.azdeq.gov/pn/azpdes_rcml_fs.pdf (last
visited Oct. 3, 2022); see Giragi v. Moore, 48 Ariz. 33,
41–42, 58 P.2d 1249 (1936); Ariz. R. Evid. 201(b). We
also take judicial notice of ADEQ issuing draft forms
of the renewed permit. Draft Permit: Authorization to
Discharge Under the Arizona Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System, Ariz. Dep't of Env't Quality,
APP-41
https://static.azdeq.gov/pn/azpdes_rcml_dp.pdf (last
visited Oct. 3, 2022); see Moore, 48 Ariz. at 41–42, 58
P.2d 1249; Ariz. R. Evid. 201(b). Resolution, thus,
continues to operate its mining site under the permit
at issue here.
VI. The Tribe Untimely Appealed The Board's
November 2018 Order.
¶23 The Tribe argues the Board erred when it did not
give a written justification for the November 2018
order. In that order, the Board allowed ADEQ to
disregard portions of the ALJ's findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The Tribe argues the order
modified the ALJ decision, requiring written
justification. The State correctly contends the Tribe's
challenge is untimely because the Tribe did not file its
challenge until over 100 days later.
¶24 “[T]he decision of the Board [to reject or modify
the ALJ's decision] is the final administrative
decision.” A.A.C. R2-17-124.A.2. Under A.R.S. § 12904, a party must commence “an action to review a
final administrative decision ... by filing a notice of
appeal within thirty-five days from the date” it
receives a copy of that decision.
¶25 Because the Tribe waited over 100 days to
challenge the Board's November 2018 order and the
Board's decision to modify or reject an ALJ's decision
was a final agency decision, the Tribe untimely
challenged the Board's November 2018 order.
VII. Because The Parties Raise No Issues Of
Fact On Appeal, We Need Not Address The 2021
Amendment To § 12-910.F Regarding This
Court's Deference To Agencies’ Determinations
Of Questions Of Fact.
¶26 In 2021, during the pendency of this appeal, the
Arizona Legislature modified § 12-910.F to include
APP-42
language providing, “In a proceeding brought by or
against the regulated party, the court shall decide all
questions of fact without deference to any previous
determination that may have been made on the
question by the agency.” See 2021 Ariz. Laws, ch. 281,
§ 1 (S.B. 1063) (1st Reg. Sess.) (amending A.R.S. § 12910.F). Before the amendment, Arizona courts held “a
reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency on factual questions or matters of
agency expertise.” See WildEarth Guardians, Inc. v.
Hickman, 233 Ariz. 50, 53, ¶ 7, 308 P.3d 1201, 1204
(App. 2013).
¶27 Resolution argues we should not decide the
constitutionality of the 2021 amendment because
none of the parties dispute any of the facts below. We
agree.
¶28 The Tribe contends it raised issues of fact because
it challenged the superior court's decision, “including
the factual error that the Resolution [m]ine was the
same mine as the more than 100-year-old Magma
[m]ine.” But, as we will discuss, this issue is a
question of law, not fact. See infra ¶¶ 33–35. Cf. State
v. Romero, 248 Ariz. 601, 604, ¶ 12, 463 P.3d 225, 228
(App. 2020) (issue of whether the defendant
knowingly engaged in criminal conduct is a question
of fact because it “refers to factual knowledge”). The
Tribe also contends whether the superior court's
apparent assumption of the Tribe's motivations for
disputing the permit improperly influenced its
decision to uphold the permit is a question of fact. But
the Tribe did not challenge any specific factual
determinations below. Given the parties have not
raised any factual issues on appeal, we need not
resolve any questions of fact.
APP-43
*187 **678 ¶29 Accordingly, we need not resolve
issues relating to the constitutionality of the 2021
amendment to subsection F.
VIII. Shaft 10 Is A New Source Under The CWA.
¶30 A “new source” under the CWA is “any building,
structure, facility, or installation from which there is
or may be a ‘discharge of pollutants,’ the construction
of which commenced ... [a]fter promulgation of
standards of performance under section 306 of CWA
which are applicable to such source.” 40 C.F.R. §
122.2; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(2) (same). A source
is “a new source only if a new source performance
standard is independently applicable to it.” 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.29(b)(2). By contrast, the CWA grandfathers in
an “existing source,” which is a source permitted
before the EPA promulgated performance standards
independently
applicable
to
the
source.
NPDES Permit Regulations, 49 Fed. Reg. 37,998,
38,042–43 (Sept. 26, 1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.21(k)(4)). This distinction exists because new
sources “have never operated under a previously
issued permit and ... are considered to be in a better
position than existing sources to install and ‘start up’
their equipment and meet the [more stringent NSPS]
permit limitations.” Id. at 38,034.
¶31 Resolution and the State argue all the sources in
Resolution's mining site are existing sources under
the CWA because a source must be subject to
independently applicable standards to be a new
source, and the only applicable standard applies to
the “mine as a whole.” Resolution and the State,
therefore, conclude the mining site is not subject to
NSPS because the mining site has existed since 1912,
APP-44
and as a result, any additional structure or facility
must be an existing source.
¶32 The Tribe contends “discrete pollutantgenerating structures and facilities can themselves be
new sources[,]” including the additions Resolution
made since the EPA promulgated standards
for copper mining in 1982. The Tribe further contends
Resolution's additions effectively created a distinct
mine from the original Magma mine, and the new
mine should be subject to new source analysis.
¶33 We first address our standard of review for
ADEQ's determinations of issues related to the new
source analysis. Second, we discuss whether the EPA
promulgated any independently applicable standards
for the types of sources Resolution constructed at its
mining site after the EPA promulgated standards for
copper—more specifically, we decide whether shaft 10
is
a
“mine”
under 40
C.F.R.
§§
440.100, 440.132(a), (g). Third, we decide whether
shaft 10 is subject to independently applicable NSPS.
Fourth, we resolve whether shaft 10 is a new source
under the 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(1) criteria (further
defining what is required for a source to be classified
as a new source).
A. We Review ADEQ's New Source Analysis De
Novo.
¶34 This court generally reviews de novo “the
decisions reached by the administrative officer and
the superior court” when reviewing questions of law
involving an agency's “legal interpretation of a
statute.” Eaton v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment
Sys., 206 Ariz. 430, 432, ¶ 7, 79 P.3d 1044, 1046 (App.
2003). Principles of statutory construction apply to
federal regulations. See Env't Def. v. Duke Energy
Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 573–74, 127 S.Ct. 1423, 167
APP-45
L.Ed.2d 295 (2007) (applying principles of statutory
construction to regulations the EPA promulgated
under the Clean Air Act); Time Warner Ent. Co., L.P.
v. Everest Midwest Licensee, L.L.C., 381 F.3d 1039,
1050 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying “general rules of
statutory construction” to Federal Communication
Commission's regulations). This court construes a
regulation “and its subsections as a consistent and
harmonious whole.” See State v. Green, 248 Ariz. 133,
135, ¶ 8, 459 P.3d 45, 47 (2020).
¶35 This court starts by “giv[ing] words their plain
meaning unless it is impossible to do so or absurd
consequences will result.” Marsoner v. Pima Cnty.,
166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991); see
also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters, Inc.,
199 Ariz. 261, 264, ¶ 8, 17 P.3d 106, 109 (App. 2000).
When a case involves the intersection *188 **679 of
multiple statutes or regulations, this court
“construe[s] them together, seeking to give meaning
to all provisions.” See State v. Francis, 243 Ariz. 434,
435, ¶ 6, 410 P.3d 416, 417 (2018) (cleaned up).
¶36 This court gives a federal agency's interpretation
of the federal law it administers the level of deference
annunciated by the United States Supreme Court
in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467
U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694
(1984). See Eaton, 206 Ariz. at 434, ¶ 16, 79 P.3d at
1048. By contrast, “[a] state agency's interpretation of
a federal statutes is not entitled to the deference
afforded a federal agency's interpretation of its own
statutes under Chevron.” Orthopedic Hosp. v. Belshe,
103 F.3d 1491, 1495 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Arizona
v. City of Tucson, 761 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014).
Instead, this court “review[s] de novo a state agency's
interpretation of a federal [law].” See Belshe, 103 F.3d
at 1495. Further, the Arizona Legislature amended
APP-46
A.R.S. § 12-910.F (providing the standards of review
for final administrative decisions) in 2018 to abolish
what is commonly known as the Chevron doctrine in
Arizona. See 2018 Ariz. Laws, ch. 180, § 1 (2d Reg.
Sess.) (H.B. 2238) (amending A.R.S. § 12-910.E) (“In a
proceeding brought by or against the regulated party,
the court shall decide all questions of law, including
the interpretation of a constitutional or statutory
provision or a rule adopted by an agency, without
deference to any previous determination that may
have been made on the question by the agency.”).
B. Because Shaft 10 Is A “Mine,” It Is A Type Of
Source
Subject
To
CWA Copper Mining
Regulations.
¶37 The State contends “independently applicable
standard” under 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(2) means the
EPA must have made standards independently
applicable to the types of sources Resolution
constructed at its site after 1982 to classify those
sources as new sources. And the State urges this court
to affirm ADEQ's decision to renew the permit
because the only applicable standard under 40 C.F.R.
§ 440, Subpart J is for “the mine as a whole.”
¶38 Under 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(2), “[a] source
meeting the requirements of paragraphs (b)(1)(i), (ii),
or (iii) of this section is a new source only if a new
source performance standard is independently
applicable to it. If there is no such independently
applicable standard, the source is a new
discharger.” See In re: Phelps Dodge Corp., Verde
Valley Ranch Dev., 10 E.A.D. 460, 2002 WL 1315601,
at *15 (EAB 2002) (discussing the need for an
independently applicable standard to categorize a
source as a new source under the CWA). NSPS only
go into effect once the EPA promulgates performance
standards independently applicable to the type of
APP-47
source the EPA is permitting. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2; see 33
U.S.C. § 1316(a)(2).
¶39 The EPA promulgated the most recent
performance standards for copper mines in 1982. Ore
Mining and Dressing Point Source Category Effluent
Limitation Guidelines and New Source Performance
Standards, Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 54,598 (Dec. 3,
1982).
A
source
producing
pollution
from copper mining activities, thus, may only be a
new source if it was constructed after 1982 and an
independent standard applies to such a source. See 40
C.F.R. § 122.2; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(2).
¶40 The standards for copper mining apply to only a
few types of sources, and here the only applicable
standard
is
for
“mines.” See 40
C.F.R.
§
440.100(a) (“provisions of this subpart are applicable
to discharges from ... [m]ines that produce copper”
from “open-pit or underground operations”). The other
types of sources subject to independently applicable
standards under this section are “mills” and “mines
and mills,” which do not apply here because there are
no copper mills
at
issue. See 40
C.F.R.
§
440.100(a)(2)–(4). A plain reading of the controlling
regulations requires this result, and we agree with the
State to the extent it argues the only independently
applicable standard is for “mines.” See Marsoner, 166
Ariz. at 488, 803 P.2d at 899. But that determination
does not end our analysis.
¶41 Because “mines” are the only type of source
subject to independently applicable standards here,
we must determine whether *189 **680 any sources
Resolution constructed at its mining site after 1982
fall within the definition of a “mine.” The EPA
provides three terms guiding our interpretation of
what a “mine” means. The first term, “active mining
area,” is “a place where work or other activity related
APP-48
to the extraction, removal, or recovery of metal ore is
being conducted.” 40 C.F.R. § 440.132(a). The second
term, “mine,” is:
[A]n active mining area, including all
land and property placed under, or above
the surface of such land, used in or
resulting from the work of extracting
metal ore or minerals from their natural
deposits by any means or method,
including secondary recovery of metal
ore from refuse or other storage piles,
wastes, or rock dumps and mill tailings
derived from the mining, cleaning, or
concentration of metal ores.
40 C.F.R. § 440.132(g) (emphasis added). The third
and most expansive of the three terms, “site,” means
“the land or water area where any ‘facility or activity’
is physically located or conducted, including adjacent
land used in connection with the facility or
activity.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.2.
¶42 These three terms are like nesting dolls in that
an “active mining area” falls squarely within the
definition of a “mine.” Thus, if a source would qualify
as an “active mining area,” it would also qualify as a
“mine.” And because a “mine” and “active mining
area” are each examples of “the land area where any
‘facility or activity’ is physically located or conducted,”
both an “active mining area” and “mine” neatly fit into
the term “site.” The term “site,” however, cannot nest
within the terms “mine” or “active mining
area.” See infra ¶ 44.
¶43 The State argues new additions to Resolution's
mining site, including shaft 10, cannot be considered
new sources because the only applicable standards
are for “mines,” which can only mean the “mine as a
APP-49
whole.” But the term “mine,” as defined by 40 C.F.R.
§ 440.132(g) (defining “mines” in the ore mining
context, including copper mining), does not mean the
“mine as a whole.” Instead, a “mine” is a discrete
structure used for “extracting ore or minerals,” such
as shaft 10. See 40 C.F.R. § 440.132(g) (a mine “is an
active mining area, including all land and
property placed under, or above the surface of such
land, used in or resulting from the work of extracting
metal ore or minerals from their natural deposits by
any means or method”) (emphasis added); 40 C.F.R. §
440.132(a) (an active mining area “is a place where
work or other activity related to the extraction,
removal, or recovery of metal ore is being
conducted”); see Marsoner, 166 Ariz. at 488, 803 P.2d
at 899.
¶44 If the State was correct in arguing we must look
to the mining site “as a whole,” then it would render
the new source rule under 40 C.F.R. § 122.29 null as
applied
to
new
facilities
at
mining
sites. See Chaparral Dev. v. RMED Int'l, Inc., 170
Ariz. 309, 313, 823 P.2d 1317, 1321 (App. 1991) (this
court harmonizes conflicting language of different
parts of the statute to give effect to both); Cleckner v.
Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 246 Ariz. 40, 43, ¶ 9, 433
P.3d 1200, 1203 (2019) (this court strives “to give
meaning to each word, phrase, clause and sentence so
that no part of that legislation will be void, inert or
trivial”); see also Patterson v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff's
Off., 177 Ariz. 153, 157, 865 P.2d 814, 818 (App.
1993) (applying statutory construction principles to
read a portion of a rule in harmony with other parts
of the rule to “give effect to the [framers’] intent
behind” the rule). Indeed, the EPA wrote 40 C.F.R. §
122.29 to provide a framework to decide whether an
APP-50
addition to a mining site is a new source. See infra ¶¶
48–60.
¶45 Shaft 10 neatly falls within the description of a
“mine,” as opposed to a “site.” As applied here, shaft
10 is an area of “land” (a 7,000-foot-deep hole) and
“property” (a shaft is a man-made facility). See 40
C.F.R. § 440.132(g). Shaft 10 is located “under ... the
surface of such land,” and Resolution has used the
shaft to implement its plans to “extract[ ] metal ore or
minerals from their natural deposits.” See 40 C.F.R. §
440.132(g). And because Resolution is using shaft 10
to further its expansion of the site to
extract copper from the new ore body, shaft 10 is “a
place where work or other activity related to the
extraction, removal, or recovery of metal ore is being
[or will be] conducted.” See 40 C.F.R. § 440.132(a).
Shaft 10, thus, squarely *190 **681 falls within the
plain meaning of the definitions of an “active mining
area” and a “mine.” As such, the EPA effectively
provided an independently applicable standard for
mining shafts—at least to the extent they qualify as
“mines” or “active mining areas.” See Francis, 243
Ariz. at 436, ¶¶ 9–10, 410 P.3d at 418 (interpreting
interrelated statutes together to discern their
meaning); cf. Verde Valley Ranch Dev., 10 E.A.D. 460,
2002 WL 1315601, at *16 (“Phelps Dodge's active
maintenance of the tailings site (i.e., sprinkling with
water to reduce dust blowing off the site surface) over
the past years ... cannot reasonably be categorized as
active pursuit or processing of ore within the meaning
of the copper mining NSPS.”). Moreover, though the
ALJ did not decide whether shaft 10 was a new
source, the ALJ decided shaft 10 was a “mine” when
the matter was before the OAH, in part, because
Resolution was using it to further its mining activity,
such as the production of mine drainage.
APP-51
¶46 Further, contrary to the State's argument, the
EPA's regulatory framework does not require us to
consider all “active mining areas” within Resolution's
mining “site” when determining whether a source is a
new or existing source. Here, the State has confused
the term “mine” with the term “site” when arguing we
must consider “the mine as a whole.” See 40 C.F.R. §§
122.2, 440.132(g). In contrast to the EPA's definition
of a “mine,” the EPA's definition of a “site” includes
“adjacent land used in connection with the facility or
activity.” We cannot define a mining shaft as a “site”
rather than a “mine” because of this additional
requirement. Here, we have determined Resolution's
shaft 10 is one “mine” of at least one or more “mines”
or “active mining areas” operating within Resolution's
mining “site.” We, therefore, need not determine
whether the mining site “as a whole” is a new source.
¶47 Our interpretation of the EPA's regulations is
consistent with the EPA's guidance on new sources,
which we find persuasive. See Christensen v. Harris
Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d
621 (2000) (an administrative body's informal
guidance on a regulation is not binding but may be
persuasive “to the extent that those interpretations
have the ‘power to persuade’ ”) (citations omitted).
Indeed, the EPA provided several materials
explaining parts of a discharger's site may be subject
to NSPS while others are subject to existing source
standards when the discharger constructs a new
building,
structure,
or
installation
at
a
site. See Memorandum from Linda Boornazian,
Director Water Permits Division, Office of
Wastewater Management, and Mary Smith,
Engineering & Analysis Division, Office of Science &
Technology Office of Water, to Regional Water
Division Directors, at 3 (Sept. 28, 2006) (“[I]f the new
APP-52
source is a new installation of process equipment at
an existing facility, part of the facility may be subject
to existing source standards and other parts of the
facility subject to new source standards.”);
NPDES Permit Regulations, 49 Fed. Reg. 37,998,
38044 (Sept. 26, 1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
122.29(b)) (“[I]f a facility replicates an existing
facility, the fact that it shares or uses common land
with another source does not prevent it from being
considered a new source.”).
¶48 Resolution, nonetheless, argues its interpretation
of the new source regulations, requiring this court to
look to the “whole mine” when deciding whether shaft
10 is a new source, is consistent with EPA
interpretations of a new source. Resolution cites past
NPDES permits to support its proposition. Though
EPA interpretations of regulations do not necessarily
receive Chevron deference,
“[c]ogent
[federal]
administrative
interpretations
...
warrant
respect.” Alaska Dep't of Env't Conservation v. U.S.
E.P.A., 540 U.S. 461, 488, 124 S.Ct. 983, 157 L.Ed.2d
967 (2004). But Resolution's examples of past EPA
permitting decisions are distinguishable from the
permit
here
because
none
were
for
underground copper mines. Several of the cited EPA
permits, for instance, were for coal mines, which are
subject to “new source coal mine” standards. See 40
C.F.R. § 434.11(j)(1). Even so, those permits do not
necessarily assist Resolution's proposition, and some
even cut against it. Indeed, the regulatory definition
of “new source coal mine” requires agencies to
consider whether the regulated body created new
shafts when deciding if a mine is a new source. See 40
C.F.R. § 434.11(j)(1) (a new *191 **682 source may
also arise from a “major alteration” to an existing site,
such as the “construction of a new shaft”). A new
APP-53
shaft, therefore, could be a “mine” and new source in
the context of a coal mine as well.
C. Because Shaft 10 Is A “Mine” And Shaft 10
Produces Mine Drainage, Shaft 10 Is Subject To
“Independently Applicable Standards.”
¶49 For an agency to classify a source as a new source,
the source must:
(1) Be one of the types of sources the
EPA has enumerated as being applicable
to performance standards—here, the
applicable regulation is 40 C.F.R. §
440.100 (listing the types of sources
subject to copper mining standards)—
and
(2) Produce the type of wastewater
discharge governed by the NSPS.
See 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(2) (a source meeting the
requirements of § 122.29(b)(1) “(i), (ii), or (iii) is a new
source only if a [NSPS] is independently applicable to
it”). Here, NSPS are independently applicable to shaft
10. First, as explained above, shaft 10 is a “mine” and,
thus, is one of the types of sources specifically
promulgated as applicable to the standards
for copper. See supra ¶¶ 44–47. Second, shaft 10 is
subject to NSPS under 40 C.F.R. § 440.104(a) because
this standard applies to mine drainage from
underground copper mining operations and shaft 10
produces mine drainage.
¶50 The dissent believes we embark on our analysis
out of order. As explained above, ignoring whether a
new construction is a mine undercuts the effect of
entire sections of federal regulations. We decline this
path and instead give force to every word of the
regulations by considering whether shaft 10 is a mine.
In doing so, traditional canons of statutory
APP-54
interpretation guide our path. And ADEQ's own flow
chart confirms our approach. See Appendix A.
¶51 Accordingly, the EPA has provided an
independently applicable NSPS standard for shaft 10.
But that does not end our analysis.
D. Shaft 10 Is A New Source Under The 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.29(b) Criteria.
¶52 Next, to determine whether shaft 10 is a new
source, we must decide if it meets one of the three new
source criteria under 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b). Because
we decide only whether the third criteria applies, we
decline to address the parties’ arguments about the
other two criteria.
¶53 To be classified as a new source, a source must
meet one of the following criteria: (1) “[i]t is
constructed at a site at which no other source is
located”; (2) “[i]t totally replaces the process or
production equipment that causes the discharge of
pollutants at an existing source”; or (3) “[i]ts processes
are substantially independent of an existing source at
the same site.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(1)(i)–(iii).
¶54 The State argues shaft 10 is not “substantially
independent” from other structures on the site but is
fully integrated, and thus should not be considered a
new source. Because Resolution only recently built
shaft 10, heavily modified other nearby existing
structures to facilitate the use of shaft 10, and
operated or has plans to operate shaft 10
for copper mining so as not to replace but replicate
existing source's copper mining activity, we disagree.
¶55 In 1984, the EPA amended the third prong—
regarding “whether the [source's] processes are
substantially independent”—of the new source
APP-55
analysis test by requiring agencies to consider factors:
(1) “the extent to which the new facility is integrated
with the existing plant”; and (2) “the extent to which
the new facility is engaged in the same general type
of activity as the existing source.” See NPDES Permit
Regulations, 49 Fed. Reg. 37,998, 38,048 (Sept. 26,
1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b)(1)(iii)).
¶56 The application of the 40 C.F.R. §
122.29(b)(1)(iii) criterion presents an issue of first
impression to this court. The State, Resolution, and
the Tribe provided no authority other than federal
guidance from the EPA, and—aside from that
guidance—we also found none.
¶57 The State contends categorizing any new
facilities
in
the
mining
site,
such
as
shaft *192 **683 10, would contradict the EPA's
intent
when
it
amended 40
C.F.R.
§
122.29(b)(1)(iii) by adding two additional factors. To
support this proposition, the State cites the EPA's
discussion of the policy and application of the
“substantially independent” factor in NPDES Permit
Regulations, 49 Fed. Reg., 37,998, 38,048 (Sept. 26,
1984). But the EPA's guidance on the new rule
establishes shaft 10 is a new source. Under the first of
the two new factors, the EPA explains:
[A] minor change[, such as a plant's
installation of a new purification step in
its process, like a new filter or
distillation column,] would be integral to
existing operations and would not
require the facility to be reclassified as a
new source. However, on the other
extreme, if the only connection between
the new and old facility is that they are
supplied utilities such as steam,
electricity, or cooling water from the
APP-56
same source or that their wastewater
effluents are treated in the same
treatment plant, then the facility will be
a new source.
Id. Here, shaft 10 falls in the latter category as shaft
10 is not some insignificant process added to
Resolution's mining site. Instead, shaft 10 is a brand
new 7,000-foot-deep mining shaft. And though shaft
10 uses other facilities from other areas of the mining
site to assist in ore production, such as Resolution's
use of shaft 9 to pass mine drainage from shaft 9 to
shaft 10, other pertinent facts show shaft 10 is a new
source. Resolution modified several of these preexisting structures, such as the Never Sweat Tunnel,
to facilitate its $500 million investment in shaft
10. Further, Resolution also built shaft 10 over 300
feet away—laterally from shaft 9—to construct a new
underground mining operation to extract copper from
the new and as yet untouched ore body in the EPS.
¶58 The EPA's guidance on the second factor—
whether the source engages in the “same general type
of activity as the existing source”—also cuts against
the State's argument. Under the second factor, the
EPA explains, “if the proposed facility is engaged in a
sufficiently similar type of activity as the existing
source, it will not be treated as a new source.” Id. at
38,044. On first blush, Resolution's plans to use shaft
10 to mine copper appear to fall under the same type
of
activity
at
the
mining
site—
specifically, copper mining. See id. (“For example, if a
plant begins to produce a new product, e.g., nylon
synthetic fiber, which is very similar to the product
currently being produced by that plant, e.g., polyester
synthetic fiber, using equipment that is essentially
the same as the existing production equipment, this
would likely be considered an existing source.”). The
APP-57
EPA, however, goes on to explain, “Of course, to the
extent the construction results in facilities engaged in
the same type of activity because it essentially
replicates, without replacing, the existing source, the
new construction would result in a new
source.” Id. On this precise point, the State's
argument collapses in on itself.
¶59 Resolution built shaft 10, a completely new
mining shaft, exceeding the depth of the nearest shaft
(shaft 9) by over 2,000 feet bgs. And Resolution
constructed shaft 10 approximately 300 feet away
from shaft 9. Though Resolution repurposed shaft 9 to
help facilitate mining in shaft 10 and no longer uses
shaft 9 for mining ore, Resolution still has plans to
expand shaft 9 by extending it to the same depth as
shaft 10. And though Resolution has plans to stop
using shaft 9 to extract copper ore, none of the parties
have given us any reason to determine Resolution is
using shaft 10 to replace shaft 9. Instead, Resolution
built structures, such as shaft 10, to expand its
mining site to begin mining the new, untouched ore
body on the EPS—a feat BHP was unable to
accomplish with the limited capabilities of older
structures like shaft 9. Resolution also plans to use
panel caving, a new and high-volume mining
technique to access the untouched ore body, which
Resolution's predecessors did not use when shaft 9
was producing ore. Resolution, thus, “replicated” the
WPS when it constructed shaft 10 in the hopes of
supplying over a quarter of our nation's copper needs.
Indeed, the ALJ even referred to Resolution's site as
being made up of “two non-contiguous areas,” the EPS
and the WPS, which the superior court adopted on
appeal. Our determination is consistent with ADEQ's
concession that “shaft 10 would be a new source” if it
APP-58
had been subject to
performance standards.
independently
applicable
*193 **684 ¶60 Moreover, the State's use of other
portions of the EPA's guidance is unconvincing and,
in fact, supports a contrary result to the one it urges
us to adopt. The State, for instance, cites to a portion
of the EPA's guidance explaining the “substantial
independence test was aimed at ascertaining whether
an existing source which undertakes major
construction that legitimately provides it with the
opportunity to install the best and most efficient
production processes and wastewater treatment
technologies should be required to meet new source
performance
standards
at
that
facility.” See NPDES Permit Regulations, 49 Fed.
Reg. 37,998, 38,043 (Sept. 26, 1984). Indeed,
Resolution built shaft 10 well after 1982 and at a time
when it had “the opportunity to install the best and
most efficient production processes and wastewater
treatment
technologies.” See id. And
because
Resolution “undert[ook] major construction” when it
recently dug shaft 10, the facility, according to the
EPA's own words, “should be required to meet new
source performance standards.” See id. And, as the
ALJ aptly observed, the State's argument “that any
new buildings, structures, facilities, or installations
constructed at a copper mine that began operations
before Subpart J was promulgated” is inconsistent
with the regulatory framework and EPA guidance. A
contrary result would mean Resolution could
continuously sink shafts into its property and
perpetually expand its mining site without being
subject to NSPS so long as those structures were
constructed on lands adjacent to its copper mining
site.
APP-59
¶61 Accordingly, shaft 10—though not completely
independent from other sources—is substantially
separate to be classified as a new source under §
122.29(b)(1)(iii). Shaft 10, thus, is a new source and
Resolution's mining site is subject to NSPS under 40
C.F.R. § 440.104(a).
IX. To Comply With The CWA And For ADEQ To
Permit Resolution's Site, Resolution And ADEQ
Must Finalize The Ongoing TMDLs For Queen
Creek, And Resolution Must Show The Site Will
Comply With Applicable Water Quality
Standards.
¶62 The Tribe contends ADEQ may not issue the
permit to Resolution because shaft 10 is a new source
and Queen Creek is an impaired waterway. We
disagree. Though permitting a new source for
impaired waterways is more arduous, the CWA does
not prohibit such an action. See Friends of Pinto Creek
v. U.S. E.P.A., 504 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2007).
¶63 Because shaft 10 is a “new source” within the
meaning of 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, ADEQ may not renew
the permit until: (1) ADEQ finalizes a TMDL plan for
the receiving water segment; (2) Resolution
demonstrates the existence of sufficient copper load
allocations to allow for the proposed discharge; and (3)
Resolution demonstrates the existence of water
quality compliance schedules for the segment. See 40
C.F.R. § 122.4(i); Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1012.
¶64 The CWA preserves and restores the integrity of
navigable waters by controlling both point and
nonpoint pollution sources. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(7).
Point sources are discrete conveyances, including
pipes, ditches, or other outfalls. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
“Nonpoint sources of pollution are non-discrete
sources,” such as agricultural runoff. Pinto Creek, 504
APP-60
F.3d at 1011. Section 303 of the CWA requires states
to identify waters not meeting applicable water
quality standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A). In
Arizona, ADEQ prepares a list of those “impaired”
waters and indicates the pollutant(s) causing
impairment. A.R.S. § 49-232; see also 33 U.S.C. §
1313(d).
¶65 CWA section 303 also requires states to
determine the maximum amount of a given pollutant
an impaired water can absorb but still meet water
quality standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C). Using
this determination, ADEQ develops TMDLs for
impaired waters. A.R.S. § 49-234.A. TMDLs are
informational tools establishing attainment targets
for pollutants, allocating discharge amounts, and
aiding with attainment planning. See 40 C.F.R. §§
130.2(e)–(i), 130.7(c); see also Pronsolino v. Nastri,
291 F.3d 1123, 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2002). TMDLs are
comprised
of
a
water's
waste
load
allocation *194 **685 (WLA) and its load allocation
(LA) plus a margin of safety. Overview of Total
Maximum Daily Loads, Envt'l Prot. Agency,
https://www.epa.gov/tmdl/overview-total-maximumdaily-loads-tmdls (last updated Aug. 31, 2022). WLAs
represent the sum-total pollutant allocations for all
point sources. In contrast, LAs are the sum total
allocations for nonpoint and background pollution. Id.
¶66 Special rules apply to permits authorizing a
discharge into impaired waters. 40 C.F.R. §
122.4(i); see also Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1011.
Federal regulations broadly prohibit issuing a permit
to a new source proposing to discharge into impaired
waters. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i); Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d
at 1012. This ban, however, is not absolute. Pinto
Creek, 504 F.3d at 1013. The relevant regulation
reads in part:
APP-61
No permit may be issued:
....
(i) To a new source or new discharger,
if the discharge from its construction or
operation will cause or contribute to the
violation of water quality standards. The
owner or operator of a new source or new
discharger proposing to discharge into a
water segment which does not meet
applicable water quality standards ...
and for which the State or interstate
agency has performed a pollutants load
allocation for the pollutant to be
discharged, must demonstrate, before
the close of the public comment period,
that:
(1) There are sufficient remaining
pollutant load allocations to allow for the
discharge; and
(2) The existing dischargers into that
segment are subject to compliance
schedules designed to bring the segment
into compliance with applicable water
quality standards.
40 C.F.R. § 122.4.
¶67 This court reviews administrative regulations
like statutes and interprets the regulations to further
the intent of the enabling legislation. Cooke v. Ariz.
Dep't of Econ. Sec., 232 Ariz. 141, 144, ¶ 13, 302 P.3d
666, 669 (App. 2013). The plain meaning of subsection
(i)’s first sentence lays out a default rule: no permit
may be issued to a new source causing or contributing
to a violation of water quality standards. Cf. State ex
rel. Winkleman v. Ariz. Navigable Stream
Adjudication Comm'n, 224 Ariz. 230, 240, ¶ 24, 229
APP-62
P.3d 242, 252 (App. 2010) (“We look to the plain
language ... because it is the best evidence of the
legislature's intent.”). Under this rule, it would be
nearly impossible for a new source to obtain a permit
to discharge into impaired waters. But, when reading
the regulation as a whole, the operator of a new source
has two clearly defined steps it may take to show it
will not “cause or contribute” to a violation of water
quality standards. Cf. Stambaugh v. Killian, 242
Ariz. 508, 509, ¶ 7, 398 P.3d 574, 575 (2017) (use
context to interpret words and provisions).
32¶68 The EPA has interpreted 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i)(1)
and (2) to require a demonstration of sufficient
loading capacity in a segment's WLAs to
accommodate the new discharge in addition to the
existence of compliance schedules. In re: Carlota
Copper Co., 11 E.A.D. 692, 765, 2004 WL 3214473, at
*55 (EAB 2004). Stated more plainly, the party
seeking the permit must show: (1) the segment's
TMDL allocations can accommodate the proposed
additional point source; and (2) existing point sources
are subject to plans detailing the changes needed to
bring the segment into compliance. See Pinto Creek,
504 F.3d at 1012–15. Once the operator of a new
source establishes those two conditions, or if the
director of the permitting department determines the
department already has adequate information
establishing those two conditions, the new source will
not “cause or contribute” to continued water quality
violations. 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i).
¶69 Here, the CWA lists the tributary of Queen
Creek—the proposed receiving water—as impaired
for copper. Because of this impairment, ADEQ must
finalize the TMDLs before issuing a permit for any
new source. ADEQ, thus, erred in not finalizing the
APP-63
TMDLs before renewing the permit. See 40 C.F.R. §
122.4(i); see also Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1012.
*195 **686 ¶70 The parties devote most of their
briefings to whether shaft 10 is a new source.
Resolution, however, preserves one argument
pertinent to 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i). Resolution contends
a discharge by itself “would not cause or contribute to
[the] impairment of Queen Creek.” In support,
Resolution points to Andy Koester, Manager of the
AZPDES Permit Unit, who testified Resolution would
not cause or contribute to a violation of water quality
standards if their discharges do not exceed the
limitations of the permit. Though this nascent
argument does not directly address 40 C.F.R. § 122.4,
it may suggest the federal regulation's prohibition
against permitting new sources does not apply. And
to the extent Koester's argument does, we disagree.
33¶71 This court gives meaning to every word and
provision in a regulation, rendering none
superfluous. See Garcia v. Butler, 251 Ariz. 191, 194,
¶ 12, 487 P.3d 256, 259 (2021). Koester's testimony
may be probative on whether the TMDL's load
allocation can accommodate the proposed discharge—
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