Amicus Curiae Brief — Tamer Mahmoud, et al., Petitioners v. Thomas W. Taylor, et al.

No. 24-297

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

______________________

TAMER MAHMOUD, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

THOMAS W. TAYLOR, ET AL.,

Respondents.

______________________

On Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

______________________

BRIEF OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY FAITH

LEADERS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

RESPONDENTS

____________________

MEAGHAN VERGOW

Counsel of Record

JOSHUA REVESZ

O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP

1625 Eye Street NW

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 383-5300

mvergow@omm.com

LAUREN MARTIN

O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP

1301 Avenue of the

Americas, 17th Floor

New York, NY 10019

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .............................. 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT................................... 1

ARGUMENT ............................................................. 3

I. PUBLIC EDUCATION ENABLES

AMERICANS TO PARTICIPATE IN

PLURALISTIC SOCIETY. .................................. 3

II. A CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPELLED

OPT-OUT SYSTEM WOULD

UNDERMINE THE FIRST AMENDMENT

AND PUBLIC EDUCATION ALIKE. ................. 8

A. Mandatory opt-outs would contract

public-school curricula and stymie

lessons about faith. ......................................... 9

B. Mandatory opt-outs would turn schools

into ideological battlegrounds. ..................... 12

C. If petitioners prevail, damages liability

will be an even greater threat to

classroom discussion. ................................... 13

CONCLUSION ........................................................ 17

APPENDIX A: List of Amici Curiae ....................... 1a

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Brown v. Board of Education,

347 U.S. 483 (1954) ........................................... 2, 5

Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin,

596 U.S. 767 (2022) ............................................... 8

Citizens United v. FEC,

558 U.S. 310 (2010) ............................................. 11

Edwards v. Aguillard,

482 U.S. 578 (1987) ....................................... 10, 11

Emp. Div., Dept. of Human Resources of

Ore. v. Smith,

494 U.S. 872 (1990) ........................................... 3, 4

Epperson v. Arkansas,

393 U.S. 97 (1968) ............................................... 10

Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch.,

533 U.S. 98 (2001) ................................................. 9

Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ.

of Sch. Dist. No. 71,

333 U.S. 203 (1948) ......................................... 5, 11

Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., &

Mun. Emps., Council 31,

585 U.S. 878 (2018) ............................................. 13

Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.,

597 U.S. 507 (2022) ............................... 2-4, 7-9, 16

Lee v. Weisman,

505 U.S. 577 (1992) ............................................... 3

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(cont’d)

Page(s)

McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky.,

545 U.S. 844 (2005) ............................................... 3

Meyer v. Nebraska,

262 U.S. 390 (1923) ............................................. 15

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,

376 U.S. 254 (1964) ............................................... 4

Plyler v. Doe,

457 U.S. 202 (1982) ............................................... 4

Safford United Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding,

557 U.S. 364 (2009) ............................................. 15

Saline Parents v. Garland,

88 F.4th 298 (D.C. Cir. 2023) ............................. 12

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,

393 U.S. 503 (1969) ............................................... 6

Town of Greece v. Galloway,

572 U.S. 565 (2014) ............................................... 7

W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,

319 U.S. 624 (1943) ............................................... 7

Zorach v. Clauson,

343 U.S. 306 (1952) ............................................... 4

Statutes

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ....................................................... 14

Other Authorities

The Federalist No. 48 (J. Madison) ........................... 4

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

Amici are faith leaders who live in Montgomery

County and lead congregations in the county and

nearby communities. Although amici come from different faith traditions, they are united in their call for

a society that is inclusive and welcoming to all. Amici

are also parents, who send their children to Montgomery County Public Schools precisely to ensure that

they are exposed to a full range of perspectives.

Amici therefore have an acute interest in the question presented. Amici believe that the constitutional

interpretation petitioners ask this Court to recognize

would, if accepted, hinder amici’s faith practices,

weaken public education, and run contrary to the pluralistic values on which the First Amendment’s Free

Exercise Clause rests.

Amici’s names and professional affiliations are set

forth in the Appendix. Amici submit this brief in their

individual capacities.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The First Amendment guarantees that our Nation

can be home to people of all religions and no religion.

Unlike in other societies, no one is forced to hide their

faith. Instead, the First Amendment’s Free Exercise

Clause, Free Speech Clause, and Establishment

Clause operate together to ensure that matters of

1 No counsel for any party has authored this brief in whole

or in part, and no person other than amici or their counsel have

made any monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.

2

faith can be openly discussed, and that all Americans

can choose for themselves what they believe.

Those constitutional values are reflected in our

public schools. In the Court’s finest hour, it held that

“education is the very foundation of good citizenship”

because it serves as the “principal instrument in

awakening the child to cultural values . . . and in

helping him to adjust normally to his environment.”

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493

(1954). And just three years ago, this Court reiterated

that commitment, holding that “learning how to live

in a pluralistic society” is “a trait of character essential to a tolerant citizenry,” and a mission supported

by our public schools. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch.

Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 538 (2022) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

This case puts those foundational values under

threat. Petitioners seek to wield the First Amendment to curtail students’ exposure to ideas in the

classroom. Indeed, petitioners’ arguments would restrict students’ access to facts about the world in

which we live. The First Amendment is about facilitating dialogue, not preventing it. And adopting petitioners’ rule would threaten public schools’ ability to

carry out their educational functions: it would require

schools to shrink their curricula; it would allow parents to turn schools into forums for ideological disputes; and it would even expose teachers to damages

liability if they make classroom comments that a parent later wishes their child had not heard.

Amici urge this Court not to misinterpret the Free

Exercise Clause to weaken public schools. Amici’s

faith traditions espouse inclusivity and tolerance, and

3

petitioners’ vision for public schools runs counter to

their own religious practice. But if schools are prohibited from informing students about the wide range of

beliefs and identities in the United States, all Americans will suffer. If we cannot learn about each other,

we cannot learn how to function in society as it actually exists. That result would turn the First Amendment’s commitment to tolerance on its head.

ARGUMENT

I.

PUBLIC EDUCATION ENABLES AMERICANS TO PARTICIPATE IN PLURALISTIC SOCIETY.

This Court recently emphasized that “learning

how to tolerate speech or prayer of all kinds is part of

learning how to live in a pluralistic society, a trait of

character essential to a tolerant citizenry.” Kennedy,

597 U.S. at 538 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.

577, 590 (1992)). The United States, after all, is a

place for “adherents of all religions, as well as those

who believe in no religion at all.” McCreary Cnty. v.

ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 884 (2005) (O’Connor, J.,

concurring). Tolerance begins with knowledge. When

we learn about each other, we often find that we have

more in common than we feared. And where there are

differences, we learn how to bridge them, or to chart

a path forward despite them.

Three clauses of the First Amendment work in

tandem to safeguard our pluralistic society. The Free

Exercise Clause ensures that Americans can “live out

their faiths” in public. Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 524 (citing Emp. Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v.

Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)). The Free Speech

4

Clause “provides overlapping protection for expressive religious activities,” id. at 523, by protecting

Americans’ right to “uninhibited, robust, and wideopen” debate on all matters of public concern, including matters of faith, N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376

U.S. 254, 270 (1964). And the Establishment Clause

safeguards the right to practice or forebear from practicing religion free from government “coercion.” Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 537; see, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343

U.S. 306, 314 (1952). Together, these provisions

“counsel mutual respect and tolerance, not censorship

and suppression, for religious and nonreligious views

alike.” Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 514.

The First Amendment’s “parchment barriers,”

though, accomplish little unless the values they reflect can be put into practice. The Federalist No. 48,

at 333 (J. Madison). If Americans do not come in contact with ideas and beliefs that were previously unknown to them, they will never develop the “mutual

respect and tolerance” that the Constitution aims to

foster. Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 514.

Public schools are a unique place—likely the best

possible site—for these exchanges. This Court has

“recognized the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system

of government, and as the primary vehicle for transmitting the values on which our society rests.” Plyler

v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the Brown

Court wrote that “education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments,” in

part because it “is the very foundation of good

5

citizenship” and “the principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values.” Brown, 347 U.S. at

493.

That is because, at school, students are exposed to

difference. “The modern public school derived from a

philosophy of freedom reflected in the First Amendment.” Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch.

Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203, 214 (1948) (opinion of

Frankfurter, J.). Schools are the primary place where

young people learn about identities and ideas outside

of their own personal experiences. Students of all

races and religions attend the same school. School is

where many Americans are likely to meet fellow students who wear kippot, forgo meat for Lent, or pray

to Mecca during the school day. And school is where

many students will first make friends who are gay,

lesbian, bisexual, and transgender. All of this exposure combats prejudice: collective learning in shared

classrooms with people of all religions, races, political

backgrounds, genders, and sexualities is a surefire

way to build tolerance of those different identities.

No surprise, then, that public school curricula reflect the pluralistic nature of the public school environment. Coexistence, cooperation, and civil discourse in society require mutual understanding. So

schools will often—should often—teach about the differences that students observe. That can mean instructing on the panoply of world faiths: “One can

hardly respect a system of education that would leave

the student wholly ignorant of the currents of religious thought that move the world society for a part

in which he is being prepared.” McCollum, 333 U.S.

at 236 (Jackson, J., concurring). It can also mean

6

explaining to students why classmates talk differently, look differently, or act differently from one another. Obscuring these differences would not serve

the goals of public education, or of the First Amendment itself: “[O]ur history says that it is this sort of

hazardous freedom—this kind of openness—that is

the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in

this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,

393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969).

For amici, exploring differences is not just a civic

nicety: it is integral to the practice of their faith.

Amici are religious leaders from different traditions.

But they are unified in their conviction that understanding and respect for others are essential to building an inclusive and welcoming society, a conviction

grounded in their respective faith traditions and reflective of their shared commitment to human dignity

and flourishing. That is partly why amici have chosen to live in Montgomery County, the most religiously diverse county in the United States. See

Pet’rs’ Br. 6. It is why amici are committed to promoting interfaith dialogue and understanding. And it is

why amici have chosen to send their children to Montgomery County Public Schools in the hope and expectation that through public education they will be exposed to diverse viewpoints and lived experiences.

Amici have a personal stake—in addition to an ethical, social, moral, and political interest—in making

sure that public schools, in Montgomery County and

elsewhere, teach the full gamut of the American

7

experience. In other words, scrubbing curricula of all

diversity would impair amici’s religious practices.

None of that, of course, is a license for coercion. “If

there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe

what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to

confess by word or act their faith therein.” W. Va. Bd.

of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). As

practitioners of many faiths—some of which have

been subject to state persecution throughout history—amici are adamant that schools must teach understanding, not mandate belief.

Thus, schools can introduce the range of faith traditions but cannot instruct that one religion is true.

They can teach students about current events, but

must not instruct that any politician or ideology has

a monopoly on what is right or true. They can teach

about gender and sexuality, but must tell students

that they can choose how to act authentically to themselves while respecting the dignity of others. Cf. Pet.

App. 640 (“No child who does not agree with or understand another student’s gender, expression, or their

sexual identity is asked to change how they feel about

it.”).

No doubt “some will take offense” to those lessons,

however they are phrased. Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 53839. But “offense” alone “does not equate to coercion.”

Id. at 539 (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572

U.S. 565, 589 (2014) (alterations adopted)). As long

as schools are merely exposing children to the ideas

shared by their fellow citizens, the school is advancing

8

the values of the First Amendment, not contravening

them.

II.

A CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPELLED

OPT-OUT SYSTEM WOULD UNDERMINE

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PUBLIC

EDUCATION ALIKE.

This case is a direct challenge to the pluralistic

values that the First Amendment embodies and that

public education safeguards. Petitioners ask this

Court to recognize a constitutional right for parents

to absent their children from lessons that they do not

want their children to hear. And they insist that such

a right should inhere regardless of whether the lessons are coercive or merely expose students to many

perspectives. Pet’rs’ Br. 43-46; see U.S. Br. 26-29.

Accepting those arguments would have far-reaching consequences, all at the cost of building a “tolerant

citizenry.” Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 538. Of course, no

parent is obligated to send their child to public school.

Cf. Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 596 U.S. 767, 776

(2022). So if opt-outs had no effect beyond the objecting parents and their children, amici would have no

quarrel with petitioners’ claims.

But a ruling in petitioners’ favor will not be so limited: instead, a constitutional opt-out doctrine would

worsen public education in multiple ways. Given the

costs of opt-outs, schools would hesitate before including important topics in their curricula. Parents of all

perspectives could manipulate this newly recognized

right to pressure schools. And given the threat of personal liability, teachers would hesitate before beginning the kinds of organic discussions that make

9

education worthwhile. These ramifications would be

immediate, long-lasting, and impossible to address at

the local level.

A.

Mandatory opt-outs would contract

public-school curricula and stymie

lessons about faith.

A central flaw in petitioners’ argument is the claim

that constitutionally mandated opt-outs would be

costless to schools and the diverse communities they

serve.

In fact, there is every reason to think that constitutionally compelled opt-outs will substantially complicate public education. As the record in this action

shows, opt-outs are disruptive, especially for younger

students for whom alternative activities must be

found. See Pet. App. 96-99, 606-08. Allowing older

students to opt out of topics of study raises questions

about how to assess all students equally. And optouts can make students feel excluded: Students whose

parents opt them out of topics may experience social

pressure or reprisal, and students who identify with

the material that prompted the opt-out may feel hurt

and isolated.

The obvious result, therefore, will be that schools

will shape their curricula to minimize opt-outs. If

particular material would prompt a flood of opt-outs,

that material will be removed from lesson plans. The

consequence will be that all children will learn less,

and that opting-out parents will acquire a “heckler’s

veto” over public school curricula—precisely what the

First Amendment abhors. Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 534

10

(quoting Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533

U.S. 98, 119 (2001)).

Amici believe that public schools should cover the

ethical, historical, political, or scientific questions

that are critical to a well-rounded education. Students should learn about the world around them, including about the identities and values of people of all

religions, races, genders, and sexualities. Losing discussion of those topics would make it harder for students to learn to coexist in a multicultural, multifaith

society.

Take, for one example, the teaching of world

faiths. As religious leaders whose congregations sit

in a diverse community, amici believe that it benefits

all Americans to understand fellow citizens’ religious

beliefs. Many schools agree, teaching the tenets and

histories of Abrahamic and non-Abrahamic religions.

Yet if parents begin to opt their children out of lessons

on faiths that are not their own—contending, as petitioners do here, that mere exposure to those beliefs

interferes with their ability to instruct their children

in their own faith—those lessons will become far

rarer. Students will be less likely to learn about the

horrors of the Holocaust, the teachings of Confucius,

or the history of the Reformation. And children who

do not learn about other faiths will become adults who

are less likely to understand and respect the pluralistic society they inhabit and that amici value.

Or take the teaching of evolution, a subject familiar to this Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. This Court has held that schools cannot require teachers to teach creation science alongside evolution. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-

11

97 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109

(1968). But a required opt-out regime could effectively unwind those precedents. That is because if

enough students opt out of science lessons, school districts may very well change those lessons—both to

avoid absenteeism and because science (unlike sex education) is a subject on which students are tested, and

so schools will want all students to learn the same

topics. Siding with petitioners here would thus “undermine[] the provision of a comprehensive scientific

education.” Edwards, 482 U.S. at 587. The same

problems may redound in the study of literature, history, and other subjects.

None of this is to say that parents should never be

able to opt their students out of instruction. As petitioners themselves note, different states and localities

have adopted different policies that address circumstances when opt-outs should be permitted. See

Pet’rs’ Br. 7-8. And decisionmakers at that level can

tailor policies to balance the potential risks of opt-out

regimes with parents’ legitimate interests in furthering their children’s education.

But a rule of constitutional law is a “sledge hammer rather than a scalpel.” Citizens United v. FEC,

558 U.S. 310, 399 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in

the judgment). “We must leave some flexibility to

meet local conditions, some chance to progress by trial

and error.” McCollum, 333 U.S. at 237 (Jackson, J.,

concurring). But adopting petitioners’ rule in this

case would take these decisions out of educators’ control. There would be no way to tailor opt-out regimes

to harmonize various interests, or to make a course

12

correction if opt-outs (as amici predict and fear) upend public school curricula.

B.

Mandatory opt-outs would turn

schools into ideological battlegrounds.

A mandatory opt-out regime could also have adverse consequences beyond the curriculum, politicizing the public school environment and creating discord within school communities.

Americans are moving further apart. And public

schools are not immune to this phenomenon. See Saline Parents v. Garland, 88 F.4th 298, 300 (D.C. Cir.

2023) (discussing controversy over Attorney General

memorandum “expressing concern over a spike in reported incidents involving harassment, intimidation,

and threats of violence against school administrators,

board members, teachers, and staff”).

Constitutionalizing opt-outs would fan these

flames. Parents who disagree with specific lessons

could use the holding of this case to pull their children

from class, and to urge their fellow community members to do the same.2 Parents on the other side of the

ideological dispute, meanwhile, will respond in kind.

Petitions will fly to get enough parents to effectively

veto various topics through opt-outs.

2 To be sure, the Free Exercise Clause would at most protect

parents’ religious, not political, desire to opt their children out.

But that line can be blurry, and schools—especially given the

threat of damages litigation, see infra Section II.C—will not realistically be positioned to police the religious sincerity of any

asserted belief.

13

Nothing good lies at the end of this road. Students

will be hurt when their classmates absent themselves

from discussions relevant to their identities or viewpoints. In some places, parents of faith will feel the

sincerity of their beliefs called into question if they

(perhaps because they, like amici, hold pluralistic values) choose not to opt their children out of lessons. In

other places, the parents and students opting out

might face ostracism as a result of their decision. The

bottom line will be that school communities will become more fraught and less tolerant of differences.

“The First Amendment was meant for better things.”

Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps.,

Council 31, 585 U.S. 878, 956 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).

C.

If petitioners prevail, damages liability will be an even greater threat

to classroom discussion.

The worst consequences of petitioners’ rule,

though, may come outside of the opt-out context. Not

all classroom conversations are pre-scripted in careful

lesson plans. And not all lessons are confined just to

pre-vetted curricular materials, like the books at issue in this case. Instead, some of the best instruction

arises organically, in response to students’ questions

or comments.

But if petitioners persuade the Court that the Free

Exercise Clause provides “notice and opt-out rights”

for potentially controversial instruction, see Pet’rs’ Br.

19, organic conversations in classrooms will become

legally risky. A teacher who speaks off-script could

give an answer that her students’ parents do not want

their children to hear. And if she does so, she and her

14

employer could be liable for damages for having violated the parents’ free-exercise rights by denying

them notice and the chance to opt out of the supposedly controversial instruction. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Petitioners’ rule, therefore, would require every public-school teacher in the country to consider, before

making any in-class statement, whether that statement could subject the teacher to suit.

Consider just a few dilemmas that petitioners’ rule

would create:



A student raises his hand during a science lesson and asks how old the Earth is. Can his

teacher answer the question without stopping

class and checking whether any parent objects

to the potential answer?



An English teacher is asked about John

Donne’s sonnet titled “Batter my heart, threeperson’d God.”

May the teacher explain

Donne’s reference to the Trinity without assuring herself that every parent is comfortable

with the precise explanation she plans to give?



A student comes into school one day and asks

to be called by different pronouns. Can the

teacher convey that request to the class, or is

the teacher liable for damages if he does so and

a parent later objects to the discussion?

This is no way to run an educational environment.

Teaching our young people is an honorable but difficult and frequently thankless calling. Teachers

should be able to focus their efforts on instructing

their students—not on worrying about financial liability under Section 1983. And while qualified

15

immunity may, for a time, dispose of some suits

against teachers who make comments that parents

later dislike, see, e.g., Safford United Sch. Dist. No. 1

v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377 (2009) (applying the

qualified immunity test in the school official context),

it will not resolve them all. In particular, if a parent

flags in advance that she or he does not want a child

to learn about a particular topic on religious grounds,

petitioners’ rule would seem to require the teacher to

recognize the potential issue in real time, halt conversation, and usher a student out of the room.

So the result, again, will be to chill speech. Teachers who fear suits will shut down conversations rather

than give impromptu answers. School districts

(which themselves may bear liability for teachers’ offthe-cuff remarks) will direct that classroom environments be arranged to minimize litigation, not to maximize education. The school environment will become

more sterile, with organic conversations harder to

find. Students, in short, will learn less.

All of this is at odds with the First Amendment’s

commitment to open discourse, including about matters of faith. See supra at 3-5. The Court’s prior decisions in this area have facilitated, not diminished,

the free flow of ideas in classrooms. Indeed, a decision

on which petitioners chiefly rely, Meyer v. Nebraska,

262 U.S. 390 (1923), applied the First Amendment to

save teachers from the threat of suits arising out of

their instruction. Id. at 403; see, e.g., Pet’rs’ Br. 2326. It would be ironic if petitioners could harness that

precedent to stifle organic conversations and subject

hardworking teachers to federal suits.

16

* * *

The heart of the First Amendment is that we

should hear and respect the views of others. Because

“[r]espect for religious expression is indispensable to

life in a free and diverse Republic,” that principle is

strongest when it comes to matters of faith. Kennedy,

597 U.S. at 543-44. So the Court should not subvert

the First Amendment’s commitment to free discourse

by adopting petitioners’ rule. That rule whitewashes

the existence of difference across our pluralistic society. It will have severely adverse effects on schools’

ability to prepare students to be citizens of the United

States. It will inflame ideological battles over public

schooling. And it will cow teachers from even responding to inquiries.

This all will be to the detriment of amici, whose

religious practices are bound up in recognizing the

very differences that petitioners’ rule will shunt

aside. It will also be to the detriment of public school

teachers and students, and to all Americans of all

faiths. The Court should protect the First Amendment’s values by rejecting petitioners’ First Amendment claim.

17

CONCLUSION

This Court should affirm the judgment below.

Respectfully submitted,

MEAGHAN VERGOW

Counsel of Record

JOSHUA REVESZ

O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP

1625 Eye Street, NW

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 383-5300

mvergow@omm.com

LAUREN MARTIN

O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP

1301 Avenue of the

Americas, 17th Floor

New York, NY 10019

April 9, 2025

APPENDIX

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

APPENDIX A: List of Amici Curiae ....................... 1a

1a

APPENDIX A

LIST OF AMICI CURIAE1

The Reverend Sari Ateek, Rector, St. John’s Episcopal Church Norwood Parish, Chevy Chase, MD

Reverend Daniel Cho, Pastor, Silver Spring United

Methodist Church, Silver Spring, MD

Rabbi Deborah Bodin Cohen, Rabbi, Congregation

Beth Chai, Bethesda, MD

Reverend Rachel Cornwell, Pastor, Dumbarton

United Methodist Church, Washington, DC

Reverend Sara Fisher, Pastor, University Christian Church, Hyattsville, MD

Reverend Joey Heath-Mason, Pastor, St. Paul’s

United Methodist Church, Kensington, MD

The Reverend Kent Marcoux, Priest, Episcopal Diocese of Washington, Washington, DC

Reverend James McSavaney, Pastor, United

Methodist Church, Howard Chapel-Ridgeville, Mount

Airy, MD

1 Institutional affiliations are provided for identification pur-

poses only. The views expressed in this brief do not reflect the

views of the institutions with which amici are affiliated.

2a

Reverend Amanda Poppei, Senior Minister, Unitarian Universalist Church of Arlington, Arlington,

VA

Rabbi Adam Rosenwasser, Senior Rabbi, Temple

Emanuel, Kensington, MD

Reverend Dr. Rebekah A. Savage, Minister, Unitarian Universalist Congregation of Rockville, Rockville, MD

Reverend Christian Schmidt, Community Minister, Unitarian Universalist Society of Mill Creek,

Newark, DE

Rabbi Sid Schwarz, Founding Rabbi, Adat Shalom

Reconstructionist Congregation, Bethesda, MD

Reverend Angela M. Wells, Pastor, Christ United

Methodist Church, Columbia, MD

Mr. Dennis Williams, Director of Christian Education, Bethesda United Methodist Church, Bethesda,

MD