Amicus Curiae Brief — PennyMac Loan Services, LLC, Petitioner v. Roosevelt Associates, RIGP, et al.

No. 24-29

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

____________________

PENNYMAC LOAN SERVICES, LLC, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

ROOSEVELT ASSOCIATES, RIGP, ET AL.,

Respondents.

____________________

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Rhode Island

____________________

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF

PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

____________________

CHRISTINA M. MARTIN

Counsel of Record

DEBORAH J. LA FETRA

Pacific Legal Foundation

555 Capitol Mall, Suite 1290

Sacramento, CA 95814

(916) 419-7111

CMartin@pacificlegal.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Pacific Legal Foundation

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Does the government violate the Takings Clause

when it confiscates property for payment of a tax debt

without allowing the property owner any means of

recovering the value of the property in excess of the

debt?

2. Is an otherwise unconstitutional taking

insulated from the Constitution’s reach just because

the confiscating municipality delivers the excess

equity to private investors rather than to local

governments?

ii

Table of Contents

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................ i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... iii

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF

AMICUS CURIAE.................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................. 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 5

I.

THE RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT’S

DECISION CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS

BY THIS COURT ............................................ 5

II. THE LOWER COURT’S DECISION

CREATES A CONFLICT WITH OTHER

JURISDICTIONS ........................................... 6

II. LAWS LIKE RHODE ISLAND’S

OVERWHELMINGLY HARM

SOCIETY’S WEAKEST MEMBERS............ 10

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 12

iii

Table of Authorities

Page(s)

Cases

257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC v.

Roberto, 307 A.3d 19

(N.J. App. Div. 2023) ......................................... 7–8

Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,

594 U.S. 139 (2021) ............................................... 1

Cherokee Equities, L.L.C. v. Garaventa,

382 N.J. Super. 201 (Ch. Div. 2005) ................... 11

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at

Monterey, Ltd.,

526 U.S. 687 (1999) ............................................... 5

Coleman through Bunn v. D.C.,

70 F.Supp.3d 58 (D.D.C. 2014) ........................... 11

Dorce v. City of New York,

2 F.4th 82 (2d Cir. 2021) ....................................... 2

Fair v. Continental Resources,

143 S. Ct. 2580 (2023) ....................................... 1, 5

Fair v. Continental Resources,

311 Neb. 184 (2022) ......................................... 6, 11

Foss v. City of New Bedford,

621 F.Supp.3d 203 (D. Mass. 2022) .................... 10

Freed v. Thomas,

976 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2020) ................................. 2

French v. Edwards,

80 U.S. 506 (1871) ............................................... 10

Fuentes v. Shevin,

407 U.S. 67 (1972) ................................................. 6

iv

Hall v. Meisner,

51 F.4th 185 (6th Cir. 2022) .......................... 2, 7–8

Jackson v. Southfield Neighborhood

Revitalization Initiative,

No. 361397, __ N.W.3d __,

2023 WL 6164992

(Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2023) ......................... 7–8

Knick v. Twp. of Scott,

588 U.S. 180 (2019) ............................................... 1

Koontz v. St. Johns River

Water Mgmt. Dist.,

570 U.S. 595 (2013) ............................................... 1

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,

457 U.S. 922 (1982) ............................................... 6

Nieveen v. TAX 106,

143 S. Ct. 2580 (2023) ................................... 1, 5–6

Nieveen v. TAX 106,

311 Neb. 574 (2022) ............................................... 6

Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n,

483 U.S. 825 (1987) ............................................... 1

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,

533 U.S. 606 (2001) ............................................... 1

PennEast Pipeline Co., LLC v.

New Jersey,

594 U.S. 482 (2021) ............................................... 6

PennyMac Loan Servs., LLC v.

Roosevelt Assocs., RIGP,

No. KC-2021-0798

(Sup. Ct. R.I. July 21, 2022) .................................. 2

v

Picerne v. Sylvestre,

113 R.I. 598 (1974) ............................................ 4, 9

Rafaeli, LLC v. Oakland Cnty.,

505 Mich. 429 (2020) ....................................... 1, 10

Schafer v. Kent Cnty.,

No. 164975, __ N.W.3d __,

2024 WL 3573500

(Mich. July 29, 2024) ......................................... 1–2

Searle v. Allen,

No. CV-24-00025-PHX-JJT,

2024 WL 3427163

(D. Ariz. July 16, 2024) ......................................... 2

Sheetz v. Cnty. of El Dorado,

601 U.S. 267 (2024) ............................................... 1

Slater v. Maxwell,

73 U.S. 268 (1867) ................................................. 9

Tulsa Professional Collection

Services, Inc. v. Pope,

485 U.S. 478 (1988) ............................................... 6

Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty.,

598 U.S. 631 (2023) ................................. 1, 4–8, 10

Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB

v. Power Realty, RIGP,

No. KC-2021-0582

(Sup. Ct. R.I. July 21, 2022) .................................. 3

Wisner v. Vandelay Invs., L.L.C.,

No. A-16-451, 2017 WL 2399492

(Neb. Ct. App. May 30, 2017),

rev’d, 300 Neb. 825 (2018) ................................... 11

vi

United States Constitution

U.S. Const. amend. V .................................................. 2

U.S. Const. amend. XIV .............................................. 2

Statutes

R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 44-9-8...................................... 3

R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 44-9-12(a) ................... 3–4, 8–9

R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 44-9-19................................ 3, 9

R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 44-9-21........................ 3–4, 8–9

Rules

S. Ct. R. 37.2 ............................................................... 1

S. Ct. R. 37.6 ............................................................... 1

Other Authorities

Anderson, Patrick, Should RI tax sales

be for ‘locals only?’ Bill seeks to

reduce out-of-state competition,

The Providence Journal

(May 7, 2022), 2022/05/07/bill-wouldgive-rhode-island-bidders-edgemunicipal-tax-sales/9686609002/ ......................... 3

Francis, Jennifer C.H., Comment,

Redeeming What Is Lost:

The Need to Improve Notice for

Elderly Homeowners Before and

After Tax Sales,

Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 85 (2014) ............... 10

Joint Appendix, Tyler v.

Hennepin Cnty., No. 22-166

(U.S. Feb. 27, 2023) ............................................. 11

vii

Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment,

Johnson v. City of East Orange,

No. ESX-C-000016-23 (N.J. Sup. Ct.

Law Div. Mar. 19, 2024) ........................................ 2

Rao, John, The Other Foreclosure Crisis,

Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. (July 2012) ................ 10

1

IDENTITY AND INTEREST

OF AMICUS CURIAE1

Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) is a nonprofit, taxexempt corporation organized for the purpose of

litigating matters affecting the public interest in

private property rights, individual liberty, economic

freedom, and the separation of powers. Founded more

than 50 years ago, PLF is the most experienced legal

organization of its kind.

PLF has represented property owners in many

important property rights cases in this Court,

including Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631

(2023), a case that is central to the questions

presented here. See also, e.g., Sheetz v. Cnty. of El

Dorado, 601 U.S. 267 (2024) Cedar Point Nursery v.

Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 147 (2021); Knick v. Twp. of

Scott, 588 U.S. 180 (2019); Koontz v. St. Johns River

Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013); Palazzolo v.

Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Nollan v. Cal.

Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).

PLF attorneys have extensive experience with the

constitutional issues in this case, having represented

more than two dozen former owners of tax-delinquent

property lost to foreclosure. See, e.g., Fair v. Cont’l

Res., 143 S. Ct. 2580 (2023); Nieveen v. TAX 106, 143

S. Ct. 2580 (2023); Rafaeli, LLC v. Oakland Cnty., 505

Mich. 429 (2020); Schafer v. Kent Cnty., No. 164975,

1 Pursuant to Rule 37.2, PLF provided timely notice to all parties.

Pursuant to Rule 37.6, PLF affirms that no counsel for any party

authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party

made a monetary contribution intended to find the preparation

or submission of this brief. No person other than PLF, its

members, or its counsel made a monetary contribution to its

preparation or submission.

2

__ N.W.3d __, 2024 WL 3573500 (Mich. July 29, 2024);

Hall v. Meisner, 51 F.4th 185 (6th Cir. 2022); Johnson

v. City of East Orange, No. ESX-C-000016-23, Order

Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

(N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. Mar. 19, 2024) (appeal

pending). Moreover, PLF also frequently participates

as amicus curiae in cases alleging that government

takes private property without just compensation

when it confiscates more than is owed in property

taxes. See, e.g., Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82

(2d Cir. 2021); Freed v. Thomas, 976 F.3d 729 (6th Cir.

2020); Searle v. Allen, No. CV-24-00025-PHX-JJT,

2024 WL 3427163 (D. Ariz. July 16, 2024).

PLF advocates in favor of the highest levels of

constitutional protection for property tax debtors,

particularly because such property owners frequently

are among the most vulnerable demographics—

elderly and suffering from physical and mental

impairments. The Fifth Amendment, as incorporated

against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment,

protects against takings without just compensation

and deprivation of property without due process of

law. Both are implicated by this petition and warrant

this Court’s review.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Petitioners here both owned property interests

in homes in Coventry, Rhode Island, that were taken

by the government and given to investors as payment

for relatively small tax debts. In PennyMac Loan

Servs., LLC v. Roosevelt Assocs., RIGP, the tax debt

was $1,213.54 and the property was worth $300,000—

giving a huge windfall to the Respondent investor at

the expense of the debtor Domenico Companatico and

3

Petitioner PennyMac. App. 32a. In Wilmington

Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Power Realty, RIGP, the

tax debt was $4,330.44 on a property worth

approximately $165,000. See App. 50a–51a. No one

paid Petitioners or other parties with an interest in

the home for the taking of the excess value of the

homes.

In Rhode Island, tax collectors auction tax liens to

private investors. The tax lien—called a “collector’s

deed”—entitles the debt collector to collect the tax

debt plus costs and 12% annual interest. R.I. Gen.

Laws Ann. § 44-9-21. The lienholder has no right of

possession and no right to exclude. R.I. Gen. Laws

Ann. § 44-9-12(a) (interest in real estate is “held as

security for the repayment of the purchase price with

all intervening costs, terms”). If the full debt is not

paid within one year, the lienholder may foreclose and

take title to the percentage of ownership in the

property offered by the lienholder at an auction. R.I.

Gen. Laws Ann. § 44-9-12(a), -19. The winning bidder

for the lien—the collector’s deed—is the investor who

offers to take the smallest share of ownership if the

property is foreclosed. R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 44-9-8.

Usually, the auctions lack competition because

only a handful of investors in Rhode Island

understand the unusual state statutes governing

these sales. See Patrick Anderson, Should RI tax sales

be for ‘locals only?’ Bill seeks to reduce out-of-state

competition, The Providence Journal (May 7, 2022).2

Consequently, the winning bidder often prevails after

offering to take the entire property—100% ownership.

2 www.providencejournal.com/story/news/politics/2022/05/07/

bill-would-give-rhode-island-bidders-edge-municipal-taxsales/9686609002/.

4

Picerne v. Sylvestre, 113 R.I. 598, 603 n.7 (1974) (“[a]s

a practical matter, the only offer made in most sales

is for the whole interest.”). Regardless, the property

interest sold at these auctions is not fee simple

ownership to the property. Rather it is a lien with a

future contingent interest in title to the property. See

R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 44-9-12(a). The investors here

used the purchased tax liens, for which they paid only

the tax debt, to take the valuable homes without any

payment to the former owners for the substantial

home equity taken.

In Tyler, 598 U.S. at 639, this Court held that the

government has “the power to sell . . . [a debtor’s]

home to recover the unpaid property taxes.” But the

government cannot “use the toehold of the tax debt to

confiscate more property than was due.” Id. Such

confiscation unconstitutionally takes private property

without just compensation. Id. That decision requires

payment of just compensation for the alleged

confiscation at issue here.

Yet the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that

Tyler did not apply because the government here “sold

the subject property exclusively for unpaid taxes and

fees . . . and did not retain any excess value in the

property.” App. 13a, 26a. The Rhode Island Supreme

Court’s decisions conflict with decisions by this Court

and other jurisdictions. The Rhode Island Supreme

Court’s decision especially harms vulnerable owners,

including the elderly, sick, and poor, who are most

prone to losing their homes to tax foreclosures.

This Court should grant the petition and reverse to

ensure consistent application of Tyler by the lower

courts.

5

ARGUMENT

I. THE RHODE ISLAND SUPREME

COURT’S DECISION CONFLICTS WITH

DECISIONS BY THIS COURT

In Tyler, a Minnesota county took Geraldine

Tyler’s condo to collect $15,000 in taxes, penalties,

interest, and fees. 598 U.S. at 634. Pursuant to

Minnesota statutes, the county sold it for $40,000 and

kept it all to fund various public programs. Id. The

county never paid Tyler for the excess property that it

took. Id. This Court unanimously held, “The County

had the power to sell Tyler’s home to recover the

unpaid property taxes. But it could not use the toehold

of the tax debt to confiscate more property than was

due.” Id. at 639. By doing so, it effected a classic

unconstitutional taking. Id.

Tyler compels the conclusion that Petitioners’

private property, which was worth more than what

they owed, was taken without just compensation. Like

in Tyler, the government here confiscated valuable

homes as payment for much smaller tax debts. Here,

the government gave that confiscated property away

to private parties—Respondents. But when deciding

whether there was a taking, it is irrelevant whether

the government keeps a windfall or gives it away to

private lienholders. “[T]he question is what has the

owner lost, not what has the taker gained.” City of

Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526

U.S. 687, 710 (1999).

Consistent with that view, shortly after deciding

Tyler, this Court vacated two judgments by the

Nebraska Supreme Court for reconsideration “in light

of Tyler.” Fair, 143 S. Ct. 2580; Nieveen, 143 S. Ct.

6

2580. In both cases, the government sold tax liens to

private parties, which gave the investors a right to

collect the tax debt with interest. Fair v. Continental

Resources, 311 Neb. 184, 186–87 (2022); Nieveen v.

TAX 106, 311 Neb. 574, 589 (2022). When the owners

failed to pay, the investors were able to obtain a deed

to the properties. The investors only paid the tax debt,

so the government did not receive a windfall.3

Nevertheless, this Court sent both cases back to the

Nebraska Supreme Court for reconsideration, where

they are currently pending.

The lower court’s holding that Tyler cannot apply

because the government did not retain a windfall

conflicts with Tyler. The Court should grant the

Petition.

II. THE LOWER COURT’S DECISION

CREATES A CONFLICT WITH OTHER

JURISDICTIONS

The Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected the

takings claim raised here because the government

sold the property for only the amount of the debt and

“did not retain any excess value in the property.”

App. 13a, 26a. That holding conflicts with the Sixth

Circuit, Michigan Court of Appeals, and the New

3 The investor that received the windfall may also be liable as a

state actor for an unconstitutional taking when acting under the

color of state law and with aid from the government. See Lugar

v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936–37 (1982); Fuentes v.

Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 69 (1972); Tulsa Professional Collection

Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486 (1988). This Court has

long recognized that the power of eminent domain can be

exercised “by private parties to whom the power has been

delegated.” PennEast Pipeline Co., LLC v. New Jersey, 594 U.S.

482, 487 (2021).

7

Jersey Appellate Division. See Hall, 51 F.4th at 189,

reh’g denied, No. 21-1700, 2023 WL 370649 (6th Cir.

Jan. 4, 2023), and cert. denied, No. 22-874, 2023 WL

4065633 (U.S. June 20, 2023); Jackson v. Southfield

Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative, No. 361397, __

N.W.3d __, 2023 WL 6164992, at *14 (Mich. Ct. App.

Sept. 21, 2023); 257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC v.

Roberto, 307 A.3d 19, 32 (N.J. App. Div. 2023).

In Hall, which was cited favorably by this Court

in Tyler, 598 U.S. at 638, the Sixth Circuit held that

just compensation must be paid even if the

government gives the windfall from the tax

foreclosure to a private investor. 51 F.4th at 189. In

that case, consistent with Michigan’s statutes,

Oakland County confiscated Tawanda Hall’s home,

which was worth substantially more than her $22,642

debt. Id. The county did not auction it in a fair sale.

Instead, the county sold it to the city for the amount

of the tax debt, and the city then transferred the

property to a private company run by city officials for

$1. Id. at 189. Even though the government did not

profit from the sale, this was still a taking. Id. at 196.

The Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that a

homeowner’s property interest in foreclosed “property

is limited to any ‘surplus’ proceeds after a foreclosure

sale” by the government. Id. at 195. “[T]he County

took

the

plaintiffs’ property

without

just

compensation, in violation of the Takings Clause.” Id.

at 196.

Under a similar set of facts as in Hall, the

Michigan Court of Appeals recognized that the

government violated the Takings Clause when it “took

title to the plaintiffs’ properties” via tax foreclosure

“without paying plaintiffs just compensation for their

8

equity in the subject properties.” Jackson, 2023 WL

6164992, at *14. That court held Tyler means “an

unjust taking occurs under the federal constitution

when the government keeps the entire property itself

instead of holding a tax-foreclosure sale.” Id. at *13.

And it was irrelevant whether the government then

gave that windfall to a private party. See id. at *14.

“The right to the retention of surplus proceeds

necessarily relies on an arms-length public auction,

which allows for a real-time evaluation of the value of

the subject property.” Id. at *16. Without such an

auction, “the lack of surplus proceeds can hardly be

described as not a taking—plaintiffs still lost their

equitable title in their properties.” Id. at *16.

Likewise, New Jersey’s appellate court held that

Tyler applies to the state’s tax lien law, which like

Rhode Island, sells tax liens that give the purchaser a

right to collect the debt, and if not paid, later foreclose

and take title without paying the debtor for the excess

value of the property. See Roberto, 307 A.3d at 32. The

New Jersey Appellate Division held that the state’s

tax sale law “permitted foreclosure of a property

owner’s equity and is thus a prohibited taking after

Tyler.” Id. It did not matter that the government did

not take a windfall. See id.

Like the confiscations in Hall, Jackson, and

Roberto, there was no arms-length public auction for

the fee simple title to the homes here. Rather, the

Rhode Island auctions were for liens,4 similar to those

sold in New Jersey, which did not give the lienholders

a right to possess or other interests associated with

4 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 44-9-12(a) (interest initially must “be

held as security for the repayment of the purchase price with all

intervening costs” plus interest).

9

ownership.5 The lienholders were entitled to only

collect the tax debt with costs and 12% interest, plus

a 10% penalty.6 After one year of holding the lien, the

investors then could seek foreclosure and take fee

simple title if the debt remained unpaid. R.I. Gen.

Laws Ann. § 44-9-19. The unusual auction procedure

cannot transform an unconstitutional taking into a

lawful confiscation.

Respondents may argue that Rhode Island’s

system nevertheless protects debtors by auctioning

tax liens to the buyer who offers to take the smallest

percentage ownership of the property if the lien is not

paid in time. As noted, these “bid down” sales for

something other than fee simple title are generally not

commercially reasonable and attract little or no

competition in some jurisdictions. Picerne, 113 R.I. at

603 n.7.

But even if in some municipalities, Rhode Island’s

“bid down” statute might sometimes result in

competitive sales that protect equity, the alleged facts

suggest the sales here failed to do so. That such

valuable properties were transferred in their entirety

for only the cost of the tax debts suggests that these

auctions were insufficient to satisfy the Takings

Clause. See Slater v. Maxwell, 73 U.S. 268, 276 (1867)

(Because tax sales present “a great temptation” to

corruption, they must be “closely scrutinized” to

ensure they are conducted “not merely . . . in

conformity with requirements of the law, but that they

5 The purchaser of the lien does not have “any right to either the

possession, or the rents or profits of the land until the expiration

of one year after the date of the sale.” R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 449-12(a).

6 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 44-9-21.

10

should be conducted with entire fairness.”); French v.

Edwards, 80 U.S. 506, 508 (1871) (tax debt statutes

are “intended for the protection of the taxpayer”). At a

minimum, this is a factual matter that the lower court

should at least address, rather than cursorily refusing

to apply Tyler.

The decision below conflicts with decisions in other

jurisdictions and allows uncompensated takings to

continue in Rhode Island. The Court should grant the

petition.

III. LAWS LIKE RHODE ISLAND’S

OVERWHELMINGLY HARM

SOCIETY’S WEAKEST MEMBERS

The decision below will most often harm owners

who are elderly, sick, or poor. See, e.g., John Rao, The

Other Foreclosure Crisis, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. 5,

9, 33, 38 (July 2012); Jennifer C.H. Francis, Comment,

Redeeming What Is Lost: The Need to Improve Notice

for Elderly Homeowners Before and After Tax Sales,

25 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 85 (2014).

Amicus Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation has

represented more than two dozen property owners

who lost homes and other real estate to confiscatory

tax foreclosures. Most of these owners, like Geraldine

Tyler herself, are elderly or otherwise struggling with

severe medical issues that interfere with their ability

to keep up with debts and notices. See, e.g., Foss v.

City of New Bedford, 621 F.Supp.3d 203, 206 (D. Mass.

2022) (confiscatory foreclosure law took an indigent

senior’s $240,000 home over a $9,626 tax debt);

Rafaeli, LLC v. Oakland Cnty., 505 Mich. 429, 437

(2020) (octogenarian owner lost home over $8.41 tax

11

deficiency); Fair, 311 Neb. at 318 (owner was caring

for wife who was dying of multiple sclerosis).

Indeed, cases filed by other firms demonstrate the

same trend. See, e.g., Coleman through Bunn v. D.C.,

70 F.Supp.3d 58, 62 (D.D.C. 2014) (elderly veteran

suffering from dementia); Wisner v. Vandelay Invs.,

L.L.C., No. A-16-451, 2017 WL 2399492, at *1–2 (Neb.

Ct. App. May 30, 2017), rev’d, 300 Neb. 825 (2018)

(elderly widow in nursing home). Even trial judges

who regularly hear tax foreclosure and related cases

have noted that those who lose their homes this way

are in especially vulnerable populations. See, e.g.,

Cherokee Equities, L.L.C. v. Garaventa, 382 N.J.

Super. 201, 211 (Ch. Div. 2005) (tax foreclosure

defendants are often “among society’s most

unfortunate.”); Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty., No. 22-166,

Joint Appendix at 51–52 (district court noting

“disproportionate impact on the poor, the elderly, the

infirm”).

This Court should grant the petition to ensure

those populations are protected from unconstitutional

confiscatory tax foreclosures.

12

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant the petition.

DATED: August 2024.

Respectfully submitted,

CHRISTINA M. MARTIN

Counsel of Record

DEBORAH J. LA FETRA

Pacific Legal Foundation

555 Capitol Mall, Suite 1290

Sacramento, CA 95814

(916) 419-7111

CMartin@pacificlegal.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Pacific Legal Foundation