Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Oxana N. Parikh, Petitioner v. Anthony G. Brown, et al.

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ORDER DENYING REHEARING

(AUG. 06, 2024)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-1111

(8:22-cv-00110-PX)

OXANA N. PARIKH, Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

ANTHONY G. BROWN; JOSEPH GRIFFIN; LYNN

CAUDLE PENDLETON; JAMES J. DEBELIUS, De­

fendants - Appellees

ORDER

The petition and supplemental petition for rehear­

ing en banc was circulated to the full court. No judge

requested a poll under Fed. R. App. P. 35. The court

denies the petitions for rehearing en banc.

For the Court

Is/ Nwamaka Anowi. Clerk

2a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNREPORTED DECISION

(MAY 30, 2024)

OXANA N. PARIKH, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ANTHONY G. BROWN; JOSEPH GRIFFIN; LYNN

CAUDLE PENDLETON; JAMES J. DEBELIUS, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 23-1111.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 21, 2024.

Decided: May 30, 2024.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Paula Xinis, Dis­

trict Judge. (8:22-cv-00110-PX).

Oxana N. Parikh, Appellant Pro Se.

Kathryn Elizabeth Hummel, OFFICE OF THE AT­

TORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore,

Maryland; James Debelius, CLIFFORD, DEBELIUS

& BOYNTON, CHTD., Gaithersburg, Marylan, for Ap­

pellees.

Before AGEE and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and KEE­

NAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

3a

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by

unpublished per curiam opinion.

UNPUBLISHED

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in

this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Oxana Pari kb appeals the district court's order

dismissing her amended complaint against Brian

Frosh, the former Attorney General of Maryland, [*]

and Joseph Griffin, the Register of Wills for Montgom­

ery County, Maryland, as barred by the Eleventh

Amendment; dismissing her action against James J.

Debelius and Lynn Caudle Pendleton as barred by res

judicata; and imposing a prefiling injunction. In her

amended complaint, Parikh raised claims under 42

U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983 and Maryland state

law alleging unlawful interference with her right to

make and enforce contracts, interference with her

property rights, violations of her right to equal protec­

tion, defamation, and fraudulent misrepresentation,

all in connection with the administration of her former

father in-law's estate in state court. Parikh challenges

every aspect of the court's order. We affirm in part, va­

cate the portion of the order imposing sanctions, and

remand for further proceedings.

We review de novo a district court's dismissal of

an action as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 542 (4th Cir.

2014). "The Eleventh Amendment immunizes states

from suits seeking money damages." Adams v. Fergu­

son, 884 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 2018). "This immunity

4a

also applies to judgments against a public servant in

his official capacity." Id. (cleaned up). "In contrast, the

Eleventh Amendment does not bar an award of dam­

ages against an official in his personal capacity." Id. at

225 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although

Parikh's amended complaint named both state offi­

cials in their official "and/or" individual capacities, the

Supreme Court has cautioned against "allowing an ac­

tion to proceed simply because the complaint names a

state official in his or her individual capacity." Martin

v. Wood, 772 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2014). Indeed,

"the mere incantation of the term 'individual capacity'

is not enough to transform an official capacity action

into an individual capacity action." Adams, 884 F.3d

at 225 (internal quotation marks omitted). When a

plaintiff states in a complaint that she is bringing an

individual-capacity suit, we ask whether anything "in

the remainder of the complaint, or in the record, un­

dermines [that] clear statement" and shows that the

state is the real party in interest. Id. Upon review of

the record, we conclude that the remainder of the

amended complaint alleged claims against Frosh and

Griffin only in their official capacities and that the

state was the real party in interest. See id. Thus, sov­

ereign immunity requires dismissal of the claims un­

less an exception applies. See id.

Parikh argues that her claims should proceed

pursuant to the exception in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.

123 (1908). Under Ex Parte Young, sovereign immun­

ity under the Eleventh Amendment does not extend to

suits against state officials seeking prospective injunc­

tive or declaratory relief designed to correct an ongo­

ing violation of federal law. Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass'n,

248 F.3d 275, 292 (4th Cir. 2001). But "this exception

5a

does not apply when the alleged violation of federal

law occurred entirely in the past"; it applies only when

"(1) the violation for which relief is sought is an ongo­

ing one, and (2) the relief sought is only prospective."

Wicomico Nursing Home v. Padilla, 910 F.3d 739, 747

(4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Parikh sought a declaratory judgment stating that she

was discriminated against during the state court pro­

ceedings, her full inheritance under the terms of her

father-in-law's original will, and money damages. Be­

cause such relief is retrospective in nature, Ex Parte

Young does not apply.

Turning to whether principles of res judicata

barred Parikh's claims against Debelius and Pend­

leton, we again review the question de novo. Provi­

dence Hall Assocs. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 816 F.3d

273, 276 (4th Cir. 2016). Under the doctrine of res ju­

dicata, or claim preclusion, parties are prevented

"from raising issues that could have been raised and

decided in a prior action—even if they were not actu­

ally litigated." Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel

Fashions Grp., Inc., 590 U.S. 405, 412 (2020). If a sub­

sequent suit "advances the same claim as an earlier

suit between the same parties, the earlier suit's judg­

ment prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses

to, recovery that were previously available to the par­

ties, regardless of whether they were asserted or de­

termined in the prior proceeding." Id. (internal quota­

tion marks omitted).

For res judicata to apply, there must be "(1) a

final judgment on the merits in a prior suit; (2) an

identity of the cause of action in both the earlier and

the later suit; and (3) an identity of parties or their

privies in the two suits." Providence Hall Assocs., 816

6a

F.3d at 276 (internal quotation marks omitted). The

second prong is met where "the claims in the second

matter are based upon the same cause of action in­

volved in the earlier proceeding— i.e., the claims arise

out of the same transaction or series of transactions,

or the same core of operative facts." Duckett v. Fuller,

819 F.3d 740, 744 (4th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). We

agree with the district court that Parikh litigated her

claims to finality many times and that res judicata

therefore applies to bar her claims against Debelius

and Pendleton.

Finally, we review a district court's decision re­

garding Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions for abuse of dis­

cretion. Barlow v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 772 F.3d

1001, 1007 (4th Cir. 2014). Parikh argues that the

court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions

without requesting a response from her. Under the

district court's local rules, "the [c]ourt shall not grant

any motion [for sanctions] without requesting a re­

sponse." D. Md. Local R. 105.8(b); see Ortega v. Geelhaar, 914 F.2d 495, 498 (4th Cir. 1990). Here, the dis­

trict court did not request a response from Parikh as

required by the local rule before granting the Rule 11

motion and imposing the prefiling injunction. Thus,

we vacate this portion of the district court's order im­

posing sanctions and remand for further proceedings.

Accordingly, we affirm in part, vacate in part,

and remand for further proceedings on the issue of

sanctions. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately pre­

sented in the materials before this court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

7a

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND RE­

MANDED.

[*] Anthony G. Brown was sworn in as Maryland's At­

torney General on January 3, 2023, and was automat­

ically substituted for Frosh on appeal pursuant to Fed.

R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

8a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

UNREPORTED DECISION

(JAN. 09, 2023)

OXANA N. PARIKH, Plaintiff,

v.

BRIAN FROSH et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 8:22-cv-00110-PX.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

January 9, 2023.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PAULA XINIS, District Judge.

Pending before the Court are two motions to dis­

miss the Amended Complaint filed by Defendants

Brian Frosh in his official capacity as Attorney Gen­

eral, Joseph Griffin in his official capacity as Register

of Wills for Montgomery County, James J. Debelius,

and Lynn Caudle Pendleton. ECF Nos. 16 & 26. Also

pending is the Motion for Sanctions filed by Debelius

and Pendleton. ECF No. 32. All motions are fully

briefed, and no hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Loc.

R. 105.6. For the reasons that follow, the Court

GRANTS the motions to dismiss and GRANTS in part

the sanctions motion.

I. Background

9a

This dispute concerns the estate of Dr. Dinesh

0. Parikh, who left his loved ones an approximately

$1.5 million inheritance (the "Estate"). See ECF No.

12

95, 282. Dr. Parikh is survived by his spouse,

Neela, and two adult children, Tina Parikh-Smith and

Namish Parikh. ECF No. 26-3 at 2. Plaintiff Oxana N.

Parikh ("Plaintiff' or "Oxana") is the ex-wife of

Namish Parikh, and the former daughter-in-law of the

decedent. See ECF No. 12 Iff 1, 65. Under the terms of

Dr. Parikh's Last Will and Testament (the "Will"),

Oxana was named the Estate's personal representa­

tive and sole legatee. Id. Tff 57, 97, 103, 170, 303. The

Will did not provide for Neela, Tina, or Namish. Con­

sequently, the family feud over the disbursement of

the Estate has spawned tortured litigation that neces­

sitates detailed review. [1]

A. Early State Court Proceedings

The Will was probated on June 22, 2016. ECF

No. 16-2 at 1; In the Estate of Dinesh 0. Parikh, No.

W87973 ("Probate action"). Soon after, on July 11,

2016, Tina petitioned to caveat the Will and remove

Oxana as personal representative. ECF No. 16-2 Dkt.

Nos. 22 & 23; see also ECF No. 31-6. Tina alleged that

Oxana had abused her power of attorney to misappro­

priate $1.14 million from Dinesh and to fraudulently

file on Dinesh's behalf an uncontested divorce from

Neela, all during the final months of the decedent's

life. ECF No. 31-6 UU 12 — 16; ECF No. 31-7 at 2. The

Montgomery County Orphan's Court held an emer­

gency evidentiary hearing on September 9, 2016, after

which it removed Oxana as personal representative

and appointed Pendleton—a neutral third party—as

10a

Special Administrator for the Estate. ECF No. 12 Tf

304; ECF No. 16-2 Dkt. No. 61; ECF No. 26-8; ECF No.

31-10 at 74:19 —75:10.[2]

On October 6, 2016, Pendleton filed a separate

action on behalf of the Estate against Oxana and

Namish in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County

to recoup the misappropriated funds. Lynn Caudle

Boynton v. Oxana Parikh et al., No. 425847V (filed

Oct. 6, 2016) ("Circuit Court action"); see also ECF No.

26-3 at 6, 42. Pendleton moved for pre-judgment at­

tachment of the funds, which the Circuit Court

granted. Next, Pendleton and the Parikhs mediated

the matter and reached a settlement in principle, as

memorialized in a settlement agreement (the "Agree­

ment"). The Agreement required that the $1.14 million

in misappropriated funds be paid to Pendleton as Spe­

cial Administrator, who would next distribute the pro­

ceeds with roughly 57 percent to Namish and 43 per­

cent to Tina and Neela. ECF No. 26-10 Ifl 1, 3, 11.

On November 17, 2016, Oxana and Namish

agreed to return the $1.14 million into an escrow ac­

count. ECF No. 31-11 at 1. Oxana and Namish depos­

ited the funds, but otherwise they repudiated the

Agreement. They next filed counterclaims in the Cir­

cuit Court action, challenging Pendleton's actions as

Special Administrator. See ECF No. 26-16. The claims

averred that Pendleton abusively froze the deposited

funds; negligently breached her fiduciary duty to the

Estate; and that the opposing parties conspired to "in­

validate the Will, seize the personal assets of Namish

and Oxana, and distribute those ill-gotten gains in a

manner which perverts the terms of the Will." Id.

54 — 78.

11a

In response, Pendleton, Neela, and Tina moved

to dismiss the counterclaims and for summary judg­

ment in their favor regarding Oxana's breach of fidu­

ciary duty as power of attorney. Pendleton also moved

for sanctions to be imposed against Oxana and

Namish for their refusal to engage in discovery in the

Circuit Court proceedings. ECF No. 26-3 at 9. After a

hearing, the Circuit Court entered several orders that

dismissed the counterclaims, granted summary judg­

ment in Pendleton's favor on the fiduciary breach

claim, and granted Pendleton's motion for sanctions.

The Circuit Court separately ordered that the $1.14

million of the misappropriated funds be paid to the Es­

tate.

Around the same time, in the Probate action,

Tina moved to enforce the Agreement. ECF No. 16-2

Dkt. No. 112. Oxana opposed the motion, asserting an

array of far-flung arguments. ECF No. 16-2 Dkt. No.

117; see generally ECF No. 26-17. Following a hearing

April 24 and 25, 2017, the Orphan's Court granted

Tina's motion and declared the Agreement valid and

enforceable. ECF No. 16-2 Dkt. Nos. 139 — 41, 161;

see also ECF Nos. 26-9, 31-12, 31-13, 31-14, & 31-15.

Oxana reacted poorly to these adverse decisions. On

August 17, 2017, she filed an emergency motion to

transfer the Probate action to Baltimore City, arguing

that because Pendleton and her counsel, James Debelius, enjoyed close, personal relationships with several

Montgomery County Circuit Judges, she could not re­

ceive a fair trial in that court. ECF No. 16-2 Dkt. No.

167; ECF No. 26-4 at 22 — 23. Oxana also renewed her

efforts to remove Pendleton as Special Administrator.

ECF No. 16-2 Dkt. No. 180. The Circuit Court denied

the motions. ECF No. 16-2 Dkt. No. 198.

12a

For several years after, Oxana engaged in what

can only be described as vexatious and obstructive lit­

igation tactics aimed at thwarting Pendleton's efforts

to carry out her duties as Special Administrator. For

example, when Pendleton, through Debelius, filed a

routine notice of expenses report for the Estate, ECF

No. 26-12 at 3, Oxana opposed the notice, lodging base­

less accusations that she had been "wrongfully re­

moved, under suspicious circumstances" as the "sole

legatee" by "a disinherited daughter with no standing

to seek removal of the Personal Representative." ECF

No. 26-13

1, 2. In the same opposition, Oxana de­

scribed Pendleton as "a putative special administra­

tor, with a purported name of Lynn C. Boynton," and

further objected to Debelius' role in the Estate's ad­

ministration. Id.

4, 6, 8 ("[T]he putative special ad­

ministrator had no authority to hire and/or to retain

an attorney to represent her."); see also ECF No. 16-2

Dkt. Nos. 196, 219, 229, & 262 (opposing similar no­

tices). The Orphan's Court has soundly overruled each

of Oxana's objections. See, e.g., ECF No. 26-11; see also

ECF No. 16-2 Dkt. Nos. 208, 215, & 222.

Oxana also persisted in moving to oust Pend­

leton as Special Administrator and transfer both the

Probate and Circuit Court actions to Baltimore City.

ECF No. 16-2 Dkt. Nos. 239, 240, & 245; see generally

ECF No. 26-18. Particular to the Circuit Court action,

Oxana submitted a robust pleading of her grievances

against Pendleton and Debelius. ECF No. 26-18 at 7.

She called them "imposters"; accused Debelius of

"fraud" and "misrepresentation" in his representation

of Pendleton; and asserted that Pendleton "does not

exist." Id. at 7 — 8, 15, 21. She also suggested that

Debelius' advocacy had been motivated by his racial

13a

animus toward "dark-skinned immigrants." Id. at 10.

Again, the Circuit Court rejected every assertion.

Next, in the Probate action, Oxana resurrected

arguments, which the Orphan's Court had long since

rejected, to set aside the Agreement. ECF No. 16-2

Dkt. No. 328; ECF No. 26-19. She accused Debelius of

fraud and other related claims, and vilified him and

Pendleton as "liars and cheaters." ECF No. 26-19 at 3

n.3. As to Debelius specifically, Oxana argued that he

"used fake-contract obtained by perjury to obtain final

judgments in circuit court. He couldn't contain his joy;

he celebrated perjury." Id. at 21. Oxana continued,

"The truth is 'Lynn Caudle Boynton' is an unlawful

pseudonym used by 'Lynn Caudle Pendleton'" and

"since Fake-boynton is Fake, Then Unethical-debelius

is Unethical." Id. at 29, 30. Oxana also moved, again,

to challenge the Orphan's Court 2016 order that re­

moved her as personal representative. ECF No. 16-2

Dkt. No. 331; ECF No. 26-20. On October 21, 2020, the

Orphan's Court denied both petitions, along with 13

other related petitions and motions filed by the Plain­

tiff. ECF No. 16-2 Dkt. No. 340 — 54.

B. Appealing Adverse Rulings

On appeal, Oxana employed the same head­

spinning litigation strategy by separately challenging

nearly every adverse decision. On January 16, 2019,

the Appellate Court of Maryland issued the first of five

decisions rejecting Oxana's serial challenges. See gen­

erally ECF No. 26-3 (Parikh I). Parikh I consolidated

the appeals of three different orders from the Probate

action, namely the September 2016 Order dismissing

Oxana as Personal Representative and appointing

14a

Pendleton as Special Administrator; the May 2017 Or­

der enforcing the Agreement; and the August 2017 Or­

der declaring the Agreement valid and enforceable.

EOF No. 26-3 at 12. Parikh I also reviewed the various

May 2017 orders from the Circuit Court action related

to Oxana and Namish's counterclaims. Id. In total, this

consolidated appeal involved 21 questions, over 300

pages of briefing, and roughly 1600 pages of exhibits.

Id.

Ultimately, in a 60-page opinion, the Appellate

Court rejected each of Oxana's arguments. See gener­

ally ECF No. 26-3. Much of the Court's analyses

turned on its conclusion that the Orphan's Court had

not erred in finding the Agreement to be binding and

enforceable. Id. at 16 — 30, 32 — 34. Likewise, the Ap­

pellate Court found no infirmity in Pendleton's author­

ity as Special Administrator, and squarely rejected

any claim of unfair bias. Id. at 31, 41 — 46. Last, the

Appellate Court affirmed the Circuit Court's imposi­

tion of sanctions against Oxana for her discovery vio­

lations. Id. at 49 — 50.

On March 23, 2020, the Appellate Court issued

its second decision, resolving 38 questions presented

in five consolidated appeals. ECF No. 26-4 at 2 (Parikh

II). The Court again affirmed all lower court decisions

adverse to Oxana, including one denying her petition

for reinstatement as personal representative, as well

as the orders overruling Oxana's challenges to Pend­

leton's notices of payment. ECF No. 26-4 at 2, 5 — 10.

The Appellate Court specifically commented that it

had already addressed related issues in Parikh I, id.

at 11 — 15, and once again, specifically noted that "no

15a

evidence" supported Oxana's farfetched claims of "im­

propriety or personal bias" as explanations for her se­

riatim losses. Id. at 25.

On April 7, 2021, the Appellate Court issued its

third decision, which solely reviewed the Circuit

Court's January 27, 2020, order denying Oxana's mo­

tion to set aside the final judgment and transfer the

action to Baltimore City. ECF No. 26-5 at 2 (Parikh

III). The Court described Oxana's brief as "a mish­

mash of conspiracy theories and intemperate rhetoric,

so much so that it is difficult to discern actual legal

arguments." Id. at 5. The Court held that many of

Oxana's claims were "precluded from review" because

they "were or could have been decided in previous ap­

peals"; this included Oxana's allegations of fraud as to

Debelius and Pendleton. Id. at 5, 7 — 11. As to Oxana's

other contentions, the Appellate Court otherwise af­

firmed the Circuit Court decision in all respects. Id. at

16.

Also in Parikh III, the Appellate Court ad­

dressed the propriety of sanctions against Oxana. In

so doing, the Court noted Oxana and Namish's "use of

the appeals process to pursue their vexatious litigation

and meritless arguments warrants a finding of both

bad faith and lack of substantial justification." ECF

No. 26-5 at 20. Critically, the Appellate Court con­

cluded that,

Appellants devised bad faith claims of fraud,

based on personal attacks and vitriolic diatribes

against opposing parties and counsel. Appellants' alle­

gations of perjury and fraudulent ex parte communi­

cations on the part of Attorney Debelius were unsup­

ported by any credible evidence. The pursuit of the

16a

recusal of Judge Rubin and transfer of the case to Bal­

timore City was completely without merit and under­

taken primarily to harass appellees and delay the fi­

nality of the case. We struggle to characterize appel­

lants' challenges to Tina's share of the estate and SA

Boynton's 'existence' as anything short of a vengeful

crusade anchored in bad faith and pursued without

substantial justification.

Id. at 21. Accordingly, the Appellate Court determined

that the appeal was frivolous and thus granted the mo­

tion for attorney's fees and remanded to the Circuit

Court for further proceedings consistent with its deci­

sion. Id. at 22.

Next, on September 28, 2021, the Appellate

Court summarily affirmed that Oxana lacked stand­

ing to continually contest the administration of the Es­

tate in the Probate Action, and otherwise rejected all

of Namish's contentions on the merits. See ECF No.

26-6 at 4 — 6 (Parikh IV). As for sanctions, the Appel­

late Court again concluded that the appeal was "base­

less and entirely lacking in merit," and pursued "with

the purpose of intentional harassment and delay of the

administration of the estate." Id. at 14. Thus, the Ap­

pellate Court awarded "reasonable attorneys' fees for

the costs incurred in defending against this frivolous

appeal." Id.

In the most recent appeal, the Appellate Court

reviewed a "rehash of various meritless arguments

presented in their prior appeals" concerning the Cir­

cuit Court action. ECF No. 26-7 at 6 (Parikh V). The

Court also concluded that the Agreement as to each

party bearing her own litigation costs did not affect the

imposition of attorneys' fees as a sanction for litigation

17a

misconduct, and so, affirmed the Circuit Court deci­

sion to award Pendleton reasonable attorneys' fees. Id.

at 9.

C. Current State Court Litigation

Even though it has been conclusively estab­

lished that Oxana lacks standing to participate in the

Probation action, she continues to file scores of mo­

tions, repeating the same baseless claims rejected sev­

eral times over. See, e.g., In the Estate of Dinesh 0.

Parikh, No. W87973, Dkt. No. 474 (filed Oct. 20, 2022)

("Sole-Legatee in Unaltered Will and Sole-Interested

Person Ms. Oxana Parikh's Petition to Remove Im­

poster 'Lynn C. Pendleton,' Feigning To Be Personal

Representative; And, Proposed Order."). Several such

motions are pending, as is another appeal to the Ap­

pellate Court and a petition for mandamus before the

Supreme Court of Maryland. In re the Matter of the

Estate of Dinesh O. Parikh, No. CSA-REG-0807-2022

(notice of appeal filed June 28, 2022); Namish Parikh,

et al. v. Joseph M. Griffin. ROW, Montgomery Cnty.,

No. COA-MISC-0012-2022 (filed Nov. 1, 2022).

D. This Lawsuit

This suit, filed on January 14, 2022, bears the

same hallmarks of Plaintiffs frivolous and vexatious

litigation tactics that she has used in the state litiga­

tion for six long years. The Amended Complaint spans

64 pages and 387 paragraphs, all concerning the un­

derlying state actions. It also includes what appear to

be partial screenshots from the state court dockets,

out-of-context excerpts from state court decisions or

18a

filings, exhibits, and block quotes from secondary

sources on trusts and estates. See, e.g., ECF No. 12

14, 16, 22, 26, 27, 34, 56, 67, 75, 79, 142. The Amended

Complaint alleges broadly that the defendants vio­

lated her right to contract under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 &

1983 (Count I), interfered with her property rights un­

der 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 & 1983 (Count II), denied her

equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts III &

IV), and fabricated or destroyed evidence in violation

of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count V); as to Defendants Debelius and Pendleton, the Amended Complaint accuses

them of defamation (Count VI) and fraudulent misrep­

resentation (Count VII). Plaintiff seeks as relief "her

full inheritance per the Terms of Testator's unaltered

valid-Will" plus additional compensation and declara­

tory relief. ECF No. 12

376 — 86 (emphasis in orig­

inal). Defendants now ask this Court to dismiss the

claims and impose sanctions. ECF Nos. 16, 26, & 32.

II. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1) "addresses whether [the plaintiff] has a right

to be in the district court at all and whether the court

has the power to hear and dispose of his claim [.]" Hol­

loway v. Pagan River Dockside Seafood, Inc., 669 F.3d

448, 452 (4th Cir. 2012). "The plaintiff bears the bur­

den of establishing subject matter jurisdiction." Dun­

can v. Kavanagh, 439 F. Supp. 3d 576, 581 (D. Md.

2020). A defendant can challenge subject matter juris­

diction by either: (1) "'attacking the veracity of the al­

legations contained in the complaint;' or (2) 'by con­

tending that, even assuming that the allegations are

19a

true, the complaint fails to set forth facts upon which

jurisdiction is proper.'" Id. (quoting Durden v. United

States, 736 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2013)). "When a de­

fendant uses the latter method to contest subject mat­

ter jurisdiction, the plaintiff 'is afforded the same pro­

cedural protection as he would receive under Rule

12(b)(6) consideration.'" Id. (quoting Kerns v. United

States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009)).

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests

the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Presley v. City

of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006).

The Court accepts "the well-pled allegations of the

complaint as true," and construes all facts and reason­

able inferences most favorably to the plaintiff. Ibarra,

120 F.3d at 474. To survive a motion to dismiss, a com­

plaint's factual allegations "must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level [.]" Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal

citations omitted). "Threadbare recitals of the ele­

ments of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

The Court must be able to deduce "more than the mere

possibility of misconduct"; the facts of the complaint,

accepted as true, must demonstrate that the plaintiff

is entitled to relief. See Ruffin v. Lockheed Martin

Corp., 126 F. Supp. 3d 521, 526 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679), affd in relevant part, 659 F.

App'x 744 (4th Cir. 2016).

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court

may consider documents attached to the motion pro­

vided that they are "integral to and explicitly relied on

in the compliant, and when the [plaintiff does] not

challenge the document's authenticity." Wallace v.

20a

Moyer, No. CCB-17-3718, 2020 WL 1506343, at *4 (D.

Md. Mar. 30, 2020) (quoting Zak v. Chelsea Therapeu­

tics Int'l, Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 606 — 07 (4th Cir. 2015));

see also Sec'y of State for Defence v. Trimble Naviga­

tion Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007). In addi­

tion, "[a] federal district court may take judicial notice

of documents from state court proceedings and other

matters of public record in conjunction with a Rule

12(b)(6) motion without converting it to a motion for

summary judgment." Green v. Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A., 927 F. Supp. 2d 244, 246 n.2 (D. Md. 2013) (re­

viewing docket sheet from state foreclosure proceed­

ing) (citing Philips, 572 F.3d at 180); see also U.S. v.

O'Brien, 356 F. Supp. 3d 518, 521 — 22 (D. Md. 2018)

(taking judicial notice of probate proceedings). [3]

Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court

must give her pleadings an especially charitable read­

ing so to let all potentially viable claims proceed on the

merits. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

But "even a pro se complaint must be dismissed if it

does not allege a 'plausible claim for relief.'" Forquer

v. Schlee, No. RDB-12-969, 2012 WL 6087491, at *3

(D. Md. Dec. 4, 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

Ultimately, a complaint must "permit the court to in­

fer more than the mere possibility of misconduct based

upon its judicial experience and common sense." Cole­

man v. Md. Ct. App., 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679) (internal quotes and

alterations omitted).

III. Analysis

21a

The Court turns first to those arguments that

implicate its jurisdiction to hear the case.

A. Claims Barred by Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

All defendants contend that the claims are

barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The

Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes litigation of "cases

brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries

caused by state-court judgments rendered before the

district court proceedings commenced and inviting dis­

trict court review and rejection of those judgments."

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544

U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The doctrine derives from the

rule that the power to review state court decisions lies

not with a federal district court, but rather "exclu­

sively with superior state courts and, ultimately, the

United States Supreme Court." Plyler v. Moore, 129

F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997); see 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

That said, the Court must construe the RookerFeldman doctrine narrowly; it does not bar federal

courts from considering "the same or a related ques­

tion [that] was earlier aired between the parties in

state court," so long as the movant is not seeking "re­

view of the state court judgment itself[.]" Thana v. Bd.

of License Comm'rs for Charles Cnty., Md., 827 F.3d

314, 320 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Elyazidi v. SunTrust Bank, 780 F.3d

227, 233 (4th Cir. 2015). So even if this Court's deci­

sion "may call into question the correctness of a state

court judgment," that alone does not deprive the court

of jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman. Vicks v. Ocwen

Loan Servicing, LLC, 676 F. App'x 167, 169 (4th Cir.

2017).

22a

Although the Amended Complaint overlaps sig­

nificantly with matters raised in the state court ac­

tions, adjudication of the claims does not require this

Court to sit in review of the state court proceedings.

Vicks, 676 F. App'x at 169. Plaintiff is challenging al­

leged misconduct by Defendants, not by the state

courts. Thus, the claims do not implicate Rooker-Feldman. Dismissal is denied on that ground.

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity as to Frosh and

Griffin

Defendants Frosh and Griffin argue that, as

agents of the state, they are immune from suit under

the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Consti­

tution. See ECF No. 16-1 at 8 — 10. The Eleventh

Amendment generally prohibits citizen suits against

states or state agents in federal court. Bd. of Trustees

of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001);

Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71

(1989) ("[A] suit against a state official in her or her

official capacity is not a suit against the official but ra­

ther is a suit against the official's office."); see also Re­

gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429

(1997). Because Eleventh Amendment immunity "is

an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to

liability," it must be addressed in advance of reaching

the merits of the claims. Constantine v. Rectors & Vis­

itors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 482 (4th

Cir. 2005). Defendants bear the burden of demonstrat­

ing that the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against

them. Hutto v. S.C. Retirement Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 543

(4th Cir. 2014).

23a

As state officials, Frosh and Griffin presump­

tively enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit

for acts taken in their official capacities. See Sikes v.

Ward, No. TDC-16-4108, 2017 WL 6055686, at *4 (D.

Md. Dec. 6, 2017). Further, the Court sees no basis to

apply any of the well-recognized exceptions to Elev­

enth Amendment immunity here. Plainly, Congress

has not limited or abrogated immunity for any of the

statutory causes of action. See Lee-Thomas v. Prince

George's Cnty. Public Schools, 666 F.3d 244, 249 (4th

Cir. 2012). Nor have Frosh or Griffin waived their pro­

tections against federal suit. See id.

As to the final exception, that articulated in Ex

Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), Frosh and Griffin's

mere status as state officials does not trigger its appli­

cation. The Ex Parte Young exception provides that

state officers may be subject to federal suit where the

plaintiff seeks "prospective relief from ongoing viola­

tions of federal law." Allen v. Cooper, 895 F.3d 337, 354

(4th Cir. 2018). Importantly, however, Ex Parte Young

applies only where a "special relation" exists between

the state official and the allegedly unlawful conduct.

See McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 399 (4th

Cir. 2010) (quoting Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157);

that is, the state official must have "proximity to and

responsibility for the challenged state action [.]" Id.

(quoting S.C. Wildlife Fed'n v. Limehouse, 549 F.3d

324, 333 (4th Cir. 2008)). Mere "[gjeneral authority to

enforce the laws of the state is an insufficient ground

for abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity."

Wright v. N.C., 787 F.3d 256, 262 (4th Cir. 2015) (quot­

ing S.C. Wildlife Fed'n, 549 F.3d at 333).

The Amended Complaint avers solely that

Frosh "is responsible for the laws and legal procedures

24a

within the State" and "exercise[s] oversight and ad­

ministers] the proper administration of decedents' es­

tates in Montgomery County." ECF No. 12

9, 19.

From this, the Amended Complaint blames Frosh for

Pendleton's appointment as Special Administrator for

the Estate and for all consequential adverse events

flowing from her appointment. See generally ECF No.

12. But no facts make plausible that Frosh, as Mary­

land Attorney General, had any connection with this

matter whatsoever. Occupying the office of Attorney

General alone does not suffice. See McBurney, 616

F.3d at 399 — 402 (dismissing suit where Virginia At­

torney General lacked "special relation" to challenged

statute); cf. Sikes, 2017 WL 6055686, at *5 (dismissing

suit against General Frosh because he "has neither

proximity to nor responsibility for the enforcement of

Maryland's foreclosure laws").

As to Griffin, Plaintiff similarly attempts to

hold him liable because, as Register of Wills, he "is re­

sponsible for the proper, lawful, and timely admin­

istration of all estates within Montgomery County,"

and because he issued letters regarding Pendleton's

appointment. ECF No. 12

10, 26 — 27, 79. Plain­

tiffs liability theory sweeps too broadly. As to the Es­

tate, Griffin is akin to a clerk of the court. Md. Code

Ann., Est. & Trusts § 2-201(b). In that capacity, he acts

under the direction of the Orphan's Court to issue and

process letters and orders as directed. See Md. Code

Ann., Est. & Trusts § 2-208(e). This general authority,

however, does not confer any specific responsibility

for, or proximity to, Plaintiffs removal from the Estate

or any related adverse action. Because no exception to

Eleventh Amendment immunity reaches Frosh and

Griffin, [4] the claims as to them must be dismissed.

25a

The Court next turns to Pendleton and Debelius' separate challenges.

C. Claims Barred as Res Judicata

Defendants Debelius and Pendleton urge dis­

missal of the Amended Complaint because all claims

raised in this litigation "were or should have been

raised" in the state cases. See ECF No. 26-1 at 5 — 6,

28 — 29. The Court construes the argument as one of

claim preclusion—that because the claims were or

could have been raised in the prior suits, Plaintiff is

barred from raising them now. Although res judicata

is customarily an affirmative defense, the Court may

reach the question on a motion to dismiss when the

complaint and the prior state court docket make its

application clear. See Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494

F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007). For the following rea­

sons, res judicata squarely applies and demands dis­

missal of the claims against Pendleton and Debelius.

Res judicata prevents parties from "relitigating

an identical issue with the same party or his privy" af­

ter having had a full and fair opportunity initially to

press their claims. Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Wil­

son, 519 F.3d 156, 161 — 62 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326

(1979)). Res judicata bars the later-filed action when

(1) the parties or their privies in both suits are identi­

cal; (2) the claims in the new suit were or could have

been brought in the original suit; and (3) the claims in

the original suit reached a final judgment on the mer­

its. See Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc., 519 F.3d at 162.

26a

When viewing the Complaint and the state court dock­

ets most favorably to Plaintiff, res judicata clearly bars

this suit.

First, this action involves the same parties as

the underlying state court proceedings. Pendleton and

Oxana were parties to the Circuit Court action which

challenged the propriety of Pendleton's role as Special

Administrator. ECF Nos. 26-16, 26-18, & 26-3. Debelius, as Pendleton's counsel, was in privity with Pend­

leton during the state court actions. A non-party is

considered in privity with a party to litigation when

the non-party is so "identified in interest with a party

to former litigation that he represents precisely the

same legal right in respect to the subject matter in­

volved.'" Martin v. Am. Bancorporation Retirement

Plan, 407 F.3d 643, 651 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Jones

v. SEC, 115 F.3d 1173, 1180 (4th Cir. 1997)). Privity

does not automatically exist "with respect to every at­

torney-client interaction" but attorneys may share

privity with clients depending on the closeness of the

relationship. Weinberger v. Tucker, 510 F.3d 486, 492

— 93 (4th Cir. 2007); Here, Debelius represented

Pendleton in the mediation and later testified as a wit­

ness on behalf of the Estate as to the formation of the

Agreement. ECF No. 31-12 at 66 — 97. Further, in the

proceedings below, Plaintiff repeatedly raised that

Debelius engaged in fraud and misrepresentation.

See, e.g., ECF No. 26-18 at 21 — 23. Thus, because

Pendleton and Debelius share a close relationship and

similar interests in representing the Estate, the first

res judicata prong is satisfied.

Second, the Amended Complaint recycles the

same basic claims pursued in the previous actions. For

res judicata purposes, the test is "whether the claim

27a

presented in the new litigation 'arises out of the same

transaction or series of transactions as the claim re­

solved by the prior judgment.'" Laurel Sand & Gravel,

Inc., 519 F.3d at 162 (quoting Pittston Co. v. United

States, 199 F.3d 694, 704 (4th Cir. 1999)). "[N]ewly ar­

ticulated claims based on the same transactional nu­

cleus of facts may still be subject to a res judicata find­

ing if the claims could have been brought in the earlier

action." Id. (citing Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.

Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1078

(9th Cir. 2003)). In this action, Plaintiff finds fault

with Pendleton as the Special Administrator and

raises the same identical issues at the heart of the

state court proceedings. Compare ECF No. 12, with

ECF No. 26-3. Plaintiff accuses Pendleton and Debelius of the same fraud, misrepresentation, and self­

dealing that she did in her petitions to remove the Cir­

cuit Court action to Baltimore City and set aside ear­

lier judgments in the Probate action. See generally

ECF Nos. 26-18, 26-19, & 26-20; ECF No. 26-5 at 7 —

11. Thus, Plaintiffs claims here were or could have

been brought in the earlier suit.

Third, Plaintiff has litigated her claims to final

judgment in the state courts many times over. "The

standard of finality for res judicata purposes is similar

to the standard of finality for purposes of appeal."

Torkornoo v. Helwig, No. TDC-15-2652, 2017 WL

4898260, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 27, 2017) (citing Cook v.

State, 281 Md. 665, 668 — 70 (1978)). In the probate

context, final judgments "of an Orphans' Court are

those judgments, orders, decisions, etc. which, in ca­

veat proceedings, finally determine the proper parties,

the issues to be tried and the sending of those issues

to a court of law." See Schlossberg v. Schlossberg, 275

28a

Md. 600, 612 (1975) (defining "final judgment" for pur­

poses of determining appellate jurisdiction). Thus, an

order appointing a special administrator is a final

judgment. See Carrick v. Henley, 44 Md. App. 124,129

— 30 (1979). Likewise, the orders enforcing the settle­

ment agreement are considered final. See Jones v.

Hubbard, 356 Md. 513, 525 (1999). Lastly, the Circuit

Court decision rejecting Plaintiffs claims that impli­

cated Debelius was clearly final, and it was affirmed

by the Appellate Court. In short, res judicata clearly

bars all claims as to Pendleton and Debelius. The

claims must be dismissed on this ground alone.

D. Claims Fail as a Matter of Law

Although the claims are barred by res judicata,

Plaintiffs inherently litigious disposition prompts the

Court to address briefly why even if the doctrine of res

judicata did not apply, the Amended Complaint fails

to state a legally cognizable claim.

i. Counts I — V

For Counts I through V, Plaintiff broadly al­

leges that "Defendants discriminated against her on

the basis of race, ancestry or ethnic characteristics,"

all in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,1982, & 1983. ECF

No. 12 f 261; see also id. f f 259, 265, 268, 284, 285,

288, 298, 299, 315, 350, 355. Sections 1981 and 1982

prohibit discrimination against racial minorities with

respect to contracts, including in the employment and

retail contexts, and property. Baltimore-Clark v.

Kinko's Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698 — 99 (D. Md.

2003) (describing Section 1981 claims); Jones v. Alfred

I

29a

H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422 — 24 (1968) (contex­

tualizing Section 1982 in relation to the Thirteenth

Amendment). To proceed on either claim a plaintiff

must plausibly aver her (1) status as a racial minority;

(2) discriminatory intent by the defendant; and (3)

that the discrimination related to an activity covered

in the particular provision. Baltimore-Clark, 270 F.

Supp. 2d at 699; Hayat v. Diaz, No. 20-cv-02994-LKG,

2022 WL 252963, at *7 (D. Md. Jan. 27, 2022) (apply­

ing test to Section 1982 claims). For each claim, the

facts must also make plausible that "race was a butfor cause of the plaintiffs injury." See Gary v. Facebook, Inc., 822 F. App'x 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2020) (dis­

cussing Section 1981) (citing Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l

Ass'n of African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009,

1019 (2020)).

Despite the Amended Complaint's heft, no facts

remotely make plausible either statutory violation.

Plaintiff avers solely (and repeatedly) that she is a

"U.S. Citizen" who suffered generalized discrimination

on account of her "race, ancestry, or ethnic character­

istics." See ECF No. 12 ^ 8, 108, 109, 110, 128, 129,

135, 259, 261, 265, 268, 269, 285, 298, 299, 315, 355,

376. But she avers no facts to even suggest she is a

member of a protected race group or, more fundamen­

tally, that either defendant engaged in any adverse

conduct on account of her race. More to the point, no

facts make plausible that Debelius and Pendleton

were "solely motivated by racial animus." Id.

276.

The Amended Complaint's naked allegations of dis­

crimination are fatal to Counts I & II.

Counts III through V, the Section 1983 claims,

fail for a different but equally fatal reason. Section

1983 liability extends only to persons acting under

30a

color of law who, in that capacity, deprive an individ­

ual of the "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also

Philips, 572 F.3d at 180. Although Section 1983 liabil­

ity may extend to private persons whose actions

demonstrate a "sufficiently close nexus" with the state,

Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir.

2003), no such close nexus exists here. Simply because

Pendleton had been appointed as Special Administra­

tor does "not vest state power in the appointee in such

a way as to attribute that person's conduct to the

state[.]" Conboy v. Norwest Bank Ind., N.A., No. 941851, 1994 WL 621605, at *1 (D. Md. July 13, 1994).

No alleged acts or omissions transform purely private

conduct into state action sufficient to sustain a Section

1983 claim. Thus, the Section 1983 claims as to Debelius and Pendleton must be dismissed.

Because Defendants Debelius and Pendleton

could not conceivably have acted "under color of law,"

any further amendment of the Section 1983 claim

would be futile. See Innocent v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon,

No. PWG-15-951, 2016 WL 386222, at *3 (D. Md. Feb.

2, 2016) (citing Curry v. Farmer, 2 F.3d 1149 (Table),

1993 WL 311947, at *1 n.* (4th Cir. 1993)). Similarly,

nothing in the five appellate decisions, dozens of court

orders, and hundreds of related pleadings and tran­

script pages, if added to a proposed second amended

complaint, could make plausible that Plaintiff was the

victim of but-for racial discrimination. Accordingly,

these claims are dismissed with prejudice.

ii. Count VI

31a

For the defamation claim in Count VI, Plaintiff

points to two statements that were made in the state

litigation concerning some alleged "incestuous rela­

tionship." ECF No. 12

358, 359. The first, uttered

in 2018, is clearly time barred. Indeed, Plaintiff con­

cedes that suit must be brought within one year from

the date the claim accrues. Id. 357; see also Md. Code

Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-105. Thus, that allegation

is dismissed on limitations grounds alone.

Plaintiff also appears to challenge an array of

more recent statements. As to those claims, the Court

starts with the elements of common law defamation.

In Maryland, defamation occurs where "(1) the defend­

ant made a defamatory statement to a third person (a

requirement known as publication); (2) the statement

was false; (3) the defendant was legally at fault in

making the statement; and (4) the plaintiff thereby

suffered harm." Doe v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys.

Corp., 274 F. Supp. 3d 355, 365 (D. Md. 2017) (citing

Gohari v. Darvish, 363 Md. 42 (2001)). Even if an of­

fending statement meets the criteria for defamation,

where the alleged defamatory statements are "words

spoken or written in the course of a judicial proceed­

ing," the declarant is shielded from liability "so long as

the words are relevant to the proceeding." O'Brien &

Gere Engineers, Inc. v. City of Salisbury, 222 Md. App.

492, 508 (2015) (citing Norman v. Borison, 418 Md.

630, 650 (2011)).

Here, the Court seriously questions whether the

offending statements are defamatory as a matter of

law. But even if they were, the underlying litigation as

incorporated into the Amended Complaint leaves no

doubt that each of the alleged statements were also

32a

connected to the underlying judicial proceedings re­

lated to the Estate.

Plaintiff alleges that Pendleton and Debelius

published accusations of an "incestuous sexual rela­

tionship with her former father-in-law" on January 11,

2022. ECF No. 12 If 358. That was the same date on

which Pendleton and Debelius filed their fourth peti­

tion for attorney's fees in the Probate action. ECF No.

16-2 Dkt. No. 440. Plaintiff also alleges that Pendleton

and Debelius falsely referred to her as the "true sur­

viving spouse" of the decedent, including in a "pro­

posed order." ECF No. 12

126, 127, 360, 361. Plain­

tiff alleges that Pendleton and Debelius falsely refer to

Neela the true wife and legatee. ECF No. 12

136,

362. In all events, these offending statements appear

in state court filings concerning the Estate litigation.

Moreover, all allegedly offending statements

are relevant to the Probate action. Determining the

identity of the decedent's "true surviving spouse" is a

highly relevant inquiry because a surviving spouse

may elect to take a statutory share of the Estate. See

Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts § 3-403. Neela ulti­

mately received a share of the Estate under the terms

of the Agreement, ECF No. 26-10 at 1, and the Appel­

late Court affirmed the enforceability of that arrange­

ment in Parikh I. ECF No. 26-3 at 13 — 29. Similarly,

parsing Plaintiffs exact relationship to the decedent is

essential to determining whether she is an "interested

person" in the administration of the Estate. Md. Code

An.., Est. & Trusts § 101(i)(l). To the extent Pendleton

and Debelius have summarized or quoted offensive

language throughout the state court proceedings, do­

ing so was relevant to their requests made to the state

courts for various forms of relief.

33a

At bottom, the allegedly defamatory statements

that Plaintiff highlights all revolve around the compli­

cated web of relationships in the Parikh family and the

lengthy litigation that has plagued the administration

of this Estate. Further, because all allegedly defama­

tory statements concerning Plaintiff took place in con­

nection with six years of underlying state court litiga­

tion, the Court cannot discern how Plaintiff could cure

the pleading defects. Thus, the defamation claims are

dismissed with prejudice.

iii. Count VII

Last, the Court considers Plaintiffs fraudulent

misrepresentation claim (Count VII). To survive chal­

lenge, the Amended Complaint must make plausible

that a defendant (1) made a false representation to the

plaintiff, (2) with knowledge of its falsity or with reck­

less indifference as to its truth, (3) the misrepresenta­

tion was made for the purpose of defrauding the plain­

tiff, (4) the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation

and had the right to rely on it, and (5) the plaintiff suf­

fered compensable injury as a result. DiFranco v.

Green Tomato, LLC, No. 2305, 2018 WL 3202983, at

*10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. June 29, 2018).

Plaintiff cites a litany of purported statements

made in connection with the underlying state litiga­

tion. Putting to one side whether the challenged state­

ments were false or fraudulent, no facts make plausi­

ble that Plaintiff relied on the misstatements to her

detriment. In fact, she contends quite the opposite—

that she disputes now, as she did then, the veracity of

the statements made to the Court and thus, never re­

lied on them for anything. Compare ECF No. 12

111

34a

— 24 (describing Pendleton's alleged misrepresenta­

tions as Special Administrator), with ECF No. 16-2

Dkt. Nos. 61 & 63 (immediately noticing appeal of Or­

phan's Court Order appointing Pendleton). Because

Plaintiff cannot make plausible any allegation of det­

rimental reliance, DiFranco, 2018 WL 3202983 at *10,

the claim must be dismissed with prejudice.

IV. Sanctions

The Court finally turns to Defendants Debelius

and Pendleton's separate Rule 11 motion for sanctions

against Plaintiff. ECF No. 32. Given the tortured his­

tory of this litigation, Debelius and Pendleton under­

standably seek a prefiling injunction against Plaintiff

as well as their attorneys' fees and costs in defending

the matter. ECF No. 32 at 11. Defendants, as required

by Rule 11, provided notice of intention to seek sanc­

tions more than twenty-one days prior to filing the mo­

tion with the Court. See generally ECF No. 32-1. The

question of sanctions, therefore, is properly before the

Court.

Under Rule 11, federal courts retain authority

to sanction litigants for filings made with an "im­

proper purpose, such as harassment, delay, or coer­

cion." Fastov v. Palisades Swimming Pool Assoc., Inc.,

et al., No. AW-05-1760, 2006 WL 4560161, at *7 (D.

Md. Jan. 31, 2006) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11). Rule 11

expressly applies to pro se litigants, but the court must

exercise "sufficient discretion to take account of the

special circumstances that often arise in pro se situa­

tions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to

1983 amendment (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519 (1972)). "[U]se of such measures against a pro se

35a

plaintiff should be approached with particular caution

and should remain very much the exception to the gen­

eral rule of free access to the courts." Cromer v. Kraft

Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 818 (4th Cir. 2004)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Pre-filing injunctions are available to courts

"where vexatious conduct hinders the court from ful­

filling its constitutional duty." Whitehead v. Viacom,

233 F. Supp. 2d 715, 726 (D. Md. 2002), affd sub nom.

Whitehead v. Viacom, Inc., 63 F. App'x. 175 (4th Cir.

2003); Cromer, 390 F.3d at 818 (noting that courts

may limit a litigant's access as a sanction for "a liti­

gant's continuous abuse of the judicial process by filing

meritless and repetitive actions."). A pre-filing injunc­

tion is valid so long as it does not "effectively deny ac­

cess to the courts, and the district court must give the

litigant notice and the opportunity to be heard prior to

granting the injunction." Whitehead, 233 F. Supp. 2d

at 726.

Courts consider four factors when weighing the

propriety of a pre-filing injunction: "(1) the party's his­

tory of litigation, in particular whether [the party] has

filed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits; (2)

whether the party had a good faith basis for pursuing

the litigation, or simply intended to harass; (3) the ex­

tent of the burden on the courts and other parties re­

sulting from the party's filings; and (4) the adequacy

of alternative sanctions." Cromer, 390 F.3d at 818 (cit­

ing Safir v. United States Lines, Inc., 729 F.2d 19, 24

(2d Cir. 1986)). "Ultimately, the question the court

must answer is whether a litigant who has a history of

vexatious litigation is likely to continue to abuse the

judicial process and harass other parties." Safir, 792

F.2d at 24; see also Cromer, 390 F.3d at 818. If the

36a

court determines a pre-filing injunction is the appro­

priate remedy, "the judge must ensure that the injunc­

tion is narrowly tailored to fit the specific circum­

stances at issue." Cromer, 390 F.3d at 818.

Here, each factor weighs in favor of imposing

the requested injunction. First, although Plaintiff ap­

pears for her first time in federal court, [5] she has

bombarded the state courts and Defendants with friv­

olous motions, petitions, and appeals for six years. See

generally ECF No. 16-2. In two separate decisions, the

Appellate Court has explained the propriety of sanc­

tions to address Plaintiffs "vexatious litigation and

meritless arguments," and "frivolous appeals" brought

with "bad faith and lack of substantial justification."

ECF No. 26-5 at 20; see also ECF No. 26-6 at 13 — 14.

Yet undeterred, Plaintiff now turns her sights on this

Court to resurrect the same claims against the same

defendants. In short, Plaintiffs litigation history

strongly supports the requested prefiling injunction.

Second, Plaintiffs pressing of the same argu­

ments rejected time and again constitutes bad faith.

Whether it be to hurl unsupported invective at Pend­

leton and Debelius, see, e.g., ECF No. 12 ^ 66, 110,

or maintain her right to contest the Estate, id. ^ 103,

138, 164, 170, 205, 208, 209, 211, her arguments have

all been raised and rejected time and again. This fac­

tor, too, supports a pre-filing injunction.

Third, Plaintiff has been sanctioned in state

court on more than one occasion, ECF Nos. 26-5 at 21,

26-6 at 14, & 26-7 at 9, and yet continues her buckshot

approach to persist in her frivolous litigation. For

these reasons, nothing short of a pre-filing injunction

will deter her from similar vexation litigation in the

37a

future. Because a pre-filing injunction's aim is to elim­

inate only frivolous actions, Plaintiff will still have ac­

cess to the courts, but as to future litigation concerning

this matter, she will need advance leave of the Court

before she may file suit. Whitehead, 233 F. Supp. 2d

at 726; see also Cromer, 390 F.3d at 817.

Pendleton and Debelius also seek attorneys'

fees. Although the Court sympathizes with the time

and expense that Plaintiffs seriatim litigation has cost

Defendants, the Court will not impose monetary sanc­

tions at this juncture. Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting pro­

vision. See In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 522 (4th Cir.

1990) (Rule 11 sanctions "should not blindly he used to

shift fees."). Nor have similar sanctions, imposed in

the Circuit Court action, worked to chill Plaintiffs vex­

atious approach to litigation. In the Court's view, the

prefiling injunction most effectively addresses Plain­

tiffs abuse of process and best deters future miscon­

duct. See id. at 523 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[I]t is clear that

the primary, or 'first' purpose of Rule 11 is to deter

future litigation abuse."). Nevertheless, the Court

warns Plaintiff that should she continue to clog the

docket with additional baseless pleadings, the Court

will not hesitate to revisit the requested monetary

sanctions.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DIS­

MISSES the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 12);

GRANTS the motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 16 & 26);

and GRANTS in part the motion for sanctions (ECF

No. 32). A separate Order follows.

38a

[1] The Court considers "allegations in the [amended] ,

complaint, matters of public record, and documents at­

tached to the motion to dismiss that are integral to the

complaint and authentic." Martynuska v. BWW Law

Grp., LLC, No. DKC-19-0660, 2020 WL 374464, at *1

n.l (D. Md. Jan. 23, 2020) (citing Philips v. Pitt Cnty.

Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009)). As al­

ways, at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court con­

strues the complaint facts as true and most favorably

to the Plaintiff. Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472,

474 (4th Cir. 1997). Also, the Court refers to the family

members by their first names to avoid confusion.

[2] Throughout the underlying state proceedings that

are the subject of this litigation, Pendleton also went

by the name "Lynn Boynton." To avoid confusion, the

Court will refer to her as Pendleton throughout this

opinion.

[3] Defendants attached exhibits from, the underlying

state court proceedings that Plaintiff references

throughout the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff does not

contest the authenticity of these documents. Dockets

from the Probate and Circuit actions are also available

online at http://registers maryland.gov/main/search

html and http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us.

[4] Griffin also enjoys "[ajbsolute quasi-judicial im­

munity" in his role as Register of Wills. See Kendrick

v. Cavanaugh, et al., No. CCB-10-2207, 2011 WL

2837910, at *4 (D. Md. July 14, 2011) (extending im­

munity to Register of Wills for Baltimore County) (cit­

ing Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1461 (D.C. Cir.

1993)).

39a

[5] Namish, however, sued Frosh in connection with

the Estate dispute, challenging the constitutionality of

Maryland's prejudgment attachment procedure.

Parikh v. Frosh, No. GJH-17-0332, ECF No. 1 (D. Md.

filed Feb. 6, 2017). This challenge that was summarily

rejected and affirmed on appeal. See generally Parikh

v. Frosh, No. GJH-17-0332, 2017 WL 4124238 (D. Md.

Sept. 15, 2017), affd 715 F. App'x 288 (Mem) (4th Cir.

2018).