Petitioners Brief — A. J. T., By and Through Her Parents, A. T. & G. T., Petitioner v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279, et al.

Supreme Court briefFeb 27, 2025

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No. 24-249

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

A.J.T., BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS,

A.T. AND G.T.,

Petitioner,

OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS,

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 279;

OSSEO SCHOOL BOARD,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

NICHOLAS ROSELLINI

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

505 Montgomery Street

Suite 2000

San Francisco, CA 94111

AMY J. GOETZ

SCHOOL LAW CENTER, LLC

520 Fifth Street South

Stillwater, MN 55082

ROMAN MARTINEZ

Counsel of Record

PETER A. PRINDIVILLE

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

555 11th Street, NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 637-3377

roman.martinez@lw.com

GRAHAM AMBROSE

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

200 Clarendon Street

Boston, MA 02116

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTION PRESENTED

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

require public entities and organizations that receive

federal

funding

provide

reasonable

accommodations for people with disabilities. In the

decision below, the Eighth Circuit held that for

discrimination claims “based on educational services”

brought by children with disabilities, these statutes

are violated only if school officials acted with “bad

faith or gross misjudgment.” Pet.App.3a. That test

arbitrarily departs from the more lenient standards

that all courts—including the Eighth Circuit—apply

to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought by

other plaintiffs outside the school setting.

The question presented is:

Whether the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require

children with disabilities to satisfy a uniquely

stringent “bad faith or gross misjudgment” standard

when seeking relief for discrimination relating to

their education.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

The following proceedings are directly related to

this petition under Rule 14.1(b)(iii):

•

A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent

School District No. 279, No. 23-1399, United

States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,

judgment entered March 21, 2024 (96 F.4th

1058), rehearing denied June 5, 2024 (2024

WL 2845774).

•

A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent

School District No. 279, No. 21-cv-1760,

United States District Court for the District of

Minnesota, judgment entered February 1,

2023 (2023 WL 2316893).

The following proceedings involve the same

parties and operative facts:

•

Osseo Area Schools, Independent School

District No. 279 v. A.J.T., No. 22-3137, United

States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,

judgment entered March 21, 2024 (96 F.4th

1062), rehearing denied May 24, 2024 (2024

WL 2702397).

•

Osseo Area Schools, Independent School

District No. 279 v. A.J.T., No. 21-cv-1453,

United States District Court for the District of

Minnesota, judgment entered September 13,

2022 (2022 WL 4226097).

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ......................................... i

RELATED PROCEEDINGS ...................................... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................v

OPINIONS BELOW ....................................................1

JURISDICTION ..........................................................1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .................1

INTRODUCTION .......................................................2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................5

A. Legal Background ........................................5

B. Factual Background ...................................13

C. Procedural History .....................................15

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT...................................20

ARGUMENT .............................................................23

MONAHAN’S

ATEXTUAL

AND

ASYMMETRIC RULE SHOULD BE

REJECTED ..........................................................23

A. The Statutory Text Establishes

Uniform Rules Governing All Claims ......24

B. Monahan Violates Section 1415(l) .............30

C. Monahan Undermines The Core Goals

Of The ADA And Rehabilitation Act ........35

D. Monahan Is Unfair And Leads To

Arbitrary Results ......................................38

E. Monahan Rested On Flawed Policy

Analysis, Not Law .....................................44

CONCLUSION ..........................................................48

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

ADDENDUM

20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) ....................................................1a

29 U.S.C. § 794(a)......................................................2a

29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) ...............................................3a

42 U.S.C. § 12132 ......................................................4a

42 U.S.C. § 12133 ......................................................5a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Alabama v. North Carolina,

560 U.S. 330 (2010) ..............................................20

Alexander v. Choate,

469 U.S. 287 (1985) .................... 3, 7, 22, 25, 37, 38

Alexander v. Sandoval,

532 U.S. 275 (2001) ................................ 8, 9, 27, 29

Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons,

552 U.S. 214 (2008) ..............................................24

Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services,

87 F.4th 822 (6th Cir. 2023) ................................28

B.M. ex rel. Miller v. South Callaway R-II

School District,

732 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2013)................................12

Babb v. Wilkie,

589 U.S. 399 (2020) ..............................................47

Baker v. Bentonville School District,

75 F.4th 810 (8th Cir. 2023) ................................43

Baker v. Bentonville School District,

610 F. Supp. 3d 1157 (W.D. Ark. 2022),

aff’d, 75 F.4th 810 (8th Cir. 2023) .......................40

Barnes v. Gorman,

536 U.S. 181 (2002) ........................................27, 29

Basta v. Novant Health Inc.,

56 F.4th 307 (4th Cir. 2022) ................................10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Bennett-Nelson v. Louisiana Board of

Regents,

431 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2005)..................................8

Brogan v. United States,

522 U.S. 398 (1998) ..............................................27

Brooks v. Colorado Department of

Corrections,

12 F.4th 1160 (10th Cir. 2021) ..............................9

C.L. v. Scarsdale Union Free School

District,

744 F.3d 826 (2d Cir. 2014) .................................11

Charles v. Johnson,

18 F.4th 686 (11th Cir. 2021) ................................9

Chenari v. George Washington University,

847 F.3d 740 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ................................9

Clark v. Martinez,

543 U.S. 371 (2005) .................................... 3, 21, 25

Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller,

P.L.L.C.,

596 U.S. 212 (2022) ..........................................7, 45

D.A. v. Houston Independent School

District,

716 F. Supp. 2d 603 (S.D. Tex. 2009) ..................42

D.A. ex rel. Latasha A. v. Houston

Independent School District,

629 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2010)..........................11, 42

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

D.E. v. Central Dauphin School District,

765 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2014) .................................10

Doe v. Osseo Area School District, ISD

No. 279,

296 F. Supp. 3d 1090 (D. Minn. 2017) ................41

Doe v. Pleasant Valley School District,

2017 WL 8792704 (S.D. Iowa Dec. 5,

2017), aff’d, 745 F. App’x 658 (8th Cir.

2018) .....................................................................41

Durham v. Kelley,

82 F.4th 217 (3d Cir. 2023)....................................8

E.W. v. School Board of Miami-Dade

County,

307 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (S.D. Fla. 2004) ................10

Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas

County School District RE-1,

580 U.S. 386 (2017) ........................................46, 47

Estate of Barnwell ex rel. Barnwell v.

Watson,

2016 WL 11527708 (E.D. Ark.

June 2, 2016) ........................................................41

Estate of Barnwell ex rel. Barnwell v.

Watson,

880 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2018)................................11

Finley v. Huss,

102 F.4th 789 (6th Cir. 2024) ................................8

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee,

555 U.S. 246 (2009) ................................................6

Florence County School District Four v.

Carter ex rel. Carter,

510 U.S. 7 (1993) ....................................................5

Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools,

580 U.S. 154 (2017) ....................... 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 25,

32, 33, 37, 47

G.C. v. Owensboro Public Schools,

711 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2013)................................11

Gati v. Western Kentucky University,

762 F. App’x 246 (6th Cir. 2019) .........................43

Gaona v. Town & Country Credit,

324 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2003)..............................17

Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School

District,

524 U.S. 274 (1998) .................................... 9, 29, 45

Gorman v. Bartch,

152 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1998)..................................7

Groff v. DeJoy,

600 U.S. 447 (2023) ..............................................47

Hall v. Higgins,

77 F.4th 1171 (8th Cir. 2023) ................................9

Halpern v. Wake Forest University Health

Sciences,

669 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2012)................................43

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Hamilton v. Westchester County,

3 F.4th 86 (2d Cir. 2021)........................................8

Hoekstra ex rel. Hoekstra v. Independent

School District, No. 283,

103 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 1996)..........................12, 43

Howell ex rel. Howell v. Waterford Public

Schools,

731 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D. Mich. 1990) ..................34

I.A. v. Seguin Independent School District,

881 F. Supp. 2d 770 (W.D. Tex. 2012).................42

I.Z.M. v. Rosemount- Apple Valley-Eagan

Public Schools,

863 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2017)................................43

Jacksonville North Pulaski School District

v. D.M.,

2021 WL 2043469 (E.D. Ark. May 21,

2021) .....................................................................40

K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified School

District,

725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013)................................7

Knox County v. M.Q.,

62 F.4th 978 (6th Cir. 2023) ...................... 4, 37, 42

Lacy v. Cook County,

897 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2018)................................10

Lartigue v. Northside Independent School

District,

100 F.4th 510 (5th Cir. 2024) ................................6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Lawrence County School District v.

McDaniel,

2018 WL 1569484 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 30,

2018) .....................................................................41

Le Pape v. Lower Merion School District,

103 F.4th 966 (3d Cir. 2024)..................................6

Loeffler v. Staten Island University

Hospital,

582 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2009) .................................10

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,

603 U.S. 369 (2024) ..............................................46

M.P. ex rel. K. v. Independent School

District No. 721,

326 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2003)................................13

Mark H. v. Hamamoto,

620 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2010)..............................10

Mark H. v. Lemahieu,

513 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2008)................................10

McMinn v. Sloan-Hendrix School District,

2018 WL 1277719 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 12,

2018) .....................................................................41

Meagley v. City of Little Rock,

639 F.3d 384 (8th Cir. 2011)..........................10, 29

Mershon v. St. Louis University,

442 F.3d 1069 (8th Cir. 2006)..............................43

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Miles v. Cushing Public Schools,

2008 WL 4619857 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 16,

2008) .....................................................................10

Monahan v. Nebraska,

687 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1982)....... 2, 11, 12, 18-21,

23, 25, 31, 33, 38, 44, 46

Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido,

586 U.S. 1 (2018) ..................................................47

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis,

601 U.S. 346 (2024) ..............................................47

N.G. v. District of Columbia,

556 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2008) ........................41

N.P. v. Kenton County Public Schools,

2023 WL 1822833 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 8,

2023) .....................................................................40

P.W. v. Leander Independent School

District,

2022 WL 19003381 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 10,

2022) .....................................................................40

Parnes v. Orange County School Board,

2024 WL 4290383 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25,

2024) .....................................................................40

Parrish v. Bentonville School District,

2017 WL 1086198 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 22,

2017), aff’d, 896 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2018) ...........41

xii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Payan v. Los Angeles Community College

District,

11 F.4th 729 (9th Cir. 2021) ..................................9

Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools,

598 U.S. 142 (2023) .................................. 37, 44, 47

Pierce v. District of Columbia,

128 F. Supp. 3d 250 (D.D.C. 2015) ........................9

Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp.,

184 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 1999)............................10

Reid-Witt ex rel. C.W. v. District of

Columbia,

486 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2020) ..........................41

Richardson v. Clarke,

52 F.4th 614 (4th Cir. 2022) ..................................8

Richardson v. Omaha School District,

2019 WL 1930129 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 30,

2019), aff’d, 957 F.3d 869 (8th Cir. 2020) ...........40

Robertson v. District of Columbia,

2025 WL 211056 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2025) .............10

S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion School

District,

729 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2013) .............................9, 10

S.F. v. Union County Board of Educatioin,

2024 WL 1316229 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 27,

2024) .....................................................................40

xiii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

S.W. v. Holbrook Public Schools,

221 F. Supp. 2d 222 (D. Mass. 2002) ..................10

SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu,

584 U.S. 357 (2018) ........................................26, 28

School Committee of Burlington v.

Department of Education of

Massachusetts,

471 U.S. 359 (1985) ................................................5

Sellers ex rel. Sellers v. School Board of the

City of Manassas,

141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998)................................11

Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit,

927 F.3d 1123 (11th Cir. 2019)............................10

Smith v. Robinson,

468 U.S. 992 (1984) ..............................................31

Sosa v. Massachusetts Department of

Correction,

80 F.4th 15 (1st Cir. 2023).....................................8

Southeastern Community College v. Davis,

442 U.S. 397 (1979) ................................................7

Tolan v. Cotton,

572 U.S. 650 (2014) ..............................................13

Torres v. Stewart County School System,

2023 WL 6368186 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28,

2023) .....................................................................40

United States v. Gonzales,

520 U.S. 1 (1997) ..................................................27

xiv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

United States v. Santos,

553 U.S. 507 (2008) .................................. 21, 25, 26

Walker v. District of Columbia,

157 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2001) ........................41

Wisconsin Community Services, Inc. v. City

of Milwaukee,

465 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2006)..................................8

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) ............................................5

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4) ...............................................16

20 U.S.C. § 1415 ..........................................................5

20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C) ...........................................17

20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) ................ 12, 20, 22, 31, 32, 34, 43

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)......................................................1

29 U.S.C. § 794(a)........................................ 3, 6, 21, 24

29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) ........................... 3, 8, 21, 26, 45

42 U.S.C. § 2000d ......................................................27

42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) ....................................................7

42 U.S.C. § 12132 ........................................ 3, 6, 21, 24

42 U.S.C. § 12133 .................................. 3, 8, 21, 26, 45

Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986) ...........20, 32

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

28 C.F.R. § 35.107 .....................................................15

28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) ..............................................7

28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) ..............................................7

28 C.F.R. § 41.53 .........................................................7

34 C.F.R. § 104.7 .......................................................15

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

Americans With Disabilities Act of 1988:

Joint Hearing on S. 2345 Before the

Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the S.

Comm. on Labor & Hum. Resources &

the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the H.

Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 100th Cong.

938 (1988) .......................................................36, 38

Americans With Disabilities Act of 1989:

Hearing on S. 933 Before the Subcomm.

on the Handicapped of the S. Comm. On

Labor & Hum. Res., 101st Cong. 223

(1989) ....................................................................35

H.R. Rep. No. 99-296 (1985) ...............................32, 33

S. Rep. No. 93-391 (1973) ..........................................35

S. Rep. No. 99-112 (1985) ..........................................32

OTHER AUTHORITIES

117 Cong. Rec. 45974 (Dec. 9, 1971) .........................37

118 Cong. Rec. 525 (Jan. 20, 1972) ...........................38

xvi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

119 Cong. Rec. 29632 (Sept. 13, 1973) ...............22, 35

131 Cong. Rec. 21391 (July 30, 1985) .................33, 36

132 Cong. Rec. 28090 (Oct. 2, 1986) .........................36

132 Cong. Rec. S15104 (Oct. 3, 1986) .......................36

135 Cong. Rec. 19895 (Sept. 7, 1989) .................22, 36

136 Cong. Rec. 17376 (July 13, 1990) .......................36

Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory

Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118

(2016) ....................................................................47

Drew Millar, Judicially Reducing the

Standard of Care: An Analysis of the

Bad Faith/Gross Misjudgment

Standard in Special Education

Discrimination, 96 Ky. L.J. 711 (2008) ...............46

Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2016) ..................26

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading

Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts

(2012) ....................................................................45

Thomas Simmons, The ADA Prima Facie

Plaintiff: A Critical Overview of Eighth

Circuit Case Law, 47 Drake L. Rev. 761

(1999) ....................................................................27

Mark C. Weber, Accidently on Purpose:

Intent in Disability Discrimination Law,

56 B.C. L. Rev. 1417 (2015) .................................27

OPINIONS BELOW

The Eighth Circuit’s decision (Pet.App.1a-5a) is

published at 96 F.4th 1058. The court’s denial of

rehearing en banc (Pet.App.44a-45a) is not published,

but available at 2024 WL 2845774. The opinion of the

United States District Court for the District of

Minnesota granting respondents’ motion for

summary judgment (Pet.App.6a-43a) is not published

but available at 2023 WL 2316893.

JURISDICTION

The Eighth Circuit entered judgment on

March 21, 2024 (Pet.App.1a-5a) and denied A.J.T.’s

timely petition for rehearing en banc on June 5, 2024

(Pet.App.44a-45a). This Court has jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Relevant statutory provisions are reproduced in

the addendum (Add. 1a-5a).

INTRODUCTION

This case raises a simple question: Do children

with disabilities seeking relief for education-related

discrimination need to satisfy a more stringent legal

test than all other plaintiffs suing under Title II of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act? The answer to

that question is emphatically no. The same standards

apply to everyone.

As a general matter, plaintiffs suing under the

ADA and Rehabilitation Act can establish a statutory

violation and obtain injunctive relief without proving

intentional disability discrimination, and they can

recover compensatory damages by proving that the

defendant was deliberately indifferent to their

federally protected rights. But over four decades ago,

in Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.

1982), the Eighth Circuit invented a more stringent

test for children with disabilities who suffer

discrimination in the school setting.

Those

plaintiffs—and only those plaintiffs—must prove that

school officials acted with “bad faith or gross

misjudgment” to establish a violation and obtain any

kind of relief whatsoever. Id. at 1170-71; Pet.App.5a

n.2.

Since then, four other circuits and many district

courts have reflexively adopted Monahan’s rule and

required children with disabilities to show “bad faith

or gross misjudgment” to prove education-related

violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.

Hundreds of children with disabilities have seen their

claims rejected under Monahan’s heightened

standard.

That standard has absolutely no basis in the

relevant statutory text. Neither the ADA nor the

Rehabilitation Act authorizes courts to impose a

uniquely stringent standard on children with

disabilities bringing claims against their schools. On

the contrary, both statutes broadly prohibit disability

discrimination and provide relief to “any person”

subjected to it. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 794(a), 794a(a)(2);

42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12133. Nothing in that text

permits exceptions or special rules making it more

difficult for children with disabilities to prove

discrimination in the school setting. Indeed, this

Court has firmly rejected the “dangerous principle

that judges can give the same statutory text different

meanings in different cases.” Clark v. Martinez, 543

U.S. 371, 386 (2005). Yet that is exactly what

Monahan requires.

It is inconceivable that when Congress enacted

laws to combat disability discrimination, it silently

singled out school-age children—perhaps the most

vulnerable subset of people with disabilities—for

disfavored treatment. And there is no reason to think

that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are violated only

if the defendant acts with bad faith or gross

misjudgment given Congress’s explicit recognition

that disability discrimination is “most often the

product, not of invidious animus” or egregious

misconduct, “but rather of thoughtlessness and

indifference—of benign neglect.” Alexander v. Choate,

469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985).

Below, the Eighth Circuit rejected ADA and

Rehabilitation Act claims brought by petitioner A.J.T.

(Ava), a teenage girl who suffers from severe epilepsy

and cognitive deficits.

The Eighth Circuit

acknowledged that Ava presented evidence showing

that her Minnesota school district had been

“negligent or even deliberately indifferent” in

steadfastly refusing reasonable accommodations that

her prior Kentucky school district had provided for

years. Pet.App.3a. Nonetheless, the court rejected

her claims because it was “constrained” by Monahan.

Id. at 4a-5a. Under the baseline standards that the

Eighth Circuit applies in ADA and Rehabilitation Act

cases outside the school setting, Ava’s evidence would

have been sufficient to survive summary judgment.

Id. at 3a. “[B]ut under Monahan,” her evidence was

“just not enough.” Id.

Remarkably, the Eighth Circuit sharply criticized

Monahan—its own precedent—for jacking up the

standard for school-age children to prove violations of

the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The court observed

that Monahan’s “judicial gloss” on the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act lacked “any anchor in statutory

text” and was built instead on misguided

“speculat[ion]” about Congress’s intent. Id. at 5a n.2.

That criticism echoed the Sixth Circuit’s recent

discomfort with its own uncritical embrace of

Monahan’s “impossibly high bar” for educationrelated claims brought by children with disabilities.

Knox County v. M.Q., 62 F.4th 978, 1002 (6th Cir.

2023). Nevertheless, the decision below concluded

that Monahan “remains the law” in the

Eighth Circuit and must be followed. Pet.App.5a n.2.

Monahan should not be the law anywhere. This

Court should enforce the plain meaning of the ADA

and Rehabilitation Act—and restore the full

protections against discrimination that Congress

granted children with disabilities. The decision below

cannot stand.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves Ava’s claims of disability

discrimination against respondents Osseo Area

Schools, Independent School District No. 279, and its

board (together, the District) under the ADA,

Rehabilitation Act, and Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act (IDEA).

The district court and

Eighth Circuit held that the District violated Ava’s

rights under the IDEA by denying her a full day of

education based on “shifting,” “pretextual,” and “not

credible” reasons.

JA468, 471, 498, 544; see

Pet.App.49a-50a. But both courts rejected Ava’s

claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act because

she could not satisfy Monahan’s heightened standard

for establishing a violation of those statutes.

A. Legal Background

1. Multiple federal laws protect children with

disabilities from education-related discrimination.

The IDEA—like its predecessor, the Education for All

Handicapped Children Act (EHA)—guarantees all

children a “free appropriate public education

[or FAPE].” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). To that end,

the IDEA ensures that children with disabilities

receive an “‘individualized education program

[or IEP]’” that “spells out a personalized plan to meet

all of the child’s ‘educational needs.’” Fry v. Napoleon

Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 158 (2017).

The IDEA creates specialized procedures for

resolving IEP-related disputes between families and

schools, 20 U.S.C. § 1415, but it allows courts to

award only limited “equitable relief,” Florence Cnty.

Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7,

15-16 (1993). Such relief may include an “injunction”

or “reimbursement” for educational expenses, Sch.

Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471

U.S. 359, 369-70 (1985). But the IDEA “d[oes] not

allow for damages.” Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch.

Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 254 n.1 (2009).

The ADA and Rehabilitation Act provide

additional protections to victims of disability

discrimination. Unlike the IDEA, which applies only

to the education of school-age children, the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act protect all Americans, both inside

and outside the school setting. As relevant here, the

ADA states that “no qualified individual with a

disability shall, by reason of such disability, be

excluded from participation in or be denied the

benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a

public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any

such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act contains a similarly phrased

prohibition that applies to recipients of federal

funding. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

Despite some “overlap in coverage” with the IDEA,

the ADA and Rehabilitation Act do different work

when it comes to primary and secondary schools’

treatment of children with disabilities. Fry, 580 U.S.

at 170-71.

Whereas “the IDEA guarantees

individually tailored educational services”—namely,

an IEP designed to ensure that the child receives a

FAPE—the ADA and Rehabilitation Act “promise

non-discriminatory access” to education. Id. A school

district can therefore “establish a FAPE in compliance

with the IDEA, while nevertheless engaging in

discriminatory conduct under the ADA [and

Rehabilitation Act].” Lartigue v. Northside Indep.

Sch. Dist., 100 F.4th 510, 521 (5th Cir. 2024); accord

Le Pape v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 103 F.4th 966,

981 (3d Cir. 2024).

The ADA and Rehabilitation Act both recognize

that failing to provide “reasonable accommodations”

that would enable people with disabilities to

“participate equally” in a given service or program is

disability discrimination. Fry, 580 U.S. at 170; see

also id. at 159-60. Indeed, since the Rehabilitation

Act became law in 1973, courts have uniformly

understood that “a refusal to accommodate the needs

of a disabled person” can “amount[] to discrimination

against the handicapped” if the requested

accommodations are reasonable. Se. Cmty. Coll. v.

Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412-13 (1979); accord Choate,

469 U.S. at 300-01 & n.21. In 1990, Congress

reaffirmed and adopted this longstanding principle

when enacting the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2)

(providing that people with disabilities are “qualified”

for public services, programs, or activities if they can

participate

with

“reasonable

modifications”);

28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (requiring “reasonable

modifications”

when

“necessary

avoid

discrimination on the basis of disability”).

Under both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act,

accommodations are reasonable so long as they do not

entail “a fundamental alteration” of the service in

question

impose

“undue

financial

[or]

administrative burdens” on the regulated party.

28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (ADA); see also id. § 41.53

(Rehabilitation Act); Choate, 469 U.S. at 300 & n.20;

K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725

F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013); Gorman v. Bartch,

152 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir. 1998).

2. The ADA and Rehabilitation Act “expressly

incorporate[]” the same “rights and remedies provided

under Title VI” of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 596

U.S. 212, 218 (2022). The ADA provides that “[t]he

remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in” the

Rehabilitation Act “shall be the remedies, procedures,

and rights this subchapter provides to any person

alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in

violation of [the ADA].” 42 U.S.C § 12133. And the

Rehabilitation Act, in turn, states that “[t]he

remedies, procedures, and rights set forth” in Title VI

“shall be available to any person aggrieved by”

disability discrimination inflicted by a person or

entity subject to the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C.

§ 794a(a)(2).

Accordingly, both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act

follow Title VI in “authoriz[ing] individuals,”

including children with disabilities, “to seek redress

for violations” by “bringing suits” for both “injunctive

relief” and “money damages.” Fry, 580 U.S. at 160;

see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279-80

(2001) (observing that “private individuals may sue”

under “Title VI and obtain both injunctive relief and

damages”). In cases outside the educational context,

the courts of appeals unanimously agree that ADA

and Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs can establish a

statutory violation—and with it, eligibility for

injunctive relief—if they show, on the merits, that the

defendant failed to provide a reasonable

accommodation to a covered person with a disability.1

1 See, e.g., Sosa v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 80 F.4th 15, 30 (1st

Cir. 2023); Hamilton v. Westchester County, 3 F.4th 86, 91

(2d Cir. 2021); Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 225-26

(3d Cir. 2023); Richardson v. Clarke, 52 F.4th 614, 619

(4th Cir. 2022); Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d

448, 455 (5th Cir. 2005); Finley v. Huss, 102 F.4th 789, 820-21

(6th Cir. 2024); Wis. Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee,

Such plaintiffs need not make any specific showing of

wrongful intent to prove a statutory violation and

obtain injunctive relief.

For compensatory damages, however, every circuit

requires “a showing of intentional discrimination.”

S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729

F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2013) (collecting cases).

Because “private individuals [may] not recover

compensatory damages under Title VI except for

intentional discrimination,” Sandoval, 532 U.S.

at 282-83, and because the ADA and Rehabilitation

Act incorporate Title VI’s rights and remedies, supra

at 7-8, ADA and Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs may not

obtain damages without proving that the defendant

acted with a wrongful state of mind. See S.H., 729

F.3d at 262.

The “vast majority” of courts hold that this intent

requirement for damages demands proof that the

defendant was, at a minimum, “deliberately

indifferent” to the plaintiff’s federally protected

rights. Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F. Supp. 3d

250, 278-79 (D.D.C. 2015) (Jackson, J.) (collecting

cases). Those courts have done so based on this

Court’s precedent adopting a deliberate indifference

standard under Title IX, which was likewise “modeled

after Title VI.” Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist.,

465 F.3d 737, 750-51 (7th Cir. 2006) (en banc); Hall v. Higgins,

77 F.4th 1171, 1180-81 (8th Cir. 2023); Payan v. L.A. Cmty. Coll.

Dist., 11 F.4th 729, 738 (9th Cir. 2021); Brooks v. Colo. Dep’t of

Corr., 12 F.4th 1160, 1167 (10th Cir. 2021); Charles v. Johnson,

18 F.4th 686, 702 (11th Cir. 2021); Chenari v. George

Washington Univ., 847 F.3d 740, 746-47 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

524 U.S. 274, 286, 290 (1998).2 This “deliberate

indifference” test requires that a defendant ignore a

“strong likelihood” that the challenged action

(or inaction) would “result in a violation of federally

protected rights.” Meagley v. City of Little Rock, 639

F.3d 384, 389 (8th Cir. 2011).

3. Although the circuits largely agree on the

standards governing ADA and Rehabilitation Act

claims outside the educational setting, they are

divided over whether those same standards apply to

children with disabilities bringing education-related

claims.

The Third and Ninth Circuits apply the same

standards in these cases as they do in all others.

Pet.17-19.3 So do various district courts sitting in

other circuits. Pet.20 n.3.4 Five circuits, though, hold

that children with disabilities seeking relief for

education-related discrimination cannot establish a

2 See, e.g., Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d

268, 275 (2d Cir. 2009); S.H., 729 F.3d at 263-64; Basta v. Novant

Health Inc., 56 F.4th 307, 316-17 (4th Cir. 2022); Lacy v. Cook

County, 897 F.3d 847, 863 (7th Cir. 2018); Meagley v. City of

Little Rock, 639 F.3d 384, 389 (8th Cir. 2011); Mark H. v.

Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 938 (9th Cir. 2008); Powers v. MJB

Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1999);

Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1134

(11th Cir. 2019).

3 See, e.g., D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260,

268-69 (3d Cir. 2014); Mark H. v. Hamamoto, 620 F.3d 1090,

1097 (9th Cir. 2010).

4 See, e.g., Robertson v. District of Columbia, 2025 WL

211056, at *11 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2025); Miles v. Cushing Pub.

Schs., 2008 WL 4619857, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 16, 2008); E.W.

v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1370-71

(S.D. Fla. 2004); S.W. v. Holbrook Pub. Schs., 221 F. Supp. 2d

222, 228 (D. Mass. 2002).

statutory violation—and thus cannot obtain either an

injunction or damages—unless they prove that school

officials acted with “bad faith or gross misjudgment.”

Pet.17-20.5

The Eighth Circuit first invented this stringent,

context-specific standard in Monahan v. Nebraska,

687 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1982). There, the court

affirmed the dismissal without prejudice of a “cryptic”

Rehabilitation Act claim alleging an “improper

educational placement.” Id. at 1169-70. To offer “a

few words [of] guidance” on remand, the court opined

that “bad faith or gross misjudgment should be

shown” before a Rehabilitation Act “violation can be

made out” in “the context of education of handicapped

children.” Id. at 1170-71. This heightened standard

requires proof that school officials departed so

“substantially from accepted professional judgment,

practice or standards as to demonstrate” that they

“actually did not base the decision on [professional]

judgment.” Est. of Barnwell ex rel. Barnwell v.

Watson, 880 F.3d 998, 1004 (8th Cir. 2018).

Monahan justified this harsh test based on a

perceived “duty to harmonize the Rehabilitation Act”

with the IDEA’s predecessor—the EHA—given that

the EHA specifically addressed the educational needs

of children with disabilities. 687 F.2d at 1171.

According to Monahan, a heightened standard was

necessary to “give each of these statutes the full play

5 See, e.g., C.L. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 744

F.3d 826, 841 (2d Cir. 2014); Sellers ex rel. Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of

the City of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1998); D.A. ex

rel. Latasha A. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 454-55

(5th Cir. 2010); G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Schs., 711 F.3d 623, 635

(6th Cir. 2013); Pet.App.5a & n.2.

intended by Congress” and achieve “what [the court]

believe[d] to be a proper balance between the rights of

handicapped children, the responsibilities of state

educational officials, and the competence of courts to

make judgments in technical fields.” Id. Monahan

therefore construed the EHA to limit the relief

available to school-age children with disabilities

under the Rehabilitation Act. Id.

The Eighth Circuit subsequently extended

Monahan’s bad-faith-or-gross-misjudgment standard

to claims brought by children under the ADA. See

Hoekstra ex rel. Hoekstra v. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 283,

103 F.3d 624, 626-27 (8th Cir. 1996).

4. Two years after Monahan, Congress amended

the EHA by enacting what is now Section 1415(l) of

the IDEA. See Fry, 580 U.S. at 161. That provision,

as amended, states in relevant part:

Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be

construed to restrict or limit the rights,

procedures, and remedies available

under the Constitution, the [ADA],

[Rehabilitation Act], or other Federal

laws protecting the rights of children

with disabilities . . . .

20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).

In other words, Congress

declared that the IDEA does not “restrict or limit” the

ability of children with disabilities to obtain relief

under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. Id.

Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit has continued to

rely on the IDEA to restrict ADA and Rehabilitation

Act relief for school-age children with disabilities by

limiting liability to cases involving “bad faith or gross

misjudgment” by school officials. See, e.g., B.M. ex rel.

Miller v. S. Callaway R-II Sch. Dist., 732 F.3d 882,

887 (8th Cir. 2013); M.P. ex rel. K. v. Indep. Sch. Dist.

No. 721, 326 F.3d 975, 981-82 (8th Cir. 2003). So have

the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits. Supra

at 10-11 & n.5 (collecting cases).

B. Factual Background

Because this case comes to the Court on the

District’s motion for summary judgment, the evidence

must be viewed “in the light most favorable to [Ava].”

Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (per curiam).

That evidence shows that the District has

systematically discriminated against Ava in violation

of the IDEA, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act.

Since Ava was six months old, she has suffered

from “a rare form of epilepsy” known as LennoxGastaut Syndrome. Pet.App.6a, 50a. Ava’s condition

severely impacts her ability to function. For example,

Ava has “significantly diminished intellectual

capacities” and she requires “assistance with

everyday tasks like walking and toileting.” Id. Ava

also suffers from “seizures throughout the day.” Id.

at 50a. Her seizures “creat[e] safety concerns and

interfer[e] with her capacity to learn.” JA515. The

seizures “are so frequent in the morning that [Ava]

can’t attend school before noon.” Pet.App.50a. From

then on, however, Ava is “alert and able to learn until

about 6:00 p.m.” Id.

Ava’s parents and physicians recognized this

pattern early on and developed a plan to help her

achieve her educational and personal goals. JA47981, 510-16. Since preschool, Ava has slept late and

avoided activities before midday. JA479-81. And

until Ava was 10 years old, educational professionals

respected these limitations. See, e.g., JA497-507.

Indeed, Ava’s public school district in Kentucky

adequately addressed her needs, including by

providing

“evening

instruction

home.”

Pet.App.50a.

In 2015, when Ava was ten years old, her family

moved to Minnesota. But her new school district

there, respondent Osseo Area Schools, refused to

provide her with the same accommodation. Id. “Year

after year,” the District “denied [Ava’s] parents’

requests for evening instruction” based on “a series of

shifting explanations.” Id. Initially, the District

“claimed that state law d[id] not require” adjusting

Ava’s instructional hours. Id. Then, the District “said

it needed to avoid setting unfavorable precedent for

itself and other districts.” Id. “And later, it said that

the home environment would be too restrictive,” while

demanding more “data” to justify a “programming

change.” Id.

All told, over her first three years in Minnesota,

Ava received only 4.25 hours of instruction per day—

just 65% of what her non-disabled peers received. Id.;

see id. at 8a. Rather than provide a full day of

professional instruction by a teacher, the District

opined that Ava’s parents “should hire a personal care

attendant after school hours.” JA495.

In 2018, the District insisted on truncating Ava’s

instructional time even further. As Ava prepared to

enter middle school, the District abruptly amended

her IEP to “cut[] back her day to about 3 hours”—less

than half of what her peers would receive.

Pet.App.51a; see id. at 8a. Despite this latest setback,

Ava’s parents continued to seek a workable

compromise with the District. They made “various

proposals to at least maintain [Ava’s] 4.25-hour day,”

including keeping her at the elementary school,

where the school day was longer. Id. at 51a. The

District rejected all of their proposals. Id.

Throughout this period, Ava’s parents repeatedly

complained to the District that its refusal to provide

Ava “a full day of school equal to her peers was

discriminatory and did not comply with” the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act. JA484, 440-41. But despite

federal regulatory requirements and a written

District policy requiring investigation of such

complaints, the District refused to investigate or

resolve these complaints. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.7; 28

C.F.R. § 35.107; JA80-83, 485.

Instead, the District claimed credit for supposedly

giving Ava an “equal opportunity” to other students,

based on its willingness to tolerate Ava’s delayed start

to the school day and its restraint in not filing a

juvenile “truancy action” against her parents. JA7073, 84.

C. Procedural History

1. After years of frustration, Ava’s parents

“[r]ealiz[ed] that an agreement [with the District] was

beyond reach,” so they filed an IDEA complaint with

the

Minnesota

Department

Education.

Pet.App.51a. An administrative law judge (ALJ) held

a five-day hearing and concluded that the District had

violated the IDEA by depriving Ava of a FAPE. See

JA450-78.

The ALJ found that the District’s “proffered

reasons” for denying her a full school day were “not

credible” and “more pretextual than real.” JA468,

471. It explained that the District’s “prevailing and

paramount consideration” had never been Ava’s “need

for instruction,” but rather its own desire “to

safeguard the ordinary end-of-the-workday departure

times for its faculty and staff.” JA468, 471-72, 475.

The ALJ accordingly ordered the District to

“revise” Ava’s IEP to include evening instruction and

other services. JA476-77. In so doing, the ALJ

rejected the District’s proposal of providing a mere

three hours of daily instructional time and instead

directed the District to provide 5.75 hours, which is

what Ava had received in Kentucky. JA444, 473-78.

The ALJ also ordered “495 hours of compensatory

educational instruction,” limiting relief to what the

ALJ believed was the proper two-year “limitations

period” under the IDEA. JA474, 477.6

2. The parties then proceeded to federal court.

The District challenged the ALJ’s IDEA ruling. For

her part, Ava sued the District under the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act.

Ava’s lawsuit under the ADA and Rehabilitation

Act sought an injunction that would “permanently

secure [her] rights to a full school day.” JA21, 24-25;

see also JA496. That injunction would also give her

“the opportunity” to participate in non-instructional

services that “typical kids get,” such as

extracurricular activities, where feasible with

reasonable accommodations for her disability. JA2,

20-25, 27-28, 318; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)

(permitting school officials to revise IEPs

“periodically”).

6 The District continued to evade its obligations after the

ALJ’s order. For example, the District “consistently cancelled

instructional sessions,” and its instructors were regularly “late.”

JA491. The District also took six months to comply with the

ALJ’s order to provide eye-gaze technology, Ava’s “most efficient

and versatile means of communication.” JA464, 491.

In addition, Ava requested “compensatory

damages” for the entire duration of her mistreatment,

invoking the six-year limitations period governing

ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought in

Minnesota. JA2, 24, 28; see also Gaona v. Town &

Country

Credit,

324

F.3d

1050,

1054-56

(8th Cir. 2003) (noting absence of express statute of

limitations under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act

and applying Minnesota’s “six-year limitations period

for personal injury actions”); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C)

(establishing a two-year statute of limitations under

the IDEA). Those damages included expenses that

would “not be fully reimbursed in the IDEA

proceedings,” such as costs of hiring outside

specialists to assist Ava with speech, walking, and

toileting. JA23-24.

The district court upheld Ava’s victory on her

IDEA claim before the ALJ. See JA542-95. The court

agreed with the ALJ that “the District’s shifting

reasons for denying the in-home instruction [Ava]

seeks to make up for the morning hours she is not in

school were never based on [Ava]’s needs.” JA544.

Rather, “when there was a conflict between [Ava’s]

need for instruction and the school’s regular hours,

the regular hours of the faculty were always the

prevailing consideration.”

JA574.

The court

criticized the District’s “steadfast[] refusal” to extend

Ava’s school day, noting that “[a]dministrative

convenience is not an excuse for impermissibly

shortening the instructional time a disabled child

receives.” JA574-75.

The district court further noted the harm

associated with the District’s unwillingness to provide

Ava a full day of instruction. It emphasized that Ava

had “lost the capacity” to “use a variety of signs that

she had used in Kentucky,” to “void on the toilet 50%

of the time,” and to “interact with peers by using

assistive technology to initiate or return a greeting.”

JA582-83.

The court ultimately held that Ava “requires more

than 4.25 hours of schooling a day to have an

educational program” that “will allow her to meet

challenging objectives.” JA595. It thus agreed that

“[e]xtending [Ava’s] instructional day until 6:00 pm

and including compensatory hours of instruction” was

“the appropriate remedy” under the IDEA. Id.

As to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, however,

the district court granted summary judgment against

Ava and in favor of the District. The court explained

that to prove a violation of those statutes under

Monahan, Ava had to show that the District had acted

with “bad faith or gross misjudgment.” Pet.App.24a25a; see Monahan, 687 F.2d at 1171. Applying

Monahan’s heightened standard, the district court

concluded that the District’s actions “did not rise to

th[at] level.” Pet.App.30a.

3. In two published opinions by Judge Kobes

issued in March 2024, the Eighth Circuit

unanimously affirmed both rulings.

See id. at

49a-57a (IDEA decision); id. at 1a-5a (ADA and

Rehabilitation Act decision).

In the IDEA ruling, the Eighth Circuit agreed that

Ava had not received a FAPE based on “[s]everal”

facts. Id. at 54a. First, Ava had made “only slight

progress in a few areas” while in the District’s care.

Id. Second, Ava “regressed in toileting” so drastically

that the District had “removed her toileting goal”

altogether, citing only a “lack of time in the short

day—not [a] lack of ability to improve.” Id. at

55a-56a. Third, “expert testimony” confirmed that

Ava “would have made more progress” with “evening

instruction.” Id. at 56a-57a. The court also sharply

criticized the District, emphasizing that its decisions

had “[n]ever been grounded in [Ava]’s individual

needs.” Id. at 57a.

Despite ruling for Ava on her IDEA claim, the

Eighth Circuit regretfully rejected her ADA and

Rehabilitation Act claims. Like the district court, the

Eighth Circuit found itself “constrained” by Monahan,

which required Ava to establish “‘bad faith or gross

misjudgment’” by the District. Id. at 3a-4a (quoting

687 F.2d at 1171). The court recognized that Ava

“may have established a genuine dispute about

whether the district was negligent or even

deliberately indifferent.” Id. at 3a. “[B]ut under

Monahan,” the court explained, “that’s just not

enough.” Id. Because her case involved “‘educational

services for disabled children,’” Ava had to “prove that

school officials acted with ‘either bad faith or gross

misjudgment.’” Id. The court held that Ava “ha[d]

failed to identify conduct clearing Monahan’s bar”—

and thus could not obtain any relief as a matter of law.

Id. at 4a-5a.

Notably, the Eighth Circuit expressed deep

discomfort with Monahan imposing “such a high bar

for claims based on educational services” brought by

children with disabilities. Id. at 5a n.2. The court

emphasized that “much less” is required “in other

disability-discrimination contexts.” Id. In every

other scenario, the court observed, “no intent [is]

required” to establish liability and obtain injunctive

relief on a “failure-to-accommodate claim,” while

“damages”

claims

require

only

“deliberate

indifference.” Id.

The Eighth Circuit conceded that Monahan’s

carve-out for school-age children with disabilities

lacks “any anchor in statutory text.” Id. Rather,

Monahan had “speculated that Congress intended the

IDEA’s predecessor”—the EHA—“to limit [the

Rehabilitation Act]’s protections” (and thus the

ADA’s). Id. But the court pointed out that “Congress

rejected [that] premise” in amendments to the EHA

enacted “just a few years later.”

Id. (citing

Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, Pub.

L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (codified at 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(l))). Despite those amendments, the Eighth

Circuit lamented, Monahan’s heightened standard

“spread like wildfire” across other courts. Id.

The Eighth Circuit concluded that Monahan has

“been questioned” by courts and commentators alike.

Id. It declared that the decision stands as “a lesson in

why” courts should not “‘add provisions’” to “‘federal

statute[s]’” that aren’t there. Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting Alabama v. North Carolina, 560

U.S. 330, 352 (2010)).

Nevertheless, the court

observed that Monahan “remains the law of [this]

circuit”—at least “for the time being.” Id.

4. In June 2024, the Eighth Circuit denied Ava’s

petition for rehearing en banc. Id. at 44a-45a. Judges

Grasz, Stras, and Kobes dissented, noting that they

would grant the petition. Id. at 44a.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164

(8th Cir. 1982), the Eighth Circuit invented a rule

stating that, unlike all other ADA and Rehabilitation

Act plaintiffs, children with disabilities seeking relief

for education-related discrimination must prove “bad

faith or gross misjudgment” to establish a statutory

violation. Id. at 1170-71. Monahan is wrong. The

ADA and Rehabilitation Act require courts to apply

the same legal standards to all plaintiffs, including

children with disabilities bringing claims arising in

the educational setting.

A. Nothing in the ADA or Rehabilitation Act

remotely suggests that those statutes apply different

legal standards to different categories of plaintiffs.

The statutes’ substantive prohibitions establish

uniform, across-the-board protections against

disability discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132;

29 U.S.C. § 794(a). And their remedial provisions

state that “any person” who suffers disability

discrimination may obtain the same relief—without

exceptions or limitations for school-age children or

anyone else. See 42 U.S.C § 12133; 29 U.S.C.

§ 794a(a)(2).

By reading the same operative language in the

ADA and Rehabilitation Act to establish a different

standard in this single factual context, Monahan

engaged in nothing less than “interpretive

contortion.” United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507,

522 (2008). This Court has firmly rejected the

“dangerous principle that judges can give the same

statutory text different meanings in different cases.”

Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005). So the

ADA and Rehabilitation Act’s plain text forecloses

Monahan’s bespoke standard uniquely disfavoring

children

with

disabilities

victimized

discrimination at school.

B. Monahan adopted its atextual rule because the

Eighth Circuit perceived a need to “harmonize” the

IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act, so as to “give each

of these statutes the full play intended by Congress.”

687 F.2d at 1170-71.

That reasoning violates

Congress’s later unambiguous command in 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(l) that “[n]othing in [the IDEA] shall be

construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures,

and remedies available” to children with disabilities

under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and other federal

laws. Construing the IDEA to restrict the relief

available to school-age children with disabilities

under other statutes is exactly what Section 1415(l)

forbids.

C. The ADA and Rehabilitation Act’s history and

purposes confirm that Monahan is deeply misguided.

Congress enacted these laws to protect “all disabled

individuals”—equally. 135 Cong. Rec. 19895 (Sept. 7,

1989) (Statement of Sen. Joe Lieberman) (emphasis

added); see, e.g., 119 Cong. Rec. 29632 (Sept. 13,

1973). And Congress recognized that disability

discrimination is “most often the product, not of

invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and

indifference—of benign neglect.” Alexander v. Choate,

469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985).

Given those legislative goals, it is clear that the

ADA and Rehabilitation Act do not treat school-age

children with disabilities worse than other plaintiffs.

And the statutes were not meant to condition

liability—for anyone—on a showing of outright

animus or severe misconduct. Monahan was plainly

wrong to require children to prove “bad faith or gross

misjudgment” to prove disability discrimination,

particularly given their special vulnerabilities and

the acute risks of lifelong harms in the educational

context.

D. Monahan’s rule is unfair and leads to bizarre

results. Its additional barrier to relief senselessly

disadvantages vulnerable children like Ava by

making it harder for them to prove ADA and

Rehabilitation Act claims. In doing so, Monahan

undermines incentives for schools to comply with

their statutory obligations in the first place. And

despite severely disadvantaging primary and

secondary students in this way, Monahan

inexplicably excuses from its heightened standard

college students bringing education-related claims for

disability discrimination. That disparate treatment

makes no sense.

E. At its core, Monahan’s asymmetric standard is

based on flawed policy, not law. Monahan purported

to seek “a proper balance between the rights of

handicapped children, the responsibilities of state

educational officials, and the competence of courts to

make judgments in technical fields.” 687 F.2d at

1171. But Congress itself struck that proper balance

by granting broad relief to all plaintiffs under the

uniform standards set forth in the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act. In any event, Monahan’s policy

concerns are themselves misguided: There is no

sound basis for singling out school-age children with

disabilities for disfavored treatment under those

statutes.

ARGUMENT

MONAHAN’S ATEXTUAL AND ASYMMETRIC

RULE SHOULD BE REJECTED

Forty-three years ago, in Monahan v. Nebraska,

687 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1982), the Eighth Circuit

offered this “guidance” to lower courts: Before a

Rehabilitation Act “violation can be made out” in “the

context of education of handicapped children,” the

plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with

“bad faith or gross misjudgment.” Id. at 1170-71.

Monahan is wrong. Courts must apply the same legal

standards to all claims brought under the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act, regardless of who the plaintiff is

or how her claims arose.

A. The Statutory Text Establishes Uniform

Rules Governing All Claims

The Eighth Circuit’s decision below correctly

recognized that Monahan’s “judicial gloss” on the

ADA and Rehabilitation Act is “without any anchor in

statutory text.” Pet.App.5a n.2. The ADA and

Rehabilitation Act’s substantive prohibitions and

remedial provisions offer “no indication that Congress

intended” for the legal standard a plaintiff must

satisfy “to turn on the type of [claim] being [brought].”

Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 220-21

(2008). Rather, they establish uniform standards

that courts must apply even-handedly—to everyone.

So the baseline rules that govern in all other ADA and

Rehabilitation Act cases must govern claims brought

children

with

disabilities

challenging

discrimination at school.

1. The ADA and Rehabilitation Act’s substantive

prohibitions create a single standard governing all

claims brought under each statute. Section 202 of the

ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a

disability shall, by reason of such disability, be

excluded from participation in or be denied the

benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a

public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any

such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act establishes a materially identical

prohibition for recipients of federal funding. See 29

U.S.C. § 794(a).

These expansive prohibitions forbid not just

actions motivated by “invidious animus” or other

egregious misconduct toward people with disabilities,

but

also

conduct

stemming

from

mere

“thoughtlessness and indifference” toward their

unique needs. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295

(1985) (addressing Rehabilitation Act).

The

provisions

accordingly

require

“reasonable

accommodations” in order “to assure meaningful

access” to public or federally funded services,

programs, and activities to which “otherwise qualified

handicapped individuals” are “entitled.” Id. at 301.

Failure to provide such accommodations violates both

statutes. See Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S.

154, 170 (2017); supra at 7. And contrary to

Monahan, nothing in either law remotely suggests

that “bad faith or gross misjudgment” must be

shown—by anyone—before a statutory “violation” can

be “made out.” 687 F.2d at 1170-71.

The text of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act’s

prohibitions gives no hint that education-related

claims brought by children with disabilities should be

treated differently from all other claims seeking relief

under the same operative provision. And this Court

has firmly rejected the “dangerous principle that

judges can give the same statutory text different

meanings in different cases.” Clark v. Martinez, 543

U.S. 371, 386 (2005). The “same word[s]” in the “same

statutory provisions” must have the same meaning,

even “in different factual contexts.” United States v.

Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 522 (2008) (emphasis omitted).

By reading the same operative language to

establish a different standard in just one

circumstance, Monahan engaged in nothing less than

“interpretive contortion.”

Id.

The ADA and

Rehabilitation Act are not “chameleon[s].”

Id.

(quoting Clark, 543 U.S at 382). Their meaning

“cannot change” whenever a child with disabilities

alleges discrimination at the hands of school officials.

Id. Accordingly, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act’s

across-the-board prohibitions apply equally in all

cases seeking relief under these statutes, no matter a

plaintiff’s age, the nature of her disability, or whether

she suffered discrimination in a school setting.

2. The statutes’ remedial provisions reinforce that

all plaintiffs must be treated equally. Section 203 of

the ADA states that “[t]he remedies, procedures, and

rights set forth in” the Rehabilitation Act “shall be the

remedies, procedures, and rights” that the ADA

“provides to any person alleging discrimination on the

basis of disability in violation of [the ADA].” 42 U.S.C

§ 12133 (emphasis added). And Section 505 of the

Rehabilitation Act, in turn, provides that “[t]he

remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in

[T]itle VI” are “available to any person aggrieved” by

disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation

Act. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (emphasis added).

“Any person” means just that—any person. This

language requires equal treatment of all ADA and

Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs. It leaves no room for

exceptions or special rules making it more difficult for

certain classes of plaintiffs to prove their claims.

“When used (as here) with a ‘singular noun in

affirmative contexts,’ the word ‘any’ ordinarily

‘refer[s] to a member of a particular group or class

without distinction or limitation’ and in this way

‘impl[ies] every member of the class or group.’” SAS

Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 363 (2018)

(alterations in original) (quoting Oxford English

Dictionary (3d ed. 2016)).

Monahan thus had no textual basis “to restrict the

unqualified language” of the ADA and Rehabilitation

Act’s remedial provisions by making it more difficult

for children with disabilities to prove discrimination

in the educational context. Brogan v. United States,

522 U.S. 398, 403 (1998); accord Pet.App.5a n.2; Mark

C. Weber, Accidently on Purpose: Intent in Disability

Discrimination Law, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 1417, 1455-61

(2015); Thomas Simmons, The ADA Prima Facie

Plaintiff: A Critical Overview of Eighth Circuit Case

Law, 47 Drake L. Rev. 761, 822-23 & nn.370-71

(1999). Like the statutes’ substantive prohibitions,

the remedial provisions expressly incorporating

Title VI’s rights and remedies apply equally to victims

of disability discrimination “of whatever kind.”

United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997).

As for Title VI itself, that landmark civil-rights

law likewise demands evenhanded enforcement.

Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United

States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national

origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied

the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination

under any program or activity receiving Federal

financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. This Court’s

“prior decisions have found an implied right of action”

for anyone who suffers such discrimination under

Title VI, which “Congress has acknowledged” in

subsequent “amendments to the statute.” Barnes v.

Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002).

Title VI’s across-the-board ban on racial

discrimination supplies no basis for imposing a

uniquely stringent standard on any class of plaintiffs,

let alone school-age children. And no Title VI case has

ever adopted a Monahan-like “bad faith or gross

misjudgment” rule for establishing a statutory

violation or obtaining any form of relief in the school

setting. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,

279-80 (2001) (noting that “both injunctive relief and

damages” are available under Title VI). It follows

that courts “cannot curate” ADA and Rehabilitation

Act claims and treat some differently from others.

SAS Inst., 584 U.S. at 359-60. Rather, courts “must

decide them all” under the same legal standards. Id.

3. This is not the only case this Term where the

Court will address whether to impose a more

stringent—and non-textual—legal standard on only a

subset of anti-discrimination plaintiffs under the

same statute. In Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth

Services, No. 23-1039, the Sixth Circuit held that

Title VII plaintiffs who are members of a majority

group—but not members of minority groups—must

satisfy not only “the usual [requirements] for

establishing a prima-facie case” of discrimination, but

also an additional requirement of showing

“‘background circumstances to support the suspicion

that the defendant is that unusual employer who

discriminates against the majority.’” Ames v. Ohio

Dep’t of Youth Servs., 87 F.4th 822, 825 (6th Cir.

2023).

This Court granted certiorari to decide

whether that extra requirement is correct.

Notably, the Ames respondent has now

abandoned the Sixth Circuit’s rule and conceded that

“the same legal standard applies to all Title VII

plaintiffs,” Ames Resp. Br. 1, and that “it is wrong to

hold some litigants to a higher standard” than others,

Ames Oral Argument Tr. 39. Both parties in Ames,

along with the United States, are thus “in radical

agreement” that Title VII “applies the same to

everybody,” no matter who they are or the nature of

their discrimination claim. Ames Oral Arg. Tr. 39;

Ames U.S. Amicus Br. 11-31. This Court seems

similarly inclined. See Ames Oral Arg. Tr. 43-45,

49-51, 54-56, 58-60. The same even-handed approach

should govern the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, too.

4. Neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act

expressly sets forth an intent requirement for proving

a statutory violation or for obtaining particular kinds

of relief. And while this Court has not squarely

addressed the issue, the lower courts generally agree

on the baseline standards governing ADA and

Rehabilitation Act claims.

Outside the educational context, the courts of

appeals uniformly hold that plaintiffs can show a

violation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act—and by

extension, establish eligibility for injunctive relief—if

they prove that the defendant failed to provide a

reasonable accommodation to a covered person with a

disability. Supra at 8-9 & n.1. No showing of

wrongful intent is required. Id.

For damages, though, virtually all courts have

held that plaintiffs outside the educational setting

must prove a form of wrongful intent, consistent with

this Court’s case interpreting Title VI. Supra at 9;

see also Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282-83 (requiring

wrongful intent for damages claims under Title VI).

The overwhelming majority have held that plaintiffs

may satisfy this intent requirement by proving that

the defendant acted with deliberate indifference—i.e.,

ignored a “strong likelihood” that its conduct would

“result in a violation of federally protected rights.”

Meagley v. City of Little Rock, 639 F.3d 384, 389

(8th Cir. 2011); see also supra at 10 & n.2; Gebser v.

Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998)

(holding that deliberate indifference is sufficient to

show such intent under Title IX, which was likewise

“modeled after Title VI”); Barnes, 536 U.S. at 185-89

(looking to Title IX precedent in determining the

scope of private damages remedies available under

the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and Title VI).

For the reasons explained above, the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act subject all discrimination

plaintiffs to the same legal standards. As the United

States has noted, “where courts have interpreted” the

ADA and Rehabilitation Act “to require proof of

certain elements for claims outside of the school

context, they must do the same with claims in the

school context.” Suppl.Br.Add.11a (filed Oct. 7, 2024).

So whichever baseline legal standards apply under

these statutes in other contexts must apply in this one

too. There is no textual basis for disfavoring children

with disabilities who suffer education-related

discrimination.7

B. Monahan Violates Section 1415(l)

Monahan justified its atextual rule primarily by

“speculat[ing] that Congress intended the IDEA’s

predecessor” statute—the EHA—“to limit [the

Rehabilitation Act’s] protections.” Pet.App.5a n.2.

Two years later, Congress refuted that reasoning by

providing that “[n]othing” in the IDEA “restrict[s] or

limit[s]” relief available under the ADA and

7 Ava’s question presented focuses only on whether

children with disabilities bringing education-related claims

should be subject to a heightened, context-specific standard for

proving violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Supra

at i. It does not ask the Court to decide what standard should

uniformly govern all claims. That said, the courts of appeals are

clearly correct that intentional discrimination is not required to

establish a violation of either statute, especially when the claim

alleges that the defendant failed to provide a reasonable

accommodation. Supra at 8-9 & n.1.

Rehabilitation Act. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). Monahan

directly violates Section 1415(l)’s command.

1. Monahan perceived a need to “harmonize” the

EHA (now the IDEA) and Rehabilitation Act and

prevent the latter from becoming a cause of action “for

educational malpractice” that would supplant the

EHA. 687 F.2d at 1170-71. In other words, Monahan

construed the EHA as an implicit constraint on

Rehabilitation Act claims brought in the school

setting—one limiting liability and restricting relief to

rare cases where children with disabilities can prove

“bad faith or gross misjudgment” by school officials.

Id. According to Monahan, this step was needed to

“give each of these statutes the full play intended by

Congress.” Id. at 1171.

Two years after Monahan was decided, this Court

embraced a version of Monahan’s logic. In Smith v.

Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), the Court held that the

EHA provided the “exclusive avenue” for children

with disabilities to bring discrimination claims

related to their education. Id. at 1009 (emphasis

added). The Court reasoned that the EHA establishes

“a comprehensive scheme” that focused directly on

“public education for handicapped children.” Id.

Because that scheme gives “local and state

educational agencies the primary responsibility for

developing a plan to accommodate the needs of each

individual handicapped child,” the Court found it

“difficult to believe that Congress also meant to leave

undisturbed the ability of a handicapped child” to

assert other “virtually identical” causes of action. Id.

at 1009, 1011. Smith thus decreed that the EHA did

not just limit Rehabilitation Act relief for school-age

children with disabilities (as Monahan had

concluded), but fully displaced that statute in the

school setting.

Congress swiftly repudiated Smith’s reasoning—

and with it, Monahan’s as well. In 1986, Congress

amended the EHA (now the IDEA) to “‘reaffirm[] the

viability’ of federal statutes like the ADA [and

Rehabilitation Act] ‘as separate vehicles,’ no less

integral than the IDEA, ‘for ensuring the rights of

handicapped children.’” Fry, 580 U.S. at 161 (quoting

H.R. Rep. No. 99-296, at 4, 6 (1985)); see also S. Rep.

No. 99-112, at 2 (1985). Now codified at 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(l), this IDEA amendment provides in relevant

part:

Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be

construed to restrict or limit the rights,

procedures, and remedies available

under the Constitution, the [ADA],

[Rehabilitation Act], or other Federal

laws protecting the rights of children

with disabilities . . . .

20 U.S.C. § 1415(l); see also Handicapped Children’s

Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, § 3, 100

Stat. 796, 797 (HCPA).

Congress thus expressly established a rule of

construction under which the IDEA cannot be

interpreted to “restrict or limit” the ability of children

with disabilities to obtain relief under the ADA or

Rehabilitation Act. Id. In doing so, Congress made

clear that while these various statutes “overlap” in

some respects, they are different in important ways

and retain full independent force. Fry, 580 U.S.

at 171. “The IDEA offers federal funds to States in

exchange for a commitment: to furnish a ‘free

appropriate public education’” to “all children with

certain physical or intellectual disabilities.” Id. at

158. By contrast, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act

each guarantee “non-discriminatory access to”

educational services for children with disabilities, as

compared to their non-disabled peers. Id. at 170-71.

Section 1415(l) establishes that the latter guarantee

coexists with, and cannot be subordinated to, the

former.

Section 1415(l)’s drafters repeatedly emphasized

what the text makes clear. One HCPA co-sponsor, for

example, declared that the IDEA was never “intended

to in any way limit handicapped children’s

educational rights or the remedies for protecting

those rights.” 131 Cong. Rec. 21391 (July 30, 1985)

(statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy) (emphasis added).

Another explained that Section 1415(l) commands

that the IDEA must be interpreted to “enhance” the

remedies available to children with disabilities

“under other laws”—not to “limit[]” or “replace” them.

Id. at 21392 (statement of Sen. Paul Simon). And the

report from the House Committee on Education and

Labor reiterated that the IDEA may not “be construed

to modify traditional standards used by the courts for

determining” when relief “is appropriate” under the

Rehabilitation Act and other federal laws (such as the

later-enacted ADA). H.R. Rep. No. 99-296, at 7.

These sources confirm the statutory text’s plain

meaning.

2. Monahan violates Section 1415(l)’s directive.

Monahan held that the IDEA (formerly the EHA)

requires interpreting the ADA and Rehabilitation Act

to require children with disabilities to show bad faith

or gross misjudgment to prevail on education-related

discrimination claims. 687 F.2d at 1170-71. That is,

Monahan interpreted the IDEA to “restrict” and

“limit” the “rights” and “remedies” available to

children like Ava under the ADA and Rehabilitation

Act by requiring them to satisfy a more stringent

standard than anyone else suing under these

statutes. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). That is precisely what

Section 1415(l) forbids. See Howell ex rel. Howell v.

Waterford Pub. Schs., 731 F. Supp. 1314, 1318 (E.D.

Mich. 1990) (criticizing Monahan for violating Section

1415(l)).

The District resisted this straightforward

conclusion in its brief opposing certiorari. There, the

District asserted that Section 1415(l) “overruled

Smith”—“not Monahan”—and did not “opine on the

standard governing” ADA and Rehabilitation Act

claims. BIO31. That misses the point. Congress

undoubtedly sought to reject Smith, but Smith and

Monahan both adopted the same flawed view that the

IDEA implicitly restricts the scope of other federal

anti-discrimination statutes, as applied to children

with disabilities suffering from discrimination in the

educational context.

Whatever particular precedent Congress had in

mind, Section 1415(l)’s text flatly prohibits Monahan’s

construction of the IDEA to limit relief available

under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. So even

though Section 1415(l) does not set forth legal

standards governing ADA and Rehabilitation Act

claims, it still squarely “reject[s] Monahan’s premise”

that the IDEA requires a uniquely stringent standard

for ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, as the Eighth

Circuit recognized in its decision below. Pet.App.5a

n.2. Section 1415(l) leaves no doubt that Monahan’s

atextual and asymmetric rule is wrong.

C. Monahan Undermines The Core Goals Of

The ADA And Rehabilitation Act

Monahan’s judicially invented rule requiring only

school-age children with disabilities to prove bad faith

or gross misjudgment violates the central purpose of

both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Congress

enacted those statutes to protect all Americans living

with disabilities from discrimination.

Nothing

suggests that Congress wanted to diminish the extent

of that protection for anyone with a disability—let

alone for school-age children, who are perhaps the

most vulnerable subset of such people. And because

both statutes were designed to remedy passive

neglect, it is clear Congress did not intend to limit

relief solely to cases involving outright animus or

egregious misconduct for any class of plaintiffs.

1. The goal of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act

was, as Senator Ted Kennedy explained, “nothing less

than to give every disabled American a fair share of

the American Dream.” Americans With Disabilities

Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 933 Before the Subcomm.

on the Handicapped of the S. Comm. On Labor &

Hum. Res., 101st Cong. 223 (1989) (emphasis added)

(discussing ADA). The legislative history of both

statutes confirms Congress’s desire to promote equal

treatment of all Americans with disabilities, across

the board.

For example, in enacting the Rehabilitation Act,

Senator Alan Cranston described Congress’s goal as

protecting all of the “9.8 million handicapped persons”

then living in the United States. 119 Cong. Rec. at

29631-32; see also S. Rep. No. 93-391, at 45 (1973)

(observing that the statute prohibits the denial of

services to “any handicapped individual” based on the

individual’s disability). And later, when Congress

amended the Act to codify a private right of action,

Senator Cranston emphasized that the statute was

meant to “to remedy violations of [S]ection 504—with

no exception.” 132 Cong. Rec. S15104 (Oct. 3, 1986)

(emphasis added). Other legislators reiterated that,

“[s]ince initial passage of this law, Congress has”

sought to protect “the quality of life for all

handicapped persons.” 132 Cong. Rec. 28090 (Oct. 2,

1986) (statement of Representative Mario Biaggi,

co-sponsor of 1986 amendments) (emphasis added);

see also 131 Cong. Rec. at 21391 (statement of Sen.

John Kerry, another co-sponsor) (similar).

So too for the ADA. Representative Tony Coelho—

who sponsored the legislation and, like Ava, suffers

from epilepsy—observed that the statute would also

protect “[e]very American,” without exception.

Americans With Disabilities Act of 1988: Joint

Hearing on S. 2345 Before the Subcomm. on the

Handicapped of the S. Comm. on Labor & Hum.

Resources & the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the H.

Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 100th Cong. 938 (1988).

His colleagues agreed that the ADA was meant to

“bring equality to the lives of all Americans with

disabilities.” 136 Cong. Rec. 17376 (July 13, 1990)

(statement of Senator Bob Dole, an ADA sponsor)

(emphasis added); see, e.g., 135 Cong. Rec. 19895

(Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Senator Warren

Rudman, another ADA sponsor, observing that the

ADA’s protections “extend to all disabled

individuals”).

Given these statements, it boggles the mind to

think that Congress wanted these important

anti-discrimination statutes to disfavor certain

classes of plaintiffs with disabilities by requiring

them to satisfy a more stringent test than anyone

else. Children with disabilities are among the most

vulnerable members of our society. Too often, they

are “shunted aside, hidden, and ignored” while at

school. Choate, 469 U.S. at 295-96 (quoting 117 Cong.

Rec. 45974 (Dec. 9, 1971)). Such discrimination in the

educational context can inflict severe, life-altering

harm. See, e.g., Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 598 U.S.

142, 145 (2023) (school district denied deaf student a

qualified aide for twelve years, drastically

diminishing his ability to communicate with others

and earn a living).

When such discrimination happens, the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act provide crucial means of

“protecting [victims’] interests,” just as those statutes

assist other plaintiffs facing disability discrimination

in other contexts. Fry, 580 U.S. at 159. There is no

reason to think that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act

saddle children with disabilities—and nobody else—

with “an impossibly high bar” for proving a statutory

violation. Knox County v. M.Q., 62 F.4th 978, 1002

(6th Cir. 2023); see also Pet.App.5a n.2. The ADA and

Rehabilitation Act were meant to ensure equality,

and their guarantees apply equally.

2. Even clearer is that Congress never wanted

courts to impose an intent requirement for liability on

anyone suing under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act,

especially for failure to accommodate a disability.

“Discrimination against the handicapped was

perceived by Congress to be most often the product,

not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness

and indifference—of benign neglect.” Choate, 469

U.S. at 295. Congress thus enacted the Rehabilitation

Act to remedy “shameful oversights” and “the

invisibility of the handicapped in America.” Id.

at 295-96 (first quoting 117 Cong. Rec. 45974

(Dec. 9, 1971); and then quoting, 118 Cong. Rec.

525-26 (Jan. 20, 1972)). The ADA was likewise

enacted to address how “society has been

inadvertently structured in a way that unnecessarily

denies innumerable opportunities, great and small, to

people with disabilities.” Joint Hearing on S. 2345,

100th Cong. at 941 (emphasis added). The central

goal of these statutes, in other words, was to guard

against “apathetic attitudes” toward people with

disabilities. Choate, 469 U.S. at 296.

Monahan’s directive that a Rehabilitation Act

“violation can be made out” in the educational context

only by showing bad faith or gross misjudgment, 687

F.2d at 1171—rather than mere “benign neglect,” as

required from all other plaintiffs, Choate, 469 U.S. at

295—defies that objective.

With Congress so

unmistakably focused on the widespread passive

neglect of people with disabilities, it is inconceivable

that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act excuse liability

in any category of cases, just because the alleged

disability discrimination falls short of outright

animus or especially severe mistreatment. So by

giving a free pass to actions driven by educational

officials’ “apathetic attitudes,” Monahan immunized

“much of the conduct that Congress sought to alter in

passing the Rehabilitation Act,” as well as the ADA.

Id. at 296-97. Monahan is at odds with the core

purpose of both statutes.

D. Monahan Is Unfair

Arbitrary Results

And

Leads

Monahan singles out school-age children with

disabilities for disfavored treatment under the ADA

and Rehabilitation Act. Beside openly defying the

statutory text and purpose, this asymmetric

treatment is fundamentally unfair and leads to

bizarre results.

1. Whereas Monahan establishes an exceedingly

“high bar for claims based on educational services”

brought by children with disabilities, courts “require

much less in other disability-discrimination

contexts.” Pet.App.5a n.2. That disparity matters, as

this case illustrates.

It is hard enough for parents to muster the

resources needed to fight for their child’s federally

protected rights while simultaneously trying to

remediate life-altering educational gaps in the

meantime. Yet Monahan’s heightened standard lets

school districts off the hook even when they act with

deliberate indifference to students’ federally

protected rights. That additional barrier makes it

exceedingly difficult for children with disabilities to

obtain much-needed relief under the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act. It also blunts incentives for

schools to fulfill their statutory responsibilities in the

first place.

Here, for example, Ava’s parents spent years

fighting for the District to give her the same

reasonable accommodations that her prior school

district in Kentucky had provided without issue.

Pet.App.50a-51a. But over and over again, the

District refused, offering a series of “shifting,”

“pretextual,” and “not credible” explanations that had

nothing to do with Ava’s “individual needs.” Id. at

50a, 57a; JA468, 471, 544; supra at 14-16. Indeed, the

District’s own Director of Student Services appeared

unaware of the District’s obligations under the ADA

and Rehabilitation Act: She repeatedly insisted—

incorrectly—that providing a FAPE under the IDEA

satisfied the District’s non-discrimination obligations

under these other statutes. JA190 (rejecting notion

that “a school district [can] provide a FAPE under

IDEA and still discriminate on the basis of

disability”); see also JA191-96, 208-09, 216-18, 240.

Below, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged the

considerable evidence showing that the District had

been “negligent or even deliberately indifferent” in

denying the reasonable accommodations she

desperately needed. Pet.App.3a. The court also

pointedly criticized the District’s deliberate “choice to

prioritize its administrative concerns” over Ava’s

“individual needs,” while giving “a series of shifting

explanations” for failing to meet them. Id. at 57a; see

CA8 Appellant’s Br.4-17, 50-55. All this should have

been more than sufficient for Ava to survive summary

judgment and obtain both injunctive relief and

damages. Pet.App.5a n.2. “[B]ut under Monahan,

[i]t’s just not enough.” Id. at 3a.

2. Ava’s experience is all too common. A Westlaw

search reveals hundreds of district court decisions

applying Monahan’s bad-faith-or-gross-misjudgment

standard in ADA and Rehabilitation Act cases, with

the overwhelming majority denying relief.8 Many

See, e.g., Parnes v. Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd., 2024 WL

4290383, at *4-6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2024); S.F. v. Union Cnty.

Bd. of Educ., 2024 WL 1316229, at *3-4 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 27,

2024); Torres v. Stewart Cnty. Sch. Sys., 2023 WL 6368186, at

*5-6 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2023); N.P. v. Kenton Cnty. Pub. Schs.,

2023 WL 1822833, at *5-6 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 8, 2023); Baker v.

Bentonville Sch. Dist., 610 F. Supp. 3d 1157, 1166

(W.D. Ark. 2022), aff’d, 75 F.4th 810 (8th Cir. 2023); P.W. v.

Leander Indep. Sch. Dist., 2022 WL 19003381, at *5-7

(W.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2022); Jacksonville N. Pulaski Sch. Dist. v.

D.M., 2021 WL 2043469, at *5 (E.D. Ark. May 21, 2021);

Richardson v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 2019 WL 1930129, at *7-9

involved alleged discrimination that would have been

actionable under the baseline standards applied in

other ADA and Rehabilitation Act cases.

Consider a few examples. In Reid-Witt ex rel. C.W.

v. District of Columbia, 486 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C.

2020), school officials refused to provide urgently

needed at-home instruction, even after a child

suffering from severe anxiety and depression

experienced “suicidal ideation that required

hospitalization.” Id. at 3-4. The school baselessly

insisted that the child was “ineligible for specialeducation services.” Id. at 4. Yet the district court

denied relief, finding that the plaintiff could not

satisfy the “tougher” and “more stringent” bad-faithor-gross-misjudgment standard, which can be

satisfied “‘[o]nly in the rarest of cases.’” Id. at 8-9

(quoting Walker v. District of Columbia, 157 F. Supp.

2d 11, 36 (D.D.C. 2001)). Because school officials were

not “completely indifferent” to the child’s disability,

the court concluded, her ADA and Rehabilitation Act

claims failed as a matter of law. Id. at 9; see also N.G.

v. District of Columbia, 556 F. Supp. 2d 11, 18-21, 36

(D.D.C. 2008) (similar).

(W.D. Ark. Apr. 30, 2019), aff’d, 957 F.3d 869 (8th Cir. 2020);

Lawrence Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. McDaniel, 2018 WL 1569484, at

*5-6 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 30, 2018); McMinn v. Sloan-Hendrix Sch.

Dist., 2018 WL 1277719, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 12, 2018); Doe v.

Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., 2017 WL 8792704, at *3-5 (S.D. Iowa

Dec. 5, 2017), aff’d, 745 F. App’x 658 (8th Cir. 2018); Doe v. Osseo

Area Sch. Dist., ISD No. 279, 296 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1098 n.7

(D. Minn. 2017); Parrish v. Bentonville Sch. Dist., 2017 WL

1086198, at *17-18 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 22, 2017), aff’d, 896 F.3d 889

(8th Cir. 2018); Est. of Barnwell ex rel. Barnwell v. Watson, 2016

WL 11527708, at *4-5 (E.D. Ark. June 2, 2016).

Another example is D.A. v. Houston Independent

School District, 716 F. Supp. 2d 603 (S.D. Tex. 2009),

which involved school officials’ years-long “failure to

test” a young child for learning disabilities—even

though he “was the lowest performing child” in the

first grade and had exhibited “‘extreme behavior,”

such as “fighting” and “hav[ing] outbursts.” Id. at

606-07. School officials also ignored an independent

expert who warned—in writing—that the child was

“in desperate need of intervention.” Id. at 608. And

the child reported “being dragged around,” “put in a

closet,” and called “a lazy monkey” by school staff. Id.

Nevertheless, the district court denied relief under

Monahan, id. at 620, in a decision that the Fifth

Circuit unanimously affirmed, D.A. ex rel. Latasha A.

v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 454-55

(5th Cir. 2010).

Or take I.A. v. Seguin Independent School District,

881 F. Supp. 2d 770 (W.D. Tex. 2012), where a school

repeatedly excluded a paralyzed student from

extracurricular activities—including field trips,

swimming classes, and band concerts—despite

obvious and readily available accommodations for his

disability. See id. at 774-75. The school also failed to

provide suitable “desks” and “an accessible

bathroom,” while failing to fix “dangerous” walkways

to various facilities, despite the child falling multiple

times. Id. at 778. There too, the court rejected the

student’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims under

Monahan, reasoning that “[a]lthough mistakes may

have been made, they d[id] not rise to the level of bad

faith or gross misjudgment.” Id. at 784.

These cases confirm that the “additional element”

imposed by Monahan is “impossibl[e]” to satisfy “for

many plaintiffs.” Knox, 62 F.4th at 1002. Congress

did not enact that unduly harsh regime, which

senselessly disadvantages some of society’s most

vulnerable members.

3. Monahan’s asymmetric rule also leads to

arbitrary and anomalous results. It requires pre-K,

elementary, middle, and high school students suing

under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act to prove bad

faith or gross misjudgment. See, e.g., I.Z.M. v.

Rosemount- Apple Valley-Eagan Pub. Schs., 863 F.3d

966, 968, 972-73 (8th Cir. 2017). But college students

bringing the exact same claims do not have to clear

that hurdle, even in circuits that apply Monahan’s

heightened standard. See, e.g., Halpern v. Wake

Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 461-62

(4th Cir. 2012); Mershon v. St. Louis Univ., 442 F.3d

1069, 1076-77 (8th Cir. 2006); Gati v. W. Kentucky

Univ., 762 F. App’x 246, 250 (6th Cir. 2019). Why

should a graduation ceremony drastically alter the

standard for demonstrating disability discrimination

in the educational context? Monahan doesn’t say.

The District asserts that this head-scratching

regime was actually part of Congress’s design because

“college students,” unlike “elementary and secondary

students, “are not covered by the IDEA.” BIO31 n.3.

But again, Congress has made clear—in unequivocal

statutory text—that potential overlap with the IDEA

does not “restrict” or “limit” the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act’s protections. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l);

see supra at 30-34. Plus, courts apply Monahan’s

bad-faith-or-gross-misjudgment standard even in

cases where school-age children with disabilities are

bringing claims that do not involve the denial of a

FAPE—and thus lack any nexus with the IDEA.

See, e.g., Baker v. Bentonville Sch. Dist., 75 F.4th 810,

815-16 (8th Cir. 2023) (safety hazards at school for

visually impaired child); Hoekstra ex rel. Hoekstra v.

Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 283, 103 F.3d 624, 626-27 (8th

Cir. 1996) (elevator access at school for physically

impaired child).

Requiring school-age children with disabilities

who suffer education-related discrimination to satisfy

a more stringent standard than college students who

endured the same mistreatment makes no sense. Yet

that unsound result flows directly from Monahan.

E. Monahan Rested

Analysis, Not Law

Flawed

Policy

At its core, Monahan is a textbook example of

legislating from the bench. The Eighth Circuit

admitted that it sought to achieve “what we”—judges,

not legislators—“believe to be a proper balance

between the rights of handicapped children, the

responsibilities of state educational officials, and the

competence of courts to make judgments in technical

fields.” Monahan, 687 F.2d at 1171 (emphasis added).

Monahan was wrong to “replace the actual text” of

the ADA and Rehabilitation Act with judicial

“speculation as to Congress’ intent” on matters of

policy. Perez, 598 U.S. at 150. It was especially wrong

to do so in a case where the parties’ briefs did not

address the proper standard for Rehabilitation Act

claims in the school setting—let alone propose a

brand new “bad faith or gross misjudgment” test.9

And even on its own terms, Monahan’s speculation

about Congress’s intent makes little sense.

9 The Monahan briefs are available at the National

Archives in Kansas City, and can be provided to the Court by

Ava’s counsel upon request.

1. Judges ordinarily do not claim broad authority

to invent bespoke legal standards for federal statutes

based on pure policy grounds. In Monahan, the

Eighth Circuit offered no persuasive basis for

claiming that policymaking authority.

The District has now tried to fill in the gap. In its

brief opposing certiorari, the District argued that

because the ADA and Rehabilitation Act’s private

rights of action are “judicially implied,” courts have “a

measure of latitude to shape a sensible remedial

scheme.” BIO26 (quoting Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284).

This post hoc defense of Monahan’s self-described

policymaking does not withstand scrutiny.

For starters, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act’s

private rights of action are not implied. Rather, the

statutes “expressly incorporate[]” the preexisting

right of action under Title VI, which was originally

judicially implied and later congressionally ratified.

Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 596

U.S. 212, 218 (2022); see 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2); 42

U.S.C § 12133. So whatever “measure of latitude”

courts might have to tinker with an implied private

right of action is irrelevant. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284.

Regardless, any such latitude is sharply limited.

Courts can only shape an implied right of action in the

way that “best comports with the statute.” Id. But

here, as explained, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act’s

“general language” served to “produce general

coverage” for all people with disabilities—and does

not “leave room for courts to recognize ad hoc

exceptions” for school-age children or anyone else.

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:

The Interpretation of Legal Texts 101 (2012); see supra

at 24-30. Indeed, the District has not mustered a

single decision from this Court authorizing disfavored

treatment of different classes of plaintiffs asserting

the same private right of action, implied or otherwise.

Monahan’s “judicial overreaching” is clear as day.

Drew Millar, Judicially Reducing the Standard of

Care: An Analysis of the Bad Faith/Gross

Misjudgment Standard in Special Education

Discrimination, 96 Ky. L.J. 711, 728-29 (2008).

2. Even on its own terms, Monahan’s atextual

appeal to policy does not hold up. Monahan doubted

“the competence of courts to make judgments” about

decisions by “educational officials” in this “technical

field[].” 687 F.2d at 1171. But the IDEA demands

inquiry into the “adequacy of a given” child’s

education—and thus judicial examination of the

“decisions” made by educational officials, with

appropriate respect for the “expertise and the exercise

of judgment by school authorities.” Endrew F. ex rel.

Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S.

386, 404 (2017). Such respectful consideration of

schools’ decisionmaking is equally proper under the

ADA and Rehabilitation Act.

More fundamentally, just last Term this Court

resoundingly rejected the notion, echoed in Monahan,

that some matters are simply too “technical” for

courts to review independently. Loper Bright Enters.

v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 402 (2024). Federal courts

are surely capable of showing due respect for

educational officials’ experience and expertise while

adjudicating discrimination claims in the school

setting—just as they do in any other context. It is a

mistake to distort statutory text out of a misplaced

fear that courts cannot responsibly decide cases

implicating sensitive or technical matters. The ADA

and Rehabilitation Act are no exception.10

3. Rather than focus on policy, this Court should

apply the law. In recent years, the Court has

repeatedly enforced the plain text of federal

civil-rights

statutes

protecting

vulnerable

populations—including children with disabilities—

from discrimination. See, e.g., Perez, 598 U.S. at

146-47; Fry, 580 U.S. at 158; Endrew F., 580 U.S. at

399; see also Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S.

346, 355 (2024); Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 468-70

(2023); Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U.S. 399, 402 (2020);

Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido, 586 U.S. 1, 6-8

(2018). These decisions vindicate textualism as a

method of statutory interpretation that is “neutral as

a matter of politics and policy.” Brett M. Kavanaugh,

Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev.

2118, 2135 (2016).

This Court should embrace that same textualist

approach here.

Monahan’s “bad faith or gross

misjudgment” standard flunks every test of text,

history, purpose, and policy. This Court should now

fix Monahan’s error. It should enforce the plain

meaning of the Nation’s anti-discrimination laws and

restore the full protections Congress granted children

with disabilities.

10 It would likewise be mistaken to distort the statutory

text out of fear that plaintiffs might try to “end-run the

statutorily prescribed IEP process and preempt school districts’

facilitation of the IDEA.” BIO28. The IDEA already addresses

potential evasion: It “demand[s]” exhaustion of the IEP process

“when a plaintiff seeks a remedy IDEA can supply,” like a

FAPE-related injunction—while “excusing exhaustion when a

plaintiff seeks a remedy IDEA cannot provide,” like damages.

Perez, 598 U.S. at 150.

CONCLUSION

The Eighth Circuit’s judgment should be vacated

and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Respectfully submitted,

NICHOLAS ROSELLINI

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

505 Montgomery Street

Suite 2000

San Francisco, CA 94111

AMY J. GOETZ

SCHOOL LAW CENTER, LLC

520 Fifth Street South

Stillwater, MN 55082

ROMAN MARTINEZ

Counsel of Record

PETER A. PRINDIVILLE

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

555 11th Street, NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 637-3377

roman.martinez@lw.com

GRAHAM AMBROSE

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

200 Clarendon Street

Boston, MA 02116

Counsel for Petitioner

February 27, 2025

ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) ....................................................1a

29 U.S.C. § 794(a)......................................................2a

29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) ...............................................3a

42 U.S.C. § 12132 ......................................................4a

42 U.S.C. § 12133 ......................................................5a

20 U.S.C. § 1415

§ 1415. Procedural safeguards

***

(l) Rule of construction

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to

restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies

available under the Constitution, the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.], title

V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. 790 et

seq.], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of

children with disabilities, except that before the filing

of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is

also available under this subchapter, the procedures

under subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted to the

same extent as would be required had the action been

brought under this subchapter.

***

29 U.S.C. § 794

§ 794. Nondiscrimination under Federal grants

and programs

(a) Promulgation of rules and regulations

No otherwise qualified individual with a disability

in the United States, as defined in section 705(20) of

this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his

disability, be excluded from the participation in, be

denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

discrimination under any program or activity

receiving Federal financial assistance or under any

program or activity conducted by any Executive

agency or by the United States Postal Service. The

head of each such agency shall promulgate such

regulations as may be necessary to carry out the

amendments to this section made by the

Rehabilitation,

Comprehensive

Services,

and

Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978. Copies of any

proposed regulation shall be submitted to appropriate

authorizing committees of the Congress, and such

regulation may take effect no earlier than the

thirtieth day after the date on which such regulation

is so submitted to such committees.

***

29 U.S.C. § 794a

§ 794a. Remedies and attorney fees

(a)

(2)

***

The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in

title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.

2000d et seq.) (and in subsection (e)(3) of section 706

of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e–5), applied to claims of

discrimination in compensation) shall be available to

any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by

any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal

provider of such assistance under section 794 of this

title.

***

42 U.S.C. § 12132

§ 12132.

Discrimination

Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no

qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason

of such disability, be excluded from participation in or

be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or

activities of a public entity, or be subjected to

discrimination by any such entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12133

§ 12133.

Enforcement

The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in

section 794a of title 29 shall be the remedies,

procedures, and rights this subchapter provides to

any person alleging discrimination on the basis of

disability in violation of section 12132 of this title.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.