Opposition Brief — Anthony Monroe, Petitioner v. Terry Conner, et al.

No. 24-16

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

ANTHONY MONROE,

v.

Petitioner,

TERRY CONNER, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

ELIZABETH B. MURRILL

Attorney General

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE

1885 N. Third St.

Baton Rouge, LA 70802

(225) 506-3746

AguinagaB@ag.louisiana.gov

September 27, 2024

J. BENJAMIN AGUIÑAGA

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

KELSEY L. SMITH

Deputy Solicitor General

PHYLLIS E. GLAZER

Ass’t Attorney General

(Additional counsel listed in

signature block)

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

This Court has long held that “the length of the

statute of limitations” for a claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 depends on “the law of the State in which the

cause of action arose.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,

387 (2007) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235

(1989); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985)). Specifically, the limitations period for a § 1983 claim is the

same limitations period “the State provides for personal-injury torts.” Id.

For over a century, Louisiana provided a one-year

limitations period for such actions, which courts faithfully applied to § 1983 claims arising in Louisiana. In

2024, the Louisiana Legislature replaced that oneyear limitations period with a two-year limitations period for claims arising after July 1, 2024. The question

presented in this case is:

Whether Louisiana’s now defunct one-year limitations period for personal-injury actions was

compatible with 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ........................................... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... iv

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION ............................................ 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 5

A.

Legal Background........................................... 5

B.

Procedural Background .................................. 7

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION .......... 10

I.

THIS IS A POOR VEHICLE TO DECIDE

THE ISSUE PRESENTED. ................................. 10

A.

Plaintiff’s Lawsuit Is Heck-Barred. .......... 10

B.

The Fifth Circuit’s Decisions in

Monroe and Brown Did Not Fully

Answer the Issue Presented. .................... 12

II.

THE ISSUE PRESENTED IS NOT

CERT-WORTHY. .............................................. 14

III.

THE DECISION BELOW IS CORRECT. ............... 17

IV.

IF THE COURT BELIEVES FURTHER

REVIEW IS NECESSARY, IT SHOULD

GRANT MONROE INSTEAD OF BROWN,

OR BOTH MONROE AND BROWN. ..................... 23

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 25

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A — EXCERPT OF TRIAL TRANSCRIPT FROM THE TWENTY-SIXTH JUDICIAL

DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF BOSSIER, STATE

OF LOUISIANA, FILED JULY 31, 2023……………1A

APPENDIX B — APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, SECOND CIRCUIT, FILED

NOVEMBER 22, 2023………………………………….9A

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Brown v. Pouncy,

93 F.4th 331 (5th Cir. 2024), petition for cert. filed,

No. 23-1332 (U.S.) ... 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 20, 22,

23, 24, 25

Brown v. Wigginton,

981 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1992) .................................. 21

Burnett v. Grattan,

468 U.S. 42 (1984) ............................ 4, 17, 18, 19, 20

Carreras-Rosa v. Alves-Cruz,

127 F.3d 172 (1st Cir. 1997)................................... 21

Chardon v. Fernandez,

454 U.S. 6 (1981) ................................................ 3, 20

Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv.

Sys.,

144 S. Ct. 2440 (2024) ............................................ 19

Dugas v. City of Ville Platte,

2017 WL 6521660 (W.D. La. Nov. 17, 2017) ......... 16

Hardin v. Straub,

490 U.S. 536 (1989) ................................................ 16

Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477 (1994) ................................ 2, 10, 11, 12

Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ.,

215 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2000) .................................. 21

Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,

421 U.S. 454 (1975) ............................................ 3, 20

Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.,

541 U.S. 369 (2004) ................................................ 21

McDonough v. Smith,

588 U.S. 109 (2019) ................................................ 12

v

Owens v. Okure,

488 U.S. 235 (1989) ............. i, 5, 6, 12, 19, 21, 22, 24

Ramos v. Louisiana,

590 U.S. 83 (2020) .................................................. 22

Wallace v. Kato,

549 U.S. 384 (2007) ............................... i, 2, 5, 11, 12

Washington v. Breaux,

782 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1986) .................................... 6

Wilson v. Garcia,

471 U.S. 261 (1985) ............... i, 3, 5, 6, 17, 21, 22, 24

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1658 ................................ 13, 21, 22, 23, 24

42 U.S.C. § 1981 .............................................. 3, 18, 20

42 U.S.C. § 1983 .... i, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15,

16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24

42 U.S.C. § 1986 ........................................................ 20

La. Civ. Code art. 3492 ............................................ 6, 7

La. R.S. 14:34.2 ............................................................ 7

La. R.S. 14:108 ............................................................. 7

Other Authorities

2024 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 423 (H.B. 315) ....... 6, 14

Excessive Force Alleged in Lawsuit over 2019 Traffic

Stop, THE ADVOCATE (Nov. 30, 2021),

https://tinyurl.com/mu4fscyk ................................... 1

State Police Targeted in New Excessive-Force Suit by

Shreveport Card Dealer; See Video, THE TIMESPICAYUNE (Nov. 29, 2021),

https://tinyurl.com/p4uw79xw ................................. 1

1

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Late one night in 2019, Petitioner finished his shift

as a card dealer at the El Dorado Casino in Shreveport, Louisiana. As he drove home, a Louisiana State

Police officer stopped him for speeding. During that

stop—and as documented by video 1—Petitioner repeatedly refused to comply with lawful commands and

physically assaulted multiple police officers.

After a bench trial, Petitioner was convicted of battery of a police officer and resisting a police officer. The

Louisiana court of appeal affirmed those convictions,

“conclud[ing] that the evidence presented was sufficient to support both convictions”:

[Petitioner] repeatedly refused direct and lawful instructions to exit his vehicle and once [Petitioner] exited his vehicle, his resistance became both verbal and physical. [Petitioner]

pushed, shoved, and grabbed the officers when

they attempted to put [Petitioner] in handcuffs.

BIO App.2a. The testimony at trial “was corroborated

by the body camera and dash camera videos.” Id. In

his writ application now pending in the Louisiana Supreme Court, Petitioner has dropped his sufficiency

1 According to media reports, Petitioner’s counsel shared the

body camera and dash camera videos—which were later introduced at Petitioner’s criminal trial—with the media, which published them. See, e.g., Excessive Force Alleged in Lawsuit over

2019 Traffic Stop, THE ADVOCATE (Nov. 30, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/mu4fscyk; State Police Targeted in New ExcessiveForce Suit by Shreveport Card Dealer; See Video, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Nov. 29, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/p4uw79xw.

2

challenge, choosing to raise only the (forfeited) question whether he was entitled to a jury trial.

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case in federal court represents Petitioner’s collateral attack on his state-court

convictions. He alleges that Louisiana State Police officers used excessive force in arresting him, and he

seeks damages under § 1983. It is undisputed, however, that his § 1983 claim is untimely because he filed

suit almost a year after Louisiana’s former one-year

limitations period for personal-injury torts expired.

See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (forum

State’s limitations period for personal-injury torts applies to § 1983 claims arising out of that State). The

issue he presents is thus whether Louisiana’s former

one-year limitations period was “inconsistent with

[§ 1983] and the interests that it is designed to uphold.” Pet. i.

This is an exceedingly poor vehicle to address that

issue. For one thing, Petitioner cannot obtain meaningful relief in this case because, even if his lawsuit

were timely, it is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477 (1994). Indeed, his attack on the legality of

his arrest is an attack on “the legality of [his] conviction[s],” which is foreclosed by Heck. Id. at 490. For

another thing, by Petitioner’s own telling (Pet. 12), the

Fifth Circuit “largely sidestep[ped]” the issue he now

presents, both in this case and in its decision in Brown

v. Pouncy, 93 F.4th 331, 332 (5th Cir. 2024), petition

for cert. filed, No. 23-1332 (U.S.). It would thus make

no sense to grant review on an issue that the court below did not fully address (and that no court appears to

have fully addressed).

3

For similar reasons, Petitioner’s issue presented is

not cert-worthy. He rightly does not claim a circuit

split. And although he proclaims that the issue is “critically important,” e.g., Pet. 1, his petition does not substantiate that claim. He acknowledges that this issue

is irrelevant to Louisiana on a going-forward basis in

light of Louisiana’s new two-year limitations period.

And he does not identify a single case in Kentucky,

Tennessee, or Puerto Rico—the only other jurisdictions with a one-year limitations period—where it was

“virtually impossible” (id. at 4) for a plaintiff to timely

file suit. If the sky were in fact falling throughout the

decades-long existence of these limitations periods,

the petition would be overflowing with examples rather than generalities.

In all events, Petitioner has no serious argument

that the Fifth Circuit erred in applying Louisiana’s

former one-year limitations period, just as this Court

has applied Tennessee’s and Puerto Rico’s one-year

limitations periods. See Chardon v. Fernandez, 454

U.S. 6 (1981) (per curiam) (§ 1983); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (§ 1981).

He claims that the “practicalities” (Pet. 20) of litigating § 1983 claims render a one-year limitations period

unworkable and contrary to § 1983’s purposes. But

this Court has long explained, in the § 1983 context,

that “[i]t is most unlikely” that a personal-injury limitations period “ever would be[] fixed in a way that

would … be inconsistent with federal law in any respect.” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985).

Moreover, as then-Justice Rehnquist (joined by Chief

Justice Burger and Justice O’Connor) explained, this

line of reasoning makes no sense because the “practicalities” “are hardly unique to [§ 1983 plaintiffs’]

4

claims or any other garden-variety federal civil rights

claim”—they are a feature of ordinary litigation. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 57 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.,

concurring in the judgment). And that says nothing of

the arbitrariness inherent in Petitioner’s position:

Why is one year intolerable but not, say, 18 months or

two years? He has no principled answer.

Accepting Petitioner’s position in this case, moreover, would destroy settled expectations. For decades,

courts within the First (Puerto Rico) and Sixth (Kentucky and Tennessee) Circuits have faithfully applied

one-year limitations periods pursuant to this Court’s

instructions. The bench, bar, and litigants in those jurisdictions would thus face a sea change in § 1983 litigation. Worse, Petitioner here and the petitioner in

Brown have suggested installing a “uniform” federal

statute of limitations across the country—which

would “eliminate” (i.e., overrule) this Court’s careful

precedents establishing the existing framework.

Brown Pet. 4. There is no good reason to do so.

Finally, although Respondents urge the Court to

deny the petition, if the Court is inclined to grant the

petition, it should grant this case over Brown or at

least alongside Brown. As the Court is aware, the petitioner in Brown has a serious switching-horses problem that threatens a dismissal as improvidently

granted. Moreover, Petitioner here appears to have

tried to temper the more sweeping positions espoused

by the petitioner in Brown. Accordingly, if the Court

wishes to take the issue presented, this vehicle, while

still poor, is comparatively better than Brown.

The Court should deny the petition.

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Legal Background

1. “Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action,

but in several respects … [it] looks to the law of the

State in which the cause of action arose.” Wallace, 549

U.S. at 387. “This is so for the length of the statute of

limitations: It is that which the State provides for personal-injury torts.” Id. (citing Owens v. Okure, 488

U.S. 235 (1989); Wilson, 471 U.S. 261).

This well-settled rule is the product of multiple decisions from this Court carefully designed to eliminate

any “confusion over what statute of limitations to apply to § 1983.” Owens, 488 U.S. at 251. In Wilson, the

Court “[r]ecognized the problems inherent in [a] caseby-case approach” where courts would rely on random

state-law analogies, such that “plaintiffs and defendants often had no idea whether a federal civil rights

claim was barred until a court ruled on their case.” Id.

at 240. The Wilson Court “sought to end” that uncertainty by “determin[ing] that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 requires courts to borrow and apply to all § 1983 claims

the one most analogous state statute of limitations.”

Id. (citing Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275). And that most

analogous statute of limitations, the Wilson Court

held, is “a State’s personal injury statute of limitations.” Id. at 240–41.

Following Wilson, “confusion” persisted with respect to “§ 1983 claims in States with multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions.” Id. at

241 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court’s “task” in Owens was “to provide courts with a rule for determining

the appropriate personal injury limitations statute

6

that can be applied with ease and predictability in all

50 States.” Id. The Owens Court did so: “We [] hold

that where state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering

§ 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual

statute for personal injury actions.” Id. at 249–50.

That rule makes sense because “every State has one

general or residual statute of limitations governing

personal injury actions.” Id. at 246. Moreover, “plaintiffs and defendants [] can readily ascertain, with little

risk of confusion or unpredictability, the applicable

limitations period in advance of filing a § 1983 action.”

Id. at 248.

2. For some 40 years following Wilson and Owens,

federal courts—including the Fifth Circuit in this case

and Brown—consistently applied Louisiana’s general

one-year limitations period for personal-injury actions

to § 1983 actions arising in Louisiana. See La. Civ.

Code art. 3492 (2024) (“Delictual actions are subject to

a liberative prescription of one year.”); Pet. App.2a; see

also Brown, 93 F.4th at 332; Washington v. Breaux,

782 F.2d 553, 554 n.1 (5th Cir. 1986).

During the summer of 2024, however, the Louisiana Legislature repealed that one-year limitations period. See 2024 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 423 (H.B. 315).

Specifically, Act 423 repeals Article 3492 itself and

creates a two-year limitations period. Act 423 took effect on July 1, 2024, and the new limitations period

governs all causes of action arising after July 1, 2024.

See id.

7

B. Procedural Background

1. Petitioner filed this § 1983 lawsuit on November

24, 2021—“one year and eleven months” after the

events giving rise to his suit. Pet.App.2a & n.2. His

lawsuit alleges that Respondents Terry Conner and

Richard Matthews, in their former capacities as Louisiana State Police officers, violated his constitutional

rights while arresting him during “a routine traffic

stop” in 2019. Pet.App.2a. The district court dismissed

his lawsuit because “[b]inding Supreme Court authority directs that federal courts apply the residual state

limitations period to Section 1983 actions,” which, under former Civil Code Article 3492, “is one year.”

Pet.App.6a–7a. Thus, “[b]ecause Monroe brought this

Section 1983 action nearly two years after the incident

giving rise to his lawsuit, Monroe’s federal law claims

have prescribed[.]” Pet.App.7a.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed in a brief order repeating its decision in Brown. “[O]ur precedent ‘consistently applied shorter, general limitations periods instead of longer ones governing analogous state law

claims,’ and has ‘repeatedly applied Louisiana’s oneyear prescriptive period’ to claims brought under

§ 1983.” Pet.App.4a. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit rejected Petitioner’s challenge to the application of former Article 3492’s one-year limitations period to bar

his claim.

2. Two years after he filed this lawsuit—and 11

days after he filed his opening brief in the Fifth Circuit—Petitioner was tried and convicted in Louisiana

state court for both “battery of a police officer, in violation of La. R.S. 14:34.2, and resisting an officer, in

violation of La. R.S. 14:108.” BIO App.10a. The state

8

trial court explained to Petitioner that Officer Matthews “asked you multiple times to step out [of your

vehicle] and you refused to step out.” Id. at 2a. “[T]his

all started with the resisting, refusing to get out of the

vehicle as well as, I mean, this resisting continued

throughout the entire stop even when Sergeant Conner arrived at the scene.” Id. at 3a. “It took both of

them pulling at you and eventually they couldn’t even

pull you out of the vehicle. Eventually you got out on

your own and then there was more resistance …. [Y[ou

resisted that to the extent that they eventually had to

take you to the ground to handcuff you.” Id. The state

trial court acknowledged Petitioner’s claim that “they

were beating me,” but the court rejected it: “I just don’t

see it that way, Mr. Monroe. I – I see that you were not

compliant and so they had to try to get you in handcuffs and it ultimately led to them taking you to the

ground.” Id. “[T]he continual resistance it’s just clear.”

Id.

The evidence and state trial court’s decision also

revealed inaccuracies in Petitioner’s story in this federal litigation. His petition suggests (Pet. 8) that Officer Matthews deliberately turned his body camera

off so that it would not depict Officer Matthews

“dr[awing] his gun and point[ing] it at Mr. Monroe”—

and that “Officer Matthews turned his body camera

[back] on” later. This is not true. Officer Matthews testified, and the state trial court credited (and the video

actually shows), that Petitioner himself temporarily

“deactivate[d]” the body camera by shoving Officer

Matthews in the chest. BIO App.2a. In fact, the state

trial court cited that “push” to find “beyond a reasonable doubt that that was a battery of a police officer.”

Id. Petitioner’s insinuation that Officer Matthews

9

“turned off” the camera is thus misleading and wrong.

Pet. 8. Moreover, Petitioner notably did not testify at

trial that Officer Matthews drew and aimed a gun at

Petitioner. In fact, Officer Matthews testified, and the

video actually shows, that Officer Matthews drew his

Taser, not a gun, due to Petitioner’s physical resistance.

Following his convictions, Petitioner challenged

the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. The Louisiana court of appeal rejected that challenge:

At trial, Monroe testified that he was aware

that Trooper Matthews was a Louisiana State

Police Officer and that he was being stopped for

speeding. Monroe repeatedly refused direct and

lawful instructions to exit his vehicle and once

Monroe exited his vehicle, his resistance became both verbal and physical. Monroe pushed,

shoved, and grabbed the officers when they attempted to put Monroe in handcuffs. The testimony of Trooper Matthews and Sergeant Conner[] was corroborated by the body camera and

dash camera videos.

BIO App.10a. The court of appeal thus “conclude[d]

that the evidence presented was sufficient to support

both convictions.” Id. (Petitioner now has a writ pending in the Louisiana Supreme Court, but he has abandoned any sufficiency argument, choosing to ask only

the (forfeited) question whether he was entitled to a

jury trial. The Louisiana Supreme Court has not acted

on the writ as of this filing.)

Following Petitioner’s state-court convictions, Respondents sought an indicative ruling from the district

10

court that Petitioner’s already-dismissed lawsuit is

also barred by Heck. Dist. Ct. ECF No. 87-1. The parties thereafter agreed to stay briefing on this issue.

Dist. Ct. ECF No. 91. The district court denied the motion for an indicative ruling without prejudice to Respondents’ “right to re-urge” the motion once Petitioner has exhausted his state-court appellate rights.

Dist. Ct. ECF No. 92.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

The Court should deny the petition for any number

of reasons. First, and foremost, this is an exceedingly

poor vehicle to decide the appropriateness of a oneyear limitation period for § 1983 claims, both because

Petitioner’s lawsuit (timely or not) is Heck-barred and

because (as Petitioner complains) even the Fifth Circuit did not squarely answer that question. Second,

even aside from vehicle problems, the issue is not certworthy. And third, the Fifth Circuit faithfully followed

this Court’s own precedents, while Petitioner’s contrary position would upset settled law. Given all this,

the Court should deny the petition. If it is inclined to

address the issue presented, however, there are good

reasons to prefer this vehicle over Brown, or at least

alongside Brown. Still, the most appropriate disposition here and in Brown is to deny.

I. THIS IS A POOR VEHICLE TO DECIDE THE ISSUE

PRESENTED.

A. Plaintiff’s Lawsuit Is Heck-Barred.

The principal problem for Petitioner is that, even if

his § 1983 claim were timely, he will not obtain any

relief in this case because his lawsuit is Heck-barred.

11

This Court has long held that, “in order to recover

damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by

a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at

486–87 (footnote omitted). Indeed, “[a] claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable

under § 1983.” Id. at 487 (emphasis in original). As the

Court later put it, “[i]f the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the [§ 1983] suit would impugn the conviction, Heck will require dismissal.” Wallace, 549 U.S.

at 394.

Here, there can be no serious dispute that Petitioner’s § 1983 lawsuit seeks to impugn his state-court

convictions. Specifically, his claims of “excessive force”

attack the Louisiana state courts’ precise findings undergirding his convictions for battery of a police officer

and resisting a police officer. In fact, Petitioner himself candidly told the Fifth Circuit that his “civil

claims necessarily amount to a challenge against the

validity of the criminal proceedings against him.” C.A.

Appellant’s Br. 39 n.5. 2 So, again, there can be no dispute that Petitioner’s lawsuit—timely or not—is now

2 In the same footnote, Petitioner argued that, “[s]hould the

Court decline to reject Louisiana’s one-year limitations period,

the Court should find that Mr. Monroe’s Section 1983 and 1985

claims do not accrue until resolution of the criminal proceedings

12

Heck-barred because he was “ultimately convicted”

and his suit “would impugn [his] conviction[s].” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 394.

To be sure, the district court in this case has deferred consideration of the Heck problem, see supra p.

10—and it will not need to consider the problem at all

if and when this Court denies the petition, which

would affirm the dismissal of Petitioner’s lawsuit on

timeliness grounds. But, because the clear Heck bar

illustrates that Petitioner will not obtain relief in this

lawsuit regardless of the Court’s disposition of his

question presented, this is a poor vehicle to take his

question.

B. The Fifth Circuit’s Decisions in Monroe

and Brown Did Not Fully Answer the Issue

Presented.

More fatal still is the fact that there is no fully reasoned decision—either in the Fifth Circuit below or apparently anywhere else—addressing Petitioner’s issue

presented.

As Petitioner describes it, “the question presented

here” is “[w]hether ‘applying a 1-year limitations period to § 1983 actions’ would flunk the third step of

Section 1988’s borrowing analysis for being ‘inconsistent with [the] federal interests’ underlying the federal civil rights laws.” Pet. 13 (quoting Owens, 488

U.S. at 251 n.13). But the Fifth Circuit did not

squarely answer that question—in either this case or

Brown. As Petitioner tells it, the Fifth Circuit “largely

against him.” C.A. Appellant’s Br. 39 n.5 (citing McDonough v.

Smith, 588 U.S. 109 (2019)). The Fifth Circuit did not address

that argument, and Petitioner does not raise it in his petition.

13

sidestep[ped]” the question altogether “on the theory

that only this Court can decide how lower courts

should evaluate the question in light of existing precedent.” Id. at 12 (cleaned up); see also id. (“The Fifth

Circuit’s half-hearted resolution”); id. at 18 (“The Fifth

Circuit failed to grapple with this analysis.”); id. at 19

(“The Fifth Circuit claimed that it could not ‘evaluate’

the frustration of those federal interests absent further guidance from ‘[this] Court.’”); id. (“the court

shirked its ‘duty’”); id. at 22 (“the Fifth Circuit insisted

that only this Court is capable of answering that question” (cleaned up)).

Worse for Petitioner, there does not appear to be a

reasoned decision on the issue presented—much less

one espousing his view—anywhere in the country.

Compare Pet. 16 n.3 (noting that the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits “have applied one-year limitations periods to Section 1983 claims” with “only ‘limited analysis’”). And that includes Petitioner’s (and the Brown

petitioner’s) musings about uprooting this Court’s

longstanding precedents and replacing them with a

uniform rule like the default four-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 1658. Pet. 20; Brown Pet. i. The

Fifth Circuit said nothing about this argument either

below or in Brown, and (it appears) in fact no court has

addressed the issue.

The upshot is that there is no thoroughly reasoned

decision, below or otherwise, taking either side on Petitioner’s question presented. Given that reality, it

would make little sense for the Court to take this issue

now. This is a quintessential example of the need for

further percolation and judicial decisions that could

14

aid this Court’s own decision-making process. Neither

this case nor Brown are appropriate vehicles.

II. THE ISSUE PRESENTED IS NOT CERT-WORTHY.

Petitioner’s vehicle problems lead, in turn, to the

unavoidable fact that his question presented is not

cert-worthy. Petitioner notably does not—and cannot—argue that there is a circuit split. This is unsurprising. By his telling, Pet. 1, only Louisiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Puerto Rico have (or had) a oneyear limitations period—and Petitioner does not cite a

single decision from any court, let alone the First,

Fifth, or Sixth Circuits, fully addressing the issue. Cf.

supra Section I.B (citing Petitioner’s view that even

the Fifth Circuit itself did not squarely address the issue below and in Brown).

This explains why Petitioner hangs his hat (Pet. 1,

12, 23) on the “critical[] importan[ce]” of the issue. But

the petition itself undercuts even that suggestion.

First, Petitioner concedes that a decision invalidating the use of Louisiana’s former one-year limitations

period would have no impact on Louisiana for cases

arising after July 1, 2024. Pet. 3 n.1, 25. That is because Act 423 repealed the limitations period and replaced it with a two-year limitations period. See supra

p. 6.

Second, recognizing the vanishing relevance of the

issue presented for Louisiana, Petitioner focuses his

attention on its supposed importance for “Kentucky,

Tennessee, and Puerto Rico.” Pet. 25–26. But his use

of words like “million” and “hundreds” distracts from

his failure to concretely identify any person or group

of persons affected by the issue presented.

15

For example, he proclaims that Kentucky, Tennessee, and Puerto Rico “are home to more than 14 million

people.” Id. at 25. Respondents have no reason to question that number—but it has zero bearing on the question here, which is how many, if any, § 1983 plaintiffs

“experience emotional trauma, physical injuries, and

legal obstacles” that render “a one-year filing deadline

[] virtually impossible to meet.” E.g., id. at 17. Similarly, Petitioner says that “hundreds of plaintiffs fil[e]

Section 1983 claims in federal courts in these jurisdictions every year.” Id. at 25. Again, Respondents have

no reason to question that number—but it, too, says

nothing about how many, if any, of these § 1983 plaintiffs faced some sort of obstacle that purportedly prevented them from timely filing a § 1983 lawsuit.

The most Petitioner offers is a footnoted string-citation of cases in which “plaintiffs [found] their claims

time-barred by the one-year limitations period.” Id. at

25–26 & n.7. But each of those cases reflects the unremarkable fact that a plaintiff simply failed to file her

suit on time—not that some obstacle made a one-year

filing deadline “virtually impossible to meet.” Id. at 17.

In fact, it appears that this lawsuit is one such case.

Although his petition is premised on purported difficulties that make a one-year limitations period “virtually impossible to meet,” Petitioner notably never argues that some obstacle prevented him from filing suit

on time or that it was impossible for him to sue on

time. He simply failed to do so.

Petitioner’s apparent inability to identify any

§ 1983 cases substantiating his generalities is fatal for

cert-worthiness purposes, but it is also understandable. That is because equitable tolling—or, in Louisiana

16

parlance, the doctrine of contra non valentem—generally tolls or suspends a limitations period where some

obstacle prevents a plaintiff from timely filing suit. In

Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536 (1989), this Court held

that state-law tolling rules generally apply alongside

state-law limitations periods in § 1983 actions. And

pursuant to Hardin and its progeny, “Louisiana’s federal courts have, on numerous occasions, applied contra non valentem in Section 1983 cases.” Dugas v. City

of Ville Platte, 2017 WL 6521660, at *6 & n.35 (W.D.

La. Nov. 17, 2017) (collecting cases). The result is that

the doctrines of equitable tolling and contra non

valentem are a safety valve that protects any § 1983

plaintiff who (as Petitioner surmises) confronts some

obstacle that prevents the timely filing of a lawsuit.

And that only underscores that the suitability of oneyear limitations periods for § 1983 claims is not exceptionally important: If the hypothetical examples of

§ 1983 plaintiffs who face an “impossible” one-year filing deadline actually exist, doctrines like equitable

tolling also exist to toll or suspend the limitations period in extraordinary circumstances.

To sum up, under Petitioner’s view, the sky has

been falling in Louisiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, and

Puerto Rico for decades now because of the one-year

limitations period. If that were true, the petition

would overflow with examples of § 1983 plaintiffs on

whom “the federal courthouse doors [have been]

wrongly slammed shut.” Pet. 27. Petitioner’s silence

thus reinforces that this issue is not cert-worthy.

17

III. THE DECISION BELOW IS CORRECT.

In all events, the petition does not seriously argue

that the Fifth Circuit erred in applying a one-year limitations period to § 1983 claims as it has done for decades. And a ruling for Petitioner would uproot deeply

settled law.

1. As just explained, Petitioner’s only real argument (shared by his amici) is that a “one-year period

disregards practicalities of litigating” § 1983 claims.

Pet.App.11a. For example, he recites this Court’s observation that litigating civil rights claims requires

preparatory steps such as “drafting pleadings compliant with federal rules” and “conducting pre-filing investigation.” Pet. 14–15 (citing Burnett, 468 U.S. at

50–51).

It bears noting (again), however, that Petitioner

never specifies how, if at all, any of these preparatory

steps was the reason why he failed to timely file his

lawsuit. But more fundamentally, the Court in Burnett made its “practicalities of litigation” point only to

illustrate the potential mismatch of adopting for

§ 1983 litigation a short limitations period intended

for administrative proceedings where the “practicalities” present comparatively minimal burdens. See

Burnett, 468 U.S. at 50–51. Indeed, Petitioner does not

acknowledge the Court’s statement—after Burnett—

that “[i]t is most unlikely that the period of limitations

applicable to [personal injury] claims ever was, or ever

would be, fixed in a way that would discriminate

against federal claims, or be inconsistent with federal

law in any respect.” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 279. In other

words, applying personal-injury statutes of limitation

for litigation in § 1983 litigation invariably resolves

18

any potential problem with the limitations periods not

accounting for the practicalities of litigation.

Petitioner also says nothing about then-Justice

Rehnquist’s view—joined by Chief Justice Burger and

Justice O’Connor—that this “practicalities” reasoning

makes little sense. See Burnett, 468 U.S. at 57

(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). “These

seeming difficulties are hardly unique to respondents’

claims or any other garden-variety federal civil rights

claim.” Id. Indeed, “there is nothing inherent in a

claim asserted under § 1981, § 1983, or § 1985, in light

of modern pleading rules, that makes such a claim invariably more difficult to investigate than a claim asserted under state law.” Id. Justice Rehnquist recognized—as Petitioner emphasizes—“that a longer statute of limitations will give a person more time to reflect and to recognize that he may have some means of

relief.” Id. “But that common-sense truism hardly

qualifies as a ‘practicality’ that should ordinarily affect a court’s analysis whether to borrow a particular

state statute of limitations. Were it otherwise, a federal court should always prefer a longer statute of limitations over an alternative, but shorter period, a type

of approach we have rejected before.” Id. at 57–58.

The generalized nature of Petitioner’s “practicalities” argument likewise points up the arbitrariness of

his position: Why is one year too short but not two

years? Petitioner’s only answer appears to be that

“[m]ost states have a limitations period for personal

injury actions that is at least two years.” Pet. 21. But

that is not a defense of a two-year limitations period

as sufficient to overcome the “practicalities” of litigating § 1983 claims; that is just an argument that other

19

States made different policy choices for their respective tort-law systems and thus (here’s Petitioner’s own

policy argument) Louisiana, Kentucky, Tennessee,

and Puerto Rico should be required to follow suit. Petitioner offers no principled basis for drawing his oneyear line.

This Court itself has never drawn that line, although Petitioner makes much of footnote 13 in Owens,

where the Court stated: “Because we hold that the

Court of Appeals correctly borrowed New York’s 3year general personal injury statute of limitations, we

need not address Okure’s argument that applying a 1year limitations period to § 1983 actions would be inconsistent with federal interests.” Owens, 488 U.S. at

251 n.13 (citing Justice Rehnquist’s Burnett concurrence); see also Pet. i (footnote 13 “expressly left open

the question”), 1 (“previously reserved the question”),

2 (“expressly flagged, but declined to resolve, the question”). Petitioner’s emphasis on footnote 13 suggests

that the Court has called into question the validity of

a one-year limitations period.

Petitioner overreads that footnote for at least two

reasons. First, footnote 13 in Owens reflects the

Court’s common practice of noting that it has no occasion to resolve alternative arguments given the outcome-determinative argument(s) adopted by the

Court. See, e.g., Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors

of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 144 S. Ct. 2440, 2459 n.8 (2024)

(“We need not resolve that issue here ….”). By definition, such notations are not intended to reflect a view

one way or the other on the merits. And second, Petitioner must take the bitter with any sweet: In the paragraph of Justice Rehnquist’s Burnett concurrence

20

cited by footnote 13 in Owens, Justice Rehnquist

(again, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice

O’Connor) expressly argued that “at least a 1-year period is reasonable” (because Congress imposed a oneyear period in 42 U.S.C. § 1986) and, in fact, “a 6month limitations period” and “[e]ven shorter periods

of limitation might be permissible.” Burnett, 468 U.S.

at 61 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).

Thus, although the unanimous Owens Court did not

express a view on that question, we know that at least

three Members of the Owens Court would reject Petitioner’s argument outright.

Finally, Petitioner does not acknowledge that this

Court itself has applied a one-year limitations period

to claims under § 1983 and its sister statute, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981, arising out of Puerto Rico and Tennessee—

though, to be sure, without squarely addressing the

question presented in this case. In Chardon, 454 U.S.

6, the Court held that § 1983 actions filed by terminated employees were time-barred under Puerto

Rico’s one-year limitations period. And in Johnson,

421 U.S. 454, the Court held that a terminated employee’s § 1981 claim was time-barred under Tennessee’s one-year limitations period. Considering this history, as well as Congress’s express imposition of a oneyear limitations period for claims arising under 42

U.S.C. § 1986—as the Fifth Circuit and then-Justice

Rehnquist have noted, Brown, 93 F.4th at 337; Burnett, 468 U.S. at 61 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)—the

Fifth Circuit did not err in this case by following suit.

2. Any ruling to the contrary, moreover, would uproot long-settled precedent. As just explained, this

Court has at least assumed the validity of a one-year

21

limitations period for § 1983 actions. And in Kentucky,

Tennessee, and Puerto Rico—the only jurisdictions

that would be affected on a going-forward basis by a

decision in this case—that has been the settled rule

for decades. See, e.g., Brown v. Wigginton, 981 F.2d

913, 914 (6th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (“There is also no

dispute that in Kentucky there is a one-year statute of

limitations on section 1983 actions.”); Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 F.3d 543, 547 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he

applicable limitations period in Tennessee is one

year.”); Carreras-Rosa v. Alves-Cruz, 127 F.3d 172,

174 (1st Cir. 1997) (“In Puerto Rico the applicable limitation period for tort actions is one year.”). Changing

the limitations period for § 1983 actions would thus be

a seismic shift for the bench, bar, and litigants that

have come to rely on that settled precedent.

Petitioner suggests that this change is warranted

because Congress created a “catch-all” four-year limitations period in 1990. Pet. 20 (citing 28 U.S.C.

§ 1658(a)). As Petitioner acknowledges, however, by

its own terms § 1658 applies only to actions arising

under federal laws enacted after 1990. Id. Not to

worry, Petitioner says, because “it would be appropriate to borrow that four-year period.” Id. That would be

inappropriate. This Court recognized in Jones v. R.R.

Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004), that Congress “refused to make § 1658 retroactive” to avoid upsetting “settled expectations” that had come about

through prior judicial decisions like Wilson and Owens. Id. at 381–82. To stubbornly “borrow” § 1658’s

four-year limitations period for § 1983 actions none-

22

theless, therefore, would be to override Congress’s refusal to make § 1658 retroactive. 3 Petitioner’s suggestions (and the Brown petitioner’s suggestions) that

§ 1658 marks a material development for purposes of

§ 1983 are thus incorrect.

Finally, it is important to appreciate the implications of invoking § 1658. Applying its four-year limitations period to § 1983 actions would be tantamount to

overruling Wilson, Owens, and every other case where

this Court carefully crafted the existing framework

that “end[ed] [] the confusion over what statute of limitations to apply to § 1983 actions.” Owens, 488 U.S. at

251; compare Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 118

(2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“In statutory

cases, stare decisis is comparatively strict, as history

shows and the Court has often stated.”). The petitioner

in Brown embraces this proposed sea change. See

Brown Pet. 4 (“[T]his Court can eliminate the fiftystate patchwork approach and replace it with a suitable federal solution that is uniform across the country

and faithful to the federal interests underpinning Section 1983.” (emphasis omitted)). And he willfully

acknowledges that those prior decisions “would no

longer control”—no matter, he says, because “those decisions became outdated as soon as Congress enacted

3 This answers Petitioner’s citation (Pet. 20) of an article by

Judge Mikva suggesting that courts could borrow § 1658’s fouryear limitations period for claims arising under pre-1990 federal

laws where “no clear rule of federal law has emerged.” As of

§ 1658’s enactment, this Court’s decisions in Wilson and Owens

had intentionally and clearly created the existing framework for

statutes of limitations in the § 1983 context—and by now, that

clear rule has been in effect for decades.

23

Section 1658 in 1990.” Brown Cert. Reply 12. As explained above, that flips § 1658 on its head and would

destroy this Court’s precedents.

Petitioner apparently recognizes as much, and so

he proposes instead that the Court could apply

§ 1658’s four-year limitations period “at least” in jurisdictions with one-year limitations periods. Pet. 20. But

there is no principled basis for importing only as to

some jurisdictions a statute that was not intended to

apply at all on the subject of § 1983 actions. Petitioner

must own up to his distortion of § 1658 and the sweeping consequences of his position, if adopted.

For these reasons, there was no error below, much

less an error that would compel this Court to grant review and overhaul § 1983’s existing framework.

IV. IF THE COURT BELIEVES FURTHER REVIEW IS

NECESSARY, IT SHOULD GRANT MONROE INSTEAD

OF BROWN, OR BOTH MONROE AND BROWN.

Although the Court should deny the petition, in the

alternative the Court should—if it is otherwise inclined to address the issue presented—grant Monroe

rather than Brown, or at least grant and hear both

cases in tandem.

The principal reason is that there is a serious risk

that the Court would have to dismiss Brown as improvidently granted. In the Fifth Circuit, the petitioner in Brown framed his case as a challenge to a

one-year limitations period for so-called “police brutality” claims under § 1983—a term he used 47 times in

his opening Fifth Circuit brief, 32 times in his Fifth

Circuit reply brief, and only once (in a parenthetical in

a footnote) in his cert petition, see Brown Pet. 18 n.2.

24

Indeed, his statement of the issue presented in the

Fifth Circuit was “[w]hether the district court erred in

holding that Louisiana’s one-year, residual prescriptive period should apply to Section 1983 suits for injuries resulting from police brutality[.]” Brown C.A. Appellant’s Br. 3 (emphasis added). Most striking is that,

in the Fifth Circuit, he expressly disavowed the exact

broadside attack on one-year limitations periods (as

applied to all § 1983 claims) that he now presses in

this Court: That “is a question decidedly not before

this Court. Mr. Brown has not brought this challenge

to address every manner of Section 1983 claims.”

Brown C.A. Reply Br. at 12.

Unsurprisingly, the Fifth Circuit understood the

petitioner in Brown to be arguing for a “police brutality”-specific rule: “He contends that the one-year period both impermissibly discriminates against Section

1983 police brutality claims and practically frustrates

litigants’ ability to bring such claims.” 93 F.4th at 332

(emphases added). His statement now (Brown Cert.

Reply 10) that he is simply “further refin[ing]” his arguments is thus belied by the reality that his petition

does not match the briefing he presented to the Fifth

Circuit. As a result, granting the Brown petition

would be perilous.

In addition, Petitioner here claims (Pet. 28 n.8)

that his position in this case is “not identical” to the

position held by the petitioner in Brown. One example

noted above is the Brown petitioner’s urging this

Court to “eliminate” the state-by-state approach under

Wilson, Owens, and their progeny and “replace it with”

§ 1658’s four-year limitations period. Brown Pet. 4. By

contrast here, Petitioner offers that suggestion as

25

“[t]he best approach … at least in circumstances where

the state-law analogue would be an impermissibly

short one-year limitations period”—a rule for just

Kentucky, Tennessee, and Puerto Rico. Pet. 20 (emphasis added). In other words, Petitioner here, unlike

the petitioner in Brown, appears to appreciate the extraordinary nature of asking this Court to overrule entire lines of precedent affecting the whole country.

For these reasons, Respondents reiterate that the

Court should deny the petition. But, if the Court is inclined to address the issue presented, it should take

this case instead of, or at least alongside, Brown.

CONCLUSION

The Court should deny the petition.

Respectfully submitted,

ELIZABETH B. MURRILL

J. BENJAMIN AGUIÑAGA

Attorney General

Solicitor General

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF

Counsel of Record

JUSTICE

KELSEY L. SMITH

1885 N. Third St.

Deputy Solicitor

Baton Rouge, LA 70802

General

(225) 506-3746

PHYLLIS E. GLAZER

AguinagaB@ag.louisiAss’t Attorney

ana.gov

General

Jennie P. Pellegrin

Ben L. Mayeaux

NEUNERPATE

One Petroleum Center,

Suite 200

1001 West Pinhook Rd.

Lafayette, LA 70503

(337) 237-7000

jpellegrin@neunerpate.com

bmayeaux@neunerpate.com

Sidney W. Degan, III

Travis L. Bourgeois

Keith A. Kornman

Jena W. Smith

DEGAN, BLANCHARD &

NASH

400 Poydras Street,

Suite 2600

New Orleans, LA 70130

(504) 529-3333

sdegan@degan.com

tbourgeois@degan.com

kkornman@degan.com

jsmith@degan.com

26

Blake J. Arcuri

Laura C. Rodrigue

RODRIGUE & ARCURI,

LLP

1615 Poydras St.,

Suite 1250

New Orleans, LA 70112

(504) 592-4600

bja@rodriguearcuri.com

APPENDIX

i

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

A PPENDI X A — EXCERP T OF TRI A L

TR A NSCRIP T FROM THE T W ENT YSIXTH JUDICIA L DISTRICT COURT,

PA R I S H OF B O S S I E R , S T A T E OF

LOUISIANA, FILED JULY 31, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

A P PEN DI X B — A P PL ICAT ION F OR

SU PERV ISORY W RIT OF THE

S TAT E OF L OU I SI A NA C OU RT OF

A PPEA L, SECOND CIRCUIT, FILED

NOVEMBER 22, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9a

1a

A

APPENDIX A Appendix

— EXCERPT

OF TRIAL

TRANSCRIPT FROM THE TWENTY-SIXTH

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF

BOSSIER, STATE OF LOUISIANA,

FILED JULY 31, 2023

IN THE TWENTY-SIXTH JUDICIAL

DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR THE PARISH OF BOSSIER

STATE OF LOUISIANA

DOCKET NUMBER: 234,040 CT 1 & 2

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

ANTHONY T. MONROE

TRIAL in the above entitled and numbered cause,

before Your Honor, Douglas Stinson, Judge, of the TwentySixth Judicial District Court in and for the Parish of

Bossier, State of Louisiana, on the 31st of July, 2023, at

Benton, Bossier Parish, Louisiana.

*

*

*

THE COURT: Okay. I listened to all the testimony

and both now retired Trooper Matthews and now retired

Sergeant Conner. Also listened, Mr. Monroe, to your

testimony and Mr. Boyd stated that he believes you were

sincere in your testimony and I really have no reason

to doubt any of that. I don’t doubt that you were scared

2a

Appendix A

at the time. Just I made a note that I have no problem

whatsoever with you delaying the stop until you got to the

front of Boomtown. And I don’t have an issue with that.

And watching the video I don’t - and hearing Trooper

Matthews testify I don’t think he really had a problem

with that, that being in a well-lit area it makes sense

giving your concerns. I think the problem started once

the stop was initiated in front of [77]Boomtown. Officers

have a right to ask whoever they pull over, that’s a lawful

detention traffic stop, they have a right to ask the driver

to step out of the vehicle for officer safety and I think

that’s where things kind of unraveled. Technically the

law I think, well, he asked you multiple times to step out

and you refused to step out. You eventually rolled up your

window, then you rolled down your window. I didn’t know

what you were doing, but you testified that you accidentally

called your mom and she told you to step out and that’s

when you stepped out. So I believe what you testified to.

But then at that point, at some point you reach back in

the vehicle and an officer has, I would think, the right to

be concerned about what you may be reaching for. And at

that point for officer safety Trooper Matthews said that he

was going to detain you. He asked you to put your hands

behind you back and that’s when the struggle, the first

struggle started. And his, I saw his bodycam deactivate

and he testified that you had pushed him at that point. You

testified something completely different that he grabbed

your hand, one hand and brought to his neck and the other

hand he brought to his - to his gun. I didn’t see that in the

video. And so the push of Mr. Matthews, Mr. Monroe, I

think there’s beyond a reasonable doubt that that was a

battery of a police officer. And so I find you guilty of that

3a

Appendix A

charge. And this all started with the resisting, refusing

to get out the vehicle as well as, I mean, this resisting

continued throughout the entire stop even when Sergeant

Conner arrived at the scene. It took both of them pulling

at you and eventually they couldn’t even pull you out of

the [78]vehicle. Eventually you got out on your own and

then there was more resistance once they - once they

took you to the front of your vehicle. They asked you to

go to the back, you went to the front because you had a

camera. Don’t necessarily have a problem with that, but

then, again after a struggle an officer I think for officer

safety has - has concerns and he wished to detain you at

that time and you resisted that to the extent that they

eventually had to take you to the ground to handcuff you.

And even then, they constantly when you were on the

ground I heard them say multiple times, put your hands

behind your back, put your hands behind your back. And

so the only thing with your testimony that I just maybe

just in the excitement of the event, but you - you kept

saying you’ve testified at least twice I was - I’m trying

to comply but they were beating me. And I just don’t

see it that way, Mr. Monroe. I - I see that you were not

compliant and so they had to try to get you in handcuffs

and it ultimately led to them taking you to the ground.

Both troopers stated that detaining you was necessary.

Trooper - Sergeant Conner stated the same thing. I

think he said that it was necessary to detain you. And

you mentioned a few things, the one, two, three now. Um,

I didn’t hear that. Could it have happened? Maybe. But

I didn’t hear it in the video. But the continual resistance

it’s just clear. The law is you were stopped for speeding

and the officer made the traffic stop. That’s a detention.

4a

Appendix A

And you resisted the officer during a lawful detention.

And so I know you feel like you didn’t break any law to

initiate the stop but the officer had reasonable suspicion

to believe that you [79]were speeding and he stopped you.

That’s not the moment for trial on the speeding. And I feel

like that’s where you took it is you wanted to be put under

trial right then and there and prove you were innocent.

But the way it should work theoretically and ideally, is

you step out of the vehicle, you let the officer give you a

citation for speeding and you go on your way. But this stop

just did not occur that way. And so I find you guilty of the

resisting an officer as well. It’s not resisting an arrest, it’s

resisting an officer. And that includes a lawful detention.

So I find you guilty of both charges of Mr. Monroe. It’s my

duty even with having sympathy for how you felt and how

scared you were, I’ve got to follow the law as it’s written.

And the way I see it written and what I saw the evidence

presented is that you resisted and that you pushed the

officer. So that’s the reason behind my findings of guilt

on both charges. Yes, sir?

MR. MONROE: We never saw complete all of the

video, so maybe it’s stuff you didn’t see because they didn’t

show it or they only showed what they need to show to

prove their case.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Monroe, the - the way it

works is I’m to rule on the facts and evidence that are

presented to me and that’s what I’m basing my decision

off of. I watched every video carefully and if part - part

of the video was not presented, the defense, y’all both had

chances to present evidence and I just that’s the way I see

5a

Appendix A

it, Mr. Monroe. So certainly I’ll note your objection. Is he

ready for sentencing today?

[80](OBJECTION NOTED FOR THE RECORD)

MR. ROGERS: No, Your Honor. I believe there’s a

mandatory fifteen days.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROGERS: He might be ready for his sentencing,

but we’re not ready to be remanded for custody for that

fifteen days today.

THE COURT: Okay. Why don’t we bring it back.

That’ll give me some time to - to think about it since it’s

not less than fifteen days. I see what you’re talking about,

so. Um, do you have a date in mind for remand?

MR. BOYD: Your Honor, you don’t have to order a

PSI for a misdemeanor?

THE COURT: No

MR. BOYD: Correct? Okay.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. BOYD: Mr. Rogers, is, uh, August 21st a good

date?

MR. ROGERS: That date’s agreeable.

6a

Appendix A

MR. BOYD: Is that a good date with you, Judge?

THE COURT: If I’m here that’s a good date, so yeah.

[81]MR. BOYD: I just as far as time out.

THE COURT: Yeah. No, that’s - that’s fine. Mr.

Monroe, you’re now set for remand on August 21st. This

is your notice to be in court on that date 9:30 A.M. I’m

going to - you bonded out on these charges; is that correct?

MR. MONROE: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. I’ll allow you to remain.

MADAM SHERIFF: Uh, if he is on bond I have to

take him downstairs. I have to contact the bondsman on

a misdemeanor. The bondsman can give me something in

writing saying that he’ll stay on it. I don’t have to receive

anything from whoever the bond was wrote on, but the

bondsman does have to approve that he is - that he can

remain out on bond.

THE COURT: Okay. Should I do an in lieu of bond in

case the bondsman is not okay with that? Is that something

I can do?

MADAM SHERIFF: Yeah, that’s fine.

THE COURT: Okay. I have no problem with you

remaining out on the same bond that you’re on so long

as your bondsman approves of it. In the case that your

7a

Appendix A

bondsman does not approve of it I’m going to set the bond

on each matter at $500 and that’ll - you’ll have to, if you

have to post that you’ll have to post that to be - to be [82]

released to come back on August 21st, okay. So that’ll be

$500 per count and this is your notice to be back August

21st. What I’d like you mentioned some health issues.

If you have any documentation of that to provide Mr.

Rogers before the 21st I’d ask that you do that, okay. Do

you understand?

MR. MONROE: So what happens today then?

THE COURT: Today we had your trial. Mr. Rogers

asked that sentencing be held off and so I gave you the

date for August 21st for sentencing.

MR. MONROE: And then why do I have to go with

her then?

THE COURT: Cause you bonded out and the bond

only ensures your presence through trial or resolution of

your cases so the bondsman has to agree to allow you to

remain out on the same bond. If he doesn’t I - I gave you

new bonds and I gave a pretty, fairly low considering the

charges so that you could bond out again so you don’t have

to stay in jail till August 21st.

MR. ROGERS: If - if you have to bond out. But your

bondsman should stay on your regular bond, but in case

they don’t you have a secondary bond that has been set

mighty low to make sure that you’d be able to at least post

that to get out.

8a

Appendix A

THE COURT: Okay. I’ll see you back August 21st.

And he needs to be fingerprinted on the battery of a police

officer charge. Just thought about that.

[83]MR. BOYD: And, Your Honor, at this time the

State’s gonna dismiss - dismiss the case 234,040B and

I believe we dismissed 234,040A this morning in court.

THE COURT: Okay. We’ll show 040B dismissed by

the State. Anything else?

MR. BOYD: I believe that’s - that’s all for today, Your

Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. We’ll adjourn court once he’s

fingerprinted, so.

MR. ROGERS: Thank you, Your Honor. You have a

good afternoon.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Rogers. You too.

MR. BOYD: Thank y’all for staying in here all day.

(END OF HEARING)

9a

B

APPENDIX BAppendix

— APPLICATION

FOR

SUPERVISORY WRIT OF THE STATE OF

LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, SECOND

CIRCUIT, FILED NOVEMBER 22, 2023

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, SECOND CIRCUIT

430 Fannin Street

Shreveport, LA 71101

(318) 227-3700

No. 55,704-KW

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

ANTHONY T. MONROE

FILED: 11/22/23

RECEIVED: PM 11/17/23

On application of Anthony T. Monroe for SUPERVISORY

WRIT in No. 234,040 on the docket of the Twenty Sixth

Judicial District, Parish of BOSSIER, Judge Douglas M.

Stinson.

E. Bridget Wheeler

Delia Addo-Yobo

John Schuyler Marvin

Cody Allen Boyd

Counsel for:

Anthony T. Monroe

Counsel for:

State of Louisiana

10a

Appendix B

Before PITMAN, STEPHENS, and HUNTER, JJ.

WRIT GRANTED; AFFIRMED.

Anthony T. Monroe seeks supervisory review of

his misdemeanor convictions for battery of a police

officer, in violation of La. R.S. 14:34.2; and resisting an

officer, in violation of La. R.S. 14:108. Monroe raises four

assignments of error, including claims of insufficiency of

the evidence and violation of his right to a jury trial.

Based upon the standard of review for the sufficiency

of evidence provided by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979), we

conclude that the evidence presented was sufficient to

support both convictions. At trial, Monroe testified that

he was aware that Trooper Matthews was a Louisiana

State Police Officer and that he was being stopped for

speeding. Monroe repeatedly refused direct and lawful

instructions to exit his vehicle and once Monroe exited

his vehicle, his resistance became both verbal and

physical. Monroe pushed, shoved, and grabbed the officers

when they attempted to put Monroe in handcuffs. The

testimony of Trooper Matthews and Sergeant Conners

was corroborated by the body camera and dash camera

videos.

As to Monroe’s claims that his constitutional right to

due process was violated because he was not provided a

jury trial, Monroe did not object when the State amended

the bill of information to reduce the felony charge to the

misdemeanor charge of resisting an officer, or when the

11a

Appendix B

bench trial started just moments after the State filed the

amended bill of information. Monroe never raised the

issue of constitutional violation at the trial court level, and

accordingly, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review

these assignments. U.R.C.A. 1-3. Issues not submitted to

the trial court for decision will not be considered by the

appellate court on appeal. First Federal Sav and Loans

Ass’n of Rochester v. Mullone, 612 So. 2d 1016 (La. App.

2 Cir. 1993), citing, Williams v. Williams, 586 So. 2d 658

(La. App. 2 Cir. 1991).

Accordingly, the writ is granted and Anthony T.

Monroe’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.

Shreveport, Louisiana, this 22 day of February, 2024.

/s/_____________

/s/_____________

FILED: February 22, 2024

/s/

DEPUTY CLERK

/s/