Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Anthony Monroe, Petitioner v. Terry Conner, et al.

Supreme Court briefJul 3, 2024

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No. ______

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

————

ANTHONY MONROE,

Petitioner,

TERRY CONNER, ET AL.,

Respondents.

————

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

————

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

————

JASON M. OHTA

ERIC A. RIVAS

ADAM A. HERRERA

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

12670 High Bluff Drive

San Diego, CA 92130

EMILY R. ORMAN

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

355 South Grand Avenue

Suite 100

Los Angeles, CA 90071

ROMAN MARTINEZ

Counsel of Record

BLAKE E. STAFFORD

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

555 Eleventh Street, NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 637-3377

roman.martinez@lw.com

DAVID D. COLE

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES

UNION FOUNDATION

915 Fifteenth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20005

NIKITA KANSRA

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

1271 Avenue of the Americas

NORA AHMED

New York, NY 10020

ACLU FOUNDATION OF

LOUISIANA

1340 Poydras Street

Suite 2160

New Orleans, LA 70112

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTION PRESENTED

Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a means to

hold state actors accountable for violating federal

constitutional and statutory rights. Congress did not,

however, specify every rule governing claims filed

under Section 1983, instead instructing courts to fill

in the gaps by borrowing “suitable” federal law or,

where no such federal law exists, pertinent state law

that is “not inconsistent with the Constitution and

laws of the United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a).

Because Congress did not specify a statute of

limitations for Section 1983 claims, the Court has

held that courts may borrow state statutes of

limitations as long as the borrowed statute does not

frustrate the “federal interest[s]” underpinning

Section 1983. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-49

(1984).

Applying that standard, this Court has held that

courts adjudicating Section 1983 claims should

ordinarily borrow the forum state’s statute of

limitations governing personal injury actions, see

Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989), which

in most states is at least two years. The Court

expressly left open the question whether applying a

state’s one-year limitations period to Section 1983

claims would be “inconsistent with federal interests.”

Id. at 251 n.13. This case presents the question that

the Court expressly left unanswered in Owens:

Whether applying a state’s one-year statute of

limitations to Section 1983 claims is inconsistent with

the federal statutory scheme and the interests that it

is designed to uphold (and if so, how courts should

determine the appropriate limitations period).

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner (plaintiff-appellant below) is Anthony

Monroe.

Respondents (defendants-appellees below) are

Terry Conner, in his individual capacity as a law

enforcement officer with the Louisiana State Police;

Richard Matthews, in his individual capacity as a law

enforcement officer with the Louisiana State Police;

Lamar Davis, in his official capacity as the

Superintendent of the Louisiana State Police; and

Chavez Cammon, in his official capacity as records

custodian.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States Court of Appeals (5th Cir.):

Monroe v. Conner, No. 23-30230, judgment

entered March 5, 2024.

United States District Court (W.D. La.):

Monroe v. Conner, No. 21-cv-4063 judgment

entered March 9, 2023.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ......................................... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ........................... ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS ...................................... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................v

OPINIONS BELOW ....................................................1

JURISDICTION ..........................................................1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .................1

INTRODUCTION .......................................................1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................4

A. Legal Background ........................................4

B. Factual and Procedural Background ...........7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .......11

The Fifth Circuit’s Resolution Of The

Question Left Open In Owens Is Plainly

Wrong ................................................................12

II.

The Question Presented Is Exceptionally

Important And Warrants This Court’s

Review ...............................................................23

CONCLUSION ..........................................................29

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

APPENDIX

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit, Anthony Monroe v.

Terry Conner, No. 23-30230, 2024 WL

939735 (5th Cir. Mar. 5, 2024) ...........................1a

Memorandum Ruling of the United States

District Court for the Western District of

Louisiana, Anthony Monroe v. Terry

Conner, No. 21-4063, 2023 WL 2434696

(W.D. La. Mar. 9, 2023) ......................................6a

28 U.S.C. § 1658 ......................................................16a

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ......................................................17a

42 U.S.C. § 1985 ......................................................18a

42 U.S.C. § 1988 ......................................................20a

La. Civ. Code art. 3492 (repealed by 2024 La.

Sess. Law Serv. Act 423 (H.B. 315)) ................22a

La. Civ. Code art. 3493.10 ......................................23a

2024 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 423 (H.B. 315)

(West) (effective July 1, 2024) ..........................24a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Accord v. Anderson County,

No. 22-5206, 2022 WL 16825411 (6th

Cir. Nov. 8, 2022) .................................................26

Arroyo-Santiago v. Garcia-Vicario,

187 F.3d 621, 1999 WL 551294 (1st Cir.

July 28, 1999) .......................................................26

Asociación de Suscripción Conjunta del

Seguro de Responsabilidad Obligatorio

v. Juarbe-Jiménez,

659 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2011) ..................................26

Bonner v. Perry,

564 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 2009)................................26

Brown v. Pouncy,

— So. 3d —, 2024 WL 2307514 (La. Ct.

App. May 22, 2024) ..............................................22

Brown v. Pouncy,

93 F.4th 331 (5th Cir. 2024),

petition for cert. filed, No. 23-1332

(June 18, 2024)................... 3, 10, 11, 16, 18, 19, 22

Burnett v. Grattan,

468 U.S. 42 (1984) .......................... 2, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12

13, 14, 15, 18, 20

Butts v. Dutton,

878 F.2d 1436, 1989 WL 73653 (6th Cir.

July 6, 1989) .........................................................26

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano

de Melecio,

406 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) ....................................26

Collard v. Kentucky Board of Nursing,

896 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1990)................................26

DelCostello v. International Brotherhood

of Teamsters,

462 U.S. 151 (1983) ..............................................20

Felder v. Casey,

487 U.S. 131 (1988) ........................................14, 21

Green v. Dauphinet,

380 So. 3d 169 (La. Ct. App. 2024) ......................22

Hall v. Tennessee,

60 F.3d 828, 1995 WL 385112 (6th Cir.

June 27, 1995) ......................................................26

Hardin v. Straub,

490 U.S. 536 (1989) ........................................18, 19

Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County

v. Talevski,

599 U.S. 166 (2023) ................................................5

Hobson v. Brennan,

625 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1985) ...........................16

Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin,

876 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1989)............................16

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Lawrence v. Jefferson Parish Public

Defenders,

No. 20-cv-1615, 2022 WL 16739519

(E.D. La. Nov. 7, 2022), appeal

dismissed sub nom. Lawrence v.

Lopinto, No. 22-30776, 2023 WL

8641369 (5th Cir. June 26, 2023) ........................27

Martínez-Rivera v. Puerto Rico,

812 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2016) ..................................26

McDonough v. Smith,

588 U.S. 109 (2019) ........................................18, 24

McDougal v. County of Imperial,

942 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1991)................................16

Merriweather v. City of Memphis,

107 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 1997)................................26

Mitchum v. Foster,

407 U.S. 225 (1972) ................................................5

Muniz-Cabrero v. Ruiz,

23 F.3d 607 (1st Cir. 1994) ..................................26

Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC,

432 U.S. 355 (1977) ..............................................13

Okure v. Owens,

816 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1987), aff’d, 488

U.S. 235 (1989)...............................................15, 16

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Owens v. Okure,

488 U.S. 235 (1989) .............................. 1, 2, 6, 7, 11

13, 14, 17, 19, 21

Perez-Sanchez v. Public Building Authority,

531 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 2008) ................................26

Reed v. Goertz,

598 U.S. 230 (2023) ..............................................24

Robinson v. Butler County,

No. 21-5536, 2022 WL 19977828 (6th

Cir. Dec. 16, 2022)................................................26

Smith v. Kentucky,

36 F.4th 671 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 143

S. Ct. 213 (2022)...................................................26

United States v. Price,

383 U.S. 787 (1966) ................................................5

Vandiver v. Hardin County Board of

Education,

925 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1991)................................26

Wallace v. Kato,

549 U.S. 384 (2007) ..............................................24

Wilson v. Garcia,

471 U.S. 261 (1985) . 2, 4-6, 11-13, 17, 19-21, 23-25

FEDERAL STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)......................................................1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

28 U.S.C. § 1658 ........................................................10

28 U.S.C. § 1658(a)..............................................16, 20

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ..........................................................5

42 U.S.C. § 1986 ........................................................18

42 U.S.C. § 1988(a)........................................ 2, 5, 6, 13

Pub. L. No. 42-22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) .........................5

STATE STATUTES

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140(1)(a) ..........................25

La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492 .......................... 3, 10, 25

La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3493.10 .........................10, 22

La. Rev. Stat. § 14:2(B) .............................................22

P.R. Laws tit. 31, § 5298(2) .......................................25

Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(A) ........................25

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

136 Cong. Rec. H8256 (daily ed. Sept. 27,

1990) .....................................................................16

2024 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 423 (H.B. 315)

(approved June 3, 2024),

https://legiscan.com/LA/bill/HB315/2024 ..............3

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

H.R. Rep. No. 101-734 (1990) .............................16, 21

OTHER AUTHORITIES

ACLU Louisiana, Justice Lab Manual

(Mar. 2022), https://perma.cc/98J9-6ZTU ...........21

Jordan E. DeVylder et al., Elevated

Prevalence of Suicide Attempts among

Victims of Police Violence in the USA, 94

J. Urban Health 629 (2017) .................................17

9 Martin S. Greenberg & R. Barry Ruback,

After the Crime: Victim Decision

Making, in Perspectives in Law &

Psychology (1992) ................................................17

Abner J. Mikva & James E. Pfander, On the

Meaning of Congressional Silence: Using

Federal Common Law to Fill the Gap in

Congress’s Residual Statute of

Limitations, 107 Yale L.J. 393 (1997) .................20

U.S. Census Bureau, State Population

Totals and Components of Change:

2020-2023, https://www.census.gov/data/

tables/time-series/demo/popest/2020sstate-total.html (last revised Dec. 18,

2023) .....................................................................25

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Anthony Monroe respectfully petitions

this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App. 1a-5a) is

available at 2024 WL 939735. The opinion of the

district court (App. 6a-15a) is available at 2023 WL

2434696.

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals entered its judgment on

March 5, 2024. On May 31, 2024, Justice Alito

extended the time to file a petition for a writ of

certiorari through July 3, 2024. This Court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The relevant statutory provisions are reproduced

in the appendix to this petition. App. 16a-22a.

INTRODUCTION

This petition presents a critically important

question concerning the limitations period for civil

rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In three States

and Puerto Rico—unlike everywhere else in the

country—Section 1983 claims are subject to a oneyear statute of limitations that makes it exceedingly

difficult for victims of constitutional violations to

bring timely claims. This Court has previously

reserved the question of whether a one-year

limitations period comports with federal law. Owens

v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251 n.13 (1989). The Court

should grant certiorari in this case to hold it does not.

Enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state

actors who violate federal constitutional and

statutory rights. Rather than delineate every rule

required to adjudicate Section 1983 claims, Congress

directed courts to borrow pertinent rules from

“suitable” federal law or, where such federal law does

not exist, state law—but only insofar as the borrowed

state law is “not inconsistent with the Constitution

and laws of the United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a).

This condition “emphasizes ‘the predominance of the

federal interest’ in the borrowing process,” Wilson v.

Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985) (citation omitted), by

requiring federal courts to ensure that the borrowed

state law does not frustrate “the goals of the federal

civil rights statutes,” Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42,

53 (1984).

One such borrowed rule is the applicable

limitations period. Congress did not specify a statute

of limitations for Section 1983 claims, and, in light of

the absence of otherwise suitable federal law, this

Court filled in the gap by establishing a default rule

that courts adjudicating Section 1983 claims should

borrow the forum state’s general or residual statute of

limitations for personal injury actions. Owens, 488

U.S. at 249-50; Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280. In so holding,

however, the Court has never wavered from Section

1988’s command that a borrowed state law must

comport with the federal interests underlying Section

1983. To the contrary, the Court in Owens expressly

flagged, but declined to resolve, the question whether

a one-year limitations period is so short that applying

it to Section 1983 claims “would be inconsistent with

[those] federal interests.” 488 U.S. at 251 n.13.

That question is squarely presented in this case.

Petitioner Anthony Monroe was pulled over by the

Louisiana State Police for no justifiable reason and

beaten by multiple officers to the point of suffering a

heart attack and incurring permanent injuries to his

upper body. Less than two years after the beating,

Mr. Monroe filed suit, bringing federal civil rights

claims and state-law claims. In most states, his suit

would be timely under the state’s personal injury

limitations period. The district court, however,

dismissed Mr. Monroe’s federal claims as time-barred

under Louisiana’s outlier one-year prescriptive period

(i.e., statute of limitations) for personal injury claims.

La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492.1 That limitations period

is the shortest in the nation, and is matched by only

three other jurisdictions.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed. “[A]lthough” the court

was “sympathetic to Monroe’s plight,” it was “bound”

by a prior panel’s resolution of this issue in Brown v.

Pouncy, 93 F.4th 331 (5th Cir. 2024), petition for cert.

filed, No. 23-1332 (June 18, 2024), to apply

Louisiana’s one-year limitations period to Mr.

Monroe’s claims. See App. 5a. The court emphasized

that “[o]nly the Supreme Court, having already solved

the problem of uncertainty in the absence of a federal

limitations period for Section 1983 claims, can clarify

how lower courts should evaluate practical

frustration [in the ability to litigate such claims]

Louisiana recently lengthened this prescriptive period to

two years—but only for injuries suffered after July 1, 2024. See

2024 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 423 (H.B. 315) (approved

June 3, 2024), https://legiscan.com/LA/bill/HB315/2024. The

amendment thus does not affect Mr. Monroe’s claims.

without undermining that solution.” App. 4a-5a

(alteration in original) (citation omitted).

This Court should take up that invitation and

resolve that question. Applying a one-year period to

Section 1983 claims frustrates the ability of claimants

to enforce their federal rights, especially for victims of

police brutality who often experience trauma,

physical injuries, and legal obstacles that render

filing a claim within a year virtually impossible. The

Fifth Circuit’s contrary conclusion rests on inapt

analogies that largely sidestep the framework

articulated by the Court in Burnett.

This question is indisputably important. Section

1983 is one of the “most important, and ubiquitous,

civil rights statute[s]” enacted by Congress. Wilson,

471 U.S. at 266. It enables individuals to vindicate

their federal rights and prevents state actors from

denying relief for civil rights violations. Yet nearly 15

million people live in jurisdictions where the default

limitations period for asserting Section 1983 claims is

(as a matter of state law) one year. The question

presented thus has ramifications for several

hundreds of civil rights claimants every year. And

unless this Court intervenes, lower courts will

continue to apply unduly short limitations periods to

Section 1983 claims without properly considering the

federal interests at stake. The petition should be

granted.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Legal Background

1. Congress enacted Section 1983 as part of the

Civil Rights Act of 1871 in order to curb “pervasive

state-sanctioned lawlessness and violence against the

freedmen and their White Republican allies” during

the Reconstruction Era. Health & Hosp. Corp. of

Marion Cnty. v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 176 (2023); see

Pub. L. No. 42-22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (1871) (codified

as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Recognizing that

“‘state instrumentalities’ could not, or would not, fully

protect federal rights,” Congress provided individuals

with a private cause of action for their injuries and

entrusted federal courts with protecting individuals’

constitutional rights from violations by state actors.

Talevski, 588 U.S. at 177 (citation omitted); see

Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-43 (1972).

Under Section 1983, individuals may seek

recourse against state actors who deprive them of

“any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court

has given this core private remedy “a sweep as broad

as its language.” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 272 (quoting

United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)).

Congress did not delineate “every rule of decision

required to adjudicate claims asserted under” the civil

rights laws. Burnett, 468 U.S. at 47. Instead,

Congress instructed courts to fill in the gaps by

borrowing “the laws of the United States, so far as

such laws are suitable to carry [the civil rights laws]

into effect,” as well as “the common law, as modified

and changed by the constitution and statutes of the

State, . . . so far as the same is not inconsistent with

the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 42

U.S.C. § 1988(a).

Section 1988 accordingly prescribes a “three-step

process” for “borrow[ing] an appropriate rule.”

Burnett, 468 U.S. at 47. Courts first “look to the laws

of the United States” to determine whether an

analogous federal law that is “‘suitable to carry [the

civil rights statutes] into effect’” exists. Id. at 47-48

(alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a)).

If “no suitable federal rule exists, courts undertake

the second step by considering application of state

‘common law, as modified and changed by the

constitution and statutes’ of the forum State.” Id. at

48 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a)). Before borrowing

state law, the “third step” requires courts to ensure

that the state law “is not ‘inconsistent with the

Constitution and laws of the United States.’” Id.

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a)). The third step “asserts

the predominance of the federal interest,” id.,

ensuring that any borrowed state law is “consistent

with federal law and policy,” Owens, 488 U.S. at 239.

2. Congress did not set out an express statute of

limitations for Section 1983 claims. As a result, this

Court has applied the framework set forth above and

held that Section 1988 generally “requires courts to

borrow and apply to all [Section] 1983 claims” the

forum State’s “personal injury statute of limitations.”

Owens, 488 U.S. at 240-41 (citing Wilson, 471 U.S. at

275, 280). The Court reasoned that attaching the

limitations period for personal injury claims to

Section 1983 claims “is supported by the nature of the

§ 1983 remedy, and by the federal interest in ensuring

that the borrowed period of limitations not

discriminate against the federal civil rights remedy.”

Wilson, 471 U.S at 276. And when state law provides

multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury

actions, courts should “borrow the general or residual

statute.” Owens, 488 U.S. at 249-50.

Notwithstanding these default rules, the Court

has noted that, “before borrowing a state statute of

limitations and applying it to § 1983 claims, a court

must ensure that it ‘afford[s] a reasonable time to the

federal claimant.’” Id. at 251 n.13 (alteration in

original) (quoting Burnett, 468 U.S. at 61 (Rehnquist,

J., concurring in the judgment)). The Court has

accordingly left open the question whether a one-year

limitations period would be so short that it is

“inconsistent with federal interests” and thus should

not be borrowed for purposes of Section 1983 claims.

Id.

B. Factual and Procedural Background

1. Petitioner Anthony Monroe is a 61-year-old

Black resident of Shreveport, Louisiana.

November 29, 2019, just before dawn, Mr. Monroe

was driving home after finishing a shift at the casino

where he worked. CA5 Record on Appeal (CA5 ROA)

108. He was pulled over by a Louisiana State Police

(“LSP”) officer, Richard Matthews. Id. at 108-09.

Without justifying the stop, Officer Matthews, with

his hand placed on his gun, demanded that Mr.

Monroe exit his vehicle. Id. at 109. Well aware of the

recent history of police violence against other Black

victims in his area, Mr. Monroe immediately feared

for his life. Id. at 110. He remained in his truck and

called his mother on his cell phone, who stayed on the

line throughout the ensuing encounter. Id.

Through his rolled-down window, Mr. Monroe

repeatedly asked why he had been pulled over. Id.

Officer Matthews claimed that Mr. Monroe was

driving 45 miles per hour in a 25-miles-per-hour

speed zone—an allegation that was later dismissed by

the district attorney—and continued to demand that

Mr. Monroe get out of his vehicle. Id. at 110 & n.8.

Mr. Monroe informed Officer Matthews that he did

not want to be handcuffed due to medical issues,

including a heart condition. Id. at 110. Officer

Matthews said that he did not plan to handcuff Mr.

Monroe, and Mr. Monroe’s mother told her son to get

out of the vehicle so as not to give Officer Matthews a

reason to shoot him. Id. at 110-11.

Once Mr. Monroe stepped out of the truck, Officer

Matthews said that Mr. Monroe’s arrest had to be

done “the hard way.” Id. at 111. With his body

camera turned off, Officer Matthews drew his gun and

pointed it at Mr. Monroe, who cowered back into his

truck out of fear that Officer Matthews would shoot

and kill him. Id.

Two other LSP officers arrived at the scene, at

which point Officer Matthews turned his body camera

on. Id. at 111-12. The officers demanded that Mr.

Monroe get out of his truck, and his mother—still on

the phone—once again told him to comply so he would

not be shot. Id. Upon exiting his truck, Mr. Monroe

was violently slammed to the concrete by all three

officers. Id. at 112. Together, the officers kneeled on

his back and legs, placing their entire collective

weight on him, and continued to beat and suffocate

him despite his cries for help. Id. One officer kneed

Mr. Monroe in the kidney so violently that it caused

him to involuntarily urinate. Id. at 113. Mr. Monroe

experienced extreme chest pain and tightness, and

later learned he had suffered a heart attack during

the beating. Id. The chest pain persisted throughout

the 45-minute ride to a local jail, during which Mr.

Monroe went in and out of consciousness. Id. Once

at the jail, the officers denied Mr. Monroe proper

medical treatment and refused to take him to the

hospital. Id. at 114.

Several hours later, after he was released from

jail, Mr. Monroe went to the emergency room, where

he remained for two nights before being admitted to a

hospital because the doctor feared he might die from

bodily-fluid buildup caused by the beating. Id. Mr.

Monroe learned that he had suffered fractures in both

wrists and significant injuries to his shoulders and

arms. Id. He was later declared disabled and

diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder

stemming from the incident. Id. at 114-15.

In September 2020, the district attorney formally

dismissed the speeding charge against Mr. Monroe,

after Officer Matthews failed to provide additional

footage or information. Id. at 110 n.8. Mr. Monroe

remains, however, the subject of criminal charges for

allegedly “resisting … arrest.” Id. at 324, 328. After

the officers lodged criminal charges against him, Mr.

Monroe lost his job of twenty years. Id. at 115. Mr.

Monroe’s mother suffered a major stroke and thirteen

minor strokes due to the stress caused by her son’s

arrest, and she passed away. Id.

In July 2021, Mr. Monroe’s counsel served on LSP

a public records request, pursuant to his rights under

the Louisiana Constitution, seeking seventeen

categories of documents relating to the incident,

including internal reports as well as records related

to LSP’s policies and practices. Id. at 116-18, 396. To

date, Mr. Monroe has not received any documents,

aside from one outlining LSP’s standard use of force

policy and another setting out LSP’s cadet training

schedule. Id. at 119-20, 396-97.

2. On November 24, 2021, less than two years

after the beating, Mr. Monroe filed suit in the United

States District Court for the Western District of

Louisiana, seeking relief for excessive force in

violation of Section 1983; conspiracy in violation of

Sections 1983 and 1985; failure to supervise,

investigate, and decertify officers in violation of

Section 1983; and aggravated assault, aggravated

battery, and failure to comply with his records request

in violation of state law. Id. at 34-43.

On March 9, 2023, the district court dismissed Mr.

Monroe’s federal law claims with prejudice. App. 6a15a.

The court held that Louisiana’s one-year

prescriptive period governed Mr. Monroe’s federal

claims. Id. at 12a-13a. That period is the residual

statute of limitations that applies to personal injury

actions for which a statute of limitations is not

otherwise specified. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492.

The court acknowledged that Louisiana’s one-year

limitations period was “atypical and relatively brief”

but believed it was bound by existing precedent and

the court’s own “prior rulings.” App. 12a-13a. The

court thus rejected Mr. Monroe’s argument that a

longer limitations period—such as Louisiana’s twoyear period for torts that amount to crimes of violence,

see La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3493.10, or the federal

four-year “catch-all” limitations period, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 1658—should apply. App. 12a-13a.2

3. On March 5, 2024, the Fifth Circuit affirmed

the dismissal of Mr. Monroe’s federal claims. App. 1a5a. While noting that it was “sympathetic to Monroe’s

plight,” the panel held that it was “bound” by the Fifth

Circuit’s decision in Brown, issued two weeks earlier.

Id. at 5a (citing Brown, 93 F.4th at 338).

In Brown, the Fifth Circuit had affirmed the

dismissal of similar police brutality claims filed under

Section 1983 as untimely under Louisiana’s one-year

prescriptive period. 93 F.4th at 337-38. The court

recognized that this Court “has not addressed”

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over Mr. Monroe’s state law claims and dismissed those claims

without prejudice. App. 14a.

whether and when the length of a limitations period

can contravene federal interests underlying Section

1983. Id. Nonetheless, the court believed that this

Court’s decision in Owens requires courts to apply a

forum state’s general limitations period to Section

1983 claims, regardless of its length. Id.

Constrained by that precedent, the Fifth Circuit in

this case followed suit and dismissed Mr. Monroe’s

claims as time-barred under Louisiana’s one-year

limitations period. App. 4a-5a. The panel reiterated

that “[o]nly the Supreme Court, having already solved

the problem of uncertainty in the absence of a federal

limitations period for Section 1983 claims, can clarify

how lower courts should evaluate practical

frustration [in the ability to litigate such claims]

without undermining that solution.” Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting Brown, 93 F.4th at 338).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This case is a straightforward candidate for

certiorari. In a series of decisions, this Court has

articulated and refined a framework for borrowing

statutes of limitations for federal civil rights claims,

stressing that under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, borrowing is

permissible only “where doing so is consistent with

federal law.” Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 239

(1989); see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67

(1985); Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1984).

As the Fifth Circuit recognized, the question

presented in this case—which considers the propriety

of borrowing a one-year limitations period from state

law—“pick[s] up where Owens left off.” Brown v.

Pouncy, 93 F.4th 331, 334 (5th Cir. 2024), petition for

cert. filed, No. 23-1332 (June 18, 2024); see App. 4a-5a

(applying Brown).

The Court should grant review to answer that

question. Under this Court’s jurisprudence, applying

a one-year state statute of limitations is insufficient

to vindicate Section 1983’s federal interests. The

Fifth Circuit’s decision largely sidesteps the analysis

commanded by this Court’s decisions on the theory

that “[o]nly [this] Court” can decide “how lower courts

should evaluate” the question in light of existing

precedent. App. 4a-5a (first alteration in original)

(citation omitted).

The question presented is

critically important to the hundreds of individuals

who file federal civil rights claims each year in

jurisdictions currently subject to one-year limitations

periods. Because this question is cleanly presented in

this case, the Court should take this opportunity to

resolve it once and for all.

I. The Fifth Circuit’s Resolution Of The

Question Left Open In Owens Is Plainly

Wrong

The Fifth Circuit’s half-hearted resolution of the

question left open in Owens bypasses the framework

articulated in this Court’s cases, discounts the federal

interests protected by Section 1983 claims, and

warrants this Court’s review.

1. Given the absence of a federal statute of

limitations for Section 1983 claims, courts must

borrow a limitations period pursuant to the “threestep process” prescribed in Section 1988. Wilson, 471

U.S. at 267 (quoting Burnett, 468 U.S. at 47-48).

Under that process, courts shall (1) consider “the laws

of the United States” to determine whether a

“suitable federal rule exists”; (2) if not, “consider[]

application of state ‘common law, as modified and

changed by the constitution and statutes’ of the forum

State”; and (3) ensure that any borrowed state law “is

not ‘inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the

United States.’” Burnett, 468 U.S. at 47-48 (quoting

42 U.S.C. § 1988(a)).

In a trio of decisions in the 1980s, the Court

declared that at step one no suitable federal rule

existed, id. at 48-49, and that, at “the second step in

the process,” courts should borrow the forum state’s

general or residual statute of limitations governing

personal injury actions, Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268, 276;

Owens, 488 U.S. at 249-50. Although the Court

assumed that, in most states, the limitations period

for “[g]eneral personal injury actions” would not be

“fixed in a way that would discriminate against

federal claims, or be inconsistent with federal law,”

Wilson, 471 U.S. at 279, the Court in Owens expressly

identified and left open the question presented here:

Whether “applying a 1-year limitations period to

§ 1983 actions” would flunk the third step of Section

1988’s borrowing analysis for being “inconsistent with

[the] federal interests” underlying the federal civil

rights laws, 488 U.S. at 251 n.13.

Applying a state’s one-year limitations period is

inconsistent with the federal interests underlying the

civil rights laws.

Section 1988’s third step

“emphasizes ‘the predominance of the federal interest’

in the borrowing process,” commanding “‘federal

courts to assure that the importation of state law will

not frustrate or interfere with the implementation of

national policies.’” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 269 & n.18

(first quoting Burnett, 468 U.S. at 48; then quoting

Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367

(1977)). Courts must consider the “practicalities that

are involved in litigating federal civil rights claims

and policies that are analogous to the goals of the

Civil Rights Acts,” including whether the state

limitations period is “responsive” to the “broadly

inclusive language” of Section 1983. Burnett, 468 U.S.

at 50. Where a state limitations period does not

faithfully effectuate the “goals of the federal

statutes”—including the “compensation of persons

whose civil rights have been violated[] and prevention

of the abuse of state power”—a court cannot apply the

period to a Section 1983 claim. Id. at 53.

A one-year limitations period fails the third step of

Section 1988’s framework, as it is incompatible with

the “practicalities that are involved in litigating

federal civil rights claims” under Section 1983. Id. at

50. The Court has “disapproved the adoption of state

statutes of limitation that provide only a truncated

period of time within which to file suit, because such

statutes inadequately accommodate the complexities

of federal civil rights litigation and are thus

inconsistent with Congress’ compensatory aims.”

Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1988).

These complexities are no mystery: “Injuries to

personal rights are not ‘necessarily apparent to the

victim at the time they are inflicted,’” and “‘[e]ven

where the injury itself is obvious, the constitutional

dimensions of the tort may not be.’” Owens, 488 U.S.

at 238 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

Moreover, “[l]itigating a civil rights claim requires

considerable [pre-suit] preparation.” Burnett, 468

U.S. at 50. This preparation includes securing

counsel with expertise in a given area of law or

preparing to proceed pro se, drafting pleadings

compliant with federal rules, conducting pre-filing

investigation, identifying “Doe” defendants, assessing

damages, paying a substantial filing fee or preparing

additional supporting papers for a request to proceed

in forma pauperis, and filing and serving a complaint.

See id. at 50-51.

As several amici explained to the district court in

this case and to the Fifth Circuit in the related Brown

case, Section 1983 plaintiffs often face significant

“practical and trauma-related challenges” when

attempting to bring a Section 1983 action,

particularly in cases like Mr. Monroe’s, where the

police have withheld critical evidence. Nat’l Police

Accountability Project, Inc. Amicus Br. 1-9 (Mar. 9,

2023), D. Ct. Doc. 84 (NPAP Amicus Br.); see Law

Enf’t Action P’ship Amicus Br. 1-5 (Mar. 9, 2023), D.

Ct. Doc. 83 (LEAP Amicus Br.) (similar); see also

Orleans Public Defenders Amicus Br. 2-9, Brown,

supra (No. 22-30691), 2023 WL 2019613 (detailing the

“practical impediments . . . in bringing a civil-rights

claim within [a] restrictive one-year period”). These

cases are particularly complex because plaintiffs

must assess whether their claims can withstand

immunity defenses and whether to assert claims of

municipal liability, which often will turn on facts that

require substantial investigation. See NPAP Amicus

Br. 4-5.

Indeed, similar concerns animated the Second

Circuit’s decision, affirmed by this Court in Owens, to

apply New York’s three-year limitations period rather

than a one-year limitations period to Section 1983

claims. Okure v. Owens, 816 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir.

1987), aff’d, 488 U.S. 235 (1989). Highlighting the

injurious nature and “constitutional dimensions” of

certain civil rights violations, which are not always

“immediately obvious,” the court stressed that “there

must be time for plaintiffs to reflect and to probe” on

their claims. Id. at 48-49. Pursuant to the “[p]roper

consideration of the federal interest,” only the three-

year limitations period was “long enough to effectuate

the policies embedded in section 1983.” Id. at 48; see

also Hobson v. Brennan, 625 F. Supp. 459, 466-67

(D.D.C. 1985) (holding that application of one-year

limitations period was “inconsistent with the

purposes of § 1985(3)” given that such cases often

require “considerable reflection and investigation by

plaintiffs and their counsel” and involve “obstacles

which some defendants effectively place[] . . . in the

way of plaintiffs’ efforts to identify, serve and depose

them”).3

Congress itself has recognized that, as a general

matter, far more than one year is necessary to prepare

and file federal claims. In 1990, Congress enacted a

default four-year statute of limitations governing any

“civil action” under subsequently enacted federal law

for which a limitations period is not otherwise

specified. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). Congress enacted this

“fallback,” or “catch-all,” statute of limitations after

commissioning an independent, 15-month study,

which revealed that a period of four years

appropriately accounts for the complexities of federal

litigation across a diverse array of claims under

various federal laws. H.R. 5381 (101st Cong.), 136

Cong. Rec. H8256, H8262 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990);

see also H.R. Rep. No. 101-734, at 24 (1990). Although

this catch-all federal four-year limitations period

Since Owens, two other circuit courts have applied oneyear limitations periods to Section 1983 claims. But as the Fifth

Circuit recognized, these decisions contain only “limited

analysis” and do not meaningfully grapple with the federal

interests underlying Section 1983. Brown, 93 F.4th at 338; see

McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 673 (9th Cir.

1991); Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 876 F.2d 1480, 1484 (11th Cir.

1989).

applies by its terms to federal statutes enacted after

1990, it underscores that applying an outlier one-year

limitations period to Section 1983—a federal statute

that similarly spans a “wide [spectrum] of claims”

encompassing “numerous and diverse topics and

subtopics,” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 273-75—is

“inconsistent with federal interests.” Owens, 488 U.S.

at 251 n.13.

Moreover, as Mr. Monroe’s own case shows, the

impracticability of a restrictive one-year limitations

period is especially strong in the context of police

brutality claims. In such cases—where victims often

experience emotional trauma, physical injuries, and

legal obstacles—a one-year filing deadline is virtually

impossible to meet. Victims of abuse often struggle to

report misconduct. See 9 Martin S. Greenberg & R.

Barry Ruback, After the Crime: Victim Decision

Making 1-15, in Perspectives in Law & Psychology

(1992) (explaining that after suffering trauma,

victims often struggle in deciding whether they

should report the crime). Trauma is heightened in

cases of police brutality against people of color. See

Jordan E. DeVylder et al., Elevated Prevalence of

Suicide Attempts among Victims of Police Violence in

the USA, 94 J. Urban Health 629, 631 (2017) (finding

that “[p]olice victimization was broadly more common

among racial/ethnic minorities” and strongly

associated with suicide attempts).

Like Mr. Monroe, victims of police brutality may

also face (spurious) criminal charges arising from the

incident, which raise further hurdles to timely filing

a Section 1983 suit, including the requirement to

fulfill bond conditions and other monetary

obligations, any collateral consequences of the

criminal charges on their employment, housing, and

parental rights, the need to focus on defending

against the criminal charges, and the risk of

retaliation by the state institutions bringing the

charges.

The possibility that a litigant facing

criminal charges would be forced to prematurely

bring his civil suit increases the likelihood of the risks

this Court has cautioned against: forcing a defendant

to “tip[] his hand as to his defense strategy” and

“undermining

his

privilege

against

selfincrimination.” McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109,

120 (2019).

2. The Fifth Circuit failed to grapple with this

analysis. Instead, the court affirmed the application

of a one-year limitations period by pointing to the oneyear limitations period for claims filed under 42

U.S.C. § 1986, and this Court’s discussion in Hardin

v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536 (1989), regarding the

application of state tolling provisions in Section 1983

cases filed by prisoners. See Brown, 93 F.4th at 33637; App. 5a (applying Brown).

These inapt analogies merely highlight the need

for this Court’s intervention. Section 1986 imposes

secondary liability on those who have knowledge of,

and the power to prevent, a conspiracy to violate civil

rights in violation of Section 1985. 42 U.S.C. § 1986.

Section 1983, by contrast, covers a far broader set of

claims seeking to impose liability for direct civil rights

violations, rather than the mere failure to prevent a

conspiracy. Section 1986’s limitations period is

“no[t] . . . helpful” in this context. Burnett, 468 U.S.

at 48-49. Indeed, even the Fifth Circuit did not seem

convinced by this comparison, acknowledging that

Section 1983 and Section 1986 are “distinct” statutes

and that “what is too short to vindicate one [statute]

might be sufficient to vindicate the other.” Brown, 93

F.4th at 337.

And Hardin simply stands for the proposition that

state legislatures have some latitude in devising state

tolling provisions without running afoul of Section

1983’s interests. 490 U.S. at 544. Nothing in Hardin

remotely supports the Fifth Circuit’s evident belief

that “the length of a statute of limitations”—no

matter how short—will not create an impermissible

“frustration of federal interests.” Brown, 93 F.4th at

337. In fact, Hardin reaffirmed that courts borrowing

state rules must consider whether the rules “defeat

the goals of the federal statute at issue.” 490 U.S. at

539.

Neither of these analogies satisfactorily addresses

the question whether a one-year period “practical[ly]

frustrat[es]” the federal interests underlying Section

1983. App. 4a-5a (citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit

claimed that it could not “evaluate” the frustration of

those federal interests absent further guidance from

“[this] Court.” Id. By affirming the application of a

one-year limitations period in this case, the court

shirked its “duty” under Section 1988 to “assure that

the importation of state law will not frustrate or

interfere with the implementation of national

policies.” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 269 n.18 (citation

omitted).

3. Once the Court makes clear that “applying a

[one]-year limitations period to § 1983 actions [is]

inconsistent with federal interests,” Owens, 488 U.S.

at 251 n.13, the Court would have the option of

providing additional guidance to lower courts on the

proper statute of limitations to apply in these

circumstances.

The best approach would be to apply 28 U.S.C.

§ 1658—the federal “catch-all” four-year limitations

period enacted by Congress in 1990. Although this

provision by its terms directly governs “action[s]

arising under [federal laws] enacted after [December

1, 1990],” 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a), it would be appropriate

to borrow that four-year period as a “suitable federal

rule” for purposes of Section 1988’s borrowing

analysis, Burnett, 468 U.S. at 48, at least in

circumstances where the state-law analogue would be

an impermissibly short one-year limitations period.

See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva & James E. Pfander, On the

Meaning of Congressional Silence: Using Federal

Common Law to Fill the Gap in Congress’s Residual

Statute of Limitations, 107 Yale L.J. 393, 396, 416-25

(1997) (explaining that courts can “borrow[] the

§ 1658 four-year limitations period for most claims

arising under [pre-1990] federal statutes as to which

no clear rule of federal law has emerged”).

That conclusion squares with this Court’s prior

decisions in this area. Section 1658 did not exist when

this Court decided its trilogy of cases applying Section

1988’s three-step borrowing process to Section 1983

claims. But as the Court put it in those cases, “when

a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides

a closer analogy than available state statutes, and

when the federal policies at stake and the

practicalities of litigation make that rule a

significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial

lawmaking, we have not hesitated to turn away from

state law.” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 270 n.21 (quoting

DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151,

171-72 (1983)); see also DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 16162 (where state rules are “unsatisfactory vehicles for

the enforcement of federal law,” the Court has

“instead used timeliness rules drawn from federal

law”).

Section 1658 was designed for precisely this

purpose: to serve as a “fallback” statute for federal

claims. H.R. Rep. No. 101-734, at 24 (noting intent to

reduce “practical problems” caused by borrowing

state statutes, including “uncertainty on litigants,”

“undesirable variance among federal courts,” and

“disrupt[ion] [of] the development of federal doctrine

on the suspension of the limitation periods”). Given

that Section 1983 “provides ‘a uniquely federal

remedy’” for a “diverse” array of claims, Wilson, 471

U.S. at 271-72, 273 (emphasis added) (citation

omitted), it makes sense to borrow the period from a

federal statute of limitations with a reach just as

broad. At a minimum, this is true when, as here, the

borrowing process would otherwise yield a “truncated

[limitations] period” from state law that is

“inconsistent with [Section 1983’s] compensatory

aims.” Felder, 487 U.S. at 139-40.

Another option in the event that the borrowing

analysis points to an impermissible one-year statute

of limitations might be to borrow the state-law

limitations period governing the next-most analogous

tort claim, provided that period is consistent with

Section 1983’s aims and not an outlier among the

states. Indeed, in Wilson and Owens, this Court

surveyed state statutes of limitations across the

country to determine the “best alternative available”

in light of the Section 1983 remedy. Wilson, 471 U.S.

at 276; see Owens, 488 U.S. at 242-48. Most states

have a limitations period for personal injury actions

that is at least two years. See ACLU Louisiana,

Justice

Lab

Manual

(Mar.

2022),

https://perma.cc/98J9-6ZTU. Accordingly, it would be

appropriate to borrow a period from state law of at

least that length.4

To be sure, the Court need not decide which

limitations period is appropriate once Louisiana’s

one-year requirement is deemed inapplicable. Under

any conceivable alternative, Mr. Monroe’s claim—

which was filed within two years—is timely. The

Court can thus simply answer the question left open

in Owens: Whether applying a one-year limitations

period frustrates the federal interests underlying

Section 1983. Because the Fifth Circuit insisted that

“[o]nly [this] Court” is capable of answering that

question in a way that harmonizes existing precedent,

and because a one-year period impedes the federal

interests underpinning the Civil Rights Act, it is

imperative for the Court to do so. App. 4a-5a (first

alteration in original) (quoting Brown, 93 F.4th at

338).

In Mr. Monroe’s case, Louisiana’s two-year limitations

period for personal injury torts that amount to crimes of violence

is a potential candidate. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3493.10.

This statute encompasses any offense “that has, as an element,

the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force

against the person or property of another.” Green v. Dauphinet,

380 So. 3d 169, 174 (La. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting La. Rev. Stat.

§ 14:2(B), the state legislature’s definition of crime of violence);

see also Brown v. Pouncy, — So. 3d —, 2024 WL 2307514, at *3

(La. Ct. App. May 22, 2024). The state legislature’s enumeration

of offenses that constitute crimes of violence includes, among

other offenses, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, second

degree battery, and false imprisonment—each of which fit the

conduct at issue here. And the length of the limitations period

better reflects the federal goals of enabling individuals to

vindicate their federal constitutional and statutory rights.

II. The Question Presented Is Exceptionally

Important And Warrants This Court’s

Review

The question presented is not only unresolved but

also critically important. Section 1983 reflects one of

the “most important, and ubiquitous, civil rights

statute[s]” enacted by Congress, and the Court has

taken pains to cement an analytical framework for

determining “the appropriate statute of limitations to

apply.” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 266. This case provides

the Court an opportunity to resolve an unsettled

aspect of that framework that is vitally important to

the millions of people living in jurisdictions where the

residual limitations period for personal injury actions

is one year.

The lingering uncertainty over a

fundamentally important aspect of Section 1983

litigation provides a “compelling reason[] for granting

certiorari.” Id.

1. Section 1983’s importance is indisputable.

Enacted in direct response to southern states’ violent

hostility to federally guaranteed civil rights during

the Reconstruction Era, the Section 1983 cause of

action is an essential mechanism for protecting civil

liberties in our democratic society. Id. at 276-77.

Indeed, Section 1983 often serves as the only recourse

for individuals to seek redress for violations of their

civil rights in a neutral forum. And it is indispensable

to maintaining the legitimacy of state administrative

and law enforcement functions, frequently surfacing

deep-rooted problems in state administrative and law

enforcement processes while deterring state actors

from violating federal constitutional and statutory

protections. When police brutality claims brought by

individuals like Mr. Monroe are unaddressed,

community trust in the police drops, leading to lower

rates of reactive use of police services, less

cooperation with investigations, and less deference to

the police. See LEAP Amicus Br. 5-11.

Statutes of limitations perform a critically

important role in implementing Congress’s directive.

They tell individuals by when they must sue, and they

clarify for potential defendants when potential claims

expire. Given their importance, this Court has

repeatedly granted review to resolve unsettled

limitations questions in the Section 1983 context.

See, e.g., Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 236-37 (2023);

McDonough, 588 U.S. at 113-14; Wallace v. Kato, 549

U.S. 384, 387 (2007).

The limitations question at issue in this case is

just as important.

Indeed, because it involves

borrowing state law, the question presented here

strikes at the heart of Section 1983’s core aim—

securing federal relief for individuals suffering civil

rights violations at the hands of state actors. Wilson,

471 U.S. at 271-72. Determining whether a state has

enacted a limitations period so short that it thwarts

the availability of federal relief is critical to

maintaining Section 1983’s role as a check on state

power.

And “having solved the problem of

uncertainty in the absence of a federal limitations

period for Section 1983 claims” in Owens and Wilson,

it is incumbent on “[this] Court” to “clarify how lower

courts” should apply that solution in the context of a

one-year limitations period. App. 4a-5a (citation

omitted).

2. The breadth of Section 1983 and the volume of

such claims in jurisdictions with one-year limitations

periods—including Kentucky, Tennessee, and Puerto

Rico—reinforce the importance of this Court’s review.

As this Court has noted, Section 1983 extends far

beyond police brutality claims like Mr. Monroe’s.

Rather, individuals rely on Section 1983 to challenge,

for example, “discrimination in public employment on

the basis of race or the exercise of First Amendment

rights, discharge or demotion without procedural due

process, mistreatment of schoolchildren, deliberate

indifference to the medical needs of prison inmates,

[and] the seizure of chattels without advance notice or

sufficient opportunity to be heard.” Wilson, 471 U.S.

at 273 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 273 n.31

(collecting examples).

Yet in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Puerto Rico,

plaintiffs seeking to raise such claims will have to

contend with a one-year limitations periods for

personal injury claims. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 413.140(1)(a); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(A);

P.R. Laws tit. 31, § 5298(2). And any plaintiff in

Louisiana who suffered a federal civil rights violation

before July 1 of this year is likewise subject to a oneyear period. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492

(effective until July 1, 2024); supra at 3 n.1. But even

the remaining three jurisdictions are home to more

than 14 million people,5 with hundreds of plaintiffs

filing Section 1983 claims in federal courts in these

jurisdictions every year.6 Many of those plaintiffs find

their claims time-barred by the one-year limitations

See U.S. Census Bureau, State Population Totals and

Components of Change: 2020-2023, https://www.census.gov/

data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2020s-state-total.html (last

revised Dec. 18, 2023).

This average is based on a Lex Machina search of

complaints that included Section 1983 across federal courts in

Kentucky, Tennessee, and Puerto Rico between January 1, 2019

to June 14, 2024.

period,7 and countless others are deterred from even

filing their claims at all due to the restrictive one-year

period.

The application of a one-year limitations period to

Section 1983 claims thus has serious ramifications for

See, e.g., Robinson v. Butler County, No. 21-5536, 2022

WL 19977828, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 16, 2022) (claim for denial of

medical care time-barred under Kentucky’s one-year limitations

period); Smith v. Kentucky, 36 F.4th 671, 675-76 (6th Cir.) (same,

as to Thirteenth Amendment claim), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 213

(2022); Bonner v. Perry, 564 F.3d 424, 430-31 (6th Cir. 2009)

(same, as to sexual abuse claim); Vandiver v. Hardin Cnty. Bd.

of Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 930 (6th Cir. 1991) (same, as to due

process claim related to student’s school placement); Collard v.

Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 181-82 (6th Cir. 1990) (same,

as to First Amendment and due process claims); Accord v.

Anderson County, No. 22-5206, 2022 WL 16825411, at *2 (6th

Cir. Nov. 8, 2022) (invalid arrest and prosecution claims timebarred under Tennessee’s one-year limitations period);

Merriweather v. City of Memphis, 107 F.3d 396, 400 (6th Cir.

1997) (same, as to claims related to police shooting); Hall v.

Tennessee, 60 F.3d 828, 1995 WL 385112, at *1-2 (6th Cir. June

27, 1995) (same, as to wrongful termination claim); Butts v.

Dutton, 878 F.2d 1436, 1989 WL 73653, at *2-3 (6th Cir. July 6,

1989) (same, as to improper administrative segregation claims);

Martínez-Rivera v. Puerto Rico, 812 F.3d 69, 74-75 (1st Cir. 2016)

(employment discrimination claim time-barred under Puerto

Rico’s one-year limitations period); Asociación de Suscripción

Conjunta del Seguro de Responsabilidad Obligatorio v. JuarbeJiménez, 659 F.3d 42, 50-51 (1st Cir. 2011) (same, as to Takings

Clause claim); Perez-Sanchez v. Pub. Bldg. Auth., 531 F.3d 104,

107 (1st Cir. 2008) (same, as to freedom of association claim);

Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d

1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005) (same, as to First, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendment claims); Arroyo-Santiago v. Garcia-Vicario, 187

F.3d 621, 1999 WL 551294, at *2 (1st Cir. July 28, 1999) (same,

as to claim related to judicial misconduct); Muniz-Cabrero v.

Ruiz, 23 F.3d 607, 610 (1st Cir. 1994) (same, as to demotion

claim).

numerous civil rights claimants. If a one-year period

is indeed improper under this Court’s jurisprudence,

and if the Court does not resolve this issue, the federal

courthouse doors will be wrongly slammed shut for a

significant number of plaintiffs suffering civil rights

violations. And that is unlikely to change if, as the

Fifth Circuit insisted, lower courts cannot even

“evaluate [the] practical frustration” of civil rights

claims inflicted by a one-year limitations period

without guidance that “[o]nly [this] Court” can

provide. App. 4a-5a (first alteration in original)

(citation omitted).

Unless this Court grants review, lower courts will

continue to apply one-year (or shorter) limitations

periods simply because they feel “bound” to do so by

precedent, and even when they have doubts as to the

legitimacy of borrowing such restrictive periods. App.

5a (noting that panel was “sympathetic to Monroe’s

plight,” but was “bound” by precedent); see also, e.g.,

Lawrence v. Jefferson Par. Pub. Defs., No. 20-cv-1615,

2022 WL 16739519, at *2 n.14 (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 2022)

(“District courts in the Fifth Circuit have recognized

the challenges imposed by the one-year statute of

limitations for Section 1983 plaintiffs in Louisiana.”),

appeal dismissed sub nom. Lawrence v. Lopinto, No.

22-30776, 2023 WL 8641369 (5th Cir. June 26, 2023).

This Court’s intervention is warranted.

3. This case is an excellent vehicle for resolving

the question presented. The question whether a oneyear limitations period is too short to effectuate the

federal interests underlying Section 1983 was

squarely raised and fully briefed in the courts below,

and it is outcome-determinative. Indeed, that was the

only question addressed by the Fifth Circuit. See App.

3a. There are no jurisdictional or threshold issues

that would complicate the Court’s adjudication of that

question. And while Louisiana has amended its

prescriptive period, that amendment does not apply

to Mr. Monroe’s claims. See supra at 3 n.1. This

Court should resolve the statute-of-limitations

question in this case.8

The plaintiff in Brown has likewise filed a petition for

certiorari (No. 23-1332) raising many of the same issues

presented here. Mr. Monroe respectfully suggests that if this

Court deems either case worthy of review, it should grant

certiorari in both cases. Although the petitioners here and in

Brown make similar and compatible arguments on the merits,

their positions are not identical, and the Court would benefit

from having the full range of arguments before it when

considering the questions presented by the cases. At a

minimum, if the Court grants review in either case alone, it

should hold the other case for resolution of the granted case.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

JASON M. OHTA

ERIC A. RIVAS

ADAM A. HERRERA

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

12670 High Bluff Drive

San Diego, CA 92130

EMILY R. ORMAN

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

355 South Grand Avenue

Suite 100

Los Angeles, CA 90071

NIKITA KANSRA

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

1271 Avenue of the

Americas

New York, NY 10020

ROMAN MARTINEZ

Counsel of Record

BLAKE E. STAFFORD

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

555 Eleventh Street, NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 637-3377

roman.martinez@lw.com

DAVID D. COLE

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES

UNION FOUNDATION

915 Fifteenth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20005

NORA AHMED

ACLU FOUNDATION OF

LOUISIANA

1340 Poydras Street

Suite 2160

New Orleans, LA 70112

Counsel for Petitioner

July 3, 2024

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit, Anthony Monroe v.

Terry Conner, No. 23-30230, 2024 WL

939735 (5th Cir. Mar. 5, 2024) ...........................1a

Memorandum Ruling of the United States

District Court for the Western District of

Louisiana, Anthony Monroe v. Terry

Conner, No. 21-4063, 2023 WL 2434696

(W.D. La. Mar. 9, 2023) ......................................6a

28 U.S.C. § 1658 ......................................................16a

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ......................................................17a

42 U.S.C. § 1985 ......................................................18a

42 U.S.C. § 1988 ......................................................20a

La. Civ. Code art. 3492 (repealed by 2024 La.

Sess. Law Serv. Act 423 (H.B. 315)) ................22a

La. Civ. Code art. 3493.10 ......................................23a

2024 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 423 (H.B. 315)

(West) (effective July 1, 2024) ..........................24a

[2024 WL 939735]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States

Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 5, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

No. 23-30230

ANTHONY MONROE,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

TERRY CONNER, in his individual capacity as a law

enforcement officer with Louisiana State Police;

RICHARD MATTHEWS, in his individual capacity as a

law enforcement officer with the Louisiana State

Police; LAMAR DAVIS, in his official capacity as the

Superintendent of the Louisiana State Police;

CHAVEZ CAMMON, in his official capacity as records

custodian,

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:21-CV-4063

Before JONES, DENNIS, and DOUGLAS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In Owens v. Okure, the Supreme Court held that a

forum state’s general or residual statute of limitations

for personal injury claims applies to claims brought

under § 1983. 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989). Appellant

Anthony Monroe challenges the application of

Louisiana’s one-year residual prescriptive period to

his police brutality claims found in Article 3492 of the

Louisiana Civil Code.1 The district court concluded

that Monroe’s claims, filed one year and eleven

months after the conduct giving rise to his federal

claims, was time-barred. Because we are bound by

precedent, we AFFIRM.

This case involves a routine traffic stop that

allegedly ended in violence after three Louisiana

State Police Troopers (collectively “Defendants”)

physically attacked Monroe in Bossier Parish,

Louisiana.

According to Monroe’s amended

complaint, this brutality caused Monroe to suffer a

heart attack and other severe life-threatening

injuries.

Monroe filed suit one year and eleven months2

after the incident, bringing claims under 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1983 and 1985. He asserted violations of his

This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5TH

CIR. R. 47.5.

In Louisiana, the state legislature sets “prescriptive

periods” rather than “statutes of limitations.” LA. CIV. CODE art.

3492 (2024) (“Delictual actions are subject to a liberative

prescription of one year.”).

2 The attack occurred on November 29, 2019. Monroe filed

his complaint November 24, 2021.

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, for

excessive force and conspiracy. He also brought

Monell3 claims for failure to supervise, investigate,

and decertify officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

aggravated assault in violation of La. Rev. Stat.

§ 14:37; aggravated battery in violation of La. Rev.

Stat. § 14:34; and violations of the Louisiana

Constitution and the Records Law, La. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 44.31, for refusal to comply with document

requests.

Defendants separately moved to dismiss Monroe’s

federal claims as time barred under Louisiana’s oneyear prescriptive period. In March 2023, the district

court granted the motions to dismiss, dismissing his

federal claims with prejudice and declining to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Monroe’s state law

claims, dismissing them without prejudice. Monroe

timely filed a notice of appeal on April 10, 2023. We

review the district court’s dismissal de novo. United

States v. Irby, 703 F.3d 280, 283-84 (5th Cir. 2012)

(citation omitted).

On appeal, Monroe argues that Louisiana’s oneyear prescriptive period is inapplicable under Burnett

v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 48 (1984), because it

undermines § 1983’s federal interests. Specifically,

he argues that (1) Louisiana law discriminates

against § 1983 claimants because it time-bars federal

claims one year earlier than equivalent state claims

involving crimes of violence; (2) the Louisiana

legislature consciously seeks to prevent plaintiffs

from bringing police brutality claims; and

(3) Louisiana’s residual limitations period does not

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

account for the practicalities of litigating police

brutality claims. Additionally, Monroe argues that

Louisiana Civil Code Article 3493.10,4 a prescriptive

period that applies to crimes of violence, provides an

appropriate analogue to apply to police brutality

claims. Finally, he argues that the four-year statute

of limitations supplied by 28 U.S.C. § 1658 could also

apply.

Recently, a panel of our court considered identical

arguments in Brown v. Pouncy, -- F.4th --, 2024 WL

667692 (5th Cir. 2024).

In that case, Brown

argued that Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive period

should not apply to police brutality claims brought

under § 1983 because the period “impermissibly

discriminates against Section 1983 police brutality

claims and practically frustrates litigants’ ability to

bring such claims,” both of which contravene the

federal interests behind § 1983. Id. at *1, *3. There,

the panel held that “Supreme Court precedent, and

our cases applying that precedent, [ ] forcelose[d]

Brown's position.” Id. at *3. The panel noted that our

precedent “consistently applied shorter, general

limitations periods instead of longer ones governing

analogous state law claims,” and has “repeatedly

applied Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive period”

to claims brought under § 1983. Id. at *4, *6. It

explicitly stated that “[o]nly the Supreme Court,

having already solved the problem of uncertainty in

the absence of a federal limitations period for Section

1983 claims, can clarify how lower courts should

4 LA. CIV. CODE art. 3493.10 (2024) (“Delictual actions

which arise due to damages sustained as a result of an act

defined as a crime of violence . . . are subject to a liberative

prescription of two years.”).

evaluate practical frustration without undermining

that solution.”

Id. at *7.

Although we are

sympathetic to Monroe’s plight, we are bound by

Brown under our rule of orderliness. Edmiston v.

Borrego, 75 F.4th 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Def.

Distrib. v. Platkin, 55 F.4th 486, 495 n.10 (5th Cir.

2022)) (“The rule of orderliness means that one panel

of our court may not overturn another panel’s

decision, absent an intervening change in law, such

as by statutory amendment, or the Supreme Court, or

our en banc court.”).

III

Accordingly, the decision of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

[2023 WL 2434696]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

ANTHONY MONROE,

CIVIL ACTION NO.

21-4063

VERSUS

JUDGE ELIZABETH

E. FOOTE

TERRY CONNER,

ET AL.

MAGISTRATE

JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING

In this Section 1983 action, three Defendants seek

to dismiss Plaintiff Anthony Monroe’s (“Monroe”)

complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6).1 Whether Monroe’s federal claims survive

dismissal turns on whether his complaint, filed nearly

two years after the alleged offense, is timely. A short

time ago, this Court was tasked with determining if

Section 1983 suits brought in Louisiana and arising

from a “crime of violence” had a one-year limitations

period. Brown v. Pouncy, ____ F.Supp.3d ____, 2022

WL 4594557 (W.D. La. Sept. 29, 2022). Once again,

this Court must answer that same question in the

affirmative: Binding Supreme Court authority directs

that federal courts apply the residual state

Record Documents 28, 31 & 40. These Defendants

include Colonel Lamar Davis [Record Document 28], whom

Monroe sued in his official capacity, and Officers Richard

Matthews [Record Document 31] and Terry Conner [Record

Document 40], whom Monroe sued in their individual capacities.

limitations period to Section 1983 actions.

Louisiana, this period is one year. Because Monroe

brought this Section 1983 action nearly two years

after the incident giving rise to his lawsuit, Monroe’s

federal law claims have prescribed, and Defendants’

motions to dismiss are GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

A routine traffic stop allegedly ended in violence

after three2 Louisiana State Police (“LSP”) Troopers

(“Defendant Officers”) physically attacked Monroe

in Bossier Parish, Louisiana.3 According to the

Amended Complaint, this unprovoked brutality

caused Monroe to suffer a heart attack and other

severe life-threatening injuries.4 As a result of the

altercation, Monroe says the Defendant Officers and

their supervisors5 violated his constitutional rights.

Monroe brought suit one year and eleven months

after the incident.6 Invoking 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983

and 1985, Monroe claims the Defendant Officers

violated and conspired to violate his Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights.7 He further contends

The officers Monroe claims were involved in the beating

include Richard Matthews, Terry Conner, and one “John Doe”

officer. Record Document 16 at 4.

Id. at 6, 8 & 10−11.

Id. at 11−13.

The supervisors noted in the Amended Complaint

include the Superintendent of the Louisiana State Police,

Colonel Lamar Davis, and additional “John Doe” officers. Id. at

4–5.

Id. at 1–3. The incident in Bossier Parish, Louisiana,

occurred on November 29, 2019, and Monroe filed this lawsuit

on November 24, 2021. Record Document 1.

Record Document 16 at 18−21.

that their supervisors and the LSP Superintendent

are also liable under Section 1983 for failing to

supervise, investigate, and decertify the Defendant

Officers.8 Along with these federal law claims,

Monroe asserts additional causes of action arising

under Louisiana law. Among them, Monroe argues

that Defendant Officers committed aggravated

assault and battery under Louisiana Revised Statutes

Sections 14:37 and 14:34, respectively.9 Lastly, he

contends that an additional Defendant, the Custodian

of Records for the LSP10 (“Custodian”), is liable for

failing to supply requested public documents

throughout this litigation. Monroe says this violates

Louisiana’s public records law under Louisiana

Revised Statute Section 14:1.

In response, all Defendants against whom Monroe

brings federal claims have filed motions to

dismiss Monroe’s lawsuit, arguing his complaint

is untimely.11 The Custodian, however, brings a

In connection with this Section 1983 claim, Monroe

urges this Court to take judicial notice of a Department of

Justice press release announcing an investigation of the

Louisiana State Police [Record Document 56-1]. Because

Monroe’s action will be denied for the reasons below, this motion

[Record Document 56] is DENIED as moot.

Record Document 16 at 23−24.

10 This Defendant is Lt. Colonel Chavez Cammon, whom

Monroe sued in his official capacity.

11 The National Police Accountability Project, Inc., and the

Law Enforcement Action Partnership have each moved to file

amicus briefs into the record [Record Documents 59 & 62]. The

Court has reviewed and considered these briefs before issuing

this ruling. The motions to file the amicus briefs are therefore

GRANTED, and the Clerk shall file the movants’ filings into the

record.

separate motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).12 His motion exclusively

addresses the alleged public records law violation and

will be addressed in greater detail below.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss brought under Rule

12(b)(6), a plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A court must accept all of

the factual allegations in the complaint as true in

determining whether the plaintiff has stated a

plausible claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; In re

Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th

Cir. 2007). However, a court is “not bound to accept as

true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286

(1986). If a complaint cannot meet this standard, it

may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–

79. A court does not evaluate a plaintiff’s likelihood

of success but determines whether a plaintiff has

pleaded a legally cognizable claim. U.S. ex rel. Riley

v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 376 (5th

Cir. 2004). A dismissal under 12(b)(6) ends the case

12 Record Document 26.

10a

“at the point of minimum expenditure of time and

money by the parties and the court.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 558.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Federal Claims Under Section 1983

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any

person acting under the color of state law who

“subjects” a person or “causes [a person] to be

subjected . . . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution

and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Since Congress adopted

the statute, Section 1983 has become the primary civil

remedy for enforcing federal constitutional and

statutory rights. Ronald D. Rotunda & John E.

Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law-Substance &

Procedure § 19:13 (May 2021). Yet while Congress

provided private plaintiffs a means to challenge state

actors in federal court, it never adopted a limitations

period governing Section 1983 lawsuits.

The United States Supreme Court filled that void

in Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989). The Owens

Court held that “where state law provides multiple

statutes of limitations for personal injury actions,

courts considering § 1983 claims should borrow the

general or residual statute for personal injury

actions.” Id. at 249–50. Like other states, Louisiana

has numerous limitations—or “prescriptive”—periods

dependent on an actor’s alleged misconduct. But

Louisiana’s “residual” prescriptive period for personal

injury actions is one year under article 3492.13 La.

13 Though all of Monroe’s federal claims arise under

Section 1983, he notes in his Amended Complaint that his

conspiracy theory is based in both Sections 1983 and 1985.

11a

Civ. Code art. 3492; Bradley v. Sheriff’s Dep’t St.

Landry Par., 958 F.3d 387, 389–90 (5th Cir. 2020)

(observing that Louisiana’s “residual” prescriptive

period is found in article 3492).

Monroe argues, however, that Louisiana’s oneyear period disregards the practicalities of litigating

federal civil rights claims and discriminates against

Section 1983 claimants. For these reasons, he

believes that the brief timeframe is inconsistent with

the Constitution and law of the United States, so he

urges the Court to apply a different limitations period

in its place. As a practical alternative, he suggests

that the Court adopt the period in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a),

which provides a four-year statute of limitations for

all civil actions “arising under an Act of Congress

enacted after the date of the enactment of this

section.” 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). Compared with a lone

year, Monroe argues that Section 1658’s four-year

statute of limitations is a more suitable alternative to

carry Section 1983 into effect.

Be that as it may, Monroe fails to address the fatal

flaw in his argument: Congress passed Section 1658

after Section 1983. And unfortunately for Monroe,

Section 1658’s application is not retroactive; its text

expressly excludes Section 1983 and all other federal

causes of action enacted before December 1, 1990. Id.

Though Monroe would have this Court adopt the fouryear limitations period regardless, the plain text of

Section 1658 precludes the Court from applying its

Record Document 16 at 20. That Monroe invokes Section 1985

does not affect this Court’s prescription analysis. This is because

“[t]he statutes of limitations for § 1983 and § 1985 claims are the

same as the statute of limitations in a personal injury action in

the state in which the cause of action arose.” Smith v.

Humphrey, 540 F. App’x 348, 349 (5th Cir. 2013).

12a

provisions to Monroe’s claims. See also Garrett v.

Thaler, 560 F. App’x 375, 383 (5th Cir. 2014)

(concluding that the four-year limitations period

under 28 U.S.C. § 1658 does not apply to Section 1983

actions).

Perhaps foreseeing this issue, Monroe makes an

alternative argument: If this Court is unwilling to

adopt the four years in Section 1658, Monroe urges

the Court to clarify Owens’s holding. Monroe

explicitly seeks a ruling limiting Owens to states that

have a residual statute of limitations longer than

their other more applicable and particularized statute

of limitations. In other words, Monroe wants this

Court to apply a longer prescriptive period under

Louisiana law—one that explicitly governs the

Defendant Officers’ conduct giving rise to this

lawsuit. Monroe cites a specific Civil Code article, in

particular, that provides a two-year prescriptive

period for “[d]elictual actions which arise due to

damages sustained as a result of an act defined as a

crime of violence.” La. Civ. Code art. 3493.10.

Because Monroe’s federal claims allegedly arose from

a criminal act of violence—aggravated assault and

battery—he argues that his claims should be subject

to this particularized statute of limitations.

But binding precedential authority says

otherwise, and this Court must apply the law as

written. As noted above, the Supreme Court has

issued a clear directive that requires minimal

interpretation: When “considering § 1983 claims,”

courts “should borrow the general or residual statute

[of limitations] for personal injury actions.” Owens,

488 U.S. at 249–50, 109 S.Ct. 573. That period is one

year in Louisiana. True enough, as Monroe points

out, maintaining a general one-year period for

13a

personal injury actions is rare.14 The vast majority of

other states, in fact, provide a residual statute of

limitations of at least two years. But despite the

atypical and relatively brief nature of Louisiana’s oneyear prescriptive period, courts in each of Louisiana’s

federal districts agree that it applies to Section 1983

actions. Brown, 2022 WL 4594557, at * 1; Diaz v.

Guynes, No. CV 13-4958, 2015 WL 1897630, at *2

(E.D. La. Apr. 27, 2015); Cook v. Lamotte, No. CV 140428, 2015 WL 269149, at *1 n.2 (M.D. La. Jan. 21,

2015). Here, the Court will neither stray from

precedent nor contradict its prior rulings. Because

Monroe’s federal claims prescribed one year after the

incident giving rise to this lawsuit, the Defendant

Officers’ and the LSP Superintendent’s motions are

GRANTED in this respect. Monroe’s federal law

claims are thus DISMISSED with prejudice.

II.

State Law Claims

Having dismissed Monroe’s federal claims, the

Court must next consider whether exercising

jurisdiction over his state law claims is proper. A

district court may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction if:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of

State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the

claim or claims over which the district court

has original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over

which it has original jurisdiction, or

14 Indeed, only two other states and Puerto Rico have a oneyear statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Brown,

2022 WL 4594557, at *4.

14a

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other

compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

In this case, the Court “observes that

interpretation and application of Louisiana’s various

prescriptive periods to plaintiff’s state law claims

remains an issue within the particular province and

expertise of the state courts.” Williams v. Ouachita

Par. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. CV 17-0060, 2017 WL

4401891, at *4 (W.D. La. Aug. 28, 2017), report and

recommendation adopted, No. CV 17-0060, 2017 WL

4399277 (W.D. La. Oct. 3, 2017). As a result, the Court

declines to exercise jurisdiction over Monroe’s

pendant state law claims. Bradley, 958 F.3d at 396

(“Since [the plaintiff’s] § 1983 claims failed, dismissal

of the pendant state-law claims was within the

district court’s discretion.”). The claims are thus

DISMISSED without prejudice.

Finally, because the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Monroe’s claims

arising under state law, the Custodian’s motion

exclusively addressing the alleged violation of

Louisiana’s public record law is DENIED as moot.

Monroe’s state law claims in that regard are likewise

DISMISSED without prejudice.

15a

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the motions to

dismiss15 filed by Defendants Lamar Davis, Richard

Matthews, and Terry Conner are GRANTED.

Defendant Chavez Cammon’s motion to dismiss16 is

DENIED as moot. Monroe’s federal claims are

DISMISSED with prejudice. Monroe’s state law

claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. The

Court will issue a corresponding Judgment alongside

this ruling.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 9th day of

March, 2023.

/s/ Elizabeth Erny Foote

ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Record Documents 28, 31 & 40.

Record Document 26.

16a

28 U.S.C. § 1658

§ 1658. Time

limitations

the

commencement of civil actions arising

under Acts of Congress

(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil

action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after

the date of the enactment of this section may not be

commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action

accrues.

(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a private right

of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit,

manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a

regulatory requirement concerning the securities

laws, as defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47)), may be

brought not later than the earlier of—

(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts

constituting the violation; or

(2) 5 years after such violation.

17a

42 U.S.C. § 1983

§ 1983.

Civil action for deprivation of rights

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,

except that in any action brought against a judicial

officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s

judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted

unless a declaratory decree was violated or

declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes

of this section, any Act of Congress applicable

exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be

considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

18a

42 U.S.C. § 1985

§ 1985. Conspiracy to interfere with civil

rights

(1) Preventing officer from performing duties

If two or more persons in any State or Territory

conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat,

any person from accepting or holding any office, trust,

or place of confidence under the United States, or

from discharging any duties thereof; or to induce by

like means any officer of the United States to leave

any State, district, or place, where his duties as an

officer are required to be performed, or to injure him

in his person or property on account of his lawful

discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged

in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his

property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede

him in the discharge of his official duties;

(2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party,

witness, or juror

If two or more persons in any State or Territory

conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any

party or witness in any court of the United States

from attending such court, or from testifying to any

matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully,

or to injure such party or witness in his person or

property on account of his having so attended or

testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or

indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such

court, or to injure such juror in his person or property

on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment

lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having

been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for

the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or

19a

defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in

any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any

citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure

him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or

attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class

of persons, to the equal protection of the laws;

(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges

If two or more persons in any State or Territory

conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the

premises of another, for the purpose of depriving,

either directly or indirectly, any person or class of

persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal

privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the

purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted

authorities of any State or Territory from giving or

securing to all persons within such State or Territory

the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more

persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or

threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote,

from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner,

toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully

qualified person as an elector for President or Vice

President, or as a Member of Congress of the United

States; or to injure any citizen in person or property

on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of

conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more

persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any

act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy,

whereby another is injured in his person or property,

or deprived of having and exercising any right or

privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so

injured or deprived may have an action for the

recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or

deprivation, against any one or more of the

conspirators.

20a

42 U.S.C. § 1988

§ 1988. Proceedings in vindication of civil

rights

(a) Applicability of statutory and common law

The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters

conferred on the district courts by the provisions of

titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes for the

protection of all persons in the United States in their

civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be

exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of

the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to

carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they

are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the

provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and

punish offenses against law, the common law, as

modified and changed by the constitution and

statutes of the State wherein the court having

jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so

far as the same is not inconsistent with the

Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be

extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and

disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal

nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party

found guilty.

(b) Attorney’s fees

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of

sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of

this title, title IX of Public Law 92–318 [20 U.S.C.

1681 et seq.], the Religious Freedom Restoration Act

of 1993 [42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.], the Religious Land

Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 [42

U.S.C. 2000cc et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], or section 12361 of

21a

title 34, the court, in its discretion, may allow the

prevailing party, other than the United States, a

reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, except

that in any action brought against a judicial officer for

an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial

capacity such officer shall not be held liable for any

costs, including attorney’s fees, unless such action

was clearly in excess of such officer’s jurisdiction.

In awarding an attorney’s fee under subsection

(b) in any action or proceeding to enforce a provision

of section 1981 or 1981a of this title, the court, in its

discretion, may include expert fees as part of the

attorney’s fee.

22a

Louisiana Civil Code Article 3492

Art. 3492.

Delictual actions

Delictual actions are subject to a liberative

prescription of one year.

This prescription

commences to run from the day injury or damage is

sustained.

It does not run against minors or

interdicts in actions involving permanent disability

and brought pursuant to the Louisiana Products

Liability Act or state law governing product liability

actions in effect at the time of the injury or damage.

23a

Louisiana Civil Code Article 3493.10

Art. 3493.10. Delictual

actions;

prescription; criminal act

two-year

Delictual actions which arise due to damages

sustained as a result of an act defined as a crime of

violence under Chapter 1 of Title 14 of the Louisiana

Revised Statutes of 1950, except as provided in Article

3496.2, are subject to a liberative prescription of two

years. This prescription commences to run from the

day injury or damage is sustained.

24a

2024 Louisiana Session Law Service Act 423

(H.B. 315) (West)

ACT NO. 423

H.B. No. 315

TORT ACTIONS

AN ACT to enact Civil Code Articles 3493.11 and

3493.12, and to repeal Civil Code Articles 3492 and

3493, relative to tort actions; to provide prescriptive

periods for tort actions; to provide for applicability; to

provide for an effective date; and to provide for related

matters.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana:

Section 1. Civil Code Articles 3493.11 and 3493.12

are hereby enacted to read as follows:

Art. 3493.11. Delictual actions

Delictual actions are subject to a liberative

prescription of two years.

This prescription

commences to run from the day injury or damage is

sustained.

It does not run against minors or

interdicts in actions involving permanent disability

and brought pursuant to the Louisiana Products

Liability Act or state law governing product liability

actions in effect at the time of the injury or damage.

***

Section 2. Civil Code Articles 3492 and 3493 are

hereby repealed their entirety.

Section 3. The provisions of this Act shall be given

prospective application only and shall apply to

delictual actions arising after the effective date of this

Act.

25a

Section 4. This Act shall become effective on July

1, 2024.

Approved June 3, 2024.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.