Petition for Writ of Certiorari — George Bivens, Acting Commissioner, Pennsylvania State Police, Petitioner v. Second Amendment Foundation, et al.

Supreme Court briefJun 26, 2025

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No. __________

In the Supreme Court of the United States

CHRISTOPHER PARIS, COMMISSIONER, PENNSYLVANIA

STATE POLICE,

Petitioner

SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION, INC.;

FIREARMS POLICY COALITION,

Respondents

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DAVID W. SUNDAY, JR.

Attorney General

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

DANIEL B. MULLEN

Senior Deputy Attorney General

Counsel of Record

SEAN A. KIRKPATRICK

Chief Deputy Attorney General

Chief, Appellate Litigation Section

Office of Attorney General

1251 Waterfront Place

Mezzanine Level

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

(412) 235-9067

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER

QUESTION PRESENTED

The federal government and 32 states establish 21

as the minimum age for certain gun rights. Since

United States v. Rahimi, five courts of appeals have

considered whether these widespread laws violate the

purported Second Amendment rights of 18-to-20-yearolds. Those Courts are sharply divided in both method

and result.

The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits held that restrictions on 18-to-20-year-olds are constitutional, relying on Founding-era common law principles that prevented anyone under the age of 21 from purchasing

weapons. Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, 121

F.4th 96 (10th Cir. 2024); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bondi, 133

F.4th 1108 (11th Cir. 2025) (en banc), cert. pending sub

nom., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Glass, 24-1185 (U.S.). Those

courts also looked to post-enactment history to confirm

their understanding of the Founding-era evidence.

Ibid. But the Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits reached

the opposite conclusion when examining the same history. App.1a-52a; Reese v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

Firearms, and Explosives, 127 F.4th 583 (5th Cir.

2025); Worth v. Jacobson, 108 F.4th 677 (8th Cir. 2024),

cert. denied, 24-782 (U.S.). This Court’s review is necessary to resolve this acknowledged split on an important, recurring issue. Law enforcement officials

need clarity before the confusion deepens. The question

presented is:

Do firearms laws imposing a minimum age of 21 violate the purported Second Amendment rights of 18-to20-year-olds?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner (defendant-appellee below) is the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police, Christopher Paris, in his official capacity. *

Respondents (plaintiffs-appellants below) are the

Firearms Policy Coalition and the Second Amendment

Foundation. †

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court for the Western District of

Pennsylvania:

Lara, et al., v. Evanchick, No. 2:20-cv-01582

(judgment entered on April 16, 2021).

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit:

Lara, et al., v. Commissioner Pennsylvania State

Police, No. 21-1832 (judgment entered on January 13, 2025).

Supreme Court of the United States:

Paris v. Lara, et al., No. 24-93 (judgment entered

on November 18, 2024).

* Christopher Paris succeeded Robert Evanchick as Commissioner of the State Police.

† At the outset of this suit, there were also three individual

plaintiffs who were between the ages of 18 and 21, Madison Lara,

Sophia Knepley, and Logan Miller. Because all three individual

plaintiffs are now at least 21 years’ old, Respondents conceded below that their claims are now moot. 3d Cir. Dkt. ECF No. 71. But

the Court of Appeals determined that the case itself is not moot

because the organizational plaintiffs have independent standing

to continue litigating the claims. App.33a n.28.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ........................................... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ............................. ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS ........................................ ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................. iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... vi

INTRODUCTION .........................................................1

OPINIONS BELOW......................................................4

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .............................4

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED ........4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .........11

I. THERE IS AN ACKNOWLEDGED CIRCUIT SPLIT

OVER THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FIREARMS

RESTRICTIONS ON 18-TO-20-YEAR-OLDS. .................11

A. Since Rahimi, the Circuits Have Split 3-2 on

the Question Presented. ...................................11

B. The Split Among the Circuits Reflects Deep

Methodological Disagreements About the

Proper Analysis Under Bruen and Rahimi. ....20

II. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS IMPORTANT. .............23

III.THE

THIRD

CIRCUIT

FUNDAMENTALLY

MISUNDERSTANDS THIS COURT’S SECOND

AMENDMENT METHODOLOGY. .................................26

A. Despite Rahimi, the Third Circuit Continues

to Demand Founding-Era Twins. ....................26

B. The Third Circuit Gleaned the Wrong

Principle From Founding-Era Militia

Statutes. ............................................................27

C. The Third Circuit Failed to Take a Nuanced

Approach to Post-Enactment History. .............30

D. The Third Circuit Invoked Contemporary

Legal Precepts to Interpret the Second

Amendment. .....................................................32

CONCLUSION ............................................................35

APPENDIX

Appendix A. Court of Appeals panel majority

opinion and dissent (January 13, 2025) .................1a

Appendix B. District Court opinion

(April 16, 2021)......................................................53a

Appendix C. District Court order

(April 16, 2021)......................................................84a

Appendix D. District Court judgment

(April 16, 2021)......................................................85a

Appendix E. Court of Appeals order denying

en banc review (February, 26, 2025) ....................86a

Appendix F. Dissent from the denial of

en banc review (February 26, 2025) .....................88a

Appendix G. Constitutional and statutory

provisions.............................................................105a

U.S. Const. Amend II ........................................105a

U.S. Const. Amend XIV ....................................105a

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §6106 ...................................107a

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §6107 ...................................113a

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §6109 ...................................114a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

District of Columbia v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570 (2008) .............................. 3, 9, 16, 29, 33

Firearms Policy Coalition, et al., v. Ott, et al.,

24-cv-00274 (W.D. Pa.) ........................................6, 25

Kanter v. Barr,

919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019) ....................................10

Lara v. Comm'r Pa. State Police,

91 F.4th 122 (3d Cir. 2024), reh’g denied, 97

F.4th 156 (3d Cir. 2024) (“Lara I”) ......................6, 26

Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bondi,

133 F.4th 1108 (11th Cir. 2025) (en banc),

cert. pending sub nom., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Glass,

24-1185 (U.S.).... 1, 2, 3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21,

28, 29, 30, 31, 32

Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir.

2012) .........................................................................19

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,

597 U.S. 1 (2022) .................. 1, 3, 9, 11, 16, 31, 33, 34

NRA v. Swearingen,

545 F.Supp.3d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 2021) ......................28

Paris v. Lara,

145 S. Ct. 369 (2024) ..................................................6

Reese v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and

Explosives, 127 F.4th 583 (5th Cir. 2025) ....3, 12, 18,

19, 20, 22, 23, 25

Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis,

121 F.4th 96 (10th Cir. 2024) ...... 1, 16, 17, 20, 22, 34

Second Amendment Foundation, et al. v. Paris,

24-cv-01015 (M.D. Pa.)...............................................6

Suarez v. Paris,

741 F.Supp.3d 237, 258-61 (M.D. Pa. 2024) ...........25

vii

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,

393 U.S. 503 (1969) ..................................................34

United States v. Rahimi,

602 U.S. 680 (2024) .......... 2, 14, 15, 16, 22, 27, 31, 32

Worth v. Jacobson,

108 F.4th 677 (8th Cir. 2024),

cert. denied, 24-782 (U.S.)............ 3, 12, 17, 18, 20, 22

Statutes

18 U. S. C. §921, et seq. ...............................................25

18 U.S.C. §922(b)(1) ........................................ 18, 23, 25

28 U. S. C. §1254(1).......................................................4

1 Stat. 271, §2 (1792) ..................................................28

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §1606(b) ...........................................5

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §6106(a) ...........................................4

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §6107(a) .....................................5, 24

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §6109(b) ...........................................5

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §6110.1 ............................................4

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §6111.1 ..........................................25

430 Ill. Comp. Stat. 66/25(1) .......................................24

720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24-1(a)(10) ...............................24

Act of April 11, 1793 (14 St.L., Ch. 1696) ..................28

Alaska Stat. §11.61.220(a)(6)......................................23

Alaska Stat. §18.65.705 ..............................................23

Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-3102(A)(2) ...................................23

Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-3112(E) .......................................23

Ark. Code §5-73-309 ....................................................23

Cal. Penal Code §26150(a)(2)......................................23

Cal. Penal Code §26155(a)(2)......................................23

Colo. Rev. Stat. §18-12-203(1)(b) ................................23

Conn. Gen. Stat. §29-28(b)..........................................23

Conn. Gen. Stat. §29-35(a)..........................................23

Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §1448(a)(5) .............................23

Fla. Stat. §790.053(1) ..................................................23

Fla. Stat. §790.06(1) ....................................................23

Fla. Stat. §790.06(2)(b) ...............................................23

viii

Ga. Code §16-11-125.1(2.1) .........................................23

Ga. Code §16-11-126(g)(1) ...........................................23

Ga. Code §16-11-129(b)(2)(A) ......................................23

Haw. Rev. Stat. §134-9(a)(6) .......................................24

Ky. Rev. Stat. §237.110(4)(c) ......................................24

La. Rev. Stat. §40:1379.3(C)(4) ...................................24

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, §131(d)(iv) .........................24

Md. Public Safety Code §5-133(d)...............................24

Mich. Comp. Laws §28.425b(7)(a) ..............................24

Minn. Stat. §624.714 ...................................................24

N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-415.12(a)(2).................................24

N.J. Stat. §2C:58-3(c)(4) ..............................................24

N.J. Stat. §2C:58-4(c) ..................................................24

N.M. Stat. §29-19-4(A)(3) ............................................24

N.Y. Penal Law §400.00(1) .........................................24

Neb. Rev. Stat. §69-2433(1) ........................................24

Nev. Rev. Stat. §202.3657(3)(a)(1) ..............................24

Ohio Rev. Code §2923.125(D)(1)(b) ............................24

Okla. Stat. tit. 21 §1272(A)(6) ....................................24

Or. Rev. Stat. §166.291(1)(b) ......................................24

R.I. Gen. Laws §11-47-11 ............................................24

R.I. Gen. Laws §11-47-18 ............................................24

Utah Code §76-10-505 .................................................24

Utah Code §76-10-523(5) ............................................24

Va. Code §18.2-308.02(A) ............................................24

Wash. Rev. Code §9.41.070(1)(c).................................24

Wis. Stat. §175.60(3)(a) ...............................................24

Wyo. Stat. §6-8-104 .....................................................24

Other Authorities

Joseph Blocher & Eric Ruben, Originalism-byAnalogy and Second Amendment Adjudication,

133 YALE L.J. 99, 154–55 (2023) .............................30

Kevin C. Newsom, The Road to Tradition or

Perdition? An Originalist Critique of

Traditionalism in Constitutional Interpretation,

47 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 745 (2024)....................15

Kevin Sweeney, “Firearms Militias, and the

Second Amendment,” The Second Amendment on

Trial: Critical Essays on District of Columbia v.

Heller (2013) .............................................................27

Megan Walsh & Saul Cornell, Age Restrictions and

the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 1791-1868, 108

MINN. L. REV. 3049 (2024) ................... 2, 3, 13, 30, 31

Patrick Charles, Armed in America: The History of

Gun Rights from Colonial Militias to Concealed

Carry (2018) .........................................................2, 31

Saul Cornell, “Infants” and Arms Bearing in the

Era of the Second Amendment: Making Sense of

the Historical Record, 40 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.

INTER ALIA 1 (2021) ............................................27, 28

Treatises

Thomas M. Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional

Limitations, 740 n.4 (5th ed. 1883) ...........................2

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of

England (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1765) .................9

INTRODUCTION

All 50 states and the federal government establish

minimum-age requirements for acquiring, possessing,

and carrying firearms. Recognizing that there must be

some age threshold for the right to bear arms, this

Court stated that the Second Amendment applies to all

“law-abiding, adult citizens[.]” New York State Rifle &

Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 31-32 (2022) (emphasis added). The question in this case “is where does that

age threshold lie?” App.37a (Restrepo, J., dissenting).

Historically, the answer was age 21. From the time

of the Founding, through Reconstruction and most of

the 20th century, there was a widely-held consensus

that anyone under the age of 21 was a minor. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bondi, 133 F.4th 1108, 1116-18 (11th Cir.

2025) (en banc), cert. pending sub nom., Nat’l Rifle

Ass’n v. Glass, 24-1185 (U.S.); Rocky Mountain Gun

Owners v. Polis, 121 F.4th 96, 124-25 (10th Cir. 2024).

The Founding generation believed that under-21-yearolds “lacked the reason and judgment necessary to be

trusted with legal rights,” including the ability to contract. Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1117-20. As a consequence,

Founding-era minors “could not purchase weapons for

themselves” under the common law. Bondi, 133 F.4th

at 1120. Founding-era militia laws—which either exempted minors from firearm requirements entirely, or

expected minors’ parents to acquire firearms for

them—reflected this limitation. Bondi, 133 F.4th at

1119 (collecting statutes).

Post-ratification history confirms the Founding-era

understanding. Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1122. Although the

pervasive common law limitations prevented unsupervised minors from acquiring dangerous weapons at the

Founding, by the mid-19th century this proved inade-

quate. Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1122-23. During the antebellum period, dramatic economic and technological

transformations—especially the mass production of

deadlier and more accurate handguns—made it easier

for minors to independently acquire firearms. Id. at

1135-40 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring). This, in turn, led

to a “tide of firearm-related injuries at the hands of minors”—a discrete problem the Founding generation did

not confront. Patrick Charles, Armed in America: The

History of Gun Rights from Colonial Militias to Concealed Carry, 141, 156 (2018).

States “filled the void” by enacting “a flurry of outright bans” on under-21-year-olds acquiring firearms.

Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1159 (Newsom, J., concurring). Between 1856 and 1897, 20 jurisdictions enacted laws

specifically curtailing the gun rights of under-21-yearolds. Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1121-22; Megan Walsh & Saul

Cornell, Age Restrictions and the Right to Keep and

Bear Arms, 1791-1868, 108 MINN. L. REV. 3049, 3092

(2024) (collecting statutes). Those 19th-century statutes made “explicit what was implicit at the Founding:

laws may regulate the purchase of firearms by minors.”

Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1124. At the time, courts, scholars,

and the public at large universally approved of those

measures. State v. Callicutt, 69 Tenn. 714 (1878);

Thomas M. Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, 740 n.4 (5th ed. 1883); Charles, Armed in America, 404-05 n.212.

Laws imposing a minimum age of 21 for gun rights

thus comport with the “principles that underpin our

regulatory tradition.” United States v. Rahimi, 602

U.S. 680, 692 (2024). And, in contrast to the extreme

outlier laws this Court invalidated in Bruen and Heller,

restrictions on under-21-year-olds remain widespread

today, with the federal government and 32 states using

that threshold. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.

570, 629 (2008); Bruen, 597 U.S. at 79 (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring); id. at 73 (Alito, J., concurring).

Despite the “mountain of historical evidence”

demonstrating that restrictions on 18-to-20-year-olds

comport with our regulatory tradition, see App.100a

(Krause, J., dissenting from the denial of en banc review), the Third, Fifth, and Eight Circuits failed to perceive that mountain through the fog of modernity.

App.1a-52a; Reese v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 127 F.4th 583 (5th Cir. 2025);

Worth v. Jacobson, 108 F.4th 677 (8th Cir. 2024), cert.

denied, 24-782 (U.S.). Those courts managed to “avoid

the weight of legal history by labeling individuals between the ages of 18 and 21 as ‘adults.’” Bondi, 133

F.4th at 1125. Or, as the Third and Fifth Circuits labeled them, “young adults.” App.32a; Reese, 127 F.4th

at 590. But “there was no legal category of young adult”

at the Founding. Walsh & Cornell, 108 MINN. L. REV.

at 3063. It is a purely modern construct. App.40a (Restrepo, J., dissenting).

The Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits thus reason

backwards from contemporary legal principles recognizing 18-to-20-year-olds as “young adults” for some

purposes and impose this late-20th-century paradigm

on the people who adopted the Second and Fourteenth

Amendments. That approach is the opposite of

originalism, as it places the Second Amendment on “a

sliding scale defined by contemporary state law that

varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.” Bondi, 133

F.4th at 1125.

The disparate methodologies used by the Circuits

have sown chaos and confusion for law enforcement officials. This Court should grant certiorari, resolve this

entrenched Circuit split, and clarify that the Second

Amendment rights of 18-to-20-year-olds today are the

same as they were in 1791 and 1868.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals and dissent are

reported at 125 F.4th 428 and reproduced in the appendix at 1a-52a. The dissenting opinion from the denial

of rehearing en banc is reported at 130 F.4th 65 and is

reproduced in the appendix at 88a-104a. The decision

of the District Court is reported at 534 F.Supp.3d 478

and is reproduced in the appendix at 53a-83a.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered

on January 13, 2025. The Court of Appeals denied rehearing en banc on February 26, 2025. On April 21,

2025, Justice Alito extended the time to file a petition

for a writ of certiorari to and including June 26, 2025.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S.

C. §1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution and the relevant provisions

of Pennsylvania’s Uniform Firearms Act are reproduced in the appendix at 105a-133a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Pennsylvania’s Uniform Firearms Act establishes 18 as the minimum age to possess a handgun or

other firearm in one’s home or place of business. 18 Pa.

Cons. Stat. §§6106(a) and 6110.1. With respect to carrying firearms outside the home, the Act generally allows unlicensed open carry by lawful gun owners, but

requires a license to concealed carry. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.

§6106(a)(1). The Act establishes 21 as the minimum

age for concealed-carry licenses. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.

§6109(b). 3

The Act also provides that “[n]o person shall carry

a firearm upon the public streets or upon any public

property during an emergency proclaimed by a State or

municipal governmental executive” unless the person

(1) has a concealed-carry license, or (2) is “[a]ctively engaged in a defense of that person’s life or property from

peril or threat.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §6107(a).

Because 18-to-20-year-olds cannot obtain concealed-carry licenses, these provisions mean that 18-to20-year-olds may generally carry firearms openly in

public, but not when the Commonwealth is in a declared emergency.

2. In 2021, Respondents brought suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania, claiming that Pennsylvania’s law violates the Second Amendment rights of 18to-20-year-olds. App.56a-58a. Respondents also moved

for a preliminary injunction. App.57a. Respondents

challenged, inter alia, the restriction on 18-to-20-yearolds’ ability to openly carry during emergencies.

App.53a-55a 4 The District Court dismissed the complaint and denied the requested preliminary injunction. App.83a.

3 Pennsylvania’s statute enumerates 15 exemptions to the li-

censing requirement, which have no age limits. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.

§1606(b). Among other things, those exemptions permit unlicensed concealed carry if an individual is in law enforcement, the

National Guard, or the military.

4 In the District Court, Respondents also sought concealedcarry licenses for 18-to-20-year-olds. App.29a. But in the Court of

Appeals, they narrowed their request for relief, and currently seek

only an injunction on arresting 18-to-20-year-olds for openly carrying during declared emergencies. 3d Cir. Dkt. ECF Nos. 57, 63.

Since the Third Circuit’s ruling here, Respondents have filed other

Although the District Court’s ruling predated

Bruen, that court did not perform the means-ends balancing that Bruen later abrogated. App.82a-83a n.8.

Instead, the District Court ended its analysis after concluding that Pennsylvania’s law is consistent with

analogous historical regulations. App.70a-82a. The

District Court also noted the broad consensus among

federal courts at the time that laws establishing 21 as

the minimum age for gun rights are constitutional.

App.71a-76a, 80a-81a. Respondents appealed.

3. A divided three-judge panel of the Third Circuit

reversed. Lara v. Comm'r Pa. State Police, 91 F.4th

122, 127 (3d Cir. 2024), reh’g denied, 97 F.4th 156 (3d

Cir. 2024) (“Lara I”). Lara I was decided after Bruen,

but before Rahimi.

The panel majority concluded that Pennsylvania’s

law violates the Second Amendment because the Commissioner did not identify a Founding-era regulatory

twin. Lara I, 91 F.4th at 137 (requiring “a single founding-era statute imposing restrictions on the freedom of

18-to-20-year-olds to carry guns”). The Court of Appeals narrowly denied en banc review. Lara I, 97 F.4th

156 (3d Cir. 2024).

4. After Lara I, this Court decided Rahimi, clarifying that Courts must identify historical principles in

Second Amendment cases, not historical replicas.

Then, this Court granted certiorari in Lara I, vacated

the Third Circuit’s judgment, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rahimi. Paris v. Lara, 145 S. Ct.

369 (2024).

suits seeking concealed-carry licenses for 18-to-20-year-olds. Second Amendment Foundation, et al. v. Paris, 24-cv-01015 (M.D.

Pa.); Firearms Policy Coalition, et al., v. Ott, et al., 24-cv-00274

(W.D. Pa.).

5. On January 13, 2025, the same divided panel issued its post-remand opinion in Lara II, holding, once

again, that Pennsylvania’s law violates the Second

Amendment. App.1a-52a. The Court of Appeals instructed the District Court to enter an injunction forbidding the Commissioner from arresting 18-to-20year-olds who openly carry firearms during a declared

emergency. App.35a.

a. The majority opinion was authored by Judge Jordan and joined by Senior Judge Smith. 5 As Respondents’ requested, the panel essentially reissued its prior

opinion in Lara I with few substantive changes. App.5a

(the post-remand opinion is “repetitive of our earlier

decision”); 3d Cir. Dkt. ECF No. 106, Respondents’

Post-Rem. Br. at 7 (urging the court to reissue its prior

opinion “unchanged”).

The majority began by considering whether 18-to20-year-olds are among “the people” covered by the text

of the Second Amendment. App.12a-18a. The majority

presumed that the Second Amendment applies to all

“adult” Americans—including 18-to-20-year-olds—and

required the Commissioner to defeat that presumption.

App.13a-14a.

The majority dismissed the Commissioner’s historical argument that when the Second Amendment was

adopted, anyone under 21 was considered a minor at

common law. App.15a. In the majority’s view, it could

not consider this historical evidence—or, seemingly,

any historical evidence—when construing the text because it supposedly “conflates Bruen’s two distinct analytical steps[.]” App.16a. So instead of looking to his-

On January 15, 2025—two days after the Third Circuit’s

post-remand opinion—Judge Jordan retired. App.86a.

tory, the majority relied on modern standards recognizing 18-to-20-year-olds as “young adults” for other

rights. App.17a, 32a.

Next, the majority considered whether Pennsylvania’s law is consistent with historical regulations. Despite Rahimi, the majority reiterated its holding from

Lara I that the Commissioner was required to identify

“an eighteenth-century regulation barring 18-to-20year-olds from carrying firearms[.]” App.20a.

The majority also believed it was “obligated” to resolve the question of whether courts should primarily

rely on the prevailing understanding of the right to

keep and bear arms from 1791 when the Second

Amendment was adopted, or 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. App.19a-24a. Holding that it could consider historical evidence from the

Founding era only, the majority disregarded all historical evidence from the mid-to-late-1800s, which demonstrated that 20 jurisdictions enacted analogous age

statutes during that time period. Ibid.

Having confined its analysis to Founding-era statutes, the majority reiterated its holding that Pennsylvania law violates the Second Amendment because the

Commissioner did not identify a statutory twin from

the 1790s. App.31a (“the Commissioner cannot point us

to a single founding-era statute imposing restrictions

on the freedom of 18-to-20-year-olds to carry guns”).

And, to bolster its conclusion that the Second Amendment extends to 18-to-20-year-olds, the majority

pointed to minors’ occasional militia service in the decades surrounding the adoption of the Second Amendment. App.29a-32a.

b. Judge Restrepo dissented. App.36a-52a. Beginning with the Constitution’s text, Judge Restrepo emphasized that the Second Amendment must be given

the “normal and ordinary” meaning known to the citizens who ratified the right to keep and bear arms.

App.37a. He consulted various “historical sources evidencing how the public would have understood its text

near the time of its ratification.” Ibid. (citing Bruen,

597 U.S. at 19-21 and Heller, 554 U.S. at 576).

At the Founding, anyone under 21 was considered a

minor at common law. App.39a-41a (citing, inter alia,

1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of

England 451 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1765)). The consequences of this categorization were “profound,” as

minors had “few independent legal rights” and “very

little independent ability to exercise fundamental

rights, including those of contract and property.”

App.41a, 45a. Judge Restrepo concluded that this “legal incapacity” indicated that under-21-year-olds were

“disabled in keeping and bearing arms,” given the “important connection between property law and the right

to keep arms.” App.43a.

Judge Restrepo also addressed the majority’s reliance on Founding-era militia laws, noting that those

laws actually undercut the argument that 18-to-20year-olds had an unfettered right to keep and bear

arms. App.46a-49a. When militia laws required minors

to enroll, minors’ parents were often required to furnish weapons for them. App.46a. And, once in the militia, minors carried arms in that highly-regulated setting “under the supervision of peace officers who * * *

stood in loco parentis.” App.46a-47a. Thus, that minors

occasionally bore arms in the militia “at the pleasure of

their superiors” did not mean they had “an independent right under the Second Amendment” that they

could assert against the government. App.46a, 49a.

(emphasis in original). Moreover, “Heller made clear

that the Second Amendment codifies an individual

right to keep and bear arms that is unconnected to militia service[.]” App.48a.

Next, Judge Restrepo surveyed post-enactment history to confirm his initial analysis. App.51a (“Under

Bruen and Rahimi, it is appropriate to consider the evidence from the Founding and determine if later evidence offers greater proof and context.”). Judge Restrepo highlighted a series of statutes enacted in the

mid-to-late-1800s that restricted the ability of under21-year-olds to acquire firearms. Ibid. Based on the totality of this historical evidence, Judge Restrepo concluded that Pennsylvania’s law is consistent with the

Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Ibid.

c. The Commissioner filed a sur-petition for rehearing en banc, which the Court of Appeals narrowly denied. App.86a-87a. Judge Krause authored a dissenting opinion. App.88a-104a.

Judge Krause criticized the panel majority for “repeating the same error” it made in Lara I. App.90a. In

her view, “Pennsylvania’s statutory scheme enjoys ample support in Founding-era history to which we look

for a match in principle, not with precision.” App.91a

(cleaned up).

Judge Krause highlighted the well-established

principle that “founding-era legislatures categorically

disarmed groups whom they judged to be a threat to

the public safety.” App.91a (quoting Kanter v. Barr, 919

F.3d 437, 458 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting)).

Judge Krause emphasized that “it was the legislatures

of the Founding generation that determined—consistent with the Second Amendment—which groups

posed sufficient risk to justify categorical disarmament.” Ibid. (emphasis added). “Pennsylvania exercised such legislative judgment when it decided that

those under 21 categorically pose a danger to public

safety during times of emergency[.]” App.92a.

In light of this Founding-era evidence, Judge

Krause believed it was appropriate to also consider evidence “through the end of the 19th century” to “confirm” the Founding-era understanding of the right.

App.96a (cleaned up). Like Judge Restrepo, Judge

Krause concluded that post-enactment statutes from

the mid-to-late 19th century that restricted firearm

possession by under-21-year-olds reflected Foundingera principles. App.96a-97a.

Judge Krause also explained how the timing of the

19th-century minimum-age laws coincided with the

first mass production of handguns and a corresponding

rise in interpersonal gun violence by minors—a specific

danger that the Founding generation did not confront.

App.98a-100a, 101a-103a. She noted that this Court

“anticipated this situation in Bruen” when it stated

that the “regulatory challenges posed by firearms today

are not always the same as those that preoccupied the

Founders in 1791 or the Reconstruction generation in

1868” and that laws “implicating unprecedented societal concerns or dramatic technological changes may require a more nuanced approach.” App.101a-103a (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27).

Judge Krause closed by urging this Court to take up

this case “if presented the opportunity.” App.104a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

THERE IS AN ACKNOWLEDGED CIRCUIT SPLIT

OVER THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FIREARMS RESTRICTIONS ON 18-TO-20-YEAR-OLDS.

A. Since Rahimi, the Circuits Have Split 3-2

on the Question Presented.

Since Rahimi, the Circuits have split 3-2 over the

constitutionality of firearms laws imposing a minimum

age of 21. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits held that

these laws are consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition. But the Third, Fifth,

and Eighth Circuits held that these laws violate the

purported Second Amendment rights of 18-to-20-yearolds.

These courts have acknowledged the divergence

among themselves and engaged with each other’s reasoning. Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1128 (“The recent contrary

decision of our sister circuit [in Reese] * * * fails to persuade us.”); id. at 1171 (Brasher, J., dissenting) (the

majority’s holding “splits with at least three sister circuits”) (citing Reese, Lara II, and Worth); App.18a (citing Rocky Mountain Gun Owners and Worth); Reese,

127 F.4th at 595 (citing Worth and Lara II); Worth, 108

F.4th at 688-689, 691 (citing Lara I). The distinct approach taken by each Circuit reflects deep disagreement over how to analyze the constitutionality of age

restrictions under Bruen and Rahimi. This Court’s review is necessary to resolve this acknowledged and

ever-widening split on an important, recurring issue.

1. Beginning with the most recent decision, the

Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that Florida’s

law banning firearms purchases by under-21-year-olds

does not violate the Second Amendment. Bondi, 133

F.4th at 1120. Writing for the majority, Chief Judge

William Pryor explained that during the Founding, anyone under the age of 21 was considered a minor at

common law. Id. at 1116-18. This threshold reflected

the Founding generation’s view that “minors lacked the

reason and judgment necessary to be trusted with legal

rights.” Id. at 1117. As a result, under-21-year-olds

could not enter into contracts, or even retain the profits

of their labor, which were received by their parents. Id.

at 1117-18.

“The inability to contract impeded minors from acquiring firearms during the Founding era.” Ibid. At

that time, most goods—including firearms—were purchased on credit, so the capacity to contract was essential. Ibid. Indeed, any seller who contracted with an under-21-year-old risked “voidability,” and with it, the

“high risk that they could not recover the goods sold[.]”

Ibid. (cleaned up).

The Eleventh Circuit extrapolated two broad historical principles from the common law’s treatment of minors at the Founding. “First, minors generally could

not purchase firearms because they lacked the judgment and discretion to enter contracts and to receive

the wages of their labor.” Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1118.

“Second, minors were subject to the power of their parents and depended on their parents’ consent to exercise

rights and deal with others in society.” Ibid.

“State militia laws from the Founding era confirm

this understanding.” Id. at 1119. Precisely because of

the legal incapacity of under-21-year-olds, “states enacted laws at the Founding to address minors’ inability

to purchase firearms required for their militia service.”

Ibid. States addressed this problem by either exempting minors from the firearm requirement altogether, or

by requiring their parents to acquire the firearms for

them. Ibid. (collecting statutes). These ubiquitous laws

“reflected that, at common law, minors could not purchase weapons for themselves.” Id. at 1120. Foundingera university regulations further reinforced the principle that under-21-year-olds had limited access to firearms. Ibid. Standing in loco parentis, “universities

commonly restricted firearm access both on and off

campus.” Ibid. (citing Walsh & Cornell, 108 MINN. L.

REV. at 3069-75).

The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that “the common-law regime of the Founding era differs from our

modern regime of statutory regulation.” Id. at 1123.

But under Rahimi, a modern law does not need to “precisely match its historical precursors.” Ibid. (quoting

Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692). The Eleventh Circuit majority also rejected “as contrary to Supreme Court precedent” the dissent’s view that courts “must rely only on

firearm-specific regulations from the Founding era and

cannot consider the common law[.]” Id. at 1127 (emphasis added). As the majority explained, Rahimi specifically “relied on principles ‘well entrenched in the

common law’ that were not limited to firearms.” Ibid.

(quoting Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 695) (cleaned up).

Next, the Eleventh Circuit looked to mid-to-late

19th-century history to “confirm the Founding-era understanding of the Second Amendment,” highlighting

that “20 jurisdictions enacted laws that restricted access to arms” for under-21-year-olds. Bondi, 133 F.4th

at 1116, 1121-22 (collecting statutes). At the Founding,

the common law limitations on the legal rights of minors were “so pervasive that states had no need to enact restrictions that prohibited their purchase of firearms.” Id. at 1123. But when “the common-law regime

became less effective at restricting minors’ access to

firearms, statutes increasingly did the work.” Id. at

1122; see also id. at 1135-40 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring). Thus, “[t]he law of the Founding era, which restricted the purchase of firearms by minors, continued

into the nineteenth century in the form of statutory

prohibitions.” Id. at 1122.

Judge Kevin Newsom agreed with the majority’s reliance on mid-to-late 19th-century statutes—despite

his general skepticism of relying on post-ratification

history—and wrote separately to explain why analyzing the question presented here “presents one of the exceedingly rare circumstances in which post[-]ratification evidence is fair game.” Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1157

(Newsom, J., concurring); see also Kevin C. Newsom,

The Road to Tradition or Perdition? An Originalist Critique of Traditionalism in Constitutional Interpretation, 47 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 745, 746-55 (2024).

Consulting post-ratification history “helps us avoid

mistaking the absence of a precisely analogous Founding-era regulation for the existence of a substantive constitutional right.” Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1159 (Newsom,

J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (citing Rahimi,

602 U.S. at 739-40 (Barrett, J., concurring)).

Returning to the majority opinion, Chief Judge

Pryor found it unnecessary to resolve “how to address

a conflict between the Founding-era and Reconstruction-era understandings of the right because the law of

both eras restricted the purchase of firearms by minors.” Id. at 1116-17.

The majority criticized the dissent’s “attempt to

avoid the weight of legal history by labeling individuals

between 18 and 21 as ‘adults[.]’” Bondi, 133 F.4th at

1125. That view “discounts the key fact that, at the

Founding and until the late twentieth century, the age

of majority was 21.” Ibid. Thus, the dissent “erroneously reviews the Florida law under an equal protection standard masquerading as an analysis under the

Second Amendment.” Id. at 1126.

“Instead of reviewing the legal analogues for regulating the rights of individuals under the age of 21 as

minors, the dissent treats contemporary ‘adults’ as the

so-called ‘analogues’ of the adults of the Founding era.”

Id. at 1125. The logical extension of the dissent’s approach “would mean that the federal right to keep and

bear arms turns on a sliding scale defined by contemporary state law that varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.” Id. at 1125. And it would mean that “the Second Amendment turns on an evolving standard of

adulthood that is divorced from the text of the Amendment and from our regulatory tradition.” Ibid. 6

2. Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit addressed the question presented in the context of a law

prohibiting gun sales to under-21-year-olds. Rocky

Mountain Gun Owners, 121 F.4th at 104-05. There, the

district court had preliminarily enjoined enforcement

of Colorado’s statute. Id. 104. But the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that Colorado’s law is constitutional.

After concluding that 18-to-20-year-olds are among

“the people” covered by the Second Amendment’s text,

the Tenth Circuit turned to Heller’s list of “presumptively lawful” firearms regulations, which included

“laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the

commercial sale of arms.” Id. at 114-16; id. at 118-19

(quoting, Heller, 554, U.S. at 626-27, 627 n.26); see also

Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 735 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

The Tenth Circuit concluded that Colorado’s age provision is covered by Heller’s “safe harbor” as an “agebased-qualification on the sale of arms[.]” Rocky Mountain Gun Owners, 121 F.4th at 119-20. “[A]s such, it

falls outside the scope of the Second Amendment’s

right to ‘keep and bear’ arms.” Ibid. The Tenth Circuit

also highlighted Justice Alito’s concurrence in Bruen in

which he stated that the decision did not “expand the

categories of people who may lawfully possess a gun”

and noted that federal law bans handgun sales to anyone under the age of 21. Id. at 124 (quoting Bruen, 597

U.S. at 73 (Alito J., concurring)).

6 Because the parties did not focus on Bruen’s textual prong,

the Eleventh Circuit assumed, without deciding, that 18-to-20year-olds are among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1130. But Judge Restrepo’s dissent here

demonstrates how the result is the same under the textual prong.

App.37a-46a (Restrepo, J., dissenting).

The Tenth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ argument

that the minimum age for firearm purchases must reflect contemporary age thresholds for other rights.

Rocky Mountain Gun Owners, 121 F.4th at 124. The

Tenth Circuit emphasized that the age of majority at

the Founding was 21, and that, at common law, under21-year-olds “were entirely subsumed under the authority of” their parents or guardians and could not independently enter into contracts. Id. at 124-25. Despite

the voting age for federal elections being lowered to 18

in 1971 with the passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, state legislatures still retained “the authority

and prerogative, rooted in the Tenth Amendment, to

set and adjust the age of majority” for other rights. Id.

at 125-126.

3. Two Circuits (in addition to the Third Circuit)

have reached the opposite result. The Eighth Circuit,

like the Third Circuit here, resolved the question presented when reviewing a public-carry prohibition on

18-to-20-year-olds. Worth, 108 F.4th at 683. And, like

the Third Circuit, the Eighth Circuit held that the law

was unconstitutional because it lacked a historical

twin. Id. at 693-98.

There, Minnesota proffered three broad pieces of

historical evidence to justify its law: (1) status-based

restrictions from the Founding that disarmed dangerous groups; (2) common law principles from the Founding; and (3) statutes enacted in the mid-to-late 19th

century. Id. at 693. Instead of taking this evidence together and extrapolating relevant principles, the

Eighth Circuit considered each piece of historical evidence in isolation, explaining how each source differed

from Minnesota’s modern statute.

Initially, Minnesota argued that Founding-era status-based restrictions establish the broad principle

that legislatures can disarm groups that pose a danger

if armed, enabling modern legislatures to categorize

other groups—including 18-to-20-year-olds—as dangerous. Worth, 108 F.4th at 693-94. While accepting

Minnesota’s premise that Founding-era status-based

restrictions reveal a relevant principle under Rahimi,

the Eighth Circuit concluded that Minnesota failed to

demonstrate “with enough evidence” that “18-to-20year-olds present a danger to the public.” Id. at 694.

And, lapsing into the very means-ends scrutiny this

Court adamantly disclaimed in Bruen, the Eighth Circuit opined that Minnesota might have other means to

address the danger posed by armed 18-to-20-year-olds.

Ibid.

The Eighth Circuit also rejected Minnesota’s reliance on Founding-era common law principles, concluding that “[i]nverse evidence of the common law is not a

sufficient analogue to meet the state’s burden.” Id. at

695.

Next, the Eighth Circuit addressed whether minimum-age statutes enacted during the mid-to-late 19th

century justified Minnesota’s law. In contrast to the

Third Circuit here, the Eighth Circuit accepted that

this post-enactment evidence could be considered. Id.

at 696-97. But it focused on how those laws were less

burdensome than Minnesota’s contemporary statute.

Id. at 697-98.

4. Finally, the Fifth Circuit considered the question

presented in a challenge to 18 U. S. C. §922(b)(1), a federal statute prohibiting handgun sales to under-21year-olds. Reese, 127 F.4th at 586. In 2012, the Fifth

Circuit upheld the provision as consistent with historical principles, citing, inter alia, common law standards

during the Founding and mid-to-late 19th-century

statutes “expressly restricting the ability of persons

under 21” to purchase or use firearms. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n

v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives,

700 F.3d 185, 201-203 (5th Cir. 2012). But in Reese, the

Fifth Circuit reversed its own precedent, holding that

the federal statute violates the Second Amendment.

Beginning with the text, the Fifth Circuit concluded

that so-called “young adults” are among “the people”

covered by the Second Amendment. Reese, 127 F.4th at

590-95. Like the Third Circuit here, the Fifth Circuit

reasoned that because 18-to-20-year-olds are among

“the people” covered by other constitutional rights,

they must also be among “the people” covered by the

Second Amendment. Id. at 591. And, like the Third Circuit here, the Fifth Circuit emphasized under-21-yearolds’ sporadic militia service during the Founding. Id.

at 592-95.

The Fifth Circuit also rejected the argument—expressly adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in Bondi—that

militia statutes reflected the Founding-era common

law view that under-21-year-olds could not independently purchase firearms because parents were expected to “furnish firearms for their sons’ militia service.” Reese, 127 F.4th at 597; see also Bondi, 133 F.4th

at 1129. Instead, the Fifth Circuit—like the Eighth and

Third Circuits—generally discounted the relevance of

the common law during the Founding. Reese, 127 F.4th

at 597. Under the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of

Bruen and Rahimi, the federal government was required to put forth specific “evidence that eighteen-totwenty-year-olds’ firearm rights during the foundingera were restricted in a similar manner to the contemporary handgun purchase ban.” Id. at 600.

As to post-enactment history, the Fifth Circuit

acknowledged that statutes enacted in the mid-to-late

19th century banning firearm access by under-21-yearolds were “relevantly similar” to the federal handgun

purchase ban. Id. at 599. But it determined that those

laws were “passed too late in time to outweigh” evidence that 18-to-20-year-olds sometimes served in

Founding-era militias. Ibid.

B. The Split Among the Circuits Reflects

Deep

Methodological

Disagreements

About the Proper Analysis Under Bruen

and Rahimi.

The split among these five Circuits is not merely a

disagreement over the correct result, but a deep methodological disagreement over the proper way to analyze

historical principles under Bruen and Rahimi. Even

though these five courts were all presented with the

same historical evidence, they diverged wildly in interpreting that history. The varied approaches taken by

each Circuit reflect widespread confusion over how to

analyze the question presented.

1. Initially, these courts diverged over the relevance

of the Founding-era common law. In Rahimi, this

Court specifically relied on principles “[w]ell entrenched in the common law” to interpret the Second

Amendment. 602 U.S. at 695. But the Third, Fifth, and

Eighth Circuits rejected any reliance on common law

principles when analyzing age restrictions, holding

that courts within those Circuits may consider only

Founding-era statutes. App.15a-16a, 20a, 31a; Reese,

127 F.4th at 590, 597-600; Worth, 108 F.4th at 695.

For the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, however, the

common law was essential to their conclusion that under-21-year-olds could not independently acquire firearms at the Founding. Rocky Mountain Gun Owners,

121 F.4th at 124-25; Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1117-18. The

Eleventh Circuit specifically rejected the view that

courts can consider only “firearm-specific regulations

from the Founding era and cannot consider the common law” as “contrary to Supreme Court precedent[.]”

Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1127 (emphasis added). This doctrinal dispute about whether common law principles

may be considered in Second Amendment cases was

outcome-determinative for the courts that resolved the

question presented.

2. The threshold disagreement over the relevance of

the common law, in turn, led the Circuits to diametrically opposed interpretations of Founding-era militia

statutes. See Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1129 (“Because the

Fifth Circuit failed to consider the background common-law regime, it misapprehended the import of

these written laws.”). As noted, Founding-era militia

statutes either exempted minors from the firearm requirement, or required minors’ parents to furnish firearms for them. Id. at 1119 (collecting statutes); see also

App.46a-49a (Restrepo, J., dissenting).

To the Eleventh Circuit, Founding-era militia statutes served to reinforce its understanding of the “legal

incapacity of under-21-year-olds” at common law.

Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1119. As the Eleventh Circuit explained, those laws were necessary only because of the

“legal incapacity of under-21-year-olds” during the

Founding, which rendered them unable to “purchase

firearms required for their militia service.” Bondi, 133

F.4th at 1119.

But the Third and Fifth Circuits disagreed. In the

Third Circuit’s view, because Founding-era militia

statutes did not specifically spell out that “18-to-20year-olds could not purchase or otherwise acquire their

own guns,” they lent no support to Pennsylvania’s law.

App.32a. Instead, the Third Circuit concluded that because “young adults had to serve in the militia[,] * * *

founding-era lawmakers believed those youth could,

and indeed should, keep and bear arms.” App.30a. The

Fifth Circuit also discounted the view that statutes re-

quiring parents to “furnish firearms for their sons’ militia service” proved that minors “lacked the right to

keep and bear (or obtain) such arms themselves.”

Reese, 127 F.4th at 597. According to the Fifth Circuit,

those militia statutes “just as readily imply that eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds were expected to keep and bear

arms, even if provided by their parents.” Ibid. (emphasis in original).

The dispute over the correct interpretation of militia laws is indicative of the Circuits’ differing approaches to the “generality problem[.]” Rahimi, 602

U.S. at 739 (Barrett, J., concurring). That is, when engaging in analogical reasoning under Bruen, how

“broad or narrow” does the controlling principle need to

be? Id. at 740. The Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits

failed to strike a coherent balance.

3. The Circuits also disagree over whether, and

how, to consider post-enactment history. The Eleventh

Circuit looked to post-enactment history to confirm its

analysis of the Founding-era evidence, highlighting

statutes enacted in the mid-to-late 19th century that

restricted firearm access by under-21-year-olds. Bondi,

133 F.4th at 1121-22. Judges Restrepo and Krause took

a similar approach to post-enactment history here.

App.51a (Restrepo, J., dissenting); App.96a-100a

(Krause, J., dissenting from the denial of en banc review). As did one concurring judge from the Tenth Circuit. Rocky Mountain Gun Owners, 121 F.4th at 141-42

(McHugh, J., concurring). And even the Eighth Circuit—despite declaring Minnesota’s law unconstitutional—assumed it could consider post-enactment statutes from the mid-to-late 19th century, but concluded

that none of those statutes imposed a comparable burden to Minnesota’s contemporary statute. Worth, 108

F.4th at 696-98.

But the Third and Fifth Circuits foreclosed any reliance on post-enactment history. Those courts believed

that the post-enactment statutes contradicted the

Founding-era evidence and were enacted too late to be

considered. App.20a, 25a; Reese, 127 F.4th at 599.

***

As a result of these disparate approaches, the meaning of the Second Amendment, and the tools available

to law enforcement officials, vary significantly from one

jurisdiction to the next. The conflict will only deepen as

courts within these five Circuits apply these incompatible methodologies in other Second Amendment challenges. As Justice Jackson observed, “when courts signal they are having trouble with one of our standards,

we should pay attention.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 742

(Jackson, J., concurring). Courts are sending that signal here. This Court should resolve the conflict before

the confusion deepens.

II. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS IMPORTANT.

The confusion among courts over the constitutionality of these minimum-age laws, if allowed to fester,

will be profoundly disruptive as laws limiting under21-year-olds’ access to firearms are ubiquitous. Federal

law prohibits federally-licensed firearms dealers from

selling handguns to anyone under 21 years of age. 18

U. S. C. §922(b)(1). And 32 states—including every

state within the Third Circuit—have laws establishing

21 as the minimum age for gun rights. 7 But in the 13

7 Alaska Stat. §§11.61.220(a)(6), 18.65.705; Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§§3-3102(A)(2), 13-3112(E); Ark. Code §5-73-309; Cal. Penal Code

§§26150(a)(2), 26155(a)(2); Colo. Rev. Stat. §18-12-203(1)(b);

Conn. Gen. Stat. §§29-28(b), 29-35(a); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11,

§1448(a)(5); Fla. Stat. §§790.06(1), (2)(b), 790.053(1); Ga. Code

§§16-11-125.1(2.1), 16-11-126(g)(1), 16-11-129(b)(2)(A); Haw. Rev.

states in the Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, officials

are enjoined from enforcing minimum-age laws on 18to-20-year-olds. This disharmony creates real practical

problems for law enforcement officials throughout the

country.

Consider the position Pennsylvania officials are

currently in as a result of the Third Circuit’s ruling.

Under Pennsylvania’s statutory scheme, 18-to-20-yearolds can carry firearms openly in public, but may not

obtain concealed-carry licenses. And public carry of any

kind (open or concealed) during declared emergencies

is limited to those with licenses. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.

§6107(a)(2). The rationale for this policy choice is apparent: Pennsylvania’s legislature wanted to limit

arms-bearing during emergencies to those who have

undergone the investigations and background checks

required before obtaining licenses. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.

§6109(d). The distinction is between licensees and nonlicensees. But the Third Circuit’s ruling affords 18-to20-year-olds—and only them—the unique privilege of

unlicensed public carry during proclaimed emergencies

without any background check. That takes the precise

age group about whom Pennsylvania’s legislature was

Stat. §134-9(a)(6); 430 Ill. Comp. Stat. 66/25(1); 720 Ill. Comp.

Stat. 5/24-1(a)(10); Ky. Rev. Stat. §237.110(4)(c); La. Rev. Stat.

§40:1379.3(C)(4); Md. Public Safety Code §5-133(d); Mass. Gen.

Laws ch. 140, §131(d)(iv); Mich. Comp. Laws §28.425b(7)(a); Minn.

Stat. §624.714; Neb. Rev. Stat. §69-2433(1); Nev. Rev. Stat.

§202.3657(3)(a)(1); N.J. Stat. §§2C:58-3(c)(4), 2C:58-4(c); N.M.

Stat. §29-19-4(A)(3); N.Y. Penal Law §400.00(1); N.C. Gen. Stat.

§14-415.12(a)(2); Ohio Rev. Code §2923.125(D)(1)(b); Okla. Stat.

tit. 21 §1272(A)(6); Or. Rev. Stat. §166.291(1)(b); R.I. Gen. Laws

§§11-47-11, 11-47-18; Utah Code §§76-10-505, 76-10-523(5); Va.

Code §18.2-308.02(A); Wash. Rev. Code §9.41.070(1)(c); Wis. Stat.

§175.60(3)(a); Wyo. Stat. §6-8-104(a)(iv), (b)(ii).

most concerned and subjects them to the least amount

of oversight.

On top of this, the Pennsylvania State Police force

is a “point-of-contact” under the federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, P.L. 103-159, Nov. 30,

1993, 107 Stat 1536 (codified at 18 U. S. C. §921, et

seq.), meaning it is responsible for performing all federally-required background checks on gun sales in

Pennsylvania. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §6111.1. When Pennsylvania officials perform that function, federal law

prohibits them from approving a handgun sale to an

under-21-year-old. 18 U. S. C. §922(b)(1). 8 But the

State Police must reconcile that obligation with the fact

that it is also bound by a federal court ruling proclaiming that 18-to-20-year-olds are “adults” under the Second Amendment.

More confusion is coming. Litigants, including the

Respondents in this case, are already attempting to expand the Third Circuit’s reasoning to invalidate other

restrictions in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Firearms Policy

Coalition, et al., v. Ott, et al., 24-cv-00274 (W.D. Pa.)

(seeking an injunction prohibiting Pennsylvania from

denying concealed-carry licenses to 18-to-20-year-olds);

Suarez v. Paris, 741 F.Supp.3d 237 (M.D. Pa. 2024) (invalidating Pennsylvania statutes prohibiting unlicensed open carry during emergencies and prohibiting

unlicensed individuals from carrying loaded firearms

in vehicles). The officials on the front lines of enforcing

these minimum-age laws are desperate for clarity on

this important issue. And gun-rights advocates likewise recognize the need for this Court to resolve the

8 The very same handgun sale that is not permitted in Pennsylvania—or 46 other states—must be permitted in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. See Reese, 127 F.4th at 586 (holding that 18

U. S. C. §922(b)(1) is “inconsistent with the Second Amendment”).

question presented. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Glass, 241185 (U.S.) (asking the Court to grant certiorari in

Bondi and resolve “[w]hether Florida’s law banning 18to-20-year-olds from purchasing firearms violates the

Second Amendment”). Review will benefit all parties to

these disputes.

III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT FUNDAMENTALLY MISUNDERSTANDS THIS COURT’S SECOND AMENDMENT

METHODOLOGY.

A. Despite Rahimi, the Third Circuit Continues to Demand Founding-Era Twins.

In Lara I, the Third Circuit required the Commissioner to identify a Founding-era twin of its law. 91

F.4th 137 (“the Commissioner cannot point us to a single founding-era statute imposing restrictions on the

freedom of 18-to-20-year-olds to carry guns”). One

would think that both Rahimi and this Court’s GVR order in Lara I would have led the Third Circuit to meaningfully reconsider its analytical missteps on remand.

Unfortunately, it did not.

Instead, the Third Circuit simply reissued its prior

opinion in Lara I with few substantive changes, see

App.5a, stubbornly doubling-down on its original misinterpretation of Bruen, see App.90a (Krause, J., dissenting from the denial of en banc review) (the panel

majority repeated “the same error it made the last time

around”). The Third Circuit held, yet again, that Pennsylvania was required to find an identical match of its

contemporary law from the 1790s to prevail. App.20a

(“the Commissioner has not pointed to an eighteenthcentury regulation barring 18-to-20-year-olds from carrying firearms”); App.31a (“the Commissioner cannot

point to a single founding-era statute imposing restrictions on the freedom of 18-to-20-year-olds to carry

guns”).

So while the Third Circuit acknowledged this

Court’s admonition in Rahimi and Bruen that twins

are not required, see App.4a, it nonetheless repeatedly

faulted the Commissioner for failing to produce siblings that resemble one another, as if there is somehow

a meaningful difference. Simply put, the Third Circuit’s analysis is impossible to reconcile with Rahimi’s

holding that “the Second Amendment permits more

than just those regulations identical to ones that could

be found in 1791.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 691-92.

B. The Third Circuit Gleaned the Wrong

Principle From Founding-Era Militia

Statutes.

As Judge Krause noted, the panel majority’s reasoning was “based exclusively on a handful of 18th-century

militia laws[.]” App.89a (Krause, J., dissenting from

the denial of en banc review). Because the majority

failed to understand the underlying purpose of Founding-era militia statutes, it gleaned the wrong principle

from them.

Militia statutes were “not about protecting handguns for self[-]defense, but securing muskets for national defense.” Kevin Sweeney, “Firearms, Militias,

and the Second Amendment,” The Second Amendment

on Trial: Critical Essays on District of Columbia v. Heller, 362-63 (2013). Accordingly, “the composition of the

militia was always dictated by strategic imperatives,

not by any constitutional mandate” that under-21year-olds had the right to bear arms. Saul Cornell, “Infants” and Arms Bearing in the Era of the Second

Amendment: Making Sense of the Historical Record, 40

YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 1, 16 (2021).

“In times of war, the age for service in the militia

crept down towards sixteen; in times of peace, it crept

up towards twenty-one.” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v.

Swearingen, 545 F.Supp.3d 1247, 1256-59 (N.D. Fla.

2021), aff’d sub nom, Bondi. When the Second Amendment was ratified in 1791, nine states mandated militia service beginning at age 16. Id. at 1257. And when

state militia laws allowed under-21-year-olds to serve,

parental consent was often a prerequisite. Bondi, 133

F.4th at 1120. The panel majority pointed to the Federal Militia Act of 1792, which set a minimum age of 18

for militia service. App.29a-30a. But even that law

maintained states’ discretion to impose their own age

qualifications. 1 Stat. 271, §2 (1792). Pennsylvania,

like other states, quickly availed itself of that discretion and raised the minimum age to 21. Act of April 11,

1793 (14 St.L., Ch. 1696).

The Third Circuit did not meaningfully grapple

with this fact: the minimum age for militia service fluctuated based on strategic imperatives. Nor did it account for the logical extension of its analysis to firearms restrictions on 16 and 17 year-olds, given that

they, too, served in militias.

The Third Circuit also overlooked that adult supervision was a critical component of under-21-year-olds’

ability to bear muskets in the militia where they served

“under the supervision of peace officers who * * * stood

in loco parentis.” App.46a-47a (Restrepo, J., dissenting). So minors’ access to and use of firearms “occurred

in supervised situations where minors were under the

direction of those who enjoyed legal authority over

them[.]” Cornell, Infants, 40 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA at 14.

That 18-to-20-year-olds (like 16 and 17 year-olds)

sporadically served in militias provides an exceedingly

weak basis for concluding that they had independent

Second Amendment rights at the Founding. App.46a

(Restrepo, J., dissenting). Precisely for this reason, this

Court made it clear—more than 15 years ago—that the

scope of the Second Amendment is “unconnected with

militia service.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 582; but cf. App.30a

(“That young adults had to serve in the militia indicated that founding-era lawmakers believed those

youth could, and indeed should, keep and bear arms.”).

The Third Circuit also failed to consider how militia

statutes reflected the Founding-era understanding

that under-21-year-olds did not have inherent Second

Amendment rights. As the Eleventh Circuit highlighted, when under-21-year-olds served in militias,

state statutes either exempted minors from the firearm

requirement, or required minors’ parents to furnish

them with firearms. Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1119 (collecting statutes). The Third Circuit discounted the relevance of those provisions, however, because the militia

statutes did not specifically state that “18-to-20-yearolds could not purchase or otherwise acquire their own

guns.” App.32a. True, the statutes themselves did not

spell that out. But, in its continued search for historical

twins instead of historical principles, the Third Circuit

overlooked that those provisions were only necessary

because of the “legal incapacity of under-21-year-olds”

during the Founding, which rendered them unable to

“purchase firearms required for their militia service.”

Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1119. Such provisions were superfluous if minors already had the independent right to

acquire and carry firearms, as the Third Circuit suggests.

The Third Circuit’s failure to “consider the background common-law regime” in place at the time led it

to “misapprehend the import” of Founding-era militia

statutes. Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1129.

C. The Third Circuit Failed to Take a Nuanced Approach to Post-Enactment History.

In its search for Founding-era replicas, the Third

Circuit foreclosed any reliance on the common law, and

overlooked an important reason why early legislatures

may not have enacted specific statutes curtailing the

gun rights of minors: there was simply no societal need

for such laws in 1791. And “[l]egislatures tend not to

enact laws to address problems that do not exist[.]”

App.50a (Restrepo, J., dissenting).

In 1791, handguns “were owned by a tiny fraction of

the population,” and it was exceedingly difficult for minors to acquire firearms without parental consent.

Walsh & Cornell, 108 MINN. L. REV. at 3062-63, 3088,

3118. The commonly-owned muskets of the time “were

prone to misfiring, needed to be released after each

shot, and required substantial acumen[.]”Bondi, 133

F.4th at 1135-36 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring); see also

Joseph Blocher & Eric Ruben, Originalism-by-Analogy

and Second Amendment Adjudication, 133 YALE L. J.

99, 153 (2023). Firearms were thus rarely used to commit homicides at the Founding. Ibid. Yet even those

firearms could not be independently accessed by

Founding-era 18-to-20-year-olds. Bondi, 133 F.4th at

1120-24. The common law regime, coupled with the

scarcity and limited lethality of Founding-era weapons,

meant there was no particular need to enact minimumage statutes for firearms at that time. Bondi, 133 F.4th

at 1123 (“the [common law] limitations on the legal

rights of minors were so pervasive that states had no

need to enact restrictions that prohibited their purchase of firearms”); see also App.95a (Krause, J., dissenting from the denial of en banc review).

This changed during the 19th century. By the

1850s, the mass production of deadlier and more accurate handguns made such weapons readily available to

minors the first time. Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1135-40 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring). Increased access led to a “tide

of firearm-related injuries at the hands of minors.”

Charles, Armed in America at 141; see also Bondi, 133

F.4th at 1137 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring) (under-21year-olds “gained the personal and economic freedom

to buy the new, widely available, and lethal weapons”).

These monumental economic and technological

changes created the imperative for legislatures to enact

laws restricting the ability of under-21-year-olds to acquire and use handguns. Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1135-40

(Rosenbaum, J., concurring); Walsh & Cornell, 108

MINN. L. REV. at 3087-89.

Bruen instructed courts to take a “nuanced approach” to cases “implicating societal concerns or dramatic technological changes” not present at the Founding. 597 U.S. at 27-28. Because regulatory challenges

evolve, “the Constitution can, and must, apply to circumstances beyond those the Founders specifically anticipated.” Ibid.; Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 691-92 (“the Second Amendment permits more than just those regulations identical to ones that could be found in 1791”).

Instead of analyzing the relevant history with nuance,

the Third Circuit wrongly assumed that “founding-era

legislatures maximally exercised their powers to regulate, thereby adopting a ‘use it or lose it’ view of legislative authority.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 739-40 (Barrett,

J., concurring). The Third Circuit’s flattening of the relevant history is incompatible with Bruen and Rahimi.

The Third Circuit’s unrefined approach to analyzing the relevant history led it to incorrectly perceive a

conflict between the Founding and Reconstruction eras

and unnecessarily resolve the historical timeframe debate. App.19a-25a. 9 But as the Eleventh Circuit explained, the rights of 18-to-20-year-olds were the same

in 1791 as they were in 1868, so it is unnecessary to

decide “how to address a conflict between the Founding-era and Reconstruction-era understandings of the

right” when answering the question presented. Bondi,

133 F.4th at 1116-17; see also Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692

n.1 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 37). The Third Circuit’s

contrary view mistook “the absence of a precisely analogous Founding-era regulation for the existence of a

substantive constitutional right.” Bondi, 133 F.4th at

1159 (Newsom, J., concurring) (emphasis in original)

(citation omitted).

D. The Third Circuit Invoked Contemporary

Legal Precepts to Interpret the Second

Amendment.

The Third Circuit’s textual analysis conflicts with

Bruen and Heller. The Second Amendment must be

given the “normal and ordinary” meaning known to the

citizens who ratified the Second and Fourteenth

9 The Third Circuit claimed that the Commissioner (i) “forced”

the issue by merely referencing post-enactment statutes, and (ii)

asserted “by implication” a conflict between the Founding-era and

Reconstruction-era understandings. App.20a; id. at n.17. The

Commissioner’s actual position below was that it is unnecessary

to resolve the historical timeframe debate here because there is no

conflict between the 1791 and 1868 understandings of the rights

of 18-to-20-year-olds. 3d Cir. Dkt. ECF No. 107, PostRem.Supp.Br. at 21 (“The Commissioner’s position on this issue

is—and has always been—that this [c]ourt does not need to resolve that open question in this particular case.”); see also 3d Cir.

Dkt. ECF No. 57, Post-Bruen Letter Br. at 5 n.1 (“It is unnecessary

to definitely resolve here because * * * both in 1791 and 1868 those

younger than 21 were considered [minors] not covered by the

right.”). That is still the Commissioner’s position in this Court.

Amendments. Heller, 554 U.S. at 577, 604. The text is

thus “informed by history” and “confirmed by the historical background of the Second Amendment.” Bruen,

597 U.S. at 19-20. Judge Restrepo’s dissent explained

how the relevant historical background here demonstrates that the citizens who adopted the Second and

Fourteenth Amendments did not regard under-21year-olds to be among “the people” protected by the

right to bear arms. App.37a-46a. But the majority refused to consider this historical backdrop.

In the majority’s view, a historically-rooted textual

analysis “conflates Bruen’s two distinct analytical

steps.” App.16a. That view is belied by both Bruen and

Heller. Under the textual prong, courts examine “a variety of legal and other sources to determine the public

understanding of a legal text in the period after its enactment or ratification.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 20 (quoting

Heller, 554 U.S. at 605).

Unmooring its textual analysis from history led the

majority to default to contemporary legal principles.

According to the Third Circuit, it would be “untenable”

to interpret 18-to-20-year-olds to be among “the people”

for certain rights, but not others. App.16a-17a. But references to “the people” have always varied between

constitutional provisions when it comes to age considerations. The Third Circuit’s failure to recognize that

variance was the product of a purely modern conception of “young” adulthood.

Consider the examples the Majority cited: (1) Article I, Section 2, which provides that the House is chosen

by “the People of the several states”; (2) the Seventeenth Amendment, which was ratified in 1913 and

provides that Senators are elected by “the people” of

each State; (3) the First Amendment rights of speech,

assembly, and petition; and (4) the Fourth Amendment

right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

App.17a. Before 1971—when the Twenty-sixth Amendment lowered the voting age to 18—“the people” as it

appeared in Article I, Section 2 and the Seventeenth

Amendment did not include under-21-year-olds. Yet,

well before that same date, “the people” protected by

the First Amendment did include under-21-year-olds.

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.

503, 506-07 (1969).

The majority’s supposed claim to “consistency,” see

App.17a, is further undercut by the fact that there is

no age threshold for the First and Fourth Amendments. After all, even five-year-olds have First and

Fourth Amendment rights. By contrast, this Court has

emphasized that the “the people” under the Second

Amendment are “law-abiding, adult citizens,” recognizing some age threshold for the right to bear arms.

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 15, 31-32 (emphasis added); id. at

72-73 (Alito, J., concurring). Whatever First or Fourth

Amendment rights under-21-year-olds may possess,

that does not necessarily entitle them to Second

Amendment coverage. Or, as the Tenth Circuit put it,

“the Constitution does not establish a one-age-fits-all

standard for all rights.” Rocky Mountain Gun Owners,

121 F.4th at 124.

The Third Circuit incorrectly relied on a contemporary conception of “young adulthood” when interpreting the Second Amendment. But the rights 18-to-20year-olds enjoy in modern times have no bearing on

whether the citizens who adopted the Second and Fourteenth Amendments believed they had the independent right to bear arms. They did not.

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,