Respondents Brief — FirstEnergy Service Company, Petitioner v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, et al.
Supreme Court briefSep 19, 2025
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Nos. 24-1304, 24-1318
In the Supreme Court of the United States
______________________________
FIRSTENERGY SERVICE COMPANY,
Petitioner,
v.
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, ET AL.,
Respondents.
______________________________
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
v.
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, ET AL.,
Respondents.
______________________________
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
______________________________
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
______________________________
DAVE YOST
Ohio Attorney General
MATHURA J. SRIDHARAN *
Ohio Solicitor General
*Counsel of Record
SAMUEL C. PETERSON
Deputy Solicitor General
30 E. Broad St., 17th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215
614.466.8980
Mathura.Sridharan@OhioAGO.gov
Counsel for Respondent
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether federal law preempts an Ohio law that
mandates that a utility that owns transmission assets
and provides retail electric service within the state
join a qualified transmission organization.
ii
LIST OF DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS
The petitions’ lists of related proceedings are complete and correct.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................... i
LIST OF DIRECTLY RELATED
PROCEEDINGS ....................................................ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................... iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... v
INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1
STATEMENT .............................................................. 2
I.
The Federal Power Act and Ohio law
establish
independent
requirements
related to RTO membership. ......................... 2
II.
FERC declined to address whether the
Federal Power Act preempts Ohio’s RTO
mandate. ........................................................ 3
III. The Sixth Circuit held that the Federal
Power Act does not preempt Ohio’s RTO
mandate. ........................................................ 4
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ........... 4
I.
There is no circuit conflict about whether
the Federal Power Act preempts state
RTO mandates. .............................................. 5
A.
The only circuit that has addressed the
preemption question has agreed that
laws like Ohio’s RTO mandate are not
preempted. ................................................ 5
B.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision does not
conflict with the cases that the
Utilities cite. ............................................. 6
iv
II.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision does not
conflict with this Court’s precedent. ........... 10
III. The Sixth Circuit’s decision was correct..... 13
CONCLUSION.......................................................... 17
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page(s)
AEP Tex. N. Co. v. Tex. Indus. Energy
Consumers,
473 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 2006) ................................. 8
Ass’n of Pub. Agency Customers v.
Bonneville Power Admin.,
126 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1997) ............................. 10
Brown v. Earthboard Sports USA, Inc.,
481 F.3d 901 (6th Cir. 2007) ............................... 14
Cent. Iowa Power Coop. v. Midwest
Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator,
561 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 2009) ................................. 8
Chamber of Commerce of the United
States v. Whiting,
563 U.S. 582 (2011) ....................................... 14, 15
Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star,
904 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2018) ......................... 15, 16
Federal Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power &
Light Co.,
404 U.S. 453 (1972) ............................................. 11
FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n,
577 U.S. 260 (2016) ............................................. 13
Gade v. National Solid Wastes
Management Assn.,
505 U.S. 88 (1992) ............................................... 14
vi
Green Dev., LLC v. FERC,
77 F.4th 997 (D.C. Cir. 2023) ................................ 9
Hughes v. Talen Energy,
578 U.S. 150 (2016) ....................................... 12, 16
Murphy v. NCAA,
584 U.S. 453 (2018) ....................................... 13, 15
Nevada v. Jackson,
569 U.S. 505 (2013) ............................................... 5
New York v. FERC,
535 U.S. 1 (2002) ..................................... 10, 11, 16
North Dakota v. Heydinger,
825 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2016) ............................. 8, 9
Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.,
575 U.S. 373 (2015) ........................1, 12, 13, 14, 16
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FERC,
Nos. 24-2527 & 24-3786, 2025 WL
1912363 (9th Cir. July 11, 2025)................. 6, 9, 10
Portland Gen Elec. Co. v. FERC,
854 F.3d 692 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ............................... 9
PPL Energy Plus, LLC v. Solomon,
766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014) ................................... 8
South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth. v.
FERC,
762 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ............................. 5, 9
vii
Transmission Agency of N. Cal. v.
Sierra Pac. Power Co.,
295 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2002) ............................... 10
Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren,
587 U.S. 761 (2019) ............................................. 14
Whitman v. American Trucking Assns.,
Inc.,
531 U.S. 457 (2001) ............................................. 17
Wyeth v. Levine,
555 U.S. 555 (2009) ....................................... 14, 15
Statutes and Regulations
18 C.F.R. §35.35 .......................................................... 2
16 U.S.C. §824 ................................................... 1, 7, 13
16 U.S.C. §824a ..................................................... 2, 15
16 U.S.C. §824s ........................................................... 2
California Public Utilities Code Section
362 .......................................................................... 6
Ohio Rev. Code §4911.15 ............................................ 3
Ohio Rev. Code §4928.02 ...................................... 3, 13
Ohio Rev. Code §4928.12 ...................1, 3, 5, 12, 13, 16
INTRODUCTION
When it comes to electricity regulation, the balance
of power is settled. The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission gets to regulate interstate electricity
markets. But Congress allowed, and this Court confirmed, that States can regulate intrastate electricity
markets—even if their state-focused regulations incidentally affect interstate markets. See 16 U.S.C.
§824(b); Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 385–
87 (2015) (natural-gas regulation). The Sixth Circuit
maintained this balance. It applied settled law when
it held that the Federal Power Act does not preempt
an Ohio law that requires utilities engaged in retail
electric service to join an organization that will separately and independently manage the transmission of
electricity (the “RTO mandate”). See Ohio Rev. Code
§4928.12(A).
American Electric Power’s and FirstEnergy’s (“the
Utilities”) assertion that the Sixth Circuit disregarded
settled federal-preemption law, and that this case demands the Court’s attention, lacks juice. The Utilities
frame their arguments in favor of certiorari at an exceedingly high level of generality, frequently asserting
general background principles that the Sixth Circuit
did not dispute and no one now contests. A similar
analytical leap undermines the Utilities’ attempts to
generate a circuit split. Their allegations of a split
misread the Sixth Circuit’s decision—as well as the
decisions of the other circuits with which they allege
the Sixth Circuit’s decision conflicts. These flaws may
explain why several respondents who have generally
supported the Utilities’ petitions have not urged the
Court to accept the federal-preemption question that
the Utilities present. See Brief of Respondent Duke
Energy Ohio, Inc. in Support of Certiorari at i; Brief of
2
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. in Support of Certiorari
at i.
Before proceeding, the Public Utilities Commission
of Ohio (“PUCO”) must make two housekeeping
points. First, American Electric Power Services Corporation and affiliated entities (which this brief refers
to as “American Electric Power” or AEP) and FirstEnergy challenge the same Sixth Circuit judgment, but
have filed separate appeals, with separate case numbers. Because the issues that they raise overlap,
PUCO is filing the same brief in both cases. When
citing the Sixth Circuit’s decision, PUCO cites to
American Electric Power’s Petition Appendix. Second, PUCO, in this Brief in Opposition addresses only
one of the Questions Presented in each petition:
whether the Federal Power Act preempts Ohio’s Regional Transmission Organization (“RTO”) mandate.
In the Sixth Circuit, PUCO focused exclusively on that
question. It maintains that narrow focus here.
STATEMENT
I.
The Federal Power Act and Ohio law
establish
independent
requirements
related to RTO membership.
Congress, through the Federal Power Act, directed
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to establish incentives for electric utilities that join RTOs,
which are organizations that coordinate the transmission of electricity across state lines. 16 U.S.C. §824s;
see §824a. FERC implemented that requirement by
creating an “adder” for utilities that join an RTO. 18
C.F.R. §35.35(e). This RTO adder allows utilities that
voluntarily join an RTO to charge more when transmitting electricity to wholesale purchasers. Id.
3
Ohio, for its part, regulates “competitive retail
electric service” (as opposed to wholesale service).
Ohio Rev. Code §4928.12(A) (emphasis added). It has
adopted its own requirements with respect to RTO
membership. Specifically, to “improve[] service reliability within [the] state,” it requires utilities to join an
RTO or other qualifying transmission entity if they
are engaged in retail electric service in Ohio. See Ohio
Rev. Code §4928.12(B)(4); see also Ohio Rev. Code
§4928.02 (establishing state policies with respect to
competitive retail electric service).
II.
FERC declined to address whether the
Federal Power Act preempts Ohio’s RTO
mandate.
The Ohio Consumers’ Counsel is responsible for
representing the interests of residential consumers of
retail electricity. Ohio Rev. Code §4911.15. To that
end, the Consumers’ Counsel filed a complaint with
FERC, in which it asserted that certain Ohio utilities,
including American Electric Power, FirstEnergy, and
Duke Energy Ohio, were not entitled to receive the
RTO adder. The Consumers’ Counsel asserted that,
because Ohio law required the named utilities to join
a qualified transmission organization, their membership was not voluntary. See AEP Pet.App.17a.
FERC agreed in part with the Consumers’ Counsel. It concluded that American Electric Power was
not entitled to receive the RTO adder.
AEP
Pet.App.18a.
FERC concluded, however, that
FirstEnergy and Duke Energy were entitled to the adder because their rates resulted from settlements that
the two utilities had negotiated. AEP Pet.App. 18a–
19a. As is relevant to the federal-preemption question
that PUCO addresses here, FERC declined to decide
4
whether the Federal Power Act preempts Ohio’s RTO
mandate. See AEP Pet.App.32a–33a.
III.
The Sixth Circuit held that the Federal
Power Act does not preempt Ohio’s RTO
mandate.
The Sixth Circuit, unlike FERC, did address
preemption—and held that the Federal Power Act
does not preempt Ohio law. AEP Pet.App.33a. It held
that Ohio’s RTO mandate did not conflict with federal
law because “[n]o party” disputed that it was possible
to comply “with both Ohio law and the [Federal Power
Act].” AEP Pet.App.35a. It rejected the Utilities’ argument that Congress intended to pursue “the federal
model of voluntary [RTO] membership” at “all costs,”
concluding that Congress instead “may have wanted
to prevent FERC from mandating membership via
rule, not prevent Ohio from doing so.”
AEP
Pet.App.37a (quotation omitted).
The Sixth Circuit rejected the Utilities’ field
preemption argument as well. It noted that the utilities had failed to carry their burden of showing that
Congress occupied the field, in part because “Congress
explicitly preserved state authority over certain transmission-related areas, including intrastate transmission.” AEP Pet.App.39a. Ohio’s RTO mandate, the
Sixth Circuit concluded, was merely an exercise of
that authority because “Ohio law targets intrastate
transmission,” and any effects on interstate electricity
transmission were indirect. AEP Pet.App.40a–41a.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
This case does not possess any of the characteristics that the Court looks for when deciding whether to
grant a petition for a writ of certiorari. The Sixth
5
Circuit’s resolution of the preemption question did not
create a circuit split nor did it disregard this Court’s
federal-preemption jurisprudence. It instead properly
applied the Court’s precedents and correctly concluded that federal law does not preempt Ohio’s RTO
mandate.
I.
There is no circuit conflict about whether
the Federal Power Act preempts state
RTO mandates.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision does not create a circuit split. It is, in fact, consistent with the only other
circuit court decision to have considered the federalpreemption question presented here. To overcome
this, the Utilities take the Sixth Circuit’s decision out
of context and frame decisions of other circuits at a
“high level of generality” in an attempt to manufacture a conflict. Cf. Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505,
512 (2013) (per curiam). That attempt falls short. The
Utilities in many cases cite general factual discussions of energy generation and transmission, rather
than a decision’s relevant legal holding. See, e.g.,
FirstEnergy Pet.21–22 (citing South Carolina Pub.
Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41, 49–50 (D.C. Cir.
2014) for its general discussion of how the electricity
market has changed over time).
A.
The only circuit that has addressed
the preemption question has agreed
that laws like Ohio’s RTO mandate
are not preempted.
Only one circuit other than the Sixth has considered whether the Federal Power Act preempts state
RTO mandates like the one found in Ohio Rev. Code
§4928.12(A). That circuit, the Ninth, agreed that such
mandates are not preempted. It recently held in
6
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FERC that the Federal
Power Act does not preempt a California statute that,
like Ohio’s RTO mandate, requires membership in an
organization that independently manages the electric
grid. Nos. 24-2527 & 24-3786, 2025 WL 1912363, *2–
3 (9th Cir. July 11, 2025); see also California Public
Utilities Code Section 362(c). As the Sixth Circuit did
here, the Ninth Circuit concluded that neither obstacle nor conflict preemption barred the California law
in question. Id.
Significantly, the Ninth Circuit rejected the broad
application of federal preemption that the Utilities assert here.
Like the Sixth Circuit, see AEP
Pet.App.39a–41a, it noted that the Federal Power Act
leaves certain areas of traditional state authority untouched, including “regulation of intrastate wholesale
markets and retail sales of electricity,” Pacific Gas &
Electric Co., 2025 WL 1912363 at *3. And it concluded
that remains true even when a state regulation, like
an RTO mandate, has “indirect effects” on the interstate electricity market. Id.
B.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision does not
conflict with the cases that the
Utilities cite.
The Utilities’ attempt to manufacture a split with
other circuits proceeds in two steps. They first take
the Sixth Circuit’s decision out of context and imply
that the Sixth Circuit questioned FERC’s exclusive
authority to regulate the interstate electricity market.
See FirstEnergy Pet.21; AEP Pet.16. Having done
that, they then cite cases from other circuits that reaffirm the uncontroversial proposition that FERC
alone is responsible for regulating the interstate
7
market. There is no conflict on that point, however,
because it is not one that the Sixth Circuit rejected.
1. The Utilities assert that “FERC’s jurisdiction
over the interstate transmission of electricity is exclusive.” AEP Pet.16; see FirstEnergy Pet.21. Everyone,
including the Sixth Circuit, agrees. The Sixth Circuit
noted below that FERC has “‘jurisdiction over all facilities for [interstate] transmission or sale of electric
energy [at wholesale].’” AEP Pet.App.38a–39a (quoting 16 U.S.C. §824(b)(1)) (brackets in petition).
The Utilities take the Sixth Circuit’s decision out
of context when they suggest otherwise. American
Electric Power, for example, cites a snippet of the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in which it wrote that the Federal Power Act’s “‘text does not grant FERC exclusive
jurisdiction over interstate transmission facilities.’”
AEP Pet.4 (quoting the Sixth Circuit’s decision) (emphasis added). Read in context, that quoted language
merely says that States are not prevented from adopting regulations aimed at their intrastate electricity
market simply because those regulations might have
an “incidental” and “indirect” effect on interstate
transmission. See Pet.App.39a–41a.
2. None of the alleged conflict cases, from the
Third, Fifth, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits, involved intrastate regulations that had only an incidental or indirect interstate effect. Many cases that the Utilities
cite instead involved state laws that, unlike Ohio’s
RTO mandate, aimed to directly regulate the interstate electricity market, or otherwise intrude on
FERC’s authority.
The Third Circuit rejected, for example, New Jersey’s attempt to interfere with the interstate price for
electricity by providing additional payments to certain
8
electricity generators. See PPL Energy Plus, LLC v.
Solomon, 766 F.3d 241, 253 (3d Cir. 2014). It was this
attempt to directly regulate an area committed to
FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction—interstate electricity
transmission—that the Third Circuit found problematic. See id. at 253. Highlighting the differences between that case and this one, the Third Circuit distinguished New Jersey’s impermissible direct regulation
from other types of regulations that would have been
permissible because they were targeted at intrastate
activities and had only an “incidental effect” on interstate markets. Id. at 254.
The Fifth Circuit decision the Utilities cite also involved a law that directly interfered with FERC’s authority. Texas, in that case, made its own determination about whether a utility complied with a FERC
tariff and adjusted retail rates on the basis that the
utility had violated that tariff. AEP Tex. N. Co. v. Tex.
Indus. Energy Consumers, 473 F.3d 581, 582 (5th Cir.
2006). The Fifth Circuit rejected Texas’s attempt to
step into FERC’s shoes.
The two Eighth Circuit decisions the Utilities cite
also do not conflict with the decision below. One case
did not address federal preemption. Cent. Iowa Power
Coop. v. Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator,
561 F.3d 904, 919–20 (8th Cir. 2009). The other invalidated a Minnesota law that purported to regulate “activity and transactions taking place wholly outside of
Minnesota.” North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d
912, 921 (8th Cir. 2016) (lead op.). But while the members of the Heydinger panel agreed that Minnesota’s
law was invalid, they could not agree on why that was
so. See id. at 919–22 (lead op.) (violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause); id. at 926–27 (Murphy,
J., concurring) (FERC preemption); id. at 928–29
9
(Colloton, J., concurring) (FERC and Clean Air Act
preemption). The members of the panel that would
have found that the Minnesota law intruded on
FERC’s exclusive authority, however, would have
done so because it banned “wholesale sales of electric
energy in interstate commerce.” Id. at 926 (Murphy,
J., concurring); id. at 928 (Colloton, J., concurring).
The three D.C. Circuit decisions that the Utilities
cite across their two separate briefs are even less relevant. Two of them did not involve preemption questions. See Portland Gen Elec. Co. v. FERC, 854 F.3d
692 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Green Dev., LLC v. FERC, 77
F.4th 997 (D.C. Cir. 2023). The third, which only tangentially touched on preemption, recognized that
States retain significant regulatory authority. It
found that FERC had the authority to adopt a challenged rule because the rule did not “interfere with
traditional state authority.” See South Carolina Pub.
Serv. Auth., 762 F.3d at 64. But, even then, the Utilities do not cite that portion of that D.C. Circuit decision. FirstEnergy cites the decision only for its factual
background, not its holding. That background merely
observed that the electricity market has changed over
time as it has become less vertically integrated. See
FirstEnergy Pet.21–22 (citing South Carolina Pub.
Serv. Auth., 762 F.3d at 49–50).
The flaws in the Utilities’ effort to generate a circuit conflict can be seen most clearly when it comes to
the conflict that they allege with respect to the Ninth
Circuit. The only Ninth Circuit decision that directly
addressed the preemption question that is presented
in this case is the one discussed above: Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. And that decision, as already discussed,
does not conflict with the Sixth Circuit’s decision. It
10
confirms it. See above 5–6; see also Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 2025 WL 1912363 at *2–3.
American Electric Power is therefore wrong when
it alleges that there is a conflict between the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits. See AEP Pet.17. In arguing otherwise, it again cites decisions that involved entirely different questions than the preemption question presented here. See Ass’n of Pub. Agency Customers v.
Bonneville Power Admin., 126 F.3d 1158, 1169 (9th
Cir. 1997) (whether the Bonneville Power Administration, a federal agency, had the “statutory authority to
transmit non-federal power”); Transmission Agency of
N. Cal. v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 295 F.3d 918, 928–29
(9th Cir. 2002) (whether the Federal Power Act
preempted state-law claims related to the interstate
transmission of electricity that was explicitly approved of by FERC). It also again frames the relevant
question at an improperly high level of generality, citing the Ninth Circuit decisions for the uncontroversial
background principle that the “‘[i]nterstate transmission [of electricity] is clearly a federal matter.” AEP
Pet.17 (quoting Ass’n of Pub. Agency Customers, 126
F.3d at 1173) (brackets in petition).
II.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision does not
conflict with this Court’s precedent.
The Utilities repeat their mistakes when they assert that the Sixth Circuit’s decision conflicts with this
Court’s precedents. As with their alleged circuit conflict, they frame the relevant issue at an improperly
high level of generality and again attempt to manufacture a conflict out of background discussions rather
than case holdings.
As evidence of a conflict, the Utilities point to this
Court’s statement in New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 7
11
(2002) that when electricity enters the grid it “‘immediately becomes a part of a vast pool of energy that is
constantly moving in interstate commerce.’” See
FirstEnergy Pet.21 (quoting New York); AEP Pet.18
(similar). That may be true scientifically. But the
laws of preemption do not mirror the laws of physics.
The comment that the Utilities quote comes from the
Court’s background discussion of the history and development of the electricity market in the United
States, not its holding. See New York, 535 U.S. at 5–
9. New York’s holding focused on a different question
than the one at issue here: whether FERC had exceeded its authority in regulating certain types of electricity transmission. Unlike this case, it did not “concern the validity of a conflicting state law or regulation.” See id. at 18.
Despite what the Utilities imply, the Court in New
York did not decide whether FERC could assert jurisdiction over all retail transmissions of electricity. The
Court noted that the Act gives States the authority to
regulate retail electricity sales—including retail
transmission—and wrote that any attempt by FERC
to exclusively regulate all retail transmissions would
raise difficult jurisdictional questions. Id. at 27–28.
The Court opted not to answer those questions. See
id. That is, it explicitly did not hold what the Utilities
now suggest that it did.
The other two decisions that the Utilities cite also
do not conflict with the Sixth Circuit’s decision. Federal Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404
U.S. 453 (1972) held only that the evidence presented
in that case was sufficient to establish that electricity
had moved in interstate commerce and that the Federal Power Commission therefore had jurisdiction
over the Florida utility that generated it—even
12
though none of the utility’s equipment directly connected to out-of-state companies. See id. at 456–57.
That decision did not address whether States lose
their ability to regulate intrastate activity simply because that activity has an incidental and indirect effect on interstate electricity transmission.
Hughes v. Talen Energy, 578 U.S. 150 (2016) did
not address that question either. The Court in that
case rejected Maryland’s attempt to “disregard an interstate wholesale rate required by FERC.” Id. at 166.
But even so, the Court’s holding in that case was “limited” to such direct intervention. Id. The Court reaffirmed that States “may regulate within the domain
Congress assigned to them even when their laws incidentally affect areas within FERC’s domain.” Id. at
164.
That is what the Sixth Circuit held here. It held
that the “indirect impacts” of Ohio’s efforts to improve
the reliability of intrastate transmission of electricity
and its efforts to improve reliability, options and competition “‘in the provision of retail electric service’” do
not trigger federal field preemption.
See AEP
Pet.App.40a–41a (second quotation citing Ohio Rev.
Code §4928.12(B)(5)). The Sixth Circuit’s decision
was consistent with the Court’s decision in Hughes,
not in conflict with it. See id. at 42a–43a (distinguishing Hughes).
Finally, it is telling that, despite their allegations
of a conflict with this Court’s decisions, the Utilities
have little to say about the most relevant of the
Court’s federal-preemption precedents: Oneok, Inc. v.
Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373 (2015). The Court in that
case limited the scope of the field preemption in this
area and held that federal law does not preempt state
13
regulation simply because it might have an indirect
effect on interstate activity. Id. at 386–87. The relevant question “in determining whether [a State] law
is pre-empted,” Oneok held, is “the target at which the
state law aims.” Id. at 385 (emphasis in original).
The Utilities, in attempting to distinguish Oneok,
assert that the target of Ohio’s RTO mandate is “the
federal field of interstate transmission.” AEP Pet.23
(citing Oneok, 575 U.S. at 385); FirstEnergy Pet.23
(arguing that Ohio’s RTO mandate “acts directly, not
incidentally” on interstate activity). But that is
wrong. The State’s regulatory target is “retail electric
service.”
See Ohio Rev. Code §4928.02;
§4928.12(B)(5). And that is an area which Congress
explicitly left to the States; the Act “leaves to the
States alone, the regulation of ‘any other sale’—most
notably, any retail sale—of electricity.” FERC v. Elec.
Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 265 (2016) (quoting
16 U.S.C. §824(b)).
III.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision was correct.
The Sixth Circuit correctly concluded that Ohio’s
RTO mandate is not preempted by the Federal Power
Act.
Congress may preempt state action expressly. Or
it may do so implicitly through conflict or field
preemption. See Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453, 477
(2018). The Utilities bore the burden of demonstrating that the Federal Power Act preempts Ohio law.
They failed to carry that burden. The Federal Power
Act does not expressly preempt state laws like Ohio’s
RTO mandate. And, for reasons discussed next, neither conflict preemption nor field preemption applies
here. So the Sixth Circuit correctly held that the Utilities failed to carry their burden here. See AEP
14
Pet.App.38a (citing Brown v. Earthboard Sports USA,
Inc., 481 F.3d 901, 912–13 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Conflict preemption. Conflict preemption exists
where “compliance with both state and federal law is
impossible, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.” Oneok, 575 U.S.
at 377 (quotation omitted). Here, the former is easily
dispatched: no party disputed that it is possible to
comply with both Ohio’s RTO mandate and the Federal Power Act, and the Court below was correct to
note as much. AEP Pet.App.35a.
The latter is harder. This Court has set “a high
threshold” to establish that “a state law is to be preempted for conflicting with the purposes of a federal
Act.” Chamber of Commerce of the United States v.
Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 607 (2011) (plurality op.) (quoting Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn.,
505 U.S. 88, 110 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment)); cf. Wyeth v. Levine,
555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment) (expressing skepticism of the Court’s
“purposes and objectives pre-emption jurisprudence”).
That makes sense. “Invoking some brooding federal
interest or appealing to a judicial policy preference
should never be enough to win preemption of a state
law.” Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 587 U.S. 761, 767
(2019) (lead op.). If it were, courts could “wind up displacing perfectly legitimate state laws on the strength
of ‘purposes’ that only [they] can see” and that “lack
the democratic provenance the Constitution demands
before a federal law may be declared supreme.” Id. at
778 (lead op.).
15
Apply those principles to the Federal Power Act.
Although the Act gives FERC the authority to encourage voluntary RTO membership, it says nothing about
what the States may, or more relevant, may not do.
See 16 U.S.C. §824a(a). So the Sixth Circuit was correct to refuse the Utilities’ invitation to divine from
that statute a federal objective to pursue voluntary
RTO membership “‘at all costs.’” AEP Pet.App.37a
(quoting Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 601 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)). That argument, the court below noted, would require the type of “‘freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension
with federal objectives’” that this Court has rejected.
Id. at 36a. (quoting Whiting, 563 U.S. at 607 (plurality op.)); see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 587 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
Field preemption. The Sixth Circuit correctly rejected the Utilities’ field preemption argument as
well. “Field preemption occurs when federal law occupies a ‘field’ of regulation ‘so comprehensively that it
has left no room for supplementary state legislation.’”
Murphy, 584 U.S. at 479 (quotation omitted). The
Federal Power Act does not. It does the opposite. As
the Sixth Circuit noted, rather than clear the field,
Congress explicitly reserved State authority in a variety of areas including “intrastate transmission.” See
AEP Pet.App.39a (emphasis added).
The division of authority between the States and
FERC is not always a clean one. “[W]hat states do in
the exercise of their powers affects interstate sales,
just as what the FERC does in the exercise of its powers affects the need for and economic feasibility of
plants over which the states possess authority.” Elec.
Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518, 523 (7th Cir.
2018). Recognizing that “each use of authorized power
16
necessarily affects tasks that have been assigned elsewhere,” id., the Court has held that States “may regulate within the domain Congress assigned to them
even when their laws incidentally affect areas within
FERC’s domain,” Hughes, 578 U.S. at 164 (citing
Oneok, 575 U.S. at 385).
That is what the Sixth Circuit held here. It noted
that Ohio’s RTO mandate fits within the Federal
Power Act’s regulatory scheme because “Ohio’s law …
primarily regulates intrastate transmission.” AEP
Pet.App.40a. It further noted that Ohio’s laws focus
on intrastate facilities and effects, including “‘the provision of retail electric service.’” AEP Pet.App.41a
(quoting Ohio Rev. Code §4928.12(B)(5)). Applying
this Court’s precedent, the Sixth Circuit concluded
that the Federal Power Act does not preempt Ohio’s
RTO mandate because it is targeted at intrastate activity and has only incidental effects on the interstate
transmission of electricity. AEP Pet.App.40a–41a
(applying Oneok, 575 U.S. at 385).
It is in fact the Utilities, not the Sixth Circuit, that
would depart from the Court’s precedent and rewrite
the balance of power that the Federal Power Act
strikes. They would have the Court hold that States
that are connected to an electric grid that crosses their
borders have no authority to regulate even intrastate
retail transmission of electricity. See FirstEnergy
Pet.21–22; AEP Pet.20. But, as the Utilities note, see
id., “[i]t is only in Hawaii and Alaska and on the
‘Texas Interconnect’ … that electricity is distributed
entirely within a single State.” New York, 535 U.S. at
7. If the Utilities are correct, then the Federal Power
Act would preempt state regulation in nearly every
state in the country. Interpreting statutory language
that was intended to preserve state power as leaving
17
all but three states powerless, would squeeze the largest elephant in the smallest mousehole. See Whitman
v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468
(2001).
CONCLUSION
The Court should deny the petition for a writ of
certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVE YOST
Ohio Attorney General
MATHURA J. SRIDHARAN *
Ohio Solicitor General
*Counsel of Record
SAMUEL C. PETERSON
Deputy Solicitor General
30 E. Broad St., 17th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215
614.466.8980
Mathura.Sridharan@OhioAGO.gov
Counsel for Respondent
Public Utilities Commission
of Ohio
SEPTEMBER 2025
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.