Respondents Brief — FirstEnergy Service Company, Petitioner v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 19, 2025

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Nos. 24-1304, 24-1318

In the Supreme Court of the United States

______________________________

FIRSTENERGY SERVICE COMPANY,

Petitioner,

v.

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, ET AL.,

Respondents.

______________________________

AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

v.

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, ET AL.,

Respondents.

______________________________

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

______________________________

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

______________________________

DAVE YOST

Ohio Attorney General

MATHURA J. SRIDHARAN *

Ohio Solicitor General

*Counsel of Record

SAMUEL C. PETERSON

Deputy Solicitor General

30 E. Broad St., 17th Floor

Columbus, Ohio 43215

614.466.8980

Mathura.Sridharan@OhioAGO.gov

Counsel for Respondent

Public Utilities Commission of Ohio

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether federal law preempts an Ohio law that

mandates that a utility that owns transmission assets

and provides retail electric service within the state

join a qualified transmission organization.

ii

LIST OF DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS

The petitions’ lists of related proceedings are complete and correct.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................... i

LIST OF DIRECTLY RELATED

PROCEEDINGS ....................................................ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... v

INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1

STATEMENT .............................................................. 2

I.

The Federal Power Act and Ohio law

establish

independent

requirements

related to RTO membership. ......................... 2

II.

FERC declined to address whether the

Federal Power Act preempts Ohio’s RTO

mandate. ........................................................ 3

III. The Sixth Circuit held that the Federal

Power Act does not preempt Ohio’s RTO

mandate. ........................................................ 4

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ........... 4

I.

There is no circuit conflict about whether

the Federal Power Act preempts state

RTO mandates. .............................................. 5

A.

The only circuit that has addressed the

preemption question has agreed that

laws like Ohio’s RTO mandate are not

preempted. ................................................ 5

B.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision does not

conflict with the cases that the

Utilities cite. ............................................. 6

iv

II.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision does not

conflict with this Court’s precedent. ........... 10

III. The Sixth Circuit’s decision was correct..... 13

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 17

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

AEP Tex. N. Co. v. Tex. Indus. Energy

Consumers,

473 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 2006) ................................. 8

Ass’n of Pub. Agency Customers v.

Bonneville Power Admin.,

126 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1997) ............................. 10

Brown v. Earthboard Sports USA, Inc.,

481 F.3d 901 (6th Cir. 2007) ............................... 14

Cent. Iowa Power Coop. v. Midwest

Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator,

561 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 2009) ................................. 8

Chamber of Commerce of the United

States v. Whiting,

563 U.S. 582 (2011) ....................................... 14, 15

Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star,

904 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2018) ......................... 15, 16

Federal Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power &

Light Co.,

404 U.S. 453 (1972) ............................................. 11

FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n,

577 U.S. 260 (2016) ............................................. 13

Gade v. National Solid Wastes

Management Assn.,

505 U.S. 88 (1992) ............................................... 14

vi

Green Dev., LLC v. FERC,

77 F.4th 997 (D.C. Cir. 2023) ................................ 9

Hughes v. Talen Energy,

578 U.S. 150 (2016) ....................................... 12, 16

Murphy v. NCAA,

584 U.S. 453 (2018) ....................................... 13, 15

Nevada v. Jackson,

569 U.S. 505 (2013) ............................................... 5

New York v. FERC,

535 U.S. 1 (2002) ..................................... 10, 11, 16

North Dakota v. Heydinger,

825 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2016) ............................. 8, 9

Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.,

575 U.S. 373 (2015) ........................1, 12, 13, 14, 16

Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FERC,

Nos. 24-2527 & 24-3786, 2025 WL

1912363 (9th Cir. July 11, 2025)................. 6, 9, 10

Portland Gen Elec. Co. v. FERC,

854 F.3d 692 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ............................... 9

PPL Energy Plus, LLC v. Solomon,

766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014) ................................... 8

South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth. v.

FERC,

762 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ............................. 5, 9

vii

Transmission Agency of N. Cal. v.

Sierra Pac. Power Co.,

295 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2002) ............................... 10

Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren,

587 U.S. 761 (2019) ............................................. 14

Whitman v. American Trucking Assns.,

Inc.,

531 U.S. 457 (2001) ............................................. 17

Wyeth v. Levine,

555 U.S. 555 (2009) ....................................... 14, 15

Statutes and Regulations

18 C.F.R. §35.35 .......................................................... 2

16 U.S.C. §824 ................................................... 1, 7, 13

16 U.S.C. §824a ..................................................... 2, 15

16 U.S.C. §824s ........................................................... 2

California Public Utilities Code Section

362 .......................................................................... 6

Ohio Rev. Code §4911.15 ............................................ 3

Ohio Rev. Code §4928.02 ...................................... 3, 13

Ohio Rev. Code §4928.12 ...................1, 3, 5, 12, 13, 16

INTRODUCTION

When it comes to electricity regulation, the balance

of power is settled. The Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission gets to regulate interstate electricity

markets. But Congress allowed, and this Court confirmed, that States can regulate intrastate electricity

markets—even if their state-focused regulations incidentally affect interstate markets. See 16 U.S.C.

§824(b); Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 385–

87 (2015) (natural-gas regulation). The Sixth Circuit

maintained this balance. It applied settled law when

it held that the Federal Power Act does not preempt

an Ohio law that requires utilities engaged in retail

electric service to join an organization that will separately and independently manage the transmission of

electricity (the “RTO mandate”). See Ohio Rev. Code

§4928.12(A).

American Electric Power’s and FirstEnergy’s (“the

Utilities”) assertion that the Sixth Circuit disregarded

settled federal-preemption law, and that this case demands the Court’s attention, lacks juice. The Utilities

frame their arguments in favor of certiorari at an exceedingly high level of generality, frequently asserting

general background principles that the Sixth Circuit

did not dispute and no one now contests. A similar

analytical leap undermines the Utilities’ attempts to

generate a circuit split. Their allegations of a split

misread the Sixth Circuit’s decision—as well as the

decisions of the other circuits with which they allege

the Sixth Circuit’s decision conflicts. These flaws may

explain why several respondents who have generally

supported the Utilities’ petitions have not urged the

Court to accept the federal-preemption question that

the Utilities present. See Brief of Respondent Duke

Energy Ohio, Inc. in Support of Certiorari at i; Brief of

2

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. in Support of Certiorari

at i.

Before proceeding, the Public Utilities Commission

of Ohio (“PUCO”) must make two housekeeping

points. First, American Electric Power Services Corporation and affiliated entities (which this brief refers

to as “American Electric Power” or AEP) and FirstEnergy challenge the same Sixth Circuit judgment, but

have filed separate appeals, with separate case numbers. Because the issues that they raise overlap,

PUCO is filing the same brief in both cases. When

citing the Sixth Circuit’s decision, PUCO cites to

American Electric Power’s Petition Appendix. Second, PUCO, in this Brief in Opposition addresses only

one of the Questions Presented in each petition:

whether the Federal Power Act preempts Ohio’s Regional Transmission Organization (“RTO”) mandate.

In the Sixth Circuit, PUCO focused exclusively on that

question. It maintains that narrow focus here.

STATEMENT

I.

The Federal Power Act and Ohio law

establish

independent

requirements

related to RTO membership.

Congress, through the Federal Power Act, directed

the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to establish incentives for electric utilities that join RTOs,

which are organizations that coordinate the transmission of electricity across state lines. 16 U.S.C. §824s;

see §824a. FERC implemented that requirement by

creating an “adder” for utilities that join an RTO. 18

C.F.R. §35.35(e). This RTO adder allows utilities that

voluntarily join an RTO to charge more when transmitting electricity to wholesale purchasers. Id.

3

Ohio, for its part, regulates “competitive retail

electric service” (as opposed to wholesale service).

Ohio Rev. Code §4928.12(A) (emphasis added). It has

adopted its own requirements with respect to RTO

membership. Specifically, to “improve[] service reliability within [the] state,” it requires utilities to join an

RTO or other qualifying transmission entity if they

are engaged in retail electric service in Ohio. See Ohio

Rev. Code §4928.12(B)(4); see also Ohio Rev. Code

§4928.02 (establishing state policies with respect to

competitive retail electric service).

II.

FERC declined to address whether the

Federal Power Act preempts Ohio’s RTO

mandate.

The Ohio Consumers’ Counsel is responsible for

representing the interests of residential consumers of

retail electricity. Ohio Rev. Code §4911.15. To that

end, the Consumers’ Counsel filed a complaint with

FERC, in which it asserted that certain Ohio utilities,

including American Electric Power, FirstEnergy, and

Duke Energy Ohio, were not entitled to receive the

RTO adder. The Consumers’ Counsel asserted that,

because Ohio law required the named utilities to join

a qualified transmission organization, their membership was not voluntary. See AEP Pet.App.17a.

FERC agreed in part with the Consumers’ Counsel. It concluded that American Electric Power was

not entitled to receive the RTO adder.

AEP

Pet.App.18a.

FERC concluded, however, that

FirstEnergy and Duke Energy were entitled to the adder because their rates resulted from settlements that

the two utilities had negotiated. AEP Pet.App. 18a–

19a. As is relevant to the federal-preemption question

that PUCO addresses here, FERC declined to decide

4

whether the Federal Power Act preempts Ohio’s RTO

mandate. See AEP Pet.App.32a–33a.

III.

The Sixth Circuit held that the Federal

Power Act does not preempt Ohio’s RTO

mandate.

The Sixth Circuit, unlike FERC, did address

preemption—and held that the Federal Power Act

does not preempt Ohio law. AEP Pet.App.33a. It held

that Ohio’s RTO mandate did not conflict with federal

law because “[n]o party” disputed that it was possible

to comply “with both Ohio law and the [Federal Power

Act].” AEP Pet.App.35a. It rejected the Utilities’ argument that Congress intended to pursue “the federal

model of voluntary [RTO] membership” at “all costs,”

concluding that Congress instead “may have wanted

to prevent FERC from mandating membership via

rule, not prevent Ohio from doing so.”

AEP

Pet.App.37a (quotation omitted).

The Sixth Circuit rejected the Utilities’ field

preemption argument as well. It noted that the utilities had failed to carry their burden of showing that

Congress occupied the field, in part because “Congress

explicitly preserved state authority over certain transmission-related areas, including intrastate transmission.” AEP Pet.App.39a. Ohio’s RTO mandate, the

Sixth Circuit concluded, was merely an exercise of

that authority because “Ohio law targets intrastate

transmission,” and any effects on interstate electricity

transmission were indirect. AEP Pet.App.40a–41a.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

This case does not possess any of the characteristics that the Court looks for when deciding whether to

grant a petition for a writ of certiorari. The Sixth

5

Circuit’s resolution of the preemption question did not

create a circuit split nor did it disregard this Court’s

federal-preemption jurisprudence. It instead properly

applied the Court’s precedents and correctly concluded that federal law does not preempt Ohio’s RTO

mandate.

I.

There is no circuit conflict about whether

the Federal Power Act preempts state

RTO mandates.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision does not create a circuit split. It is, in fact, consistent with the only other

circuit court decision to have considered the federalpreemption question presented here. To overcome

this, the Utilities take the Sixth Circuit’s decision out

of context and frame decisions of other circuits at a

“high level of generality” in an attempt to manufacture a conflict. Cf. Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505,

512 (2013) (per curiam). That attempt falls short. The

Utilities in many cases cite general factual discussions of energy generation and transmission, rather

than a decision’s relevant legal holding. See, e.g.,

FirstEnergy Pet.21–22 (citing South Carolina Pub.

Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41, 49–50 (D.C. Cir.

2014) for its general discussion of how the electricity

market has changed over time).

A.

The only circuit that has addressed

the preemption question has agreed

that laws like Ohio’s RTO mandate

are not preempted.

Only one circuit other than the Sixth has considered whether the Federal Power Act preempts state

RTO mandates like the one found in Ohio Rev. Code

§4928.12(A). That circuit, the Ninth, agreed that such

mandates are not preempted. It recently held in

6

Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FERC that the Federal

Power Act does not preempt a California statute that,

like Ohio’s RTO mandate, requires membership in an

organization that independently manages the electric

grid. Nos. 24-2527 & 24-3786, 2025 WL 1912363, *2–

3 (9th Cir. July 11, 2025); see also California Public

Utilities Code Section 362(c). As the Sixth Circuit did

here, the Ninth Circuit concluded that neither obstacle nor conflict preemption barred the California law

in question. Id.

Significantly, the Ninth Circuit rejected the broad

application of federal preemption that the Utilities assert here.

Like the Sixth Circuit, see AEP

Pet.App.39a–41a, it noted that the Federal Power Act

leaves certain areas of traditional state authority untouched, including “regulation of intrastate wholesale

markets and retail sales of electricity,” Pacific Gas &

Electric Co., 2025 WL 1912363 at *3. And it concluded

that remains true even when a state regulation, like

an RTO mandate, has “indirect effects” on the interstate electricity market. Id.

B.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision does not

conflict with the cases that the

Utilities cite.

The Utilities’ attempt to manufacture a split with

other circuits proceeds in two steps. They first take

the Sixth Circuit’s decision out of context and imply

that the Sixth Circuit questioned FERC’s exclusive

authority to regulate the interstate electricity market.

See FirstEnergy Pet.21; AEP Pet.16. Having done

that, they then cite cases from other circuits that reaffirm the uncontroversial proposition that FERC

alone is responsible for regulating the interstate

7

market. There is no conflict on that point, however,

because it is not one that the Sixth Circuit rejected.

1. The Utilities assert that “FERC’s jurisdiction

over the interstate transmission of electricity is exclusive.” AEP Pet.16; see FirstEnergy Pet.21. Everyone,

including the Sixth Circuit, agrees. The Sixth Circuit

noted below that FERC has “‘jurisdiction over all facilities for [interstate] transmission or sale of electric

energy [at wholesale].’” AEP Pet.App.38a–39a (quoting 16 U.S.C. §824(b)(1)) (brackets in petition).

The Utilities take the Sixth Circuit’s decision out

of context when they suggest otherwise. American

Electric Power, for example, cites a snippet of the

Sixth Circuit’s decision in which it wrote that the Federal Power Act’s “‘text does not grant FERC exclusive

jurisdiction over interstate transmission facilities.’”

AEP Pet.4 (quoting the Sixth Circuit’s decision) (emphasis added). Read in context, that quoted language

merely says that States are not prevented from adopting regulations aimed at their intrastate electricity

market simply because those regulations might have

an “incidental” and “indirect” effect on interstate

transmission. See Pet.App.39a–41a.

2. None of the alleged conflict cases, from the

Third, Fifth, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits, involved intrastate regulations that had only an incidental or indirect interstate effect. Many cases that the Utilities

cite instead involved state laws that, unlike Ohio’s

RTO mandate, aimed to directly regulate the interstate electricity market, or otherwise intrude on

FERC’s authority.

The Third Circuit rejected, for example, New Jersey’s attempt to interfere with the interstate price for

electricity by providing additional payments to certain

8

electricity generators. See PPL Energy Plus, LLC v.

Solomon, 766 F.3d 241, 253 (3d Cir. 2014). It was this

attempt to directly regulate an area committed to

FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction—interstate electricity

transmission—that the Third Circuit found problematic. See id. at 253. Highlighting the differences between that case and this one, the Third Circuit distinguished New Jersey’s impermissible direct regulation

from other types of regulations that would have been

permissible because they were targeted at intrastate

activities and had only an “incidental effect” on interstate markets. Id. at 254.

The Fifth Circuit decision the Utilities cite also involved a law that directly interfered with FERC’s authority. Texas, in that case, made its own determination about whether a utility complied with a FERC

tariff and adjusted retail rates on the basis that the

utility had violated that tariff. AEP Tex. N. Co. v. Tex.

Indus. Energy Consumers, 473 F.3d 581, 582 (5th Cir.

2006). The Fifth Circuit rejected Texas’s attempt to

step into FERC’s shoes.

The two Eighth Circuit decisions the Utilities cite

also do not conflict with the decision below. One case

did not address federal preemption. Cent. Iowa Power

Coop. v. Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator,

561 F.3d 904, 919–20 (8th Cir. 2009). The other invalidated a Minnesota law that purported to regulate “activity and transactions taking place wholly outside of

Minnesota.” North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d

912, 921 (8th Cir. 2016) (lead op.). But while the members of the Heydinger panel agreed that Minnesota’s

law was invalid, they could not agree on why that was

so. See id. at 919–22 (lead op.) (violation of the

dormant Commerce Clause); id. at 926–27 (Murphy,

J., concurring) (FERC preemption); id. at 928–29

9

(Colloton, J., concurring) (FERC and Clean Air Act

preemption). The members of the panel that would

have found that the Minnesota law intruded on

FERC’s exclusive authority, however, would have

done so because it banned “wholesale sales of electric

energy in interstate commerce.” Id. at 926 (Murphy,

J., concurring); id. at 928 (Colloton, J., concurring).

The three D.C. Circuit decisions that the Utilities

cite across their two separate briefs are even less relevant. Two of them did not involve preemption questions. See Portland Gen Elec. Co. v. FERC, 854 F.3d

692 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Green Dev., LLC v. FERC, 77

F.4th 997 (D.C. Cir. 2023). The third, which only tangentially touched on preemption, recognized that

States retain significant regulatory authority. It

found that FERC had the authority to adopt a challenged rule because the rule did not “interfere with

traditional state authority.” See South Carolina Pub.

Serv. Auth., 762 F.3d at 64. But, even then, the Utilities do not cite that portion of that D.C. Circuit decision. FirstEnergy cites the decision only for its factual

background, not its holding. That background merely

observed that the electricity market has changed over

time as it has become less vertically integrated. See

FirstEnergy Pet.21–22 (citing South Carolina Pub.

Serv. Auth., 762 F.3d at 49–50).

The flaws in the Utilities’ effort to generate a circuit conflict can be seen most clearly when it comes to

the conflict that they allege with respect to the Ninth

Circuit. The only Ninth Circuit decision that directly

addressed the preemption question that is presented

in this case is the one discussed above: Pacific Gas &

Electric Co. And that decision, as already discussed,

does not conflict with the Sixth Circuit’s decision. It

10

confirms it. See above 5–6; see also Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 2025 WL 1912363 at *2–3.

American Electric Power is therefore wrong when

it alleges that there is a conflict between the Sixth and

Ninth Circuits. See AEP Pet.17. In arguing otherwise, it again cites decisions that involved entirely different questions than the preemption question presented here. See Ass’n of Pub. Agency Customers v.

Bonneville Power Admin., 126 F.3d 1158, 1169 (9th

Cir. 1997) (whether the Bonneville Power Administration, a federal agency, had the “statutory authority to

transmit non-federal power”); Transmission Agency of

N. Cal. v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 295 F.3d 918, 928–29

(9th Cir. 2002) (whether the Federal Power Act

preempted state-law claims related to the interstate

transmission of electricity that was explicitly approved of by FERC). It also again frames the relevant

question at an improperly high level of generality, citing the Ninth Circuit decisions for the uncontroversial

background principle that the “‘[i]nterstate transmission [of electricity] is clearly a federal matter.” AEP

Pet.17 (quoting Ass’n of Pub. Agency Customers, 126

F.3d at 1173) (brackets in petition).

II.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision does not

conflict with this Court’s precedent.

The Utilities repeat their mistakes when they assert that the Sixth Circuit’s decision conflicts with this

Court’s precedents. As with their alleged circuit conflict, they frame the relevant issue at an improperly

high level of generality and again attempt to manufacture a conflict out of background discussions rather

than case holdings.

As evidence of a conflict, the Utilities point to this

Court’s statement in New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 7

11

(2002) that when electricity enters the grid it “‘immediately becomes a part of a vast pool of energy that is

constantly moving in interstate commerce.’” See

FirstEnergy Pet.21 (quoting New York); AEP Pet.18

(similar). That may be true scientifically. But the

laws of preemption do not mirror the laws of physics.

The comment that the Utilities quote comes from the

Court’s background discussion of the history and development of the electricity market in the United

States, not its holding. See New York, 535 U.S. at 5–

9. New York’s holding focused on a different question

than the one at issue here: whether FERC had exceeded its authority in regulating certain types of electricity transmission. Unlike this case, it did not “concern the validity of a conflicting state law or regulation.” See id. at 18.

Despite what the Utilities imply, the Court in New

York did not decide whether FERC could assert jurisdiction over all retail transmissions of electricity. The

Court noted that the Act gives States the authority to

regulate retail electricity sales—including retail

transmission—and wrote that any attempt by FERC

to exclusively regulate all retail transmissions would

raise difficult jurisdictional questions. Id. at 27–28.

The Court opted not to answer those questions. See

id. That is, it explicitly did not hold what the Utilities

now suggest that it did.

The other two decisions that the Utilities cite also

do not conflict with the Sixth Circuit’s decision. Federal Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404

U.S. 453 (1972) held only that the evidence presented

in that case was sufficient to establish that electricity

had moved in interstate commerce and that the Federal Power Commission therefore had jurisdiction

over the Florida utility that generated it—even

12

though none of the utility’s equipment directly connected to out-of-state companies. See id. at 456–57.

That decision did not address whether States lose

their ability to regulate intrastate activity simply because that activity has an incidental and indirect effect on interstate electricity transmission.

Hughes v. Talen Energy, 578 U.S. 150 (2016) did

not address that question either. The Court in that

case rejected Maryland’s attempt to “disregard an interstate wholesale rate required by FERC.” Id. at 166.

But even so, the Court’s holding in that case was “limited” to such direct intervention. Id. The Court reaffirmed that States “may regulate within the domain

Congress assigned to them even when their laws incidentally affect areas within FERC’s domain.” Id. at

164.

That is what the Sixth Circuit held here. It held

that the “indirect impacts” of Ohio’s efforts to improve

the reliability of intrastate transmission of electricity

and its efforts to improve reliability, options and competition “‘in the provision of retail electric service’” do

not trigger federal field preemption.

See AEP

Pet.App.40a–41a (second quotation citing Ohio Rev.

Code §4928.12(B)(5)). The Sixth Circuit’s decision

was consistent with the Court’s decision in Hughes,

not in conflict with it. See id. at 42a–43a (distinguishing Hughes).

Finally, it is telling that, despite their allegations

of a conflict with this Court’s decisions, the Utilities

have little to say about the most relevant of the

Court’s federal-preemption precedents: Oneok, Inc. v.

Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373 (2015). The Court in that

case limited the scope of the field preemption in this

area and held that federal law does not preempt state

13

regulation simply because it might have an indirect

effect on interstate activity. Id. at 386–87. The relevant question “in determining whether [a State] law

is pre-empted,” Oneok held, is “the target at which the

state law aims.” Id. at 385 (emphasis in original).

The Utilities, in attempting to distinguish Oneok,

assert that the target of Ohio’s RTO mandate is “the

federal field of interstate transmission.” AEP Pet.23

(citing Oneok, 575 U.S. at 385); FirstEnergy Pet.23

(arguing that Ohio’s RTO mandate “acts directly, not

incidentally” on interstate activity). But that is

wrong. The State’s regulatory target is “retail electric

service.”

See Ohio Rev. Code §4928.02;

§4928.12(B)(5). And that is an area which Congress

explicitly left to the States; the Act “leaves to the

States alone, the regulation of ‘any other sale’—most

notably, any retail sale—of electricity.” FERC v. Elec.

Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 265 (2016) (quoting

16 U.S.C. §824(b)).

III.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision was correct.

The Sixth Circuit correctly concluded that Ohio’s

RTO mandate is not preempted by the Federal Power

Act.

Congress may preempt state action expressly. Or

it may do so implicitly through conflict or field

preemption. See Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453, 477

(2018). The Utilities bore the burden of demonstrating that the Federal Power Act preempts Ohio law.

They failed to carry that burden. The Federal Power

Act does not expressly preempt state laws like Ohio’s

RTO mandate. And, for reasons discussed next, neither conflict preemption nor field preemption applies

here. So the Sixth Circuit correctly held that the Utilities failed to carry their burden here. See AEP

14

Pet.App.38a (citing Brown v. Earthboard Sports USA,

Inc., 481 F.3d 901, 912–13 (6th Cir. 2007)).

Conflict preemption. Conflict preemption exists

where “compliance with both state and federal law is

impossible, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full

purposes and objectives of Congress.” Oneok, 575 U.S.

at 377 (quotation omitted). Here, the former is easily

dispatched: no party disputed that it is possible to

comply with both Ohio’s RTO mandate and the Federal Power Act, and the Court below was correct to

note as much. AEP Pet.App.35a.

The latter is harder. This Court has set “a high

threshold” to establish that “a state law is to be preempted for conflicting with the purposes of a federal

Act.” Chamber of Commerce of the United States v.

Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 607 (2011) (plurality op.) (quoting Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn.,

505 U.S. 88, 110 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in

part and concurring in judgment)); cf. Wyeth v. Levine,

555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in

the judgment) (expressing skepticism of the Court’s

“purposes and objectives pre-emption jurisprudence”).

That makes sense. “Invoking some brooding federal

interest or appealing to a judicial policy preference

should never be enough to win preemption of a state

law.” Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 587 U.S. 761, 767

(2019) (lead op.). If it were, courts could “wind up displacing perfectly legitimate state laws on the strength

of ‘purposes’ that only [they] can see” and that “lack

the democratic provenance the Constitution demands

before a federal law may be declared supreme.” Id. at

778 (lead op.).

15

Apply those principles to the Federal Power Act.

Although the Act gives FERC the authority to encourage voluntary RTO membership, it says nothing about

what the States may, or more relevant, may not do.

See 16 U.S.C. §824a(a). So the Sixth Circuit was correct to refuse the Utilities’ invitation to divine from

that statute a federal objective to pursue voluntary

RTO membership “‘at all costs.’” AEP Pet.App.37a

(quoting Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 601 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)). That argument, the court below noted, would require the type of “‘freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension

with federal objectives’” that this Court has rejected.

Id. at 36a. (quoting Whiting, 563 U.S. at 607 (plurality op.)); see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 587 (Thomas, J.,

concurring in the judgment).

Field preemption. The Sixth Circuit correctly rejected the Utilities’ field preemption argument as

well. “Field preemption occurs when federal law occupies a ‘field’ of regulation ‘so comprehensively that it

has left no room for supplementary state legislation.’”

Murphy, 584 U.S. at 479 (quotation omitted). The

Federal Power Act does not. It does the opposite. As

the Sixth Circuit noted, rather than clear the field,

Congress explicitly reserved State authority in a variety of areas including “intrastate transmission.” See

AEP Pet.App.39a (emphasis added).

The division of authority between the States and

FERC is not always a clean one. “[W]hat states do in

the exercise of their powers affects interstate sales,

just as what the FERC does in the exercise of its powers affects the need for and economic feasibility of

plants over which the states possess authority.” Elec.

Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518, 523 (7th Cir.

2018). Recognizing that “each use of authorized power

16

necessarily affects tasks that have been assigned elsewhere,” id., the Court has held that States “may regulate within the domain Congress assigned to them

even when their laws incidentally affect areas within

FERC’s domain,” Hughes, 578 U.S. at 164 (citing

Oneok, 575 U.S. at 385).

That is what the Sixth Circuit held here. It noted

that Ohio’s RTO mandate fits within the Federal

Power Act’s regulatory scheme because “Ohio’s law …

primarily regulates intrastate transmission.” AEP

Pet.App.40a. It further noted that Ohio’s laws focus

on intrastate facilities and effects, including “‘the provision of retail electric service.’” AEP Pet.App.41a

(quoting Ohio Rev. Code §4928.12(B)(5)). Applying

this Court’s precedent, the Sixth Circuit concluded

that the Federal Power Act does not preempt Ohio’s

RTO mandate because it is targeted at intrastate activity and has only incidental effects on the interstate

transmission of electricity. AEP Pet.App.40a–41a

(applying Oneok, 575 U.S. at 385).

It is in fact the Utilities, not the Sixth Circuit, that

would depart from the Court’s precedent and rewrite

the balance of power that the Federal Power Act

strikes. They would have the Court hold that States

that are connected to an electric grid that crosses their

borders have no authority to regulate even intrastate

retail transmission of electricity. See FirstEnergy

Pet.21–22; AEP Pet.20. But, as the Utilities note, see

id., “[i]t is only in Hawaii and Alaska and on the

‘Texas Interconnect’ … that electricity is distributed

entirely within a single State.” New York, 535 U.S. at

7. If the Utilities are correct, then the Federal Power

Act would preempt state regulation in nearly every

state in the country. Interpreting statutory language

that was intended to preserve state power as leaving

17

all but three states powerless, would squeeze the largest elephant in the smallest mousehole. See Whitman

v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468

(2001).

CONCLUSION

The Court should deny the petition for a writ of

certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVE YOST

Ohio Attorney General

MATHURA J. SRIDHARAN *

Ohio Solicitor General

*Counsel of Record

SAMUEL C. PETERSON

Deputy Solicitor General

30 E. Broad St., 17th Floor

Columbus, Ohio 43215

614.466.8980

Mathura.Sridharan@OhioAGO.gov

Counsel for Respondent

Public Utilities Commission

of Ohio

SEPTEMBER 2025

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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