Reply Brief — Ohio, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

No. 24-13

In the Supreme Court of the United States

______________________________

STATE OF OHIO, ET AL.

v.

Petitioners,

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,

Respondents.

______________________________

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

______________________________

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT

OF CERTIORARI

______________________________

DAVE YOST

Ohio Attorney General

T. ELLIOT GAISER*

Ohio Solicitor General

*Counsel of Record

MICHAEL J. HENDERSHOT

Chief Deputy Solicitor General

30 E. Broad St., 17th Floor

Columbus, Ohio 43215

614-466-8980

thomas.gaiser@ohioago.gov

Counsel for Petitioner

State of Ohio

(additional counsel listed at the end)

QUESTION PRESENTED

Over a century ago, this Court remarked that “the

whole Federal system is based upon the fundamental

principle of the equality of the states under the Constitution.” Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83, 89 (1900).

It continued: “The idea that one state is debarred,

while the others are granted, the privilege of amending their organic laws to conform to the wishes of their

inhabitants, is so repugnant to the theory of their

equality under the Constitution that it cannot be entertained even if Congress had power to make such

discrimination.” Id. Are those words just a fin de siècle sentiment, or do they endure today?

The Question Presented is: May Congress pass a

law under the Commerce Clause that empowers one

State to exercise sovereign power that the law denies

to all other States?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................... i

TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... iii

REPLY ......................................................................... 1

I.

The EPA’s merits arguments are wrong

about Ohio’s equal sovereignty, but

reinforce why this case is certworthy

anyway. .......................................................... 3

II.

The EPA gestures at vehicle issues, but

Ohio already largely answered them in its

opening brief. ................................................. 8

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 12

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

City of Rome v. United States,

446 U.S. 156 (1980) ............................................... 6

Coyle v. Smith,

221 U.S. 559 (1911) ............................................... 7

Currin v. Wallace,

306 U.S. 1 (1939) ................................................... 6

Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury,

489 U.S. 803 (1989) ............................................. 10

EEOC v. Wyoming,

460 U.S. 226 (1983) ............................................... 6

Egbert v. Boule,

596 U.S. 482 (2022) ............................................... 9

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,

427 U.S. 445 (1976) ............................................... 3

Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt,

587 U.S. 230 (2019) ......................................... 9, 11

Haaland v. Brackeen,

599 U.S. 255 (2023) ............................................... 4

McGirt v. Oklahoma,

591 U.S. 894 (2020) ............................................... 5

McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic

Beverages & Tobacco, Dep’t of Bus.

Regulation of Fla.,

496 U.S. 18 (1990) ............................................... 10

iv

Moody v. NetChoice, LLC,

144 S. Ct. 2383 (2024) ........................................... 9

Moore v. Harper,

600 U.S. 1 (2023) ................................................... 5

Myers v. United States,

272 U.S. 52 (1926) ................................................. 5

N.J. Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Ass’n v.

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,

584 U.S. 453 (2018) ............................................... 1

Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. Ross,

598 U.S. 356 (2023) ............................................... 1

Nevada v. Watkins,

914 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1990) ............................... 7

Printz v. United States,

521 U.S. 898 (1997) ............................................... 4

Sec’y of Ag. v. Cent. Roig Refining Co.,

338 U.S. 604 (1950) ............................................... 6

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,

517 U.S. 44 (1996) ................................................. 6

Sessions v. Morales-Santana,

582 U.S. 47 (2017) ............................................... 11

Shelby County v. Holder,

570 U.S. 529 (2013) ....................................... 6, 7, 8

Stanton v. Stanton,

421 U.S. 7 (1975) ................................................. 11

v

Torres v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety,

597 U.S. 580 (2022) ............................................... 3

Trump v. Anderson,

601 U.S. 100 (2024) ........................................... 3, 6

Yee v. City of Escondido, Cal.,

503 U.S. 519 (1992) ............................................... 9

Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. art. I, §10 ................................................. 3

U.S. Const. art. IV, §3................................................. 7

U.S. Const., pream. ..................................................... 5

88 Fed Reg. 20,688 (Apr. 6, 2023) .............................. 2

89 Fed. Reg. 57,151 (July 12, 2024) ........................... 2

5 U.S.C. §706 ............................................................. 10

Fed. R. Ev. 804 .......................................................... 10

Other Authorities

Act of Aug. 11, 1970, 1 Stat. 184 ................................ 4

Act of Feb. 19, 1791, 1 Stat. 190................................. 4

Act of March 8, 1806, 2 Stat. 354 ............................... 4

Act of April 14, 1802, 2 Stat. 152 ............................... 4

Articles of Confederation, art. II ................................ 5

Articles of Confederation, art. IV ............................... 5

vi

Articles of Confederation, art. XI ............................... 5

Articles of Confederation, art. XIII ............................ 5

Comment of Nebraska, et al., No. EPAHQ-OAR-2023-0589-0001 (Sept. 16,

20204)..................................................................... 2

Order 1208581944, Iowa v. EPA, No. 231144 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 23, 2023) ............................... 2

REPLY

The plan of the constitutional convention reinforces accountability to the people at every turn,

whether through the horizontal separation of powers

within the federal government, or the vertical division

of authority among it and the States. But what happens when Congress thwarts such accountability by

exempting one state—California—from its rules? California state officials, who answer only to California

voters, end up wielding their bespoke power to impose

environmental and transportation “policy preferences” on other states, Nat’l Pork Producers Council v.

Ross, 598 U.S. 356, 406 (2023) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), all while externalizing the costs of those preferences at thermostats and car dealerships across the country. When

voters want to grade these policies, they should “know

who to credit or blame.” N.J. Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Ass’n v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 584 U.S.

453, 473 (2018). Yet, the people of those other states

cannot use their ballot box to change the policies that

California adopts. For people outside California, their

only remedy is to challenge the EPA’s waiver applying

an unconstitutional statute so that this Court may restore the equal sovereignty—and the lines of accountability it provides—that are intrinsic to the Constitution.

Rather than seriously dispute that this Question

Presented is weighty and worthy of this Court’s review, the EPA’s opposition front-loads a merits argument and then spends two pages on supposed vehicle

issues that Ohio largely addressed ahead of time.

The States’ status either as equal sovereigns, as

Ohio and 16 other States say—or as functional

2

instrumentalities of the federal government, as the

EPA says—is a question of exceptional importance.

Look no further than the litigation trailing this case

over other EPA actions that many States challenge as

violating the equal-sovereignty doctrine. One rule

would empower California to nearly eliminate the sale

of heavy-duty trucks with internal-combustion engines. California State Motor Vehicle and Engine Pollution Control Standards; Heavy-Duty Vehicle and

Engine Emission Warranty and Maintenance Provisions; Advanced Clean Trucks; Zero Emission Airport

Shuttle; Zero-Emission Power Train Certification;

Waiver of Preemption; Notice of Decision, 88 Fed. Reg.

20,688 (Apr. 6, 2023). Eighteen States challenged

that rule in the D.C. Circuit, but that challenge is currently in abeyance. See Order 1208581944 in Iowa v.

EPA, No. 23-1144 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 2023). Another

rule involves a package of California regulations related to truck fleets. See California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Advanced Clean

Fleets Regulation; Request for Waiver of Preemption

and Authorization, 89 Fed. Reg. 57,151 (July 12,

2024). Again, two dozen States objected to a proposal

to give California a sovereign power denied to the

other 49 States. See Comment of Nebraska, et al., No.

EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0589-0001 (Sept. 16, 2024).

Those challenges show that the issue warrants this

Court’s attention now. Nearly a third of States believe

the EPA is consistently violating their equal sovereignty by applying a law that Congress had no power

to enact. And if Ohio and the other States are right,

then every day that they are denied their rightful status both irreparably injures them and thwarts accountability for the environmental policies that affect

3

their citizens. This Court should grant certiorari and

reverse.

I.

The EPA’s merits arguments are wrong

about Ohio’s equal sovereignty, but

reinforce why this case is certworthy

anyway.

The EPA opens its merits-forward opposition by

highlighting parts of the Constitution that mandate

equality among the States in specific areas. EPA

Br.11–12; St. Resp. Br.27. Ohio flagged and distinguished these provisions in is petition. Pet. 20–21. As

Ohio explained, these parts of the Constitution enforce a greater equality mandate than the background

equality that undergirds the entire relationship between the States and the federal government.

True, some parts of the Constitution authorize

Congress to treat the States unequally. EPA Br.12

(citing clauses in art. I, §10). But the permission these

clauses give Congress to treat the States unequally

does not dent the deep structural equality of the

States outside those limited spheres. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Torres v. Texas

Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 597 U.S. 580, 594 (2022). At

most, any permission given Congress to treat States

unequally in Article I, §10 is an exception that proves

the general rule—Congress has no roving power to enhance one State’s sovereign power over all the others.

In the Constitution, State uniformity is the norm, and

State dis-uniformity the exception. Cf. Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. 100, 112 (2024); id. at 121 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).

Turning to history, the EPA draws the wrong lesson from four early statutes. EPA Br.13. Those statutes are not—as the EPA would have it—evidence

4

that Congress has conferred unequal sovereignty from

the start. Rather, these statutes align with Ohio’s theory that the Constitution generally requires Congress

to treat the States as equal sovereigns.

The first two statutes did no more than allow certain States to impose tonnage duties. See Act of Aug.

11, 1790, 1 Stat. 184–85; Act of Feb. 19, 1791, 1 Stat.

190. As just discussed, the Constitution explicitly allows Congress to authorize the States to impose tonnage duties without authorizing the States to do so

equally. The statutes are therefore no evidence that

the Constitution erases the States’ equal sovereignty

generally.

A third statute the EPA highlights authorized

courts in only some States to hear certain revenue offenses. See Act of March 8, 1806, 2 Stat. 354–55. That

statute holds no lesson for the States’ equal sovereignty either. The Constitution restricts Congress’s

power as to state legislators and executives in a way

it does not restrict Congress’s power as to state judges.

See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997).

The Constitution, that is, prevents Congress from

“harness[ing] a State’s legislative or executive authority,” Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255, 281 (2023),

but not its judicial authority. What is more, opening

some state courts to hear federal actions is not analogous to enabling a single state to legislate in a field

closed to all other States.

The EPA’s final historical example betrays no evidence of unequal treatment of the States’ sovereignty.

The 1802 law the EPA cites authorized Virginia to improve navigation of the Appomattox River. Act of

April 14, 1802, 2 Stat. 152. The six-line act involves

no sovereign power. The act did not authorize

5

Virginia to regulate navigation while disbarring sister

States from doing the same. Instead, the act granted

Virginia permission to make improvements in a federal easement. The act bears no semblance to the law

that gives California alone the power to regulate the

auto industry. Nor does the short 1802 statute suggest that any other State would be denied similar permission should it desire it.

The EPA also cites some modern statutes, but

these are not the kind of early “legislative exposition[s] of the Constitution,” Myers v. United States,

272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926), that might shed light on original meaning. EPA Br.13–14. Some, maybe even all,

of these laws are inconsistent with the States’ equal

sovereignty. But “the magnitude of a legal wrong is

no reason to perpetuate it.” McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591

U.S. 894, 934 (2020). If these laws raise equal-sovereignty issues, they are all the more reason to grant

certiorari.

In contrast to these few statutes, Ohio’s petition

laid out some of the history that supports the Constitution’s equal-sovereignty feature. Pet.12–14. And

while there is more, the depth of the historical record

is not a debate that matters for evaluating certiorari.

But here is one more bit of historical background.

“[T]he Framers did not write” the Constitution “on a

blank slate—they instead borrowed from the Articles

of Confederation.” Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 33

(2023). The Article of Confederation declared that

each State retained “its sovereignty.” Articles of Confederation, art. II. It then described the combination

of these sovereign entities as a “union.” Id. at arts. IV,

XI, XIII. The Constitution picks up the same “union”

language. U.S. Const., pream.; id. at art. IV, §3. The

6

Constitution’s “union” is a union of equally sovereign

States.

When the EPA turns to precedent, it either cites

cases that did not involve disparate treatment of

States or draws the wrong lesson from the caselaw.

Some of the cases the EPA cites make the uncontroversial point (at the time) that the Commerce Clause

“has no equal protection clause,” Currin v. Wallace,

306 U.S. 1, 14 (1939), or any requirement of “geographic uniformity” of result, Sec’y of Ag. v. Cent. Roig

Refining Co., 338 U.S. 604, 616 (1950). Ohio has never

claimed otherwise. Throughout this litigation, Ohio

has distinguished between permissible disparate results and impermissible disparate treatment. See

Pet.28–29.

Now consider Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S.

529 (2013). The EPA, like the D.C. Circuit, see Pet.

App.43a–44a, makes the surprising claim that Congress has more power to treat the States unequally

under the Commerce Clause as compared to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. EPA Br.17–18;

St. Resp. Br.29–30. That claim is hard to square with

this Court’s repeated holdings that “principles of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the

power to enforce the Civil War Amendments ‘by appropriate legislation.’” City of Rome v. United States,

446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980); see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.

Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65–66 (1996); EEOC v. Wyoming,

460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983). As the Court said recently, these amendments “grant[] new power to Congress.” Trump, 601 U.S. at 112. If anything, the

EPA’s doubling down on this point is a strong reason

for the Court to grant review.

7

Finally, the EPA concludes the merits part of its

brief by reading one of this Court’s seminal equal-footing cases contrary to how this Court reads that decision. According to the EPA, Coyle observes that Congress can treat different States differently when “regulating commerce among the States in the normal

course.” EPA Br.18 (quotation marks omitted) (citing

Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)); St. Resp. Br.29.

Coyle says nothing of the sort. Its holding, of course,

rejected Congress’s attempt to treat Oklahoma worse

than the 45 States that preceded it. This Court later

cited Coyle in the same paragraph reiterating that

“the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessing” post-admission

“disparate treatment of States.” Shelby Cnty., 570

U.S. at 544. And Coyle’s commentary about hypothetical laws passed when admitting a new State describes nothing more than the Commerce Clause’s accepted “sphere” and the uncontroversial congressional

power to regulate “public lands” (i.e. federal property)

even if that regulation has disparate consequences in

different States. Coyle, 221 U.S. at 574, see Const. art.

IV, §3; Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1555 (9th

Cir. 1990).

EPA is also rightly spooked by Ohio’s as-applied

challenge. EPA Br.10 (calling the argument “forfeited”). As Ohio has consistently argued, even if Congress could authorize a single State to regulate a matter of unique concern to that State, the waiver at issue

here exceeds any plausible limits on this principle.

Pet. 31-32. The waiver reinstatement is not “sufficiently related to the problem that it targets” because

no California-specific concerns can plausibly justify

allowing California alone among the 50 States to

8

broadly fight global climate change. Shelby Cnty., 570

U.S. at 542 (quotation omitted).

In short, the EPA is incorrect that Congress may

select California alone to retain its sovereign powers

over important environmental policy choices, but the

fact that the EPA devotes the bulk of its opposition to

certiorari to the merits only proves the weightiness of

the Question Presented.

II.

The EPA gestures at vehicle issues, but

Ohio already largely answered them in its

opening brief.

The EPA devotes scant attention to vehicle issues,

preferring to join Ohio on the merits of the Question

Presented, and in so doing, showing the merits are

worthy of this Court’s attention. Even so, the concerns

the EPA raises take no shine off the reasons to grant

review.

The EPA reiterates that the decision below creates

no split—a fact Ohio noted in its petition. EPA Br.19;

Pet.34. But the EPA makes no effort to engage Ohio’s

argument that, because the D.C. Circuit is likely the

only court that will confront the Question Presented

as applied to the Clean Air Act, the Court should grant

review now. Pet.34. In fact, the two equal-sovereignty

challenges to more-recent approvals of California

rules that post-date this one are either in or headed to

the D.C. Circuit.

The EPA similarly fails to engage Ohio’s point

about the D.C. Circuit’s hyper-aggressive view of forfeiture. EPA Br.19. The EPA retreads what the D.C.

Circuit said. But as Ohio explained in the Petition,

the D.C. Circuit’s forfeiture analysis veers quite wide

of this Court’s holdings in that area. The rule is that

9

a petitioner can bring “any argument they like[] in

support of” a consistent claim. Yee v. City of Escondido, Cal., 503 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1992); see also Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 497 n.3 (2022). To illustrate, only a few terms ago, this Court “reject[ed]” a

claimed forfeiture even though the petitioner “initially” pegged its constitutional argument to a different clause in the Constitution and switched clauses

later on. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 587 U.S.

230, 235 n.1 (2019). Applying that lesson here, it is no

knock on Ohio’s efforts to vindicate its equal sovereignty that it has refined its arguments as the case

progressed. Any sharpening of that argument has always advanced the same claim: Congress’s choice in

the Clean Air Act to confer greater sovereignty on California than all the other States violates the foundational principle that the States are equal sovereigns.

And that sharpening makes sense because facial and

as-applied challenges are joined at the hip. As the

Court recently reiterated, a court evaluating a facial

challenge must “decide which of the laws’ applications

violate” the Constitution and then “measure” those

against the laws’ other “applications.” Moody v.

NetChoice, LLC, 144 S. Ct. 2383, 2398 (2024).

State Respondents push a slightly varied form of

this argument, but it falls short as well. St. Resp.

Br.32. As those States see things, Ohio and its sister

States originally brought a facial challenge to the statute and now add an as-applied challenge to the particular federal regulation authorizing a California rule.

But this case has always been an APA challenge to

specific agency action. It is not a facial or as-applied

challenge to a statute. From the start, this case has

challenged the EPA’s agency action permitting California to regulate as no other State can. In service of

10

that challenge, Ohio has advanced both broader and

narrower arguments about why that agency action violated the APA. 5 U.S.C. §§706(A), (B). None of those

theories are forfeited.

The EPA makes two new points in the Opposition’s

last two paragraphs, but neither forecasts any headwind for review.

The EPA seems to fault Ohio for bringing this challenge because any success will not enhance Ohio’s own

sovereign power, but only bring California back in line

with the other 49 States. EPA Br.20. Ohio believes

that the Clean Air Act’s favoring California lets California enforce its voters’ preferences about balancing

environmental and economic values—not Ohioan’s.

Ohio believes that its citizens’ interests are at stake in

Congress’s illegal act, even if Ohio as a sovereign actor

will not gain legislative power by winning this lawsuit. So Ohio believes it has quite concrete interests

in winning back its sovereign equality. But if the

EPA’s judgment about Ohio’s best interest is relevant

at all, it enhances Ohio’s sincerity here and favors

granting review. Cf. Fed. R. Ev. 804(b)(3).

Finally, the EPA floats—but does not develop—the

idea that Ohio and the other 16 States may lack standing under the “novel” view that returning the states to

equal sovereign status does not satisfy Article III jurisdiction. EPA Br.20; St. Resp. Br.31. Ohio’s position

that equal treatment is its own reward draws on this

Court’s consistent holdings in cases where the remedy

demands equality, but that remedy can follow from

curing up or curing down. See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v.

Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Dep’t of Bus.

Regulation of Fla., 496 U.S. 18, 51 (1990) (dormant

Commerce Clause); Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury,

11

489 U.S. 803, 817 (1989) (intergovernmental tax immunity); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17–18 (1975)

(Equal Protection Clause). In such cases, a challenger

has standing even if the only relief is vindicating the

promise of equal treatment. See, e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 582 U.S. 47, 76 (2017). If the States

enjoy “equal dignity,” Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 587

U.S. at 245, in our federalist Republic, vindicating

that dignity and restoring the long-established lines

of political accountability satisfies Article III.

*

*

*

Seventeen States and a major industry seek review

of agency action that lets California regulate the environment in a way prohibited to all other States. More

EPA rules resting on the same unconstitutional statute follow on its heels, further depriving the States the

equal sovereignty guaranteed them by the Constitution. The time and place to address the States’ equal

sovereignty is here and now.

12

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant the petition for certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVE YOST

Ohio Attorney General

T. ELLIOT GAISER*

Ohio Solicitor General

*Counsel of Record

MICHAEL J. HENDERSHOT

Chief Deputy Solicitor General

30 E. Broad St., 17th Floor

Columbus, Ohio 43215

614-466-8980

thomas.gaiser@ohioago.gov

Counsel for Petitioner

State of Ohio

SEPTEMBER 2024

13

Additional Counsel

STEVE MARSHALL

Attorney General of Alabama

EDMUND G. LACOUR JR.

Solicitor General

Office of the Attorney General

State of Alabama

501 Washington Avenue

P.O. Box 300152

Montgomery, Alabama 36130-0152

334-242-7300

Edmund.LaCour@AlabamaAG.gov

Counsel for State of Alabama

TIM GRIFFIN

Attorney General of Arkansas

NICHOLAS J. BRONNI

Solicitor General

Arkansas Attorney General’s Office

323 Center Street, Suite 200

Little Rock, Arkansas 72201

501-682-2007

Nicholas.Bronni@arkansasag.gov

Counsel for the State of Arkansas

14

CHRISTOPHER M. CARR

Attorney General of Georgia

STEPHEN J. PETRANY

Solicitor General

Georgia Department of Law

40 Capitol Square, SW

Atlanta, Georgia 30334

404-458-3408

spetrany@law.ga.gov

Counsel for State of Georgia

THEODORE E. ROKITA

Attorney General of Indiana

JAMES A. BARTA

Solicitor General

Office of the Indiana Attorney General

IGC-South, Fifth Floor

302 West Washington Street

Indianapolis, IN 46204-2770

317-232-0607

James.Barta@atg.in.gov

Counsel for State of Indiana

15

KRIS KOBACH

Attorney General of Kansas

ANTHONY J. POWELL

Solicitor General

120 S.W. 10th Avenue, 3rd Floor

Topeka, KS 66612

785-368-8435

Anthony.Powell@ag.ks.gov

Counsel for State of Kansas

RUSSELL COLEMAN

Attorney General of Kentucky

MATTHEW F. KUHN

Solicitor General

Office of Kentucky Attorney General

700 Capital Avenue, Suite 118

Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

502-696-5400

Matt.Kuhn@ky.gov

Counsel for State of Kentucky

16

ELIZABETH B. MURRILL

Attorney General of Louisiana

BENJAMIN AGUIÑAGA

Solicitor General

Louisiana Department of Justice

1885 N. Third Street

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804

225-326-6766

AguinagaJ@ag.louisiana.gov

Counsel for State of Louisiana

LYNN FITCH

Attorney General of Mississippi

JUSTIN L. MATHENY

Deputy Solicitor General

Office of the Attorney General

P.O. Box 220

Jackson, MS 39205-0220

601-359-3680

justin.matheny@ago.ms.gov

Counsel for State of Mississippi

17

ANDREW BAILEY

Attorney General of Missouri

JOSHUA DIVINE

Solicitor General

Supreme Court Building

P.O. Box 899

Jefferson City, Missouri 65102

573-751-8870

Josh.Divine@ago.mo.gov

Counsel for State of Missouri

AUSTIN KNUDSEN

Attorney General of Montana

CHRISTIAN B. CORRIGAN

Solicitor General

PETER M. TORSTENSEN, JR.

Deputy Solicitor General

Montana Department of Justice

215 N. Sanders St

Helena, MT 59601

406-444-2707

christian.corrigan@mt.gov

peter.torstensen@mt.gov

Counsel for State of Montana

18

MICHAEL T. HILGERS

Attorney General of Nebraska

ERIC HAMILTON

Solicitor General

Office of the Nebraska Attorney General

2115 State Capitol

Lincoln, NE 68509

402-471-2682

eric.hamilton@nebraska.gov

Counsel for State of Nebraska

GENTNER DRUMMOND

Attorney General of Oklahoma

GARRY M. GASKINS, II

Solicitor General

Office of the Oklahoma Attorney General

313 NE 21st Street

Oklahoma City, OK 73105

405-521-3921

garry.gaskins@oag.ok.gov

Counsel for State of Oklahoma

19

ALAN WILSON

Attorney General of South Carolina

JAMES EMORY SMITH

Deputy Solicitor General

South Carolina Attorney General’s Office

P.O. Box 11549

Columbia, SC 29211

803-734-3680

esmith@scag.gov

Counsel for State of South Carolina

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

BRENT WEBSTER

First Assistant Attorney General

AARON NIELSON

Solicitor General

Office of the Attorney General

P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059)

Austin, Texas 78711-2548

512-936-1700

Aaron.Nielson@oag.texas.gov

Counsel for State of Texas

20

SEAN D. REYES

Attorney General of Utah

STANFORD PURSER

Utah Solicitor General

160 East 300 South, 5th Floor

Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

801-366-0260

Spurser@agutah.gov

Counsel for State of Utah

PATRICK MORRISEY

Attorney General of West Virginia

MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS

Solicitor General

Office of the West Virginia Attorney General

State Capitol Complex

Building 1, Room E-26

Charleston, WV 25305

304-558-2021

mwilliams@wvago.gov

Counsel for State of West Virginia