Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jo-Ann Connelly, Petitioner v. Connecticut, ex rel. Jeremiah Dunn, Chief State Animal Control Officer

No. ______

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

JO-ANN CONNELLY,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT EX REL. JEREMIAH DUNN,

CHIEF STATE ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICER,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

APPELLATE COURT OF CONNECTICUT

_____________________________

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_______________________________

Earl N. “Trey” Mayfield, III

Counsel of Record

CHALMERS ADAMS BACKER & KAUFMAN, LLC

10521 Judicial Drive, Suite 200

Fairfax, Virginia 22030

(703) 268-5600

tmayfield@chalmersadams.com

Counsel for Petitioner

GibsonMoore Appellate Services, LLC

206 East Cary Street♦ Richmond, VA 23219

804-249-7770 ♦

www.gibsonmoore.net

ia

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix

Page:

Opinion

Connecticut Appellate Court

filed October 8, 2024........................................ 1a

Order on Petition for

Certification to Appeal

Supreme Court State of Connecticut

filed December 17, 2024 ................................ 63a

Memorandum of Decision

Superior Court

Judicial District of

Hartford at Hartford

filed December 13, 2022 ................................ 64a

Order

Superior Court

Judicial District of

Hartford at Hartford

filed October 18, 2022 ................................... 71a

Order

Superior Court

Judicial District of

Hartford at Hartford

filed October 6, 2022...................................... 72a

U.S. Const. amend. IV......................................... 73a

C.G.S.A. § 22-329a ................................................ 74a

1a

[FILED OCTOBER 8, 2024]

Connecticut Appellate Court

STATE OF CONNECTICUT EX REL. JEREMIAH

DUNN, CHIEF STATE ANIMAL CONTROL

OFFICER v. JOANN CONNELLY ET AL.

(AC 46113)

Eigo, Seeley and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant C appealed from the judgment of the

trial court vesting in the plaintiff ownership of certain

animals the court found to be neglected after they

were seized subsequent to a warrantless search of C's

property, where she operated an animal rescue. C

claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly denied

her motion in limine, which sought to exclude all

evidence seized following the search on the basis of its

determination that the exclusionary rule did not

apply to animal welfare proceedings brought

pursuant to statute (§ 22-329a). Held:

This court concluded, under the balancing test set

forth in United States v. Janis (428 U.S. 433), that the

trial court's ruling denying C's motion in limine was

legally and logically correct, that court having

correctly determined that the exclusionary rule was

inapplicable in civil proceedings, as the minimal

deterrent effect of employing the rule in the

circumstances at issue was substantially outweighed

by the societal interest in presenting reliable evidence

of animal neglect in actions under § 22-329a to protect

the health and safety of animals.

C waived her claim that she was entitled to a jury

trial under article first, § 19, of the state constitution,

as she never requested a jury trial and made no

2a

objection prior to the start of the proceedings, in

which she actively participated.

Argued May 23---officially released October 8, 2024

Procedural History

Verified petition seeking, inter alia, custody in

favor of the plaintiff of certain animals in the named

defendant's possession that allegedly were neglected

or cruelly treated, and for other relief, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford,

where the court, Budzik, J., issued an order vesting

temporary custody of the animals with the plaintiff;

thereafter, the court granted the named defendant's

motion to reargue; subsequently, the court, issued an

order vesting temporary custody of the animals with

the plaintiff; thereafter, the court denied the named

defendant's motion to exclude certain evidence;

subsequently, the case was tried to the court, Budzik,

J.; judgment vesting permanent ownership of the

animals with the plaintiff, from which the named

defendant appealed to this court. Affinned.

Trey Mayfield, pro hac vice, with whom, on the

brief, was John J. Radshaw III, for the appellant

(named defendant).

Daniel M. Salton, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney

general, and Katherine A. Roseman, assistant

attorney general, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

SEELEY, J. The defendant Joann Connelly 1

appeals from the judgment of the trial court vesting

CT Pregnant Dog and Cat Rescue, Inc. (rescue), an animal

rescue operated by Connelly, also was named as a defendant in

1

3a

permanent custody with the Department of

Agriculture (department) of certain animals owned by

the defendant, which included thirty-three dogs,

twenty-eight cats, five ducks, three goats, one

parakeet, and one pony. On appeal, the defendant

claims that (1) the court improperly denied her

motion in limine, which sought to exclude any

evidence seized following a warrantless search of her

property, on the basis of its determination that the

exclusionary rule does not apply to civil proceedings,

and (2) the animal welfare statute, General Statutes

(Supp. 2022) § 22-329a 2 (g) and (h), violates her right

to a civil jury trial under article first, § 19, of the

Connecticut constitution. We disagree and affirm the

judgment of the court.

The following facts and procedural history are

relevant to this appeal. The defendant is the owner of

property located at 171 Porter Road in Hebron, at

which she operates CT Pregnant Dog and Cat Rescue,

Inc. (rescue). The rescue is wholly owned by the

defendant and is a licensed animal importer

registered with the state pursuant to General

Statutes § 22-344 (e). The property serves as the

defendant's primary residential and business

address, and consists of 5.57 acres, including a twostory residential home, a barn or stable outbuilding,

and several sheds. The defendant uses the house,

this matter. Because an appearance by counsel was not filed on

behalf of the rescue by the deadline set by this court, the appeal

was dismissed as to the rescue. In this opinion, our references to

the defendant are to Connelly.

2 All references in this opinion to § 22-329a are to the version of

the statute codified in the 2022 supplement to the General

Statutes unless otherwise indicated.

4a

barn and surrounding land to house and care for

animals.

On March 23, 2022, Tanya Wescovich, an animal

control officer with the plaintiff, the state of

Connecticut, visited the property with an employee of

the Department of Children and Families, 3 which had

received a report that the defendant was abandoning

the property and the animals being kept there. On the

basis of Wescovich's observations during that visit,

the next day, March 24, 2022, Wescovich, along with

William A. Bell, the animal control officer for the town

of Hebron, applied for a search and seizure warrant

for the defendant's property in Hebron. The warrant

application was granted by the Superior Court that

same day. 4 On March 25, 2022, Wescovich, along

with members of the Connecticut State Police, animal

control officers from the department and nearby

towns, and officials from the Chatham Health

District, 5 executed the warrant, seizing, in total,

3 An employee of the Department of Children and Families had

contact with the defendant on March 21, 2022, concerning an

unrelated matter.

4 Specifically, the warrant granted permission to search "[t]he

grounds, property, house, garage, trailers, vehicles, paddocks,

barns and outbuildings located at 171 Porter Rd., Hebron, CT"

for the following: "All animals on the property, alive or dead,

including but not limited to dogs, cats, horses, goats, poultry and

to have said animals evaluated and tested for dehydration,

emaciation, physical condition, wounds, parasites, injuries and

illness by a licensed veterinarian; all animal health and

ownership records; collars, leashes, halters, lead ropes;

photographs of animals; receipts and bills related to animal care

and feeding; medication and syringes related to animal care."

5 The Chatham Health District serves the towns of Colchester,

East Haddam, East Hampton, Hebron, Marlborough, and

Portland, and has authority, pursuant to General Statutes § 19a-

5a

thirty-three dogs, twenty-eight cats, five ducks, three

goats, one parakeet, and one pony.

On April 18, 2022, Jeremiah Dunn, the chief

animal control officer of the plaintiff, filed a verified

petition seeking permanent ownership of the animals

pursuant to § 22-329a (b) 66 and (c), 7 as well as an

application for an immediate ex parte order of

temporary care and custody. The court, Cobb, J.,

granted the application for an immediate ex parte

order of temporary care and custody that same day

and ordered a remote hearing to be held on April 22,

2022, at which the defendant had to show cause as to

206, to "examine all nuisances and sources of filth injurious to

the public health .... "

6 General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 22-329a (b) provides: "Any

animal control officer or regional animal control officer

appointed pursuant to section 22-328, 22-331 or 22-33la, as

applicable, may take physical custody of any animal upon

issuance of a warrant finding probable cause that such animal is

neglected or is cruelly treated in violation of section 22-366, 22415, 53-247, 53-248, 53-249, 53-249a, 53-250, 53-251 or 53-252,

and shall thereupon proceed as provided in subsection (c) of this

section except that if, in the opinion of a licensed veterinarian or

the State Veterinarian, at any time after physical custody of

such animal is taken, such animal is so injured or diseased that

it should be euthanized immediately, such officer may have such

animal humanely euthanized by a licensed veterinarian."

7 General Statutes§ 22-329a (c) provides: "Such officer shall file

with the superior court which has venue over such matter or

with the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford at

Hartford a verified petition plainly stating such facts of neglect

or cruel treatment as to bring such animal within the

jurisdiction of the court and praying for appropriate action by

the court in accordance with the provisions of this section. Upon

the filing of such petition, the court shall cause a summons to be

issued requiring the owner or owners or person having

responsibility for the care of the animal, if known, to appear in

court at the time and place named."

6a

why the order of temporary care and custody should

not continue. The remote hearing, however, took place

on April 29, 2022, at which the defendant stipulated,

through counsel, that she would not contest the ex

parte order vesting the temporary care of the animals

in the department. The court, Budzik, J., thus,

ordered that day that temporary custody of the

animals be vested in the department.

The defendant subsequently filed a motion

seeking to withdraw her oral stipulation from the

April 29, 2022 hearing, as well as a motion to reargue

the court's April 29, 2022 order of temporary custody.

In her motion to reargue, the defendant asserted that

new information had come to light that created "a

genuine issue of material fact regarding the statutory

underpinnings of the plaintiffs claims in [the] verified

petition." Specifically, the defendant claimed that

results of the examinations performed "on each

individual animal by licensed veterinarians after they

were in the custody of the animal control officers who

had effectuated the seizure" were not available at the

time of the April 29, 2022 hearing, and that the

results of these examinations showed that all but one

animal were "healthy and apparently well cared for."

The court granted the defendant's motion to reargue

on May 18, 2022, and scheduled a new hearing on the

plaintiffs application for temporary custody on May

26, 2022.

During the May 26, 2022 hearing, Wescovich and

the defendant both testified. By agreement of the

parties, the court admitted into evidence twenty-nine

exhibits, consisting of, inter alia, photographs taken

during the March 25, 2022 seizure of the animals, as

well as veterinary reports documenting the physical

condition of the animals. In a memorandum of

7a

decision dated June 15, 2022, the court made the

following findings. "On March 23, 2022 ... Wescovich

visited the property with an employee of the ...

Department of Children and Families ... [which] had

received a report that [the defendant] was

abandoning the property and the animals being kept

there. Upon accessing the property ... Wescovich

testified that she observed that the entire property

was in an extreme state of uncleanliness and

disarray. 8 Trash and unusable junk were everywhere.

One dog was loose on the property. . . . Wescovich

observed numerous large piles of trash, numerous

empty plastic containers, numerous unused animal

feed containers, a full garbage dumpster, and unused

animal cages scattered about the property. A pile of

trash blocked the entrance to the garage, and a dozen

bags of trash were piled next to the house. The

pictures of the property, house, and barn entered into

evidence and examined by the court . . . corroborate

. . . Wescovich's oral testimony and affidavit, which

was also admitted into evidence as a full exhibit. . . .

"Upon walking within fifteen feet of the front door

of the house . . . Wescovich detected an overwhelming

odor of ammonia from the presence of urine and feces.

Upon enter[ing] the house itself ... Wescovich

observed that the floors of the house were covered

with cat and dog urine and feces, loose dog food, dirt,

and newspaper clippings. . . . Wescovich testified that

8 The court credited Wescovich's testimony with respect to her

experience and observations regarding the subject property and

animals. Specifically, the court stated in its memorandum of

decision that Wescovich "has extensive training and experience

in the investigation of animal neglect and abuse cases .... The

court finds ... Wescovich to be a very credible witness and credits

[her] testimony."

8a

the air quality inside the house was so poor that she

had difficulty breathing despite the use of an N95

respirator mask. . . . Wescovich also testified that the

air in the house created a burning sensation in her

eyes.

"On the first floor of the house . . . Wescovich

observed approximately twenty-eight dogs in cages

distributed throughout the first floor. Two additional

dogs were loose in the house .... Wescovich observed

that the first floor areas generally and each of the

dogs' cages were, to be plain, filthy. The cages were

soiled with urine, feces, and used and soiled 'pee'

pads. Old dog food kibble was strewn about the floor

and in the dogs' cages. 9. . . .

"Wescovich observed cobwebs throughout the

entire house. There were piles of trash and unusable

junk everywhere. . . . Wescovich stated that it was

"Testifying in her defense, [the defendant] offered that the

filthy state of the house was the result of behavioral issues

associated with [the defendant's] minor [child] and [the child's]

failure to clean the cages and house appropriately. The court

does not credit [the defendant's] testimony. Moreover, in the

exercise of common sense, human experience, and reasonable

inference, the court concludes, in its role as fact finder, that the

filthy and unsanitary conditions depicted in the photographs of

the property, house, and barn were the result of lengthy and

long-term neglect of the property, house, and the animals living

there. For clarity and completeness, the court does not credit [the

defendant's] testimony that the deplorable conditions depicted

in the photographs of the property, house, and barn were the

result of any failure to clean the house, barn, or property on the

part of [the defendant's] minor [child], or [the defendant's]

allegation that the animals were not properly walked on the

morning they were seized. Similarly, in its role as fact finder, the

court does not credit [the defendant's] allegation that the

conditions at the property were the fault of her estranged

husband."

9

9a

difficult to move about the house because of the

presence of so much trash and junk. Indeed, on March

25, 2022, the house was condemned by the Chatham

Health District 10 as unfit for human habitation and

in violation of [§ 19-13-B1 (i) of the Regulations of

Connecticut State Agencies, which is part of the

Connecticut Public Health Code]. 11 . . . Wescovich also

recovered numerous used and unused containers of

various animal medicines and syringes . . . including

canine distemper vaccine and sulfadimethoxine

(trademarked as Albon). Possession and use of canine

distemper vaccine and Albon is restricted.

"On the second floor of the house ... Wescovich

found one cat in a cage and one cat loose in a bedroom.

The cat's cage was unsanitary with dirty cat litter and

feces. There was no litter box for the loose cat. Three

other cats were confined to an upstairs bathroom.

Another bedroom held a large, caged parakeet that

was very thin. The parakeet subsequently died. The

air quality was significantly worse on the second floor

than on the first floor. There was also a strong smell

of incense on the second floor, which, in the exercise

of common sense, human experience, and reasonable

inference, the court concludes, in its role as fact

finder, was intended to cover up the smell of urine and

feces throughout the house. Incense is harmful to the

10 During the hearing, the plaintiff submitted as a full exhibit

the notice of violation and public health order issued to the

defendant, which stated that she was in violation of the health

code provisions.

11 Section 19-13-Bl of the Regulations of Connecticut State

Agencies provides in relevant part that "[t]he following

conditions are specifically declared to be public nuisances ... (i)

Buildings or any part thereof which are in a dilapidated or filthy

condition which may endanger the life or health of persons living

in the vicinity."

10a

respiratory system of parakeets. . . . Wescovich

observed the same filthy and unsanitary conditions

on the second floor as on the first floor.

"Upon entering the basement area . . . Wescovich

found fourteen cats in cages. Four more dogs were

confined to kennels in the basement, and at least one

dog was loose in the basement. The conditions in the

basement were similar to the filthy and unsanitary

conditions in the rest of the house. The floors of the

cat cages and dog kennels were dirty with urine, feces,

and spilled cat litter. Litter boxes were full. There

were no clean places for the animals to sit. Garbage

was piled in the corners of the basement and strewn

about the basement generally.

"The barn and paddock area were similarly

cluttered with trash and unusable junk. The paddock

area contained such a large pile of fecal matter and

hay that it blocked the entrance to the barn and was

situated such that animals would have to walk

through the pile to gain access to the barn. A pony and

several goats and ducks lived in this area.

"After seizure from the property, the subject

animals were taken to various local veterinary

hospitals for examination and treatment. ... While

[the defendant] is correct that the animals generally

did not show signs of malnutrition or dehydration,

many of the animals showed the detrimental effects

of the filthy and unsanitary conditions they were

forced to live in by [the defendant] and [the rescue].

Dermatitis or other skin and coat conditions (fleas,

hair loss, matted coats, matted feces in their coats)

were very common. Many cats had respiratory issues.

Veterinarians commonly noted that the cats and dogs

smelled strongly of urine or feces and [that] many

11a

animals had patching or urine scalds on their paw

pads from standing in urine or feces for long periods

of time. Gastrointestinal issues (ringworm,

roundworm, tapeworm, hookworm, giardia, urinary

tract infections, and diarrhea) were also common.

Several cats or dogs were noted to be timid or fearful.

One of the goats was malnourished and had lice."

(Citations omitted; footnotes added; footnote in

original.)

On the basis of these findings, the court found, by

a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant

"abused, neglected, and cruelly treated the subject

animals" by failing "to give the subject animals

'proper care' and [to] provide them with 'wholesome

air,' as those terms are defined by General Statutes

[Rev. to 2021] § 53-247." 12 Accordingly, the court

vested temporary ownership of the animals with the

12 General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 53-247 provides in relevant

part: "(a) Any person who overdrives, drives when overloaded,

overworks, tortures, deprives of necessary sustenance, mutilates

or cruelly beats or kills or unjustifiably injures any animal, or

who, having impounded or confined any animal, fails to give such

animal proper care or neglects to cage or restrain any such

animal from doing injury to itself or to another animal or fails to

supply any such animal with wholesome air, food and water, or

unjustifiably administers any poisonous or noxious drug or

substance to any domestic animal or unjustifiably exposes any

such drug or substance, with intent that the same shall be taken

by an animal, or causes it to be done, or, having charge or

custody of any animal, inflicts cruelty upon it or fails to provide

it with proper food, drink or protection from the weather or

abandons it or carries it or causes it to be carried in a cruel

manner, or fights with or baits, harasses or worries any animal

for the purpose of making it perform for amusement, diversion

or exhibition, shall, for a first offense, be fined not more than one

thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or both,

and for each subsequent offense, shall be guilty of a class D

felony .... "

12a

department and ordered the defendant to pay a cash

or surety bond of $500 per animal, which she did for

all of the animals except the ducks. 13

Subsequently, a hearing was scheduled for

September 7, 2022, pursuant to § 22-329a (d),

concerning the plaintiffs petition seeking permanent

custody of the animals. At the commencement of that

hearing, the defendant informed the court that she

wanted to discharge her attorney. As a result, the

court agreed to continue the hearing until October 18,

2022, to give the defendant the opportunity to retain

new counsel. Immediately following the conclusion of

the September 7 proceeding, the plaintiff filed a

motion requesting that the court take judicial notice

of the following for the upcoming October 18 hearing:

(1) "The evidentiary exhibits entered in full during

the . . . evidentiary hearing in the underlying matter

on May 26, 2022"; (2) "[t]he full transcript and

testimony of the May 26, 2022 hearing"; and (3) "[t]he

court's memorandum of decision, including factual

findings and legal conclusions, dated June 15, 2022 ....

" The defendant's counsel responded by filing an

objection to the motion for judicial notice. Therein,

counsel asserted that he had "no objection to the

[court's] taking judicial notice" of the evidentiary

exhibits and the full transcript of the May 26 hearing,

but requested that the court not take judicial notice of

its June 15 decision, findings and conclusions. On

September 22, 2022, the court granted the plaintiffs

motion for judicial notice, stating in its order that

"[t]he defendant [was] free to present additional

13 On September 7, 2022, the court vested in the department

permanent ownership of the ducks.

13a

evidence in order to attempt to convince the court that

its prior factual findings were in error."

On September 27, 2022, the defendant filed a

motion in limine seeking to exclude any evidence

obtained from her property on the ground that the

search and seizure at her home on March 23, 2022,

without a warrant and over her objection, was

unlawful, in violation of the fourth amendment to the

federal constitution and article first, § 7, of the

Connecticut constitution. The defendant further

asserted that, even though the removal of the animals

on March 25, 2022, was conducted pursuant to a

warrant, it was clear that the basis for the issuance of

the warrant was the illegal entry on March 23. The

motion was signed by the defendant herself, not by

counsel.

On October 3, 2022, the plaintiff filed an objection

to the defendant's motion in limine, arguing that the

motion was procedurally improper, as only the

defendant, and not counsel, had signed the motion.

The plaintiff claimed that, although the motion was

signed by the defendant herself and "assert[ed] in the

certification that she [was acting] 'prose' ... the

defendant's counsel has made it clear . . . [that] he

[was] still on retainer, and, in consultation with

counsel, it appears he had no knowledge of this

motion and did not review its contents prior to its

filing. The defendant cannot simultaneously have

representation and also represent herself. As is well

settled in Connecticut jurisprudence, hybrid

representation is not permitted in a civil context." The

plaintiff further argued that the motion was waived

and that the "exclusionary rule . . . has been

categorically disallowed in civil actions."

14a

On October 6, 2022, the court issued an order

denying the defendant's motion in limine. 1414 In its

order, the court stated: "The exclusionary rule does

not apply to civil cases." On October 12, 2022, the def

end ant, through counsel, filed a motion to reargue the

court's order denying her motion in limine. In her

motion to reargue, the defendant claimed that,

although there are certain civil proceedings in which

courts specifically have held that the exclusionary

rule does not apply, "the law is different when it

comes to matters involving the forfeiture of property

where the proceeding is of a quasi-criminal nature."

The court denied the defendant's motion to reargue.

On October 18, 2022, the court held a hearing on

the plaintiffs petition for permanent custody of the

animals. In doing so, it took judicial notice of the

testimony presented at the May 26, 2022 temporary

custody hearing, as well as the plaintiffs exhibits

entered into evidence at the May 26 hearing, and they

were entered into evidence at the October 18 hearing.

At the beginning of the hearing, the defendant's

counsel stated that the defendant took exception to

the court's order denying the motion to reargue the

court's denial of the motion in limine. The court

reiterated its denial of the motion in limine, stating,

"I don't think the exclusionary rule applies . . . for

purposes of this case. I'm ruling that it does not. I

agree with [plaintiffs] argument that this proceeding

is civil in nature. I'd also note that the statute . . . at

issue here is . . . for the protection of animals and . . .

the safety and security of the animals at issue. It is

Although the parties, in their appellate briefs and at oral

argument before this court, also have referred to the defendant's

motion as a motion to suppress, for consistency in this opinion

we refer to the motion as a motion in limine.

14

15a

not punitive in the sense [of] the case 15 . . . cited by

the defendant. . . . It is to protect the animals, which

would be another reason why I don't think the

exclusionary rule applies.

"Finally, I think . . . that the defendant had ample

opportunity to raise these issues at . . . probable cause

hearings. She was, obviously, present when the

circumstances upon which she's relying occurred. And

to the extent that she had any objection to the

evidence that was seized at that point, or any

procedural issues with respect to [how] the

[department] or any of the other police individuals

acted, she could have raised that at the time and did

not. The evidence that, I think, is at issue was entered

by the court on the record without objection."

(Footnote added.) The defendant's counsel then

interjected that the defendant had not been "given

any of the evidence, the video evidence . . . until some

two months after" the May 26, 2022 hearing.

The court responded: "I understood that. But your

client was present. The video simply shows the

conduct of your client. And your client was present

and could have instructed her attorney, based on her

presence and knowledge of the circumstances, to file

whatever objection she thought was appropriate. Or

you could have made that evaluation based on simply

consulting with your client. You didn't need the video

to tell you what happened. She was there." At this

point, the defendant responded by stating: "I

The defendant cited to One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.

Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170

(1965), in both her motion to reargue and at the beginning of the

October 18, 2022 hearing, for the proposition that the

exclusionary rule applies to a civil forfeiture proceeding in which

a defendant's property is seized by the government. Id., 702.

15

16a

[complained] multiple times. I'd like that on the

record. And I've complained multiple times, my civil

rights were violated. Multiple times. And I requested

to speak out and to be heard." Although the court

attempted to quiet the defendant, she continued to

speak, and the following colloquy occurred:

"[The Defendant]: They illegally entered my house

and stole my animals.

"The Court: Ma'am, you're only harming your

argument by stating that you knew your civil rights

were violated. That only makes my ruling stronger

because you knew your civil rights were violated yet

didn't object.

"[The Defendant]: I did.

"[The Court]: So, you should listen to your

attorney.

"[The Defendant]: I wasn't allowed to.

"The Court: Ma'am. You should listen to your

attorney and follow his advice."

Upon the conclusion of this exchange, the court

began the trial. After the court admitted the evidence

from the May 26, 2022 hearing, the plaintiff rested its

case. Thereafter, the defendant called as witnesses

Wescovich and Elizabeth Lee Murphy, a veterinarian.

The defendant also testified at the hearing.

On December 13, 2022, the court issued its

memorandum of decision vesting permanent

ownership of all the animals with the department. In

its memorandum of decision, the court "reaffirm[ed],

readopt[ed], and incorporate[d] . . . all of the court's

findings of fact as set forth in its June 15 [2022]

memorandum of decision, as if fully set forth herein."

17a

The court then made the following additional findings

related to the evidence presented during the

defendant's case-in-chief. "Wescovich testified that

she did not use any scientific measuring device

to measure the air quality in [the defendant's] house

. . . . Murphy has been a veterinarian since 1985. . . .

Murphy testified that she had reviewed the

[plaintiffs] exhibits and that the [plaintiffs] exhibits

were the basis of her opinions .... Murphy did not

examine any of the subject animals and never visited

the property. . . . Murphy opined that, while the

sanitary conditions in which the subject animals lived

were 'not adequate' . . . the animals were [not] in lifethreatening conditions and ... had sufficient food,

water, and shelter. . . . Murphy also testified that the

house that the subject animals lived in was more like

a 'barn,' and that, while a barn was 'probably not' a

proper environment for the subject animals, the

conditions were not actually 'cruel' and the animals

were not 'neglected,' in . . . Murphy's view. After . . .

Murphy testified, [the defendant] testified that she

spent a significant amount of money ($132,000) on

veterinary bills for the subject animals in an effort to

keep [them] healthy and well cared for, and that

many of the gastrointestinal issues suffered by the

subject animals and documented in the veterinary

records . . . were common in rescued animals."

(Citation omitted.)

The court did not credit the portions of Murphy's

testimony in which she opined that the animals had

not been neglected or cruelly treated, as well as her

testimony with respect to the specific medical

conditions of the animals, as Murphy did not examine

any of the animals. The court also specifically did not

credit portions of the defendant's testimony. The

18a

court found, "by a preponderance of the evidence, that

[the defendant] abused, neglected, and cruelly treated

the subject animals . . . . " In making this finding, the

court noted that the conditions at the property were

unsanitary and filthy, and that the medical conditions

of the animals reflected those unsanitary and filthy

conditions. The court stated: "In particular, the longterm presence and accumulation of urine and feces

[found at the defendant's property] produced an

unwholesome air quality heavily laden with harmful

ammonia gas. Nothing presented in the hearing on

permanent custody changes the factual or legal

conclusions reached by the court in its June 15, 2022

memorandum of decision on temporary custody.

Indeed . . . Murphy affirmatively testified that the

sanitary conditions in which the subject animals lived

were 'not adequate,' and that the barnlike conditions

the subject animals lived in were 'probably not' a

proper environment for the . . . animals." The court

concluded, on the basis of the evidence before it, that

"any person of ordinary intelligence" would have

known that the conditions at the property did not

meet the standard of proper care and wholesome air

as required by § 53-24 7, and that the animals were

neglected and cruelly treated by the defendant. The

court, therefore, vested permanent ownership of the

animals with the department pursuant to § 22-329a

19a

(g) (1). 16 This appeal followed. 17 Additional facts will

be set forth as necessary.

16 The court also ordered the defendant to "pay the expenses

incurred by the [plaintiff] in providing proper food, shelter and

care to the subject animals calculated at the rate of fifteen

dollars per day per animal from March 25, 2022, the date the

subject animals were seized by the [plaintiff]."

17 Following oral argument before this court, the defendant filed

a notice of supplemental authority pursuant to Practice Book§

67-10, in which she referenced two cases that were mentioned at

oral argument but not briefed, as well as a June 27, 2024

decision of the United States Supreme Court regarding the right

to a jury trial under the seventh amendment to the federal

constitution. In her notice, however, she also responded to

questions raised by this court at oral argument and set forth

arguments in support of her position on various issues raised.

The plaintiff responded to the notice, pointing out that it was not

in conformity with§ 67-10 in that, in the notice, the defendant

"engages in extensive supplemental argument .... " The plaintiff

thus asserts that it should not be considered by this court, with

the exception of the reference to the 2024 Supreme Court case,

which the plaintiff maintains is not relevant to the present case.

We agree with the plaintiff. Pursuant to § 67-10, "[w]hen

pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a

party after the party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument

but before decision, a party may promptly file with the appellate

clerk a notice listing such supplemental authorities, including

citations, with a copy certified to all counsel of record in

accordance with Section 62-7 .... The filing shall concisely and

without argument state the relevance of the supplemental

citations and shall include, where applicable, reference to the

pertinent page(s) of the brief .... This section may not be used

after oral argument to elaborate on points made or to address

points not made." The defendant's notice is four pages in length,

it includes argument, and it elaborates on and addresses issues

raised at oral argument. For that reason, we limit our

consideration to the 2024 Supreme Court decision referenced in

the notice.

20a

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court

improperly denied her motion in limine on the basis

of its determination that the exclusionary rule,

applicable in the context of a violation of the fourth

amendment, does not apply to civil matters. 18 In

support of this claim, the defendant asserts that the

present case involves a civil forfeiture proceeding, to

which the exclusionary rule applies. 19 Specifically,

18 The plaintiff argues that the defendant did not preserve this

claim for review on appeal. Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that,

because the defendant voluntarily agreed at the May 26, 2022

temporary custody hearing to the admission into evidence of

twenty-six exhibits, and because she subsequently represented

that she had no objection to the plaintiffs motion requesting that

the court take judicial notice of those exhibits and the testimony

from the May 26 hearing for purposes of the October 18, 2022

permanent custody hearing, she waived any objection to the

admission of that evidence, most of which derived from the

alleged unconstitutional warrantless search of her residence on

March 23, 2022. Thus, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant,

having agreed to the admission of the evidence at the temporary

custody hearing and having agreed with the plaintiffs request

for the trial court to take judicial notice of that evidence for

purposes of the upcoming permanent custody hearing, failed to

preserve her fourth amendment claim that the evidence should

have been suppressed as a result of the unlawful warrantless

search of her home on March 23, 2022; accordingly, the plaintiff

argues that this court should decline to review the claim. We are

not persuaded by the plaintiffs arguments. Because the

defendant filed her motion in limine seeking to exclude the

evidence on fourth amendment grounds prior to the October 18,

2022 permanent custody hearing, at which the court took

judicial notice of the challenged evidence, she revoked any prior

consent she may have given to the admission of that evidence

and, thus, did not waive her fourth amendment claim. We,

therefore, proceed to a review of the merits of this claim.

19 Although the defendant, in her motion in limine, argued that

the warrantless entry into her home violated both the federal

21a

the defendant argues that the exclusionary rule

applies to animal welfare proceedings 20 because such

proceedings involve the civil forfeiture of

noncontraband property, such as domesticated

animals, regardless of whether a crime is alleged. 21

We disagree.

constitution and article first, § 7, of the state constitution, on

appeal, she has neither raised nor briefed any claim under the

state constitution relating to the warrantless entry of her home.

Any such claim, therefore, is deemed abandoned. See, e.g.,

Nietupski v. Del Castillo, 196 Conn. App. 31, 37 n.7, 228 A.3d

1053 (failure to provide independent state constitutional

analysis renders any claim with respect to state constitution

abandoned), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 916, 229 A.3d 1045 (2020).

20 We previously have identified a proceeding conducted

pursuant to § 22-329a as an "animal welfare action .... "

Wethersfield ex rel. Monde v. Eser, 211 Conn. App. 537, 539, 274

A.3d 203 (2022).

21 In her appellate brief, the defendant cites to a number of

general principles underlying the fourth amendment, including,

inter alia, that "the fourth amendment's warrant requirement

applies to all governmental actors without regard to whether

they describe their search and seizure endeavors as 'civil' or

'criminal.'" In doing so, the defendant argues that the fourth

amendment is not limited in its application to criminal

proceedings. The issue in this appeal, however, is not whether

the fourth amendment was violated as a result of the

warrantless search of the defendant's property on March 23,

2022. Rather, the issue in this appeal concerns the court's

determination that the exclusionary rule does not apply to

animal welfare proceedings, and that is the issue addressed on

appeal by the plaintiff. The exclusionary rule is a prudential

rule, not a constitutional rule, that was formulated in the

criminal context to deter law enforcement officers who fail to

obtain a warrant as required under the fourth amendment; its

application necessarily must stem from a fourth amendment

violation. Therefore, for purposes of this appeal, we assume,

without deciding, that the warrantless search of tile defendant's

property on March 23, 2022, was conducted in violation of the

fourth amendment.

22a

We first set forth the applicable standard of

review. "The purpose of a motion in limine is to

exclude irrelevant, inadmissible and prejudicial

evidence from trial .... " (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) 111 Clearview Drive, LLC v. Patrick, 224

Conn. App. 419, 427, 313 A.3d 386 (2024). When a

trial court's ruling pertaining to a motion in limine is

based on a legal determination, "the applicable

standard of review requires this court to determine

whether the trial court was legally and logically

correct .... " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,

426. In the present case, because the court's

determination that the exclusionary rule is

inapplicable involved a legal determination, we

exercise plenary review. See id.

A

The following legal principles are relevant to the

defendant's claim that the exclusionary rule is

applicable to a civil animal welfare proceeding. "The

[f]ourth [a]mendment provides that, 'The right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to

be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'

The basic purpose of this [a]mendment, as recognized

in countless decisions of [the United States Supreme]

Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of

individuals

against

arbitrary

invasions

by

governmental officials. The [f]ourth [a]mendment

thus gives concrete expression to a right of the people

which 'is basic to a free society.' . . . As such, the

[f]ourth [a]mendment is enforceable against the

[s]tates through the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment."

23a

(Citation omitted.) Camara v. Municipal Court, 387

U.S. 523, 528, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967);

see also Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 303304, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 201 L. Ed. 2d 507 (2018); State

v. Bemer, 339 Conn. 528, 533 n.6, 262 A.3d 1 (2021).

"The [f]ourth [a]mendment protects the right to be

free from 'unreasonable searches and seizures,' but it

is silent about how this right is to be enforced. To

supplement the bare text, [the United States

Supreme Court] created the exclusionary rule, a

deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from

introducing evidence obtained by way of a [f]ourth

[a]mendment violation." Davis v. United States, 564

U.S. 229, 231-32, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285

(2011). As such, the exclusionary rule "is a prudential

doctrine . . . created by [the] [c]ourt to compel respect

for the constitutional guarant[ee] .... Exclusion is not

a personal constitutional right, nor is it designed to

redress the injury occasioned by an unconstitutional

search. . . . The rule's sole purpose is to deter future

[f]ourth [a]mendment violations." (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 236-37. "[T]he

exclusionary rule bars the government from

introducing at trial evidence obtained in violation of

the . . . United States constitution. . . . The rule applies

to evidence that is derived from unlawful government

conduct, which is commonly referred to as the fruit of

the poisonous tree . . . . " (Emphasis omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Romero, 199 Conn.

App. 39, 50, 235 A.3d 644, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 955,

238 A.3d 731 (2020).

"[T]he exclusionary rule is neither intended nor

able to cure the invasion of the defendant's rights

which he has already suffered .... [T]he [exclusionary]

rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police

24a

conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the

[f] ourth [a]mendment against unreasonable searches

and seizures . . . . Application of the rule is thus

appropriate in circumstances in which this purpose is

likely to be furthered. . . . [I]n the complex and

turbulent history of the rule, the [United States

Supreme] Court never has applied it to exclude

evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state.

Immigration & Naturalization Service v. LopezMendoza, [468 U.S. 1032, 1041-42, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 82

L. Ed. 2d 778 (1984)] (holding that rule does not apply

in deportation proceedings); see also Pennsylvania

Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357,

363, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1998)

(recognizing that [Supreme Court has] repeatedly

declined to extend the exclusionary rule to

proceedings other than criminal trials and holding

that rule was not applicable in parole revocation

proceedings); 22 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,

In Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, the United

States Supreme Court stated: "We have emphasized repeatedly

that the government's use of evidence obtained in violation of the

[f]ourth [a]mendment does not itself violate the [c]onstitution.

See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 [104 S. Ct.

3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677] (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,

482, 486 [96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067] (1976). Rather, a

[f]ourth [a]mendment violation is fully accomplished by the

illegal search or seizure, and no exclusion of evidence from a

judicial or administrative proceeding can cure the invasion of the

defendant's rights which he has already suffered. United States

v. Leon, [supra, 906] (quoting Stone v. Powell, [supra, 540]

(White, J., dissenting)). The exclusionary rule is instead a

judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and

seizures. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 [94 S. Ct.

613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561] (1974). As such, the rule does not proscribe

the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or

against all [persons; Stone v. Powell, supra, 486], but applies

only in contexts where its remedial objectives are thought most

22

25a

efficaciously [served. United States v. Calandra, supra, 348]; see

also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 [96 S. Ct. 3021, 49

L. Ed. 2d 1046] (1976) ([i]f ... the exclusionary rule does not

result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the

instant situation is unwarranted). Moreover, because the rule is

prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, we have held

it to be applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh

its substantial social costs. United States v. Leon, [supra] 907.

"Recognizing these costs, we have repeatedly declined to

extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal

trials. [Id., 909]; United States v. Janis, [supra, 428 U.S.] 447.

For example, in United States v. Calandra, [supra, 414 U.S. 338]

we held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to grand jury

proceedings; in so doing, we emphasized that such proceedings

play a special role in the law enforcement process and that the

traditionally flexible, nonadversarial nature of those

proceedings would be jeopardized by application of the rule. [Id.,

343-46, 349-50]. Likewise, in United States v. Janis, [supra, 433]

we held that the exclusionary rule did not bar the introduction

of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in a civil tax proceeding

because the costs of excluding relevant and reliable evidence

would outweigh the marginal deterrence benefits, which, we

noted, would be minimal because the use of the exclusionary rule

in criminal trials already deterred illegal searches. [Id., 448,

454]. Finally, in [Immigration & Naturalization Service) v.

Lopez-Mendoza, [supra, 468 U.S. 1032], we refused to extend the

exclusionary rule to civil deportation proceedings, citing the high

social costs of allowing an immigrant to remain illegally in this

country and noting the incompatibility of the rule with the civil,

administrative nature of those proceedings. [Id., 1050.]

"As in Calandra, Janis, and Lopez-Mendoza, we are asked to

extend the operation of the exclusionary rule beyond the

criminal trial context. We again decline to do so. Application of

the exclusionary rule would both hinder the functioning of state

parole systems and alter the traditionally flexible,

administrative nature of parole revocation proceedings. The rule

would provide only minimal deterrence benefits in this context,

because application of the rule in the criminal trial context

already provides significant deterrence of unconstitutional

searches. We therefore hold that the federal exclusionary rule

does not bar the introduction at parole revocation hearings of

26a

448, 454, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046 (1976)

(holding that rule does not apply in civil tax

proceedings); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.

338, 343-46, 94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974)

(holding that rule does not apply in grand jury

proceedings). [B]ecause the rule is prudential rather

than constitutionally mandated, [it has been held] to

be applicable only where its deterrence benefits

outweigh its substantial social costs. . . . Pennsylvania

Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott, supra, 363. [T]he

need for deterrence and hence the rationale for

excluding the evidence are strongest where the

[g]ovemment's unlawful conduct would result in

imposition of a criminal sanction on the victim of the

search. . . . Fishbein v. Kozlowski, 252 Conn. 38, 5253, 743 A.2d 1110 (1999)." (Citation omitted; footnote

added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Boyles v.

Preston, 68 Conn. App. 596, 611-13, 792 A.2d 878,

cert. denied, 261 Conn. 901, 802 A.2d 853 (2002); see

also Davis v. United States, supra, 564 U.S. 236-37

(because exclusionary "rule's sole purpose ... is to

deter future [f]ourth [a]mendment violations . . .

[United States Supreme Court] cases have thus

limited the rule's operation to situations in which this

purpose is thought most efficaciously served"

(citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted)). "Because the exclusionary rule precludes

consideration of reliable, probative evidence, it

imposes significant costs: It undeniably detracts from

the truthfinding process and allows many who would

otherwise be incarcerated to escape the consequences

of their actions. See Stone v. Powell, [428 U.S. 465,

evidence seized in violation of parolees' [f]ourth [a]mendrnent

rights." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pennsylvania Board

of Probation & Parole v. Scott, supra, 524 U.S. 362-64.

27a

490, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976)].

Although [the United States Supreme Court has] held

these costs to be worth bearing in certain

circumstances,

[its]

cases

have

repeatedly

emphasized that the rule's costly toll upon truthseeking and law enforcement objectives presents a

high obstacle for those urging application of the rule.

United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 [100 S. Ct.

2439, 65 L. Ed. 2d 468] (1980)." (Footnote omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Pennsylvania

Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott, supra, 364-65.

Consistent with this precedent, this court

previously has recognized, as a general rule, that the

exclusionary rule does not apply to civil cases. See

Tompkins v. Freedom of Information Commission,

136 Conn. App. 496, 499 n.4, 46 A.3d 291 (2012); In re

Nicholas R., 92 Conn. App. 316, 321, 884 A.2d 1059

(2005); see also State v. Schroff, 198 Conn. 405, 412,

503 A.2d 167 (1986) ("Subject to a few exceptions, the

same rules of evidence apply in criminal cases as in

civil cases. . . . The most notable exceptions are the

exclusionary rules prohibiting the use of evidence

obtained in violation of the accused's constitutional

rights." (Citation omitted; emphasis added.)).

Nevertheless, the exclusionary rule has been

applied beyond the confines of criminal cases "in a

proceeding for forfeiture of an article used in violation

of the criminal law. [See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.

Pennsylvania], 380 U.S. 693 [85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L. Ed.

2d 170] (1965) [Plymouth Sedan]. [In Plymouth

Sedan, the court] expressly relied on the fact that

'forfeiture is clearly a penalty for the criminal offense'

and '[i]t would be anomalous indeed, under these

circumstances, to hold that in the criminal proceeding

the illegally seized evidence is excludable, while in the

28a

forfeiture proceeding, requiring the determination

that the criminal law has been violated, the same

evidence would be admissible.'" United States v.

Janis, supra, 428 U.S. 447 n.17; see also In re 650

Fifth Avenue & Related Properties, 830 F.3d 66, 98 (2d

Cir. 2016) ("[i]t is well-established that the [f]ourth

[a]mendment's exclusionary rule applies in forfeiture

cases");

One

1995

Corvette

VIN

No.

1G1YY22P585103433 v. Mayor & City Council of

Baltimore, 353 Md. 114, 123-24, 724 A.2d 680

("Eleven of the thirteen United States Courts of

Appeals have interpreted Plymouth Sedan to stand

for the proposition that the exclusionary rule applies

to civil in rem forfeitures. Additionally, courts in

thirty-four states have interpreted Plymouth Sedan

to stand for the same proposition. . . . Our

examination of the cases has revealed no court that

completely rejects that interpretation .... " (Footnotes

omitted.)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 927, 120 S. Ct. 321,

145 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1999).

The United States Supreme Court, thus, has not

foreclosed application of the exclusionary rule to civil

proceedings. "Instead, the [c]ourt [has] instructed

that the exclusionary rule may be extended where the

benefits exceed the costs to society"; Garrett v.

Lehman, 751 F.2d 997, 1003 (9th Cir. 1985); and it

"set forth a framework for deciding in what types of

proceeding[s] application of the exclusionary rule is

appropriate. Imprecise as the exercise may be, the

[c]ourt recognized in [United States v. Janis, supra,

428 U.S. 446] that there is no choice but to weigh the

likely social benefits of excluding unlawfully seized

evidence against the likely costs." Immigration &

Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, supra, 468

U.S. 1041; see also Ahart v. Colorado Dept. of

29a

Corrections, 964 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo. 1998) ("The

question of whether the exclusionary rule applies in a

particular civil case requires weighing the deterrent

benefits of applying the rule against the societal cost

of excluding relevant evidence. . . . There is no 'bright

line' to determine when the rule should apply, and

courts must apply the Janis analytic framework on a

case by case basis." (Citation omitted.)). This

approach is known as the Janis balancing test. See

Immigration & Naturalization Service v. LopezMendoza, supra, 1042; see also Long Lake Township

v. Maxon, 343 Mich. App. 319, 330, 997 N.W.2d 250

(2022) ("[t]he Janis balancing test, as it is now known,

requires a court contemplating applying the

exclusionary rule in a civil proceeding to weigh the

'prime purpose' of the rule-deterrence-against 'the

likely costs'"), affd, Docket No. 164948, 2024 WL

1960615 (Mich. May 3, 2024). In applying that test,

the Supreme Court determined in Janis that the

exclusionary rule does not apply to a federal civil tax

assessment proceeding and in Lopez-Mendoza, that it

does not apply to a deportation proceeding. See

United States v. Janis, supra, 459-60; see also

Immigration & Naturalization Service v. LopezMendoza, supra, 1042.

Our appellate and trial courts have applied the

Janis balancing test when determining whether the

exclusionary rule applies to certain civil proceedings.

See, e.g., Fishbein v. Kozlowski, supra, 252 Conn. 54

(applying Janis balancing test in determining that

exclusionary rule does not apply to driver's license

suspension hearings); Payne v. Robinson, 207 Conn.

565, 570, 541 A.2d 504 (applying Janis balancing test

in determining that exclusionary rule does not apply

to probation revocation proceedings), cert. denied, 488

30a

U.S. 898, 109 S. Ct. 242, 102 L. Ed. 2d 230 (1988);

Boyles v. Preston, supra, 68 Conn. App. 612-13

(applying Janis balancing test in determining that

exclusionary rule does not apply to civil trial);

Housing Authority v. Dawkins, Superior Court,

judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Housing

Session at Norwalk, Docket No. 9502-16173 (May 10,

1995) (14 Conn. L. Rptr. 450) (applying Janis

balancing test in determining that exclusionary rule

does not apply in summary process proceeding), affd,

239 Conn. 793, 686 A.2d 994 (1997); see also

Tompkins v. Freedom of Information Commission,

supra, 136 Conn. App. 499 n.4 (standing for

proposition that exclusionary rule categorically does

not apply to civil proceedings), citing In re Nicholas

R., supra, 92 Conn. App. 321. 23

Accordingly, "United States Supreme Court

precedent regarding the exclusionary rule's use in

civil cases can be succinctly summarized as follows: it

only applies in forfeiture actions when the thing being

forfeited as a result of a criminal prosecution is worth

23 Although in Tompkins, we stated that the exclusionary rule

does not apply to civil proceedings, the previously cited

precedent from our Supreme Court indicates that application of

the Janis balancing test is appropriate when deciding if the

exclusionary rule applies to a particular civil proceeding.

Notably, however, courts in Missouri, New Jersey and North

Dakota forgo application of the Janis balancing test and,

instead, simply regard the exclusionary rule as categorically

inapplicable to civil proceedings, as we did in Tompkins. See,

e.g., Coble v. Director of Revenue, 323 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Mo. App.

2010) (exclusionary rule does not apply to civil proceedings); In

re Civil Commitment of J.M.B., 395 N.J. Super. 69, 95, 928 A.2d

102 (App. Div. 2007) (same), affd, 197 N.J. 563, 964 A.2d 752,

cert. denied sub nom. J.M.B. v. New Jersey, 558 U.S. 999, 130 S.

Ct. 509, 175 L. Ed. 2d 361 (2009); Muscha v. Kralik, 969 N.W.2d

142, 143 (N.D. 2022) (same).

31a

more than the criminal fine that might be assessed.

That's it." Long Lake Township v. Maxon, supra, 343

Mich. App. 332; see also Dolan v. Salinas, Superior

Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV

99-0494202-S (July 22, 1999) (25 Conn. L. Rptr. 119,

121) ("[t]he only civil context in which the [United

States] Supreme Court has applied the exclusionary

rule is a case of a 'quasicriminal' forfeiture proceeding

based on criminal conduct"). Further, "[i]t is unclear

if the Supreme Court requires a threshold finding

that the nature of the civil proceeding is 'quasicriminal' . . . or if the nature of the proceeding is

merely one factor in applying the Janis balancing

test." (Citation omitted.) Pike v. Gallagher, 829 F.

Supp. 1254, 1265 n.6 (D.N.M. 1993).

Notably, if a proceeding is identified as quasicriminal, we have treated that as determinative of

whether the exclusionary rule applies without

requiring consideration of the Janis balancing test.

See In re Nicholas R., supra, 92 Conn. App. 321 n.3.

In Connecticut, few proceedings are deemed to be

quasi-criminal, and they include (1) "forfeiture

proceeding[s] intended to penalize . . . for the

commission of a criminal offense"; Miller v. Dept. of

Agriculture, 168 Conn. App. 255, 269 n.15, 145 A.3d

393 (citing One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.

Pennsylvania, supra, 380 U.S. 702), cert. denied, 323

Conn. 936, 151 A.3d 386 (2016); (2) attorney

disciplinary proceedings; Burton v. Mottolese, 267

Conn. 1, 19, 835 A.2d 998 (2003), cert. denied, 541

U.S. 1073, 124 S. Ct. 2422, 158 L. Ed. 2d 983 (2004);

and (3) juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re

Nicholas R., supra, 321 n.3; see also In re Samantha

C., 268 Conn. 614, 664, 847 A.2d 883 (2004)

(proceedings to terminate parental rights are not

32a

quasi-criminal); Robertson v. Apuzzo, 170 Conn. 367,

375, 365 A.2d 824 (child paternity proceedings are

civil, not quasi-criminal), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852,

97 S. Ct. 142, 50 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1976); Millerv. Dept.

of Agriculture, supra, 263-64 (administrative hearing

on disposal orders for biting animals is not quasicriminal).

Our courts have never reached the issue of

whether animal welfare proceedings conducted

pursuant to § 22-329a are subject to the exclusionary

rule. Thus, in the present case, we first must

determine whether the animal welfare proceeding at

issue constitutes a forfeiture proceeding intended to

penalize the defendant for a criminal offense. If it

does, the exclusionary rule applies pursuant to

Plymouth Sedan. If it does not, we next must

determine whether animal welfare proceedings

conducted pursuant to § 22-329a are quasi-criminal.

If such proceedings are determined to be quasicriminal, the exclusionary rule is applicable. Finally,

even if we determine that animal welfare proceedings

are not quasi-criminal in nature, we nevertheless

must apply the Janis balancing test to determine

whether it is appropriate to extend the exclusionary

rule to this particular civil proceeding. In other words,

if the proceeding at issue constitutes either a

forfeiture akin to Plymouth Sedan or a quasi-criminal

proceeding, the exclusionary rule applies; otherwise,

the rule is inapplicable unless we determine, after

applying the Janis balancing test, that it should be

extended to animal welfare proceedings. We therefore

tum to the defendant's claim that the animal welfare

proceeding at issue in this case constitutes a civil

forfeiture proceeding to which the exclusionary rule

applies.

33a

B

The defendant's claim that the animal welfare

proceeding at issue in the present case constitutes a

civil forfeiture of noncontraband property is premised

on the principle that animals are considered property

under state law. 24 In response, the plaintiff does not

dispute whether animals are considered property but

24 We note that, although the defendant correctly notes that

animals are " 'generally . . . regarded as personal property,' "

quoting Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. R. W. Commerford &

Sons, Inc., 192 Conn. App. 36, 45, 216 A.3d 839, cert. denied, 333

Conn. 920, 217 A.3d 635 (2019), animals enjoy a unique status

in our society as opposed to typical personal property. As the

Supreme Court of Vermont stated, "nonhuman animals occupy

a unique legal status in that they have traditionally been

regarded as property but are nonetheless different from other

property" and, instead, "occup[y] a special place somewhere in

between a person and [a] piece of personal property." (Emphasis

added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sheperd, 204

Vt. 592, 601, 170 A.3d 616 (2017); see id., 602 ("animal welfare

is a factor [that must be] consider[ed] when determining whether

a search or seizure was lawful"); Baity v. Mickley-Gomez, Docket

No. CV-19-6092718-S, 2020 WL 9314537, *5 (Conn. Super.

December 14, 2020) ("a domesticated, household pet holds a

special and unique interest to its owner dissimilar to other

property"); see also General Statutes § 22-350 (dogs are

considered personal property under state law). In State v.

Newcomb, 359 Or. 756, 770, 375 P.3d 434 (2016), the Oregon

Supreme Court "conclude[d] that [the] defendant had no

protected privacy interest in [his dog's] blood that was invaded

by the medical procedures performed [to diagnose and treat the

malnourished dog]. In [those] circumstances, [the court agreed]

with the state that [a dog] is not analogous to, and should not be

analyzed as though he were, an opaque inanimate container in

which inanimate property or effects were being stored or

concealed." The court recognized that, even though "[a] dog is

personal property under Oregon law, a status that gives a dog

owner rights of dominion and control over the dog . . . Oregon

law simultaneously limits ownership and possessory rights in

34a

argues that such proceedings do not constitute a civil

forfeiture under this state's statutory scheme. We

agree with the plaintiff.

Whether an animal welfare proceeding conducted

pursuant to § 22-329a constitutes a civil forfeiture

requires us to construe § 22-329a, "which presents a

question of statutory interpretation subject to plenary

review. See Keller v. Beckenstein, 305 Conn. 523, 532,

46 A.3d 102 (2012) ([i]ssues of statutory

interpretation constitute questions of law over which

the court's review is plenary ... ). When construing a

statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain

and give effect to the apparent intent of the

legislature. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,

General Statutes § l-2z directs us first to consider the

text of the statute itself and its relationship to other

statutes. If, after examining such text and

considering such relationship, the meaning of such

text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield

absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence

of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.

ways that it does not for inanimate property. Those limitations,

too, are reflections of legal and social norms. Live animals under

Oregon law are subject to statutory welfare protections that

ensure their basic minimum care, including veterinary

treatment. The obligation to provide that minimum care falls on

any person who has custody and control of a dog or other

animal." Id., 771. Likewise, under Connecticut law, although

animals are generally considered personal property, they are

subject to statutory welfare protections that place them in a

category separate from inanimate property. Therefore, the

defendant's citation to Plymouth Sedan and its progeny, which

deal with forfeitures of assets like vehicles and currency, is

unavailing in the present case because "in the context of

searches and seizures . . . the treatment of animals is different

from that of other types of property . . . ." State v. Sheperd, supra,

602.

35a

. . . It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that

[w]e construe a statute as a whole and read its

subsections concurrently in order to reach a

reasonable overall interpretation." (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Townsend v.

Commissioner of Correction, 226 Conn. App. 313, 33031, 317 A.3d 1147 (2024). "[P]ursuantto § l-2z, [the

court is] to go through the following initial steps:

[F]irst, consider the language of the statute at issue,

including its relationship to other statutes, as applied

to the facts of the case; second, if after the completion

of step one, [the court] conclude[s] that, as so applied,

there is but one likely or plausible meaning of the

statutory language, [the court] stop[s] there; but

third, if after the completion of step one, [the court]

conclude[s] that, as applied to the facts of the case,

there is more than one likely or plausible meaning of

the statute, [the court] may consult other sources,

beyond the statutory language, to ascertain the

meaning of the statute." (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Smith, 209 Conn. App. 296, 305, 268

A.3d 127 (2021), cert. denied, 342 Conn. 905, 270 A.3d

691 (2022).

Section 22-329a is titled: "Seizure and custody of

neglected or cruelly treated animals. Vesting of

ownership of animal. Animal abuse cost recovery

account." The statute provides a mechanism by which

state animal control officials may take physical

custody of an animal. First, under subsection (a), if an

animal control officer has reasonable cause to believe

that an animal "is in imminent harm and is neglected

or is cruelly treated," the animal control officer may

take physical custody of the animal and, not later

than ninety-six hours after taking custody, shall file

with the Superior Court, in accordance with

36a

subsection ( c ), a verified petition "plainly stating

such facts of neglect or cruel treatment . . . and

praying for appropriate action by the court .... "

Pursuant to subsection (b) of§ 22-329a, "[a]ny animal

control officer ... may take physical custody of any

animal upon issuance of a warrant finding probable

cause that such animal is neglected or is cruelly

treated . . . . " The statute further sets forth the

necessary procedures after physical custody of an

animal has been taken; see General Statutes § 22329a ( c) and ( d); or if temporary custody of an animal

is sought; see General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 22329a (e); and certain requirements of the animal's

owner, including posting a bond and the payment of

expenses incurred by the state for the care of the

animal. See General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 22-329a

(f) and (h). The language of § 22-329a is clear and

unambiguous, and nowhere in the statute is the term

"forfeiture" present.

By contrast, General Statutes § 54-33g, which

governs the " [f]orfeiture of moneys and property

related to [the] commission of [a] criminal offense,"

expressly provides that it applies to forfeitures. The

same is true with respect to General Statutes § 5436h, which governs the "[f]orfeiture of moneys and

property related to [the] illegal sale or exchange of

controlled substances or money laundering." See also

General Statutes§ 54-36a (f) and (g) 25 (referring to

forfeiture of seized property). The omission of any

reference to the term forfeiture in the plain language

of § 22-329a, taken together with the existence of such

references in statutes that do provide for forfeiture

25 Although § 54-36a was amended in 2023; see Public Acts 2023,

No. 23-79, § 51; that amendment has no bearing on this appeal.

For simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.

37a

proceedings, indicates an intent that animal welfare

proceedings conducted pursuant to the statute are not

civil forfeiture proceedings. It necessarily follows

that, if the legislature intended proceedings

conducted pursuant to § 22-329a to be considered

forfeiture actions, it would have drafted the statute in

a manner similar to those forfeiture statutes. See

Stone v. East Coast Swappers, LLC, 337 Conn. 589,

606-607, 255 A.3d 851 (2020) ("Our case law is clear

... that when the legislature chooses to act, it is

presumed to know how to draft legislation consistent

with its intent and to know of all other existing

statutes . . . . [I]t is a well settled principle of statutory

construction that the legislature knows how to convey

its intent expressly . . . or to use broader or limiting

terms when it chooses to do so .... " (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.)).

For example, in State v. Richard P., 179 Conn.

App. 676, 678, 181 A.3d 107, cert. denied, 328 Conn.

924, 181 A.3d 567 (2018), the state argued on appeal

that the trial "court improperly dismissed the case

because [the state] had sufficiently represented to the

court that a material witness had 'died, disappeared

or became disabled' within the meaning of General

Statutes § 54-56b . . . . " In making that argument, the

state asserted that "the phrase 'has . . . become

disabled' should be construed to be synonymous with

'has . . . become unavailable,' as that term is typically

used in related contexts regarding witnesses." Id.,

685-86. This court disagreed, reasoning: "The

legislature has included the term 'unavailable' with

respect to witnesses in other statutes. See, e.g.,

General Statutes §§ 54-86l, 52-180, 52-148b (b) (1),

46b-129 (k) (4) and (5), and 17a-ll (f) (5). Presumably,

it chose not to do so when it enacted § 54-56b. '[A]

38a

court must construe a statute as written. . . . Courts

may not by construction supply omissions . . . or add

exceptions merely because it appears that good

reasons exist for adding them. . . . The intent of the

legislature, as this court has repeatedly observed, is

to be found not in what the legislature meant to say,

but in the meaning of what it did say. . . . It is

axiomatic that the court itself cannot rewrite a

statute to accomplish a particular result. That is a

function of the legislature.' ... Doe v. Norwich Roman

Catholic Diocesan Corp., 279 Conn. 207, 216, 901 A.2d

673 (2006).

"This rule of statutory construction has been

applied vigorously in instances in which the

legislature has repeatedly employed a term in other

statutes, but did not use it in the provision to be

construed. As our Supreme Court stated in Viera v.

Cohen, 283 Conn. 412, 431, 927 A.2d 843 (2007), 'we

underscore that the legislature frequently has used

the term withdrawal. . . . Typically, the omission of a

word otherwise used in the statutes suggests that the

legislature intended a different meaning for the

alternate term.' . . . 'Where a statute, with reference

to one subject contains a given provision, the omission

of such provision from a similar statute concerning a

related subject . . . is significant to show that a

different intention existed.' ... Hatt v. Burlington Coat

Factory, 263 Conn. 279, 310, 819 A.2d 260 (2003).

Accordingly, we find it significant that the legislature

did not choose to include the term 'unavailable' in §

54-56b.

"Moreover, in other statutes concerning witnesses,

the legislature explicitly has expressed its intent to

include circumstances in which a witness is beyond

the reach of process, or cannot be found, and thus

39a

cannot be compelled to testify. For example, in

General Statutes § 52-160, the legislature provided

that '[i]f any witness in a civil action is beyond the

reach of the process of the courts of this state, or

cannot be found . . . [a transcript of his or her recorded

testimony in] a former trial of the action . . . shall be

admissible in evidence, in the discretion of the court .

. . .' Presumably, the legislature chose not to employ

the same or similar language in § 54-56b, thereby

indicating an intent that § 54-56b sweep less broadly."

State v. Richard P., supra, 179 Conn. App. 688-89.

The analysis in Richard P. regarding legislative

intent when a statute fails to include a term that is

present in other statutes applies equally to the

present case.

Furthermore, § 54-33g "provides for a civil action

in rem for the condemnation and [forfeiture] of the

[property] which was used in violation of the law. . . .

In such an action the guilt or innocence of the owner

of the [property] is not in issue. The only issue is

whether the [property] was used in violation of law.

This follows from the nature of the action which is one

against the res, an action in rem." (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Connelly, 194 Conn. 589, 592,

483 A.2d 1085 (1984). A "forfeiture" is defined as a

procedure by which the government may divest a

person of his or her property without compensation.

Black's Law Dictionary (12th Ed. 2024) p. 789. "It is

an area of the law which is founded upon the many

inherent fictions of our jurisprudence. . . . As perhaps

the most obvious use of legal fiction, the civil

forfeiture action is brought directly against the

property as [the] defendant. The conceptual basis of

the forfeiture is, quite basically, that the property has

perpetrated some wrong. . . . Thus, as the action is

40a

against the property and not the owner, the action is

in rem in nature." (Citations omitted.) United States

(Drug Enforcement Agency) v. In re One 1987 Jeep

Wrangler

Automobile

VIN

No.

2BCCL8132HBS12835, 972 F.2d 472, 476 (2d Cir.

1992). "Modern civil-forfeiture statutes are plainly

designed, at least in part, to punish the owner of

property used for criminal purposes. See, e.g., Austin

v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, [618-19, 113 S. Ct.

2801, 125 L. Ed. 2d 488] (1993). When a [s]tate wishes

to punish one of its citizens, it ordinarily proceeds

against the defendant personally (known as in

personam), and in many cases it must provide the

defendant with full criminal procedural protections.

Nevertheless ... [the United States Supreme] Court

permits prosecutors seeking forfeiture to proceed

against the property (known as in rem) and to do so

civilly." (Emphasis omitted.) Leonard v. Texas, 580

U.S. 1178, 1179, 137 S. Ct. 84 7, 197 L. Ed. 2d 474

(2017) (statement of Thomas, J., concurring in denial

of certiorari).

Although animal welfare proceedings under § 22329a similarly are in rem actions, they differ from in

rem forfeiture actions principally in that the animals

subject to the custody order have not perpetrated

some wrong, nor were they used for criminal

purposes. The statute also is devoid of any language

indicating that it is designed to punish property

owners who abuse or neglect animals. Instead, the

overarching purpose of § 22-329a is to protect the

welfare of animals. See Wethersfield ex rel. Monde v.

Eser, 211 Conn. App. 537, 551, 274 A.3d 203 (2022).

In cases in which an animal control officer takes

physical custody of animals that are neglected or

cruelly treated, the owners must appear in court to

41a

show cause why the court should not vest in some

suitable state, municipal or other public or private

agency or person the animal's temporary care and

custody pending a hearing. If, after a hearing, it is

determined that the animal is not neglected or cruelly

treated, the court may cause the animal to be

returned to its owner. If custody of the animal is

vested in the state, the owner must pay any expenses

incurred by the state to provide proper food, shelter

and care for the animal, not as a punishment. See,

e.g., Miller v. Dept. of Agriculture, supra, 168 Conn.

App. 269 n.16 ("A municipality may assess on the

owner [of a seized animal] certain fees, including a

nominal 'redemption fee' for owners claiming a

captured or impounded animal, and a payment

representing the cost to the municipality of

quarantining a biting animal. General Statutes § 22333. These fees, however, merely compensate a

municipality for costs incurred while impounding an

animal, and thus cannot be described as punitive in

nature.").

We note that the defendant's briefing on this issue

is minimal. After citing federal case law holding that

the exclusionary rule applies to forfeiture cases, the

defendant simply asserts, in a conclusory fashion,

that "because the civil forfeiture action brought under

. . . § 22-329a (g) to seize the dogs in [the defendant's]

custody was to seize noncontraband propertydomesticated animals-the fourth amendment's

protections apply to the seizures underlying the

search." She has provided no Connecticut authority to

support her position that § 22-329a sets forth a

42a

procedure for civil forfeiture. 26 Therefore, in the

absence of any authority demonstrating that § 22329a provides for a civil forfeiture action, and keeping

in mind that, "[w]hen construing a statute, [o]ur

fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect

to the apparent intent of the legislature"; (internal

quotation marks omitted) Lawrence v. Gude, 216

Conn. App. 624, 629, 285 A.3d 1198 (2022); we

conclude that the plain language of § 22-329a

indicates that proceedings brought under the statute

are not forfeiture actions. 27

26 In her appellate reply brief, the defendant asserts that "[t]he

fourth amendment's exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture

proceedings brought to protect animal welfare, regardless of

whether a crime is alleged." In support thereof, she cites to outof-state authority and to Plymouth Sedan. As we have stated,

Plymouth Sedan stands for the proposition that the exclusionary

rule applies to civil in rem forfeitures. Plymouth Sedan,

however, involved a civil forfeiture proceeding of an automobile

brought under a Pennsylvania statute governing the forfeiture

of vehicles used in the illegal transportation of liquor. The other

out-of-state authority on which the defendant relies also is

inapposite, as it does not suggest or in any way support the

assertion that proceedings under § 22-329a are civil forfeiture

proceedings.

27 A consideration of other states' statutes that are similar in

purpose to § 22-329a provides support for our conclusion, as,

even though proceedings to seize animals in some states are

considered forfeitures, the relevant statutes, unlike § 22-329a,

specifically refer to the forfeiture of animals. In Illinois, for

example, the Humane Care for Animals Act, 510 Ill. Comp. Stat.

70/3.04 (a) (West 2012), which "promotes the humane care and

treatment of animals and punishes ... for violations thereof,"

expressly provides for the "forfeiture" of animals. People v. Koy,

13 N.E.3d 1260, 1266-67 (Ill. App. 2014). "Section 3.04 (a)

provides that the [s]tate's [a]ttorney may file a 'petition for

forfeiture prior to trial' and that the only possible ramification of

the petition is the permanent forfeiture of the animals seized in

conjunction with [an] arrest. ... Section 3.04 (a) allows the [s]tate

43a

Therefore, because an animal welfare proceeding

brought pursuant to § 22-329a does not constitute a

civil forfeiture, it is not subject to the exclusionary

rule pursuant to Plymouth Sedan.

C

Having determined that an animal welfare

proceeding brought pursuant to § 22-329a is not a civil

to take action before trial, not [as a punishment] but, rather, in

the spirit of the [a]ct, to ensure the well-being and continued

recovery of the injured animals." Id., 1267. Similarly, in

Mississippi, state law "provides that '[a]ll courts in the State of

Mississippi may order the seizure of an animal by a law

enforcement agency, for its care and protection upon a finding of

probable cause to believe said animal is being cruelly treated,

neglected or abandoned.' Miss. Code Ann. § 97-41-2 (1) (Rev.

2014). Subsection (2) allows an owner of a seized animal to

request a hearing within five days of the seizure 'to determine

whether the owner is able to provide adequately for the animal

and is fit to have custody of the animal.' Miss. Code Ann. § 9741-2 (2) (Rev. 2014). Subsection (3) provides a nonexhaustive list

of what a court may consider in determining whether the owner

is fit to have custody of an animal . . . . Subsection (5) delineates

the circumstances under which an animal may be permanently

forfeited: 'If the court finds the owner of the animal is unable or

unfit to adequately provide for the animal or that the animal is

severely injured, diseased, or suffering, and therefore, not likely

to recover, the court may order that the animal be permanently

forfeited and released to an animal control agency, animal

protection organization or to the appropriate entity to be

euthanized or the court may order that such animal be sold at

public sale in the manner now provided for judicial sales; any

proceeds from such sale shall go first toward the payment of

expenses and costs relating to the care and treatment of such

animal, and any excess amount shall be paid to the owner of the

animal.' Miss. Code Ann. § 97-41-2 (5) (Rev. 2014)." (Citation

omitted; emphasis added.) Dancy v. State, 287 So. 3d 931, 93637 (Miss. 2020); see also Wn. Rev. Code § 16.52.200 (3) (2020)

(expressly providing for forfeiture of animal following conviction

of animal cruelty).

44a

forfeiture proceeding, we now must determine

whether such a proceeding is quasi-criminal in

nature. The United States Supreme Court has

described a "quasi-criminal" proceeding as one whose

"object, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for

the commission of an offense against the law." One

1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, supra, 380

U.S. 700; see also Ahart v. Colorado Dept. of

Corrections, supra, 964 P.2d 520 ("A proceeding is

quasi-criminal if it provides for punishment but is

civil in form. . . . The more similar the objective of a

civil proceeding to the purpose of criminal

proceedings-punishment for violations of the law-the

more likely exclusion of the evidence will foster

deterrence. Perhaps the clearest example of civil

proceedings that are quasi-criminal are government

suits seeking forfeiture of non-contraband property

based on the theory that the owner used the property

in the commission of a criminal offense." (Citation

omitted.)).

We begin with the object of our state's animal

welfare proceedings. The defendant argues that

proceedings pursuant to § 22-329a, unlike our child

abuse and neglect proceedings, are not remedial in

nature. The plaintiff counters that animal welfare

actions "are standalone, remedial civil actions

designed to protect animals against neglect and

abuse." We agree with the plaintiff.

Unlike civil forfeiture actions, which are meant to

penalize the property owner, 28 remedial actions are

See Garrett v. Lehman, supra, 751 F.2d 1003 ("The

exclusionary rule has been applied to forfeiture proceedings

because they have been deemed to be 'quasi-criminal.' ... The

[c]ourt continues to instruct us, however, that the reason

28

45a

those actions that are designed to protect the rights

and interests of a specific, often vulnerable, group.

See Stone v. East Coast Swappers, LLC, supra, 337

Conn. 600-601 (Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices

Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., is remedial

measure designed to protect public); First Federal

Bank, FSB v. Whitney Development Corp., 237 Conn.

679, 688, 677 A.2d 1363 (1996) (tenant protection

statute is remedial given its purpose to protect certain

classes of tenants); see also J.R.B. v. Dept. of Human

Services, 633 N. W.2d 33, 39 (Minn. App. 2001)

(remedial statutes are those "designed to protect a

specific class of individuals" and therefore shall be

interpreted in favor of that class), review denied,

Minnesota Supreme Court (October 24, 2001); State

ex rel. Ford v. Wenskay, 824 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Mo. App.

1992) ("remedial statute is one 'enacted for the

protection of life and property, or which introduce[s]

some new regulation conducive to the public good'").

"[R]emedial statutes should be construed liberally in

favor of those whom the law is intended to [protect,

and] exceptions to those statutes should be construed

narrowly. . . . Commission on Human Rights &

Opportunities v. Edge Fitness, LLC, 342 Conn. 25, 37,

268 A.3d 630 (2022) .... [R]emedial statutes must be

afforded a liberal construction in favor of those whom

the legislature intended to benefit . . . ." (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Russbach

v. Yanez-Ventura, 213 Conn. App. 77, 102, 277 A.3d

874, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 902, 282 A.3d 465 (2022).

forfeiture proceedings are so characterized is that 'forfeiture is

clearly a penalty for the criminal offense.' [United States v. Janis,

supra 428 U.S. 447 n.17], quoting One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.

[Pennsylvania, supra, 380 U.S. 701] .... " (Citation omitted;

emphasis in original.)).

46a

With respect to the purpose of an animal welfare

action, this court has stated previously that "it is clear

from the legislative history that the primary purpose

of § 22-329a (a) is not the protection of the owner, but

rather the protection of animals from imminent

harm." 29 Wethersfield ex rel. Monde v. Eser, supra,

29 "When discussing the 2007 amendment on the floor of the

House of Representatives, Representative Gerry Fox explained

the origins of the amendment: 'This bill came to us from the

Commissioner of Agriculture and requested a change to the way

that animal control officers currently handle situations where

animals are treated cruelly or neglected. Presently, when an

animal control officer sees a situation that may appear to be

dangerous to an animal, they're required to go to court and get a

warrant. What this would allow is if there's reasonable cause to

believe that an animal [is] in imminent harm of being cruelly or

negligently treated, the animal control officer may, at that time,

seize the animal.' 50 H.R. Proc., Pt. 25, 2007 Sess., p. 8077,

remarks of Representative Gerry Fox. In support of the

legislation, Representative [Diana S.] Urban stated: 'This bill

makes it much easier when there is an animal that is being

subjected to cruel treatment or a cruel situation to get in and to

mitigate that situation and be able to move the horse, the dog,

the cat, the puppy, whatever it happens to be, out of that

situation and into a place where they will be able to receive the

treatment they need.' Id., pp. 8078-79, remarks of

Representative Diana Urban. In the judiciary committee, the

then Commissioner of Agriculture, F. Philip Prelli, explained

that 'the Department of Agriculture is the lead agency in

investigation of animal cruelty and negligence. . . Even if it's

done on a local level, the department is involved with those. The

primary purpose of [this] legislative proposal is to better define

and clarify the section to enable animal control officers to take

physical custody of animals that animal control officers have a

reasonable cause to believe are in imminent harm and are

neglected and/or being cruelly treated. One of the things that

we've noticed about the law that's there, it's been a while since

it's been modified, and the language tends to be language that

was written a number of years ago. . . . Usually, the animal

control officers will go in there and try to work with the people

47a

211 Conn. App. 551. In light of the clear purpose of

animal welfare actions to protect the health and

safety of animals, a vulnerable class, such actions are

remedial and not punitive, and, thus, not quasicriminal in nature. 30 The exclusionary rule,

therefore, does not apply to animal welfare actions on

the basis of quasi-criminality.

D

Finally, we must determine whether, pursuant to

the Janis balancing test, the exclusionary rule applies

to animal welfare actions. This court previously

applied the Janis balancing test in Payne v. Robinson,

10 Conn. App. 395, 523 A.2d 917 (1987), aff d, 207

to either get the animals fed, get the treatment up right, so

they're treated correctly, and then go to the steps. And if they

still feel they need to take those steps, they will get a warrant

first. So the steps we're defining here are never going to be the

norm. But there are times when our animal control officers will

see an animal that is truly in jeopardy of dying, and we've seen

that. We've seen horses down, and we've seen cows down, where

we've had to try to seize those animals and then go and get the

court order. So what this does is then sets up the procedure that

will give us the opportunity to seize the animals. Then within

[ninety-six] hours, we will have to get a court order . . . .' Conn.

Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 14, 2007

Sess., pp. 4422-23, remarks of Commissioner of Agriculture F.

Philip Prelli." Wethersfield ex rel. Monde v. Eser, supra, 211

Conn. App. 549-50.

30 This conclusion is also consistent with how this court has

classified an animal disposal action. See, e.g., Miller v. Dept. of

Agriculture, supra, 168 Conn. App. 268-69 ("An appeal of a

disposal order for a biting animal pursuant to [General Statutes]

§ 22-358 (c) is not a criminal prosecution. The issuance of a

disposal order under § 22-358 ( c) does not, by itself, trigger the

imposition of a fine or prison term on the owner. Rather, by

obviating the threat that dangerous animals pose to the public,

the provision is remedial and civil in nature." (Footnotes

omitted.)).

48a

Conn. 565, 541 A.2d 504, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898,

109 S. Ct. 242, 102 L. Ed. 2d 230 (1988). In Payne, this

court was faced with the question of whether the

exclusionary rule should apply to probation

revocation proceedings. We explained the Janis

balancing test as follows: "The exclusionary rule is . .

. designed to deter future unlawful conduct on the

part of law enforcement officers, and therefore the

rule is to be applied in those instances when its

deterrent purpose is likely to be served. . . . So, in

deciding whether to extend the exclusionary rule to

probation revocation hearings we must weigh the

potential injury to the fact-finding process as a result

of the exclusion of relevant evidence against the

potential benefits of the rule as applied in this

context." 31 (Citations omitted; footnote omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 398.

In addressing this claim, we first look to child

protection proceedings for guidance, as they share

important similarities with animal welfare

proceedings in that both seek to protect a vulnerable

class or group and both are civil, and not quasicriminal, in nature. See In re Samantha C., supra,

268 Conn. 649 (child neglect proceedings are civil and

not quasi-criminal); In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn 263,

282, 618 A.2d 1 (1992) (concluding that proceeding to

terminate parental rights is civil action). 32 In In re

31 After applying that test, this court determined in Payne "that

the potential injury to the function of the probation revocation

proceedings substantially outweighed the deterrent effect to be

gained by applying the exclusionary rule to [those] proceedings."

Payne v. Robinson, supra, 10 Conn. App. 400. Accordingly, we

concluded in Payne that the exclusionary rule did not apply to

the probation revocation proceeding at issue. See id.

32 See also In re Felicia S., 1993 WL 576430, *9 (Conn. Super.

May 21, 1993) ("A significant purpose of the criminal justice

49a

Nicholas R., supra, 92 Conn. App. 321, this court

concluded that the exclusionary rule does not apply to

a civil, child neglect proceeding. Similarly, in Matter

of Diane P., 110 App. Div. 2d 354, 494 N.Y.S.2d 881

(1985), appeal dismissed, 67 N.Y.2d 918, 492 N.E.2d

1235, 501 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1986), the Appellate

Division of the Supreme Court of New York rejected

the application of the exclusionary rule to a child

protection proceeding. Specifically, the court

concluded: "Upon weighing the likely deterrent effect

of the exclusionary rule against its detrimental

impact upon the fact-finding process and the [s]tate's

enormous interest in protecting the welfare of

children, we conclude that the rule should not be

applied in [child protection] proceedings. Rather, its

deterrence purpose will be adequately served by the

fact that any evidence seized pursuant to an illegal

search will be inadmissible in any related criminal

proceeding." Id., 354. In reaching that conclusion, the

court explained: "Principles of law designed to protect

the citizenry from improper police activities should

not be applied without regard to the grim realities

that permeate certain types of situations. A child

abused by a parent is bereft of any refuge and is

perhaps the most helpless and powerless of all

system is to punish the guilty. The purpose of child protection

proceedings, however, is by definition to protect children.

Although a parent whose child has been committed to [the

Department of Children and Families] or whose parental rights

have been terminated may feel punished, that result is purely

ancillary to the fundamental purpose of protecting children.

And, although the criminal justice system may have some role to

play in protecting the public and the rights of individuals, its

primary purpose is to adjudicate and punish the guilty."), affd

sub nom. In re Felicia D., 35 Conn. App. 490, 646 A.2d 862, cert.

denied, 231 Conn. 931, 649 A.2d 253 (1994).

50a

victims, betrayed by the very person to whom he or

she would most naturally tum for succor. We deal

here not with theoretical quibbles over abstract social

concepts, but with the urgent plight of those who most

need the protective hand of the [s]tate. We also

emphasize that the effects of applying the

exclusionary rule in a child protective proceeding

would potentially be immeasurably more devastating

than is true of the typical criminal prosecution.

Normally, in a criminal prosecution, if application of

the rule prevents the conviction of a guilty person, the

result will be that a past crime goes unpunished. It is

a price society has been willing to pay to prevent

unwarranted intrusions upon person or property.

Here, however, if application of the rule leads to an

erroneous finding that there has been no abuse, the

result may be to condemn an innocent child to a life of

pain and fear or even to death . . . . Where the result

would be so abhorrent, utilization of a rule normally

intended to provide protection from illegal police

activity is not justifiable.

"Nor does the potential impact upon a parent of a

child protective proceeding require application of the

rule. The possible consequences range from an order

placing the child under the supervision of a child

protective agency while remaining in parental

custody to temporary removal of the child for an

initial period of up to [eighteen] months .... Certainly,

such potential interference in family relationships

evokes the need for limited constitutional protections,

albeit not to the same extent as would a proceeding to

permanently remove the child . . . . These potential

consequences, however, are not intended to punish

the parent, but rather to protect the child. The effect

on the parent is but a necessary collateral result of

51a

the need to safeguard the child .... The [l]egislature

has specifically declared that the purpose of a child

protective proceeding is 'to help protect children from

injury or mistreatment and to help safeguard their

physical, mental, and emotional well-being' and to act

'on behalf of a child so that his needs are properly met'

.... On balance, the [s]tate's interest in protecting

abused children and the unthinkable consequences to

the children if they are left in the hands of abusive

parents far outweigh the potential consequences to

the parents." (Citations omitted.) Id., 357-58.

Accordingly, the court concluded "that because a child

protective proceeding itself is not punitive in nature

and the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule will

be adequately served by precluding use of the

evidence in any related criminal proceeding, the

[s]tate's interest in protecting its children mandates

the admissibility of relevant evidence seized during

an illegal search." Id., 358.

In State ex rel. A.R. v. C.R., 982 P.2d 73 (Utah

1999), the Supreme Court of Utah also addressed the

applicability of the exclusionary rule to a child

protection proceeding. In doing so, the court stated:

"In light of the purpose of the exclusionary rule, as

well as the [s]tate's interest in protecting children, it

is improper to exclude evidence discovered during a

warrantless search in subsequent child protection

proceedings. State officials confronting the possibility

of child abuse or neglect-emergencies that

occasionally lead to child protection proceedings-do

not ordinarily seek to uncover incriminating evidence

during the warrantless searches incidental to these

investigations. There is little incentive to violate the

[f]ourth [a]mendment because these officers do not

52a

usually act with the object of obtaining evidence for

criminal prosecution.

"There appears to be little likelihood that any

substantial deterrent effect on unlawful police

intrusion would be achieved by applying the

exclusionary rule to child protection proceedings.

Whatever deterrent effect there might be is far

outweighed by the need to provide for the safety and

health of children in peril. Although it is difficult to

empirically document the impact of the exclusionary

rule ... the very paucity of exclusionary rule cases in

the context of child welfare proceedings indicates that

allegations of improperly obtained evidence in such

proceedings are rare. Thus, extension of the

exclusionary rule to such cases does not promise to

add significant protection to ... [f]ourth [a]mendment

rights." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 78-79; see also In re Mary S., 186 Cal.

App. 3d 414, 418, 230 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1986) ("[a]

parent at a dependency hearing cannot assert the

[f]ourth [a]mendment exclusionary rule, since 'the

potential harm to children in allowing them to remain

in an unhealthy environment outweighs any

deterrent effect which would result from suppressing

evidence' unlawfully seized"), review denied,

California Supreme Court (December 3, 1986).

The reasoning underlying the refusal to apply the

exclusionary rule to child protection cases as set forth

in these cases can be analogized to the present animal

welfare action. Animals, like children, are part of a

vulnerable class, and the primary purpose of the

animal protection statute, § 22-329a, like the child

protection statutes, is to protect the safety and

welfare of animals that are subjected to neglect and

cruel treatment. Animals are dependent on their

53a

owners to provide the necessary food, shelter and care

for their health and well-being, and when they are

subjected to abuse and cruelty at the hands of their

owners, they are helpless and in need of the protective

hand of the state. As this court previously has stated,

the state has a "significant interest in protecting the

welfare of neglected or cruelly treated animals .... "

Wethersfield ex rel. Monde v. Eser, supra, 211 Conn.

App. 558. If we were to apply the exclusionary rule to

cases in which the welfare of an animal is threatened,

we would prevent the state from being able to off er

crucial evidence related to the neglect or abuse of

animals that could be used to help remove the animal

from such an environment. Consequently, the social

cost resulting from application of the exclusionary

rule in this context is that the protection of animals

would be hindered.

With respect to any benefit, or the deterrent effect,

of applying the exclusionary rule in the present

situation, we note that our Supreme Court previously

has stated that there is "only a marginal deterrent

effect ... [in cases when] there [is] already a deterrent

effect created by the application of the rule to any

criminal proceedings, and because the use of evidence

in a [civil] proceeding falls outside a [law

enforcement] officer's zone of primary interest . . . that

exclusion of such evidence will not significantly affect

a [law enforcement] officer's motivation in conducting

a search." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Jacobs, 229 Conn. 385, 391, 641 A.2d 1351 (1994).

The deterrent effect of applying the exclusionary rule

in this context, therefore, would be minimal. See

Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott,

supra, 524 U.S. 364 (discussing minimal deterrence

benefit of applying exclusionary rule to civil parole

54a

revocation hearing because "application of the rule in

the criminal trial context already provides significant

deterrence of unconstitutional searches"). Notably,

there are analogous criminal statutes, such as § 53-24

7, that allow for the criminal prosecution of

individuals who neglect or abuse animals, and any

criminal proceedings stemming from violations of

those statutes would, of course, be subject to the

exclusionary rule. As in Matter of Diane P., we

embrace the proposition that the use of illegally

seized evidence in an animal welfare case would not

impact a subsequent "related criminal prosecution

because normal application of the exclusionary rule

would in any event preclude use of that evidence in

the criminal prosecution." Matter of Diane P., supra,

110 App. Div. 2d 358. Accordingly, the potential harm

to animals from allowing them to remain in an

environment in which they are being neglected or

cruelly treated outweighs any deterrent effect that

would result from suppressing evidence unlawfully

seized. Moreover, the minimal deterrent effect of

applying the exclusionary rule in the present case is

substantially outweighed by the societal interest in

having otherwise reliable and relevant evidence

concerning animal neglect and cruelty presented at

an animal welfare proceeding seeking to remove the

animal from such circumstances.

We also emphasize that, in the absence of

imminent harm to an animal, the typical procedure as

set forth under § 22-329a (b) for an animal control

officer to enter a premises is by first obtaining a

warrant. 33 That is the procedure established by the

33 See Wethersfield ex rel. Monde v. Eser, supra, 211 Conn. App.

550-51 ("According to the legislative history, the process in§ 22329a (a) for taking physical custody of animals in imminent

55a

statute, and animal control officers need to be

properly trained to follow that procedure. Our

decision today does not condone the warrantless entry

of private residences. 34 Instead, we are charged with

harm is not the norm. Rather, the usual process is codified in §

22-329a (b), which provides in relevant part that '[a]ny animal

control officer or regional animal control officer . . . may take

physical custody of any animal upon issuance of a warrant

finding probable cause that such animal is neglected or is cruelly

treated .... ' ").

34 Indeed, such warrantless entries may subject an animal

control officer to civil liability for the illegal search and seizure,

regardless of whether the defendant can rely on illegally

obtained evidence in this animal welfare proceeding. See, e.g.,

Newsome v. Bogan, 617 F. Supp. 3d 133 (W.D.N.Y. 2022) (action

by dog owner against, inter alia, police officers and animal

control officer pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that

defendants searched his apartment and seized his dogs without

warrant in violation of fourth amendment to federal

constitution); Christensen v. Quinn, 45 F. Supp. 3d 1043 (D.S.D.

2014) (owner of dog breeding operation brought action against

various county and state officials, county's animal control

services provider, and animal rights groups, under § 1983

alleging violations of his fourth amendment rights); see also

O'Neill v. Louisville/Jefferson Metro Government, 662 F.3d 723,

727, 732 (6th Cir. 2011) (dog owners brought § 1983 action

against various government officials, including director of city

animal control agency, alleging violations of fourth and

fourteenth amendments stemming from warrantless search of

dog owners' home and seizure of dogs). This threat of civil

liability will adequately deter animal control officers from

violating the fourth amendment, regardless of whether the

exclusionary

rule applies in civil cases. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586,

597-98, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2006). The "additional

marginal deterrence" of applying the exclusionary rule in this

context would not "outweigh the societal cost of excluding

relevant evidence and decreasing the possibility of obtaining

accurate factual findings." Jonas v. Atlanta, 647 F.2d 580, 588

(5th Cir. Unit B June 1981).

56a

deciding whether, under the circumstances here, in

which that procedure was not followed, the

exclusionary rule, which is a judicially created

doctrine that historically applies in the context of

criminal trials, should be extended and applied to the

present civil animal welfare proceeding. Our

application of the Janis balancing test leads us to

conclude that it should not, given that the application

of the rule would yield a minimal deterrence benefit

while at the same time it would frustrate and hinder

the purpose of our animal welfare statute and the

protection of animals.

Accordingly, the trial court's ruling denying the

defendant's motion in limine was legally and logically

correct.

II

We now tum to the defendant's claim that her

right to a jury trial under article first, § 19, of the

Connecticut constitution was violated. The defendant

argues in support of this claim that the government

may forfeit the property of an individual only "if it

allows [the individual] to contest that position in a

court of law before a jury," and that because § 22-329a

provides for a hearing before a court only, as opposed

to a jury trial, before allowing the court to vest

ownership of the animals with the plaintiff, the

statute violates her state constitutional right to a jury

trial. The defendant concedes that she never

requested a jury trial and, thus, that this claim was

not preserved but argues that it is reviewable

pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40,

567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R.,

317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).

57a

Our resolution of this claim is governed by this

court's decision in Delahunty v. Targonski, 158 Conn.

App. 741, 746-50, 121 A.3d 727 (2015). In Delahunty,

"[t]he sole claim raised by the plaintiff in her appeal

[was] that she was denied her state constitutional

right to a trial by a jury. Specifically, she argue[d]

that the case was claimed for a jury trial, albeit by

[the third-party defendants], and the denial of her

right to a jury trial constituted structural error. She

concede[d] that th[e] claim was not preserved and

[sought] review under State v. Golding, supra, 213

Conn. 239-40. See, e.g., State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726,

743, 91 A.3d 862 (2014) (bedrock principle of appellate

jurisprudence that appellate courts generally will not

review unpreserved claims made for first time on

appeal). We conclude[d] that, under the facts and

circumstances of th[e] case, she waived her right to a

jury trial and therefore her claim fail[ed] to satisfy the

third prong of Golding.

"In State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239-40, our

Supreme Court stated that 'a defendant can prevail

on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at

trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1)

the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of

error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude

alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the

alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . .

deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and ( 4) if

subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed

to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged

constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In

the absence of any one of these conditions, the

defendant's claim will fail. The appellate tribunal is

free, therefore, to respond to the defendant's claim by

focusing on whichever condition is most relevant in

58a

the particular circumstances.' . . . Golding applies in

civil as well as criminal cases. . . .

"We are mindful that '[i]n the usual Golding

situation, the defendant raises a claim on appeal

which, while not preserved at trial, at least was not

waived at trial . . . . [A] constitutional claim that has

been waived does not satisfy the third prong of the

Golding test because, in such circumstances, we

simply cannot conclude that injustice [has been] done

to either party ... or that the alleged constitutional

violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of

a fair trial. . . . To reach a contrary conclusion would

result in an ambush of the trial court by permitting

the defendant to raise a claim on appeal that his or

her counsel expressly had abandoned in the trial

court.' . . . State v. Reddick, 153 Conn. App. 69, 80-81,

100 A.3d 439, [cert.] dismissed, 314 Conn. 934, 102

A.3d 85 [2014], and cert. denied, 315 Conn. 904, 104

A.3d 757 (2014); see also Mozell v. Commissioner of

Correction, 291 Conn. 62, 70-71, 967 A.2d 41 (2009);

State v. Fabricatore, 281 Conn. 469, 481-83, 915 A.2d

872 (2007). Simply put, a constitutional claim that

has been waived does not satisfy the third prong of

Golding. . . .

"We recently discussed waiver in the context of a

claim made pursuant to the Golding doctrine.

'[W]aiver is [t]he voluntary relinquishment or

abandonment-express or implied-of a legal right or

notice. . . . In determining waiver, the conduct of the

parties is of great importance .... [TV]aiver may be

effected by action of counsel. . . . When a party

consents to or expresses satisfaction with an issue at

trial, claims arising from that issue are deemed

waived and may not be reviewed on appeal. ... Thus,

59a

[w]aiver ... involves the idea of assent, and assent is

an act of understanding ....

" 'It is well established that implied waiver . . .

arises from an inference that the defendant knowingly

and voluntarily relinquished the right in

question. . . . Waiver does not have to be express . . .

but may consist of acts or conduct from which waiver

may be implied. . . . In other words, waiver may be inf

erred from the circumstances if it is reasonable to do

so .... It also is well established that any such

inference must be based on a course of conduct. . . .

Relevant cases inform us that a criminal defendant

may implicitly waive one or more of his or her

fundamental rights. . . . In some circumstances, a

waiver of rights must be knowing, voluntary and

intelligent, and it must be expressly made. . . . In

other circumstances, waiver can be implied ... [and]

[t]he waiver can be made by counsel ... .'"(Citations

omitted; emphasis in original.) Delahunty v.

Targonski, supra, 158 Conn. App. 746-49.

The court in Delahunty further stated: "In

criminal cases, our Supreme Court has held that the

defendant must personally waive the fundamental

right to a jury trial and there must be some

affirmative indication from the defendant, on the

record, that he or she knowingly, intelligently and

voluntarily has waived the right to a jury trial. State

v. Gore, 288 Conn. 770, 777-78, [955] A.2d 1 (2008). It

also has recognized, however, that a lower standard

for waiving the right to a jury applies in civil cases. L

& R Realty v. Connecticut National Bank, 246 Conn.

1, 14, 715 A.2d 748 (1998) (appropriate to apply lower

standard

in

determining

enforceability

of

prelitigation contractual jury trial waivers than for

waivers in criminal case); see also Fuentes v. Shevin,

60a

407 U.S. 67, 94-95, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556

(1972) (standards for waivers of rights in criminal

case would not necessarily apply to civil litigation).

"A party may forfeit the right to a jury trial in a

civil case if the right is not asserted in a timely

manner, may abandon the right to a jury trial if he or

she chooses a forum that does not afford the right to

a jury trial, or may waive the right to a jury trial. L &

R Realty v. Connecticut National Bank, supra, 246

Conn. 10; see Anastasia v. Mitsock, Superior Court,

judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-054012156-S, 2006 WL 3759402(December 1, 2006) (42

Conn. L. Rptr. 453, 454) (summary of law since 1899

that failure to claim civil action to jury within thirty

days of return date or within ten days after an issue

of fact has been joined amounts to voluntary and

intentional relinquishment of right to jury trial); see

also General Statutes §§ 51-239b and 52-215.

"In the present matter, the plaintiff did not claim

the case for a jury trial. The ... [third-party]

defendants, filed the claim for a jury trial. On April

18, 2013, the [third-party defendants] filed a motion

for a court trial and certified that a copy of their

motion was sent to the plaintiffs counsel. In a

handwritten notation dated April 29, 2013, the court

granted the ... motion by agreement and noted that

the plaintiffs counsel was present. The motion to

withdraw the [third-party] complaint was filed by the

defendants on May 31, 2013. Most importantly, the

plaintiff appeared for a trial by the court and never

raised any objection to the proceedings, namely, the

absence of a jury. We conclude that, under the facts

and circumstances of this case, the plaintiff waived

her constitutional right to a jury trial." (Footnotes

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

61a

Delahunty v. Targonski, supra, 158 Conn. App. 74950.

This court explained further in Delahunty that

"[t]he failure of the plaintiff to raise an objection at

the start of the court trial, after receiving notice that

the [third-party] defendant had moved for a court

trial and that there had been no jury selection,

combined with her active and full participation in the

ensuing trial, indicate[d] that she had acquiesced to a

court trial and correspondingly relinquished her right

to a jury trial. She failed to object at the start of the

court trial, when there was time to present the matter

to the court, so that a possible error could be

addressed and corrected if necessary. Instead, she

remained silent and participated fully in the court

trial. Only after receiving nominal damages did the

plaintiff seek to exercise her right to a jury trial. Put

another way, the plaintiff now seeks a proverbial

second bite at the apple after receiving an award that

was less than she had hoped for. We cannot endorse

such a tactic, as it amounts to an ambush of both the

trial court and the opposing party. We will not reward

the plaintiff with a new trial based on a situation that

was caused in part by her failure to raise an objection

.... We conclude that, under these facts and

circumstances, the plaintiff waived her right to a jury

trial. As a result, her claim fails under the third prong

of Golding." (Citation omitted.) Id., 751-52.

As in Delahunty, the defendant in the present case

never requested a jury trial. Moreover, she failed to

raise any objection prior to the commencement of the

hearing before the court and she actively participated

in it. On this basis, we conclude that the defendant

waived her claim that she was entitled to a jury trial

under the state constitution. As a result, she cannot

62a

demonstrate a constitutional violation under the

third prong of Golding. 35 Her claim, therefore, fails.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

35 In light of our determination that the defendant waived her

unpreserved jury trial claim, we need not reach the merits of her

claim that she has a right to a jury trial under the state

constitution in an animal welfare action pursuant to § 22-329a,

nor do we need to address the case relied on by the defendant in

her notice of supplemental authority-Securities & Exchange

Commission v. Jarkesy, U.S., 144 S. Ct. 2117, 219 L. Ed. 2d 650

(2024)-which concerns the right to a jury trial under the seventh

amendment to the federal constitution.

63a

[FILED DECEMBER 17, 2024]

SUPREME COURT

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

PSC-240207

STATE OF CONNECTICUT EX REL JEREMIAH

DUNN, CHIEF STATE ANIMAL CONTROL

OFFICER

v.

JOANN CONNELLY ET AL.

ORDER ON PETITION FOR

CERTIFICATION TO APPEAL

The named defendant's petition for certification to

appeal from the Appellate Court, 228 Conn. App. 458

(AC 46113), is denied.

Trey Mayfield and Garrett Denniston, in support of

the petition.

Daniel M. Salton, assistant attorney general, in

opposition.

Decided December 17, 2024

By the Court,

/s/

Cory M. Daige

Assistant Clerk – Appellate

Notice Sent: December 17, 2024

Petition Filed: November 18, 2024

Hon. Matthew J. Budzik

Clerk, Superior Court, HHD-CV22-6154457-S

Clerk, Appellate Court

Reporter of Judicial Decisions

Staff Attorneys’ Office

Counsel of Record

64a

[FILED DECEMBER 13, 2022]

DOCKET NO.: HHD CV-22-6154457-S

SUPERIOR COURT JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

HARTFORD AT HARTFORD

STATE OF CONNECTICUT EX REL

JEREMIAH DUNN, CHIEF STATE

ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICER

v.

THIRTY-THREE DOGS,

TWENTY-EIGHT CATS, FIVE DUCKS,

THREE GOATS, ONE PARAKEET, AND

ONE PONY AND JOANN CONNELLY

AND CT PREGNANT DOG AND

CAT RESCUE, INC.

DECEMBER 13, 2022

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Before the court is a petition pursuant to General

Statutes § 22-329a (g) by the State of Connecticut ex

rel, Jeremiah Dunn, Chief State Animal Control

Officer of the State of Connecticut, seeking

permanent custody of thirty-three (33) dogs, twentyeight (28) cats, five (5) ducks, three (3) goats, one ( 1)

parakeet, and one (1) pony (together, the subject

animals). The State alleges that the subject animals

were abused and/or neglected by defendants Joann

Connelly and CT Pregnant Dog and Cat Rescue, Inc.,

because the subject animals were not given proper

care and because they were exposed to noxious air and

unsanitary living conditions in violation of General

Statutes § 53-247(a).

After a hearing on the merits of the application,

the court agrees with the State. The court has

65a

previously heard evidence on this application during

a hearing on the State’s application for temporary

custody. See State of Connecticut ex. rel. Jeremiah

Dunn v. Thirty-Three Dogs et al., 2022 WL 2158331

(Conn. Super. Ct., June 15, 2022) (Doc. No. 128.10).

The Court reaches the same conclusion on the

application for permanent custody as the court did on

the application for temporary custody. The evidence

presented by the State demonstrates that the subject

animals were abused, neglected, and cruelly treated

by Ms. Connelly and CT Pregnant Dog and Cat

Rescue because the subject animals were not given

proper care and were not given wholesome air.

Therefore, the Court finds in favor of the State and

vests permanent custody of the subject animals in the

Connecticut Department of Agriculture.

FACTS

The court held a virtual hearing on the State's

application for temporary custody on May 26, 2022.

After the hearing, the court issued a written ruling

finding facts, making legal conclusions, and vesting

temporary custody of the subject animals with the

State. See State of Connecticul ex. rel Jeremiah Dunn

v. Thirty-Three Dogs et al., 2022 WL 2158331 (Conn.

Super. Ct., June 15, 2022) (Doc. No. 128.10). On

October 18, 2022, the court held a virtual hearing on

the State's application for permanent custody. The

State moved that the court take judicial notice of the

testimony presented at the prior May 26th hearing,

the exhibits entered into evidence at that hearing,

and the court's subsequent June 15. 2022 decision.

The court granted the State's motion (see Doc. No. 131

.86) and entered into evidence as full exhibits in the

October 18th hearing all of the State's exhibits offered

into evidence at the May 26th hearing. The State then

66a

rested its case. As the trier of fact, the court must

weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of

witnesses. Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Proctor,

324 Conn. 245, 259, 152 A.3d 470 (2016). With that

duty in mind, the court reaffirms, readopts, and

incorporates herein all of the court's findings of fact

as set forth in its June 15th Memorandum of Decision,

as if fully set forth herein.

In her case-in-chief, Ms. Connelly first called

Tanya Wescovich, an animal control officer with the

State of Connecticut. Officer Wescovich testified that

she did not use any scientific measuring device to

measure the air quality in Ms. Connelly's house at

171 Porter Road in Hebron (the property). After

Officer Wescovich, Ms. Connelly called Lee Murphy, a

doctor of veterinary medicine. Dr. Murphy has been a

veterinarian since 1985. Dr. Murphy testified that she

had reviewed the State's exhibits and that the State's

exhibits were the basis of her opinions. Dr. Murphy

did not examine any of the subject animals and never

visited the property. Dr. Murphy opined that while

the sanitary conditions in which the subject animals

lived were "not adequate," none of the animals were

in life threatening conditions and that the subject

animals had sufficient food, water, and shelter. Dr.

Murphy also testified that the house that the subject

animals lived in was more like a "barn," and that

while a barn was ·'probably not" a proper

environment for the subject animals, the conditions

were not actually "cruel" and the animals were not

'·neglected,'" in Dr. Murphy's view. After Dr. Murphy

testified, Ms. Connelly testified that she spent a

significant amount of money ($132,000.00) on

veterinary bills for the subject animals in an effort to

keep the subject animals healthy and well cared for

67a

and that many of the gastrointestinal issues suffered

by the subject animals and documented in the

veterinary records, see Exs. 24-26, were common in

rescued animals.

In its role as fact finder, the court credits Dr.

Murphy's testimony as set forth above, excepting

those portions of Dr. Murphy's testimony in which Dr.

Murphy opines that the subject animals were not

neglected or cruelly treated (which portion of Dr.

Murphy's testimony the court does not credit). ' The

court also does not credit Dr. Murphy's testimony

with respect to the specific medical conditions of any

of the subject animals because Dr. Murphy did not

examine any of the subject animals. The court credits

the testimony of Ms. Connelly as set forth above with

respect to the amount of money she spent on

veterinary services. The court does not credit the

remainder of Ms. Connelly's testimony.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

General Statutes § 22-329a (g) states, in relevant

part, that "[i]f, after hearing, the court finds that the

animal is neglected or cruelly treated, it shall vest

ownership of the animal in any state, municipal or

other public or private agency which is permitted by

law to care for neglected or cruelly treated animals or

with any person found to be suitable or worthy of such

responsibility by the court." "[T]o determine what

constitutes neglect under § 22- 329a under the

circumstances of this case, we must look to the

language of § 53 247. Section 53-247 provides in

relevant part: '(a) Any person who ... deprives of

necessary sustenance ... any animal, or who. having

impounded or confined any animal, fails to give such

animal proper care or ... fails to supply any such

68a

animal with wholesome air, food and water, or ...

having charge or custody of any animal…fails to

provide it with proper food, drink or protection from

the weather….shall be fined not more than one

thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one

year or both…’ It is reasonable to conclude, therefore,

that the neglect referred to in § 22-329a includes the

failure to provide necessary sustenance, proper care,

wholesome air, food and water under § 53-247(a)”

State ex rel. Gregan v. Koczur, 287 Conn. 145, 153-154

(2008). General Statutes § 22-329a also provides that

if an animal, seized or put in temporary care and

custody, was found to be neglected or cruelly treated,

then the owner is responsible for payment of the

expenses incurred by the agency in providing proper

food, shelter and care to such animal. The expenses

are calculated at the rate of fifteen dollars per day per

animal, plus veterinary costs and expenses not

covered by the per diem rate. See General Statutes §

22-329A (h). Where the conduct at issue implicates

the “unmistakable core of prohibited conduct” the

violation of the statue’s requirement of “proper care”

is determined from the perspective of a person of

ordinary intelligence. State ex rel. Gregan v. Koczur,

287 Conn. at 158. The State bears the burden of

proving its claims by a fair preponderance of the

evidence. Id., at 151, 155.

Here, the court finds, by a preponderance of the

evidence, the Ms. Connelly and CT Pregnant Dog and

Cat Rescue abused, neglected, and cruelly treated

subject animals because Ms. Connelly and CT

Pregnant Dog and Cat Rescue failed to give the

subject animals “proper care” and provide them with

“wholesome air” as those terms are defined by

General Statutes§ 53-247. As set forth in more detail

69a

in the Court’s Memorandum of Decision dated June

15, 2022, which factual and legal conclusions are

expressly adopted and incorporated herein as if fully

set forth herein, the conditions at the property were

unsanitary and filthy and the medical conditions of

the subject animals reflected those unsanitary and

filthy conditions. In particular, the long-term

presence and accumulation of urine and feces in the

house at 171 Porter Road produced an unwholesome

air quality heavily laden with harmful ammonia gas.

Nothing presented in hearing on permanent custody

changes the factual or legal conclusions reached by

the court in its June 15, 2022 Memorandum of

Decision on temporary custody. Indeed, Dr. Murphy

affirmatively testified that the sanitary conditions in

which the subject animals lived were "not adequate,"

and that the barn-like conditions the subject animals

lived in were "probably not" a proper environment for

the subject animals.

The court concludes that any person of ordinary

intelligence would have known that the conditions at

the property, barn, and house as set forth in this

Memorandum of Decision and the court's

Memorandum of Decision on temporary custody dated

June 15, 2022, did not meet the standard of proper

care and wholesome air as required by General

Statutes§ 53-247.

CONCLUSION

Based on all of the foregoing, and pursuant to

General Statutes § 22-329a (g), the court finds the

animals that are the subject or this matter (thirtythree (33) dogs, twenty-eight (28) cats, five (5) ducks,

three (3) goats, one (1) parakeet, and one (1) pony),

were neglected and/or cruelly treated and therefore

70a

the court vests permanent ownership of the subject

animals in the Connecticut Department of

Agriculture. The court further orders that pursuant

to General Statutes§ 22-329a (h), the defendant

Joann Connelly shall pay the expenses incurred by

the State in providing proper food, shelter and care to

the subject animals calculated at the rate of fifteen

dollars per day per animal from March 25, 2022, the

date the subject animals were seized by the State.

71a

[FILED OCTOBER 18, 2022]

ORDER 438570

SUPERIOR COURT

JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARTFORD

AT HARTFORD

10/18/2022

DOCKET NO: HHDCV226154457S

STATE OF CONNECTICUT EX REL

JEREMIAH DUNN, CHIEF S

v.

THIRTY-THREE DOGS Et Al

ORDER

ORDER REGARDING

10/11/2022 139.00

RECONSIDER

MOTION

TO

REARGUE

The foregoing. having been considered by the Court,

is hereby:

ORDER: NO ACTION NECESSARY

Superior Court Results Automated Mailing (SCRAM)

Notice was sent on the underlying: motion.

438570

_________________________________

Judge: MATTHEW JOSEPH BUDZIK

72a

[FILED OCTOBER 6, 2022]

ORDER 438570

SUPERIOR COURT

JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARTFORD

AT HARTFORD

10/6/2022

DOCKET NO: HHDCV226154457S

STATE OF CONNECTICUT EX REL

JEREMIAH DUNN, CHIEF S

v.

THIRTY-THREE DOGS Et Al

ORDER

ORDER REGARDING

09/27/2022 135.00 MOTION IN LIMINE

The foregoing. having been considered by the Court,

is hereby:

ORDER: DENIED

The exclusionary rule does not apply to civil cases.

Judicial Notice (JDNO) was sent regarding this order.

438570

_________________________________

Judge: MATTHEW JOSEPH BUDZIK

73a

U.S. Const. amend. IV:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no

warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly

describing the place to be searched, and the persons

or things to be seized.

74a

C.G.S.A. § 22-329a

§ 22-329a. Seizure and custody of neglected or

cruelly treated animals. Vesting of ownership

of animal. Animal abuse cost recovery account

(a) Any animal control officer or regional animal

control officer appointed pursuant to section 22-328,

22-331 or 22-331a, as applicable, may take physical

custody of any animal when such animal control

officer has reasonable cause to believe that such

animal is in imminent harm and is neglected or is

cruelly treated in violation of section 22-366, 22-415,

53-247, 53-248, 53-249, 53-249a, 53-250, 53-251, 53252 or 53a-73b, and, not later than ninety-six hours

after taking physical custody, shall proceed as

provided in subsection (c) of this section, except that

if, in the opinion of a licensed veterinarian or the

State Veterinarian, at any time after physical custody

of such animal is taken, such animal is so injured or

diseased that it should be euthanized immediately,

such officer may have such animal humanely

euthanized by a licensed veterinarian.

(b) Any animal control officer or regional animal

control officer appointed pursuant to section 22-328,

22-331 or 22-331a, as applicable, may take physical

custody of any animal upon issuance of a warrant

finding probable cause that such animal is neglected

or is cruelly treated in violation of section 22-366, 22415, 53-247, 53-248, 53-249, 53-249a, 53-250, 53-251,

53-252 or 53a-73b, and shall thereupon proceed as

provided in subsection (c) of this section except that

if, in the opinion of a licensed veterinarian or the

State Veterinarian, at any time after physical custody

of such animal is taken, such animal is so injured or

diseased that it should be euthanized immediately,

75a

such officer may have such animal humanely

euthanized by a licensed veterinarian.

(c) Such officer shall file with the superior court which

has venue over such matter or with the superior court

for the judicial district of Hartford at Hartford a

verified petition plainly stating such facts of neglect

or cruel treatment as to bring such animal within the

jurisdiction of the court and praying for appropriate

action by the court in accordance with the provisions

of this section. Upon the filing of such petition, the

court shall cause a summons to be issued requiring

the owner or owners or person having responsibility

for the care of the animal, if known, to appear in court

at the time and place named.

(d) If physical custody of an animal has been taken

pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this section and it

appears from the allegations of the petition filed

pursuant to subsection (c) of this section and other

affirmations of fact accompanying the petition, or

provided subsequent thereto, that there is reasonable

cause to find that the animal's condition or the

circumstances surrounding its care require that

temporary care and custody be immediately assumed

to safeguard its welfare, the court shall either (1)

issue an order to show cause why the court should not

vest in some suitable state, municipal or other public

or private agency or person the animal's temporary

care and custody pending a hearing on the petition, or

(2) issue an order vesting in some suitable state,

municipal or other public or private agency or person

the animal's temporary care and custody pending a

hearing on the petition. A hearing on the order issued

by the court pursuant to subdivision (1) or (2) of this

subsection shall be held not later than fourteen days

after the issuance of such order. The service of such

76a

order may be made by any officer authorized by law

to serve process, state police officer or indifferent

person and shall be served not less than forty-eight

hours prior to the date and time of such hearing. If

the owner or owners or person having responsibility

for the care of the animal is not known, notice of the

time and place of the hearing shall be given by

publication in a newspaper having a circulation in the

town in which such officer took physical custody of

such animal not less than forty-eight hours prior to

the date and time of such hearing.

(e) If physical custody of an animal has not been taken

pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this section, and

such officer has reasonable cause to believe that an

animal is neglected or is cruelly treated in violation of

section 22-366, 22-415, 53-247, 53-248, 53-249, 53249a, 53-250, 53-251, 53-252 or 53a-73b, such officer

may file a petition with the superior court which has

venue over such matter or with the superior court for

the judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, plainly

stating such facts of neglect or cruel treatment as to

bring the animal within the jurisdiction of the court

and praying for appropriate action by the court to

ensure the welfare of the animal, including, but not

limited to, physical removal and temporary care and

custody of the animal, an order to compel the owner

of any such animal to provide care in a manner that

the court determines is necessary, authorization of an

animal control officer or regional animal control

officer appointed pursuant to section 22-328, 22-331

or 22-331a, as applicable, or a licensed veterinarian to

provide care for the animal on site, vesting of

ownership of the animal, the posting of a bond in

accordance with subsection (f) of this section and the

assessment of costs in accordance with subsection (h)

77a

of this section. Upon the filing of such petition, the

court shall cause a summons for an order to show

cause to be issued requiring the owner or owners or

person having responsibility for the care of the

animal, if known, to appear in court at the time and

place named. If the owner or owners or person having

responsibility for the care of the animal is not known,

notice of the time and place of the hearing shall be

given by publication in a newspaper having a

circulation in the town where the animal is located

not less than forty-eight hours prior to the date and

time of the hearing. If it appears from the allegations

of the petition filed pursuant to this subsection and

other affirmations of fact accompanying the petition,

or provided subsequent thereto, that there is

reasonable cause to find that the animal's condition

or the circumstances surrounding its care require the

immediate removal of the animal from the owner or

owners or person having responsibility for the care of

the animal to safeguard its welfare, the court shall

issue an order vesting in some suitable state,

municipal or other public or private agency or person

the animal's temporary care and custody pending a

hearing on the petition which hearing shall be held

not later than ten days after the issuance of such

order for such temporary care and custody. The

service of such order may be made by any officer

authorized by law to serve process, state police officer

or indifferent person and shall be served not less than

forty-eight hours prior to the date and time of such

hearing.

(f) If the court issues an order vesting the animal's

temporary care and custody in some suitable state,

municipal or other public or private agency or person,

the owner or owners shall either relinquish ownership

78a

of the animal or post a cash bond with the agency or

person in whom the animal's temporary care and

custody was vested or with such agency's counsel of

record in the case. The cash bond shall be in the

amount of one thousand dollars for each animal

placed in the temporary care or custody of such

agency or person and shall secure payment for the

reasonable expenses of the agency or person having

temporary care and custody of the animal in caring

and providing for such animal until the court makes

a finding as to the animal's disposition under

subsection (g) of this section. The requirement that a

bond be posted may be waived if such owner provides

satisfactory evidence that such owner is indigent and

unable to pay for such bond.

(g) (1) If, after hearing, the court finds that the animal

is neglected or cruelly treated, it shall vest ownership

of the animal in any state, municipal or other public

or private agency which is permitted by law to care

for neglected or cruelly treated animals or with any

person found to be suitable or worthy of such

responsibility by the court.

(2) If, after hearing, the court finds that the animal is

so injured or diseased that it should be humanely

euthanized, the court may order that such animal be

humanely euthanized by a licensed veterinarian.

(3) If, after hearing, the court finds that the animal is

not neglected or cruelly treated, it may cause the

animal to be returned to its owner or owners or person

having responsibility for its care or, if such owner or

owners or person is unknown or unwilling to resume

caring for such animal, it may vest ownership of the

animal in any state, municipal or other public or

79a

private agency or person found to be suitable or

worthy of such responsibility.

(4) If the court makes a finding under subdivision (1)

or (2) of this subsection less than thirty days after the

issuance of an order of temporary care and custody

and the owner of the animal has posted a bond, the

agency or person with whom the bond was posted

shall return the balance of such bond, if any, to the

owner. The amount of the bond to be returned to the

owner shall be calculated at the rate of twenty dollars

per day per animal or thirty dollars per day per

animal if the animal is a horse or other large livestock

for the number of days less than thirty that such

agency or person has not had temporary care and

custody of the animal less any veterinary costs and

expenses incurred for the welfare of the animal.

(5) If the court makes a finding under subdivision (3)

of this subsection after the issuance of an order of

temporary care and custody and the owner of the

animal has posted a bond, the agency or person with

whom the bond was posted shall return such bond to

such owner.

(h) If the court finds that the animal is neglected or

cruelly treated, the expenses incurred by the state or

a municipality in providing proper food, shelter and

care to an animal it has taken custody of under

subsection (a) or (b) of this section and the expenses

incurred by any state, municipal or other public or

private agency or person in providing temporary care

and custody pursuant to an order vesting temporary

care and custody, calculated at the rate of twenty

dollars per day per animal or thirty dollars per day

per animal if the animal is a horse or other large

livestock until the date ownership is vested pursuant

80a

to subdivision (1) of subsection (g) of this section shall

be paid by the owner or owners or person having

responsibility for the care of the animal. In addition,

all veterinary costs and expenses incurred for the

welfare of the animal shall be paid by the owner or

owners or person having responsibility for the animal.

(i) If the court vests ownership of the animal in the

Commissioner of Agriculture or a municipality, the

commissioner or the municipality may conduct or

participate in a public auction of the animal under

such conditions the commissioner or the municipality

deems necessary or the commissioner or the

municipality may consign the animal to an auction or

sell the animal through an open advertised bid

process whereby bid price and demonstration of

sufficient knowledge and ability to care for such

animal are factors for the commissioner's or

municipality's consideration. All moneys collected

from the sale of animals sold by the Commissioner of

Agriculture through such open advertised bid process

shall be deposited in the animal abuse cost recovery

account established in subsection (j) of this section.

All moneys collected from the sale of animals sold by

a municipality through such open advertised bid

process shall be deposited by the town treasurer or

other fiscal officer in the town's general fund. The

commissioner or the municipality may also vest

ownership of any such animal in an individual or a

public or private nonprofit animal rescue or adoption

organization. Any record containing the name,

address or other personally identifying information of

the new owner of such animal shall be exempt from

disclosure under state law, provided such information

may be disclosed pursuant to the issuance of a lawful

subpoena.

81a

(j) There is established a separate, nonlapsing

account within the General Fund, to be known as the

“animal abuse cost recovery account”. All moneys

collected from sales at public auction of animals

seized by the Department of Agriculture pursuant to

this section shall be deposited into the account.

Deposits of moneys may be made into the account

from public or private sources, including, but not

limited to, the federal government or municipal

governments.

(k) Notwithstanding any provision of the general

statutes, any moneys received by the Department of

Agriculture pursuant to subsection (j) of this section

shall be deposited in the General Fund and credited

to the animal abuse cost recovery account. The

account shall be available to the Commissioner of

Agriculture for the purpose of the housing, care and

welfare of any animal seized by the department, until

final disposition of such animal. Additionally, the

account may be used for the purpose of providing

reimbursement to any municipality for the costs of

providing temporary care to such animal if such

temporary care exceeded thirty days in duration and

such costs exceeded the amount of any surety bond or

cash bond posted pursuant to subsection (f) of this

section provided the total annual reimbursement to

municipalities from said account for such purpose

shall not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars.

Nothing in this section shall prevent the

commissioner from obtaining or using funds from

sources other than the account for the housing, care

and welfare of any animal seized by the department

pursuant to this section.