Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Malik Leigh, Petitioner v. State Bar of Florida

Supreme Court briefJun 11, 2025

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 24- 11/\ |

In the

Supreme (Court nf the Uniteh States

MALIK LEIGH,

Petitioner,

THE FLORIDA BAR AND

THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA,

FILED

JUN 1 1 2025

Respondents.

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT, U.S.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the Supreme Court of Florida

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Malik Leigh

Counsel of Record and

Petitioner Pro Se

P.O. Box 162

Blakely, GA 39823

(888) 399-0678

mr.malikleigh@gmail.com

382285

COUNSEL PRESS

(800) 274-3321 • (800)359-6859

RECEIVED

JUN 1 3 2025

SUPREME COURT US

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether disciplining or disbarring a civil rights

attorney for speech critical of judicial bias and racial

injustice violates the First Amendment, especially

when the alleged conduct involved no harm to clients,

no criminality, and was overtly expressive in nature.

2. Whether the racially disparate treatment and eventual

disbarment of Petitioner, while white attorneys with

more egregious conduct were not disciplined, violates

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

Whether the Florida Supreme Court’s arbitrary

procedures, reliance on tainted referrals, and

imposition of disproportionate sanctions violated

Petitioner’s rights to procedural and substantive Due

Process.

Whether the Thirteenth Amendment affords parens

patriae special protection to Black Americans

(descendants of Freedmen) and imposes a strict

constitutional liability standard on federal and

state actors to prevent any badge or incident of

racial subjugation—violated here by the targeting,

discipline, and disbarment of Petitioner for racial

truth-telling.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner Malik Leigh was the respondent in the

disciplinary proceedings below.

Respondents are:

• The Florida Bar, a regulatory body created by the

Florida Supreme Court to oversee the licensing,

regulation, and discipline of attorneys practicing

in the state of Florida.

• The Supreme Court of Florida, which issued the

decision disbarring Petitioner, acting as the final

adjudicative authority in the disciplinary matter.

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule of Procedure 14.1(b)

(i-iii), the following cases are related to the instant brief:

The Florida Bar vs. Malik Leigh, SC23-0518,

Florida Supreme Court, Judgment entered Oct. 10,2023.

(Referee’s hearing)

The Florida Bar vs. Malik Leigh, SC2023-0518,

Florida Supreme Court, Judgment entered Mar. 13,2025.

(Hearing before Florida Supreme Court)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.......................................

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS..

TABLE OF APPENDICES.........................

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

.......................... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

To Clarify That Speech Criticizing

Racial Injustice by Attorneys Is

Constitutionally Protected. .......................... 11

To Resolve Whether a Court May Disbar

Sua Sponte Without New Hearings

or Findings

Table of Contents

Page

To Enforce the Equal Protection Clause

Where Disciplinary Sanctions Are

Racially Disparate and Arbitrary................ . .12

To Revisit and Overrule The Civil

Rights Cases (1883) and Restore the Full

Scope of the Thirteenth Amendment.............. 13

To Reaffirm That Disciplinary Sanctions

Must Be Justified by Legitimate Harm or Threat to the Legal Profession.................... 14

To Prevent Judicial Misuse of

Professionalism Rules to Retaliate Against

Litigants and Advocates..................................15

To Clarify That Vague and Duplicative

Charges Violate Due Process and the

“Unit of Prosecution” Principle........................15

To Recognize That Forced Mentorship

Orders Based on Race and Advocacy

Violate the Thirteenth and Fourteenth

Amendments...................................................16

To Confirm That Judicial Referrals

Must Be Evaluated Independently, Not

Taken at Face Value........................................ 16

Table of Contents

Page

10. To Address Systemic Racial Bias

Against Black Attorneys in Violation of

the Equal Protection, Due Process, and

Thirteenth Amendments.......................... 17

ARGUMENTS........................................................... 18

The First Amendment Forbids Punishing

Attorneys for Protected Speech on

Matters of Public Concern, Especially

Racial Truth-Telling. ...................................... 18

A. Leigh’s Speech Was Core Political

Expression on Matters of Public

Concern.......................................

B. The Bar’s Punishment Was

Retaliatory and Misrepresented the

Speech’s Nature.......................

C. The Government May Not Punish

Racial Advocacy by Calling It

“Unprofessional”..................................... 20

D. Punishing Racial Truth-Telling Is

Antithetical to the First Amendment...... 21

The Equal Protection Clause Forbids

Racially Disparate and Selective

Discipline of Black Attorneys.......................... 22

Table of Contents

Page

A. Unequal Standards and Arbitrary

Enforcement........................................... .22

B. Disparate Punishment Compared

to White Attorneys Engaged in

Worse Conduct........................................ 23

C. Procedural Irregularities Show

Racial Targeting................................

.26

The Disbarment of Malik Leigh Violated

Both Procedural and Substantive Due

Process........................................................... 28

A. The Referral Itself Was Constitutionally

Unjustified and Retaliatory..................... 29

Acts of Racial Bias and Retaliation.. .30

B. The Charges Were Vague, Shifting,

and Unmoored from Professional

Harm............ . ......................................... 32

C. The Florida Bar’s Charging and

Adjudication Process Was Arbitrary

and Prejudicial.......................................... 36

D. The Disciplinary Charges

Themselves Violated Substantive

Due Process..............................................37

viii

Table of Contents

Page

E. The Six Grounds for Excessiveness

& Arbitrariness in Violation

of Due Process.......................................... 37

Systemic Judicial Bias and Retali

ation at Every Level of the Process.. 39

G. The Florida Bar’s Disciplinary

Improperly aggregated & Carved

24 Counts in Violation of the

Unit of Prosecution Doctrine and

Due Process.............................................. 41

The Thirteenth Amendment Is an

Absolute Ban Against Every Form of Anti

Black Racism and Guaranteed Freedmen’s

Self-Determination, Parens Patriae

Protection, and Strict Liability Protections,

All of Which Were Violated by the Racially

Discriminatory Disbarment of Black

Civil Rights Attorney Malik Leigh...........43

A. The Thirteenth Amendment Is a

Standalone, Self-Executing &

Absolute Ban on Anti-Black Racial

Subjugation in All Forms.......................... 43

B. The Thirteenth Amendment

Restored the Freedmen’s Right to

Self-Determination, Including Four

Constitutionally Protected Options......... 44

■

Table of Contents

Page

C. Parens Patriae Protection for Black

Americans Is Constitutionally

Mandated........................

D. Anti-Black Racism Triggers Strict

Liability Under the Thirteenth

Amendment..............................................46

E. The Civil Rights Cases (1883) Must Be

Overruled: A Monument to Judicial

Racism and Constitutional Error............ 47

Leigh Was Punished for Racial TruthTelling: A Modern Badge of Slavery....... 47

G. The Referee, Bar Committees, and

Florida Supreme Court Functioned

as Instruments of Anti-Black

Repression and Retaliation...................... 49

H. The 24 Counts Were a Racially

Disguised Tool of Involuntary

Servitude.......................

Collective Punishment of Leigh and

Co-Counsel as a Badge of Slavery........... 50

CONCLUSION & PRAYER FOR RELIEF............... 51

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — CORRECTED OPINION OF

THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA,

DECIDED MARCH 13,2025..............

APPENDIX B — REPORT OF REFEREE OF

THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA,

DATED OCTOBER 10,2023. ........................ 27a

APPENDIX C — CONSTITUTIONAL AND

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED. .....60a

APPENDIX D — ANSWER EXCERPTS OF

THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

69a

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

United States Supreme Court Cases

Bailey v. Alabama,

219 U.S. 219 (1911)

Batson v. Kentucky,

476 U.S. 79 (1986)

Blockburger v. United States,

284 U.S. 299 (1932)

Bridges v. California,

314 U.S. 252 (1941)

................... 27

42,50

21,36,37,48

Brown v. Board of Education,

347 U.S. 483 (1954). ................. ;..................... 44

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,

556 U.S. 868 (2009)

12,29,37, 46

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,

30 U.S. 1 (1831)

Connick v. Myers,

461 U.S. 138 (1983)

......................... 18

FCC v. Fox Television Stations,

567 U.S. 239 (2012)

14,20,32,35,36,38,39,42

Furman v. Georgia,

408 U.S. 238 (1972)

38,39

xii

Cited Authorities

Page

Garrison v. Louisiana,

379 U.S. 64 (1964)

...21,36

Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,

501 U.S. 1030 (1991)

14,20,21,29,35,38,39

Griffin v. Breckenridge,

403 U.S. 88 (1971)

In re Sawyer,

360 U.S. 622 (1959)

20,21

In re Buffalo,

390 U.S. 544 (1968). .....12,14,29,32,36,37,38,39

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,

392 U.S. 409 (1968)

43,48

Litekyv. United States,

510 U.S. 540 (1994)

Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319 (1976)

12,37,39

McCleskey v. Kemp,

481 U.S. 279 (1987)

13,26

McDonald v. City of Chicago,

561 U.S. 742 (2010)

..................... 43

xiii

Cited Authorities

Page

Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc. v. Doyle,

. 429 U.S. 274 (1977)................................ 23,29,39

NAACP v. Button,

371 U.S. 415 (1963).............. 20,29,36,37,38,39,48

Papachristou v. Jacksonville,

405 U.S. 156 (1972)......................... 20,32, 36,42, 50

Pickering v. Board ofEducation,

391 U.S. 563 (1968).....................

Romer v. Evans,

517 U.S. 620 (1996).........

Rothv. United States,

354 U.S. 476(1957)..............................

Snyder v. Phelps,

562 U.S. 443 (2011) .................................... 21,39

Sugarman v. Dougall,

413 U.S. 634 (1973)................................................. 45

Terminiello v. Chicago,

337 U.S. 1(1949)............................................... 27

The Amistad,

40 U.S. 518 (1841).................................................. 45

XIV

Cited Authorities

Page

The Civil Rights Cases,

109 U.S. 3 (1883)

..13,46,52

The Slaughter-House Ca’ses,

83 U.S. 36 (1873)

United States v. Carolene Products Co.,

304 U.S. 144 (1938)(Footnote 4)

45-46

United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.,

344 U.S. 218 (1952)

Village ofArlington Heights v.

Metropolitan Housing Corp.,

429 U.S. 252 (1977)

Yick Wo v. Hopkins,

118 U.S. 356 (1886)

13,23,46

23,26

State Court Cases

Fla. Bar v. Anderson,

538 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1989)

U.S. Constitution

Amend. I

1,2,15,18,20,22,28,49, 51

Amend. XIII.. .1,2,13,16,17,43,44,45,46,47,51, 52

Amend. XIV

2,15,22,28, 51

Cited Authorities

Page

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)............................................... 1,2

Florida Rules Regulating the Bar (Alleged Violations

in Bar Complaint):

Rule 3-4.3 - Misconduct.......................................... 4

Rule 4-1.7 - Conflict of interest............................... 3

Rule 4-3.1 - Meritorious claims and contentions.. .3,36

Rule 4-3.3 - Candor toward the tribunal................. 3

Rule 4-3.4(c) - Disobeying an order.................... 3,36

Rule 4-3.5(d)(2) - Disruptive conduct in

proceedings.............................................................. 3

Rule 4-3.6(a) - Trial Publicity......................... .4,35

Rule 4-4.2(a) - Communication with represented

party....................................................................... 4

Rule 4-4.4(a) - Unnecessary embarrassment or

delay........................................................................ 4

Rule 4-8.2(a) - False statements about judges or

legal officials........................................................... 4

xvi

Cited Authorities

Page

Rule 4-8.4(a) - Misconduct................................ 3,36

Rule 4-8.4(c) - Conduct involving dishonesty,

fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.......................... 3

Rule 4-8.4(d) - Conduct prejudicial to the

administration of justice....... ,................................ 3

International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights (ICCPR)............................................... 45

U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence

to Colonial Countries and Peoples.................... 45

OPINIONS BELOW

The corrected opinion of the Florida Supreme Court

disbarring Petitioner Malik Leigh is unpublished but

available at The Florida Bar vs. Malik Leigh, No. SC20230518 (Fla. Mar. 13,2025). It is reproduced in the Appendix

at Appx. A, pg. la.-26a

The Referee’s Report recommending a 91-day

suspension, along with the record of disciplinary

proceedings and Bar complaint, is also reproduced in the

Appendix at: Appx B, pg. 27a.-59 a

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)

to review the final judgment of the Florida Supreme Court

in a disciplinary proceeding that disbarred Petitioner

Malik Leigh. The Florida Supreme Court issued its final

decision on March 13, 2025. This petition is timely filed

within 90 days of the denial of the final Order. Appx A,

pg- la

Because the Florida Supreme Court’s judgment

rests upon federal constitutional questions—including

violations of the First Amendment, Due Process Clause,

Equal Protection Clause, and Thirteenth Amendment—

this Court has direct appellate jurisdiction. No further

review is available in state court, and the decision below

constitutes the final judgment from the highest court of

the state. Appx A, pg. la-26a, AppxB, pg. 27a-59a, Appx

D, pg. 69a-75a

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The following provisions are directly implicated in

the issues presented by this petition and are reproduced

in full in the Appendix:

U.S. Constitution:

• First Amendment: “Congress shall make

no law... abridging the freedom of speech...

or the right of the people peaceably to

assemble, and to petition the Government

for a redress of grievances.” Appx C, pg.

60a, Appx D, pg. 69a-75a

• Thirteenth Amendment: “Neither slavery

nor involuntary servitude... shall exist

within the United States...”; and Section 2:

“Congress shall have power to enforce this

article by appropriate legislation.” Appx C,

pg. 60a, Appx D, pg. 69a-75a

• Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1: “No

State shall... deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process

of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.” Appx C, pg. 60a, Appx D, pg. 69a-75a

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a):

“Final judgments... rendered by the highest

court of a State... may be reviewed by the

Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where

. the validity of a treaty or statute of the United

States is drawn in question or where the validity

of a statute of any State is drawn in question

on the ground of its being repugnant to the

Constitution...” Appx A, pg. la-26a

Florida Rules Regulating the Bar (Alleged

Violations in Bar Complaint):

• Rule 4-8.4(a) - Misconduct Appx C, pg.

67a-68a

• Rule 4-8.4(d) - Conduct prejudicial to

the administration of justice Appx C, pg.

67a-68a

• Rule 4-8.4(c)-Conduct involving dishonesty,

fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation Appx C,

pg. 67a-68a

• Rule 4-3.5(d)(2) - Disruptive conduct in

proceedings Appx C, pg. 65a

• Rule 4-1.7 - Conflict of interest Appx C, pg.

61a-61a

• Rule 4-3.1 - Meritorious claims and

contentions Appx C, pg. 63a

• Rule 4-3.3 - Candor toward the tribunal

Appx C, pg. 63a-64a

• Rule 4-3.4(c) - Disobeying an order Appx

C, pg. 65a

• Rule 4-3.6(a) - Trial Publicity Appx C, pg.

65a

• Rule 4-4.2(a) - Communication with

represented party Appx C, pg. 66a,

• Rule 4-4.4(a) - Unnecessary embarrassment

or delay Appx C, pg. 66a

• Rule 3-4.3 - Misconduct Appx C, pg. 61a

• Rule 4-8.2(a) - False statements about

judges or legal officials Appx C, pg. 66a-67a,

These rules formed the basis for the Florida Bar’s 24-count

complaint against Petitioner, all of which are challenged

in this petition as unconstitutional or inapplicable in the

context of protected advocacy, political speech, and racial

justice litigation.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Malik Leigh is a Black family law attorney

whose disbarment was the culmination of a racially

charged and retaliatory campaign by a Florida school

district office, state and federal judges, the Florida

Bar, and the Florida Supreme Court. His discipline

was not rooted in harm to clients, criminal behavior, or

dishonesty—but in his outspoken advocacy for racial

justice, his litigation against entrenched institutional

racism, and his willingness to challenge judicial authority

on behalf of vulnerable Black communities.

The Florida Supreme Court ultimately imposed

disbarment sua sponte, after oral argument in which one

justice stated in open court: “Let’s say we were moved

to suspend your client rather than disbar him [,] I

cannot imagine him being admitted or readmitted to

the Florida Bar”. Appx. A, pg. la.

This comment, made despite the referee’s

recommendation of a 91-day suspension, suggested that

the Court had either predetermined the outcome of

the case based on information, bias not present in the

official record, or the Court was aware of the Florida

Bar’s retaliatory intent. This statement seems to reveal

the existence, of The Court’s action disregarded Florida

precedent holding that disbarment is a penalty of last

resort and improperly overturned the referee’s findings

without identifying material factual error. This action is

reviewable under the Due Process Clause, as Leigh was

denied notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond

before a more severe sanction was imposed. (In re Ruffalo,

390 U.S. 544 (1968)). Appx B, pg. 27a-59a, Appx D, pg.

69a-75a

The disciplinary proceedings arose from referrals

originating in both state and federal courts. The federal

proceedings involved three separate but consolidated

civil rights lawsuits, in which Leigh represented Black

students, teachers, and parents challenging racial

discrimination, retaliation, and abuse within the Palm

Beach County School District. These lawsuits stemmed

from incidents including student and teacher protests,

school board confrontations, and contract terminations

allegedly driven by racial bias and colourism. All three

cases—heard together due to overlapping facts—came

before U.S. District Judges Robin L. Rosenberg and

Kenneth A. Marra, with proceedings also overseen by

U.S. Magistrate Judges William Matthewman and

James Hopkins. Appx. A, pg. la, Appx B, pg. 27a-59 a

The consolidation of these three distinct federal

cases—each involving separate plaintiffs and timelines—

into a single proceeding was not a neutral administrative

action but a strategic judicial maneuver that operated to

Leigh’s extreme detriment. This consolidation allowed

the judges to impose collective sanctions, suppress

distinct evidentiary narratives, and streamline retaliation

against Leigh. The effect was to magnify any perceived

procedural defect, disregard the contextual integrity of

each case, and enable racialized scrutiny of Leigh’s legal

conduct. Leigh was denied any fair opportunity to litigate

the unique merits of each case and was subjected to a

collective punishment framework clearly tainted by racial

bias and animus. Appx B, pg. 27a-59a, AppxD, pg. 69a-75a

The triggering event for the federal referral was a

benign social media post in which Leigh—also a budding

professional photographer—used the word “shoot” in

reference to photographing a reality TV personality he

knew. The post was deliberately and falsely distorted

into a threat by Defendants’ counsel which was used

to prevent the pending deposition of a School District

superintendent. The framing of this post by Defendant’s

counsel led to major hostilities by the federal judges to

Leigh’s litigation and extrajudicial speech solely upon

his appearance. The actual post contained no threats

other than an image of Leigh, and federal authorities

never brought criminal charges or found credible danger.

Leigh contends the referral was made in retaliation for

his repeated courtroom challenges to judicial bias and

invoking his first amendment right. These allegations

were presented in court filings and objections, and the

retaliatory nature of the referral was raised explicitly,

preserving the issue for review. Appx B, pg. 27a-59a,

Appx D, pg. 69a-75a

A separate state referral originated from Judge

Howard Coates in Palm Beach County, Florida, during

litigation over dangerous housing conditions at the

Stonybrook Apartments in Riviera Beach, Florida—a

federally funded, predominantly Black complex with

widespread mold, asbestos, and structural hazards. Leigh

represented tenants, including families whose children

were hospitalized and, in at least one case, died due to

toxic exposure. Prior news coverage from WPTV, WLRN,

WPBF, and the Houston Chronicle’s investigations

preempted by then Senator Marco Rubio confirmed

the emergency conditions at the complex and validated

Leigh’s advocacy. Despite this, Judge Coates referred

Leigh for discipline in apparent retaliation, stemming

from a longstanding personal grudge dating back to a

prior family law matter where Leigh served as Petitioner’s

counsel and embarrassed the judge by correcting a legal

misstatement he made. Leigh’s filings raised judicial bias,

challenged the factual basis for sanctions, and presented

evidence of disproportionate treatment compared to white

attorneys—squarely preserving the Equal Protection

claim. Appx B, pg. 27a-59a, Appx D, pg. 69a-75a

Leigh’s representation in the Stonybrook case was

vigorous, urgent, and adversarial—as required under

the circumstances. He filed emergency motions to

protect vulnerable residents, but his pleadings were

labeled deficient and unprofessional by Coates applying

arbitrary and excessively formalistic standards. Leigh

asserts this reflected a racial double standard. Notably,

his white co-counsel, Danielle Watson, who participated

in the same cases and filings, was only given a 91-day

suspension. This disparate treatment was challenged in

Leigh’s response briefs, bar hearing objections, and oral

arguments, preserving the Equal Protection issue. Appx

B, pg. 27a-59 a, Appx D, pg. 69a-75a

The Florida Bar initially sat on the referrals for

nearly six years. Only after Leigh became more visible

for his racial justice work did the Bar escalate the charges

into 24 counts. These 24 counts were largely duplicative,

stemming from a limited set of facts and events that

were artificially subdivided to multiply the charges—

violating the constitutional Due Process principle of unit

of prosecution. Rather than identifying discrete acts of

misconduct, the Bar repeated and reclassified overlapping

allegations in a manner that unconstitutionally increased

the severity of punishment. Many of the counts were

vague, conclusory, or unrelated to actual client harm.

Crucially, the Bar never identified a single client who

was harmed or misled by Leigh. These objections were

raised in bar pleadings and preserved below. Appx B, pg.

27a-59a, Appx D, pg. 69a-75a

Neither the Bar nor the Florida Supreme Court

conducted any independent factual investigation into

the underlying allegations or the judges’ motivations for

referring Leigh. They relied wholesale on the findings

and characterizations of the same judges whom Leigh

had accused of bias and misconduct—without evaluating

whether his accusations were valid or whether the

referrals were retaliatory. This total deference to judicial

accusers deprived Leigh of any neutral assessment

of facts, rendering the process fundamentally unjust.

Leigh challenged the credibility of the referrals and

cited the lack of evidentiary hearings and independent

inquiry—preserving both Due Process and Thirteenth

Amendment claims. Appx A, pg. la-26a, Appx B, pg.

27a-59a, Appx D, pg. 69a-75a

The referee in the case—appointed by the Florida

Supreme Court—found that disbarment was not

warranted, recommending a 91-day suspension and noting

Leigh’s work on behalf of poor and disenfranchised clients.

Despite this, the Florida Supreme Court overruled the

referee, without new hearings or justification, and imposed

permanent disbarment. Leigh objected to the sua sponte

disbarment and denial of hearings, preserving the issue

for review. Appx. A, pg. la., Appx B, pg. 27a-59a, Appx

D, pg. 69a-75a

This case exemplifies the modern equivalent of a badge

of slavery prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment: a

Black lawyer punished with career destruction for racial

truth-telling and advocacy on behalf of fellow Black

Americans. Under the Amendment’s parens patriae

doctrine, Black Americans are entitled to heightened

judicial protection from systemic discrimination.

And under the strict liability framework that flows

from the Amendment’s remedial purpose, the State is

constitutionally liable where its actions, even absent

explicit racial intent, perpetuate historical subjugation

or impose disproportionate penalties on Black citizens

for race-based advocacy. Leigh’s punishment—rooted in

racialized standards of legal practice and submission—

directly implicates the constitutional prohibition on

involuntary servitude and badges of caste. These claims

were squarely raised in Leigh’s bar responses and

incorporated by reference in post-hearing filings. Appx

D, pg. 69a-75a

Moreover, Leigh’s speech and filings were protected

under the First Amendment, as expressive political and

legal advocacy on matters of racial justice. His discipline

under the pretext of professionalism cannot be reconciled

with this Court’s precedents safeguarding attorneys’

speech rights in court and public forums. Similarly,

the Equal Protection Clause prohibits differential

punishment based on race or advocacy on behalf of a

disfavored racial group. Leigh’s filings and challenges to

judicial misconduct were met with a hostility and scrutiny

not imposed on similarly situated white attorneys. And

the Due Process Clause was violated through vague

charges, biased adjudicators, duplicative punishment,

and the wholesale adoption of tainted factual findings

without independent review. Appx B, pg. 27a-59a, Appx

D, pg. 69a-75a

Requiring Leigh to undergo mentorship and

professional training—despite his record of effective

advocacy—was itself an act of racialized subjugation,

branding him as inherently deficient based solely on

his style of litigation and racial message; none of which

was disrespectful to the Court. This type of compelled

submission to white professional norms echoes the

structure of racial domination outlawed by the Thirteenth

Amendment. Appx B, pg. 27a-59a, Appx D, pg. 69a-75a

Leigh’s disbarment is part of a broader pattern: he

was punished for challenging racism in education, housing,

and the judiciary, and for speaking uncomfortable truths

in a profession that too often punishes Black lawyers for

being assertive, principled, and fearless. His case raises

urgent constitutional questions that go to the heart of

America’s struggle with race, power, and justice.. Appx.

A, pg. la., Appx B, pg. 27a-59a, Appx D, pg. 69a-75a

The procedural irregularities, inconsistent application

of standards, and racial undertones of the entire

disciplinary process cry out for this Court’s intervention.

Appx. A, pg. la., AppxB, pg. 27a-59a, AppxD, pg. 69a-75a

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This case presents exceptionally important

constitutional questions regarding racial justice, attorney

speech, judicial bias, and the misuse of disciplinary

power to silence civil rights advocacy. The facts of this

case implicate not only the rights of one attorney, but the

broader pattern of institutional retaliation against Black

professionals who challenge racism in court. Certiorari is

warranted to address the following urgent national issues:

1. To Clarify That Speech Criticizing Racial Injustice

by Attorneys Is Constitutionally Protected

The Court should grant review to clarify that speech

by attorneys criticizing racial injustice—particularly

speech that does not involve fraud, criminality, or client

harm—is protected under the First Amendment. Multiple

courts remain divided over the scope of professional

speech protections and the line between zealous advocacy

and sanctionable conduct.

This case squarely presents.the issue: Leigh’s posts,

filings, and arguments were expressive, political, and

related to civil rights litigation. The Court should confirm

that this kind of racial advocacy cannot be punished

through vague professionalism rules.

2. To Resolve Whether a Court May Disbar Sua

Sponte Without New Hearings or Findings

Review is warranted to resolve a serious due process

question: whether a court may impose disbarment sua

sponte, overriding a referee’s suspension recommendation,

based solely on a tainted federal referral and vague,

overlapping charges.

The Florida Supreme Court violated both procedural

and substantive due process by relying on arbitrary

standards, disregarding mitigating evidence, and applying

sanctions inconsistently with its own precedent. The

Court should clarify that sua sponte disbarment without

evidentiary hearing violates In re Ruffalo, Mathews v.

Eldridge, and Caperton.

3. To Enforce the Equal Protection Clause Where

Disciplinary Sanctions Are Racially Disparate and

Arbitrary

Malik Leigh was disbarred for conduct that harmed

no clients, involved no dishonesty, and was overwhelmingly

expressive, advocacy-based, and constitutionally

protected. In contrast, at least 18 white attorneys in

Florida engaged in misconduct including physical assault,

falsifying court records, sexual harassment, threats to

judges, and criminal convictions—but were either: .

• Not disciplined at all, or

• Received substantially lighter sanctions

such as private admonitions, diversion

programs, or brief suspensions.

The legal standard under Village ofArlington Heights

v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977),

requires proof of discriminatory intent or pattern.

However, courts remain unclear on how much comparator

evidence or procedural irregularity is sufficient to prove

a violation.

Certiorari is warranted to resolve:

• How systemic bias in attorney discipline

should be evaluated under Arlington

Heights and McCleskey v. Kemp, and

• Whether disparate outcomes in sanctioning

attorneys of different races, even when

factually documented, trigger constitutional

scrutiny.

4. To Revisit and Overrule The Civil Rights Cases

(1883) and Restore the Full Scope of the Thirteenth

Amendment

This case demands certiorari to restore the full force

of the Thirteenth Amendment. Petitioner was punished

for racial truth-telling—precisely the kind of speech and

advocacy the Amendment was enacted to protect.

The federal government, through the judiciary and

state mechanisms, violated its parens patriae duty and

triggered a modern badge of slavery by professionally

exiling a Black man for exposing systemic racism upon

which the Court is a part of.

5. To Reaffirm That Disciplinary Sanctions Must

Be Justified by Legitimate Harm or Threat to the

Legal Profession

The Supreme Court has long held that professional

discipline must be justified by a legitimate regulatory

interest—such as protecting the public, ensuring the

integrity of the courts, or upholding ethical standards—

not retaliation or ideological punishment.

In this case:

• No client was harmed,

• No judicial proceeding was disrupted,

• No fraud or dishonesty occurred.

The initial referral was based on an unrelated

and benign social media post and filings that were

constitutionally protected.

This Court has held in In re Buffalo, 390 U.S. 544

(1968), NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), and Gentile

v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) that lawyer

discipline cannot be used to silence political or legal

advocacy. Nor may it rely on vague or shifting standards,

as emphasized in FCC v. Fox, 567 U.S. 239 (2012).

This case presents a timely opportunity to reaffirm

that bar sanctions must be tied to real misconduct—not

retaliation or institutional discomfort.

6. To Prevent Judicial Misuse of Professionalism

Rules to Retaliate Against Litigants and Advocates

The constitutional protections of the First and

Fourteenth Amendments are undermined when state

or federal judges misuse vague professionalism rules to

retaliate against lawyers who challenge judicial bias or

racism. This Court should grant review to reaffirm that

critical legal advocacy, particularly on matters of racial

injustice, cannot be penalized under amorphous standards

of “tone,” “judgment,” or “decorum.” To do otherwise

would allow judges to silence disfavored speech under

color of regulation.

7. To Clarify That Vague and Duplicative Charges

Violate Due Process and the “Unit of Prosecution”

Principle

The 24 charges leveled against Leigh were not

24 distinct acts of wrongdoing, but duplicative and

overlapping accusations rooted in the same factual core.

Leigh’s punishment was artificially magnified through

charge-stacking—creating the illusion of pervasive

misconduct where only a handful of actions were at issue.

Review is needed to clarify that this form of duplication

offends basic fairness and is constitutionally impermissible

in disciplinary proceedings.

8. To Recognize That Forced Mentorship Orders

Based on Race and Advocacy Violate the Thirteenth

and Fourteenth Amendments

The order requiring Leigh to submit to mentoring

and training—despite no findings of incompetence or

harm—was racially demeaning. It effectively branded

him as professionally defective for litigating civil rights

cases with passion and urgency.

Such compelled re-education, imposed without factual

basis and based on deviation from white professional

norms, is a modern badge of slavery. The Court should

declare that race-based mentorship orders violate the

Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on involuntary servitude

and the Equal Protection Clause.

9. To Confirm That Judicial Referrals Must Be

Evaluated Independently, Not Taken at Face Value

Disciplinary bodies and reviewing courts must not

rubber-stamp judicial referrals—especially where the

referring judge was accused of bias or misconduct by the

attorney referred. This violates procedural due process

and invites institutional corruption. Review is needed to

establish that independent investigation is constitutionally

required before a court or bar may impose discipline

based on judicial referrals that arise from contested or

retaliatory circumstances.

10. To Address Systemic Racial Bias Against Black

Attorneys in Violation of the Equal Protection,

Due Process, and Thirteenth Amendments

Petitioner’s disbarment was not an isolated disciplinary

outcome, but part of a broader pattern of institutionalized

bias against Black attorneys who speak out against racial

injustice. This systemic disparity violates three distinct

constitutional safeguards.

• Under the Equal Protection Clause, racial

disparities in disciplinary outcomes violate

equal treatment mandates.

• Under Due Process, reliance on biased

sources, vague charges, and selective

prosecution undermines procedural

fairness.

• Under the Thirteenth Amendment,

punishing a Black attorney for racial

truth-telling constitutes a modern badge

of servitude—especially where discipline

is rooted not in harm or misconduct, but in

protected advocacy.

Certiorari is required to address this convergence of

violations and to ensure that Black attorneys may litigate

civil rights without fear of institutional exile.

ARGUMENTS

1. The First Amendment Forbids Punishing Attorneys

for Protected Speech on Matters of Public Concern,

Especially Racial Truth-Telling

Malik Leigh was disbarred not for misconduct, fraud,

or client harm—but for his speech. That speech was

political, expressive, and aimed at exposing racial injustice

in courts, schools, and housing. Such speech lies at the

core of First Amendment protection, especially when

exercised by lawyers in the service of vulnerable clients

and constitutional litigation. Leigh’s disbarment violates

foundational principles protecting political expression,

advocacy for racial justice, and the role of lawyers in

confronting systemic inequality.

A. Leigh’s Speech Was Core Political Expression

on Matters of Public Concern

The First Amendment “was fashioned to assure

unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of

political and social changes desired by the people “Roth

v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). Leigh’s social

media posts, court filings, and litigation advocacy directly

challenged systemic racism in housing and education. He

protested unsafe, racially segregated housing conditions

in federal court. He supported Black students silenced

by school boards. He criticized judicial bias in real-time..

Under Pickering v. Board ofEducation, 391 U.S. 563

(1968), and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), public

employees and professionals may not be disciplined for

speech on matters of public concern unless it materially

disrupts institutional function. No such disruption

occurred here. Leigh’s speech offended power—but

harmed no one.

B. The Bar’s Punishment Was Retaliatory and

Misrepresented the Speech’s Nature

The triggering event was a photograph-related post

in which Leigh—an experienced photographer—stated

that he wanted to do a “shoot” with a reality TV friend,

“Chinese Nicky.” This post was clearly unrelated to

litigation or legal threats. Yet a federal judge seized upon

this innocent remark, grossly mischaracterizing it as a

“threat,” initiating a referral that would lay dormant for

years before exploding into a campaign to disbar Leigh.

At oral argument, Bar counsel admitted that the post

was not a credible threat. The referee acknowledged

that there was no evidence of violence or instability.

Despite this, Leigh’s expressive online statements were

exaggerated and misrepresented by multiple judges to

appear threatening or erratic. This distortion reveals

retaliatory motive—especially given that Leigh had

previously corrected one of the judges on a legal point

and had been outspoken about racial bias in courtrooms.

The timeline reveals that no misconduct occurred

after 2017. What changed was Leigh’s rising profile

as a Black racial justice advocate, publicly litigating

housing discrimination cases, advocating for silenced

Black students, and challenging judicial indifference to

racism. The resurgence and escalation of bar discipline

in 2023—years after the initial referral—was fueled by

visibility, not ethics.

C. The Government May Not Punish Racial

Advocacy by Calling It “Unprofessional”

In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the Court

struck down Virginia’s attempt to punish civil rights

litigation as “improper solicitation,” affirming that

political expression and racial justice advocacy are entitled

to heightened protection. Leigh’s speech was part of

ongoing litigation strategy and public interest advocacy.

He posted to document injustice, uplift client voices,

and call attention to systemic racism—not to harass,

intimidate, or disrupt.

The First Amendment protects not just the content of

political speech, but the speaker’s identity and purpose.

Leigh, as a Black lawyer, had every right to speak out

against racial bias in courts and government. That he

did so with passion and clarity does not make his words

misconduct. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959), reaffirmed

that attorneys may criticize judicial conduct, especially

when tied to public interest litigation. The Court in Gentile

v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991), held that

criticism of the justice system is protected—even when

it is uncomfortable or critical.

Leigh’s commentary in pleadings—on judicial tone,

racial bias, and government indifference—falls squarely

within these precedents. Attempts to penalize him for

“demeaning” or “uncivil” language are no different than

the vague moral standards struck down in FCC v. Fox

Television Stations, 567 U.S. 239 (2012), and Papachristou

v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). Such vague criteria

cannot be used to silence protected dissent.

Relevant precedents include:

• Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S.

1030 (1991) - Attorney speech critical of the

judicial system is protected.

• In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959) - Attorneys

may speak out against judicial misconduct,

especially regarding ongoing or past cases.

• Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) Punishment for criticizing court proceedings

is unconstitutional.

• Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) Sharp criticism of judges is protected unless

false and malicious.

• Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) Public speech, even if offensive or upsetting,

is fully protected.

Leigh’s legal filings were not only accurate but legally

grounded. His speech, both inside and outside court,

was a continuation of protected advocacy on behalf of

vulnerable clients. That the Bar and courts treated his

zealous advocacy as a disciplinary offense shows a racial

double standard.

D. Punishing Racial Truth-Telling Is Antithetical

to the First Amendment

Malik Leigh did not threaten judges. He challenged

existing racism. He did not disrupt courts. He defended

his clients’ humanity. His speech, if anything, was

inconvenient—but that is exactly why the First Amendment

exists.

Leigh’s targeting shows a systemic pattern where

Black advocacy is treated as inherently aggressive,

where Black attorneys are punished for confronting

injustice, and where professional discipline becomes a

tool to enforce racial silence.

This Court must reaffirm that the First Amendment

protects attorneys who speak hard truths about race

and power. When the government penalizes dissent—

particularly from Black advocates confronting institutional

racism—it does not protect professionalism. It enforces

oppression.

The Constitution forbids that outcome.

2. The Equal Protection Clause Forbids Racially

Disparate and Selective Discipline of Black

Attorneys

A. Unequal Standards and Arbitrary Enforcement

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment prohibits state actors from selectively

punishing individuals based on race. Yet, Malik

Leigh—a Black family law attorney—was disbarred

for constitutionally protected advocacy, while white

attorneys across Florida who engaged in more egregious

misconduct faced minimal or no discipline. This racially

discriminatory enforcement of professional standards,

coupled with a retaliatory process, demands constitutional

review.

Rather than address these matters promptly and

independently, the Florida Bar allowed them to sit

dormant for nearly six years.

The disciplinary case against Leigh was not triggered

by anything but Leigh’s rising public profile and visibility

as a racial justice advocate. Watson was sanctioned only

because of her association with Leigh—not based on

individual fault—further proving the discriminatory

nature of the Bar’s targeting.

The timing and escalation support an inference

of retaliatory motive under Mt. Healthy City School

District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), especially when

combined with long delays and sudden escalation. The

pattern of conduct falls squarely within the constitutional

framework articulated in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118

U.S. 356 (1886), and Village of Arlington Heights v.

Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977),

which allow courts to infer unconstitutional racial motive

from disparate outcomes, procedural irregularities, and

suspicious timing.

B. Disparate Punishment Compared to White

Attorneys Engaged in Worse Conduct

Leigh’s disbarment contrasts starkly with the

treatment of at least 18 white attorneys in Florida who

engaged in significantly more serious misconduct—

including:

Name

Susan Hill

Misconduct

Threatened a

judge during

litigation

Fred Levin

Publicly insulted

judges; admitted

illegal gambling

Edward James Mishandled

$20,000 in trust

funds

Julia Peters

Sexual

harassment

allegations by

multiple staff

Michael Dorsey Convicted of

misdemeanor

battery

Karen Winslow Falsified billing

records in family

law cases

Ronald Baxter Filed knowingly

false affidavits

Matthew Shirk Workplace

sexual

misconduct;

alcohol abuse

Rebecca

Falsified

Coleman

evidence in

family law

Brian Nelson

False affidavits

in multiple cases

Sanction

Verbal warning

No discipline

Internal

counseling

Resigned; no

Bar referral

No Bar referral

Judicial

reprimand only

Court warning;

no Bar discipline

No Bar action

Diversion

program; no

public discipline

Private

admonition

Alan Whitman

Groped a junior Private

associate at

settlement; no

event

Bar referral

Thomas Greene Misdemeanor

No action by

assault of client state

James Toland

Abusive

Suspension

litigation against under 60 days

multiple judges

George

Racially charged Reprimand only

Callahan

threats in open

court

Douglas Martin Drug-related

Probation; no

criminal

disbarment

conviction

Henry Stark

Suborned

6-month

perjury in civil

suspension

litigation

William

Admitted to tax Reinstated after

Proctor

fraud

short suspension

Clifford Allen

Sexual contact

Private

with client under resolution; no

duress

Bar filing

None were disbarred, most had direct client or

public harm, and some had criminal convictions or repeat

offenses. Most received diversion programs, private

admonitions, or at worst, short-term suspensions.

Several were never disciplined at all.

These examples illustrate the racially disparate

treatment in Florida’s attorney discipline system.

Leigh—who engaged in no criminality, dishonesty, or

client harm—was disbarred for advocacy and protected

speech. These white attorneys retained their licenses or

received minor sanctions.

This disparate treatment violates Equal Protection.

As this Court held in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356

(1886), facially neutral standards applied in a racially

discriminatory fashion constitute a constitutional violation.

Here, neutral ethics rules were selectively enforced to

suppress a Black attorney’s speech and advocacy.

C. Procedural Irregularities Show Racial

Targeting

Leigh’s punishment cannot be justified on neutral

grounds. His social media commentary was treated as

misconduct, while white lawyers using harsher or more

vulgar language were never referred for discipline. In

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), this Court

acknowledged that statistical disparities alone may not

prove intentional discrimination—but when combined

with evidence of selective enforcement and differential

treatment, as here, they raise a constitutional claim that

must be heard.

Leigh was punished for “uncivil” language and

“improper tone,” while similarly blunt or aggressive

statements by white attorneys were excused as “zealous

advocacy.” His pleadings were parsed line by line for

imagined threats or “lack of professionalism,” yet white

attorneys are not sanctioned for their similar pleadings.

This reflects the type of racialized pleading standard

that imposes form over substance only when applied

to Black attorneys. Leigh’s pleadings were treated as

defective or unstable, not because of their substance, but

because of their assertive tone and racial content. Such

arbitrary application of rules is a badge of caste in violation

of Equal Protection.

Courts have long recognized that discriminatory

enforcement, especially against political speech, triggers

heightened scrutiny. In Batson V. Kentucky, 476 U.S.

79 (1986), the Court ruled that racial exclusions in legal

procedures violate Equal Protection even when masked

in neutral justifications. Likewise, Romer v. Evans, 517

U.S. 620 (1996), held that singling out disfavored groups

for legal disadvantage fails constitutional review. Leigh’s

case falls squarely in this tradition: a facially neutral

disciplinary process used disproportionately against Black

speech and Black advocacy.

The use of Leigh’s social media commentary as

evidence of unfitness to practice law—without a showing

of actual harm. This echoes the rationale in Terminiello

v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), where the Court held

that the purpose of free speech is to invite dispute and

provoke unrest when confronting injustice. Leigh’s

discipline punished precisely the type of truth-telling the

Constitution was meant to protect.

Finally, Leigh’s forced submission to “mentor”

training, imposed with no client complaint or finding of

professional incompetence, functioned as symbolic racial

subordination. Unlike white attorneys whose mistakes

prompted professional development, Leigh was ordered to

undergo moral and stylistic correction—despite no ethical

breach—due to racialized perceptions of his assertiveness.

Such compelled self-abasement should be examined as a

badge of caste prohibited under both Equal Protection

and the Thirteenth Amendment.

3. The Disbarment of Malik Leigh Violated Both

Procedural and Substantive Due Process

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty or

property without fair procedures and a justifiable legal

basis. In the context of attorney discipline, this includes

the right to notice, a fair hearing, consistent application

of rules, proportionate punishment, and protection from

retaliation, vagueness, and arbitrariness. The process

leading to Malik Leigh’s disbarment failed all these

standards. He was disbarred without a fair process, based

on an improper aggregation of vague allegations.

Leigh was denied basic procedural protections:

• No evidentiary hearing on his First

Amendment or Equal Protection defenses.

• Key witnesses and mitigating evidence were

ignored.

• The referee and grievance committee cut

off racial advocacy arguments.

• Leigh was punished more harshly due to his

race, political views, and advocacy.

The grievance committee failed to review retaliatory

referrals or systemic bias. The referee disparaged Leigh’s

tone and cut off his arguments. The Florida Supreme

Court elevated the sanction to disbarment without

justification or analysis.

A. The Referral Itself Was Constitutionally

Unjustified and Retaliatory

No Referral or Sanction Was Warranted—There

Was No Misconduct to Punish. Leigh’s actions were

constitutionally protected.

This Court has long held that professional discipline

must be tied to a legitimate regulatory interest. (See In

re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968); NAACP v. Button, 371

U.S. 415 (1963); Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S.

1030 (1991)). Disbarment for courtroom advocacy violates

these principles.

Even the Florida Supreme Court ignored its own

precedent. Florida law holds that disbarment is a penalty

of last resort, only appropriate for theft, dishonesty,

or criminality. Leigh’s case involved none of these.

Further, the Florida Supreme Court itself understood the

retaliatory nature of his charges. (See Caperton v. A.T.

Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); Liteky v. United

States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994))

Leigh’s referral was triggered solely by Leigh’s

expressive speech, making it an unconstitutional act of

retaliation under Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc.

v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).

Acts of Racial Bias and Retaliation

• Federal Judges (Matthewman, Hopkins):

• Mischaracterized Leigh’s protected speech

as dangerous or erratic.

• Treated valid discovery requests as

misconduct.

• Used consolidation to suppress Leigh’s

distinct civil rights cases and impose

collective punishment.

• Applied racially biased scrutiny and rejected

motions citing racial injustice.

• Federal Judge Rosenberg:

• Referred Leigh to the Bar while herself

stating that she had no cause for referral

• Initially painted Leigh as a liar despite

herself ignorant of the advances in

technology (the use of Adobe sign and fill)

• State Judge (Coates):

• Previously embarrassed by Leigh in a

family law case, where Leigh respectfully,

corrected a legal error in open court.

• Reacted with clear animus and

disproportionately harsh treatment in

subsequent litigation.

• Retaliated by referring Leigh in the

Stonybrook housing case, despite press

and government reports validating Leigh’s

claims of dangerous, racially substandard

housing.

• Grievance Committee:

• collective punishment,

• Did not review or investigate claims of

retaliatory referral.

• Refused to hold a hearing on Leigh’s claims

of systemic bias.

• Referee:

• Cut off Leigh’s racial arguments in hearings.

• Ignored key witnesses and character

evidence.

• Applied inconsistent legal standards not

used in white attorney cases.

• Inferred that Leigh was physically abusive

to Watson because of his size.

• Florida Supreme Court:

• Escalated sanction sua sponte to disbarment.

• Ignored internal precedent requiring lesser

discipline unless theft, fraud, or dishonesty

is shown.

• Inferred that upholding the 91-day

suspension would be treated as a disbarment

by the Florida bar.

B. The Charges Were Vague, Shifting, and

Unmoored from Professional Harm

Under In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968), disciplinary

charges must be based on clear standards and adequate

notice. Leigh’s case featured constantly shifting

interpretations of subjective conduct. In FCC v. Fox,

567 U.S. 239 (2012), the Court reaffirmed that vague

standards violate due process. Similarly, in Papachristou

v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), the Court invalidated

vague criminal statutes that targeted unpopular

individuals for lawful conduct.

Leigh was not given fair notice of what behavior would

trigger disbarment, nor were the standards consistently

or equally applied.

2 . Table: 24 Count Due Process & Constitutional Defect

Analysis

Originating

counts Judge

Allegation

summary

Due Process/

Constitutional

defect

Judge

Social media Vague, protected

Mathewman/ post

speech, mis

Hopkins

using word interpreted as

“shoot”

threat

Judge Coates Criticism of Core political

judge

speech, not mis

conduct

Judge

Motion lan Subjective stan

Rosenberg

guage called dard, viewpoint

“improper” discrimination

Judge Coates Alleged

Speech-based,

courtroom

vague, cultur

incivility

ally biased

Judge

Comments

Constitutionally

Mathewman/ about judi protected opin

Hopkins

cial racial

ion

bias

Judge Coates Filing

Client advocacy,

objecting

not sanctionable

to housing

condition

dismissal

Judge

Criticism

Fair comment in

Rosenberg

of oppos

litigation

ing counsel

conduct

Judge Coates Opposing

Legal strategy,

removal of not misconduct

co-counsel

Judge Coates Remarks

Truthful per

about family sonal experience,

court bias

free speech

Judge

Post ref

Public commen

Mathewman/ erencing

tary, not profes

Hopkins

civil rights sional breach

leader

Judge Coates Use of force Normal rhetori

ful language cal advocacy

in brief

Judge

Critique

Speech against

Rosenberg

of referral

government

process

retaliation

Judge

Motion to

Substantive due

Matthewman/ reconsider process issue

Hopkins

Judge Coates Raising race Raising race in

in defense

defense strategy

strategy

Judge

Courtroom Cultural bias, no

Rosenberg

conduct

real disruption

character

ized as un

cooperative

Judge Coates Client com Attorney-client

munication defense, no pub

interpreted lic harm

as improper

Judge Coates Demand

Equal Protec

ing equal

tion claim, not

treatment at misconduct

hearing

Judge Coates Statement

Constitutionally

about white protected racial

privilege in analysis

housing

Judge

Public post Speech on public

Mathewman/ about case

concern

Hopkins

delay

Judge

Complaint

Permissible cri

Matthewman/ aboutju

tique, not mis

Hopkins

dicial de

conduct

meanor

Judge

General

Racially charged

Rosenberg

tone of fil

label, not action

ings seen as able

“militant”

3. Table: All 24 Counts and Constitutional Violations

This table from the petition documents how each charge

violated constitutional protections:

Count Bar

Rule

Alleged

Conduct

Consti

tutional

Issue

43.6(a) Political First

Facebook Amend

Post

ment

Controlling

Cases

Gentile, Fox

5-24

4-8.4(a) Criticiz First

Garrison,

ing judge Amend Bridges

bias

ment

Motion

4-3.1

First

NAACP v.

re: racial Amend Button

housing ment

violations

4-3.4(c) NonDue

Buffalo

disruptive Process

court

filing

Various Tone,

Vague

Papachristou,

rhetoric, ness,

Fox,

style of

Viewpoint Rosenberger

expres

Discrimi

sion

nation

C. The Florida Bar’s Charging and Adjudication

Process Was Arbitrary and Prejudicial

After receiving the federal referral in 2017, the

Bar took no action for over six years. Bar counsel later

admitted the delay was improper. When it finally acted,

the Bar:

• Bundled together unrelated allegations

across multiple years into a single complaint;

• Ignored the requirement of progressive

discipline;

• Failed to provide a fair opportunity for

mitigation.

Despite nine mitigating factors—no prior disciplinary

history, no client harm, community service—the referee

recommended only a 91-day suspension. But the Florida

Supreme Court rejected that recommendation sua sponte,

without any new evidence or findings.

This violated the procedural fairness standards in

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and mirrored

the arbitrary conduct condemned in Caperton v. A.T.

Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).

D. The Disciplinary Charges Themselves Violated

Substantive Due Process

Beyond procedural unfairness, the content of the

charges and the punishment imposed were constitutionally

intolerable. The charges punished core expressive

conduct—bias critique of judges, pleadings in civil rights

litigation, and social media commentary. Under NAACP v.

Button, Rosenberger v. Rector, and Bridges v. California,

punishment of political advocacy disguised as professional

discipline is unconstitutional.

Moreover, the 24 charges were duplicative. They

did not represent distinct legal violations, but reframed

Leigh’s public speech into an exaggerated pattern. This

is not discipline—it is suppression.

E. The Six Grounds for Excessiveness &

Arbitrariness in Violation of Due Process

1. No Prior Discipline Mathews v. Eldridge, 424

U.S. 319 (1976), and In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968).

2. Vague Charges, Overbroad Standards &

Arbitrary Process FCC v. Fox Television Stations,

567 U.S. 239 (2012); Grayned, supra., In re Buffalo, 390

U.S. 544 (1968), this Court reversed attorney discipline

imposed under shifting theories without proper notice.

Here:

•

Charges were based on ambiguous standards

(“lack of civility”).

• No clear rule specified how Leigh’s speech

violated ethical codes.

• The Florida Supreme Court increased

punishment to disbarment sua sponte,

contrary to the referee’s findings.

3. No Narrow Tailoring to Prevent Harm Gentile

4. Punishment for Protected Political and Racial

Advocacy NAAGP v. Button

5. Punishment Disproportionate to Similar

Cases Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).

6. Punishment Was Retaliatory for Accusations of

Racial Bias (Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So.2d 852 (Fla.

1989)). Leigh’s conduct met none of these categories.

4. Table: Summary of the 6 Total Grounds for Excessiveness

(Due Process Violation)

Ground

No prior

misconduct

Proportionality

Vague rules

Not narrowly

tailored

Disparate

punishment

Political speech

chilled

Retaliation for

race-bias claims

Legal Doctrine Key Cases

Proportionality Mathews v.

Eldridge,

Ruffalo

Void for

vagueness

Strict scrutiny

Grayned, Fox

Television

Gentile, Snyder

Equal protection

& fairness

First

Amendment

Retaliation

doctrine

Furman, Roper

Button, Speiser

Perry, Mt.

Healthy

Systemic Judicial Bias and Retaliation at

Every Level of the Process

The record reveals a consistent pattern of

unconstitutional behavior by every adjudicative actor

involved in Leigh’s case. At each stage of the proceedings,

bias and retaliation tainted the process:

5. Chart of Bias, Retaliatory & Arbitrary Acts by Judicial

Actors

Actor

Date(s)

Federal

Judge

(SDFL)

2016-2018

Ad Hoc

Committee

2017-2018

Florida Bar 2018-2023

Committee

Retaliatory/ Evidence/

Arbitrary

Source

Act(s)

Referral

based on

distorted

social

media post,

escalated

penalties,

referred

because

Magistrate

referred

Proceeded

on social

media

content;

mischarac

terized

creative

speech as

threats

6-year delay,

bundled

charges,

ignored

racial bias

claims

Referee

2023

Florida

Supreme

Court

2023

Ignored

9 mitigat

ing factors,

disrupted

racial

justice

arguments

Imposed

disbarment

sua sponte,

overrode

referee,

relied on

tainted

referral

G. The Florida Bar’s Disciplinary Improperly

aggregated & Carved 24 Counts in Violation

of the Unit of Prosecution Doctrine and Due

Process

The Florida Bar’s use of 24 charges to justify

disbarment violated the unit of prosecution doctrine and

principles against improper “carving,” (See United States

v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952)), and

the constitutional guarantee against arbitrary punishment.

All 24 charges arose from a single, continuous pattern

of racial advocacy and protected speech. None involved

separate victims, clients, or criminality. They were built on

the same documents, speech, and legal filings, reframed

repeatedly to exaggerate severity.

Under Bell v. United States, Brown v. Ohio, and

Blockburger, such carving is impermissible without

clear legislative intent and distinct acts. Here, the Bar’s

strategy mirrors unconstitutional multiplicity in criminal

law. It inflates a unified message into dozens of charges—a

textbook violation of substantive and procedural due

process.

Even if multiple referrals were submitted, they were

not independent, but from the same tainted motivations;

Leigh’s civil rights advocacy, and the same institutional

discomfort with Leigh’s nonconformity with expected

Black professional existence.

Leigh’s prosecution was not a response to misconduct—

it was a response to dissent. The Constitution demands

more.

Further, many of the counts were based on vague,

subjective terms such as “demeaning,” “disrespectful,” or

“inflammatory”—the kind of language the Supreme Court

has repeatedly held unconstitutional. (See FCC v. Fox

Television Stations, 567 U.S. 239 (2012); Papachristou

v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)). Leigh had no clear

notice that his conduct was sanctionable.

4. The Thirteenth Amendment Is an Absolute Ban

Against Every Form of Anti-Black Racism and

Guaranteed Freedmen’s Self-Determination,

Parens Patriae Protection, and Strict Liability

Protections, All of Which Were Violated by the

Racially Discriminatory Disbarment of Black Civil

Rights Attorney Malik Leigh

A. The Thirteenth Amendment Is a Standalone,

Self-Executing & Absolute Ban on Anti-Black

Racial Subjugation in All Forms.

As this Court declared in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer

Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Amendment empowers

Congress—and by implication, the judiciary—to prohibit

private racial discrimination as an “incident of slavery.”

In Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), the Court

reaffirmed the power to prohibit private racial violence.

In McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), the

Court reiterated that the Reconstruction Amendments

play a structural role in ensuring basic civil rights.

In The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873),

the Court explained that the “pervading purpose” of the

Reconstruction Amendments was to secure the freedom,

dignity, and equality of the newly emancipated race.

Thus, any state action that recreates racial

subordination or imposes new professional servitudes

upon Black Americans is a direct constitutional

violation. The disbarment of Malik Leigh for racial truth

telling, civil rights advocacy, and speaking uncomfortable

truths to power is precisely such an act. Malik Leigh’s

disbarment represents precisely the kind of oppressive,

race-based punishment the Amendment was designed to

prevent. Leigh was not sanctioned for fraud, client harm,

or criminality. He was punished for being himself, while

exposing discriminatory practices in schools, housing,

and the legal system.

B. The Thirteenth Amendment Restored the

Freedmen’s Right to Self-Determination,

Including Four Constitutionally Protected

Options

The Thirteenth Amendment did not merely abolish

slavery. It restored the natural, inalienable, and human

right to self-determination to the descendants of the

enslaved.

This self-determination right included four

constitutionally and internationally recognized

options:

Integration into the fabric of U.S. society on

equal terms—vindicated in Brown v. Board

of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which made

clear that segregation (i.e.. forced separation) is

inherently oppressive & unequal.

Separation to form a semi-sovereign Black nation

within the United States—a “domestic dependent

nation” status, akin to that recognized for Native

tribes in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.

1 (1831), but with even greater legal autonomy,

as the Freedmen were wrongfully enslaved, &

restoration of their sovereignty mandated not by

treaty but instead constitutionally mandated by

the Thirteenth Amendment.

Repatriation to ancestral homelands—affirmed

in The Amistad, 40 U.S. 518 (1841), where the

Court acknowledged the human dignity and

sovereignty of Black people born free in Africa.

Emigration to other sovereign nations—

protected by the International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the U.N.

Declaration on the Granting of Independence

to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which

safeguard the right of all people to freely

determine their political status.

To punish Leigh for resisting white institutional

dominance, litigating on behalf of Black tenants, and

critiquing racial injustice is to punish him for expressing

the very self-determination right that the Thirteenth

Amendment enshrined.

C. Parens Patriae Protection for Black Americans

Is Constitutionally Mandated

The Thirteenth Amendment also imposes a parens

patriae duty on the federal government to affirmatively

protect, repair & restore Black Americans, whose

status as a freed class was not the result of contract, but

of national guilt, harm and constitutional revolution.

The Freedmen’s Bureau Acts and Reconstruction

legislation institutionalized this duty, recognizing that

emancipation was insufficient without repair, protection,

and economic support. This duty was never repealed.

As this Court explained in Sugarman v. Dougall,

lf.13 U.S. 63Jf (1973); United States v. Carotene Products

Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938)(Footnote 4), “discrete and insular

minorities” require special constitutional protection when

they are politically powerless and subject to prejudice.

The government’s parens patriae obligation includes

protecting them from new forms of professional or political

servitude. When the state disbars a Black civil rights

attorney without client harm or dishonesty, and based

on constitutionally protected expression, it becomes

an agent of racial oppression, violating its affirmative

constitutional duty.

D. Anti-Black Racism Triggers Strict Liability

Under the Thirteenth Amendment

Under the Thirteenth Amendment’s absolute ban,

racism must be treated as a strict liability constitutional

offense: where state action creates a reasonable suspicion

of anti-Black racial intent or effect, the burden shifts

to the actor to prove the complete absence of racial bias.

This framework mirrors that used in Village ofArlington

Heights, 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and Caperton v. A.T. Massey

Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), where appearance, pattern,

and motive warrant heightened review.

Leigh’s disbarment—arising from racially coded

discomfort with his advocacy, timing aligned with a

white colleague’s minimal suspension, and disregard

for procedural norms—satisfies every trigger of strict

constitutional scrutiny.

E. The Civil Rights Cases (1883) Must Be

Overruled: A Monument to Judicial Racism

and Constitutional Error

The Court’s decision in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.

3 (1883), held that the 13th Amendment did not authorize

federal regulation of private racial discrimination.

That decision:

• Misunderstood the Thirteenth Amendment

as narrow and passive;

• Ignored the constitutional role of the

Freedmen as a special class requiring

protection;

• Denied the federal government’s duty to

dismantle systemic white supremacy.

The Civil Rights Cases must be overruled. The

Thirteenth Amendment was and remains a free-standing,

self-enforcing mandate, not only banning slavery, but

institutionalized racism.

Leigh Was Punished for Racial Truth-Telling:

A Modern Badge of Slavery

Federal and state authorities, acting in concert,

used their legal authority to exile Leigh from his

profession for speaking about institutional racism. That

is not professional regulation—it is racial suppression.

The Florida Supreme Court’s sua sponte escalation to

disbarment, in the absence of new hearings, findings, or

client injury, functioned as a modern-day act of involuntary

servitude. It stripped a Black attorney of his livelihood

and dignity for daring to litigate against racism working

in concert with the Florida Bar.

In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968),

the Supreme Court held that Congress may legislate

against “badges and incidents” of slavery. Here, Leigh’s

punishment was not simply a disciplinary measure; it was

an act of state power aimed at silencing Black resistance.

Malik Leigh was disbarred not for theft, fraud, or

client harm, but for resisting systemic racism and

speaking racial truth to power.

He:

• Filed civil rights lawsuits on behalf of Black

women and children in toxic HUD housing.

• Publicly exposed judicial bias, housing

discrimination, and education discrimination.

• Posted social media content affirming Black

identity and political resistance.

As this Court held in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415

(1963), and Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941),

political advocacy and courtroom criticism are at the core

of First Amendment protection. When those rights are

denied to Black attorneys based on content and race, the

harm is not only constitutional—it is generational.

G. The Referee, Bar Committees, and Florida

Supreme Court Functioned as Instruments of

Anti-Black Repression and Retaliation.

The Florida Supreme Court disregarded the referee’s

findings and Florida precedent that disbarment is the

“penalty of last resort.” Instead, it escalated punishment

sua sponte based on vague rhetoric about “attitude” and

“tone.” It applied no individualized analysis and refused to

address the racialized origin of the referral. One Florida

Supreme Court Justice in open court stated, “Let’s say

we were moved to suspend your client [Leigh] rather

than disbar him [,] I cannot imagine him being admitted

or readmitted to the Florida Bar...” is a revelation, not

constitutional justice.

The Bar grievance committee refused to review

claims of retaliation or racial discrimination and failed

to allow Leigh to present witnesses or cross-examine

accusers. It treated his expressive litigation advocacy as

misconduct, including protected First Amendment filings

and motions.

H. The 24 Counts Were a Racially Disguised Tool

of Involuntary Servitude

Each of the 24 counts originated from Leigh’s

constitutionally protected litigation and speech. They

were not distinct acts but rather a unified course of civil

rights advocacy. Yet they were artificially split (“carved”)

into multiple charges:

• Many stemmed from a single post or

pleading but were repackaged as separate

offenses.

• Some were so vague that Leigh could not

reasonably defend against them, violating

the Due Process vagueness doctrine

(Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S.

156 (1972)).

• The entire unit of prosecution was

manipulated to inflate the number of

“offenses,” without any intervening victims,

criminal intent, or clear distinction in

conduct (Blockburger v. United States, 284

U.S. 299 (1932)).

This improper multiplication of charges mirrored

McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550 (2016), where

vague standards and overbreadth allowed prosecution of

routine conduct.

Just as in Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911),

where the Court struck down laws criminalizing breach

of contract by Black workers, this punishment functioned

to trap Leigh in permanent professional exclusion based

on race.

Collective Punishment of Leigh and Co

Counsel as a Badge of Slavery

Leigh’s white co-counsel, Danielle Watson, was not

individually accused of any serious wrongdoing. She was

really punished because of her affiliation with Leigh. This

is textbook collective punishment, prohibited under all

civilized legal systems and clearly unconstitutional.

CONCLUSION & PRAYER FOR RELIEF

This case presents a profound constitutional crisis:

whether the state may weaponize attorney discipline to

suppress racial truth-telling and disbar a Black civil rights

lawyer for confronting injustice. The answer must be no.

There was no justifiable basis—factually, legally,

or ethically—to discipline Malik Leigh. He caused no

harm to clients. He committed no fraud, no theft, and

no misconduct recognized by established disciplinary

standards. The referral from the federal judges were

retaliatory, the charges were vague and unconstitutional,

and the entire proceeding—from the grievance committee

to the Florida Supreme Court—was tainted by bias,

arbitrariness, and racial reprisal. It was unlawful to

discipline him at all.

This was not regulation. It was suppression. Leigh

was punished because he dared to speak the truth about

racism—in courtrooms, on social media, and in service

to vulnerable communities. That punishment was not

only a violation of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendments—it was a direct, structural violation of the

Thirteenth Amendment.

The Thirteenth Amendment abolished more than

physical slavery. It banned every badge and incident of

anti-Black subjugation—including professional exclusion,

retaliatory prosecution, and systemic silencing of Black

resistance. This case proves those protections are not yet

secure.

To uphold Leigh’s disbarment is to uphold the very

structure of modern racial servitude that the Thirteenth

Amendment was enacted to destroy. It is time to enforce

that Amendment in full. It is also time to overrule The

Civil Rights Cases (1883), which wrongly narrowed the

Thirteenth Amendment to physical bondage and denied

Black Americans the full constitutional shield they are

due. That ruling, like Plessy, has become an obsolete and

morally indefensible relic.

This case satisfies every criterion under Supreme Court

Rule 10. It raises national questions of first impression,

reveals deep constitutional error, and involves one of

the most egregious acts of racialized legal suppression

in recent memory. It asks whether the Constitution still

or ever protects Black advocacy—especially when it is

inconvenient or uncomfortable to power.

This Court must grant the writ of certiorari—not

just to restore justice for Malik Leigh, but to affirm

that the Thirteenth Amendment still lives.

Malik Leigh prays this Court reverses his

disbarment, dismisses all 24 counts against him &

restores him to practice law in Florida as a champion

of the civil liberties of Black and all Americans.

Respectfully submitted,

Malik Leigh

Counsel of Record and

Petitioner Pro Se

P.O. Box 162

Blakely, GA 39823

(888) 399-0678

mr.malikleigh@gmail.com

June 11, 2025

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.