Amicus Curiae Brief — Michael Watson, Mississippi Secretary of State, Petitioner v. Republican National Committee, et al.

No. 24-1260

IN THE

Supreme Court

of the United States

_________________

MICHAEL WATSON, MISSISSIPPI SECRETARY OF

STATE,

Petitioner,

v.

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al.,

Respondents.

_________________

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

_________________

BRIEF OF CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER AND

PROTECT DEMOCRACY PROJECT AS

AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

PETITIONER

_________________

Jared Davidson

Jane Bentrott

PROTECT DEMOCRACY PROJECT

2020 Pennsylvania Ave NW,

Suite 163

Washington, DC 20006

Adav Noti

Counsel of Record

Danielle Lang

Anna Baldwin

Dana Paikowsky

Valencia Richardson

Benjamin Phillips

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER

1101 14th St. NW

Suite 400

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 736-2200

anoti@campaignlegal.org

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE .......................... 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 3

I.

State laws that extend receipt deadlines for

mail-in ballots postmarked by Election Day

comport with the federal election-day statutes

........................................................................... 3

A. Under the Elections Clause, states have

primary authority to regulate elections unless

Congress acts to preempt state law ................. 4

B. The text of the federal election-day statutes

does not preempt state laws like Mississippi’s

ballot receipt deadline ...................................... 7

C. Congress has never repudiated or expressed

disapproval of post-Election Day ballot receipt

deadlines ........................................................... 9

II.

Congress’s enactment of the Electoral Count

Reform Act in 2022 confirms that the federal

election-day statutes do not displace state

ballot receipt laws ........................................... 11

A. Congress was well-aware of state ballot receipt

deadlines and acted to respect, rather than

override, those laws in passing the ECRA .... 13

B. In enacting the ECRA, Congress ratified the

existing and then-uniform understanding that

the federal election-day statutes do not

displace state ballot receipt deadlines ........... 20

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 26

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.,

570 U.S. 1 (2013) .......................................... 5, 8, 26

Bob Jones University v. United States,

461 U.S. 574 (1983) .............................................. 19

Bognet v. Secretary Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,

980 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2020) ............................. 7, 23

Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections,

684 F. Supp. 3d 720 (N.D. Ill. 2023) ................ 7, 24

Dames & Moore v. Regan,

453 U.S. 654 (1981) .............................................. 26

Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Cegavske,

488 F. Supp. 3d 993 (D. Nev. 2020) ..................... 23

Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Way,

492 F. Supp. 3d 354 (D.N.J. 2020) .................. 7, 23

Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media,

588 U.S. 427 (2019) .............................................. 21

Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997)..................... 5, 8, 22

Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals

USA, Inc., 586 U.S. 123 (2019) ............................ 21

League of United Latin American Citizens v.

Executive Office of the President,

780 F. Supp. 3d 135 (D.D.C. 2025) ........................ 5

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,

603 U.S. 369 (2024) .............................................. 13

Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) ..................... 21

iii

Millsaps v. Thompson,

259 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2001) ................................ 23

Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc.,

594 U.S. 559 (2021) .............................................. 22

Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1 (2023) ........................ 2, 4

National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning,

573 U.S. 513 (2014) .............................................. 24

Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921) ........ 8

Republican National Committee v. Democratic

National Committee, 589 U.S. 423 (2020) ............. 8

Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932) .......................... 5

Splonskowski v. White,

714 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (D.N.D. 2024).................... 24

Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs

v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,

576 U.S. 519 (2015) .............................................. 22

United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) ............ 5

United States v. Midwest Oil Company,

236 U.S. 459 (1915) .............................................. 24

Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Bomer,

199 F.3d 773 (5th Cir. 2000) ................................ 23

Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Keisling,

259 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2001) .............................. 23

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 .................................. 2, 4, 5

U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2......................................... 4

U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 4......................................... 4

iv

Statutes and Codes

2 U.S.C. § 1 .......................................................... 2, 3, 7

2 U.S.C. § 7 .................................................... 2, 3, 7, 13

3 U.S.C. § 1 ...................... 2, 3, 7, 12, 13, 16, 17, 24, 25

3 U.S.C. § 4 .......................................................... 17, 25

3 U.S.C. § 5 .......................................................... 17, 25

3 U.S.C. § 5(a)(1) ....................................................... 15

3 U.S.C. § 5(c) ............................................................ 16

3 U.S.C. § 5(d) ............................................................ 16

3 U.S.C. § 7 ................................................................ 18

3 U.S.C. § 21 ............................ 3, 12, 13, 16, 21, 24, 25

3 U.S.C. § 21(1) ............................................ 3, 7, 12, 25

25 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3511(a) ........................................ 6

52 U.S.C. § 20304(b)(1) ............................................. 11

Ala. Code § 17-11-18(b) ............................................... 6

Ark. Code § 7-5-411(a)(1)(A)(ii) ................................... 6

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-8.3-113(2)..................................... 6

Fla. Stat. § 101.6952(5) ............................................... 6

Ga. Code § 21-2-386(a)(1)(G) ....................................... 6

Ind. Code § 3-12-1-17(b) .............................................. 6

Iowa Code § 53.44 ........................................................ 6

Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.759a(18) .............................. 6

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.920(1) ......................................... 6

Mont. Code Ann. § 13-21-206(1)(c) ............................. 6

v

Mont. Code Ann. § 13-21-226(1) ................................. 6

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-258.12(a) .................................. 6

N.D. Cent. Code § 16.1-07-24 ...................................... 6

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3511.11(B) .............................. 6

R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-20-16 ........................................... 6

S.C. Code § 7-15-700(A)............................................... 6

Utah Code Ann. § 20A-16-408 .................................... 6

Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.40.091.................................. 20

Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.60.190.................................. 20

Legislative Materials

32 D.C. Reg. 3828 (July 5, 1985)............................... 10

1981 N.D. Laws 564 .................................................. 10

1984 N.Y. Laws 1784................................................. 10

1984 Ohio Laws 137 .................................................. 10

1984 V.I. Sess. Laws 132........................................... 10

1985 Mass. Acts 792 .................................................. 10

1985 Md. Laws 2768.................................................. 10

1986 Ala. Sess. Laws, ch. 85 ..................................... 10

2025 Kan. Sess. Laws 33 ........................................... 20

2025 N.D. Laws, ch. 200 ........................................... 20

Assembly Bill 930, Regular Session (Cal. 2025) ...... 19

Assembly Bill A7690, 2023–2024 General Assembly

(N.Y. 2023)............................................................ 19

B24-0507, 24th Council (D.C. 2023) ......................... 19

vi

H.B. 300, 2025 General Session (Utah 2025) ........... 20

H.R. Rep. No. 99-765 (1986)...................................... 10

Pub. L. No. 111-84, Division A, Title V, Subtitle H,

123 Stat. 2318 ...................................................... 11

Pub. L. No. 117-328, 136 Stat. 5233 (2022) .............. 12

Pub. L. No. 771, 62 Stat. 672 (1948) ......................... 12

S.B. 259, 102nd Legislature (Mich. 2023) ................ 19

S.B. 293, 136th General Assembly, Regular Session

(Ohio 2025) ........................................................... 20

S.B. 5890, 68th Legislature, 2024 Regular Session

(Wash. 2024)......................................................... 20

S.4573—Electoral Count Reform and Presidential

Transition Improvement Act of 2022, Congress,

https://www.congress.gov/bill/117thcongress/senatebill/4573/cosponsors?s=1&r=1&q=%7B%22search

%22%3A%22S.4573+%282022%29%22%7D ....... 14

The Electoral Count Act: The Need for Reform:

Hearing Before the Commission on Rules

and Administration, Senate Hearing 117–332

(2022) ............................................ 14, 15, 16, 17, 18

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting

Act, Pub. L. No. 99-410, 100 Stat. 924 (1986) ....... 9

Other Authorities

3 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (M.

Farrand ed. 1911)................................................... 6

vii

Amy B. Wang, McConnell, Schumer Back Bill to

Prevent Efforts to Subvert Presidential Election

Results, Washington Post (September 28, 2022),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/09/

27/mcconnell-schumer-electoral-reform .............. 15

Cass R. Sunstein, The Rule of Law v. “Party Nature”:

Presidential Elections, the Constitution, the

Electoral Count Act of 1887, the Horror of

January 6, and the Electoral Count Reform Act of

2022, 103 B.U. L. Rev. 1171 (2023) ..................... 15

Jacob Bogage & Christopher Ingraham, Key swing

states vulnerable to USPS slowdowns as millions

vote by mail, data shows, Washington Post

(October 20, 2020),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/1

0/20/swing-states-election-usps/ .......................... 19

Jason Nagel, Standardizing State Vote-by-Mail

Deadlines in Federal Elections, 2022 Cardozo L.

Rev. De-Novo 1 (2022).......................................... 19

Kate Hamilton, State Implementation of the Electoral

Count Reform Act and the Mitigation of ElectionSubversion Risk in 2024 and Beyond, 133 Yale

L.J. Forum 249 (2023).......................................... 15

Larry Buchanan, Lazaro Gamio & Alicia Parlapiano,

Will You Have Enough Time to Vote by Mail in

Your State?, New York Times (August 31, 2020),

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/08/31/u

s/politics/vote-by-mail-deadlines.html ................ 19

Michael T. Morley, Election Emergencies: Voting in

Times of Pandemic, 80 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 359

(2023) .................................................................... 18

viii

Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the

English Language (C. Goodrich & N. Porter eds.

1869) ....................................................................... 8

Table 11: Receipt and Postmark Deadlines for

Absentee/Mail Ballots, National Conference of

State Legislatures (updated Dec. 24, 2025),

https://www.ncsl.org/elections-andcampaigns/table-11-receipt-and-postmarkdeadlines-for-absentee-mail-ballots ...................... 6

1

INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE1

Campaign Legal Center (“CLC”) is a nonpartisan,

nonprofit organization dedicated to solving the wide

range of challenges facing American democracy. CLC

is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to

solving the wide range of challenges facing American

democracy. The Protect Democracy Project (Protect

Democracy) is a nonpartisan nonprofit whose mission

is to prevent our democracy from declining into a more

authoritarian form of government. As part of that

mission, Protect Democracy engages in litigation and

advocacy aimed at ensuring elections are fair, free,

and secure.

The Electoral Count Reform Act of 2022 (“ECRA”)

updates the Electoral Count Act (“ECA”) of 1887. The

ECA, as updated by the ECRA, provides the primary

legal framework for casting and counting Electoral

College votes in presidential elections. In the wake of

January 6, 2021, CLC and Protect Democracy played

leading roles in advocating for the need to amend the

ECA. Both organizations worked closely with the

bipartisan group of Senators who worked to write and

pass the ECRA. Congress enacted this legislation to

ensure that the process by which Congress counts

each state’s electoral votes for President and Vice

President is not subject to manipulation or abuse. The

ECRA reenacted certain federal election-day statutes

at issue in this case.

1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part

and no person or entity other than Amicus, their members, or

their counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or

submission.

2

Amici submit this brief to explain that Congress

passed the ECRA with full knowledge that states had

varied deadlines for the receipt of mail-in ballots.

Rather than disrupt the states’ ability to set their own

deadlines for post-election ballot receipt, Congress

crafted the ECRA to ensure that states retained the

ability to set their own deadlines for the receipt and

counting of validly cast ballots.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The core principles that frame this case are

undisputed. Under the Elections Clause, Congress

has the power to “make or alter” states’ election laws

in order to regulate federal elections. U.S. Const. art.

I, § 4, cl. 1. But where Congress has not acted, states

retain and must exercise their “constitutional duty to

craft the rules governing federal elections.” Moore v.

Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 29 (2023). The dispute here is over

whether Congress has acted to bar states from setting

their own ballot receipt deadlines for ballots validly

cast by Election Day. Congress has done no such

thing.

While the federal election day statutes—2 U.S.C. §

7; 2 U.S.C. § 1; 3 U.S.C. § 1—set the date of the federal

Election Day, neither these statutes nor any other

federal law has ever set a uniform requirement that

validly cast ballots must be received by Election Day.

To the contrary, federal statutes such as the

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting

Act (“UOCAVA”) and the Military and Overseas Voter

Empowerment (“MOVE”) Act recognize—and, in some

cases, mandate—that the receipt of votes will extend

beyond Election Day.

3

Critically, Congress very recently considered the

impact and meaning of the federal election-day

statutes when passing the Electoral Count Reform Act

(ECRA) in 2022. When Congress drafted and passed

the ECRA, it did so with full knowledge not only that

many states’ ballot receipt deadlines fell after the

federal Election Day, but also that existing court

precedents had unanimously held that the federal

election-day statutes do not displace state ballot

receipt

deadlines.

Congress

ratified

that

understanding by reenacting 3 U.S.C. § 1 and 3 U.S.C.

§ 21 without any change that would have undermined

that line of consistent precedent. Where Congress

adopted new deadlines in the ECRA, those provisions

were crafted to ensure respect for the “laws of the

State enacted prior to . . . ‘election day,’” 3 U.S.C. §

21(1), in express deference to the states’ ability to

regulate the casting and counting of ballots, including

ballot receipt deadlines.

This Court should reverse the judgment below.

ARGUMENT

I.

State laws that extend receipt deadlines for

mail-in ballots postmarked by Election Day

comport with the federal election-day

statutes.

In three provisions of the United States code,

Congress has set the federal election day as the

Tuesday after the first Monday in November in

certain years. 2 U.S.C. § 7; 2 U.S.C. § 1; 3 U.S.C. § 1

(hereinafter,

“federal

election-day

statutes”).

Nowhere in the federal election-day statutes or

elsewhere in federal law has Congress ever set a

4

requirement that validly cast ballots must be received

by Election Day. To be sure, Congress can impose

certain uniform federal election rules. But Congress

has never chosen to displace states’ primary authority

to set deadlines and rules regarding post-election

acceptance and counting of ballots validly cast by

Election Day. Indeed, if ever there was a time that

Congress might have done so, it would have been in

passage of the ECRA in 2022. But Congress did no

such thing. Instead, Congress only changed federal

law as necessary to protect the integrity of the

Presidential electoral count while continuing to

preserve state authority and discretion to set rules for

ballot receipt.

A. Under the Elections Clause, states have

primary authority to regulate elections

unless Congress acts to preempt state

law.

The Constitution’s Elections Clause empowers

states to prescribe the “Times, Places and Manner of

holding” congressional elections. U.S. Const. art. I, §

4, cl. 1. Similarly, while Article II, Section 1, Clause 4

provides that “Congress may determine the Time of

ch[oo]sing the [presidential] Electors, and the Day on

which they shall give their Votes,” U.S. Const. art. II,

§ 1, cl. 4, the Electors Clause reserves to the states the

power to choose the “Manner” of appointing electors,

id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. These provisions provide states

with sweeping authority to enact election laws,

subject only to the rest of the Constitution and

preemption by acts of Congress. Moore v. Harper, 600

U.S. 1, 29 (2023) (states hold a “constitutional duty to

5

craft the rules governing federal elections”); Foster v.

Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997) (as a “default” rule, the

Constitution “invests the States” with “responsibility”

over most of “the mechanics” of federal elections);

United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 311 (1941) (“the

states are given, and in fact exercise a wide discretion

in the formulation of a system for” federal elections).

Where Congress acts to regulate federal elections,

federal law governs. This is so given that the Elections

Clause invests Congress with the power to “make or

alter” states’ election laws. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.

But where Congress has not acted to displace state

law, the Constitution assigns states with the

responsibility for regulating elections. See Foster, 522

U.S. at 69. Indeed, the “substantive scope” of states’

authority to regulate Federal elections is “broad” and

“comprehensive,” covering all areas where Congress

has not “exercised” its powers to preempt state

legislation. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona,

Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2013). Consistent with this

framework, states “provide a complete code for

congressional elections, not only as to times and

places, but in relation to notices, registration, . . . [and]

protection of voters,” among other issues. Smiley v.

Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).

This constitutional structure reflects the

Framers’ view that states, as an authority “more

convenient” and responsive to the people, are best

situated to carry out such responsibilities except

where Congress has made a deliberate choice to

respond to issues “where the need arose.” League of

United Latin Am. Citizens v. Exec. Off. of the

6

President, 780 F. Supp. 3d 135, 159 (D.D.C. 2025)

(quoting The Federalist No. 59 (Alexander

Hamilton)). James Madison explained the rationale

for this presumption of state authority: “[i]t was found

necessary to leave the regulation of [federal elections],

in the first place, to the state governments, as being

best acquainted with the situation of the people.” 3

Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 312 (M.

Farrand ed. 1911).

In addition to Mississippi, fourteen states (as well

as Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the

District of Columbia) have enacted laws that permit

mail ballots to be received after Election Day. Table

11:

Receipt

and

Postmark

Deadlines

for

Absentee/Mail Ballots, National Conference of State

Legislatures

(updated

Dec.

24,

2025),

https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/table11-receipt-and-postmark-deadlines-for-absenteemail-ballots. Each of these states, however, requires

that mail ballots be cast by Election Day. Likewise,

another seventeen states have laws that permit postElection Day receipt of ballots timely cast by military

and overseas voters.2 Thus, Mississippi’s law is

consistent with the practice of allowing post-Election

2 Ala. Code § 17-11-18(b); Ark. Code § 7-5-411(a)(1)(A)(ii); Colo.

Rev. Stat. § 1-8.3-113(2); Fla. Stat. § 101.6952(5); Ga. Code § 212-386(a)(1)(G); Ind. Code § 3-12-1-17(b); Iowa Code § 53.44; Mich.

Comp. Laws § 168.759a(18); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.920(1); Mont.

Code Ann. §§ 13-21-206(1)(c), 13-21-226(1); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163258.12(a); N.D. Cent. Code § 16.1-07-24; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §

3511.11(B); 25 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3511(a); R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-2016; S.C. Code § 7-15-700(A); Utah Code Ann. § 20A-16-408.

7

Day ballot receipt of timely cast ballots for some or all

mail and absentee voters in more than thirty states.

As the Third Circuit has concluded, these states’

laws “and federal laws setting the date for federal

elections can, and indeed do, operate harmoniously”

and therefore are not federally preempted. Bognet v.

Sec’y Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 980 F.3d 336,

354 (3d Cir. 2020), cert. granted, judgment vacated as

moot sub nom., Bognet v. Degraffenreid, 141 S. Ct.

2508 (2021). See also Bost v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections,

684 F. Supp. 3d 720, 736–37 (N.D. Ill. 2023), aff’d, 114

F.4th 634 (7th Cir. 2024) cert. granted on other

grounds, 145 S. Ct. 2751 (2025); Donald J. Trump for

President, Inc. v. Way, 492 F. Supp. 3d 354, 372

(D.N.J. 2020). Until the decision below, no court had

ever concluded that a state ballot-receipt deadline

statute conflicted with the federal election-day

statutes.

B. The text of the federal election-day

statutes does not preempt state laws like

Mississippi’s ballot receipt deadline.

The text of the federal election-day statutes

confirms they do not preempt ballot-receipt laws like

Mississippi’s. The federal election-day statutes set the

Tuesday after the first Monday in November as “the

day for the election” of Members of Congress, 2 U.S.C.

§ 7; see 2 U.S.C. § 1 (tying Senate elections to the same

day), and presidential electors, 3 U.S.C. §§ 1, 21(1).

The text establishes only a uniform “day” for federal

“election[s].” See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 7 (“The Tuesday next

after the 1st Monday in November, in every even

numbered year, is established as the day for the

8

election, in each of the States and Territories of the

United States, of Representatives and Delegates to

the Congress commencing on the 3d day of January

next thereafter.”) The statutes are silent as to the

details—of which there are many—of how states

conduct election administration including, for

example, ballot receipt deadlines. This silence alone

should be fatal to Respondent’s sweeping and

unprecedented preemption argument. See Arizona,

570 U.S. at 14 (when interpreting laws adopted under

the Elections Clause, “the reasonable assumption is

that the statutory text accurately communicates the

scope of Congress’s pre-emptive intent”).

Further, the plain meaning of “election” confirms

that the federal election-day statutes do not preempt

Mississippi’s ballot-receipt deadline. The meaning of

“election” as used by Congress in these statutes was

clear at enactment and has not changed in the many

years since. See Noah Webster, An American

Dictionary of the English Language 433 (C. Goodrich

& N. Porter eds. 1869) (defining “election” as “[t]he act

of choosing a person to fill an office”). As this Court

has repeatedly acknowledged, the word “election”

signifies the “final choice” of the voter. Newberry v.

United States, 256 U.S. 232, 250 (1921); see, e.g.,

Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,

589 U.S. 423, 424 (2020) (“Extending the date by

which ballots may be cast by voters—not just received

by the municipal clerks but cast by voters—for an

additional six days after the scheduled election day

fundamentally alters the nature of the election”);

Foster, 522 U.S. at 73 (“Because the candidate said to

be ‘elected’ has been selected by the voters from

9

among all eligible office-seekers, there is no reason to

suspect that the Louisiana Legislature intended some

eccentric meaning for the phrase ‘is elected.’”). Voters

in Mississippi must make their “final choice” by

Election Day, and the fact that state law allows

validly cast mail ballots to be received and counted

thereafter represents no conflict with the federal

election-day statutes.

C. Congress has never repudiated or

expressed disapproval of post-Election

Day ballot receipt deadlines.

Respondents’ theory is further undermined by the

existence of other federal statutes that recognize—

and, in some cases, mandate—that the receipt of votes

cast by Election Day will sometimes extend beyond

Election Day. These statutes also make clear that

Congress has long been aware of, and taken no action

to preempt, state laws permitting post-election day

receipt of ballots cast by Election Day.

For example, in 1986, Congress enacted the

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting

Act (“UOCAVA”). UOCAVA requires states to accept

absentee federal ballots for certain overseas and

military voters in the event they are unable to submit

a timely vote using their state absentee ballot. The

statute mandates that federal absentee ballots “shall

be submitted and processed in the manner provided

by law for absentee ballots in the State involved” and

that the state absentee ballot deadline applies.

UOCAVA, Pub. L. No. 99-410, § 103(b), 100 Stat. 924,

924–926 (1986) (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 20303(b)).

10

Critically, in drafting UOCAVA, Congress did not

set “election day” as the ballot receipt deadline; it did

not cite the federal election-day statutes as a

reference date for ballot receipt; nor did it simply

assume states’ ballot receipt deadlines to be

coextensive with “election day.” Rather, Congress

expressly contemplated that the reference date would

vary and be determined by the individual states—i.e.,

“the deadline for receipt of the State absentee ballot

under State law.”

Moreover, at the time Congress enacted

UOCAVA, at least eight states and the District of

Columbia already had laws that, like Mississippi’s

here, required that absentee ballots postmarked by

election day but received within some period after

election day must be counted. 1986 Ala. Sess. Laws,

ch. 85, §§ 9–11; 1985 Md. Laws 2768; 1985 Mass. Acts

792, 792–93; 1984 N.Y. Laws 1784; 1981 N.D. Laws

564, 564–65; 1984 Ohio Laws 137; 1984 V.I. Sess.

Laws 132; 32 D.C. Reg. 3828 (July 5, 1985). Congress’

passage of UOCAVA not only permitted post-Election

Day ballot receipt deadlines, but mandated that

states apply them (where applicable) to UOCAVA

ballots. This is clear evidence that Congress has not

understood the federal election-day statutes to

prohibit laws like Mississippi’s. Indeed, that

UOCAVA was crafted to operate harmoniously with

these state laws is indicative of Congress’s intent to

facilitate rather than constrain participation in

federal elections. H.R. Rep. No. 99-765, at 7, 13 (1986)

(UOCAVA House Report).

11

In 2009, Congress enacted the Military and

Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act,

amending UOCAVA to establish new voter

registration procedures for federal elections, making

voting more accessible to military and overseas voters.

Pub. L. No. 111-84, Div. A, Tit. V, Subtit. H, 123 Stat.

2318 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1566a; 52 U.S.C. §§

20301–20308, 20311). As in UOCAVA, the MOVE Act

reaffirmed Congress’s choice to defer to states’

divergent ballot receipt deadlines; it neither insisted

nor assumed that “Election Day” is the final date by

which states must receive all ballots. Specifically, the

MOVE Act requires that overseas servicemembers’

ballots must be delivered “to the appropriate election

officials” “not later than the date by which an absentee

ballot must be received in order to be counted in the

election.” 52 U.S.C. § 20304(b)(1) (emphasis added).

This language clearly shows that Congress was aware

of and deferred to the states’ choices in setting

particular ballot receipt deadlines.

II. Congress’s enactment of the Electoral Count

Reform Act in 2022 confirms that the federal

election-day statutes do not displace state

ballot receipt laws.

The text of the federal election day statutes and

well-established principles regarding preemption

under the Elections Clause plainly establish that

federal law does not displace state ballot receipt laws.

If Congress wanted to mandate a uniform federal

ballot receipt deadline, it would have done so in the

ECRA. But Congress did no such thing; instead,

Congress amended and reenacted the operative

12

language of 3 U.S.C. § 1 and 3 U.S.C. § 21 as part of

its passage of the Electoral Count Reform Act in 2022,

all without taking any action to set a uniform ballot

receipt deadline. See Pub. L. No. 117-328, 136 Stat.

5233 (2022).

Prior to enactment of the ECRA, 3 U.S.C. § 1 read:

“The electors of President and Vice President shall be

appointed, in each State, on the Tuesday next after

the first Monday in November, in every fourth year

succeeding every election of a President and Vice

President.” See Pub. L. No. 771, 62 Stat. 672, 672

(1948). The ECRA amended 3 U.S.C. § 1 to read: “The

electors of President and Vice President shall be

appointed, in each State, on election day, in

accordance with the laws of the State enacted prior to

election day.” See Pub. L. No. 117-328, § 102(a), 136

Stat. 5233 (2022). Likewise, 3 U.S.C. § 21, as amended

by the ECRA defines “election day” as “the Tuesday

next after the first Monday in November, in every

fourth year succeeding every election of a President

and Vice President held in each State . . . as provided

under laws of the State enacted prior to such day.” 3

U.S.C. § 21(1).

When Congress drafted and passed the ECRA, it

did so with full knowledge that many states’ ballot

receipt deadlines fell after the federal Election Day. In

fact, controversy around ballot receipt deadlines had

recently taken center stage—capturing headlines and

courtroom attention in the wake of the COVID-19

pandemic.

Congress was also aware that existing court

precedent had unanimously held that the federal

13

election-day statutes do not displace state law ballot

receipt deadlines. Congress declined to affect a

“dramatic departure” from “settled [] understanding”

and current practice on this high-profile issue in the

ECRA. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603

U.S. 369, 392 (2024). To the contrary, Congress

ratified that uniform precedent by reenacting 3 U.S.C.

§ 1 and 3 U.S.C. § 21 without any change that would

have disrupted it. (2 U.S.C. § 7, concerning election of

members of Congress, also remained unchanged.) In

so doing, Congress reaffirmed that the power to set

ballot receipt deadlines is one afforded to the states.

Congress’s actions in passing the ECRA are therefore

fatal to Respondents’ arguments.

A.

Congress was well-aware of state ballot

receipt deadlines and acted to respect,

rather than override, those laws in

passing the ECRA.

The ECRA was crafted by a bipartisan group of

legislators to update the Electoral Count Act (ECA) of

1887, the law that had provided the primary

framework for the casting and counting of electoral

college votes in presidential elections for more than a

century. In the wake of the 2020 Presidential Election,

however, it became clear that the outdated language

of the ECA needed to be modernized to ensure the

orderly and peaceful transition of presidential power.

Senators Joe Manchin and Susan Collins were leading

14

sponsors of the ECRA, legislation that drew broad,

bipartisan support.3

In hearings on the ECRA, Senator Manchin

explained that while the original ECA had been

passed in 1887 to address the problem of dueling

slates of presidential electors, many of the fixes that

had been established by the ECA “are not merely

outdated, but actually serve as the very mechanisms

that bad actors have zeroed in on, as a way to

potentially invalidate presidential election results.” S.

Hrg. 117–332 at 7 (2022), The Electoral Count Act:

The Need for Reform: Hearing Before the Comm. on

Rules and Admin. (testimony of Sen. Joe Manchin). As

Minority Leader McConnell remarked at the time,

“Congress’s process for counting their presidential

electors’ votes was written 135 years ago. The chaos

that came to a head on January 6th [of 2021] certainly

3 Before its inclusion in the omnibus appropriations package in

which it passed Congress, the Electoral Count Reform Act had

obtained thirty-nine cosponsors in the Senate. Specifically, it had

twenty-two Democrats, sixteen Republicans, and one

Independent, including both then-Senate Majority Leader Chuck

Schumer and then-Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell.

S.4573—Electoral Count Reform and Presidential Transition

Improvement

Act

of

2022,

CONG.,

https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senatebill/4573/cosponsors?s=1&r=1&q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22S

.4573+%282022%29%22%7D).

15

underscored the need for an update.”4 The ECRA was

that update.5

In passing the ECRA, Congress sought to replace

ambiguous text in the ECA with clear federal

mandates where necessary, while also affording

states as much flexibility as possible to regulate their

own elections. As Senator Shelley Moore Capito

explained, the purpose of the ECRA was to provide

clear rules for the certification of presidential

elections while allowing “states to tailor their election

laws to the specific needs of their citizens.” The

Electoral Count Act: The Need for Reform: Hearing

Before the Comm. on Rules and Admin., 117th Cong.

6 (2022) (testimony of Sen. Shelley Moore Capito).

Thus, where the ECRA displaces state election

procedures in favor of new, uniform federal

procedures, it does so clearly and expressly.

By design, the ECRA did not touch state ballot

receipt deadlines. Instead, and as relevant here, the

ECRA sets a firm deadline for state election officials

to certify the appointment of electors, 3 U.S.C. §

5(a)(1); creates an expedited pathway in federal court

4 Amy B. Wang, McConnell, Schumer Back Bill to Prevent Efforts

to Subvert Presidential Election Results, Wash. Post (Sep. 28,

2022),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/09/27/mcconnellschumer-electoral-reform.

5 See also Kate Hamilton, State Implementation of the Electoral

Count Reform Act and the Mitigation of Election-Subversion Risk

in 2024 and Beyond, 133 Yale L.J. Forum 249, 250 (2023); Cass

R. Sunstein, The Rule of Law v. “Party Nature”: Presidential

Elections, the Constitution, the Electoral Count Act of 1887, the

Horror of January 6, and the Electoral Count Reform Act of 2022,

103 B.U. L. Rev. 1171, 1177 (2023).

16

for legal challenges to the executive’s certification

without displacing existing state and federal causes of

action around an election; and adds a single day

before the meeting of the electors to provide time for

all judicial action to conclude, 3 U.S.C. §§ 5(c), 5(d),

7. In all, the ECRA provides that each State must

finish its electoral processes and certify the election

by the second Wednesday of December to meet the

combined deadlines.

These deadlines were drawn to ensure respect for

“the laws of the State enacted prior to election day,”

in express deference to the states’ ability to regulate

the casting and counting of ballots, including ballot

receipt deadlines. 3 U.S.C. § 1. For example, the

ECRA defined Election Day to mean “the Tuesday

next after the first Monday in November, in every

fourth year succeeding every election of a President

and Vice President held in each State.” 3 U.S.C. § 21.

If “the State modifies the period of voting, as

necessitated by force majeure events that are

extraordinary and catastrophic,” then election day

“shall include the modified period of voting.” Id.

Further, that provision allows states to modify the

period of voting “as provided under laws of the State

enacted prior to such day[.]” Id; see also The Electoral

Count Act: The Need for Reform: Hearing Before the

Comm. on Rules and Admin., 117th Cong. 6 (2022)

(opening statement of Sen. Susan Collins).

This added provision at 3 U.S.C. § 21 replaced the

now-repealed provisions of 3 U.S.C. § 2, which vaguely

provided that any state could modify an election if it

had “failed to make a choice,” which created

17

controversy during the ballot receipt and counting

processes in 2000 and 2020. See The Electoral Count

Act: The Need for Reform: Hearing Before the Comm.

on Rules and Admin., 117th Cong. 21-22 (2022)

(testimony of Derek T. Muller, University of Iowa

College of Law). As one noted expert testified to

Congress, this provision is a “clever, practical, and

minimally-intrusive way to address election

emergencies”

while

“defer[ing]

to

state

determinations about when to modify the period of

voting[.]” The Electoral Count Act: The Need for

Reform: Hearing Before the Comm. on Rules and

Admin., 117th Cong. 74-75 (2022) (written testimony

of Professor Derek T. Muller, University of Iowa

College of Law) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Congress intentionally created a “mechanism [that]

allows absentee ballots, including military and

overseas personnel, to be counted in the election,

rather than a new election being held.” Id.

Likewise, the ECRA provides that the “electors of

President and Vice President shall be appointed, in

each State, on election day, in accordance with the

laws of the State enacted prior to election day.” 3

U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added). This provision expressly

requires each state to abide by its own enacted

election procedures, which would include a state’s

ballot receipt deadlines.

Throughout the statute, in multiple sections, the

ECRA defers to the “laws of the State enacted prior to

election day.” See 3 U.S.C. § 4 (providing for the filling

of vacancies in the electoral college according to the

laws of each state); id. § 5 (providing for the

18

appointment of electors according to the laws of each

state); id. § 7 (providing for the meeting of the electors

according to the laws of each state). As bill proponents

noted, this language was intended to provide “a clear

set of rules and principles that people can all

understand and accept in advance,” The Electoral

Count Act: The Need for Reform: Hearing Before the

Comm. on Rules and Admin., 117th Cong. 74-75

(2022) (opening statement of Sen. Angus King), while

“ultimately empower[ing] state legislatures to set

those rules in the manner that they deemed best in

each individual state.” Id. at 21 (testimony of former

Trump administration Principal Deputy Assistant

Attorney General John M. Gore). Indeed, as a

practical matter, as elected officials holding federal

office, members of Congress were keenly aware that

multiple states had post-election ballot receipt

deadlines.

Moreover, the ECRA came in the wake not only of

January 6, 2021, but also the COVID-19 pandemic,

which led to both massive expansions in absentee

voting and last-minute changes to election procedures

to accommodate the national emergency. 6 And

perhaps no issue captured headlines more—or was

litigated more—than concerns about mail delays and

6 Michael T. Morley, Election Emergencies: Voting in Times of

Pandemic, 80 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 359, 408 (2023).

19

absentee ballot receipt deadlines. 7 Members of

Congress were thus “abundantly aware” of the

divergence in state laws governing absentee ballot

receipt deadlines when enacting the ECRA. See Bob

Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599–601

(1983) (finding an “unusually strong case of legislative

acquiescence” where Congress was “constantly

reminded” and “acute[ly] aware[]” of the relevant

issue “when enacting . . . legislation”). In addition,

since the passage of the ECRA, several states have

expanded their post-election ballot receipt deadlines,

further underscoring how state laws on this topic

operate harmoniously with the federal election day

statutes, including as amended and reenacted in the

ECRA.8

See, e.g., Jason Nagel, Standardizing State Vote-by-Mail

Deadlines in Federal Elections, 2022 Cardozo L. Rev. De-Novo 1,

16 (2022) (discussing litigation concerning absentee ballot

receipt deadlines); Larry Buchanan, Lazaro Gamio & Alicia

Parlapiano, Will You Have Enough Time to Vote by Mail in Your

State?,

N.Y.

Times

(Aug.

31,

2020),

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/08/31/us/politics/vote

-by-mail-deadlines.html; Jacob Bogage & Christopher Ingraham,

Key swing states vulnerable to USPS slowdowns as millions vote

by mail, data shows, Wash. Post (Oct. 20, 2020),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/10/20/swingstates-election-usps/.

8 Following passage of the ECRA, the District of Columbia,

California, Michigan, and New York each extended their postelection day deadlines for ballot receipt or ballot cure. B24-0507,

24th Council (D.C. 2023); Assemb. B. 930, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2025);

S.B. 259, 102nd Leg. (Mich. 2023); Assemb. B. A7690, 2023–2024

Gen. Assemb. (N.Y. 2023). In contrast, Kansas, North Dakota,

Ohio, and Utah have recently amended their election laws to

7

20

The ECRA’s passage has not affected the states’

ability to receive and count ballots after election day:

the state of Washington has the longest ballot receipt

deadline in the country, allowing all ballots

postmarked by election day and received the day

before the certification of results to be counted. 9 In

2024, the Washington legislature undertook a series

of reforms to their mail-in ballot process, but left the

receipt deadline undisturbed.10 That states have

expanded or maintained their post-election ballot

receipt deadlines after the passage of the ECRA

further highlights that Congress left this choice with

the states.

Congress knew that it could change the states’

ballot receipt deadlines for federal elections, but chose

not to. Instead, in passing the ECRA, Congress took

bipartisan action to work with the states’ ballot

receipt deadlines, in express deference to the states’

individual circumstances.

B. In enacting the ECRA, Congress ratified

the

existing

and

then-uniform

understanding that the federal electionday statutes do not displace state ballot

receipt deadlines.

While the decision below spends several pages

discussing the meaning of “election,” including in

require receipt by election day for all or most absentee voters.

See 2025 Kan. Sess. Laws 33; 2025 N.D. Laws, ch. 200; S.B. 293,

136th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2025); H.B. 300, 2025 Gen.

Sess. (Utah 2025).

9 Wash. Rev. Code §§ 29A.40.091, 29A.60.190.

10 S.B. 5890, 68th Leg., 2024 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2024).

21

1845 and 1872 when the Federal Election Day

Statutes were first enacted, see Pet. at 14a, the panel

spent no time at all investigating Congressional

understanding of “election” at the most relevant time:

in 2022 when Congress again very expressly defined

“election day” in the ECRA. See 3 U.S.C. § 21.

When Congress enacted the ECRA, it ratified the

then-existing consensus among courts and states that

the federal election-day statutes do not displace state

law governing ballot receipt deadlines. Federal

precedent was clear on this issue. All courts to address

the question of whether the federal election-day

statutes displaced state laws regarding ballot receipt

deadlines came out the same way: they do not. Against

this backdrop, Congress enacted the ECRA.

Where Congress “adopts a new law incorporating

sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be

presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation

given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it

affects the new statute.” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.

575, 581 (1978). Moreover, when “Congress reenacted

the same language in [a statute], it adopted the earlier

judicial construction of that phrase.” Helsinn

Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 586 U.S.

123, 131 (2019); Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader

Media, 588 U.S. 427, 439 (2019) (“Ratification

canon . . . derives from the notion that Congress is

aware of a definitive judicial interpretation of a

statute when it reenacts the same statute using the

same language.”).

In addition, while a “single decision of this Court

can be enough” to create a presumption that Congress

22

meant to ratify an existing judicial interpretation, in

the absence of such a decision, lower court decisions

that are “uniform and sufficiently numerous” can do

the same. Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., 594

U.S. 559, 585 n.3 (2021) (Barrett, J., dissenting).

Where lower federal courts have a “consensus

interpretation” of statutory language, and Congress

reenacts such language without change, “[t]his is

persuasive that the construction adopted by the

[lower federal] courts has been acceptable” to

Congress. Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v.

Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 537

(2015) (quoting Manhattan Props., Inc. v. Irving Tr.

Co., 291 U.S. 320, 336 (1934) (alternation in original)).

This element of the reenactment canon is well

established. See Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs.,

576 U.S. at 536–37; see also Minerva Surgical, Inc.,

594 U.S. at 585 n.3 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (citing A.

Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation

of Legal Texts 323–324 (2012)).

When the ECRA was enacted in 2022, the leading

case in this Court to address the interaction between

the federal election-day statutes and state election

laws was Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997). In Foster,

this Court held that the federal election-day statutes

did not permit an election to be “consummated” prior

to Election Day. Id. at 72 & n.4. The Foster Court also

acknowledged that some aspects of the election

process will naturally occur before and after Election

Day itself. See id. Lower federal courts applying the

logic of Foster concluded that Foster “clear[ly]

signal[ed]” that state laws allowing the post-Election

Day processing and counting of validly cast ballots

23

were permissible. Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v.

Bomer, 199 F.3d 773, 776 (5th Cir. 2000); see also

Millsaps v. Thompson, 259 F.3d 535, 546 n.5 (6th Cir.

2001) (holding that it is a necessary reality that

“official action to confirm or verify the results of the

election extends well beyond federal election day”).

Federal courts asked to address the issue were

also clear that the “Federal Election Day Statutes are

silent on methods of determining the timeliness of

ballots,” Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Way,

492 F. Supp. 3d 354, 372 (D.N.J. 2020), and where

state law permitted post-Election Day ballot receipt,

courts found that those state laws and the federal

election-day statutes “can, and indeed do, operate

harmoniously.” Bognet v. Sec'y Commonwealth of

Penn., 980 F.3d 336, 354 (3d Cir. 2020), cert. granted,

judgment vacated sub nom. Bognet v. Degraffenreid,

141 S. Ct. 2508 (2021).11 Respondents’ flawed

argument had already been clearly raised at the time

of passage of the ECRA, and had been squarely

rejected by the courts.12

The same trend continued in the years following

passage of the ECRA as well. Some cases that raised

11 There were also cases that raised the theory Respondents raise

here but were dismissed on standing or other grounds before

reaching the merits. E.g., Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v.

Cegavske, 488 F. Supp. 3d 993, 997 (D. Nev. 2020).

12 Courts have also long rejected arguments similar to those that

Respondents make here, but as to the other side of Election Day,

holding that the federal election-day statutes do not preempt

various early voting regimes. See Millsaps, 259 F.3d at 545;

Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Keisling, 259 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th

Cir. 2001); Bomer, 199 F.3d at 774.

24

the issue were dismissed, e.g., Splonskowski v. White,

714 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (D.N.D. 2024), while the sole

post-ECRA case to reach the merits followed the longstanding view that no conflict was present between

the federal election-day statutes and state ballot

receipt laws. See, e.g., Bost v. Ill. State Bd. of

Elections, 684 F. Supp. 3d 720, 736 (N.D. Ill. 2023)

(post-Election Day ballot receipt deadline “operates

harmoniously with the federal statutes that set the

timing for federal elections,” aff'd, 114 F.4th 634 (7th

Cir. 2024), cert. granted on other grounds, 145 S. Ct.

2751 (2025).

Though the issue has been raised multiple times,

including in the leadup to the ECRA’s passage, prior

to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in this case, no federal

court adopted the flawed reading of the federal

election-day statutes advanced by Respondents.

Congress thus saw no need to address Respondents’

novel (and losing) construction of “election” when reenacting 3 U.S.C. § 1, amending 3 U.S.C. § 21, and

leaving 2 U.S.C. § 7 unchanged.

In addition to court precedent, the practice of the

states prior to the enactment of the ECRA is also

helpful in illuminating Congressional understanding.

“[T]he longstanding ‘practice of the government,’ can

inform [a] determination of ‘what the law is.’”

N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014)

(internal citations omitted). As this Court has made

clear for over a century, “long-continued practice,

known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise

a presumption” that it had been done “in pursuance of

its consent.” United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236

25

U.S. 459, 474 (1915). As detailed supra, the majority

of states permitted post-Election Day receipt of mail

ballots by some or all mail voters when the ECRA was

passed, and many had done so for years. This was not

some obscure government activity of which Congress

cannot be presumed to have been aware. Rather, this

is a core election administration rule in many states,

and one that governed the election of scores of

Members of Congress who voted to enact the ECRA.

Given the overwhelming evidence of precedent

and practice finding no conflict between the federal

election day statutes and state laws permitting postElection Day ballot receipt, Congress can be presumed

to have adopted that interpretation when it reenacted

3 U.S.C. § 1 and codified a definition of “election day”

in 3 U.S.C. § 21 that left this understanding

untouched. The panel decision from the Fifth Circuit

ignored this. Instead, the court of appeals erred in

reading the force majeure portion of 3 U.S.C. § 21(1)

as somehow supporting its decision. Pet. App. 23a.

But it does not. In that provision, Congress expressly

provided that, “where consistent with state law

enacted prior to the election,” states may extend the

period of voting when necessitated by “force majeure

events.” 3 U.S.C. § 21(1). There is nothing in that

language that preempts ballot receipt deadlines that

are provided for by “state law enacted prior to the

election.” Instead, the ECRA reemphasized

throughout a respect for preexisting state law that it

did not otherwise modify. See, e.g., 3 U.S.C. §§ 4, 5, 7.

26

“[L]ong-continued practice, known to and

acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption

that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its

consent.” Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686

(1981) (citation omitted). If Congress disapproved of

state laws such as Mississippi’s, it could and would

have exercised its authority to expressly preempt

them when it amended the ECRA in 2022. See

Arizona, 570 U.S. at 13–14. Instead of doing so,

Congress retained the interpretation of the federal

election-day statutes under which states have long

administered their own ballot receipt deadline policies

without issue, and which courts universally approved

until this case.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be

reversed.

January 9, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

Jared Davidson

Jane Bentrott

PROTECT DEMOCRACY

PROJECT

2020 Pennsylvania Ave

NW, Suite 163

Washington, DC 20006

Adav Noti

Counsel of Record

Danielle Lang

Anna Baldwin

Dana Paikowsky

Valencia Richardson

Benjamin Phillips

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER

1101 14th St. NW

Suite 400

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 736-2200

anoti@campaignlegal.org