Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Adam Kelnhofer, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefMay 28, 2025

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United States Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces

Washington, D.C.

United States,

USCA Dkt. No. 25-0076/AF

Appellee

Crim.App. No. 23012

v.

ORDER DENYING PETITION

Adam S.

Kelnhofer,

Appellant

On consideration of the petition for grant of review

of the decision of the United States Air Force Court of

Criminal Appeals, it is by the Court, this 28th day of

February, 2025,

ORDERED:

That the petition is hereby denied.

For the Court,

/s/ Malcolm H. Squires, Jr.

Clerk of the Court

cc:

The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force

Appellate Defense Counsel (Ward)

Appellate Government Counsel (Payne)

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF

CRIMINAL APPEALS

________________________

No. ACM 23012

________________________

UNITED STATES

Appellee

v.

Adam S. KELNHOFER

Master Sergeant (E-7), U.S. Air Force, Appellant

________________________

Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial

Judiciary

Decided 15 November 2024 1

________________________

Military Judge: Colin P. Eichenberger.

Sentence: Sentence adjudged on 14 December 2022 by

SpCM convened at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada.

Sentence entered by military judge on 20 January

2023: Confinement for 6 months, forfeiture of

Appellant appeals his conviction under Article 66(b)(1)(A),

Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §

866(b)(1)(A), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2024

ed.).

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$1,190.00 pay per month for 6 months, and reduction

to E-1.

For Appellant: Major David L. Bosner, USAF; Captain

Trevor N. Ward, USAF.

For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel J. Peter Ferrell,

USAF; Lieutenant Colonel Jenny A. Liabenow, USAF;

Major Morgan R. Christie, USAF; Major Jocelyn Q.

Wright, USAF; Captain Morgan L. Brewington,

USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.

Before

JOHNSON,

RICHARDSON,

ANNEXSTAD, Appellate Military Judges.

and

Senior Judge ANNEXSTAD delivered the opinion of

the court, in which Chief Judge JOHNSON and Senior

Judge RICHARDSON joined.

________________________

This is an unpublished opinion and, as such,

does not serve as precedent under AFCCA Rule

of Practice and Procedure 30.4.

________________________

ANNEXSTAD, Senior Judge:

A special court-martial consisting of officer

members found Appellant guilty, contrary to his

pleas, of one specification of wrongful use of cocaine in

violation of Article 112a, Uniform Code of Military

Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 912a. 2 The military judge

sentenced Appellant to confinement for six months,

forfeiture of $1,190.00 pay per month for six months,

2 Unless otherwise noted all references to the UCMJ are to the

Manual for CourtsMartial, United States (2019 ed.).

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and reduction to the grade of E-1. The convening

authority took no action on the findings or sentence.

Appellant raises three issues on appeal which we

have rephrased: (1) whether Appellant’s conviction is

legally sufficient, (2) whether Appellant’s conviction is

factually sufficient, and (3) whether Appellant’s

sentence is inappropriately severe. We address issues

(1) and (2) together.

We find no error that materially prejudiced

Appellant’s substantial rights, and we affirm the

findings and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant enlisted in the Air Force on 15 July

2003, and at the time of his court-martial had served

continuously for 19 years and 1 month. At the time of

the offense, Appellant worked in aircraft maintenance

as a supply section chief, and was stationed at Nellis

Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada. According to his most

recent performance report, Appellant supervised 29

junior Airmen and 22 vital programs.

On 8 June 2022, Appellant was randomly selected

to provide a sample of his urine. In accordance with

Drug

Demand

Reduction

Program

(DDRP)

procedures, Appellant provided his urine sample

under the observation and direction of a trained drug

testing observer. The sample was then packaged,

processed, and shipped to the Air Force Drug Testing

Lab (AFDTL) at Joint Base San Antonio–Lackland

(JBSA–Lackland), Texas, for analysis. The report

from that analysis indicated Appellant’s urine sample

was positive for cocaine at a level of 116 nanograms

per milliliter (ng/mL), 16 ng/mL above the

Department of Defense cutoff level of 100 ng/mL.

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As a result, Appellant was charged with one

specification alleging wrongful use of cocaine. During

Appellant’s court-martial the Government presented

both documentary and testimonial evidence.

Specifically, the Government introduced all

paperwork concerning the collection of Appellant’s

urine sample and the AFDTL report associated with

Appellant’s urinalysis. The Government also

presented testimony from three witnesses who were

involved with the collection and processing of the

urine sample. These witnesses included Mr. CM, the

Nellis AFB DDRP manager; Technical Sergeant

(TSgt) FJ, the observer who witnessed the collection

of Appellant’s urine sample; and Dr. JW, a forensic

toxicology expert.

Mr. CM testified generally about the processes for

random selection, notification of selection, sample

collection, processing, packaging, and shipping for lab

analysis. Mr. CM also testified about the selection of

drug testing observers and their requisite

qualifications and training. TSgt FJ testified about

the collection of Appellant’s urine sample. TSgt FJ

confirmed that he was aware of the procedures he

should follow if he should witness anything out of the

ordinary during a sample collection, but did not note

anything concerning about Appellant’s conduct during

sample collection. Finally, TSgt FJ stated he was

“100% sure” that Appellant did not put anything other

than his own urine in the specimen container.

The Government’s final witness was Dr. JW, an

expert in the field of forensic toxicology. Dr. JW

testified that he was employed by the Armed Forces

Medical Examiner System (AFMES) which is

responsible for overseeing the DDRP and all

associated drug testing laboratories. He confirmed

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that his office oversees and inspects the AFDTL at

JBSA–Lackland and added that he had recently

visited the JBSA–Lackland facility for an inspection.

Concerning the most recent inspection of the AFDTL

at JBSA–Lackland, Dr. JW indicated that the lab had

done “very well,” and he was satisfied with its

performance.

Next, Dr. JW was presented a copy of the AFDTL

report for Appellant’s urine sample which he

explained in detail for the members. First, he pointed

to how the samples are identified by the lab, how they

should look when they arrive for analysis, and where

notations should be made should any samples appear

to contain a “discrepancy.” He then discussed the

process for testing a sample once it is ready to be

analyzed, beginning with the initial screening and

then confirmation testing if any metabolite-positive

samples were flagged. He then explained that after

confirming the presence and identification of a

particular substance, the sample then undergoes

“mass spectrometry,” which is the second type of test

used in forensic urinalysis. This second type of testing

allows the lab, once they know which specific

metabolite they are looking for, to obtain more precise

details concerning the compound detected, including

the approximate levels present. Dr JW stated that no

discrepancies were noted concerning Appellant’s

sample received by the lab, that the lab equipment

used was clean and functioning properly, and that the

sample was analyzed correctly.

Concerning cocaine, Dr. JW explained that the

specific metabolite the lab would be looking for is

benzoylecgonine (BZE). He clarified that BZE is only

present in the body when a person’s body has

processed cocaine. Dr. JW confirmed that Appellant’s

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BZE level was measured at 116.41 ng/mL. Dr. JW

then explained “cutoff level.” Dr. JW explained that

the cutoff can help protect against individuals testing

positive after passive or accidental ingestion. Dr. JW

clarified that a person must have had “direct

exposure” or “direct involvement” to ingest enough

cocaine to test above the administrative cutoff.

Additionally, Dr. JW testified that cocaine is not a

substance that can enter the body through the skin; it

must be directly inhaled or consumed, which could

occur by eating, drinking, snorting, or smoking

cocaine. Dr. JW opined that the specific level of 116

ng/mL did not give him any pause about whether

Appellant used the drug. Indeed, Dr. JW went so far

as to opine that, “scientifically, this [urinalysis] was

done very well, and I believe in the result.” Dr. JW

also reiterated several times during his testimony

that the testing process was extremely thorough to

eliminate error and ensure the highest accuracy of the

test results.

Dr. JW stated he could not extrapolate the amount

of cocaine ingested at the time it was introduced to the

body, the number of uses, or the amount of time that

had passed since the last use. Rather, he could only

confirm the presence of the compound in the urine

sample and the estimated level at the time it was

tested, adding when a person tests positive, “we know

that there’s [been] a direct exposure.” Dr. JW never

departed from his position that any small amount of

cocaine ingested accidentally would not produce a

positive urinalysis result for cocaine at a level above

the 100 ng/mL cutoff.

In its case-in-chief, the Defense presented the

testimony of Mr. CO. Mr. CO was a friend of

Appellant’s brother and had met Appellant for the

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first and only time in Richmond, Virginia, the

weekend of 4 June 2022. He testified he and Appellant

were in Richmond for Appellant’s brother’s wedding.

Mr. CO confirmed that he had spent a substantial

amount of time with Appellant throughout the

weekend and did not notice Appellant using cocaine or

manifesting any physical clues that he had used the

drug. Mr. CO acknowledged that he was not with

Appellant continuously for the entire weekend.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal and Factual Sufficiency

Appellant challenges the

sufficiency of his conviction.

legal

and

factual

1. Law

We review issues of legal sufficiency de novo.

United States v. Harrington, 83 M.J. 408, 414

(C.A.A.F. 2023) (citing United States v. King, 78 M.J.

218, 221 (C.A.A.F. 2019)). Our assessment of legal

sufficiency is limited to the evidence produced at trial.

United States v. Dykes, 38 M.J. 270, 272 (C.M.A. 1993)

(citations omitted).

“The test for legal sufficiency is whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Robinson, 77 M.J.

294, 297–98 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (citation omitted). “[I]n

resolving questions of legal sufficiency, we are bound

to draw every reasonable inference from the evidence

of record in favor of the prosecution.” United States v.

Barner, 56 M.J. 131, 134 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (citations

omitted). As a result, “[t]he standard for legal

sufficiency involves a very low threshold to sustain a

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conviction.” King, 78 M.J. at 221 (alteration in

original) (citation omitted). “The [G]overnment is free

to meet its burden of proof with circumstantial

evidence.” Id. (citations omitted). “The term

reasonable doubt, however, does not mean that the

evidence must be free from conflict.” United States v.

Wheeler, 76 M.J. 564, 568 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2017),

(citing United States v. Lips, 22 M.J. 679, 684

(A.F.C.M.R. 1986)), aff’d, 77 M.J. 289 (C.A.A.F. 2018).

“This deferential standard impinges upon the

factfinder’s discretion only to the extent necessary to

guarantee the fundamental protection of due process

of law.” United States v. Mendoza, ___ M.J.___, No. 230210, 2024 CAAF LEXIS 590, at *9 (C.A.A.F. 7 Oct.

2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2021 significantly changed how Courts of

Criminal Appeals (CCAs) conduct factual sufficiency

reviews. Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 542(b)(1)(B), 134 Stat.

3388, 3612 (1 Jan. 2021). Previously, the test for

factual sufficiency required the court, after weighing

the evidence in the record of trial and making

allowances for not having personally observed the

witnesses, to be convinced of the appellant’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt before it could affirm a

finding. See United States v. Reed, 54 M.J. 37, 41

(C.A.A.F. 2000). “In conducting this unique appellate

role, we [took] ‘a fresh, impartial look at the evidence,’

applying ‘neither a presumption of innocence nor a

presumption of guilt’ to ‘make [our] own independent

determination as to whether the evidence constitutes

proof of each required element beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” Wheeler, 76 M.J. at 568 (second alteration in

original) (quoting Washington, 57 M.J. at 399)

(applying the version of Article 66(c), UCMJ, in effect

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prior to 2019); see also United States v. Rodela, 82 M.J.

521, 525 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Wheeler

and applying the same factual sufficiency test in the

context of Article 66(d), UCMJ, effective 1 January

2019).

The current version of Article 66(d)(1)(B), UCMJ,

FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY REVIEW, states:

(i) In an appeal of a finding of guilty under

subsection (b), the Court may consider whether

the finding is correct in fact upon a request of

the accused if the accused makes a specific

showing of a deficiency of proof.

(ii) After an accused has made a showing, the

Court may weigh the evidence and determine

controverted questions of fact subject to—

(I) appropriate deference to the fact that the

trial court saw and heard the witnesses and

other evidence; and

(II) appropriate deference to findings of fact

entered into the record by the military judge.

(iii) If, as a result of the review conducted under

clause (ii), the Court is clearly convinced that

the finding of guilty was against the weight of

the evidence, the Court may dismiss, set aside,

or modify the finding, or affirm a lesser finding.

10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1)(B).

“[T]he requirement of ‘appropriate deference’ when

a CCA ‘weigh[s] the evidence and determine[s]

controverted questions of fact’ . . . depend[s] on the

nature of the evidence at issue.” United States v.

Harvey, ___ M.J.___, No. 230239, 2024 CAAF LEXIS

502, at *8 (C.A.A.F. 6 Sep. 2024) (second and third

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alterations in original). It is within this court’s

discretion to determine what level of deference is

appropriate. Id.

“[T]he quantum of proof necessary to sustain a

finding of guilty during a factual sufficiency review is

proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the same as the

quantum of proof necessary to find an accused guilty

at trial.” Id. at *10 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

In order for this court “to be ‘clearly convinced that

the finding of guilty was against the weight of the

evidence,’ two requirements must be met.” Id. at *12.

First, we must decide that evidence, as we weighed it,

“does not prove that the appellant is guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id. Second, we “must be clearly

convinced of the correctness of this decision.” Id.

To find Appellant guilty of a violation of Article

112a, UCMJ, as charged, the Government was

required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that

Appellant used cocaine, and such use was wrongful.

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.)

(MCM), pt. IV, ¶ 50.b.(2).

“Use” means to inject, ingest, inhale, or

otherwise introduce into the human body, any

controlled substance. Knowledge of the

presence of the controlled substance is a

required component of use. Knowledge of the

presence of the controlled substance may be

inferred from the presence of the controlled

substance in the accused’s body or from other

circumstantial evidence. This permissive

inference may be legally sufficient to satisfy the

[G]overnment’s burden of proof as to

knowledge.

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MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 50.c.(10). “A urinalysis properly

admitted under the standards applicable to scientific

evidence, when accompanied by expert testimony

providing the interpretation required by [United

States v. Murphy, 23 M.J. 310, 312 (C.M.A. 1987)],

provides a legally sufficient basis upon which to draw

the permissive inference of knowing, wrongful use . . .

.” United States v. Green, 55 M.J. 76, 81 (C.A.A.F.

2001) (citing United States v. Bond, 46 M.J. 86, 89

(C.A.A.F. 1997)); see also United States v. Ford, 23

M.J. 331, 337 (C.M.A. 1987) (noting the permissive

inference has existed in the military justice system

since 1955 and has found “longstanding and

consistent judicial approval” in the military and

civilian courts (citation omitted)).

2. Analysis

Appellant makes two arguments on appeal. First,

Appellant argues that use of the permissive inference

violates his due process rights. Second, he argues that

the Government failed to prove he knowingly ingested

cocaine, insofar as the Government’s evidence of

Appellant’s use solely consisted of positive urinalysis

results. Specifically, Appellant argues that the

testimony from Dr. JW was insufficient to provide a

rational basis upon which the factfinder could draw

an inference that Appellant knowingly used cocaine.

We disagree with both of Appellant’s contentions.

Addressing Appellant’s first contention, the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 3 “requires the

prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of

the elements included in the definition of the offense

of which the defendant is charged.” United States v.

3 U.S. CONST. amend. V.

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Girouard, 70 M.J. 5, 10 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (emphasis

omitted) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,

210 (1977)). The United States Supreme Court has

described this burden as “vital” and “indispensable,”

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970), and as one

“our system of criminal justice deems essential,”

Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701 (1975). This is

due to the fact an accused facing prosecution “has at

stake interests of immense importance, both because

of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon

conviction and because of the certainty that he would

be stigmatized by the conviction.” In re Winship, 397

U.S. at 363.

That said, it is well-established law that

permissive inferences do not impermissibly shift the

burden of proof, so long as they “leave[ ] the trier of

fact free to credit or reject the inference” and there is

some “rational way the trier could make the

connection permitted by the inference.” Ulster County

Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979). A permissive

inference violates due process “if the suggested

conclusion is not one that reason and common sense

justify in light of the proven facts before the

[factfinder].” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314–

15 (1985) (citation omitted). Here the factfinder was

free to credit or reject the inference that Appellant’s

use was knowing. Additionally, as we stated supra,

the evidence in this case provides a sufficient basis—

scientific testing accompanied by expert testimony

providing the required interpretation—for the trierof-fact to find that Appellant knowingly and

wrongfully used cocaine.

As to Appellant’s second contention that the

Government failed to prove he knowingly ingested

cocaine, we find that the Government’s evidence, as

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explained by Dr. JW, established that Appellant’s

urine tested positive for the cocaine metabolite BZE at

a concentration of 116 ng/mL. The evidence indicated

no apparent flaws in the chain of custody or testing of

the sample. The BZE concentration was higher than

the 100 ng/mL cutoff level created to exclude

individuals who were passively exposed to cocaine.

Here, the panel of officer members, as triers-of-fact,

could reasonably apply the permissive inference

explained supra and in Green to find the urinalysis

result proved Appellant knowingly and wrongfully

used cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt.

We recognize that on cross-examination, Dr. JW

agreed that the test result itself did not prove how the

cocaine metabolite BZE came to be present in

Appellant’s urine, that studies indicate cocaine is

transferable between humans in multiple ways, and

that it was generally possible to contaminate urine

samples. However, proof beyond a reasonable doubt

does not require proof that overcomes every possible

doubt. See United States v. McClour, 76 M.J. 23, 24

(C.A.A.F. 2017) (citation omitted). It is enough that

the evidence firmly convinces the trier-of-fact of the

accused’s guilt. See id. The panel of officer members

could reasonably conclude none of the points raised by

trial defense counsel or hypothetical sources of

innocent ingestion or contamination, under the

circumstances of this case, raised a reasonable doubt

that would dissuade them from applying the

permissive inference that BZE was present in

Appellant’s urine at a concentration of 116 ng/mL

because Appellant knowingly and wrongfully used

cocaine.

Having given full consideration to Appellant’s

arguments and drawing every reasonable inference

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from the evidence in favor of the Government, we

conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support

Appellant’s conviction. Additionally, for the same

reasons, after giving the appropriate deference to the

factfinder, we are not clearly convinced the findings of

guilty were against the weight of the evidence.

Harvey, 2024 CAAF LEXIS 502, at *12.

B. Sentence Appropriateness

Appellant contends that his sentence—reduction

in grade from E-7 to E-1 and six months’

confinement—was

inappropriately

severe.

Specifically, Appellant argues his lengthy service

record, to include eight combat deployments, and a

dearth of aggravating evidence merited a less severe

punishment. We disagree and find no relief

warranted.

1. Additional Background

Appellant elected to be sentenced by the military

judge. During the presentencing portion of his courtmartial, the Government offered a personal data sheet

consisting of Appellant’s service-related data and all

of Appellant’s performance reports. The performance

reports indicated Appellant’s military service was

above average for the vast majority of his career, and

that he had deployed eight times to include service in

combat zones. In fact, the only negative aspect of

Appellant’s service record was a referral performance

report from 2009 where Appellant was alleged to have

engaged in drunk and disorderly behavior. During the

presentencing phase, Appellant’s counsel offered

three exhibits which were admitted, including a twopage written unsworn statement from Appellant, four

pages of photographs of Appellant’s awards and

mementos from his military career, and five pages

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containing personal photographs of Appellant and his

family. No witnesses testified and no character

statements were offered.

2. Law

We review sentence appropriateness de novo.

United States v. Lane, 64 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2016)

(footnote omitted). We may affirm only as much of a

sentence as we find correct in law and fact. Article

66(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(b). In reviewing judgealone

sentencing,

we

“must

consider

the

appropriateness of each segment of a . . . sentence and

the appropriateness of the sentence as a whole.”

United States v. Flores, 84 M.J. 277, 278 (C.A.A.F.

2024). We consider each “particular appellant, the

nature and seriousness of the offense[s], the

appellant’s record of service, and all matters

contained in the record of trial.” United States v. Sauk,

74 M.J. 594, 606 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2015) (en banc)

(per curiam) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

Although a CCA is empowered to “do justice[ ] with

reference to some legal standard,” we are not

authorized to grant mercy. United States v. Guinn, 81

M.J. 195, 203 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (quoting United States

v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138, 146 (C.A.A.F. 2010)).

3. Analysis

Appellant asks that we reduce his sentence by

disapproving the reduction in grade to E-1 or, in the

alternative, only approve a reduction to the grade of

E-5. We are not persuaded that his sentence, to

include reduction to the grade of E-1, is

inappropriately severe.

We begin our analysis by noting that Appellant

was a senior noncommissioned officer who had served

for over 19 years. At the time of his criminal behavior,

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by virtue of his rank, Appellant was serving in a

position to lead and set a positive example for junior

Airmen. Appellant certainly knew or should have

known the consequences of illegal drug use. We also

note that the military judge in this case did not

adjudge the maximum punishment authorized, which

in this case included a punitive discharge. Our review

of the record and Appellant’s arguments establish

that Appellant has not raised any new evidence or

argument other than what was considered by the

military judge at trial or the convening authority

during clemency. Generally, Appellant’s recitation of

prior arguments simply amounts to another attempt

at clemency which is not an authorized function of this

court. See Guinn, 81 M.J. at 203.

Having considered the nature and seriousness of

Appellant’s misconduct, and matters contained in the

entire court-martial record, including his record of

service, all matters submitted in mitigation, and his

written unsworn statement, we conclude the sentence

of confinement for six months, forfeiture of $1,190.00

pay per month for six months, and reduction to the

grade of E-1 appropriately punishes Appellant for his

misconduct. Therefore, the sentence as entered is not

inappropriately severe.

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III. CONCLUSION

The findings and sentence as entered are correct in

law and fact, and no error materially prejudicial to

Appellant’s substantial rights occurred. Articles 59(a)

and 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(d).

Accordingly,

AFFIRMED.

the

findings and sentence

FOR THE COURT

CAROL K. JOYCE

Clerk of the Court

are

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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