Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Adam Kelnhofer, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefMay 28, 2025
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
1a
United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces
Washington, D.C.
United States,
USCA Dkt. No. 25-0076/AF
Appellee
Crim.App. No. 23012
v.
ORDER DENYING PETITION
Adam S.
Kelnhofer,
Appellant
On consideration of the petition for grant of review
of the decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals, it is by the Court, this 28th day of
February, 2025,
ORDERED:
That the petition is hereby denied.
For the Court,
/s/ Malcolm H. Squires, Jr.
Clerk of the Court
cc:
The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force
Appellate Defense Counsel (Ward)
Appellate Government Counsel (Payne)
2a
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS
________________________
No. ACM 23012
________________________
UNITED STATES
Appellee
v.
Adam S. KELNHOFER
Master Sergeant (E-7), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
________________________
Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial
Judiciary
Decided 15 November 2024 1
________________________
Military Judge: Colin P. Eichenberger.
Sentence: Sentence adjudged on 14 December 2022 by
SpCM convened at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada.
Sentence entered by military judge on 20 January
2023: Confinement for 6 months, forfeiture of
Appellant appeals his conviction under Article 66(b)(1)(A),
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §
866(b)(1)(A), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2024
ed.).
1
3a
$1,190.00 pay per month for 6 months, and reduction
to E-1.
For Appellant: Major David L. Bosner, USAF; Captain
Trevor N. Ward, USAF.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel J. Peter Ferrell,
USAF; Lieutenant Colonel Jenny A. Liabenow, USAF;
Major Morgan R. Christie, USAF; Major Jocelyn Q.
Wright, USAF; Captain Morgan L. Brewington,
USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.
Before
JOHNSON,
RICHARDSON,
ANNEXSTAD, Appellate Military Judges.
and
Senior Judge ANNEXSTAD delivered the opinion of
the court, in which Chief Judge JOHNSON and Senior
Judge RICHARDSON joined.
________________________
This is an unpublished opinion and, as such,
does not serve as precedent under AFCCA Rule
of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
________________________
ANNEXSTAD, Senior Judge:
A special court-martial consisting of officer
members found Appellant guilty, contrary to his
pleas, of one specification of wrongful use of cocaine in
violation of Article 112a, Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 912a. 2 The military judge
sentenced Appellant to confinement for six months,
forfeiture of $1,190.00 pay per month for six months,
2 Unless otherwise noted all references to the UCMJ are to the
Manual for CourtsMartial, United States (2019 ed.).
4a
and reduction to the grade of E-1. The convening
authority took no action on the findings or sentence.
Appellant raises three issues on appeal which we
have rephrased: (1) whether Appellant’s conviction is
legally sufficient, (2) whether Appellant’s conviction is
factually sufficient, and (3) whether Appellant’s
sentence is inappropriately severe. We address issues
(1) and (2) together.
We find no error that materially prejudiced
Appellant’s substantial rights, and we affirm the
findings and sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
Appellant enlisted in the Air Force on 15 July
2003, and at the time of his court-martial had served
continuously for 19 years and 1 month. At the time of
the offense, Appellant worked in aircraft maintenance
as a supply section chief, and was stationed at Nellis
Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada. According to his most
recent performance report, Appellant supervised 29
junior Airmen and 22 vital programs.
On 8 June 2022, Appellant was randomly selected
to provide a sample of his urine. In accordance with
Drug
Demand
Reduction
Program
(DDRP)
procedures, Appellant provided his urine sample
under the observation and direction of a trained drug
testing observer. The sample was then packaged,
processed, and shipped to the Air Force Drug Testing
Lab (AFDTL) at Joint Base San Antonio–Lackland
(JBSA–Lackland), Texas, for analysis. The report
from that analysis indicated Appellant’s urine sample
was positive for cocaine at a level of 116 nanograms
per milliliter (ng/mL), 16 ng/mL above the
Department of Defense cutoff level of 100 ng/mL.
5a
As a result, Appellant was charged with one
specification alleging wrongful use of cocaine. During
Appellant’s court-martial the Government presented
both documentary and testimonial evidence.
Specifically, the Government introduced all
paperwork concerning the collection of Appellant’s
urine sample and the AFDTL report associated with
Appellant’s urinalysis. The Government also
presented testimony from three witnesses who were
involved with the collection and processing of the
urine sample. These witnesses included Mr. CM, the
Nellis AFB DDRP manager; Technical Sergeant
(TSgt) FJ, the observer who witnessed the collection
of Appellant’s urine sample; and Dr. JW, a forensic
toxicology expert.
Mr. CM testified generally about the processes for
random selection, notification of selection, sample
collection, processing, packaging, and shipping for lab
analysis. Mr. CM also testified about the selection of
drug testing observers and their requisite
qualifications and training. TSgt FJ testified about
the collection of Appellant’s urine sample. TSgt FJ
confirmed that he was aware of the procedures he
should follow if he should witness anything out of the
ordinary during a sample collection, but did not note
anything concerning about Appellant’s conduct during
sample collection. Finally, TSgt FJ stated he was
“100% sure” that Appellant did not put anything other
than his own urine in the specimen container.
The Government’s final witness was Dr. JW, an
expert in the field of forensic toxicology. Dr. JW
testified that he was employed by the Armed Forces
Medical Examiner System (AFMES) which is
responsible for overseeing the DDRP and all
associated drug testing laboratories. He confirmed
6a
that his office oversees and inspects the AFDTL at
JBSA–Lackland and added that he had recently
visited the JBSA–Lackland facility for an inspection.
Concerning the most recent inspection of the AFDTL
at JBSA–Lackland, Dr. JW indicated that the lab had
done “very well,” and he was satisfied with its
performance.
Next, Dr. JW was presented a copy of the AFDTL
report for Appellant’s urine sample which he
explained in detail for the members. First, he pointed
to how the samples are identified by the lab, how they
should look when they arrive for analysis, and where
notations should be made should any samples appear
to contain a “discrepancy.” He then discussed the
process for testing a sample once it is ready to be
analyzed, beginning with the initial screening and
then confirmation testing if any metabolite-positive
samples were flagged. He then explained that after
confirming the presence and identification of a
particular substance, the sample then undergoes
“mass spectrometry,” which is the second type of test
used in forensic urinalysis. This second type of testing
allows the lab, once they know which specific
metabolite they are looking for, to obtain more precise
details concerning the compound detected, including
the approximate levels present. Dr JW stated that no
discrepancies were noted concerning Appellant’s
sample received by the lab, that the lab equipment
used was clean and functioning properly, and that the
sample was analyzed correctly.
Concerning cocaine, Dr. JW explained that the
specific metabolite the lab would be looking for is
benzoylecgonine (BZE). He clarified that BZE is only
present in the body when a person’s body has
processed cocaine. Dr. JW confirmed that Appellant’s
7a
BZE level was measured at 116.41 ng/mL. Dr. JW
then explained “cutoff level.” Dr. JW explained that
the cutoff can help protect against individuals testing
positive after passive or accidental ingestion. Dr. JW
clarified that a person must have had “direct
exposure” or “direct involvement” to ingest enough
cocaine to test above the administrative cutoff.
Additionally, Dr. JW testified that cocaine is not a
substance that can enter the body through the skin; it
must be directly inhaled or consumed, which could
occur by eating, drinking, snorting, or smoking
cocaine. Dr. JW opined that the specific level of 116
ng/mL did not give him any pause about whether
Appellant used the drug. Indeed, Dr. JW went so far
as to opine that, “scientifically, this [urinalysis] was
done very well, and I believe in the result.” Dr. JW
also reiterated several times during his testimony
that the testing process was extremely thorough to
eliminate error and ensure the highest accuracy of the
test results.
Dr. JW stated he could not extrapolate the amount
of cocaine ingested at the time it was introduced to the
body, the number of uses, or the amount of time that
had passed since the last use. Rather, he could only
confirm the presence of the compound in the urine
sample and the estimated level at the time it was
tested, adding when a person tests positive, “we know
that there’s [been] a direct exposure.” Dr. JW never
departed from his position that any small amount of
cocaine ingested accidentally would not produce a
positive urinalysis result for cocaine at a level above
the 100 ng/mL cutoff.
In its case-in-chief, the Defense presented the
testimony of Mr. CO. Mr. CO was a friend of
Appellant’s brother and had met Appellant for the
8a
first and only time in Richmond, Virginia, the
weekend of 4 June 2022. He testified he and Appellant
were in Richmond for Appellant’s brother’s wedding.
Mr. CO confirmed that he had spent a substantial
amount of time with Appellant throughout the
weekend and did not notice Appellant using cocaine or
manifesting any physical clues that he had used the
drug. Mr. CO acknowledged that he was not with
Appellant continuously for the entire weekend.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal and Factual Sufficiency
Appellant challenges the
sufficiency of his conviction.
legal
and
factual
1. Law
We review issues of legal sufficiency de novo.
United States v. Harrington, 83 M.J. 408, 414
(C.A.A.F. 2023) (citing United States v. King, 78 M.J.
218, 221 (C.A.A.F. 2019)). Our assessment of legal
sufficiency is limited to the evidence produced at trial.
United States v. Dykes, 38 M.J. 270, 272 (C.M.A. 1993)
(citations omitted).
“The test for legal sufficiency is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” United States v. Robinson, 77 M.J.
294, 297–98 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (citation omitted). “[I]n
resolving questions of legal sufficiency, we are bound
to draw every reasonable inference from the evidence
of record in favor of the prosecution.” United States v.
Barner, 56 M.J. 131, 134 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (citations
omitted). As a result, “[t]he standard for legal
sufficiency involves a very low threshold to sustain a
9a
conviction.” King, 78 M.J. at 221 (alteration in
original) (citation omitted). “The [G]overnment is free
to meet its burden of proof with circumstantial
evidence.” Id. (citations omitted). “The term
reasonable doubt, however, does not mean that the
evidence must be free from conflict.” United States v.
Wheeler, 76 M.J. 564, 568 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2017),
(citing United States v. Lips, 22 M.J. 679, 684
(A.F.C.M.R. 1986)), aff’d, 77 M.J. 289 (C.A.A.F. 2018).
“This deferential standard impinges upon the
factfinder’s discretion only to the extent necessary to
guarantee the fundamental protection of due process
of law.” United States v. Mendoza, ___ M.J.___, No. 230210, 2024 CAAF LEXIS 590, at *9 (C.A.A.F. 7 Oct.
2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2021 significantly changed how Courts of
Criminal Appeals (CCAs) conduct factual sufficiency
reviews. Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 542(b)(1)(B), 134 Stat.
3388, 3612 (1 Jan. 2021). Previously, the test for
factual sufficiency required the court, after weighing
the evidence in the record of trial and making
allowances for not having personally observed the
witnesses, to be convinced of the appellant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt before it could affirm a
finding. See United States v. Reed, 54 M.J. 37, 41
(C.A.A.F. 2000). “In conducting this unique appellate
role, we [took] ‘a fresh, impartial look at the evidence,’
applying ‘neither a presumption of innocence nor a
presumption of guilt’ to ‘make [our] own independent
determination as to whether the evidence constitutes
proof of each required element beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” Wheeler, 76 M.J. at 568 (second alteration in
original) (quoting Washington, 57 M.J. at 399)
(applying the version of Article 66(c), UCMJ, in effect
10a
prior to 2019); see also United States v. Rodela, 82 M.J.
521, 525 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Wheeler
and applying the same factual sufficiency test in the
context of Article 66(d), UCMJ, effective 1 January
2019).
The current version of Article 66(d)(1)(B), UCMJ,
FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY REVIEW, states:
(i) In an appeal of a finding of guilty under
subsection (b), the Court may consider whether
the finding is correct in fact upon a request of
the accused if the accused makes a specific
showing of a deficiency of proof.
(ii) After an accused has made a showing, the
Court may weigh the evidence and determine
controverted questions of fact subject to—
(I) appropriate deference to the fact that the
trial court saw and heard the witnesses and
other evidence; and
(II) appropriate deference to findings of fact
entered into the record by the military judge.
(iii) If, as a result of the review conducted under
clause (ii), the Court is clearly convinced that
the finding of guilty was against the weight of
the evidence, the Court may dismiss, set aside,
or modify the finding, or affirm a lesser finding.
10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1)(B).
“[T]he requirement of ‘appropriate deference’ when
a CCA ‘weigh[s] the evidence and determine[s]
controverted questions of fact’ . . . depend[s] on the
nature of the evidence at issue.” United States v.
Harvey, ___ M.J.___, No. 230239, 2024 CAAF LEXIS
502, at *8 (C.A.A.F. 6 Sep. 2024) (second and third
11a
alterations in original). It is within this court’s
discretion to determine what level of deference is
appropriate. Id.
“[T]he quantum of proof necessary to sustain a
finding of guilty during a factual sufficiency review is
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the same as the
quantum of proof necessary to find an accused guilty
at trial.” Id. at *10 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In order for this court “to be ‘clearly convinced that
the finding of guilty was against the weight of the
evidence,’ two requirements must be met.” Id. at *12.
First, we must decide that evidence, as we weighed it,
“does not prove that the appellant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. Second, we “must be clearly
convinced of the correctness of this decision.” Id.
To find Appellant guilty of a violation of Article
112a, UCMJ, as charged, the Government was
required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Appellant used cocaine, and such use was wrongful.
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.)
(MCM), pt. IV, ¶ 50.b.(2).
“Use” means to inject, ingest, inhale, or
otherwise introduce into the human body, any
controlled substance. Knowledge of the
presence of the controlled substance is a
required component of use. Knowledge of the
presence of the controlled substance may be
inferred from the presence of the controlled
substance in the accused’s body or from other
circumstantial evidence. This permissive
inference may be legally sufficient to satisfy the
[G]overnment’s burden of proof as to
knowledge.
12a
MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 50.c.(10). “A urinalysis properly
admitted under the standards applicable to scientific
evidence, when accompanied by expert testimony
providing the interpretation required by [United
States v. Murphy, 23 M.J. 310, 312 (C.M.A. 1987)],
provides a legally sufficient basis upon which to draw
the permissive inference of knowing, wrongful use . . .
.” United States v. Green, 55 M.J. 76, 81 (C.A.A.F.
2001) (citing United States v. Bond, 46 M.J. 86, 89
(C.A.A.F. 1997)); see also United States v. Ford, 23
M.J. 331, 337 (C.M.A. 1987) (noting the permissive
inference has existed in the military justice system
since 1955 and has found “longstanding and
consistent judicial approval” in the military and
civilian courts (citation omitted)).
2. Analysis
Appellant makes two arguments on appeal. First,
Appellant argues that use of the permissive inference
violates his due process rights. Second, he argues that
the Government failed to prove he knowingly ingested
cocaine, insofar as the Government’s evidence of
Appellant’s use solely consisted of positive urinalysis
results. Specifically, Appellant argues that the
testimony from Dr. JW was insufficient to provide a
rational basis upon which the factfinder could draw
an inference that Appellant knowingly used cocaine.
We disagree with both of Appellant’s contentions.
Addressing Appellant’s first contention, the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 3 “requires the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of
the elements included in the definition of the offense
of which the defendant is charged.” United States v.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13a
Girouard, 70 M.J. 5, 10 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
210 (1977)). The United States Supreme Court has
described this burden as “vital” and “indispensable,”
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970), and as one
“our system of criminal justice deems essential,”
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701 (1975). This is
due to the fact an accused facing prosecution “has at
stake interests of immense importance, both because
of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon
conviction and because of the certainty that he would
be stigmatized by the conviction.” In re Winship, 397
U.S. at 363.
That said, it is well-established law that
permissive inferences do not impermissibly shift the
burden of proof, so long as they “leave[ ] the trier of
fact free to credit or reject the inference” and there is
some “rational way the trier could make the
connection permitted by the inference.” Ulster County
Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979). A permissive
inference violates due process “if the suggested
conclusion is not one that reason and common sense
justify in light of the proven facts before the
[factfinder].” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314–
15 (1985) (citation omitted). Here the factfinder was
free to credit or reject the inference that Appellant’s
use was knowing. Additionally, as we stated supra,
the evidence in this case provides a sufficient basis—
scientific testing accompanied by expert testimony
providing the required interpretation—for the trierof-fact to find that Appellant knowingly and
wrongfully used cocaine.
As to Appellant’s second contention that the
Government failed to prove he knowingly ingested
cocaine, we find that the Government’s evidence, as
14a
explained by Dr. JW, established that Appellant’s
urine tested positive for the cocaine metabolite BZE at
a concentration of 116 ng/mL. The evidence indicated
no apparent flaws in the chain of custody or testing of
the sample. The BZE concentration was higher than
the 100 ng/mL cutoff level created to exclude
individuals who were passively exposed to cocaine.
Here, the panel of officer members, as triers-of-fact,
could reasonably apply the permissive inference
explained supra and in Green to find the urinalysis
result proved Appellant knowingly and wrongfully
used cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt.
We recognize that on cross-examination, Dr. JW
agreed that the test result itself did not prove how the
cocaine metabolite BZE came to be present in
Appellant’s urine, that studies indicate cocaine is
transferable between humans in multiple ways, and
that it was generally possible to contaminate urine
samples. However, proof beyond a reasonable doubt
does not require proof that overcomes every possible
doubt. See United States v. McClour, 76 M.J. 23, 24
(C.A.A.F. 2017) (citation omitted). It is enough that
the evidence firmly convinces the trier-of-fact of the
accused’s guilt. See id. The panel of officer members
could reasonably conclude none of the points raised by
trial defense counsel or hypothetical sources of
innocent ingestion or contamination, under the
circumstances of this case, raised a reasonable doubt
that would dissuade them from applying the
permissive inference that BZE was present in
Appellant’s urine at a concentration of 116 ng/mL
because Appellant knowingly and wrongfully used
cocaine.
Having given full consideration to Appellant’s
arguments and drawing every reasonable inference
15a
from the evidence in favor of the Government, we
conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support
Appellant’s conviction. Additionally, for the same
reasons, after giving the appropriate deference to the
factfinder, we are not clearly convinced the findings of
guilty were against the weight of the evidence.
Harvey, 2024 CAAF LEXIS 502, at *12.
B. Sentence Appropriateness
Appellant contends that his sentence—reduction
in grade from E-7 to E-1 and six months’
confinement—was
inappropriately
severe.
Specifically, Appellant argues his lengthy service
record, to include eight combat deployments, and a
dearth of aggravating evidence merited a less severe
punishment. We disagree and find no relief
warranted.
1. Additional Background
Appellant elected to be sentenced by the military
judge. During the presentencing portion of his courtmartial, the Government offered a personal data sheet
consisting of Appellant’s service-related data and all
of Appellant’s performance reports. The performance
reports indicated Appellant’s military service was
above average for the vast majority of his career, and
that he had deployed eight times to include service in
combat zones. In fact, the only negative aspect of
Appellant’s service record was a referral performance
report from 2009 where Appellant was alleged to have
engaged in drunk and disorderly behavior. During the
presentencing phase, Appellant’s counsel offered
three exhibits which were admitted, including a twopage written unsworn statement from Appellant, four
pages of photographs of Appellant’s awards and
mementos from his military career, and five pages
16a
containing personal photographs of Appellant and his
family. No witnesses testified and no character
statements were offered.
2. Law
We review sentence appropriateness de novo.
United States v. Lane, 64 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2016)
(footnote omitted). We may affirm only as much of a
sentence as we find correct in law and fact. Article
66(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(b). In reviewing judgealone
sentencing,
we
“must
consider
the
appropriateness of each segment of a . . . sentence and
the appropriateness of the sentence as a whole.”
United States v. Flores, 84 M.J. 277, 278 (C.A.A.F.
2024). We consider each “particular appellant, the
nature and seriousness of the offense[s], the
appellant’s record of service, and all matters
contained in the record of trial.” United States v. Sauk,
74 M.J. 594, 606 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2015) (en banc)
(per curiam) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Although a CCA is empowered to “do justice[ ] with
reference to some legal standard,” we are not
authorized to grant mercy. United States v. Guinn, 81
M.J. 195, 203 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (quoting United States
v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138, 146 (C.A.A.F. 2010)).
3. Analysis
Appellant asks that we reduce his sentence by
disapproving the reduction in grade to E-1 or, in the
alternative, only approve a reduction to the grade of
E-5. We are not persuaded that his sentence, to
include reduction to the grade of E-1, is
inappropriately severe.
We begin our analysis by noting that Appellant
was a senior noncommissioned officer who had served
for over 19 years. At the time of his criminal behavior,
17a
by virtue of his rank, Appellant was serving in a
position to lead and set a positive example for junior
Airmen. Appellant certainly knew or should have
known the consequences of illegal drug use. We also
note that the military judge in this case did not
adjudge the maximum punishment authorized, which
in this case included a punitive discharge. Our review
of the record and Appellant’s arguments establish
that Appellant has not raised any new evidence or
argument other than what was considered by the
military judge at trial or the convening authority
during clemency. Generally, Appellant’s recitation of
prior arguments simply amounts to another attempt
at clemency which is not an authorized function of this
court. See Guinn, 81 M.J. at 203.
Having considered the nature and seriousness of
Appellant’s misconduct, and matters contained in the
entire court-martial record, including his record of
service, all matters submitted in mitigation, and his
written unsworn statement, we conclude the sentence
of confinement for six months, forfeiture of $1,190.00
pay per month for six months, and reduction to the
grade of E-1 appropriately punishes Appellant for his
misconduct. Therefore, the sentence as entered is not
inappropriately severe.
18a
III. CONCLUSION
The findings and sentence as entered are correct in
law and fact, and no error materially prejudicial to
Appellant’s substantial rights occurred. Articles 59(a)
and 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(d).
Accordingly,
AFFIRMED.
the
findings and sentence
FOR THE COURT
CAROL K. JOYCE
Clerk of the Court
are
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.