Reply Brief — Brent Brewbaker, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefSep 16, 2024

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No. 24-124

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

BRENT BREWBAKER,

v.

Cross-Petitioner,

UNITED STATES,

Cross-Respondent.

-----------------------------------------ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FOURTH CIRCUIT

------------------------------------------

REPLY TO CROSS-RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN

OPPOSITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

------------------------------------------

Elliot S. Abrams

Counsel of Record

CHESHIRE PARKER

SCHNEIDER, PLLC

133 Fayetteville Street

Suite 400

Raleigh, NC 27601

(919) 833-3114

elliot.abrams@cheshirepark.com

Ripley Rand

Samuel Hartzell

WOMBLE BOND

DICKINSON (US) LLP

555 Fayetteville Street

Suite 1100

Raleigh, NC 27601

ripley.rand@wbd-us.com

sam.hartzell@wbd-us.com

Counsel for

Cross-Petitioner

Counsel for

Cross-Petitioner

GibsonMoore Appellate Services, LLC

206 East Cary Street ♦ Richmond, VA 23219

804-249-7770 ♦ www.gibsonmoore.net

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page(s)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS ......................... 1

I. The

Court

Should

Review

the

Constitutionality of the Sherman Act

Crime................................................................ 1

II. The Court Should Review the Fourth

Circuit’s Legal Error in Its Harmless

Error Analysis. .............................................. 12

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 13

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,

310 U.S. 469 (1940) ............................................. 4

Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.,

485 U.S. 717 (1988) ............................................. 9

Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,

304 U.S. 64 (1938) ............................................. 10

Johnson v. United States,

576 U.S. 591 (2015) ..................................... 10, 11

Kolender v. Lawson,

461 U.S. 352 (1983) ................................... 1, 8, 11

Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,

551 U.S. 877 (2007) ............................... 1, 2, 9, 10

Liparota v. United States,

471 U.S. 419 (1985) ............................................. 1

Lischewski v. United States,

142 S. Ct. 2676 (2022) ......................................... 9

McDonnell v. United States,

579 U.S. 550 (2016) ............................................. 6

Nash v. United States,

229 U.S. 373 (1913) ................................. 9, 10, 11

Percoco v. United States,

598 U.S. 319 (2023) ......................................... 1, 5

PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather

Prods., Inc.,

615 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2010) ............................... 5

Ramos v. Louisiana,

590 U.S. 83 (2020) ......................................... 9, 11

iii

Rodriguez v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,

589 U.S. 132 (2020) ............................................. 1

Sessions v. Dimaya,

584 U.S. 148 (2018) ............................................. 2

Skilling v. United States,

561 U.S. 358 (2010) ........................................... 10

Smith v. Goguen,

415 U.S. 566 (1974) ........................................... 11

Sorich v. United States,

129 S. Ct. 1308 (2009) ................................... 1, 10

Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United

States,

221 U.S. 1 (1911) ..................................... 9, 10, 11

State Oil Co. v. Khan,

522 U.S. 3 (1997) ................................................. 3

Tozer v. United States,

52 F. 917 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1892) .......................... 10

United States v. Associated Press,

52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) ........................ 2

United States v. Cruikshank,

92 U.S. 542 (1875) ............................................. 12

United States v. Davis,

588 U.S. 445 (2019) ....................................... 1, 10

United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.,

255 U.S. 81 (1921) ....................................... 10, 11

United States v. Reese,

92 U.S. 214 (1875) ............................................... 1

iv

United States v. Resendiz-Ponce,

549 U.S. 102 (2007) ........................................... 12

United States v. Stevens,

559 U.S. 460 (2010) ............................................. 6

Statutes

Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 ......................... 1-5, 8-11

Other Authorities

Matthew G. Sipe, The Sherman Act and

Avoiding Void-for-Vagueness,

45 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 709 (2018) ...................... 11

Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the

Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market

Division, 74 Yale L.J. 775 (1965) ................. 4, 10

U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust

Division, Antitrust Case Filings,

https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrustcase-filings-alpha

(last visited Sept. 13, 2024) ................................ 8

William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers,

Prosecutorial Discretion, and the

“Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law,

60 Tex. L. Rev. 661 (1982) .................. 2, 3, 5-6, 8

1

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

I. The Court Should Review the

Constitutionality of the Sherman Act

Crime.

1. This conditional cross-petition first raises the

question whether the Constitution allows a federal

crime to be defined by courts using the common-law

approach of case-by-case adjudication. “To ask the

question is nearly to answer it,” Rodriguez v. Fed.

Deposit Ins. Corp., 589 U.S. 132, 133 (2020), because

“the notion of a common-law crime is utterly

anathema today,” Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct.

1308, 1310 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial

of certiorari) (cleaned up). “Only the people’s elected

representatives in the legislature are authorized to

‘make an act a crime.’” United States v. Davis, 588

U.S. 445, 451 (2019); see also, e.g., United States v.

Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 216 (1875); Liparota v. United

States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (“The definition of the

elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the

legislature.”).

Because the Sherman Act literally criminalizes all

business contracts, determining which contracts are

criminal requires a “common-law approach.” Leegin

Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S.

877, 901 (2007). But this approach violates the

Court’s repeated holding that the legislature cannot

set a net large enough to capture all possible offenders

and leave it to police and courts to decide what

conduct to prosecute and convict. Kolender v. Lawson,

461 U.S. 352, 358 n.7 (1983) (quoting Reese, 92 U.S.

at 216); Percoco v. United States, 598 U.S. 319, 337–

38 (2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (Congress “must

do more than invoke an aspirational phrase and leave

2

it to prosecutors and judges to make things up as they

go along.”). Indeed, “the more important aspect of

vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but . . . the

requirement that a legislature establish minimal

guidelines to govern law enforcement and keep the

separate branches within their proper spheres.”

Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. 148, 181 (2018)

(Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (ellipsis in original)

(quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358); id. at 182.

2. The Government does not argue that defining

crimes through the common-law process is

permissible. It instead argues (at 6) that “courts

exercise judicial rather than legislative power” when

deciding what acts constitute an antitrust crime, and

it suggests (at 7–9) that the Sherman Act provides the

requisite guidelines necessary to maintain separation

of powers. Both premises are wrong.

As the then-Division Chief for the Antitrust

Section of the Department of Justice correctly

explained, “By adopting a common-law approach,

Congress in effect delegated much of its lawmaking

power to the judicial branch.” William F. Baxter,

Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and

the “Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 Tex.

L. Rev. 661, 663 (1982). “From the beginning the

Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law

statute”; it “adapts to modern understanding and

greater experience,” such that “the Sherman Act’s

prohibition on ‘restraint[s] of trade’ evolves to meet

the dynamics of present economic conditions.” Leegin,

551 U.S. at 899; United States v. Associated Press, 52

F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (L. Hand, J.), (The

Sherman Act gave courts “a legislative warrant,

because Congress has incorporated into the AntiTrust Acts the changing standards of the common

3

law, and by so doing has delegated to the courts the

duty of fixing the standard for each case.”). Indeed,

this Court has recognized that courts often make

“legislative changes” with respect to the Sherman Act.

State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (emphasis

added). Therefore, the Government is incorrect that

courts “exercise of judicial rather than legislative

power” when deciding what conduct violates the

Sherman Act. Gov. Br. 6.

The Government also suggests (at 7–9) that the

Sherman Act’s text and the common law provide

enough guidance to avoid separation of powers and

related vagueness problems. But, as former Antitrust

Division Chief Baxter recognized, the Sherman Act

gives “only the most general statutory directions.”

Baxter, 60 Tex. L. Rev. at 663. “Taken on their face,

the antitrust provisions could have reached almost all

business decisions.” Id. at 664 (cleaned up). And the

context for those textual provisions is little help:

Congress provided little if any extrastatutory

guidance to direct interpretation of the basic

antitrust provisions. The legislative histories of

the antitrust statutes provide only the most

basic description of the goals Congress sought

to promote—competition and free enterprise—

and little indication of how these goals can best

be fostered by the judiciary.

Id. As a result, the Sherman Act “forced” courts to

“measure” business practices against courts’ own

“conception of the public interest” to determine what

practices to outlaw. Id. In other words, as Robert

Bork explained,

Lacking any real guidance from either the

language of the statute or its legislative

4

history, . . . the courts were forced themselves

to legislate in a broad manner and to discuss

what consistent and useful policy might be.

Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se

Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 Yale

L.J. 775, 782 (1965); see also Apex Hosiery Co. v.

Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940) (“In consequence of

the vagueness of its language . . . , the courts have

been left to give content to [§ 1].”).

The Government responds (at 6) that courts are

merely interpreting the statutory phrase “restraint of

trade,” 15 U.S.C. § 1, just as they interpret the text of

any other law—that is, by gleaning its original,

recognized meaning. But, as Judge Bork noted,

One frequently hears talk of the original

meaning of the Sherman Act or of the intent of

Congress in enacting that law, but it can hardly

be stressed too much that, with respect to the

Sherman Act . . . such talk of legislative intent

is more than usually foolish. Congress simply

had no discoverable intention that would help

a court decide a case one way or the other.

Bork, 74 Yale L.J. at 783. Thus, courts have

effectively writ[ten] this [criminal] law bit by

bit in decisions spanning decades with the help

of prosecutors . . . who present [courts] with one

option after another. But that is not a path the

Constitution tolerates. Under our system of

separated powers, the Legislative Branch must

do the hard work of writing federal criminal

laws. Congress cannot give the Judiciary uncut

marble with instructions to chip away all that

does not resemble David.

5

Percoco, 598 U.S. at 337–38 (Gorsuch, J., concurring)

(citing Reese, 92 U.S. 214).

3. The Sherman Act’s unconstitutional delegation

of crime-making authority is important enough for

this Court to consider. 1 The common-law approach of

making law through case-by-case adjudication relies

on parties—primarily the Government—to prosecute

novel theories that test whether certain conduct is

legal. Indeed, as former Antitrust Division Chief

Baxter explained, under this common-law approach,

“[e]very new case is an experiment.” Baxter, 60 Tex.

L. Rev. at 665 (quotation marks omitted). It may be

appropriate to “experiment” in civil cases, but not

when the defendant’s liberty is at stake.

The danger to the public arising from this

experimentation is not speculative; the Antitrust

Section has claimed that “the executive branch is

within its discretion to prosecute [a] case” “even when

precedent suggests a contrary result.” Id. at 687

(emphasis added). That was the case here. The

Government alleged a per se Sherman Act crime

based on conduct that nine circuits had deemed to be

governed by the rule of reason: forming a price

agreement within a dual-distribution arrangement.

See PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc.,

615 F.3d 412, 420–21 & n.8 (5th Cir. 2010). Still the

Government “experimented” to see if its theory would

be accepted “even [though] precedent suggested” it

would not be. Baxter, 60 Tex. L. Rev. at 665, 687. As

1 The Government’s argument that Mr. Brewbaker did not raise

his separation of powers challenge until his Fourth Circuit reply

brief is wrong. Mr. Brewbaker moved in the district court to

dismiss the indictment for unconstitutional vagueness, C.A. J.A.

1070, and he again raised that challenge in his opening brief,

Pet. C.A. Br. 54.

6

a result, Mr. Brewbaker was wrongly convicted and

served eighteen months in prison (away from his wife

who was and is suffering from brain cancer) only to

have the Fourth Circuit correctly hold (after Mr.

Brewbaker had served his entire sentence) that the

alleged conduct did not constitute the charged per se

antitrust offense.

The Government even goes as far as to claim (at

14–15) that the Constitution would permit criminal

prosecutions of rule-of-reason violations. Under that

position, every business transaction is subject to

criminal charge, leaving citizens to engage in

commerce at the risk of incarceration based on the

discretion of unelected prosecutors and judges. And,

of course, the Court “cannot construe a criminal

statute on the assumption that the Government will

‘use it responsibly.’” McDonnell v. United States, 579

U.S. 550, 576 (2016) (quoting United States v. Stevens,

559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010)).

That assumption would be particularly unjustified

here, where the Government has sued many of the

world’s most recognizable companies for alleged

anticompetitive conduct—conduct that it now says

could be charged criminally. For example, the

Antitrust Section’s website lists alphabetically—by

name of the first-listed defendant—each case it has

brought. There are thousands of companies listed in

total. Focusing only on the 228 cases within the “A”

section of the list, there are more than 500 companies

sued by the Government for anticompetitive conduct,

including the following nationally recognizable

companies:

7

1. ABC (American

Broadcasting

Companies)

2. Activision

Blizzard

3. Adobe

4. Aetna

5. AIG

6. Alaska Air

7. Alliant

Techsystems

8. ALLTEL

9. AMC

Entertainment

Holdings

10. Amcor

11. American Airlines

12. American Bar

Association

13. American Express

14. Anheuser-Busch

InBev

15. Apple

16. AT&T

17. BP

18. Cargill

19. Carmike Cinemas

20. CBS

21. Cigna

22. Continental

Airlines

23. Cox Cable

Communications

24. Delta Air Lines

25. DirectTV

26. Doubleday &

Company, Inc

27. Google

28. Grupo Modelo

29. HarperCollins

Publishers

30. Honeywell

31. Humana

32. Intel

33. Intuit

34. JetBlue

35. Mack Trucks

36. Mastercard

37. Oxford University

Press

38. Penguin Books

39. Pixar

40. Random House

41. Rio Tinto

42. Simon & Schuster

8

43. T-Mobile

47. Virgin America

44. Time Warner

48. Visa

45. United Airlines

49. Volvo

46. Union Carbide

U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division,

Antitrust

Case

Filings,

https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-case-filingsalpha

(last

visited

Sept.

13,

2024)

[https://perma.cc/83UH-S35X].

The Antitrust Section now claims (at 14–15) that

it had discretion to charge each of these companies—

and each of the thousands more it has sued—with a

felony offense carrying up to a $100 million fine.

Conferring such discretion on federal prosecutors and

agents to charge and arrest virtually every economic

actor in the country violates the “more important”

protection of the vagueness doctrine: the separation

of powers. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358.

Indeed, a hallmark of totalitarianism is using

vague laws that subject virtually every citizen to

arrest and punishment at the whim of the police and

courts. Yet the Sherman Act does just that. It can be

read to “reach[] almost all business decisions,” and,

according to former Antitrust Division Chief Baxter,

even precedent limiting the reach of the Sherman Act

is no bar to the Government’s discretion to charge

conduct as criminal under the Sherman Act’s

common-law approach. 60 Tex. L. Rev. at 664, 687.

Thus, every citizen engaged in business dealings is

subject to being charged and arrested based on the

discretion of the executive branch—and convicted

based on the policy determinations of the judicial

branch.

9

There is thus a “pressing need for this Court to

answer the question raised here,” which has

increased recently with the expanding volume and

novelty of antitrust prosecutions. Br. of Amici Curiae

Due Process Inst. & the Cato Inst. in Supp. of Pet’r at

18, Lischewski v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2676 (2022)

(No. 21-852), 2022 WL 296301, at *18.

4. Finally, the Government argues (at 14) that

this Court should reject the instant challenges based

on Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States,

221 U.S. 1 (1911), and Nash v. United States, 229 U.S.

373 (1913). But “stare decisis has never been treated

as ‘an inexorable command,’” Ramos v. Louisiana, 590

U.S. 83, 105 (2020) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555

U.S. 223, 233 (2009)), especially when, as here, the

disputed precedent has been undermined by later

developments and created significant negative realworld consequences. See also Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899

(“[s]tare decisis is not as significant” with respect to

the Sherman Act because the meaning of the act

“evolves” over time”).

Both Standard Oil and Nash relied on the

assumption that Congress’ intended meaning would

be ascertainable and would, therefore, not require

courts to legislate. 2 Yet it is now recognized that

2 Compare Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,

51 (1911) (The statutory terms “took their origin in the common

law, and were also familiar in the law of this country prior to and

at the time of the adoption of the [Sherman Act].”), and Nash v.

United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (relying, in part, on “the

common law as to the restraint of trade thus taken up by the

statute”), with Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S.

717, 732 (1988) (“[T]he term ‘restraint of trade’ . . . invokes the

common law itself, and not merely the static content that the

10

“with respect to the Sherman Act . . . Congress simply

had no discoverable intention.” Bork, 74 Yale L.J. at

78; cf. Johnson, 576 U.S. 591, 598 (2015) (“[T]he

failure of ‘persistent efforts . . . to establish a

standard’ can provide evidence of vagueness.”

(quoting United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255

U.S. 81, 91 (1921))).

Standard Oil and Nash were also decided before

the Court rejected the notion that “federal courts have

the power [to exercise] independent judgment on

matters of general law.” Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304

U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quotation marks omitted). Thus,

when Standard Oil and Nash were decided, the Court

had yet to firmly establish the prohibition on a statute

giving courts the power to “develop a common-law

crime,” Sorich, 129 S. Ct. at 1310 (Scalia, J.,

dissenting from denial of certiorari). Now, of course,

the Court has made plain that a criminal statute is

unconstitutionally vague if determining its meaning

“requires not interpretation but invention,” and that

such statutes delegate power to the court that is

“clearly beyond judicial power,” Skilling v. United

States, 561 U.S. 358, 422 (2010) (Scalia, J.,

concurring). See, e.g., Davis, 588 U.S. at 451.

Additionally, in Nash, the Court decided the case

by rejecting a proposition of law that the Court has

since repeatedly endorsed—that is, that “[t]he

criminality of an act cannot depend upon whether a

jury may think it reasonable or unreasonable.” Nash,

229 U.S. at 377 (quoting Tozer v. United States, 52 F.

917, 919 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1892)); see also, e.g., L. Cohen

common law had assigned to the term in 1890.”), and Leegin, 551

U.S. 888–89 (same).

11

Grocery Co., 255 U.S. at 89; Johnson, 576 U.S. at 598;

Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572–82 (1974).

This Court’s vagueness doctrine has also

developed significantly since 1913 when Nash was

decided.

The Court has since recognized the

increased importance of avoiding laws that delegate

to prosecutors, courts, and juries the responsibility to

determine what the criminal law is, see, e.g.,

Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358; and the Court has noted

that a law need not be unconstitutionally vague in all

applications to violate due process, Johnson, 576 U.S.

at 602.

Thus, “the logic of the Court’s analyses [in

Standard Oil and Nash] has been undercut” over the

last century. Matthew G. Sipe, The Sherman Act and

Avoiding Void-for-Vagueness, 45 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.

709, 711 (2018). And legal developments in antitrust

and vagueness law show that Standard Oil and Nash

are wrong “as a matter of law” when considering “the

quality of the precedent[s’] reasoning, consistency and

coherence with other decisions, changed law, [and]

changed facts.” Ramos, 590 U.S. at 122 (Kavanaugh,

J., concurring in part). Those precedents are also

having negative “real-world effects on the citizenry,”

id., as exemplified by Mr. Brewbaker’s wrongful

conviction and imprisonment.

*

*

*

Because of the Government’s increasing volume

and novelty of antitrust prosecutions and the clear

unconstitutionality of the common-law crime-making

process at issue, the Court should accept this

conditional cross-petition and declare the Sherman

Act crime unconstitutional.

12

II. The Court Should Review the Fourth

Circuit’s Legal Error in Its Harmless

Error Analysis.

1.

The Government argues (at 17) that the

Fourth Circuit did not find a constitutional violation.

But a valid indictment is a constitutional

requirement. E.g., United States v. Resendiz-Ponce,

549 U.S. 102, 108 (2007); United States v.

Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 557 (1875). So the Fourth

Circuit found a constitutional error when it held the

indictment failed to state an offense.

2.

Having found a constitutional error, the

Fourth Circuit had to reverse all counts unless the

Government demonstrated the error to have been

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to one or more

counts. But the Government did not provide a recordbased harmlessness argument. Instead, it asked the

Fourth Circuit to rely on a presumption that the

jurors considered each count separately. Gov. C.A.

Br. 67. And the court erroneously did so.

3.

Thus, the petition presents an important

legal issue: Can a court of appeals rely on a

presumption of correctness to find a constitutional

error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?

4.

Because the harmless error test is a

frequently invoked appellate doctrine, and because

the Fourth Circuit’s legal analysis creates a

dangerous precedent that would insulate most multicount convictions from meaningful review based on a

presumption of correctness, the Court should grant

certiorari to consider this issue.

13

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant this conditional crosspetition.

/s/ Elliot S. Abrams

Elliot S. Abrams

Counsel of Record

CHESHIRE PARKER SCHNEIDER, PLLC

133 Fayetteville Street, Suite 400

Raleigh, NC 27601

(919) 833-3114

elliot.abrams@cheshirepark.com

Ripley Rand

Samuel Hartzell

WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP

555 Fayetteville Street, Suite 1100

Raleigh, NC 27601

ripley.rand@wbd-us.com

sam.hartzell@wbd-us.com

Counsel for Cross-Petitioner

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Reply Brief — Brent Brewbaker, Petitioner v. United States | Frix