Reply Brief — Brent Brewbaker, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefSep 16, 2024
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No. 24-124
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
BRENT BREWBAKER,
v.
Cross-Petitioner,
UNITED STATES,
Cross-Respondent.
-----------------------------------------ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT
------------------------------------------
REPLY TO CROSS-RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
------------------------------------------
Elliot S. Abrams
Counsel of Record
CHESHIRE PARKER
SCHNEIDER, PLLC
133 Fayetteville Street
Suite 400
Raleigh, NC 27601
(919) 833-3114
elliot.abrams@cheshirepark.com
Ripley Rand
Samuel Hartzell
WOMBLE BOND
DICKINSON (US) LLP
555 Fayetteville Street
Suite 1100
Raleigh, NC 27601
ripley.rand@wbd-us.com
sam.hartzell@wbd-us.com
Counsel for
Cross-Petitioner
Counsel for
Cross-Petitioner
GibsonMoore Appellate Services, LLC
206 East Cary Street ♦ Richmond, VA 23219
804-249-7770 ♦ www.gibsonmoore.net
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS ......................... 1
I. The
Court
Should
Review
the
Constitutionality of the Sherman Act
Crime................................................................ 1
II. The Court Should Review the Fourth
Circuit’s Legal Error in Its Harmless
Error Analysis. .............................................. 12
CONCLUSION ......................................................... 13
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page(s)
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U.S. 469 (1940) ............................................. 4
Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.,
485 U.S. 717 (1988) ............................................. 9
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938) ............................................. 10
Johnson v. United States,
576 U.S. 591 (2015) ..................................... 10, 11
Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352 (1983) ................................... 1, 8, 11
Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
551 U.S. 877 (2007) ............................... 1, 2, 9, 10
Liparota v. United States,
471 U.S. 419 (1985) ............................................. 1
Lischewski v. United States,
142 S. Ct. 2676 (2022) ......................................... 9
McDonnell v. United States,
579 U.S. 550 (2016) ............................................. 6
Nash v. United States,
229 U.S. 373 (1913) ................................. 9, 10, 11
Percoco v. United States,
598 U.S. 319 (2023) ......................................... 1, 5
PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc.,
615 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2010) ............................... 5
Ramos v. Louisiana,
590 U.S. 83 (2020) ......................................... 9, 11
iii
Rodriguez v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,
589 U.S. 132 (2020) ............................................. 1
Sessions v. Dimaya,
584 U.S. 148 (2018) ............................................. 2
Skilling v. United States,
561 U.S. 358 (2010) ........................................... 10
Smith v. Goguen,
415 U.S. 566 (1974) ........................................... 11
Sorich v. United States,
129 S. Ct. 1308 (2009) ................................... 1, 10
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United
States,
221 U.S. 1 (1911) ..................................... 9, 10, 11
State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3 (1997) ................................................. 3
Tozer v. United States,
52 F. 917 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1892) .......................... 10
United States v. Associated Press,
52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) ........................ 2
United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542 (1875) ............................................. 12
United States v. Davis,
588 U.S. 445 (2019) ....................................... 1, 10
United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.,
255 U.S. 81 (1921) ....................................... 10, 11
United States v. Reese,
92 U.S. 214 (1875) ............................................... 1
iv
United States v. Resendiz-Ponce,
549 U.S. 102 (2007) ........................................... 12
United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460 (2010) ............................................. 6
Statutes
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 ......................... 1-5, 8-11
Other Authorities
Matthew G. Sipe, The Sherman Act and
Avoiding Void-for-Vagueness,
45 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 709 (2018) ...................... 11
Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the
Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 74 Yale L.J. 775 (1965) ................. 4, 10
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division, Antitrust Case Filings,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrustcase-filings-alpha
(last visited Sept. 13, 2024) ................................ 8
William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers,
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the
“Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law,
60 Tex. L. Rev. 661 (1982) .................. 2, 3, 5-6, 8
1
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
I. The Court Should Review the
Constitutionality of the Sherman Act
Crime.
1. This conditional cross-petition first raises the
question whether the Constitution allows a federal
crime to be defined by courts using the common-law
approach of case-by-case adjudication. “To ask the
question is nearly to answer it,” Rodriguez v. Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., 589 U.S. 132, 133 (2020), because
“the notion of a common-law crime is utterly
anathema today,” Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct.
1308, 1310 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (cleaned up). “Only the people’s elected
representatives in the legislature are authorized to
‘make an act a crime.’” United States v. Davis, 588
U.S. 445, 451 (2019); see also, e.g., United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 216 (1875); Liparota v. United
States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (“The definition of the
elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the
legislature.”).
Because the Sherman Act literally criminalizes all
business contracts, determining which contracts are
criminal requires a “common-law approach.” Leegin
Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S.
877, 901 (2007). But this approach violates the
Court’s repeated holding that the legislature cannot
set a net large enough to capture all possible offenders
and leave it to police and courts to decide what
conduct to prosecute and convict. Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 358 n.7 (1983) (quoting Reese, 92 U.S.
at 216); Percoco v. United States, 598 U.S. 319, 337–
38 (2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (Congress “must
do more than invoke an aspirational phrase and leave
2
it to prosecutors and judges to make things up as they
go along.”). Indeed, “the more important aspect of
vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but . . . the
requirement that a legislature establish minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement and keep the
separate branches within their proper spheres.”
Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. 148, 181 (2018)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (ellipsis in original)
(quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358); id. at 182.
2. The Government does not argue that defining
crimes through the common-law process is
permissible. It instead argues (at 6) that “courts
exercise judicial rather than legislative power” when
deciding what acts constitute an antitrust crime, and
it suggests (at 7–9) that the Sherman Act provides the
requisite guidelines necessary to maintain separation
of powers. Both premises are wrong.
As the then-Division Chief for the Antitrust
Section of the Department of Justice correctly
explained, “By adopting a common-law approach,
Congress in effect delegated much of its lawmaking
power to the judicial branch.” William F. Baxter,
Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and
the “Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 Tex.
L. Rev. 661, 663 (1982). “From the beginning the
Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law
statute”; it “adapts to modern understanding and
greater experience,” such that “the Sherman Act’s
prohibition on ‘restraint[s] of trade’ evolves to meet
the dynamics of present economic conditions.” Leegin,
551 U.S. at 899; United States v. Associated Press, 52
F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (L. Hand, J.), (The
Sherman Act gave courts “a legislative warrant,
because Congress has incorporated into the AntiTrust Acts the changing standards of the common
3
law, and by so doing has delegated to the courts the
duty of fixing the standard for each case.”). Indeed,
this Court has recognized that courts often make
“legislative changes” with respect to the Sherman Act.
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (emphasis
added). Therefore, the Government is incorrect that
courts “exercise of judicial rather than legislative
power” when deciding what conduct violates the
Sherman Act. Gov. Br. 6.
The Government also suggests (at 7–9) that the
Sherman Act’s text and the common law provide
enough guidance to avoid separation of powers and
related vagueness problems. But, as former Antitrust
Division Chief Baxter recognized, the Sherman Act
gives “only the most general statutory directions.”
Baxter, 60 Tex. L. Rev. at 663. “Taken on their face,
the antitrust provisions could have reached almost all
business decisions.” Id. at 664 (cleaned up). And the
context for those textual provisions is little help:
Congress provided little if any extrastatutory
guidance to direct interpretation of the basic
antitrust provisions. The legislative histories of
the antitrust statutes provide only the most
basic description of the goals Congress sought
to promote—competition and free enterprise—
and little indication of how these goals can best
be fostered by the judiciary.
Id. As a result, the Sherman Act “forced” courts to
“measure” business practices against courts’ own
“conception of the public interest” to determine what
practices to outlaw. Id. In other words, as Robert
Bork explained,
Lacking any real guidance from either the
language of the statute or its legislative
4
history, . . . the courts were forced themselves
to legislate in a broad manner and to discuss
what consistent and useful policy might be.
Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se
Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 Yale
L.J. 775, 782 (1965); see also Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940) (“In consequence of
the vagueness of its language . . . , the courts have
been left to give content to [§ 1].”).
The Government responds (at 6) that courts are
merely interpreting the statutory phrase “restraint of
trade,” 15 U.S.C. § 1, just as they interpret the text of
any other law—that is, by gleaning its original,
recognized meaning. But, as Judge Bork noted,
One frequently hears talk of the original
meaning of the Sherman Act or of the intent of
Congress in enacting that law, but it can hardly
be stressed too much that, with respect to the
Sherman Act . . . such talk of legislative intent
is more than usually foolish. Congress simply
had no discoverable intention that would help
a court decide a case one way or the other.
Bork, 74 Yale L.J. at 783. Thus, courts have
effectively writ[ten] this [criminal] law bit by
bit in decisions spanning decades with the help
of prosecutors . . . who present [courts] with one
option after another. But that is not a path the
Constitution tolerates. Under our system of
separated powers, the Legislative Branch must
do the hard work of writing federal criminal
laws. Congress cannot give the Judiciary uncut
marble with instructions to chip away all that
does not resemble David.
5
Percoco, 598 U.S. at 337–38 (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(citing Reese, 92 U.S. 214).
3. The Sherman Act’s unconstitutional delegation
of crime-making authority is important enough for
this Court to consider. 1 The common-law approach of
making law through case-by-case adjudication relies
on parties—primarily the Government—to prosecute
novel theories that test whether certain conduct is
legal. Indeed, as former Antitrust Division Chief
Baxter explained, under this common-law approach,
“[e]very new case is an experiment.” Baxter, 60 Tex.
L. Rev. at 665 (quotation marks omitted). It may be
appropriate to “experiment” in civil cases, but not
when the defendant’s liberty is at stake.
The danger to the public arising from this
experimentation is not speculative; the Antitrust
Section has claimed that “the executive branch is
within its discretion to prosecute [a] case” “even when
precedent suggests a contrary result.” Id. at 687
(emphasis added). That was the case here. The
Government alleged a per se Sherman Act crime
based on conduct that nine circuits had deemed to be
governed by the rule of reason: forming a price
agreement within a dual-distribution arrangement.
See PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc.,
615 F.3d 412, 420–21 & n.8 (5th Cir. 2010). Still the
Government “experimented” to see if its theory would
be accepted “even [though] precedent suggested” it
would not be. Baxter, 60 Tex. L. Rev. at 665, 687. As
1 The Government’s argument that Mr. Brewbaker did not raise
his separation of powers challenge until his Fourth Circuit reply
brief is wrong. Mr. Brewbaker moved in the district court to
dismiss the indictment for unconstitutional vagueness, C.A. J.A.
1070, and he again raised that challenge in his opening brief,
Pet. C.A. Br. 54.
6
a result, Mr. Brewbaker was wrongly convicted and
served eighteen months in prison (away from his wife
who was and is suffering from brain cancer) only to
have the Fourth Circuit correctly hold (after Mr.
Brewbaker had served his entire sentence) that the
alleged conduct did not constitute the charged per se
antitrust offense.
The Government even goes as far as to claim (at
14–15) that the Constitution would permit criminal
prosecutions of rule-of-reason violations. Under that
position, every business transaction is subject to
criminal charge, leaving citizens to engage in
commerce at the risk of incarceration based on the
discretion of unelected prosecutors and judges. And,
of course, the Court “cannot construe a criminal
statute on the assumption that the Government will
‘use it responsibly.’” McDonnell v. United States, 579
U.S. 550, 576 (2016) (quoting United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010)).
That assumption would be particularly unjustified
here, where the Government has sued many of the
world’s most recognizable companies for alleged
anticompetitive conduct—conduct that it now says
could be charged criminally. For example, the
Antitrust Section’s website lists alphabetically—by
name of the first-listed defendant—each case it has
brought. There are thousands of companies listed in
total. Focusing only on the 228 cases within the “A”
section of the list, there are more than 500 companies
sued by the Government for anticompetitive conduct,
including the following nationally recognizable
companies:
7
1. ABC (American
Broadcasting
Companies)
2. Activision
Blizzard
3. Adobe
4. Aetna
5. AIG
6. Alaska Air
7. Alliant
Techsystems
8. ALLTEL
9. AMC
Entertainment
Holdings
10. Amcor
11. American Airlines
12. American Bar
Association
13. American Express
14. Anheuser-Busch
InBev
15. Apple
16. AT&T
17. BP
18. Cargill
19. Carmike Cinemas
20. CBS
21. Cigna
22. Continental
Airlines
23. Cox Cable
Communications
24. Delta Air Lines
25. DirectTV
26. Doubleday &
Company, Inc
27. Google
28. Grupo Modelo
29. HarperCollins
Publishers
30. Honeywell
31. Humana
32. Intel
33. Intuit
34. JetBlue
35. Mack Trucks
36. Mastercard
37. Oxford University
Press
38. Penguin Books
39. Pixar
40. Random House
41. Rio Tinto
42. Simon & Schuster
8
43. T-Mobile
47. Virgin America
44. Time Warner
48. Visa
45. United Airlines
49. Volvo
46. Union Carbide
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division,
Antitrust
Case
Filings,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-case-filingsalpha
(last
visited
Sept.
13,
2024)
[https://perma.cc/83UH-S35X].
The Antitrust Section now claims (at 14–15) that
it had discretion to charge each of these companies—
and each of the thousands more it has sued—with a
felony offense carrying up to a $100 million fine.
Conferring such discretion on federal prosecutors and
agents to charge and arrest virtually every economic
actor in the country violates the “more important”
protection of the vagueness doctrine: the separation
of powers. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358.
Indeed, a hallmark of totalitarianism is using
vague laws that subject virtually every citizen to
arrest and punishment at the whim of the police and
courts. Yet the Sherman Act does just that. It can be
read to “reach[] almost all business decisions,” and,
according to former Antitrust Division Chief Baxter,
even precedent limiting the reach of the Sherman Act
is no bar to the Government’s discretion to charge
conduct as criminal under the Sherman Act’s
common-law approach. 60 Tex. L. Rev. at 664, 687.
Thus, every citizen engaged in business dealings is
subject to being charged and arrested based on the
discretion of the executive branch—and convicted
based on the policy determinations of the judicial
branch.
9
There is thus a “pressing need for this Court to
answer the question raised here,” which has
increased recently with the expanding volume and
novelty of antitrust prosecutions. Br. of Amici Curiae
Due Process Inst. & the Cato Inst. in Supp. of Pet’r at
18, Lischewski v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2676 (2022)
(No. 21-852), 2022 WL 296301, at *18.
4. Finally, the Government argues (at 14) that
this Court should reject the instant challenges based
on Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States,
221 U.S. 1 (1911), and Nash v. United States, 229 U.S.
373 (1913). But “stare decisis has never been treated
as ‘an inexorable command,’” Ramos v. Louisiana, 590
U.S. 83, 105 (2020) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 233 (2009)), especially when, as here, the
disputed precedent has been undermined by later
developments and created significant negative realworld consequences. See also Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899
(“[s]tare decisis is not as significant” with respect to
the Sherman Act because the meaning of the act
“evolves” over time”).
Both Standard Oil and Nash relied on the
assumption that Congress’ intended meaning would
be ascertainable and would, therefore, not require
courts to legislate. 2 Yet it is now recognized that
2 Compare Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
51 (1911) (The statutory terms “took their origin in the common
law, and were also familiar in the law of this country prior to and
at the time of the adoption of the [Sherman Act].”), and Nash v.
United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (relying, in part, on “the
common law as to the restraint of trade thus taken up by the
statute”), with Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S.
717, 732 (1988) (“[T]he term ‘restraint of trade’ . . . invokes the
common law itself, and not merely the static content that the
10
“with respect to the Sherman Act . . . Congress simply
had no discoverable intention.” Bork, 74 Yale L.J. at
78; cf. Johnson, 576 U.S. 591, 598 (2015) (“[T]he
failure of ‘persistent efforts . . . to establish a
standard’ can provide evidence of vagueness.”
(quoting United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255
U.S. 81, 91 (1921))).
Standard Oil and Nash were also decided before
the Court rejected the notion that “federal courts have
the power [to exercise] independent judgment on
matters of general law.” Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quotation marks omitted). Thus,
when Standard Oil and Nash were decided, the Court
had yet to firmly establish the prohibition on a statute
giving courts the power to “develop a common-law
crime,” Sorich, 129 S. Ct. at 1310 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). Now, of course,
the Court has made plain that a criminal statute is
unconstitutionally vague if determining its meaning
“requires not interpretation but invention,” and that
such statutes delegate power to the court that is
“clearly beyond judicial power,” Skilling v. United
States, 561 U.S. 358, 422 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). See, e.g., Davis, 588 U.S. at 451.
Additionally, in Nash, the Court decided the case
by rejecting a proposition of law that the Court has
since repeatedly endorsed—that is, that “[t]he
criminality of an act cannot depend upon whether a
jury may think it reasonable or unreasonable.” Nash,
229 U.S. at 377 (quoting Tozer v. United States, 52 F.
917, 919 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1892)); see also, e.g., L. Cohen
common law had assigned to the term in 1890.”), and Leegin, 551
U.S. 888–89 (same).
11
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. at 89; Johnson, 576 U.S. at 598;
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572–82 (1974).
This Court’s vagueness doctrine has also
developed significantly since 1913 when Nash was
decided.
The Court has since recognized the
increased importance of avoiding laws that delegate
to prosecutors, courts, and juries the responsibility to
determine what the criminal law is, see, e.g.,
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358; and the Court has noted
that a law need not be unconstitutionally vague in all
applications to violate due process, Johnson, 576 U.S.
at 602.
Thus, “the logic of the Court’s analyses [in
Standard Oil and Nash] has been undercut” over the
last century. Matthew G. Sipe, The Sherman Act and
Avoiding Void-for-Vagueness, 45 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
709, 711 (2018). And legal developments in antitrust
and vagueness law show that Standard Oil and Nash
are wrong “as a matter of law” when considering “the
quality of the precedent[s’] reasoning, consistency and
coherence with other decisions, changed law, [and]
changed facts.” Ramos, 590 U.S. at 122 (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring in part). Those precedents are also
having negative “real-world effects on the citizenry,”
id., as exemplified by Mr. Brewbaker’s wrongful
conviction and imprisonment.
*
*
*
Because of the Government’s increasing volume
and novelty of antitrust prosecutions and the clear
unconstitutionality of the common-law crime-making
process at issue, the Court should accept this
conditional cross-petition and declare the Sherman
Act crime unconstitutional.
12
II. The Court Should Review the Fourth
Circuit’s Legal Error in Its Harmless
Error Analysis.
1.
The Government argues (at 17) that the
Fourth Circuit did not find a constitutional violation.
But a valid indictment is a constitutional
requirement. E.g., United States v. Resendiz-Ponce,
549 U.S. 102, 108 (2007); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 557 (1875). So the Fourth
Circuit found a constitutional error when it held the
indictment failed to state an offense.
2.
Having found a constitutional error, the
Fourth Circuit had to reverse all counts unless the
Government demonstrated the error to have been
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to one or more
counts. But the Government did not provide a recordbased harmlessness argument. Instead, it asked the
Fourth Circuit to rely on a presumption that the
jurors considered each count separately. Gov. C.A.
Br. 67. And the court erroneously did so.
3.
Thus, the petition presents an important
legal issue: Can a court of appeals rely on a
presumption of correctness to find a constitutional
error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?
4.
Because the harmless error test is a
frequently invoked appellate doctrine, and because
the Fourth Circuit’s legal analysis creates a
dangerous precedent that would insulate most multicount convictions from meaningful review based on a
presumption of correctness, the Court should grant
certiorari to consider this issue.
13
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant this conditional crosspetition.
/s/ Elliot S. Abrams
Elliot S. Abrams
Counsel of Record
CHESHIRE PARKER SCHNEIDER, PLLC
133 Fayetteville Street, Suite 400
Raleigh, NC 27601
(919) 833-3114
elliot.abrams@cheshirepark.com
Ripley Rand
Samuel Hartzell
WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP
555 Fayetteville Street, Suite 1100
Raleigh, NC 27601
ripley.rand@wbd-us.com
sam.hartzell@wbd-us.com
Counsel for Cross-Petitioner
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