Amicus Curiae Brief — Shawn Montgomery, Petitioner v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al.

No. 24-1238

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

——————————

SHAWN MONTGOMERY,

Petitioner,

v.

CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC, YOSNIEL VARELAMOJENA, C.H. ROBINSON WORLDWIDE, INC.,

C.H. ROBINSON COMPANY, C.H. ROBINSON COMPANY,

INC., C.H. ROBINSON INTERNATIONAL, INC.

AND CARIBE TRANSPORT, LLC,

Respondents.

——————————

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

——————————

BRIEF OF AMAZON.COM, INC. AND

WAYFAIR LLC AS AMICI CURIAE IN

SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

——————————

BEN HARRIS

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

1271 Avenue of the

Americas

New York, NY 10020

ROMAN MARTINEZ

Counsel of Record

MARGARET A. UPSHAW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

555 Eleventh Street, NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 637-2207

roman.martinez@lw.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT .........................................................3

ARGUMENT ...............................................................4

I.

THE FAAAA PREEMPTS NEGLIGENTSELECTION CLAIMS AGAINST BOTH

BROKERS AND SHIPPERS ................................4

A. Section

14501(c)’s

Text

Covers

Negligent-Selection Claims Against

Brokers And Shippers .....................................5

B. Policy

Considerations

Support

Preemption Of Claims Against Both

Brokers And Shippers .....................................8

II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF BROKER

AND SHIPPER CLAIMS IS FULLY

CONSISTENT WITH ROAD SAFETY ..............12

CONCLUSION ..........................................................21

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar

Ranger, Inc.,

65 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2023) ..........................5, 7

California Trucking Association v. Su,

903 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2018)..................................9

Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc.,

142 F.4th 847 (6th Cir. 2025) ................................7

Creagan v. Wal-Mart Transportation, LLC,

354 F. Supp. 3d 808 (N.D. Ohio 2018) ..................8

CRST Dedicated Services, Inc. v. IngersollRand Co.,

194 F. Supp. 3d 426 (W.D.N.C. 2016) ...................8

Lee v. Werner Enterprises, Inc.,

No. 3:22 CV 91, 2022 WL 16695207 (N.D.

Ohio Nov. 3, 2022) .................................................8

Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.,

976 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2020)................................7

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

504 U.S. 374 (1992) ..............................................10

New Hampshire Motor Transport v. Rowe,

448 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2006), aff’d, 552 U.S.

364 (2008) ...............................................................5

People v. Blackorby,

586 N.E.2d 1231 (Ill. 1992) ..................................18

Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport

Association,

552 U.S. 364 (2008) .................................... 3, 5, 6, 8

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

State v. Beaver,

385 P.3d 956 (Mont. 2016) .............................18, 19

Tischauser v. Donnelly Transportation, Inc.,

Nos. 20-C-1291, et al., 2023 WL 8436321

(E.D. Wis. Dec. 5, 2023) .........................................8

Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc.,

74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023) ..................................7

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

49 U.S.C. § 502 ..........................................................14

49 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)-(2) ............................................14

49 U.S.C. § 506(a)......................................................14

49 U.S.C. § 521(b)......................................................18

49 U.S.C. § 13102(2) ....................................................7

49 U.S.C. § 13102(13)(C) .............................................7

49 U.S.C. § 13301(b) ..................................................17

49 U.S.C. § 13501 ......................................................13

49 U.S.C. § 13901 ................................................16, 17

49 U.S.C. § 13901(a) ..................................................14

49 U.S.C. § 13902 ................................................14, 17

49 U.S.C. § 13904 ......................................................16

49 U.S.C. § 13905(d)..................................................18

49 U.S.C. § 13905(d)(2) .......................................14, 17

49 U.S.C. § 13906(a)(1) .............................................14

49 U.S.C. § 13906(b)(2)(A) ........................................16

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

49 U.S.C. § 14501 ........................................................2

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) ........................................3, 5, 6

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A) .........................................18

49 U.S.C. § 14910 ......................................................18

49 U.S.C. § 31131(b) ..................................................12

49 U.S.C. § 31134 ......................................................14

49 U.S.C. § 31134(c) ..................................................14

49 U.S.C. § 31136(a) ..............................................4, 13

49 U.S.C. § 31136(a)(1)-(3) ........................................13

49 U.S.C. § 31136(a)(5) .............................................17

49 U.S.C. § 31139(b)(1) .............................................14

49 U.S.C. § 31141(a) ..................................................18

49 U.S.C. § 31142 ......................................................14

49 U.S.C. § 31143 ......................................................14

49 U.S.C. § 31144 ......................................................14

Pub. L. No. 98-554, 98 Stat. 2829 (1984) .................12

Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (1995) .................13

Pub. L. No. 106-159, 113 Stat. 1748 (1999)..............13

Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 405 (2012) ...............13

Cal. Veh. Code § 34520 .............................................19

49 C.F.R. pts. 301-399 .................................................4

49 C.F.R. § 1.87 .........................................................14

49 C.F.R. § 371.2 ...................................................7, 17

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

49 C.F.R. § 371.3 .......................................................17

49 C.F.R. § 371.7 .......................................................18

49 C.F.R. § 380.609 ...................................................15

49 C.F.R. § 383.1 .......................................................15

49 C.F.R. § 383.23 .....................................................15

49 C.F.R. § 383.25 .....................................................15

49 C.F.R. § 383.37 .....................................................15

49 C.F.R. § 383.51(a)(2) ............................................15

49 C.F.R. § 383.53(b)(2) ............................................15

49 C.F.R. § 383.71 .....................................................15

49 C.F.R. § 387.1 .......................................................14

49 C.F.R. § 387.7 .......................................................15

49 C.F.R. § 390.5 .......................................................17

49 C.F.R. § 392.2 .......................................................18

49 C.F.R. § 392.3 .......................................................15

49 C.F.R. § 392.4 .......................................................15

49 C.F.R. § 392.5 .......................................................15

49 C.F.R. § 392.6 .......................................................15

49 C.F.R. § 392.7(b) ...................................................15

49 C.F.R. § 392.8 .......................................................15

49 C.F.R. § 392.9 .......................................................15

49 C.F.R. § 392.10 .....................................................16

49 C.F.R. § 392.22 .....................................................16

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

49 C.F.R. § 392.80 .....................................................16

49 C.F.R. § 392.82 .....................................................16

49 C.F.R. § 395.1 .......................................................15

OTHER AUTHORITIES

53 Fed. Reg. 18042 (May 19, 1988) ..........................13

FMCSA, About Us,

https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/mission/

about-us (last updated Dec. 12, 2013) .................14

FMCSA, Compliance + Safety +

Accountability (Aug. 2014),

https://csa.fmcsa.dot.gov/

Documents/Safety_Ratings_Factsheet_

GRS_M.pdf ...........................................................16

FMCSA, Summary of Closed Enforcement

Cases, https://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/

EnforcementPrograms/EnforcementCases/

Summary (last visited Jan. 18, 2026) .................18

FMCSA, Traffic Enforcement Activity,

https://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/

EnforcementPrograms/

TrafficEnforcements (last visited Jan. 20,

2026) .....................................................................19

FMCSA, Roadside Inspection Activity,

https://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/

EnforcementPrograms/Inspections (last

visited Jan. 18, 2026) ...........................................18

H.R. Rep. No. 103-677 (1994) (Conf. Rep.) ...........9, 11

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Patrick and Barbara Kowalski Freight

Brokers Safety Act, H.R. 6884, 119th

Cong. (2025) .........................................................20

U.S. Chamber of Commerce Inst. for Legal

Reform, Roadblock: The Trucking

Litigation Problem and How to Fix It (July

2023), https://instituteforlegalreform.com/

wp-content/uploads/2023/07/RoadblockThe-Trucking-Litigation-Problem-andHow-to-Fix-It-FINAL-WEB.pdf ..........................10

U.S. Chamber of Commerce Inst. for Legal

Reform, Tort Costs in America—

Commercial Auto: An Analysis of the

Economic Impact of Commercial

Automobile Tort Costs (Oct. 2025),

https://instituteforlegalreform.com/

wp-content/uploads/2025/10/20253021ILR-Commercial-Auto-Costs-ReportDIGITAL-FINAL-1.pdf ..........................................9

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

Amazon.com, Inc. offers its own products and

those of other businesses for sale through its websites,

on mobile apps, and at physical retail locations. To

help customers receive purchases promptly and

conveniently, Amazon relies on every leg of the supply

chain and interstate transportation system operating

efficiently, including shippers, brokers, and motor

carriers.

Depending on the circumstances, Amazon can play

different roles in this system. Amazon can be (1) the

shipper, when it hires motor carriers to move

products owned by Amazon; (2) the federally licensed

broker, when it hires motor carriers and arranges

transportation services for other companies; and (3)

the motor carrier, when motor vehicles are operating

under Amazon’s federal motor carrier authority.

Wayfair LLC (“Wayfair”) is an omnichannel

retailer offering home goods and furniture to

American consumers.

Like Amazon, Wayfair

participates in the national transportation network

as both a shipper and a federally licensed broker

when contracting with motor carriers. Wayfair does

not currently operate as a motor carrier.

Given

Amazon

and

Wayfair’s

extensive

participation in the federal transportation system,

they both have a strong interest in the proper

interpretation of the preemption provision of the

1

No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or

in part, and no party, counsel for a party, or person or entity

other than amici curiae, their members, and their counsel made

a monetary contribution intended to fund the brief’s preparation

or submission.

2

Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act

(FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. § 14501.

Amici support a

uniform federal approach that clearly defines the

obligations of shippers, brokers, and motor carriers

within the modern supply chain.

3

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Respondents are right that the Federal Aviation

Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA)

preempts state tort claims against freight brokers for

negligently selecting motor carriers. Such claims are

expressly preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1),

which bars states from directly or indirectly

regulating the “price, route, or service” of motor

carriers and brokers.

As Congress recognized, brokers are entitled to

rely on the robust federal regulatory scheme designed

to ensure that motor carriers operate safely on

America’s roads. Brokers cannot fairly be held

responsible under state law for injuries caused by

federally licensed motor carriers and drivers.

Allowing such liability inhibits transportation

efficiency, throttles innovation, and defeats

Congress’s preference for uniform federal regulation

of motor carriers.

Amici fully endorse respondents’ arguments.

Amici submit this brief to underscore two important

points about FAAAA preemption.

First, the FAAAA preempts negligent-selection

claims not only against brokers, but also against

shippers. Brokers and shippers play the same role

when they hire motor carriers to transport property.

Tort claims targeting these upstream actors seek to

enforce a patchwork of inexact standards for selecting

a particular motor carrier.

Such claims are

preempted by Section 14501(c)(1) because they are

“related to” the “service” of a “motor carrier . . . with

respect to the transportation of property.” See Rowe

v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364,

4

370-72 (2008). Preemption of such claims also

furthers the FAAAA’s purpose of increasing

uniformity

and

maintaining

deregulation—

considerations that apply equally to claims against

both brokers and shippers.

Second, petitioner’s policy concerns about road

safety are misplaced.

Congress has given the

Department of Transportation robust authority to

regulate road safety. The Department has exercised

that authority by placing extensive safety obligations

on motor carriers, who are best positioned to control

the safety of their vehicles on the roads. See 49 U.S.C.

§ 31136(a); 49 C.F.R. pts. 301-399. And states retain

authority under the FAAAA to directly regulate the

safety of motor vehicles. Preemption of negligentselection claims is fully consistent with road safety.

And as improvements to this safety regime are

needed, they should come through uniform federal

legislation or rulemaking, not ad hoc tort suits

imposing the varied negligence regimes of 50 different

states.

For these reasons—and those set forth by

respondents—this Court should affirm the Seventh

Circuit’s judgment below.

ARGUMENT

I. THE FAAAA PREEMPTS NEGLIGENTSELECTION CLAIMS AGAINST BOTH

BROKERS AND SHIPPERS

Respondents correctly explain that the FAAAA

preempts state law negligent-selection claims against

brokers. Resp. Br. 15-26. The same provision also

bars such claims against shippers. That result follows

directly from Section 14501(c)’s text, and it makes

perfect sense: Shippers and brokers are equally

5

removed from motor-carrier crashes on the road, and

the same preemption rule applies to both.

A. Section 14501(c)’s Text Covers NegligentSelection Claims Against Brokers And

Shippers

1. The FAAAA’s preemption provision—49 U.S.C.

§ 14501(c)(1)—bars states from enacting or enforcing

any law “related to a price, route, or service of any

motor carrier . . . or any motor private carrier, broker,

or freight forwarder with respect to the

transportation of property.” The purpose of the

provision is to encourage uniformity in motor carrier

regulation and ensure that “a patchwork of state . . .

laws, rules, and regulations” do not stymie Congress’s

promotion of a “competitive marketplace.” Rowe v.

New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364,

373 (2008); see also New Hampshire Motor Transp. v.

Rowe, 448 F.3d 66, 72-73 (1st Cir. 2006), aff’d, 552

U.S. 364.

For two independent reasons, Section 14501(c)(1)

preempts state common-law claims against brokers

for negligently selecting a motor carrier.

First, such claims directly regulate the “service[s]”

of “broker[s].” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1); see Resp. Br.

15-18. Brokers arrange the transportation of freight

by contracting with motor carriers, who in turn hire

truck drivers to carry each load. Negligent-selection

claims generally arise when the truck driver gets into

a crash. The plaintiff contends that the broker failed

to exercise reasonable care in performing its service

of selecting a motor carrier. Such claims therefore

directly “relate to” the “service” of brokers “with

respect to the transportation of property” under

Section 14501(c)(1). See Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v.

6

Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261, 1267-68 (11th

Cir. 2023).

Second, negligent-selection claims against brokers

are also preempted because they indirectly regulate

the prices and services of “motor carriers.” 49 U.S.C.

§ 14501(c)(1); see Resp. Br. 18-21. As this Court

explained in Rowe, even laws that have “only indirect”

effects on a motor carrier’s “rates, routes, or services”

are preempted under Section 14501(c)(1). 552 U.S. at

370.

In Rowe, the Court found that the FAAAA

preempted a Maine statute forbidding tobacco

retailers from employing “a ‘delivery service’ unless

that

service

follow[ed]

particular

delivery

procedures.” Id. at 371. Although Maine only

indirectly regulated motor carriers by telling

“shippers what to choose rather than carriers what to

do,” Section 14501(c)(1) preempted the statute

because “the effect of the regulation [was] that

carriers will have to offer tobacco delivery services

that differ significantly from those that, in the

absence of the regulation, the market might dictate.”

Id. at 371-72.

That same “indirect” regulation of motor carriers

is implicated by negligent-selection claims against

brokers. Id. at 370. Just like the Maine law in Rowe,

such claims effectively tell brokers which motor

carrier services they can and cannot select, and what

standards and criteria they must apply when making

that decision. That forces motor carriers to change

the way they operate in ways the private industry

might not otherwise require. Negligent-selection

claims against brokers thus indirectly regulate the

“services” of “motor carriers”—and trigger federal

7

preemption—under Section 14501(c)(1). Every circuit

to have considered this question agrees.2

2. Although the question presented in this case

involves negligent-selection claims against brokers,

the Court’s decision could have important

implications for analogous claims against shippers.

The Court should recognize that Section 14501(c)(1)

fully bars analogous shipper claims as well.

In the transportation context, the term “shipper”

refers to the entity that owns the goods being

transported, “like a manufacturer, retailer, or

distributor.” Aspen, 65 F.4th at 1264; see 49 U.S.C.

§ 13102(13)(C). A broker, by contrast, “arrang[es] for

transportation by motor carrier for compensation.” 49

U.S.C. § 13102(2); see also 49 C.F.R. § 371.2.

Although shippers and brokers are distinct in

some respects, both serve the same role when they

hire motor carriers to transport property. Brokers

can hire motor carriers on behalf of a shipper, or

shippers can hire motor carriers directly. In both

situations, negligent-selection claims seek to hold the

hiring entity liable for failing to exercise reasonable

care in selecting a carrier. Just as claims against

brokers are preempted because they indirectly

regulate the services of motor carriers, claims against

shippers are preempted for the same reason. Supra

6-7.

Rowe confirms as much. As noted, Rowe held that

Section 14501(c)(1) preempted a Maine statute

2

See Aspen, 65 F.4th at 1268; Cox v. Total Quality

Logistics, Inc., 142 F.4th 847, 852 (6th Cir. 2025); Ye v.

GlobalTranz Enters., Inc., 74 F.4th 453, 459 (7th Cir. 2023);

Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d 1016, 1024-26

(9th Cir. 2020).

8

regulating shippers. 552 U.S. at 370-72. By imposing

restrictions on the types of delivery services shippers

could use, the Maine law necessarily forced carriers

to offer services “that differ[ed] significantly from

those that, in the absence of the regulation, the

market might dictate.” Id. at 372.

Again, Rowe’s logic applies equally to negligentselection claims, which effectively dictate which

motor carrier services shippers can select. Motor

carriers will, in turn, alter the services they offer.

Such claims thus fall squarely within Section

14501(c)(1).

Lower courts applying Rowe have

correctly held that the FAAAA preempts state

negligent-selection claims against shippers.3

B. Policy

Considerations

Support

Preemption Of Claims Against Both

Brokers And Shippers

Preempting claims against brokers and shippers is

consistent with the FAAAA’s purpose and the policy

concerns Congress sought to address.

The

preemption provision cemented the federal

government’s authority over the trucking industry.

In doing so, Congress aimed to mitigate the

3

See, e.g., Tischauser v. Donnelly Transp., Inc., Nos. 20-C1291, et al., 2023 WL 8436321, at *1, 4-5 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 5, 2023)

(applying Rowe to conclude that state common-law claims

against shipper were preempted); Creagan v. Wal-Mart Transp.,

LLC, 354 F. Supp. 3d 808, 813 n.6 (N.D. Ohio 2018) (similar,

noting that negligent-hiring claim against shipper “indirectly

attempt[ed] to regulate broker services”); Lee v. Werner Enters.,

Inc., No. 3:22 CV 91, 2022 WL 16695207, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Ohio

Nov. 3, 2022) (concluding that the “Supreme Court in Rowe

considered shippers to be included” in the FAAAA’s preemption

provision); CRST Dedicated Servs., Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,

194 F. Supp. 3d 426, 433 (W.D.N.C. 2016) (similar).

9

“inefficiencies, lack of innovation, and lack of

competition caused by non-uniform state regulations

of motor carriers.” Cal. Trucking Ass’n v. Su, 903 F.3d

953, 960 (9th Cir. 2018); H.R. Rep. No. 103-677, at 8688 (1994) (Conf. Rep.). Negligent-selection claims

undermine those goals, and that is equally true

whether the claim is brought against a broker or a

shipper.

Allowing such claims undermines uniformity by

subjecting brokers and shippers to the varied

common-law regimes of 50 different states. A carrier

hauling a load from California to New York may pass

through ten to fifteen different jurisdictions, all with

different tort regimes. Indeed, petitioner’s amici

expressly recognize that state negligence regimes

“var[y] based on state values” and serve as “a field of

dramatic state experimentation.” Amici Curiae State

of Ohio, et al. Br. 13.

As a practical matter, that eliminates any

uniform, nationwide standard for selecting a federally

licensed motor carrier.

Disuniformity imposes

greater complexity and higher costs on brokers and

shippers arranging for transportation of goods. For

each jurisdiction, brokers and shippers must

anticipate what state-law factors a plaintiff might

invoke, in the event of a crash, to impose liability for

their selection of motor carriers. Guessing wrong can

have massive financial consequences in the tort

system.4 And over time, the attendant uncertainty

4

See generally U.S. Chamber of Commerce Inst. for Legal

Reform, Tort Costs in America—Commercial Auto: An Analysis

of the Economic Impact of Commercial Automobile Tort Costs,

at 13 (Oct. 2025), https://instituteforlegalreform.com/wpcontent/uploads/2025/10/20253021-ILR-Commercial-Auto-

10

inevitably pressures shippers and brokers to follow

the state law with the most stringent rules, overriding

the policy judgments of the federal government and

other states and imposing costs that these other

jurisdictions believe are excessive.

That is not the scheme Congress enacted, and it

makes no sense. Brokers and shippers are multiple

steps removed from the transportation system causes

of road crashes. Indeed, shippers are even further

removed in situations where they select motor

carriers through a broker.

When it comes to evaluating a motor carrier’s

overall safety practices, brokers and shippers are

certainly not better situated than the Federal Motor

Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), the expert

federal agency in the Department of Transportation

charged with licensing, inspecting, and investigating

motor carriers. See infra 12-18 (describing federal

regime). That is why the federal scheme imposes no

such responsibility on them. Brokers and shippers

are instead entitled to rely on the federal

government’s licensing determinations when they

select motor carriers. Negligent-selection claims turn

that scheme on its head.

Petitioner’s unlimited “safety exception” to

preemption also allows states to “undo federal

deregulation with regulation of their own.” Morales

Costs-Report-DIGITAL-FINAL-1.pdf (noting $15 billion in tort

costs associated with trucking industry in 2022); U.S. Chamber

of Commerce Inst. for Legal Reform, Roadblock: The Trucking

Litigation Problem and How to Fix It, at 10 (July 2023),

https://instituteforlegalreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/

Roadblock-The-Trucking-Litigation-Problem-and-How-to-Fix-ItFINAL-WEB.pdf (noting average verdict of $12 million in claims

against freight brokers from 2015-2021).

11

v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378-79

(1992).

The FAAAA was the culmination of

Congress’s decades-long effort to deregulate the

transportation industries to allow for the free flow of

trade and interstate commerce. See Resp. Br. 4-7, 1821. The preemption provision was designed to stop

states from reversing those efforts. But petitioner’s

interpretation permits that very thing.

For example, through FAAAA preemption,

Congress sought to eliminate state laws that

inhibited new entry into the motor carrier business.

See H.R. Rep. No. 103-677, at 86-87 (Conf. Rep.). But

negligent-selection claims invite state juries to

effectively accomplish the same result. They can hold

a broker or shipper liable for hiring a newly licensed

motor carrier on the theory that a more experienced

motor carrier would have been safer. See, e.g., Compl.

¶¶ 26-32, Whaley v. Amazon.com, No. 23-cv-4317

(D.S.C. filed Aug. 28, 2023), ECF No. 1 (alleging

negligence based on hiring of “new entrants” that had

not yet received a safety rating from FMCSA).

Allowing such claims deters brokers and shippers

from selecting new motor carriers. And again, it

forces brokers and shippers to second-guess the

federal government’s own licensing decisions and

navigate a patchwork of expansive liability across the

country. That is precisely the opposite of what

Congress wanted.

All of these considerations apply equally to

brokers and shippers. This particular case involves

only claims against brokers, but the same preemption

questions are now regularly arising as to shippers,

who are increasingly targeted by the plaintiffs’ bar in

litigation. See, e.g., supra 8 n.3. The Court should

clarify the law by expressly acknowledging that

12

shippers—as well as brokers—are protected by

Section 14501(c)(1)’s preemption provision. At a

minimum, the Court should avoid any language or

implication that preemption is limited to claims

against brokers.

II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF BROKER AND

SHIPPER CLAIMS IS FULLY CONSISTENT

WITH ROAD SAFETY

Without a viable textual argument on preemption,

petitioner and his amici fall back to policy, claiming

this case presents a stark choice between preserving

all state safety regulation and “unleash[ing] havoc on

the roads.” Petr. Br. 40. But petitioner does not point

to any proof that negligent-selection claims actually

improve road safety. Moreover, Congress has left

ample room for federal and state regulation to protect

drivers and passengers.

Preemption of state

negligent-selection claims is fully consistent with

protecting America’s highways.

1. Congress has empowered the Department of

Transportation to promote motor carrier safety and

promulgate regulations concerning carriers, brokers,

and shippers. This robust federal scheme places the

primary legal responsibility for highway safety where

it belongs—with the entities actually operating

vehicles on the road.

In 1984, Congress enacted the Motor Carrier

Safety Act to provide “more uniform commercial

motor vehicle safety measures.” Pub. L. No. 98-554,

tit. II, § 203(2), 98 Stat. 2829, 2832; see 49 U.S.C.

§ 31131(b). That Act required the Department of

Transportation to “issue regulations” to establish

“minimum Federal safety standards for commercial

motor vehicles.” Pub. L. No. 98-554, § 206, 98 Stat. at

13

2834; see 49 U.S.C. § 31136(a). The Department first

issued such regulations in 1988. See 53 Fed. Reg.

18042 (May 19, 1988). In 1995, Congress enacted the

ICC Termination Act, further refining and clarifying

the statutory scheme. Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat.

803 (1995).

After Congress preempted state regulation

through the FAAAA, it again refined the uniform

federal safety regime through the Motor Carrier

Safety Improvement Act of 1999 (Improvement Act).

Pub. L. No. 106-159, 113 Stat. 1748 (1999). The

Improvement Act established FMCSA within the

Department “to improve the administration of the

Federal motor carrier safety program” and reduce

truck-involved crashes. Id. § 4, 113 Stat. at 1749.

And in 2012, Congress passed the Moving Ahead for

Progress in the 21st Century Act, which included

additional provisions related to registration and

revocation of motor carrier and broker licenses. Pub.

L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 405 (2012).

As it stands today, the federal scheme gives the

Department of Transportation broad “jurisdiction . . .

over transportation by motor carrier and the

procurement of that transportation.” 49 U.S.C.

§ 13501. At a minimum, the Department must

“ensure that”: (1) “commercial motor vehicles are

maintained, equipped, loaded, and operated safely,”

(2) “the responsibilities imposed on operators of

commercial motor vehicles do not impair their ability

to operate the vehicles safely,” and (3) operators are

in good “physical condition” and have “periodic . . .

examinations performed by medical examiners.” Id.

§ 31136(a)(1)-(3).

The federal regime focuses primarily on motor

carriers and their drivers, reflecting Congress’s view

14

that safety regulation should be targeted at the actors

directly responsible for operating motor vehicles.

Motor carriers “may provide transportation” only if

they are registered. Id. § 13901(a); see also id.

§§ 13902, 31134. The Department may revoke the

registration of a motor carrier for “willful failure to

comply” with applicable laws and regulations or with

any “condition of its registration.” Id. § 13905(d)(2);

see id. § 31134(c).

The Department must also “prescribe regulations

to require minimum levels of financial responsibility

sufficient to satisfy liability amounts” against motor

carriers. Id. § 31139(b)(1). That liability insurance

requirement is designed to ensure motor carriers can

satisfy judgments for “bodily injury to, or death of, an

individual resulting from the negligent operation,

maintenance, or use of motor vehicles.”

Id.

§ 13906(a)(1); see also 49 C.F.R. § 387.1 (explaining

that motor carrier insurance requirements are

designed to “create additional incentives to motor

carriers to maintain and operate their vehicles in a

safe manner”).

Federal law also empowers the Department to

inspect vehicles, 49 U.S.C. § 31142, investigate

violations of Department regulations, id. § 31143, and

determine the safety fitness of vehicle operators, id.

§ 31144; see also id. §§ 502, 504(c)(1)-(2), 506(a). The

Department has delegated its authority to

FMCSA, 49 C.F.R. § 1.87, whose “primary mission

is to prevent commercial motor vehicle-related

fatalities and injuries.”

FMCSA, About Us,

https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/mission/about-us

(last

updated Dec. 12, 2013).

To that end, FMCSA regulation imposes a range of

nationwide safety-related standards on motor

15

carriers and their drivers. These include standards

for commercial motor vehicle drivers’ licenses, which

determine when an “employer”—i.e., a motor

carrier—may allow a driver to operate a commercial

motor vehicle.

49 C.F.R. §§ 383.1, 383.37,

383.51(a)(2), 383.53(b)(2). To obtain a license to haul

a tractor-trailer (a Class A vehicle), drivers must

complete training, pass a knowledge and skills test,

obtain a commercial learner’s permit, undergo a

medical examination, and more. Id. §§ 380.609,

383.23, 383.25, 383.71. The regulations also specify

minimum insurance requirements that motor

carriers must obtain, id. § 387.7, and hours-of-service

restrictions, providing the maximum time a driver

may be on the road, id. § 395.1.

The regulations also govern virtually all aspects of

how motor carriers and drivers operate their vehicles,

including:

• Restrictions on operating, or permitting drivers

to operate, vehicles when the driver is fatigued,

ill, or under the influence of drugs, and

mandatory

out-of-service

requirements

relating to drivers who drive while abusing

alcohol, id. §§ 392.3-392.5;

• A prohibition on motor carriers scheduling

runs between points that would require

operating the commercial motor vehicle above

the speed limit, id. § 392.6;

• Standards concerning inspections of motor

vehicle equipment to ensure that vehicles are

in “good working order,” have appropriate

emergency equipment, and that cargo is

adequately secured, id. §§ 392.7(b), 392.8,

392.9;

16

Detailed requirements as to where and how to

approach railroad crossings, id. § 392.10, and

how to engage in emergency stops, id. § 392.22;

and

• Prohibitions on texting or using a hand-held

phone while driving, id. §§ 392.80, 392.82.

As one piece of the federal scheme, FMCSA uses a

rating system, called “BASICs,” to “identify motor

carriers with safety performance problems to

prioritize them for interventions, such as warning

letters or investigations.”

FMCSA, Compliance

+

Safety

+

Accountability

(Aug.

2014),

https://csa.fmcsa.dot.gov/Documents/Safety_Ratings_

Factsheet_GRS_M.pdf. FMCSA’s program uses data

that is updated monthly and relates to unsafe driving,

crash indicators, hours-of-service compliance, vehicle

maintenance, controlled substances, hazardous

materials compliance, and driver fitness. Id.

As to shippers and brokers, federal law imposes

more limited requirements commensurate with their

upstream role. Unlike motor carriers, who must carry

liability insurance for death and bodily injury,

brokers must carry security to cover claims for their

“failure to pay freight charges under [their] contracts,

agreements, or arrangements for transportation.” 49

U.S.C. § 13906(b)(2)(A).5

Brokers are subject to registration requirements,

id. §§ 13901, 13904, and, as with motor carriers, the

Department may revoke a broker’s registration for

“willful failure to comply” with applicable laws and

•

5

As respondents note, these differing insurance

requirements confirm that Congress did not expect brokers to be

financially responsible for motor-vehicle crashes. Resp. Br. 3941.

17

regulations or with any “condition of its registration,”

id. § 13905(d)(2).

Importantly, federal law makes clear that brokers

(and shippers) are authorized to contract only with

licensed motor carriers. See, e.g., id. §§ 13901, 13902

(only registered motor carriers may provide

transportation); 49 C.F.R. § 371.2 (defining “[b]roker”

as “a person who, for compensation, arranges, or

offers to arrange, the transportation of property by an

authorized motor carrier” (emphasis added)); id.

§ 371.3 (requiring that brokers keep records including

“the registration number of the carrier”). That

reflects Congress’s understanding that the federal

government—not brokers—is chiefly responsible for

deciding which motor carriers should be on the road.

Additionally, the Department must ensure that

“shipper[s]” and “transportation intermediar[ies]”

(like brokers) do not “coerce[]” any operator of a

commercial motor vehicle to operate in violation of the

regulations. 49 U.S.C. § 31136(a)(5). Shippers and

brokers may not threaten “to withhold business,

employment or work opportunities from, or to take or

permit any adverse employment action against, a

driver in order to induce the driver to operate a

commercial motor vehicle under conditions” that

would violate federal safety regulations. 49 C.F.R.

§ 390.5.

Congress has also provided the Department with

authority to “obtain” from “brokers . . . information

the [Department] decides is necessary.” 49 U.S.C.

§ 13301(b).

Pursuant to this authority, federal

regulations require that brokers “keep a record of

each transaction” with a motor carrier, 49 C.F.R.

§ 371.3; and provide that they must not “represent

[their] operations to be that of a carrier” or “perform

18

any brokerage service . . . in any name other than that

in which its registration is issued,” id. § 371.7. These

more limited requirements as to brokers reflect the

judgment that motor carriers and their drivers are

the appropriate subjects of safety regulatory

authority.

The Department thus has the tools and authority

to robustly regulate motor carrier safety. Compliance

with federal requirements is not optional—Congress

provided for significant penalties and other remedies.

See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 521(b) (civil and criminal

penalties); id. § 13905(d) (suspension and revocation

of registration); id. § 14910 (general civil penalty).

And the Department uses those tools, conducting tens

of thousands of inspections and resolving thousands

of enforcement actions against carriers each year.6

2. The FAAAA also allows states to enforce safety

regulations concerning motor vehicles pursuant to the

saving clause. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A); see also id.

§ 31141(a) (allowing concurrent state regulation,

subject to Department of Transportation approval);

49 C.F.R. § 392.2.

Many states have expressly adopted the federal

regulations concerning motor vehicles and motor

carriers.7 By doing so, states can supplement federal

See

FMCSA,

Roadside

Inspection

Activity,

https://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/EnforcementPrograms/Inspections (last

visited

Jan.

18,

2026);

FMCSA,

Summary

of

Closed

Enforcement

Cases,

https://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/

EnforcementPrograms/EnforcementCases/Summary (last

visited Jan. 18, 2026).

7

See, e.g., State v. Beaver, 385 P.3d 956, 959 (Mont. 2016)

(explaining that Montana law requires compliance “with federal

motor carrier safety . . . regulations”); People v. Blackorby, 586

N.E.2d 1231, 1233 (Ill. 1992) (explaining that the Illinois

6

19

enforcement authority, further ensuring that carriers

comply with safety regulations. See, e.g., State v.

Beaver, 385 P.3d 956, 959 (Mont. 2016) (explaining

that the Montana Department of Transportation

and Montana Highway Patrol can enforce

safety standards); see also FMCSA, Traffic

Enforcement

Activity,

https://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/

EnforcementPrograms/TrafficEnforcements

(last

visited Jan. 20, 2026) (showing that states conduct

over half a million traffic enforcement inspections

each year).

In addition to these regulations, state common-law

tort regimes remain applicable for claims directly

against motor carriers. Unlike negligent-selection

claims against brokers or shippers, negligence claims

against motor carriers pertain to the operation of

“motor vehicles” themselves and thus fall within the

FAAAA’s safety clause. Those claims provide an

additional layer of safety regulation, incentivizing

motor carriers to prioritize the safety of their drivers

and vehicles.

3. Existing law thus ensures robust protections for

road safety. Of course, there are surely ways to

improve the existing regime. But finetuning the

scheme is a job for Congress, FMCSA, and states

operating within their FAAAA-approved sphere of

authority—not this Court. Petitioner’s amici, for

example, raise questions about the level of liability

insurance required for motor carriers. See, e.g.,

Institute for Safer Trucking Amicus Curiae Br. 12-14.

General Assembly “adopt[ed] . . . the Federal motor carrier

safety regulations into the Illinois motor carrier safety

regulations of the Illinois Vehicle Code”); Cal. Veh. Code § 34520

(incorporating federal regulations for motor carrier safety).

20

That is an issue best addressed by direct legislative

reform, which would apply uniformly to all motor

carriers.

Congress has been—and continues to be—attuned

to developments in the industry. As noted, Congress

has enacted at least four different statutes in recent

decades refining the federal scheme that governs the

trucking industry. Supra 12-13. And Congress is also

actively considering new legislation. For example,

Representative John Moolenaar recently introduced a

bill that would impose on freight brokers a civil

penalty for contracting with motor carriers with poor

safety records. See Patrick and Barbara Kowalski

Freight Brokers Safety Act, H.R. 6884, 119th Cong.

(2025). Whether or not it ultimately becomes law, the

bill reflects Congress’s careful attention to trucking

industry safety and confirms that there are ample

alternatives to ensure road safety beyond state tort

suits against brokers and shippers.

*

*

*

Congress struck a careful balance in enacting the

FAAAA. Its preemption regime allows ample space

for appropriate federal and state safety regulation,

without imposing negligent-selection liability on

upstream brokers and shippers. This Court should

respect that balance and affirm the judgment below.

21

CONCLUSION

This Court should affirm.

Respectfully submitted,

BEN HARRIS

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

1271 Avenue of the

Americas

New York, NY 10020

January 21, 2026

ROMAN MARTINEZ

Counsel of Record

MARGARET A. UPSHAW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

555 Eleventh Street, NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 637-2207

roman.martinez@lw.com