Amicus Curiae Brief — Shawn Montgomery, Petitioner v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al.

No. 24-1238

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

-----------------------------------------------------------SHAWN MONTGOMERY,

v.

Petitioner,

CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC, YOSNIEL VARELA-MOJENA,

C.H. ROBINSON WORLDWIDE, INC.,

C.H. ROBINSON COMPANY, C.H. ROBINSON COMPANY, INC.,

C.H. ROBINSON INTERNATIONAL, INC., and

CARIBE TRANSPORT, LLC,

Respondents.

-----------------------------------------------------------On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

-----------------------------------------------------------BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE THE NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

-----------------------------------------------------------ERICA KLENICKI

JAMES H. BURNLEY IV

CAROLINE MCAULIFFE

RONALD M. JACOBS

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

Counsel of Record

OF MANUFACTURERS

MEGAN BARBERO

733 10th Street, N.W.

CHRISTOPHER L. BOONE

ELIZABETH M. WILSON

Suite 700

VENABLE LLP

Washington, D.C. 20001

600 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.

Counsel for National

Washington, D.C. 20001

Association of

(202) 344-8215

Manufacturers

RMJacobs@venable.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Interest of the Amicus Curiae .................................... 1

Introduction and Summary of Argument .................. 2

Argument .................................................................... 4

I. Allowing State Law Negligent-Selection

Claims

Against

Brokers

Would

Undermine A Linchpin Of Freight

Transportation And Disrupt Commerce. ........ 4

A. Brokers Play A Critical Role In Freight

Transportation, Which Is Essential To

Commerce.................................................... 5

B. Congress Prevented Brokers From

Being Governed By A Patchwork Of

State Tort Law, Which Would Harm

Every Step Of The Supply Chain. ............ 10

II. Existing Comprehensive Federal and

State Regulation, Not Broker Tort

Liability, Ensures Roadway Safety. .............. 16

A. Freight Transportation Is Governed by

a

Comprehensive

Regulatory

Framework of Federal and State Law. .... 16

B. Brokers Lack Reliable Means to

Evaluate Carrier Safety, and a

Negligence Standard is Unworkable. ...... 19

Conclusion ................................................................. 22

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Creagan v. Wal-Mart Transp., LLC, 354 F. Supp. 3d

808 (N.D. Ohio 2018). ............................................ 15

Kaipust v. Echo Global Logistics, Inc., 2025 IL App

(1st) 240530, 271 N.E. 3d 1066. ............................ 12

Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d

1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 2020) .............................. 12, 13

Montgomery v. Caribe Transp. II, LLC, 124 F.4th

1053 (7th Cir. 2025) .............................................. 19

Moseley v. Big’s Trucking, No. 2:23-CV-683-ECM,

2025 WL 1186868 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 23, 2025) ....... 15

Ye v. GlobalTranz Enters., Inc., 74 F.4th 453 (7th

Cir. 2023) ............................................................... 13

Statutes

49 U.S.C. § 13102(2) ................................................... 6

49 U.S.C. § 13902 ...................................................... 16

49 U.S.C. § 13904(d) ............................................. 6, 11

49 U.S.C. § 13904(d)(1) ............................................... 6

49 U.S.C. § 13906(a) ................................................. 18

49 U.S.C. § 13906(b) ................................................. 18

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) ......................................... 2, 10

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A) .................................... 2, 11

49 U.S.C. § 31102 ...................................................... 17

iii

49 U.S.C. § 31102(c)(1) ............................................. 13

49 U.S.C. § 31136(a) ................................................. 16

49 U.S.C. § 31144 ...................................................... 16

Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act,

Pub. L. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1312 (2015) .................. 21

Pub. L. No. 103-305, § 601(a)(1), 108 Stat. 1569, 1605

(1994) ..................................................................... 10

Regulations & Administrative Materials

49 C.F.R. § 350.303(b)-(d) ......................................... 17

49 C.F.R. § 371.2 ......................................................... 7

49 C.F.R. § 385.11 ..................................................... 20

49 C.F.R. § 393.24 ..................................................... 17

49 C.F.R. § 393.52 ..................................................... 17

49 C.F.R. § 393.60 ..................................................... 17

49 C.F.R. § 395 .......................................................... 17

49 C.F.R. pt. 350 ....................................................... 13

49 C.F.R. pts. 300–399 ........................................ 13, 17

49 C.F.R. pts. 390–399 .............................................. 16

Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and

Request for Comments, 88 Fed. Reg. 59489, 59492

(2023). .................................................................... 20

Nevada Admin. Code § 706.2472 ............................. 17

iv

Other Authorities

Abby Jenkins, What is Dropshipping & How Does it

Work?, NetSuite (Apr. 20, 2025),

https://www.netsuite.com/portal/resource/

articles/inventorymanagement/dropshipping.shtml........................... 8

About the Alliance, Commercial Vehicle Safety

Alliance, https://www.cvsa.org/about-cvsa/aboutthe-alliance/ ........................................................... 18

As Part of DOT’s Push to Bring Traffic Deaths to

Zero, Biden-Harris Administration Sends Every

State Funding for Commercial Motor Vehicle

Safety, Federal Motor Carrier Safety

Administration (June 3, 2024),

https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/newsroom/part-dotspush-bring-traffic-deaths-zero-biden-harrisadministration-sends-every-state. ........................ 17

Chris Eudy, The When, How, Where, and What of

Produce Season, Transport Topics (Mar. 25, 2024),

https://www.ttnews.com/articles/when-how-whereand-what-produce-season. ...................................... 7

CVSA’s 2021 Out-of-Service Criteria Now in Effect,

Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance

(Apr. 1, 2021) ......................................................... 18

Economics & Industry Data, Am. Trucking Ass’ns,

https://www.trucking.org/economics-and-industrydata ................................................................ 5, 6, 13

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, What

Are the Definitions of Motor Carrier, Broker and

Freight Forwarder Authorities? (May 22, 2023),

https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/faq/what-aredefinitions-motor-carrier-broker-and-freightforwarder-authorities. ............................................. 7

FedEx, What is Drop Shipping: A comprehensive

guide for entrepreneurs, https://www.fedex.com/en-

v

us/small-business/articles-insights/what-is-dropshipping.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2026). ............. 8

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-677 (1994). ........................ 10

Jeff Berman, Logistics Management, 2024 Digital

Freight Matching Roundtable: Evolving for a

Digitized Future (Nov. 1, 2024),

https://www.logisticsmgmt.com/article/2024_digital

_freight_matching_roundtable_evolving_for_a_digi

tized_future. ............................................................ 9

Joe McDevitt, News and Analysis for Transportation

Industry Shippers, Translogistics (July 30, 2024),

https://www.translogisticsinc.com/blog/news-andanalysis-for-transportation-industry-shippers. ..... 7

John Kingston, TIA Warns: TQL-linked Broker

Liability Case Threatens Industry, FreightWaves

(Sept. 15, 2025), https://www.freightwaves.com/

news/tia-warns-tql-linked-broker-liability-casethreatens-industry. ............................................... 14

Maggie Isaacson & Hannah Rubinton, Shipping

Prices and Import Price Inflation, 105 Fed. Rsrv.

Bank St. Louis Rev. 89, 90 (2023) ........................ 15

Motor Carrier Safety Planner, Federal Motor Carrier

Safety Administration, ch. 3, § 3.2,

https://csa.fmcsa.dot.gov/

safetyplanner/MyFiles/Sections.aspx?ch=20&sec=5

4 ............................................................................. 20

Moving Goods in the United States, U.S. Dep’t of

Transp., Bureau of Transp. Stats.,

https://data.bts.gov/stories/s/Moving-Goods-in-theUnited-States/bcyt-rqmu. ....................................... 6

N.Y.C. Dep’t of Transp., Deliveries in New York City,

https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/motorist/deliver

ies.shtml. ................................................................. 8

vi

NAM, Facts About Manufacturing,

https://nam.org/mfgdata/facts-aboutmanufacturing-expanded/ ....................................... 1

Notice, Safety Measurement System, Federal Motor

Carrier Safety Administration,

https://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/SMS ................................ 21

Owner-Operator Survey 2024, Owner-Operator

Independent Drivers Association Foundation, Inc.,

https://www.ooida.com/wpcontent/uploads/2024/12/2024-OOMP-SurveyReport.pdf. ............................................................... 5

Precedence Research, Freight Brokerage Market Size,

Share and Trends 2025 to 2034, Report Code 5939

(Apr. 16, 2025),

https://www.precedenceresearch.com/freightbrokerage-market. ................................................... 8

Reuters, C.H. Robinson’s Shares Hit Record High,

Defying Freight Slump with AI-driven Gains (Oct.

30, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/business/chrobinsons-shares-hit-record-high-defying-freightslump-with-ai-driven-gains-2025-10-30/. ............... 9

Tank Transport, Top 5 Breakthroughs in AI in

Freight Brokerage [2025 Update] (June 25, 2025),

https://tanktransport.com/2025/06/ai-in-freightbrokerage/. ............................................................... 9

Todd Dills, Risk & Reward: How CSA’s Data Shows

Discrimination Toward Small Carriers, Com.

Carrier J. (Aug. 6, 2013),

https://www.ccjdigital.com/business/article/149271

94/risk-reward-how-csas-data-showsdiscrimination-toward-small-carriers. ................. 14

Transp. Intermediaries Ass’n, About Us,

https://tianet.org/TIA/TIAnetOrg/About/AboutUs.aspx. ................................................................... 7

vii

U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Alternative Fuels Data Ctr.,

Freight & Last-Mile Delivery,

https://afdc.energy.gov/conserve/freight. ................ 8

U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Transp. Stats.,

Transportation Statistics Annual Report 2025, 3233 (Dec. 2025),

https://www.bts.gov/sites/bts.dot.gov/files/202512/BTS_TSAR-2025_Annual-Report_123125.pdf. . 5

U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Fed. Highway Admin., FHWAHOP-16-057, Freight Intermodal Connectors Study

43 (2017),

https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/fhwahop1605

7/fhwahop16057.pdf ................................................ 6

U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Supply Chain Assessment of

the Transportation Industrial Base: Freight and

Logistics vii–xi (Feb. 2022). .................................. 15

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-25-107334, Air

Cargo: DOT Should Communicate Data

Limitations and Identify Stakeholder Challenges

(2025) ....................................................................... 6

U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Make Onshoring Great

Again Portal, https://www.sba.gov/onshoring ........ 9

U.S. Small Bus. Admin., SBA Announces Made in

America Manufacturing Initiative (Mar. 10, 2025),

https://www.sba.gov/article/2025/03/10/sbaannounces-made-america-manufacturinginitiative. ............................................................... 10

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE 1

The National Association of Manufacturers

(“NAM”) represents companies engaged in every stage

of the supply chain, from sourcing raw materials to

manufacturing finished goods that are then shipped

to retailers and consumers. The NAM is the largest

manufacturing association in the United States,

representing 14,000 member companies, including

small and large manufacturers in every industrial

sector and all 50 states.

Manufacturing employs nearly 13 million people,

contributes $2.9 trillion to the U.S. economy annually,

has the largest economic impact of any major sector,

and accounts for more than half of all private-sector

research and development in the nation. 2 The NAM is

the voice of the manufacturing community and the

leading advocate for a policy agenda that helps

manufacturers compete in the global economy and

create jobs across the United States.

The NAM’s members depend on commercial

trucking to move goods nationwide and frequently

rely on freight brokers to arrange that transportation.

Accordingly, the NAM submits this brief to urge the

Court to clarify that negligent-selection suits against

brokers are preempted by federal law. The NAM is

concerned that the imposition of tort liability on

1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in

part, and no person other than amicus curiae, its members, or its

counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund the

preparation or submission of this brief.

NAM,

Facts

About

Manufacturing,

https://nam.org/mfgdata/facts-about-manufacturing-expanded/

(last visited Jan. 15, 2026).

2

2

freight brokers and shippers would undermine the

regulatory scheme established by Congress and

increase the difficulty and cost of doing business,

without providing any meaningful improvement to

highway safety.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In the Federal Aviation Administration

Authorization Act (“FAAAA”), Congress expressly

preempted state laws “related to” a freight broker’s

price, route, or service “with respect to the

transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).

The plain language of that broad preemption applies

to the freight broker services at issue here. And the

statute’s safety exception for state regulatory

authority “with respect to motor vehicles,” id.

§ 14501(c)(2)(A), which focuses on motor vehicles—not

brokers—does not preserve negligent-selection claims

against brokers. Allowing such suits against brokers

to proceed, as Petitioner urges this Court to do, would

permit exactly the kind of state-by-state regulation

that Congress sought to preclude. It would let state

tort law regulate broker services through after-thefact liability, driving up costs and injecting

uncertainty into interstate supply chains. The NAM

agrees with Respondents’ thorough treatment of the

statutory interpretation issues and submits this brief

to highlight two significant policy ramifications of

allowing state tort liability against brokers here.

First, the stakes of this Court’s decision extend far

beyond freight brokers. The efficient transportation of

goods by truck is critical to nearly every segment of

the American economy. Manufacturers rely on timely

3

truck deliveries for raw materials and components.

Retailers depend on trucks to stock shelves,

warehouses, and distribution centers. Increasingly,

consumers expect rapid delivery of goods directly to

their homes, often through direct-to-consumer

methods that leave little margin for delays or

inefficiencies. When freight brokerage becomes more

expensive or legally risky, those costs predictably

cascade through the economy, affecting all these

stakeholders. This is exactly the mischief Congress

sought to avoid when it preempted state authority

over brokers. And if freight brokers are driven out of

key markets or forced to scale back, that will put

added pressure on shippers—the manufacturers,

retailers, and distributors whose expertise lies in

production and commerce, not motor vehicle safety.

Congress never intended to saddle shippers with that

burden, and doing so would introduce costs and legal

uncertainty across our nation’s supply chains.

Second, tort liability for brokers and shippers

would not improve highway safety. Congress

constructed a comprehensive regulatory framework

governing motor carriers. That system, which involves

a careful partnership between federal and state

authorities, all using a comprehensive and uniform

set of standards, establishes and maintains safe

roadways. Brokers and shippers, on the other hand,

do not operate trucks, supervise drivers, or control

equipment. And they have no reliable, effective way to

determine the safety of the carriers they hire across

the market. Imposing state-law tort liability would

not enhance safety but would instead invite jury-made

standards that do not track federal motor carrier

safety determinations. That, in turn, may lead

brokers to avoid smaller or newer carriers in favor of

4

large incumbents with longer track records,

regardless of actual risk. This shift would reduce

competition, raise freight costs, and slow deliveries at

a time when modern commerce depends on logistics

supporting rapid delivery. Consumers would face

delays and higher prices, and just-in-time inventory

systems would suffer, with no discernible safety

benefit.

The Seventh Circuit’s interpretation preserves

Congress’s careful balance of uniform national rules

and federal oversight, robust road safety, and an

efficient freight system that keeps commerce moving.

This Court should affirm the decision below and

restore the consistency Congress intended for the

regulation of freight brokerage nationwide.

ARGUMENT

I.

Allowing State Law Negligent-Selection

Claims Against Brokers Would Undermine

A Linchpin Of Freight Transportation And

Disrupt Commerce.

Freight brokers play a critical role in the massive

logistical operation that is the American freight

transportation system: they arrange transportation

by matching shipper demand with carrier capacity

across a highly fragmented trucking industry.

Congress understood the distinct roles of brokers and

motor carriers in this system, and it built a federal

framework that assigns safety compliance duties to

motor

carriers—which

hire

drivers,

control

equipment, and operate on the highways. To hold

brokers liable for negligent selection of motor carriers

under every different state-law tort regime would

5

upend this federal framework. The result would be

less available capacity, higher transaction costs, and

slower interstate shipping.

A. Brokers Play A Critical Role In

Freight Transportation, Which Is

Essential To Commerce.

Brokers such as Respondent C.H. Robinson

provide transportation logistics services to facilitate

both short and long-range shipping of goods by truck.

In 2024, the U.S. freight transportation system moved

20 billion tons of goods, valued at $25 trillion. 3 A

diverse array of motor carriers, numbering more than

half a million nationwide, drives this massive

operation. 4 Carriers range widely in size and

specialty, from large national fleets to small local

businesses and single-owner operators. 5 But the vast

majority of motor carriers registered with the Federal

3 U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Transp. Stats.,

Transportation Statistics Annual Report 2025, 32-33 (Dec. 2025),

https://www.bts.gov/sites/bts.dot.gov/files/2025-12/BTS_TSAR2025_Annual-Report_123125.pdf. According to the Bureau of

Transportation Statistics, trucking continues to serve as the

principal mode of freight transportation, moving cargo valued at

more than $18 trillion, or 73 percent of the total value shipped,

during the same period. Id. at 33; see also Economics & Industry

Data, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, https://www.trucking.org/economicsand-industry-data (last visited Jan. 15, 2026) (“In 2024, the

nation’s domestic truck tonnage shipped was estimated at

11.27 billion tons of freight transported (primary shipments

only).”).

4 See Economics & Industry Data, supra note 3.

See Owner-Operator Survey 2024, Owner-Operator

Independent

Drivers

Association

Foundation,

Inc.,

https://www.ooida.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2024OOMP-Survey-Report.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2026).

5

6

Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”) are

smaller carriers, with 91.5% operating 10 or fewer

trucks. 6 These trucks are indispensable to every stage

of the supply chain: transporting raw materials,

delivering manufactured products to warehouses, and

ensuring goods reach consumers efficiently. 7 Even

shipments traveling by rail, air, or sea often begin or

end their journey by truck. 8

Because the U.S. trucking market is highly

fragmented, with many small carriers, it is

impractical for shippers to source and coordinate

shipping logistics without specialized intermediaries.

Brokers fill that gap: they act as expert

intermediaries, connecting shippers with motor

carriers based on routes, schedules, pricing, and other

logistical considerations. See 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2)

(defining “broker” as a “person, other than a motor

carrier” that “arrang[es] for[] transportation by motor

carrier for compensation”); id. § 13904(d)(1) (broker

6 Economics & Industry Data, supra note 3.

Moving Goods in the United States, U.S. Dep’t of

Transp.,

Bureau

of

Transp.

Stats.,

https://data.bts.gov/stories/s/Moving-Goods-in-the-UnitedStates/bcyt-rqmu (last visited Jan. 15, 2026) (“[T]rucks moved

more high-value, time-sensitive commodities than any other

mode in 2024.”).

7

8 See id.; U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Fed. Highway Admin.,

FHWA-HOP-16-057, Freight Intermodal Connectors Study 43

(2017),

https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/fhwahop16057/

fhwahop16057.pdf; U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-25107334, Air Cargo: DOT Should Communicate Data Limitations

and Identify Stakeholder Challenges (2025) (“Air cargo depends

on ground-based infrastructure such as warehouses and

roadways to operate efficiently.”).

7

registration). 9 Brokers bring expertise that allows

manufacturers and retailers to avoid costly,

burdensome internal logistics management, thereby

allowing goods to reach their destination in an

efficient and cost-effective manner. 10 Among other

logistical concerns, brokers’ services can be

indispensable for handling capacity and rate changes

with seasonal demand surges (such as during produce

season). 11

And the demand for freight brokers’ services

continues to climb. Freight brokers’ market

penetration increased from just 6% in the early 2000s

to over 20% by 2023. 12 This threefold increase reflects

9 See also 49 C.F.R. § 371.2 (defining “Broker”); Federal

Motor Carrier Safety Administration, What Are the Definitions

of Motor Carrier, Broker and Freight Forwarder Authorities?

(May 22, 2023), https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/faq/what-aredefinitions-motor-carrier-broker-and-freight-forwarderauthorities (explaining that “a broker is the ‘middle person’

between a shipper and a motor carrier” and that brokers

“arrange for the transportation of property or household goods”).

10

See Transp. Intermediaries Ass’n, About Us,

https://tianet.org/TIA/TIAnetOrg/About/About-Us.aspx

(last

visited Jan. 15, 2026) (explaining that transportation

intermediaries and third-party logistics companies “act as the

facilitators to arrange the efficient and economical movement of

goods” and “bring[] together the transportation needs” of

shippers with carrier capacity).

Chris Eudy, The When, How, Where, and What of

Produce Season, Transport Topics (Mar. 25, 2024),

https://www.ttnews.com/articles/when-how-where-and-whatproduce-season (explaining challenges for managing capacity

and price uncertainty during produce season).

11

12 Joe McDevitt, News and Analysis for Transportation

Industry

Shippers,

Translogistics

(July

30,

2024),

https://www.translogisticsinc.com/blog/news-and-analysis-fortransportation-industry-shippers.

8

the shipping industry’s growing dependence on

brokers to navigate carrier networks and secure

capacity efficiently. Indeed, the U.S. freight brokerage

market was valued at $12.67 billion in 2024, and one

market analysis estimates it will nearly double in

value to $23.32 billion by 2034. 13

Retail practices such as “drop-shipping,” which

rely heavily on ground freight and trucking networks,

have contributed to this growth. Under this

increasingly popular business model, retailers hold

little or no inventory, relying instead on rapid and

reliable truck transportation to deliver products

directly from manufacturers or wholesalers to end

customers. 14 Drop-shipping depends on reliable truckbased last-mile delivery, meaning disruptions in the

logistics chain can impair sellers’ ability to ship

directly from suppliers and narrow the product

inventory available to consumers. 15

13 Precedence Research, Freight Brokerage Market Size,

Share and Trends 2025 to 2034, Report Code 5939 (Apr. 16,

2025), https://www.precedenceresearch.com/freight-brokeragemarket.

14 Abby Jenkins, What is Dropshipping & How Does it

Work?,

NetSuite

(Apr.

20,

2025),

https://www.netsuite.com/portal/resource/articles/inventorymanagement/dropshipping.shtml; FedEx, What is Drop

Shipping: A comprehensive guide for entrepreneurs,

https://www.fedex.com/en-us/small-business/articlesinsights/what-is-drop-shipping.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2026).

15 See generally U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Alternative Fuels

Data

Ctr.,

Freight

&

Last-Mile

Delivery,

https://afdc.energy.gov/conserve/freight (last visited Jan. 15,

2026); N.Y.C. Dep’t of Transp., Deliveries in New York City,

https://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/motorist/deliveries.shtml

(last visited Jan. 15, 2026) (“Close to 90% of NYC’s goods are

moved into and around the city by truck.”).

9

Technological advancements have made brokers

more efficient and increased demand for their

services. C.H. Robinson “has been using artificial

intelligence to automate tasks such as generating

shipping quotes, scheduling pickups and deliveries

and tracking shipments.” 16 Those technological

changes have “helped speed up its operations.” 17

Today’s freight brokers increasingly rely on these

digital tools, from AI-based analytics to load-matching

platforms, to enhance their services. 18 Brokers have

adopted algorithms and online load boards to match

loads with carrier capacity in real time, provide

instant freight quotes, and track shipments

digitally. 19 Such innovations have made brokers more

responsive, more precise, and more deeply embedded

in modern supply chains.

As policymakers continue to encourage domestic

manufacturing, the need for efficient freight

transportation will continue to grow. 20 Consistent

Reuters, C.H. Robinson’s Shares Hit Record High,

Defying Freight Slump with AI-driven Gains (Oct. 30, 2025),

https://www.reuters.com/business/ch-robinsons-shares-hitrecord-high-defying-freight-slump-with-ai-driven-gains-202510-30/.

16

17 Id.

18 Jeff Berman, Logistics Management, 2024 Digital

Freight Matching Roundtable: Evolving for a Digitized Future

(Nov.

1,

2024),

https://www.logisticsmgmt.com/article/

2024_digital_freight_matching_roundtable_evolving_for_a_digit

ized_future.

19 Tank Transport, Top 5 Breakthroughs in AI in Freight

Brokerage

[2025

Update]

(June

25,

2025),

https://tanktransport.com/2025/06/ai-in-freight-brokerage/.

See, e.g., U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Make Onshoring

Great Again Portal, https://www.sba.gov/onshoring (last visited

Jan. 15, 2026).

20

10

with that objective, the federal government has

adopted policies aimed at expanding U.S.-based

production capacity and reducing reliance on foreign

supply chains. 21 As the economy grows more

dependent on domestic transport, freight brokers’

expertise in stitching together capacity from

thousands of U.S. trucking carriers will be

indispensable.

B. Congress Prevented Brokers From

Being Governed By A Patchwork Of

State Tort Law, Which Would Harm

Every Step Of The Supply Chain.

In enacting the FAAAA, Congress expressly

preempted state law regulation of the price, route, or

service of brokers and motor carriers because “the

regulation of intrastate transportation of property”

had “imposed an unreasonable burden on interstate

commerce,” “impeded the free flow of trade, traffic,

and transportation of interstate commerce,” and

“placed an unreasonable cost on the American

consumers.” Pub. L. No. 103-305, § 601(a)(1), 108 Stat.

1569, 1605 (1994). Congress thus preempted “[s]tate

economic regulation of motor carrier operations,”

because it had caused “significant inefficiencies,

increased costs,” and led to the “reduction of

competition, [and] inhibition of innovation.” H.R.

Conf. Rep. No. 103-677, at 87 (1994). These

Congressional objectives are reflected in Section

14501(c)(1)’s broad preemption provision, which

displaces state regulation of brokers’ services.

U.S. Small Bus. Admin., SBA Announces Made in

America

Manufacturing

Initiative

(Mar.

10,

2025),

https://www.sba.gov/article/2025/03/10/sba-announces-madeamerica-manufacturing-initiative.

21

11

Congress carved out of this preemption provision

“the safety regulatory authority of a State with

respect to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A).

As discussed below, Congress embraced a system

where federal and state authorities work together to

ensure motor carrier safety. But this exception for

safety regulation relating to motor vehicles does not

apply to brokers, which—unless separately registered

as a motor carrier, 49 U.S.C. § 13904(d)—do not

operate motor vehicles, hire drivers, or transport

property. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-677, at 84

(noting “that States . . . may . . . attempt to regulate

intrastate trucking markets through its unaffected

authority to regulate matters such as safety” and

cautioning that the “conferees do not intend for

States” to do so).

Both brokers and motor carriers play important

roles in the shipping ecosystem, but their functions

are statutorily and practically distinct. Once brokers

connect shippers with motor carriers, they remain

engaged in logistical coordination. But they lack both

the authority and the practical ability to monitor

motor carriers. Freight brokers neither own nor

operate the trucks they arrange; they do not employ

the drivers or directly oversee carrier operations. And

brokers typically have no contractual or legal right to

dictate who a carrier hires, how it trains drivers, or

how it administers its employment policies. Given the

scale of brokers’ operations—determining capacity of

thousands of carriers to match them with shippers—

continuous monitoring of carriers’ compliance with

existing safety regulations is infeasible. Tort liability

against brokers would thus create an untenable

burden on brokers ill-equipped to assume this

regulatory role. Moreover, it would impose that

12

obligation across many different jurisdictions, even

though the brokers do not control motor carrier or

driver decisions about which routes, through which

states, to use.

This risk is not hypothetical. As an initial matter,

not every negligent-selection suit will be litigated in

federal court. For example, a broker could be sued in

Illinois state court after an out-of-state load and

accident; and if the broker is incorporated in Illinois,

it may be unable to remove. See Kaipust v. Echo

Global Logistics, Inc., 2025 IL App (1st) 240530, 271

N.E. 3d 1066. This means brokers could be subject to

divergent state-law approaches and held liable based

on varying state tort law. And even where a broker

can remove to federal court or is sued there, it may

lack the ability to control—or even anticipate—what

substantive state law standards will apply. For

example, the same broker located in Illinois may

arrange for a motor carrier and driver to transport

goods. But the motor carrier and the driver may

decide to take a route through a particular state

without input from the broker. If an accident occurs in

that state, the broker could find itself defending a suit

in an unexpected jurisdiction under state tort law it

could not have anticipated would apply. Cf. Miller v.

C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d 1016, 1020

(9th Cir. 2020) (plaintiff sued C.H. Robinson in district

court in Nevada following a motor vehicle crash in the

state).

Given the central importance of trucking to the

national economy, the threat of tort liability against

brokers and shippers for negligent selection of motor

carriers and drivers poses a significant risk to the

efficient movement of goods across state lines. See Ye

13

v. GlobalTranz Enters., Inc., 74 F.4th 453, 459 (7th

Cir. 2023) (imposing state tort law duties of care on

brokers would cause brokers to “change how they

conduct their services—for instance, by incurring new

costs to evaluate motor carriers” and “hir[ing]

different motor carriers than they would have

otherwise hired without the state negligence

standards”). Indeed, allowing tort claims against

brokers will harm not just brokers, but also motor

carriers, shippers, manufacturers, retailers, and

ultimately, consumers, leading to increased costs and

decreased efficiency.

Motor Carriers: The trucking industry is vast

and varied, with nearly 580,000 active motor carriers,

ranging from large fleets operated by Fortune 500

companies to small businesses and individual owneroperators. 22 As discussed below, these motor carriers

are subject to a highly reticulated motor-carrier safety

framework, designed to ensure safe roadways. 23

Imposing a negligence standard on brokers, who

would then be forced to favor larger carriers with more

established safety records, could push smaller carriers

out of business, reducing market competition and

driving prices upward. See Miller v. C.H. Robinson

Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d 1016, 1032 (9th Cir. 2020)

22 Economics & Industry Data, supra note 3.

23 See infra Part II. Those standards are implemented

through the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, 49 C.F.R.

pts. 300-399, and enforced through a federal-state inspection and

investigation system. See 49 U.S.C. § 31102(c)(1) (conditioning

state safety-assistance funding on adoption and enforcement of

regulations “compatible” with federal motor-carrier safety rules);

see also 49 C.F.R. pt. 350 (motor-carrier safety programs include

driver and vehicle inspections, carrier investigations, and newentrant safety audits).

14

(Fernandez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part) (“It could even require brokers to effectively

eliminate some motor carriers from the transportation

market altogether.”). Moreover, larger carriers’ safety

data averages could mask individual driver and fleet

risks, providing a misleading sense of security and

further disadvantaging smaller carriers. 24

Shippers, Manufacturers and Retailers:

Shippers, including manufacturers and retailers, rely

on freight brokers to arrange cost-effective and

efficient transportation. Manufacturers depend on

brokers to source carriers for raw materials and

components. Retailers rely on them to manage

complex delivery logistics, often under just-in-time

systems or drop-shipping models that depend on

rapid, reliable transport.

If brokers face open-ended tort exposure for

carrier selection, some may withdraw from certain

markets or sharply limit their operations. 25 Shippers,

who lack regulatory tools and safety data, could be

forced to assume greater responsibility for evaluating

carrier safety, a task Congress never intended them to

bear. 26 Even those who continue using brokers will

24 See Todd Dills, Risk & Reward: How CSA’s Data Shows

Discrimination Toward Small Carriers, Com. Carrier J. (Aug. 6,

2013),

https://www.ccjdigital.com/business/article/14927194/

risk-reward-how-csas-data-shows-discrimination-toward-smallcarriers.

See John Kingston, TIA Warns: TQL-linked Broker

Liability Case Threatens Industry, FreightWaves (Sept. 15,

2025), https://www.freightwaves.com/news/tia-warns-tql-linkedbroker-liability-case-threatens-industry.

25

26 Indeed, plaintiffs have already sought to impose

negligent selection liability on shippers. See, e.g., Moseley v. Big’s

Trucking, No. 2:23-CV-683-ECM, 2025 WL 1186868, at *5 (M.D.

15

face indirect costs, as brokers pass along higher risk

premiums in the form of increased fees or more

restrictive carrier networks. The result will be higher

shipping costs, reduced access to competitive carriers,

and new legal risks for parties that have long relied

on brokers to navigate those complexities. These

burdens will raise prices and slow the movement of

goods at a moment when efficient domestic freight

transportation is more important than ever.

Consumers: Ultimately, consumers will bear the

brunt of higher shipping and brokerage costs, which

ripple through the economy, increasing prices for

everyday goods. 27 Higher costs and fewer

transportation options will also lead to delayed

deliveries,

negatively

impacting

consumer

satisfaction and placing strain on an already taxed

supply chain. Federal transportation officials have

observed that when supply chains are strained,

Americans face “higher prices and longer delays” as

logistics networks struggle to keep pace. 28

Ala. Apr. 23, 2025) (holding that the preemption clause of Section

14501(c)(1) applies “even if ABDC acted solely as a shipper”);

Creagan v. Wal-Mart Transp., LLC, 354 F. Supp. 3d 808, 813 n.6

(N.D. Ohio 2018) (“Although Wal-Mart is a shipper rather than

a broker, the negligent hiring claim against Wal-Mart . . .

indirectly attempts to regulate broker services, [and] must be

preempted as well.”).

27 See Maggie Isaacson & Hannah Rubinton, Shipping

Prices and Import Price Inflation, 105 Fed. Rsrv. Bank St. Louis

Rev. 89, 90 (2023) (finding that high shipping price increases

during the pandemic resulted in consumer-price inflation).

28 U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Supply Chain Assessment of the

Transportation Industrial Base: Freight and Logistics vii–xi

(Feb. 2022).

16

II.

Existing Comprehensive Federal and State

Regulation, Not Broker Tort Liability,

Ensures Roadway Safety.

Congress addressed roadway safety through

carrier-focused federal and state regulation of motor

carriers and drivers. 29 The responsibility for roadway

safety thus rests primarily and appropriately with the

entities directly responsible for the control and

operations of motor vehicles. Tort liability against

brokers is not only unnecessary given this federal and

state framework but also ineffective, creating an

untenable burden on brokers ill-equipped to assume

this regulatory role.

A. Freight Transportation Is Governed

by a Comprehensive Regulatory

Framework of Federal and State Law.

In designing the FAAAA, Congress recognized

both the vital role of trucking in the national economy

and the importance of keeping unsafe carriers off the

road. It created a system in which federal and state

governments work together to identify and address

safety risks in commercial transportation. Under this

partnership, federal and state authorities have

imposed rigorous safety standards designed

specifically to monitor and ensure safe motor carrier

operations. The Department of Transportation

(“DOT”) and the FMCSA administer a comprehensive

29 See 49 U.S.C. § 13902 (motor carrier registration); id.

§ 31144; (safety fitness requirements); id. § 31136(a) (requiring

Department of Transportation to prescribe “minimum safety

standards”); 49 C.F.R. pts. 390–399 (allocating operational safety

obligations to motor carriers and drivers under a carrier-focused

compliance framework).

17

regulatory framework, the Federal Motor Carrier

Safety Regulations (“FMCSR”), codified at 49 C.F.R.

pts. 300–399. These regulations meticulously govern

every safety aspect of commercial trucking, from

drivers’ hours-of-service limitations, 49 C.F.R. § 395,

to essential vehicle safety features such as brakes, id.

§ 393.52, lighting, id. § 393.24, and window integrity,

id. § 393.60.

These federal safety standards are integrated

with state law. Under the Motor Carrier Safety

Assistance Program, states agree to adopt and enforce

regulations on commercial vehicle safety that are

compatible with those of the federal government in

exchange for funding. See 49 U.S.C. § 31102. Every

state participates. 30 For instance, Nevada explicitly

incorporates numerous FMCSR provisions, including

drug and alcohol testing, commercial driver licensing,

vehicle inspections, hazardous materials transport,

and mandatory insurance coverage, directly into state

regulations. See Nevada Admin. Code § 706.2472.

Other states achieve the same effect through

analogous statutes and regulatory schemes. See 49

C.F.R. § 350.303(b)-(d) (setting forth state

responsibilities for ensuring compatibility and

conducting annual review).

This

ensures

coordinated

consistency

federal-state partnership

and

thoroughness

in

30 See As Part of DOT’s Push to Bring Traffic Deaths to

Zero, Biden-Harris Administration Sends Every State Funding

for Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety, Federal Motor Carrier

Safety

Administration

(June

3,

2024),

https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/newsroom/part-dots-push-bringtraffic-deaths-zero-biden-harris-administration-sends-everystate.

18

enforcement. Both state and federal inspectors

enforce these uniform safety standards, conducting

regular roadside inspections and promptly removing

unsafe

vehicles

or

drivers

from

service.

Complementing these efforts, the Commercial Vehicle

Safety Alliance (“CVSA”), a consortium of state,

territorial, and federal safety officials, establishes

uniform “Out-of-Service” criteria, ensuring consistent

nationwide enforcement and removing any vehicle or

driver that presents an imminent safety hazard. 31

This regulatory framework is robust and

comprehensive by design. It is specifically tailored to

address motor carrier safety at every level, from

meticulous vehicle maintenance to stringent driver

qualification standards.

Congress recognized this distinction between

brokers and motor carriers in crafting this safety

framework. Congress required, for example, that

brokers hold a surety bond or financial security to

satisfy claims arising from failure to pay contractual

freight charges, but did not require brokers to insure

against personal injury claims. Compare 49 U.S.C.

§ 13906(b) (broker bond/trust fund financial security),

with id. § 13906(a) (motor carrier financial

responsibility/insurance). Consistent with this

allocation of responsibility, the broker–carrier

agreement in this case specified that the carrier

“retained exclusive control over the manner of

performance of transportation services, as well as the

equipment and personnel it used to perform them.”

About the Alliance, Commercial Vehicle Safety

Alliance,

https://www.cvsa.org/about-cvsa/about-the-alliance/

(last visited Jan. 15, 2026); see also CVSA’s 2021 Out-of-Service

Criteria Now in Effect, Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (Apr.

1, 2021).

31

19

Montgomery v. Caribe Transp. II, LLC, 124 F.4th

1053, 1054 (7th Cir. 2025). Allowing common-law tort

claims against freight brokers for their choice of

carrier would undermine this Congressional design,

while adding nothing meaningful to these extensive

federal and state safety protections.

B. Brokers Lack Reliable Means to

Evaluate Carrier Safety, and a

Negligence Standard is Unworkable.

Motor carriers own and are responsible for

maintaining their trucks; they employ drivers and

ensure compliance with applicable safety standards;

and they control day-to-day operations. Motor carriers

have access to real-time information about their own

safety records, violations, and potential hazards—

information that freight brokers lack. Petitioner and

his amici point to the FMCSA’s “conditional” safety

rating of Caribe Transport as a reason C.H. Robinson

should have refused to hire Caribe as a motor carrier.

See Pet. Br. 11-12; see also Amici Br. of Truck Safety

Coalition, Parents Against Tired Truckers, and

Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways 16 (arguing

that FMSCA’s “safety data is available to brokers

when they make decisions about whether to bring a

carrier into their network or to hire them to move

freight”). But these rating systems are primarily

designed to help law enforcement, not to facilitate

outside investigation by brokers.

The primary federal safety evaluation system, the

FMCSA’s Compliance, Safety, Accountability (“CSA”)

program, is a law enforcement mechanism designed to

20

prioritize carriers for agency intervention. 32 The CSA

program was created to support law enforcement and

regulatory oversight, not to guide brokers or shippers

in carrier selection. The program consists of three

main components:

•

The Safety Measurement System (“SMS”),

which analyzes inspection and crash data to

identify carriers needing intervention;

•

A graduated intervention process, including

warnings, investigations, and potential out-ofservice orders; and

•

Safety Fitness Determinations, categorizing

carriers as “satisfactory,” “conditional,” or

“unsatisfactory,” with many carriers receiving

no rating at all. 49 C.F.R. § 385.11.

These ratings result from comprehensive onsite

investigations typically triggered by serious incidents

or problematic SMS scores. And they reach a very

small percentage of motor carriers. In 2019, FMCSA

and state partners inspected about 2% of registered

carriers. 33 Many carriers therefore operate without

any assigned safety rating, and even those with

“satisfactory” ratings may have outdated assessments

that no longer reflect current safety performance.

Thus, a “satisfactory” rating does not reliably indicate

a carrier’s comparative safety.

See Motor Carrier Safety Planner, Federal Motor

Carrier

Safety

Administration,

ch.

3,

§

3.2,

https://csa.fmcsa.dot.gov/safetyplanner/MyFiles/

Sections.aspx?ch=20&sec=54 (last visited Jan. 15, 2026).

32

33 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Request

for Comments, 88 Fed. Reg. 59489, 59492 (2023).

21

FMCSA itself cautions that its ratings are “not

based on relative comparison to other motor carriers,”

underscoring the system’s fundamental limitations

for comparative analysis. 34 And Congress recognized

the CSA program’s limitations in the 2015 Fixing

America’s Surface Transportation (“FAST”) Act,

mandating FMCSA to provide explicit warnings to

users of the CSA system. The required notice

underscores that conclusions about a carrier’s overall

safety should not be drawn merely from CSA data

unless FMCSA has explicitly labeled a carrier as

“unsatisfactory” and ordered it off the road. Fixing

America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, Pub. L.

114-94, 129 Stat. 1312 (2015).

Ultimately, Congress crafted an extensive

regulatory regime that places responsibility for road

safety precisely where it belongs—on motor carriers

and their drivers. Imposing a negligence standard on

brokers would be ineffective and costly, undermining

the efficiency and stability of our transportation

infrastructure with no discernible safety benefit.

*

*

*

*

*

Truck freight is a cornerstone of the American

economy. Freight brokers, though largely invisible to

the public, perform a vital function by connecting

shippers with motor carriers and keeping goods

moving efficiently. As logistical organizers who are

not well positioned to evaluate driver safety, brokers

rely on the safety regulatory agencies Congress set up

for that purpose. The Seventh Circuit’s decision

Notice, Safety Measurement System, Federal Motor

Carrier Safety Administration, https://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/SMS

(last visited Jan. 15, 2026).

34

22

preserves that role and maintains the clear federalstate framework Congress designed. Imposing

liability on brokers who lack the tools or authority to

evaluate carrier safety would not improve roadway

conditions. It would only inject uncertainty, raise

costs, and reduce access to freight services at a time

when supply chains are being restructured and

domestic freight logistics are more essential than

ever. The burden of that disruption would fall on

manufacturers, retailers, and consumers alike.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court should affirm

the decision below.

Respectfully submitted,

ERICA KLENICKI

CAROLINE MCAULIFFE

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

OF MANUFACTURERS

733 10th Street, N.W.

Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20001

Counsel for National

Association of

Manufacturers

January 2026

JAMES H. BURNLEY IV

RONALD M. JACOBS

Counsel of Record

MEGAN BARBERO

CHRISTOPHER L. BOONE

ELIZABETH M. WILSON

VENABLE LLP

600 Massachusetts Ave.,

N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 344-8215

RMJacobs@venable.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae