Amicus Curiae Brief — Shawn Montgomery, Petitioner v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al.

No. 24-1238

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

SHAWN MONTGOMERY,

Petitioner,

v.

CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC, YOSNIEL

VARELA-MOJENA, C.H. ROBINSON WORDWIDE, INC.,

C.H. ROBINSON COMPANY, C.H. ROBINSON COMPANY,

INC., C.H. ROBINSON INTERNATIONAL, INC., and

CARIBE TRANSPORT, LLC,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE ROBERT COX IN

SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

CHARLIE M. RITTGERS

W. MATTHEW NAKAJIMA

JUSTIN A. SANDERS

GUS J. LAZARES

RITTGERS & RITTGERS

12 East Warren Street

Lebanon, OH 45036

ADINA H. ROSENBAUM

Counsel of Record

ALLISON M. ZIEVE

PUBLIC CITIZEN

LITIGATION GROUP

1600 20th Street NW

Washington, DC 20009

(202) 588-1000

CHRISTOPHER T. SAUCEDO

arosenbaum@citizen.org

SAUCEDO, HARRIGAN, APODACA,

GRIESMEYER, APODACA PC

800 Lomas Blvd. NW, Suite 200

Albuquerque, NM 87102

Counsel for Amicus Curiae Robert Cox

December 2025

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................ 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 5

I.

The FAAAA’s safety exception applies to

personal injury claims against freight brokers

that arise out of the broker’s negligent hiring of

an unsafe motor carrier. ..................................... 5

II.

The Seventh Circuit’s decision is based on

flawed reasoning. ................................................ 7

III. C.H. Robinson’s additional arguments are

meritless. ........................................................... 17

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 22

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Pages

Bufkin v. Collins,

604 U.S. 369 (2025) ............................................. 19

Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines,

348 U.S. 61 (1954) ............................................... 20

City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker

Service, Inc.,

536 U.S. 424 (2002) ....................... 3, 4, 6, 7, 14, 17

Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc.,

142 F.4th 847 (6th Cir. 2025) ......... 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 10,

11, 12, 16, 19

Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey,

569 U.S. 251 (2013) ....................... 2, 6, 7, 8, 16, 20

Kaipust v. Echo Global Logistics, Inc.,

2025 WL 2374556

(Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 15, 2025) ................................ 11

Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp.,

565 U.S. 625 (2012) ........................................... 5, 6

Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc.,

586 U.S. 334 (2019) ............................................. 19

Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass’n,

552 U.S. 364 (2008) ................................. 17, 18, 21

Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc.,

74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023) ............... 3, 7, 8, 9, 10,

12, 13, 14, 15

Statutes

49 U.S.C. § 13102(16) ............................................... 12

49 U.S.C. § 14501(b)(1). ............................................ 13

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). .......................................... 1, 2

iii

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A) ............. 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12,

16, 17, 18, 20, 22

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(B) ........................................ 12

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(C) ........................................ 12

49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(4)(A) ........................................ 18

49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(4)(B)(i)..................................... 18

Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act,

Pub. L. No. 103-305, 108 Stat. 1569 (1994)

§ 601(a)(1)(A) ....................................................... 21

§ 601(a)(2) ............................................................ 20

§ 601(b)................................................................. 18

§ 601(c) ................................................................... 2

Other Authorities

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 411 ..................... 5, 6

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration,

2024 Pocket Guide to Large Truck and Bus

Statistics (2024) ................................................... 21

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1

Robert Cox is the respondent in Total Quality Logistics, LLC v. Cox, No. 25-145, in which a petition for

a writ of certiorari is currently pending before this

Court. Mr. Cox’s wife, Greta Cox, was killed in a motor

vehicle crash that resulted from a freight broker’s hiring of an unsafe motor carrier to transport goods from

Illinois to California. Mr. Cox filed suit against the

broker, both individually and as personal representative and special administrator of Greta’s estate,

alleging that the broker was negligent in selecting the

motor carrier to transport the load given the motor

carrier’s terrible safety record. The broker moved to

dismiss, arguing that Mr. Cox’s negligent-hiring claim

is preempted by an express preemption provision in

the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization

Act of 1994 (FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).

The Sixth Circuit held that Mr. Cox’s claim falls

within the scope of the FAAAA’s preemption provision, but that it is not preempted because it also falls

within the scope of the FAAAA’s safety exception,

which specifies that the preemption provision does

“not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State

with respect to motor vehicles.” Id. § 14501(c)(2)(A). In

response to the broker’s argument that Mr. Cox’s

claim was not “with respect to motor vehicles,” the

Sixth Circuit explained that “there is no way to disentangle motor vehicles from Mr. Cox’s substantive

claim.” Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc., 142 F.4th

______________________________________________________________________

1 This brief was not written in whole or in part by counsel for

a party. No one other than amicus curiae or his counsel made a

monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of the

brief.

2

847, 856 (6th Cir. 2025). “The crux of the alleged negligent conduct is that [the broker] failed to exercise

reasonable care in selecting a safe motor carrier to operate a motor vehicle on the highway, resulting in a

vehicular accident that killed Ms. Cox—allegations

that plainly ‘involve’ motor vehicles and motor vehicle

safety.” Id. (quoting Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v.

Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 262 (2013)).

The broker filed a petition for certiorari, presenting the question whether common-law negligenthiring claims against freight brokers fall within the

scope of the safety exception. See Pet., Total Quality

Logistics, No. 25-145, at i. Mr. Cox is filing this brief

because he expects the Court’s opinion in this case to

resolve that question. The brief explains that personal

injury and wrongful death (collectively, personal injury) claims against freight brokers that arise out of a

broker’s negligent hiring of an unsafe motor carrier

invoke the state’s safety regulatory authority respecting motor vehicles and therefore fall within the safety

exception’s scope.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In 1994, Congress enacted a provision regarding

the “preemption of state economic regulation of motor

carriers.” FAAAA, Pub. L. No. 103-305, § 601(c), 108

Stat. 1569, 1606 (1994). As later amended, that provision preempts state laws “related to a price, route, or

service of any motor carrier … or any motor private

carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to

the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C.

§ 14501(c)(1).

At the same time that it enacted the preemption

provision, Congress sought to “ensure that its preemption of States’ economic authority over motor carriers

3

of property” would “‘not restrict’ the preexisting and

traditional state police power over safety.” City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S.

424, 439 (2002) (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A)).

Accordingly, Congress also enacted a provision preserving “the safety regulatory authority of a State

with respect to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C.

§ 14501(c)(2)(A). This provision is generally referred

to as the safety exception.

Personal injury claims against freight brokers

based on the broker’s negligent hiring of an unsafe

motor carrier fall squarely within the scope of the

safety exception. The state-law requirement underlying such claims—the requirement to exercise

reasonable care to select a safe motor carrier to provide motor vehicle transportation—is part of the

state’s safety regulatory authority, and that safety authority concerns motor vehicles. Indeed, the purpose

of the state-law requirement is to protect the public

from the safety risks posed by dangerous motor vehicles. And the negligent conduct underlying such

claims is inextricably tied to motor vehicles and motor

vehicle safety.

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in this case rests on

an earlier holding in Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises,

Inc., 74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023). That decision, in

turn, rests on numerous irrelevant observations and

analytical mistakes. For example, Ye emphasizes that

the safety exception does not mention brokers. But the

safety exception does not mention any regulated

entities; its application is based on the nature of the

state-law requirement, not on the identity of the

regulated party. Moreover, Ye focuses on the

relationship between brokers and motor vehicles,

4

finding the relationship too “indirect” for claims

against brokers to fall within the safety exception.

But, under the plain language of the safety exception,

the relevant inquiry is into the relationship between

the state-law requirement and motor vehicles, not

between the regulated entity and motor vehicles.

Respondent C.H. Robinson’s additional arguments

fare no better.2 It is not true, for example, that the

phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” is superfluous

if the safety exception applies to claims against

brokers. To be part of the state’s “safety regulatory

authority,” a state law must be “genuinely responsive

to safety concerns.” Ours Garage, 536 U.S. at 442. The

addition of the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles”

clarifies that, to fall within the safety exception, the

state law must be genuinely responsive to safety

concerns respecting motor vehicles. And C.H.

Robinson’s focus on Congress’s deregulatory purpose

in enacting the FAAAA is misplaced. By enacting the

safety exception, Congress demonstrated that it

wanted to preserve state-law safety requirements

concerning motor vehicles. The state-law requirement

underlying personal injury claims against brokers

based on their negligent hiring of unsafe motor

carriers is precisely such a state-law safety

requirement.

Thousands of people are injured or killed in truck

crashes each year. Holding freight brokers

accountable when they hire motor carriers that they

know or should know will place dangerous trucks on

______________________________________________________________________

2 Respondents C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., C.H. Robinson

Company, C.H. Robinson Company, Inc., and C.H. Robinson International, Inc., are collectively referred to in this brief as “C.H.

Robinson.”

5

the roads is one way that states try to make the roads

safer for everyone who drives or rides on them.

Personal injury claims against freight brokers based

on the negligent hiring of unsafe motor carriers fall

directly within the safety exception and are not

preempted by the FAAAA.

ARGUMENT

I. The FAAAA’s safety exception applies to

personal injury claims against freight

brokers that arise out of the broker’s

negligent hiring of an unsafe motor carrier.

Personal injury claims against freight brokers

arising out of a broker’s negligent hiring of an unsafe

motor carrier are based on the broker’s breach of the

state-law requirement to exercise reasonable care not

to hire a motor carrier that will operate or maintain

motor vehicles unsafely—that is, not to hire a motor

carrier that will place dangerous motor vehicles on the

road. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 411 (“An

employer is subject to liability for physical harm to

third persons caused by his failure to exercise

reasonable care to employ a competent and careful

contractor … to do work which will involve a risk of

physical harm unless it is skillfully and carefully

done[.]”). That state-law requirement falls squarely

within the safety exception.

First, the state-law requirement is part of the

“safety regulatory authority of a State.” 49 U.S.C.

§ 14501(c)(2)(A); see Cox, 142 F.4th at 853–54. State

courts’ ability to develop and enforce common-law

duties and standards is undoubtedly part of the

“authority of [the] State.” This Court has recognized

that “state regulation can be effectively exerted

through an award of damages,” Kurns v. R.R. Friction

6

Prods. Corp., 565 U.S. 625, 637 (2012) (cleaned up),

making the requirement part of the state’s “regulatory

authority.” See id. (holding that a statute that

preempted the field of “regulating locomotive

equipment” preempted “state common-law duties and

standards of care”). And the state-law requirement is

“genuinely responsive to safety concerns,” Ours

Garage, 536 U.S. at 442—specifically, the risk of

physical harm if the broker selects a motor carrier

that will place dangerous motor vehicles on the road—

making the requirement part of the state’s “safety

regulatory authority.”

Second, the state safety regulatory authority at issue is “with respect to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C.

§ 14501(c)(2)(A). This Court has construed the phrase

“with respect to” in the FAAAA to mean “concern[ing].” Dan’s City, 569 U.S. at 261. The state-law

requirement for brokers to exercise reasonable care in

selecting a safe motor carrier to provide motor vehicle

transportation clearly concerns motor vehicles: The

purpose of imposing such a requirement on brokers is

to protect third parties from the “risk of physical

harm” posed by unsafely operated or maintained motor vehicles. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 411.

Moreover, in determining whether claims were

“with respect to the transportation of property” in

Dan’s City, this Court considered whether the challenged conduct “involve[d]” transportation. 569 U.S.

at 262. Applying the reasoning of Dan’s City “to the

identical language in the safety exception indicates

that, when courts evaluate whether a common law

negligence claim concerns motor vehicles, they must

look to the substance of the underlying allegations

7

and assess whether the alleged negligent conduct ‘involve[s]’ motor vehicles.” Cox, 142 F.4th at 855

(quoting Dan’s City, 569 U.S. at 262). Where the “crux

of the alleged negligent conduct is that [a broker]

failed to exercise reasonable care in selecting a safe

motor carrier to operate a motor vehicle on the highway, resulting in a vehicular accident,” those

allegations “plainly ‘involve’ motor vehicles and motor

vehicle safety.” Id. at 856 (quoting Dan’s City, 569

U.S. at 262). “Simply put, there is no way to disentangle motor vehicles from” such claims. Id.

In short, personal injury claims against freight

brokers based on the broker’s negligent hiring of an

unsafe motor carrier rely on state-law requirements

that are “genuinely responsive to safety concerns” respecting motor vehicles. Ours Garage, 536 U.S. at 442.

And such claims “substantively concern[] motor vehicles and motor vehicle safety.” Cox, 142 F.4th at 858.

Accordingly, the claims are part of the state’s safety

regulatory authority “with respect to motor vehicles”

and fall within the safety exception.

II. The Seventh Circuit’s decision is based on

flawed reasoning.

The decision below bases the determination that

the safety exception does not apply to petitioner

Shawn Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claims on the

Seventh Circuit’s prior decision in Ye, 74 F.4th 453.

There, the court of appeals held that negligent-hiring

claims against brokers do not fall within the safety exception because they are not “with respect to motor

vehicles.” Id. at 460. Ye’s analysis is deeply flawed and

its holding is incorrect.

1. As an initial matter, Ye errs in stating, at the

beginning of its analysis of the safety exception, that

8

this Court has determined that the “phrase ‘with respect to motor vehicles’ … ‘massively limits the scope’

of the safety exception.” Id. at 460 (quoting Dan’s City,

569 U.S. at 261). The statement in Dan’s City that Ye

relies on for that proposition was not addressing the

limitation “with respect to motor vehicles” in the

safety exception; it was addressing the limitation

“with respect to the transportation of property” in the

preemption provision. See Dan’s City, 569 U.S. at 261.

Although the two limitations both use the term “with

respect to,” that does not mean that the two limitations affect the same number or percentage of state

laws. The scope of each limitation turns on the words

that follow “with respect to”: the objects of the phrase.

See Cox, 142 F.4th at 855 n.6 (explaining that, in stating in Dan’s City that the “phrase ‘with respect to the

transportation of property’ ‘massively limits the scope

of preemption,’” this Court “was commenting not on

the ‘with respect to’ portion of the phrase, but on its

object, ‘transportation of property’” (cleaned up)).

To illustrate the point: Although it is generally

agreed that the term “related to” is broad, an FAAAA

exception that applied only to state laws “related to

apples” would be narrow. The object of the phrase

matters. Likewise, the universe of state laws to which

the limitation applies makes a difference. A provision

exempting from preemption state laws related to apples would have a more limiting effect if it were an

exception to a preemption provision regulating fruit

farms than if it were an exception to a preemption provision regarding trucking regulation.

The phrases “with respect to the transportation of

property” in the preemption provision and “with respect to motor vehicles” in the safety exception have

9

different objects: in the former, the transportation of

property; in the latter, motor vehicles. And the

phrases apply to different universes of state laws: in

the former, laws related to the prices, routes, or services of motor carriers, motor private carriers,

brokers, or freight forwarders; in the latter, the state’s

safety regulatory authority. There is thus no reason to

assume that they have identical limiting effects on the

provisions to which they apply. And there is no reason

to deviate from a plain-meaning interpretation of the

safety exception to try to ensure that “with respect to

motor vehicles” limits the safety exception to the same

degree that “with respect to the transportation of

property” limits the preemption provision.

2. Continuing to the rest of Ye’s reasoning, that decision is based on the Seventh Circuit’s assessment

that the relationship between brokers and motor vehicles is insufficiently direct for claims against

brokers to fall within the exception. “Absent unusual

circumstances,” the court of appeals stated, “the relationship between brokers and motor vehicle safety

will be indirect, at most.” 74 F.4th at 461. GlobalTranz, the freight broker defendant there, it noted,

“does not own or operate motor vehicles.” Id.

Under the plain text of the safety exception, however, the relevant inquiry is not into the relationship

between the regulated entity and motor vehicles, but

between the state law and motor vehicles. See 49

U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A) (saving the state’s “safety regulatory authority … with respect to motor vehicles”).

And state safety laws do not need to directly regulate

motor vehicle drivers or owners to concern motor vehicles. As the Sixth Circuit has noted, “[r]equiring

10

that the regulated entity directly own or operate motor vehicles would impose an additional limitation

beyond what the text of the exception requires.” Cox,

142 F.4th at 858. Here, where the purpose of requiring

brokers to exercise reasonable care in selecting motor

carriers to provide motor vehicle transportation is to

protect third parties from the dangers posed by unsafely operated or maintained motor vehicles, the

state-law requirement concerns motor vehicles, regardless of whether the relationship between brokers

and motor vehicles is deemed to be “direct.”

3. The Seventh Circuit also emphasized in Ye that

the safety exception does not “expressly mention brokers.” 74 F.4th at 461. “We hesitate,” the court stated,

“to read broker services into parts of the statute where

Congress declined to expressly name them.” Id. As the

Sixth Circuit has explained, however, that argument

“is based on a faulty reading of the safety exception.”

Cox, 142 F.4th at 856. “The exception contains no

mention of any regulated persons or entities,” including motor carriers, motor private carriers, or freight

forwarders, “the three other entities listed in the

preemption provision.” Id. Accordingly, if the safety

exception did not apply to laws regulating entities

that are not named in the exception, the exception

would not apply to any laws.

The lack of a direct reference to brokers, motor carriers, motor private carriers, and freight forwarders in

the safety exception reflects that application of the

safety exception is not based on the nature of the entity or person being regulated. Rather, by its plain

text, it is based on the nature of the state authority

being invoked, “provid[ing] a carveout from

11

§ 14501(c)(1) for certain state laws based on the substance of those laws—that is, whether the laws

respond to safety issues and concern motor vehicles.”

Id.; see Kaipust v. Echo Glob. Logistics, Inc., 2025 WL

2374556, at *8 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 15, 2025) (“[I]t is

clear from the plain language of 49 U.S.C.

§ 14501(c)(2)(A) that Congress did not purposefully

omit certain parties to exclude them from the safety

exception; it omitted any reference to any parties because the exception applies to the conduct of anyone,

so long as such conduct falls under the ‘safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor

vehicles.’”), appeal allowed, 2025 WL 3301665 (Ill.

Nov. 26, 2025).

The third exception in 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A)

demonstrates the distinction between an exception

based on the nature of the regulated party and an exception based on the nature of the state law. In

addition to the safety exception, section 14501(c)(2)(A)

contains two other exceptions, one of which applies to

“the authority of a State to regulate motor carriers

with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and selfinsurance authorization.” That exception’s express

reference to motor carriers indicates that the application of that exception is based on the nature of the

regulated party: It applies only to certain regulation

of motor carriers. In contrast, the absence of a reference to motor carriers or any other regulated entities

in the safety exception indicates that the application

of the safety exception is not based on the nature of

the regulated entity. It is based on whether the state

law is part of the state’s safety regulatory authority

with respect to motor vehicles, “regardless of who is

12

subject to the regulatory requirement.” Cox, 142 F.4th

at 857.

4. Just as it is irrelevant that freight brokers are

not mentioned in the safety exception, it is irrelevant

that brokers are not mentioned in the definition of

“motor vehicle” in 49 U.S.C. § 13102(16). Contra Ye,

74 F.4th at 460. Entities do not themselves need to be

motor vehicles for state laws regulating them to concern the safety of motor vehicles. And the definition of

motor vehicle does not mention motor carriers, motor

private carriers, freight forwarders, or any other regulated entities or people. Thus, if the safety exception

only applied to a law when the entity regulated by the

law was included in the definition of motor vehicle, the

safety exception would never apply.

Likewise, it is immaterial that brokers are not

mentioned in section “14501(c)(2)’s other savings provisions for ‘intrastate transportation of household

goods’ and ‘tow truck operations.’” Ye, 74 F.4th at 461

(quoting 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(B) & (C)). That Congress did not mention brokers in these two narrowly

focused exceptions does not speak to whether claims

against brokers can fall within the scope of the safety

exception, which applies more broadly to the state’s

“safety regulatory authority … with respect to motor

vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). Indeed, it would

be nonsensical to read the safety exception as limited

to intrastate transportation of household goods and

tow truck operations simply because Congress crafted

different exceptions for those specific types of transportation.

The Seventh Circuit also erred in finding meaning

in the fact that section 14501(c) is titled “Motor carriers of property,” without mentioning brokers. The

13

preemption provision in section 14501(c)(1) demonstrates that, despite that title, the contents of the

subsection can apply to laws regulating brokers, as

well as to those regulating motor carriers. Section

14501(c)(1) preempts state laws related to the prices,

routes, or services of motor carriers, motor private carriers, brokers, and freight forwarders. The safety

exception then preserves the state’s safety regulatory

authority with respect to motor vehicles, regardless of

whether that authority relates to the prices, routes,

and services of motor carriers, motor private carriers,

brokers, or freight forwarders.

5. Ye’s reliance on a separate preemption provision, 49 U.S.C. § 14501(b)(1), is also misplaced. Ye

notes that section 14501(b), which preempts laws “relating to intrastate rates, intrastate routes, or

intrastate services of any freight forwarder or broker,”

does not include a safety exception. Although section

14501(b) did not apply in Ye, which involved interstate

transportation rather than intrastate transportation,

Ye considered Congress’s decision not to add a safety

exception to that provision to be an indication that

Congress did not intend the safety exception in section

14501(c) to apply to claims against brokers. Ye, 74

F.4th at 461.

Congress, however, chose to treat laws related to

interstate and intrastate broker prices, routes, and

services differently. Although Congress could have

addressed laws related to interstate broker prices,

routes, and services alongside laws related to

intrastate broker prices, routes, and services in

section 14501(b)(1), which does not have an express

safety exception, Congress chose instead to address

those laws in section 14501(c)(1), which does have an

14

express safety exception. Rather than demonstrating

an intent to exclude laws relating to the interstate

prices, routes, and services of a broker from the safety

exception, Congress’s decision to address those laws

in section 14501(c)(1), rather than in section

14501(b)(1), indicates that Congress wanted the

safety exception to apply to them where, as here, the

exception’s conditions are met.

6. Ye likewise errs in its reliance on other

provisions of Title 49 to hold that the safety exception

does not cover claims against brokers. Ye states that

“Congress’s references to motor vehicle safety” in Title

49 “do not impose obligations on brokers.” 74 F.4th at

463. But the relevant question is not whether the

federal government regulates brokers in ways that

impact safety, but whether the law at issue is part of

the state’s safety regulatory authority concerning

motor vehicles. Congress sought, through the safety

exception, to preserve the states’ “preexisting and

traditional state police power over safety.” Ours

Garage, 536 U.S. at 439. The requirement that

brokers exercise reasonable care to hire safe motor

carriers is part of that state power.

For similar reasons, the statutory requirement

that motor carriers carry insurance for bodily injury

or death, and the absence of such a requirement for

brokers, is irrelevant. Contra Ye, 74 F.4th at 463. The

motor-carrier insurance provision demonstrates that

Congress was concerned about motor carriers’

possible inability to pay personal injury claims

against them. That Congress did not consider brokers’

inability to pay a serious enough problem for it to

mandate insurance for personal injury claims does not

demonstrate an intent to immunize brokers from such

15

claims, let alone to exclude from the safety exception

state laws regulating brokers.

7. Finally, Ye errs in relying on its perception of a

“separateness” between federal motor vehicle safety

regulations and federal regulation of brokers to

interpret the meaning of the phrase “with respect to

motor vehicles” in the safety exception, which is not

limited to laws regulating brokers. Ye states that this

“separateness” “counsels a reading of ‘with respect to

motor vehicles’ that requires a direct connection

between the potentially exempted state law and motor

vehicles.” 74 F.4th at 462. And it states that, because

“Congress’s references to motor vehicle safety do not

impose obligations on brokers,” “only those laws with

a direct link to motor vehicles fall within a state’s

‘safety regulatory authority ... with respect to motor

vehicles.’” Id. at 463–64.

It makes no sense, however, to determine the

relationship between state laws and motor vehicles

necessary for a law to be “with respect to motor

vehicles” within the meaning of the safety exception

by looking at the relationship between brokers and

motor vehicles. Under that reasoning, parties in

future cases involving the safety exception would have

to meet a standard developed based on the

relationship between brokers and motor vehicles,

even if those cases do not involve brokers. Instead, the

court should have first determined the relationship

between a state law and motor vehicles necessary for

that law to be “with respect to motor vehicles,” and

then determined whether the state-law requirement

underlying the claim at issue has the requisite

relationship to motor vehicles. As discussed above, the

necessary relationship is that the state-law

16

requirement “concern” motor vehicles. Dan’s City, 569

U.S. at 261. And the state-law requirement that

brokers exercise reasonable care to select a motor

carrier that will not unsafely operate or maintain

motor vehicles is a requirement that concerns motor

vehicles.

*****

Having applied the wrong analysis, the Seventh

Circuit reached the wrong conclusions. The court

erred both in concluding that the safety exception

requires a “direct” connection between the state law

and motor vehicles and in concluding that personal

injury claims against brokers based on their negligent

hiring of unsafe motor carriers lack such a connection.

The text of the safety exception does not limit its reach

to laws with a “direct” connection to motor vehicles.

See Cox, 142 F.4th at 857. Rather, the exception uses

the broader phrase “with respect to motor vehicles.”

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). Moreover, “[e]ven if such a

connection [were] required,” personal injury claims

against brokers based on the negligent hiring of an

unsafe motor carrier “would not be preempted,” Cox,

142 F.4th at 857, because the state-law requirement

underlying such claims is directly connected to motor

vehicles: It is aimed at protecting the public from the

dangers posed by unsafe motor vehicles. Simply put,

personal injury claims against brokers arising out of

their negligent hiring of unsafe motor carriers invoke

the state’s “safety regulatory authority … with respect

17

to motor vehicles,” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A), and

thus fall within the safety exception.

III. C.H. Robinson’s additional arguments are

meritless.

The additional arguments made by Respondent

C.H. Robinson in its petition-stage brief do not

undermine the conclusion that personal injury claims

against brokers based on their negligent hiring of

unsafe motor carriers fall within the safety exception.

1. C.H. Robinson argues that, if the safety

exception can apply to claims against brokers, who do

not themselves own or operate motor vehicles, the

phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” will have no

“operative effect.” C.H. Robinson Pet.-Stage Br. 15. By

its reading, if laws regulating brokers can be “with

respect to motor vehicles,” then all laws that fall

within the preemption provision will be “with respect

to motor vehicles.” That is incorrect. The term “safety

regulatory authority” requires that the state law at

issue be “genuinely responsive to safety concerns.”

Ours Garage, 536 U.S. at 442. The phrase “with

respect to motor vehicles” then clarifies that the statelaw requirement at issue must, specifically, be

genuinely responsive to safety concerns respecting

motor vehicles. Regardless of whether the regulated

party is a motor carrier or broker, state laws can

relate to motor carrier or broker prices, routes, or

services with respect to the transportation of property

without being genuinely responsive to safety concerns

respecting motor vehicles.

For example, in Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor

Transport Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008), this Court held

that the FAAAA preempted laws regulating the

delivery of tobacco. Although the laws related to

18

public health, they did not concern the safety risks

posed by motor vehicles, and the safety exception did

not apply. See id. at 374 (explaining that the FAAAA

contains an exception “governing motor vehicle

safety” but not one governing public health).

Moreover, although this case focuses on the

preemption provision in section 14501(c)(1), Congress

enacted two preemption provisions in the FAAAA:

section 14501(c)(1), and a preemption provision

preempting state laws related to the “price, route, or

service of an air carrier or carrier affiliated with a

direct air carrier through common controlling

ownership when such carrier is transporting property

by aircraft or by motor vehicle.” FAAAA § 601(b),

codified at 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(4)(A). Congress

attached the safety exception to both preemption

provisions. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 14501(c)(2)(A) &

41713(b)(4)(B)(i). The “with respect to motor vehicles”

language limits the safety exception to the state’s

safety regulatory authority concerning motor vehicles,

not its safety regulatory authority concerning

“aircraft.”

2. C.H. Robinson likewise errs in arguing that a

“direct” relationship between state laws and motor

vehicles is necessary to keep the second exception in

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A), which exempts from

preemption “the authority of a State to impose

highway route controls or limitations based on the

size or weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous

nature of the cargo,” from being redundant. The laws

preserved by that exception are not necessarily

responsive to safety concerns; they can be aimed at

avoiding harm to the roads. And those laws directly

relate to motor vehicles and are thus no more

19

redundant under an interpretation of the statute that

does not require a direct connection than under one

that does. See Bufkin v. Collins, 604 U.S. 369, 387

(2025) (“[W]hen both interpretations involve the same

redundancy, the canon against surplusage simply

does not apply.”). Moreover, this Court “has

emphasized that, in the context of statutory

interpretation, ‘[r]edundancy is not a silver bullet,’

and sometimes a ‘statute contains some redundancy.’”

Cox, 142 F.4th at 858 n.8 (quoting Rimini St., Inc. v.

Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U.S. 334, 346 (2019)). “It is

logical that Congress would provide a broad carveout

for states to regulate motor vehicle safety, while

expressly enumerating other areas of state regulatory

authority that are motivated not only by motor vehicle

safety, but also other concerns, such as traffic

efficiency and public health.” Id.

3. C.H. Robinson’s novel argument that the safety

exception does not cover negligent-hiring claims

against brokers because it “cannot preserve what did

not exist” is meritless. C.H. Robinson Pet.-Stage Br.

19. C.H. Robinson’s argument seems to be that the

safety exception can apply only to claims that could

have been brought prior to deregulation of the

transportation industry, and that negligent-hiring

claims against freight brokers could not have been

brought at that time because federal regulation

preempted the field.

The safety exception, however, does not apply only

to claims that could have been brought at some point

in the past. It preserves all state laws that are part of

20

the state’s “safety regulatory authority … with respect

to motor vehicles.”49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A).

Moreover, as C.H. Robinson concedes, Congress

largely deregulated the motor carrier industry in

1980—more than a decade before the FAAAA was

enacted. See C.H. Robinson Pet.-Stage Br. 20. Thus,

the “pervasive federal regulation o[f] the motor carrier

industry” on which C.H. Robinson relies, id. at 19, did

not exist when Congress enacted the FAAAA.

Furthermore, the case on which C.H. Robinson

relies for its argument that federal regulation

preempted the field held that a state could not “take

action amounting to a suspension or revocation of an

interstate carrier’s [federally] granted right to

operate.” Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61,

64 (1954). The state law at issue here does not operate

as a suspension or revocation of a carrier’s right to

operate. It simply holds brokers accountable for

failing to take ordinary care to ensure that they are

hiring safe motor carriers.

4. Finally, C.H. Robinson argues that reading the

safety exception to apply to personal injury claims

against freight brokers based on their negligent hiring

of unsafe motor carriers would undermine Congress’s

deregulatory goals. In enacting the FAAAA, however,

Congress displaced only “certain aspects of the State

regulatory process.” Dan’s City, 569 U.S. at 263

(quoting FAAAA § 601(a)(2); emphasis in Dan’s City).

It specifically preserved other aspects of the

regulatory process, including “the safety regulatory

authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” 49

U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). Stated differently, although

Congress believed that some state regulation

“imposed an unreasonable burden on interstate

21

commerce” that justified preempting such regulation,

FAAAA § 601(a)(1)(A), Congress did not believe that

safety regulation imposed such a burden. Instead of

eliminating state safety laws, Congress expressly

preserved them.

Personal injury claims based on brokers’ negligent

hiring of unsafe motor carriers help demonstrate why

Congress needed to include the safety exception in the

FAAAA. Although “competitive market forces” may

further “efficiency, innovation, and low prices” in the

market for airline and trucking services, Rowe, 552

U.S. at 371 (citation omitted), those forces do not promote safety in the broker/motor carrier market. If

brokers cannot be held liable for negligently hiring

unsafe motor carriers, they will be incentivized to hire

the cheapest motor carriers possible, rather than to

prioritize safety. Carriers, in turn, will be incentivized

to compromise safety to reduce operating costs to remain competitive. The ensuing reduction in safety will

come at the expense of other drivers and passengers

on the road—people like Shawn Montgomery and

Greta Cox, who are not part of the market for broker

or motor carrier services, but who pay a heavy price

when brokers fail to exercise ordinary care.

As of 2023, more than 28,000 brokers were registered with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety

Administration (FMCSA). See FMCSA, 2024 Pocket

Guide to Large Truck and Bus Statistics 10 (2024).3

Under C.H. Robinson’s interpretation of the FAAAA,

those brokers have no duty to exercise care to hire safe

motor carriers. Indeed, under that interpretation, a

______________________________________________________________________

3 Available at https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov/

files/2025-09/FMCSA%20Pocket%20Guide%202024-v6%20508%

20.pdf.

22

broker cannot be held liable for the harm caused by its

hiring of an unsafe motor carrier even if the broker

knew that the motor carrier would place dangerous

motor vehicles on the road.

Fortunately, the FAAAA does not require such a

result: Its safety exception exempts from preemption

the state’s “safety regulatory authority … with respect

to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). Personal injury claims against freight brokers arising

from their negligent hiring of unsafe motor carriers

invoke that state safety regulatory authority and thus

fall within the safety exception.

CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the decision below.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLIE M. RITTGERS

W. MATTHEW NAKAJIMA

JUSTIN A. SANDERS

GUS J. LAZARES

RITTGERS & RITTGERS

12 East Warren Street

Lebanon, OH 45036

ADINA H. ROSENBAUM

Counsel of Record

ALLISON M. ZIEVE

PUBLIC CITIZEN

LITIGATION GROUP

1600 20th Street NW

Washington, DC 20009

(202) 588-1000

arosenbaum@citizen.org

CHRISTOPHER T. SAUCEDO

SAUCEDO, HARRIGAN,

APODACA, GRIESMEYER,

APODACA PC

800 Lomas Blvd. NW, Suite 200

Albuquerque, NM 87102

Counsel for Amicus Curiae Robert Cox

December 2025