Petition for Writ of Certiorari — National Rifle Association, Incorporated, Petitioner v. Mark Glass, Commissioner, Florida Department of Law Enforcement
Supreme Court briefMay 16, 2025
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NO. ______
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
________________
NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
MARK GLASS, in his Official Capacity as
Commissioner of the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement,
Respondent.
________________
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit
________________
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
________________
JOHN PARKER SWEENEY
DAVID H. THOMPSON
JAMES W. PORTER, III
Counsel of Record
W. CHADWICK LAMAR, JR. PETER A. PATTERSON
BRADLEY ARANT BOULT
JOHN D. OHLENDORF
CUMMINGS LLP
COOPER & KIRK, PLLC
1615 L Street N.W.
1523 New Hampshire
Suite 1350
Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 393-7150
(202) 220-9600
jsweeney@bradley.com
dthompson@cooperkirk.com
Counsel for Petitioner
May 16, 2025
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Florida’s law banning 18-to-20-year-olds
from purchasing firearms violates the Second
Amendment.
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner National Rifle Association of America,
Inc., was a plaintiff before the District Court and a
plaintiff-appellant in the Court of Appeals. Colton
Campbell was a plaintiff-appellant in the Court of
Appeals; he was added to the case on November 15,
2024, by order of the Eleventh Circuit granting the
plaintiff-appellants’ unopposed motion to substitute
Mr. Campbell for one of the previous individual
plaintiff-appellants before she turned 21. Mr.
Campbell has since moved out of the State of Florida,
and he is not a party to the proceeding in this Court.
Radford Fant was a plaintiff before the District Court
and a plaintiff-appellant in the Court of Appeals, but
he was dismissed from the case on November 24, 2022,
by order of the Eleventh Circuit, before he turned 21,
and he is not a party to the proceeding in this Court.
Brook Stefano and Dominic Kelsey were plaintiffsappellants in the Court of Appeals, but they also were
dismissed by order of the Eleventh Circuit before
turning 21, and they are not parties to the proceeding
in this Court. Petitioner continues to have members in
Florida who are between the ages of 18 and 21 and
would purchase firearms but for the challenged law,
and it stands ready to supply information identifying
at least one of them if requested by the Court.
Respondent Mark Glass, in his official capacity as
Commissioner of the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement, was the defendant-appellee in the Court
of Appeals. Rick Swearingen, the previous
Commissioner of the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement, was a defendant before the District
Court and also initially a defendant-appellee in the
iii
Court of Appeals, but Respondent Glass was
automatically substituted in his place pursuant to
FED. R. APP. P. 43(c)(2) upon assuming office. Pam
Bondi, then the Attorney General of Florida, was also
a defendant before the District Court in her official
capacity, but Ashley Moody, her immediate successor
in office, was substituted in her place on January 31,
2019, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d). Ms. Moody was
dismissed from the case by order of the District Court
on May 1, 2020, on sovereign immunity grounds.
Neither Ms. Bondi, Ms. Moody, nor the current
Attorney General of Florida appeared as parties before
the Court of Appeals, and they are not parties to the
proceeding in this Court.
iv
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
National Rifle Association of America, Inc., has no
parent corporation, and there is no publicly held
corporation that owns 10% or more of its stock.
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
This case arises from the following proceedings:
•
National Rifle Association v. Bondi, No. 2112314 (11th Cir.) (judgment entered Mar.
14, 2025);
•
National Rifle Association v. Swearingen,
No. 18-cv-137 (N.D. Fla.) (judgment
entered June 24, 2021).
The following proceeding is also directly related to
this case under this Court’s Rule 14.1(b)(iii):
•
Doe v. Bondi, No. 18-12081 (11th Cir.)
(appeal voluntarily dismissed Nov. 19,
2019).
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................ i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ............................ ii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ............ iv
RELATED PROCEEDINGS ...................................... iv
TABLE OF APPENDICES ......................................... vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... vii
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ................. 1
OPINIONS BELOW .................................................... 5
JURISDICTION .......................................................... 5
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
ORDINANCES INVOLVED ....................................... 5
STATEMENT .............................................................. 5
I.
Florida bans 18-to-20-year-olds from purchasing
firearms. ............................................................... 5
II.
The proceedings below. ....................................... 7
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ................ 13
I.
Review is needed to resolve the conflict between
the circuits over the constitutionality of limits on
the right of 18-to-20-year-olds to purchase
firearms. ............................................................. 13
II.
Review is needed because the decision below
conflicts with this Court’s decisions in Heller and
Bruen. ................................................................. 20
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 34
vi
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, FILED
MARCH 14, 2025................................................... 1a
APPENDIX B — OPINION OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, FILED
MARCH 9, 2023................................................. 171a
APPENDIX C — ORDER OF THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA,
TALLAHASSEE
DIVISION,
FILED
JUNE 24, 2021 .................................................. 211a
APPENDIX D — RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED .................. 261a
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
PAGE
Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of
St. Johns County,
57 F.4th 791 (11th Cir. 2022) ......................... 11
Andrews v. Tennessee,
50 Tenn. 165 (1871) ........................................ 22
Coats v. Wilson,
170 Eng. Rep. 769 (1804) ................................ 33
District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008) ....... 1, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 32
Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue,
591 U.S. 464 (2020) ................................... 26, 27
Gamble v. United States,
587 U.S. 678 (2019) ......................................... 26
Hirschfeld v. BATFE,
14 F.4th 322 (4th Cir. 2021) ........................... 16
Hirschfeld v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives,
5 F.4th 407 (4th Cir. 2021) ....................... 16, 23
Jones v. Bonta,
34 F.4th 704 (9th Cir. 2022) ..................... 16, 23
Jones v. Bonta,
47 F.4th 1124 (9th Cir. 2022) (Mem.) ............ 16
Jordan v. Coffield,
70 N.C. 110 (1874) .................................... 32, 33
Lara v. Commissioner Pennsylvania State Police,
125 F.4th 428 (3d Cir. 2025) ....... 1, 2, 17, 18, 24
viii
Luis v. United States,
578 U.S. 5 (2016) ............................................. 21
McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)................... 29, 30
New Hampshire Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Noyes,
32 N.H. 345 (1855) .......................................... 30
New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985) ......................................... 21
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,
597 U.S. 1 (2022) .............. 2, 3, 8, 14, 15, 20, 21,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v.
City of New York,
590 U.S. 336 (2020) ......................................... 21
Reese v. BATFE,
127 F.4th 583 (5th Cir. 2025) .. 1, 13, 14, 15, 16,
21, 22, 24, 25
Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis,
121 F.4th 96 (10th Cir. 2024) ......... 1, 13, 19, 22
Saunders Glover & Co. v. Ott’s Adm’r,
12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 572
(S.C. Ct. App. 1822) .................................. 28, 34
Teixeira v. County of Alameda,
873 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2017) ........................... 21
Timbs v. Indiana,
586 U.S. 146 (2019) ......................................... 26
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969) ......................................... 21
ix
United States v. Marzzarella,
614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) ........................ 21, 22
United States v. Rahimi,
602 U.S. 680 (2024) ......................... 4, 27, 29, 32
Worth v. Jacobson,
108 F.4th 677 (8th Cir. 2024) .......... 1, 2, 16, 17,
26, 27
CONSTITUTIONS, CODES, AND STATUTES
U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 1, cl. 5 ................................................ 20
amend. II ......................................................... 20
amend. XXVI, § 1 ............................................ 20
18 U.S.C.
§ 922(b)(1).......................................................... 6
§ 922(x) .............................................................. 6
Act of May 8, 1792, 1 Stat. 271 ..................... 22, 33, 34
FLA. STAT.
§ 775.082 .............................................................
§ 775.083 .............................................................
§ 790.064(1) ....................................................... 6
§ 790.065(2)(a)(4) .............................................. 6
§ 790.065(13) ..................................................... 6
§ 790.22(3) ......................................................... 6
§ 790.23(1)(a) ..................................................... 6
§ 790.233(1) ....................................................... 6
2018 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 2018-3, § 2 ............. 3, 30
1856 Ala. Laws 17 ..................................................... 26
1856 Tenn. Pub. Acts 92 ............................................ 26
1859 Ky. Acts 245 ...................................................... 26
x
1785 Mass. Acts 510 .................................................. 33
1723 Va. Stat. 121 ..................................................... 33
OTHER AUTHORITIES
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND (St. George Tucker ed. 1803) .... 31,
32
2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
(1809) ............................................................... 34
30 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 277 (William Hand
Browne ed., 1910) ........................................... 33
David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, History and
Tradition in Modern Circuit Cases on the
Second Amendment Rights of Young People, 43
S. ILL. UNIV. L.J. 119 (2018) ........................... 27
Mark W. Smith, Attention Originalists: The Second
Amendment was adopted in 1791, not 1868,
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y PER CURIAM (Dec. 7,
2022), https://perma.cc/8CSW-QB2L ............. 26
1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE
STATE OF CONNECTICUT (1795) ....................... 34
THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF
CONNECTICUT 537 (J. Hammond Trumbull ed.,
1850) ................................................................ 33
1
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
The right to keep and bear arms “belongs to all
Americans,” not “an unspecified subset.” District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580–81, 592 (2008).
Yet the federal courts of appeals are divided over the
extent to which the government may prevent 18-to-20year-old adults from exercising that right—including
over whether it may bar them from purchasing the
firearms they wish to keep and bear. In nearly every
State in the Union, including Florida, eighteen-yearolds are legal adults: they are entitled to vote, marry,
enter contracts, and join the military to fight and die
for their country. And as adults, there are no parents
or other legal guardians generally responsible for
their care and protection. In the jurisdictions within
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, they also enjoy the
Second Amendment right to purchase firearms to defend themselves and their families, see Reese v.
BATFE, 127 F.4th 583 (5th Cir. 2025), but under the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision below and a similar ruling
by the Tenth Circuit, see Pet.App.1a–171a; Rocky
Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, 121 F.4th 96 (10th
Cir. 2024), states in those jurisdictions can and do bar
these legal adults, as a class, from purchasing any
firearms. This split between the circuits over so fundamental a question is intolerable, and it urgently
calls for this Court’s resolution.
In 2018, Florida enacted a flat ban on the purchase of firearms by 18-to-20-year-olds, and in the decision below the en banc Eleventh Circuit upheld that
ban. The majority’s opinion recognized that this result
was directly contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Reese, Pet.App.39a, and the opinion is also irreconcilable with the reasoning of decisions from the Third
2
and Eighth Circuits protecting 18-to-20-year-olds’
right to carry firearms, see Lara v. Commissioner
Pennsylvania State Police, 125 F.4th 428 (3d Cir.
2025); Worth v. Jacobson, 108 F.4th 677 (8th Cir.
2024). The Eleventh Circuit should have followed
these courts’ guidance. The text of the Second Amendment encompasses the purchase of firearms by 18-to20-year-olds, as the en banc majority below did not
dispute, Pet.App.43a–44a, and as the majority was
also forced to acknowledge, “the Founding era lacked
express prohibitions on the purchase of firearms” by
18-to-20-year-olds. Id. at 30a. Indeed, the eighteenthcentury laws that come closest to reflecting a “Founding-era policy on age and firearms”—militia laws
throughout the Nation obliging eighteen-year-olds to
muster for militia service bearing firearms they were
legally obligated to acquire for themselves—in fact “reflect the policy that eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds
should be armed.” Id. at 159a (Brasher, J., dissenting). That should have been the beginning and the end
of any suggestion that Florida’s age ban “is consistent
with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,
597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022).
But the majority below upheld Florida’s law anyway, based principally, if not entirely, on the notion
that the common law at the Founding made contracts
by minors for the purchase of goods—incidentally including firearms, according to the majority—“voidable” at the option of the minor. Pet.App.17a. That reasoning is unsustainable for multiple independent reasons. The Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on this commonlaw voidability rule ultimately depends on an “economic inference from indirect evidence,” rather than
3
any actual historical statute or legal rule directly limiting anyone’s acquisition of firearms. Id. at 125a
(Branch, J., dissenting). Nothing about the voidability
rule prevented minors from bartering for goods or purchasing them with cash—or even on credit, if the vendor was willing to take the risk. Moreover, the en banc
majority fails to persuasively establish that the
Founding-era voidability rule even applied to firearms
in the first place. The majority acknowledged that
there was a recognized exception covering contracts
for “necessaries,” Pet.App.36a, and the best reading of
the historical record is that this category included firearms, at least for 18-to-20-year-olds, given that most
states charged Americans in this age group with the
legal duty to acquire firearms for militia service.
What is more, even if the majority’s interpretation of this common-law contract rule were correct, it
is sharply disanalogous to modern age-based gun bans
in terms of both the “why” and the “how” of regulation.
Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29. As to the “why,” the “right of an
infant to avoid his contract” at the Founding was designed “for his protection against his own improvidence and the designs of others,” Pet.App.155a
(Brasher, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)
(cleaned up)—a purpose totally unlike Florida’s asserted goal of “address[ing] the crisis of gun violence,”
2018 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 2018-3, § 2. And the
“burden on the right of armed self-defense” imposed
by the two rules, Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29, is likewise different beyond any comparison. The Founding-era
rule, even by the en banc majority’s lights, only limited the right to keep and bear arms of legal minors—
persons who were not treated as adults for most other
purposes and who remained within the care, custody,
4
and protection of their parents. But Florida’s law
strips the right to acquire firearms from legal adults—
18-to-20-year-olds who enjoy the practical and legal
benefits of adulthood, who are not within the custody
or protection of their parents, and who often have families of their own. “Eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds
in Florida today—in other words, adults—are analogous to legal adults at the time of the Founding, not
legal minors.” Pet.App.156a–157a (Brasher, J., dissenting).
The end result of this fundamental mismatch between Florida’s law and the Founding-era contract
voidability rule is that the majority below committed
the same error as the challenger in Rahimi: asking
whether the particular application of the challenged
regulation was “identical to ones that could be found
in 1791,” rather than whether it comports “with the
principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.”
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 691–92 (2024)
(emphasis added). For the principle of the Founders’
voidability rule is clear: the right to contract may be
limited to some extent for actual legal minors. But 18to-20-year-olds in Florida today are adults, not minors. A fundamental incident of adulthood in America
is the enjoyment of constitutional rights, including the
right to defend yourself, your family, and your home
with common firearms. Stripping away an 18-year-old
adult’s Second Amendment rights is thus fundamentally irreconcilable “with the principles that underpin
the Nation’s regulatory tradition,” id. at 681, and the
Court should grant the writ and reverse.
5
OPINIONS BELOW
The en banc opinion of the Court of Appeals is
reported at 133 F.4th 1108 and reproduced at
Pet.App.1a–170a. The panel opinion of the Court of
Appeals is reported at 61 F.4th 1317 and reproduced
at Pet.App.170a–210a. The opinion of the District
Court granting summary judgment to Respondent is
reported at 545 F. Supp. 3d 1247 and reproduced at
Pet.App.211a–260a. Prior orders of the District Court
disposing of issues not presented in this Petition are
not reported in the Federal Supplement but are available at 2020 WL 5646480, 2018 WL 11014101, and
2018 WL 11014100.
JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals issued its judgment on
March 14, 2025. Pet.App.1a, 45a. This Court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
ORDINANCES INVOLVED
The relevant portions of Amendments II and XIV
to the United States Constitution and Section 790.065
of the Florida Statutes are reproduced in the Appendix beginning at Pet.App.261a–267a.
STATEMENT
I.
Florida bans 18-to-20-year-olds from purchasing firearms.
Since 2018, Florida has completely banned 18-to20-year-olds from purchasing any firearm, of any
kind, for any purpose. Section 790.065(13) provides, in
full:
6
A person younger than 21 years of age may
not purchase a firearm. The sale or transfer
of a firearm to a person younger than 21
years of age may not be made or facilitated
by a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer. A person who violates this subsection commits a felony of the
third degree, punishable as provided in
§ 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084. The prohibitions of this subsection do not apply to
the purchase of a rifle or shotgun by a law
enforcement officer or correctional officer, as
those terms are defined in § 943.10(1), (2),
(3), (6), (7), (8), or (9), or a servicemember as
defined in § 250.01.
FLA. STAT. § 790.065(13).
Enacted in the wake of the tragic 2018 school
shooting in Parkland, Florida, Florida’s age ban supplements several other provisions of federal and state
law that are not challenged here. Federal law independently bars minors under 18 from purchasing
and/or possessing firearms, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(b)(1),
(x), and also prohibits federally licensed firearm dealers from selling handguns (but not long guns) to individuals under 21, id. § 922(b)(1). And Florida law likewise generally prohibits the purchase or possession of
a firearm by minors under 18, FLA. STAT. § 790.22(3),
convicted felons, id. § 790.23(1)(a), individuals enjoined from committing acts of domestic violence, id.
§ 790.233(1), and anyone adjudicated mentally defective or committed to a mental institution, id.
§§ 790.064(1), 790.065(2)(a)(4).
7
Petitioner National Rifle Association of America,
Inc. (“NRA”) has, as members, 18-to-20-year-old Florida residents who wish to acquire common handguns,
long guns, or both for lawful purposes but are prohibited from doing so by Florida’s age ban. 11th Cir. Doc.
21 at App.34–35 (Aug. 24, 2021).1
II.
The proceedings below.
A. Petitioner NRA (then joined by individual
plaintiff Radford Fant, who later turned 21) brought
this lawsuit challenging Florida’s age ban on March 9,
2021, alleging that it violated the Second Amendment
and seeking an injunction restraining its continued
enforcement. Id. at App.26–30. The district court had
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. The individual plaintiff initially sought to proceed in the
case pseudonymously, given the acrimonious nature
of the public debate over the ban in Florida at the
time, but the district court denied his request, and the
parties proceeded to file cross-motions for summary
judgment.
On June 24, 2021, the district court granted Respondent’s motion, denied Petitioner’s cross-motion,
and entered judgment for the State. The court, analyzing the challenge before this Court’s decision in
Bruen, disposed of Petitioner’s Second Amendment
claim under the first step of the then-prevailing “twostep” analysis. It did not find that Florida’s age ban
was supported by any tradition of similar regulation
at or around the time the Second Amendment was
1 The previous individual plaintiffs are all no longer subject
to Florida’s ban, but NRA stands ready to provide evidence that
it continues to have members subject to the ban at the Court’s
request.
8
ratified; nor did it credit Respondent’s argument that
“the relevant time period is not when the Second
Amendment was ratified, but rather when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.” Pet.App.225a n.11.
Instead, the court held that Florida’s age-based ban
on purchasing firearms was “outside the Second
Amendment’s scope” based on the dicta in Heller assuming that certain “longstanding” restrictions are
“presumptively lawful.” Id. at 253a. It concluded that
age-based limits were “longstanding in time” “at least
relative to the other prohibitions listed in Heller[,]”
some of which date only to the mid-twentieth-century,
and are “sufficiently analogous” to some of the restrictions listed in Heller’s dicta, insofar as age-based
limits “target groups thought to be especially dangerous with firearms.” Id. at 244a, 246a–248a.
B. Petitioner appealed, and on March 9, 2023, a
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed. The panel’s decision was handed
down after Bruen, and it proceeded by “assum[ing] for
now that ‘the Second Amendment’s plain text’ covers
18-to-20-year-olds when they buy firearms,”
Pet.App.185a (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17), and
then upholding the age ban as justified by a collection
of laws from “nineteen states and the District of Columbia” that “banned the sale and even the giving or
loaning of handguns and other deadly weapons to 18to-20-year-olds by the close of the nineteenth century.” Id. at 198a. While the earliest of these laws did
not appear until over six decades after the Founding,
the panel concluded that in a challenge to a state law,
Bruen’s historical analysis must focus on “historical
sources from the Reconstruction Era” rather “than
those from the Founding Era” because “the
9
Fourteenth Amendment is what caused the Second
Amendment to apply to the States.” Id. at 178a.
C. Petitioner moved for rehearing of the panel’s
resolution of its Second Amendment challenge, which
the en banc court granted. On March 14, 2025, the full
court likewise affirmed the district court and upheld
Florida’s ban, in a fractured decision. Chief Judge William Pryor, writing for the majority, departed from
the earlier panel decision in determining the temporal
focus of historical inquiry: rather than looking to the
Reconstruction Era, Chief Judge Pryor “first look[ed]
to the Founding,” when “[t]he Second Amendment
was ratified, and its meaning fixed.” Pet.App.12a–
13a. The en banc majority concluded that “the Florida
law is consistent with our regulatory tradition” because “minors generally lacked the capacity to contract” in 1791 and this “inability to contract,” in the
majority’s view, “impeded minors from acquiring firearms during the Founding era.” Id. at 17a, 27a.
The court acknowledged that “the Founding era
lacked express prohibitions on the purchase of firearms” by any age group. Id. at 30a. Instead, the majority placed all of its weight on the general legal principle that “[a]t the Founding, a person was an ‘infant’
or ‘minor’ in the eyes of the law until age 21,” and that
“[a]s a general rule, contracts for the purchase of personal property involving minors were voidable.” Id. at
14a, 17a (cleaned up). That general voidability rule,
the court concluded, “impeded minors from acquiring
firearms during the Founding era.” Id. at 17a.
The en banc court further held that Florida’s age
ban is “analogous enough” to this “Founding-era legal
regime,” id. at 30a, even though Florida’s law—unlike
10
the Founding-era rule about the voidability of contracts—applies to 18-to-20-year-olds who are legal
adults, not “infants” or “minors.” “[T]he key fact,” according to majority, was that “at the Founding and until the late twentieth century, the age of majority was
21.” Id. at 33a.
D. Judge Rosenbaum, Judge Newsom, and
Judge Wilson all published separate concurring opinions. Judge Rosenbaum—the author of the panel opinion—wrote to defend the views she articulated for the
panel that the late-nineteenth-century age-based restrictions enacted in several states “provide[ ] evidence of the constitutionality of laws like Florida’s”
and that to the extent there is any “conflict between
the Founding-era and Reconstruction-era understandings” of the Second Amendment, “we should enforce Americans’ understanding of the right to keep
and bear arms in 1868.” Id. at 76a, 97a, 100a (Rosenbaum, J., concurring). She also articulated at length
the view that “modern medicine and social science
confirm” that 18-to-20-year-olds should not be trusted
with firearms. Id. at 96a.
Judge Newsom, by contrast, wrote to reiterate
his view that “evidence that significantly post-dates
[the Second Amendment’s] adoption isn’t just secondbest—it’s positively irrelevant.” Id. at 104a (Newsom,
J., concurring). This case, however, Judge Newsom believed “presents one of the exceedingly rare circumstances in which post-ratification evidence is fair
game.” Id. at 105a. According to Judge Newsom, the
late-nineteenth-century “flurry” of age bans in the
states shows that the total absence of age-based restrictions at the Founding and for sixty years thereafter should be attributed to the fact that the contract-
11
law principles cited by the majority made explicit age
limits “unnecessary,” not to any Founding-era understanding that 18-to-20-year-olds enjoyed a “substantive constitutional right” to keep and bear arms. Id. at
108a–109a.
Judge Wilson, in turn, concurred to highlight
what he believed to be an inconsistency between the
dissenting judges’ interpretation of the Second
Amendment in this case and the views expressed by
some of those judges in Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School
Board of St. Johns County, 57 F.4th 791 (11th Cir.
2022) (en banc), a recent case involving “students’ privacy interests in school bathrooms,” Pet.App.110a
(Wilson, J., concurring). Judge Wilson also expressed
dissatisfaction with “Bruen’s myopic focus on history
and tradition,” which he characterized as requiring a
“game of historical Where’s Waldo.” Id. at 111a, 114a.
E. Judges Branch, Lagoa, and Brasher all published dissents. Judge Brasher’s principal dissent,
joined by Judges Branch, Lagoa, and Luck, began by
noting that at the “text” stage of the Bruen inquiry,
Respondent did not contest that “ ‘people’ includes
adults over the age of eighteen” or that “the ability to
purchase a firearm implicates the ability to ‘keep and
bear’ one.” Id. at 144a–145a (Brasher, J., dissenting).
And Judge Brasher would have held that Respondent
“has presented no analogous Founding-era regulation
that precluded young adults from purchasing firearms” under Bruen’s second, historical inquiry. Id. at
146a.
Like the majority, Judge Brasher concluded that
“the Founding era” “should be the focus in our analysis.” Id. And “an extensive catalogue of colonial and
12
state militia statutes establishes that eighteen- to
twenty-one-year-olds were universally required to
have access to firearms.” Id. at 149a. The common law
“age of contracting” relied upon by the majority, Judge
Brasher explained, was not to the contrary because it
did not “reflect the Founding generation’s views on the
contours of the right to keep and bear arms, which is
the right at issue here.” Id. at 153a. Even more fundamentally, the “principle” behind the common law age
of contracting—which was designed for the “protection” of a minor “against his own improvidence and
the designs of others”—“doesn’t provide a comparable
justification for Florida’s ban.” Id. at 155a–156a
(cleaned up).
Judge Branch separately dissented in a brief
opinion which emphasized that because “none of the
majority’s Founding-era historical sources demonstrates that minors could not, as a legal matter, buy
goods on credit,” the majority was left relying on only
“economic inference from indirect evidence” that minors at the Founding were not able to contract to purchase firearms. Id. at 124a–125a (Branch, J., dissenting). And there is at least some “direct, contemporaneous historical evidence”—including, Judge Branch
noted, the very South Carolina state court decision
that the majority relied upon—“that minors at the
Founding could and did purchase goods, including
firearms, on credit.” Id. at 125a–126a.
Finally, Judge Lagoa, in addition to joining
Judge Brasher’s and Judge Branch’s dissents, published a brief separate dissent responding to Judge
Wilson’s concurrence discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s recent Adams decision. Id. at 129a–135a (Lagoa,
J., dissenting).
13
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I.
Review is needed to resolve the conflict between the circuits over the constitutionality of limits on the right of 18-to-20-yearolds to purchase firearms.
The federal courts of appeals are intractably divided over the constitutionality of laws that restrict
the ability of 18-to-20-year-olds to acquire or carry
firearms. Most immediately, while the Eleventh Circuit below upheld Florida’s ban on adults in this age
group purchasing any firearm from any source, and a
panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
upheld a similar Colorado age ban, a panel of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently found unconstitutional the federal ban on 18-to-20-year-olds purchasing handguns from licensed dealers, in a decision that
is directly and unequivocally in conflict with this
one—and that the court below recognized and deliberately departed from. Compare Reese, 127 F.4th at 600,
with Pet.App.39a (“The recent contrary decision of our
sister circuit [in Reese] . . . fails to persuade us.”), and
Rocky Mountain Gun Owners, 121 F.4th at 119–20.
And beyond the right to purchase firearms, some
courts of appeals have likewise addressed—and invalidated—age-based restrictions on carrying firearms,
based on reasoning that is irreconcilable with the
Eleventh Circuit’s below. This Court’s review is
needed to resolve the conflict between the circuits over
this acutely important question.
A. The clear majority of federal courts of appeals
have held that 18-to-20-year-olds enjoy full Second
Amendment rights. Of the seven federal courts of appeals that have considered the constitutionality of a
14
restriction on this age group’s right to keep and bear
arms, five have issued opinions invalidating those restrictions: three that remain the law of the circuit and
two that were subsequently vacated but retain persuasive value.
In Reese, a unanimous panel of the Fifth Circuit
recently struck down 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) & (c)(1), the
federal statutory provisions barring that age group
from purchasing handguns from a licensed firearms
dealer. 127 F.4th at 586, 600. The Reese court concluded that “the text of the Amendment’s prefatory
clause considered along with the overwhelming evidence of their militia service at the founding indicates
that eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds were indeed part of
‘the people’ for Second Amendment purposes.” Id. at
595 (citations omitted). And under Bruen’s second,
historical inquiry, the Fifth Circuit held that the challenged restriction was unsupported by historical tradition, reasoning that “[t]he federal government has
presented scant evidence that eighteen-to-twentyyear-olds’ firearm rights during the founding-era were
restricted in a similar manner to the contemporary
federal handgun purchase ban, and its 19th century
evidence ‘cannot provide much insight into the meaning of the Second Amendment when it contradicts earlier evidence.’ ” Id. at 600 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at
66).
Reese addressed, and rejected, each of the pieces
of historical evidence relied upon by the court below.
Contra Pet.App.41a (asserting that Reese “failed to
consider the background common-law regime”). The
Fifth Circuit noted “the common law’s recognition of
21 years as the date of legal maturity at the time of
the founding,” and that under this rule “eighteen-to-
15
twenty-year-olds did not enjoy the full range of civil
and political rights in the founding-era,” including the
rights to vote or serve on juries. Reese, 127 F.4th at
590–91 (quotation marks omitted). But this general
legal principle, the court held, did not demonstrate
that restrictions on this age cohort’s Second Amendment rights are constitutional, since “[t]he terms ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ lack content without reference to
the right at issue.” Id. at 592 (quoting NRA v. BATFE,
700 F.3d 185, 204 n.17 (5th Cir. 2012), abrogated by
Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and Reese, 127 F.4th 583
(5th Cir. 2025)). “The fact that eighteen-to-twentyyear-olds were minors unable to vote (or exercise
other civic rights)” accordingly “does not mean they
were deprived of the individual right to self-defense.”
Id.
Nor was the Reese court swayed by the three categories of supplemental evidence that the Eleventh
Circuit relied upon below: laws requiring parents to
acquire firearms for their children’s militia service,
university policies, and late nineteenth-century age
restrictions. Laws that “required parents to furnish
firearms for young men’s militia duty” did “not mean
that the military-age young men lacked the right to
keep and bear (or obtain) such arms themselves,” the
Fifth Circuit explained, because such laws “just as
readily imply that eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds were
expected to keep and bear arms, even if provided by
parents.” Id. at 597. University policies “prohibit[ing]
firearm possession by public university students . . .
say little about the general scope of Constitutional
rights and protections” because “universities had
heightened authority over student conduct in loco
parentis.” Id. at 596. And because the Second
16
Amendment’s meaning was fixed by “the public understanding of the right when the Bill of Rights was
adopted in 1791,” Reese held that the age limits enacted by a minority of states in the late nineteenth
century “were passed too late in time to outweigh the
tradition of pervasively acceptable firearm ownership
by eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds at the crucial period
of our nation’s history.” Id. at 599–600 (cleaned up).
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits previously
reached similar conclusions, albeit in decisions that
were subsequently vacated. In Hirschfeld v. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, the
Fourth Circuit likewise held that 18 U.S.C. § 922’s age
ban is unconstitutional. 5 F.4th 407, 452 (4th Cir.
2021). That opinion was ultimately vacated as moot,
however, after all of the plaintiffs turned 21. Hirschfeld v. BATFE, 14 F.4th 322 (4th Cir. 2021). And the
Ninth Circuit found likely unconstitutional a California law banning 18-to-20-year-olds from purchasing
semiautomatic centerfire rifles, Jones v. Bonta, 34
F.4th 704, 733 (9th Cir. 2022), though it reached that
decision before this Court’s decision in Bruen, and its
opinion has accordingly been vacated for further analysis under the Bruen framework, 47 F.4th 1124 (9th
Cir. 2022) (Mem.).
Two additional circuits have similarly enforced
the Second Amendment rights of 18-to-20-year-olds
against state laws restricting their right to carry firearms. In Worth, the Eighth Circuit invalidated a Minnesota law prohibiting anyone under 21 from carrying
firearms in public. 108 F.4th at 698. The court concluded that “[o]rdinary, law-abiding, adult citizens
that are 18 to 20-year-olds are members of the people”
within the meaning of the Second Amendment and
17
that “Minnesota did not proffer an analogue that
meets the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the Carry Ban for 18 to
20-year-old Minnesotans.” Id. at 689, 698.
Like the Reese court, the Eighth Circuit concluded that at the Founding there were insufficient
analogues “to demonstrate that the Nation’s historical
tradition of firearm regulation supports the Carry
Ban.” Id. at 696. Also like Reese, Worth specifically rejected the government’s reliance on the Founding-era
“common law” rule that “individuals did not have
rights until they turned 21 years old,” reasoning that
arguments “focusing on the original contents of a right
instead of the original definition” are “bordering on
the frivolous.” Id. at 689–90 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S.
at 582). “The Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all members of the political community, even
those that were not included at the time of the founding,” and “[e]ven if the 18 to 20-year-olds were not
members of the political community at common law,
they are today.” Id. at 690–91 (cleaned up). Finally,
the government’s Reconstruction-era laws, the Eighth
Circuit held, both “carry less weight than Foundingera evidence” and “have serious flaws even beyond
their temporal distance from the founding.” Id. at 697
(cleaned up).
The Third Circuit recently reached the same conclusion. In Lara, that court struck down state laws
that barred 18-to-20-year-olds from carrying firearms
whenever the State is under a declared state of emergency. 125 F.4th at 432, 446. It held “that 18-to-20year-olds are, like other subsets of the American public, presumptively among ‘the people’ to whom Second
Amendment rights extend,” and that the state failed
to show that its age-based restriction “is consistent
18
with the principles that underpin founding-era firearm regulations.” Id. at 438, 445. Like the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits, the Lara court did not find it dispositive that at “the Founding . . . those who were under
the age of 21 were considered ‘infants’ or ‘minors’ in
the eyes of the law,” because “the legal status of 18-to20-year-olds during that period” is not binding today,
now that this legal status has changed. Id. at 436–37
(cleaned up). Indeed, the court explained, if “we were
rigidly limited by eighteenth-century conceptual
boundaries, ‘the people’ would consist solely of white,
landed men, and that is obviously not the state of the
law.” Id. at 437. The Third Circuit likewise rejected
the relevance of the late-nineteenth-century age bans
because “the constitutional right to keep and bear
arms should be understood according to its public
meaning in 1791.” Id. at 441.
B. Most federal courts of appeals to have considered the question presented, or closely related ones,
have thus reached conclusions that correctly apply
this Court’s precedent. But two federal appellate
courts have reached a directly contrary conclusion and
upheld restrictions barring 18-to-20-year-olds from
acquiring firearms. The en banc Eleventh Circuit below upheld Florida’s age ban on purchasing any firearm based on reasoning that is directly and avowedly
contrary to the consensus represented in the decisions
just discussed. Indeed, the en banc majority recognized that its decision was “contrary” to Reese, which
“fails to persuade us.” Pet.App.39a; see also id. at 138a
(Brasher, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s
“conclusion splits with at least three sister circuits”).
The Tenth Circuit likewise recently upheld a Colorado age ban on purchasing firearms, similar to
19
Florida’s, based on reasoning that contradicts the decisions of the Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits. Rocky
Mountain Gun Owners concluded that Colorado’s ban
fell within the category of “laws imposing conditions
and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms,”
which it read this Court’s precedent to deem “presumptively lawful.” 121 F.4th at 119 (quoting Heller,
554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26). It thus concluded that
Colorado’s age ban on the purchase of firearms did not
even “implicate the plain text of the Second Amendment.” Rocky Mountain Gun Owners, 121 F.4th at
120. And the court also credited—and discussed at
length over the course of three pages—the “scientific
consensus” that the challenged age ban “will likely reduce the numbers of firearm homicides, nonhomicide
violent crimes, suicides, and accidental firearm injuries in Colorado.” Id. at 127.
C. Accordingly, the decision below forms part of
a three-to-two circuit split over the extent to which the
Second Amendment protects the right of 18-to-20year-olds to keep and bear arms. That includes a split
over the precise question presented: whether the government may ban 18-to-20-year-olds from purchasing
common firearms. This question is a foundational one:
whether an age cohort comprising millions of Americans may be categorically excluded from one of our
fundamental, enumerated constitutional protections.
In states across the country, 18-to-20-year-olds are
considered legal adults for virtually all purposes: they
may make contracts, vote, serve on juries, petition the
government, freely express their views, and serve in
(or be conscripted into) the armed services. In the
Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits the government is
barred from infringing their Second Amendment
20
rights. Yet in the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, the
states are free to effectively foreclose their right to defend themselves and their families with common firearms. That situation is intolerable and urgently calls
for this Court’s review.
II.
Review is needed because the decision below conflicts with this Court’s decisions in
Heller and Bruen.
This Court’s review is also warranted because
the Eleventh Circuit’s decision below conflicts with
this Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence. Florida’s age ban is flatly contrary to the right to keep and
bear arms as interpreted by this Court in Heller,
McDonald, Bruen, and Rahimi, and the court below
was wrong to uphold it.
A. Bruen instructs courts assessing a Second
Amendment challenge to ask, first, “whether the plain
text of the Second Amendment protects [the plaintiffs’] proposed course of conduct” and, if so, whether
the “government [can] justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nations historical tradition of firearm regulation.” 597 U.S. at 24, 32.
Petitioner’s proposed course of conduct falls squarely
within the Second Amendment’s textual reach.
18-to-20-year-olds like Petitioner’s members are
presumptively among “the people” who enjoy the right
to keep and bear arms. U.S. CONST. amend. II. The
Second Amendment does not include any express age
limit—unlike other provisions of the Constitution.
E.g. id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 5; id. at amend. XXVI, § 1.
And the “normal and ordinary” meaning of “the people” includes all the people—“all Americans,” or all
“who are part of [the] national community,” as Heller
21
put it. 554 U.S. at 576, 580–81 (cleaned up). Moreover,
the two other provisions in the Bill of Rights that explicitly protect a right of “the people”—the First and
the Fourth Amendments—extend to the whole people,
including those under 21. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985).
“The people” “seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution,” Heller, 554
U.S. at 580 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990)), and to cabin its
scope with an unenumerated age limitation for purposes of the Second Amendment only would be to treat
that provision as “a second-class right, subject to an
entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of
Rights guarantees,” Bruen, 594 U.S. at 70 (quoting
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010)
(plurality)).
The Second Amendment’s text also covers the
“proposed course of conduct” these 18-to-20-year-old
“people” wish to engage in, id. at 32: acquiring firearms in common use. Constitutional rights “implicitly
protect those closely related acts necessary to their exercise.” Luis v. United States, 578 U.S. 5, 26 (2016)
(Thomas, J., concurring). Here, the Second Amendment explicitly protects the right to “have weapons,”
Heller, 554 U.S. at 582, and one “necessary concomitant of this right,” New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n
v. City of New York, 590 U.S. 336, 364 (2020) (Alito,
J., dissenting), is obviously the right to acquire those
arms in the first place. Numerous courts of appeals
have held this. See Reese, 127 F.4th at 589–90;
Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670, 677 (9th
Cir. 2017) (en banc); United States v. Marzzarella, 614
22
F.3d 85, 92 n.8 (3d Cir. 2010), abrogated on other
grounds by Bruen, 597 U.S. 1; see also Andrews v. Tennessee, 50 Tenn. 165, 178 (1871) (“The right to keep
arms, necessarily involves the right to purchase
them.”).
Neither the court below nor the Tenth Circuit
panel in Rocky Mountain Gun Owners disputed the
conclusion that the plain text of the Second Amendment protects the purchase of firearms by peaceable
18-to-20-year-old Americans. See Pet.App.43a–44a;
121 F.4th at 114–18. They did not dispute it because
the conclusion is unassailable.
B. Nor can Florida’s absolute ban on the purchase of firearms by 18-to-20-year-olds be justified as
“consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of
firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24. Neither
Founding-era nor Reconstruction-era firearm regulations support Florida’s age ban, and neither does the
evidence offered by the majority below.
1. The clearest Founding-era evidence of our historical traditions surrounding the right of 18-to-20year-olds to keep and bear arms comes from the
Founders’ understanding of militia service. Although
the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause cannot be
read to “limit or expand the scope of the operative
clause,” it nonetheless “announces the purpose for
which the right was codified: to prevent elimination of
the militia.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 578, 599. And there is
no doubt that 18-to-20-year-olds were understood to
be part of the militia at the time the Second Amendment was adopted: the Militia Act of 1792 set the minimum age of militia service at 18, Act of May 8, 1792,
1 Stat. 271, and all states likewise adopted “the
23
minimum age of eighteen . . . at or immediately after
ratification of the Second Amendment,” Reese, 127
F.4th at 594.
These “Founding-era militia laws provide powerful historical evidence” that the Second Amendment
“encompassed 18-year-olds.” Hirschfeld, 5 F.4th at
424. “The Second Amendment refers to the militia,
and young adults had to be in the militia and bring
their own firearms. This reference implies at least
that young adults needed to have their own firearms.”
Jones, 34 F.4th at 721. Moreover, if the Second
Amendment was codified to prevent the disarmament
of the militia, and 18-to-20-year-olds were universally
understood to be part of the militia, then the Second
Amendment necessarily must protect that age cohort’s right to keep and bear arms. After Heller, there
is no doubt that ‘the militia’ was ‘a subset of the people’ protected by its operative clause,” Reese, 127 F.4th
at 593, and “because the militia is a subset of ‘the people,’ those in the militia share the same rights as ‘the
people,’ ” Hirschfeld, 5 F.4th at 427.
The majority’s reasons for rejecting the relevance
of the Founding-era militia laws, below, do not withstand scrutiny. It asserted that while “minors between the ages of 18 and 21 could serve in the militia,
there was no national requirement that they do so,”
and that three states in the mid-nineteenth-century
in fact “exempted minors from service.” Pet.App.37a.
There are multiple problems with this response. For
starters, it confuses the organized militia—those actually called into service at any given time—with the
unorganized, or “general” militia—the body of “all
able-bodied men.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 596. It is the latter group that the Second Amendment protects. Id.
24
And the fact that “the minimum age of eighteen prevailed” in every single state “at or immediately after
ratification of the Second Amendment,” Reese, 127
F.4th at 594, conclusively shows that the Founders
understood 18-to-20-year-olds to be part of the general
militia—and thus necessarily within the Second
Amendment’s protective sphere.
The en banc majority also insisted that “the duty
of some minors to serve in the militia” did not imply
“a right to purchase firearms.” Pet.App.37a. But because “militiamen were expected to appear bearing
arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time,” Reese, 127 F.4th at 593 (quotation marks omitted), militia service entailed on obligation to acquire firearms. And as Judge Brasher explained below, “as a matter of both formal logic and
common sense, a legal obligation to acquire a private
firearm necessarily presupposes the legal ability to acquire one.” Pet.App.151a (Brasher, J., dissenting).
“That young adults had to serve in the militia indicates that founding-era lawmakers believed those
youth could, and indeed should, keep and bear arms.”
Lara, 125 F.4th at 444.
Nor does the fact that some states “required parents of minors to acquire firearms for their militia service,” Pet.App.20a, undermine the force of the Founding-era militia laws. “[T]here is no evidence that legal
barriers (as opposed to financial ones) were the primary impediment to eighteen-year-olds arming themselves.” Id. at 158a (Brasher, J., dissenting). As the
majority itself noted, after all, the law generally entitled parents of 18-to-20-year-olds “to receive the
wages of their labor.” Id. at 18a. More fundamentally,
these laws mandating parental purchase of firearms
25
“just as readily imply that eighteen-to-twenty-yearolds were expected to keep and bear arms, even if provided by parents.” Reese, 127 F.4th at 597. Thus, “[t]o
the extent those laws reflect a Founding-era policy on
age and firearms, they reflect the policy that eighteento
twenty-one-year-olds
should
be
armed.”
Pet.App.159a (Brasher, J., dissenting).
By contrast to this strong historical evidence that
law-abiding 18-to-20-year-old citizens were understood at the Founding to enjoy the Second Amendment’s protections, the State and its experts have not
identified, and we are not aware of, any evidence
whatsoever of colonial or Founding-era laws restricting the keeping, carrying, or acquisition of firearms by
individuals aged 18 or over because of their age. The
closest anyone has been able to come are the handful
of nineteenth-century university restrictions on students keeping firearms, but those are “uniquely poor
analogues.” Id. at 168a. These school rules, as the majority acknowledged, were rooted in the authority of
the college to act “in loco parentis.” Id. at 22a (majority). They thus represent nothing more than the fact
that parents could restrict their children in all sorts of
ways. “A campus code says no more about the Constitution than does a particular parent’s house rules.” Id.
at 169a (Brasher, J., dissenting).
Ultimately, the en banc majority was forced to
concede that “the Founding era lacked express prohibitions on the purchase of firearms.” Id. at 30a (majority). That concession should have been dispositive.
2. Given the powerful and uniform historical evidence that 18-year-olds fully enjoyed the Second
Amendment right to acquire firearms at the
26
Founding, the restrictions enacted by a minority of
states in the late nineteenth century cannot justify
Florida’s law. There are just three putative analogues
that predate the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification in 1868: from Alabama, Tennessee, and Kentucky. See 1856 Ala. Laws 17; 1856 Tenn. Pub. Acts
92; 1859 Ky. Acts 245, § 23. Another seventeen jurisdictions followed suit in the ensuing decades—most in
the 1880s and ‘90s. See Pet.App.23a–27a. These state
laws are both too late and too little.
“[F]or decades,” this Court “has generally assumed that the public understanding of the right
when the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791 governs”
in cases involving federal law. Worth, 108 F.4th at 693
(cleaned up); see also Gamble v. United States, 587
U.S. 678, 702 (2019) (noting that the relevant inquiry
is “the public understanding in 1791 of the right codified by the Second Amendment”). And the Court has
made emphatically clear that once “a Bill of Rights
protection is incorporated, there is no daylight between the federal and state conduct it prohibits or requires.” Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146, 150 (2019). It
follows that 1791 is the focal point for inquiry into the
Second Amendment’s historically understood limits.
See Mark W. Smith, Attention Originalists: The Second Amendment was adopted in 1791, not 1868, HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y PER CURIAM (Dec. 7, 2022),
https://perma.cc/8CSW-QB2L. A collection of laws dating back no earlier than sixty years after the Second
Amendment’s ratification cannot establish a “tradition of firearm regulation” justifying Florida’s law,
particularly where those late-breaking laws “contradict[ ] earlier evidence.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24, 66; see
also Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 591 U.S.
27
464, 482 (2020) (collection of over 30 state laws that
“arose in the second half of the 19th century. . . cannot
by itself establish an early American tradition” justifying the laws under the First Amendment).
In any event, these Reconstruction-era laws
“have serious flaws even beyond their temporal distance from the founding.” Worth, 108 F.4th at 697 (internal quotation marks omitted). By the turn of the
twentieth century, less than half of the States had
adopted age-based firearm restrictions of any sort.
Those laws typically applied only to certain types of
weapons, or to carrying firearms concealed rather
than openly, and several contained “exceptions for
self-defense, hunting, or home possession.” David B.
Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, History and Tradition
in Modern Circuit Cases on the Second Amendment
Rights of Young People, 43 S. ILL. UNIV. L.J. 119, 142
(2018). This smattering of late-breaking age restrictions does not suffice to show a “[w]ell entrenched,” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 695, or “well-established and representative,” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30, historical tradition of firearm regulation.
Even more fundamentally, because the age of
majority generally was 21 at the time, these nineteenth-century laws applied only to limit the Second
Amendment rights of actual minors—individuals
who, at the time, remained under the legal custody
and protection of their parents. Because they were
“based on one’s status as a minor,” Worth, 108 F.4th
at 698, the “[w]hy and how” of these laws, Rahimi, 602
U.S. at 692, were thus both fundamentally different
from Florida’s law. “Not to belabor the point, but
eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds in Florida today are
analogous to adults, not minors, at the time these
28
statutes were enacted.” Pet.App.167a (Brasher, J.,
dissenting).
3. The en banc majority below nonetheless held
that Florida’s law “is consistent with our historical
tradition of firearm regulation,” based virtually entirely on the general common-law rule at the Founding that “a person was an ‘infant’ or a ‘minor’ in the
eyes of the law until age 21” and many contracts they
entered “were ‘voidable.’ ” Pet.App.14a, 17a, 45a; see
also id. at 127a (Branch, J., dissenting) (noting that
“the Commissioner’s case, and the majority’s reasoning, hinge entirely upon this lone contract-law doctrine”). This general contract-law voidability rule cannot bear the extraordinary weight the majority placed
on it for at least three independent reasons.
i. First, rather than identifying any direct “historical tradition of firearm regulation,” Bruen, 597
U.S. at 24, the en banc majority’s reasoning rests on a
far flimsier reed: mere “economic inference from indirect evidence.” Pet.App.125a (Branch, J., dissenting).
The majority did not cite a single Founding-era statute, ordinance, or rule actually regulating firearms—
in fact it conceded that no such law existed. Id. at 30a.
Although it asserted that the general common-law
voidability rule incidentally “restricted the purchase
of firearms by minors,” id. at 26a, it was able to identify only a single case actually applying the rule to any
firearm—and that case involved “pistols,” Saunders
Glover & Co. v. Ott’s Adm’r, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 572,
572 (S.C. Ct. App. 1822), a type of firearm that may
well have been considered “dangerous and unusual”
at the time, Bruen, 597 U.S. at 47, in contrast to the
long guns that were in common use and that 18-to-20year-olds were obliged to acquire for militia service.
29
The point is not that the majority’s decision
hanged entirely on “general common-law proscriptions” rather than “firearm-specific regulations,”
Pet.App.81a (Rosenbaum, J., concurring), because the
majority did not even identify any common-law proscription that actually restricted the purchase of firearms. Even by the majority’s telling, the common law
at most rendered minors’ contracts voidable; it did not
proscribe them. The majority’s conclusion that “minors generally could not purchase firearms” at the
Founding, id. at 18a (majority), is thus based not on
any law saying this but rather on the inference that
the “ex ante effect[s]” of the voidability rule created
“practical difficulties” for minors who wished to purchase firearms on credit, id. at 124a–125a (Branch, J.,
dissenting). That inference does not show that laws
banning 18-to-20-year-olds are “consistent with this
Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation” at
the Founding. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17.
ii. If the majority had shown that the common
law at the Founding barred minors from acquiring
firearms, this evidence would still fail to justify Florida’s ban for an even more fundamental reason: a restriction on the Second Amendment rights of minors
at the Founding is simply not analogous to a restriction on the Second Amendment rights of adults
today. It is “the principles that underpin the Nation’s
regulatory tradition” that bind us today, not those
principles’ specific eighteenth-century application,
and analogizing to Founding-era restrictions on minors to justify a modern ban on adults commits the
very same error this Court condemned in Rahimi:
treating the Second Amendment as “a law trapped in
amber,” 602 U.S. at 681, 691, rather than “a
30
constitution, intended to endure for ages to come,”
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415
(1819).
This Court’s precedent requires inquiry into
“how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding
citizen’s right to armed self-defense,” Bruen, 597 U.S.
at 29, and the common-law voidability rule fails on
both metrics. Florida’s age ban wears its purpose on
its face: to “address the crisis of gun violence, including but not limited to, gun violence on school campuses.” 2018 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 2018-3, § 2. But
the “why” of the voidability rule—even assuming it
applied, incidentally, to contracts for the purchase of
firearms—was nothing like this. Rather than protecting public safety from minors, the Founding-era contract rule was designed to protect the minor himself:
it was “conferred by law for his protection against his
own improvidence and the designs of others.”
Pet.App.155a (Brasher, J., dissenting); see also New
Hampshire Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Noyes, 32 N.H. 345,
351–52 (1855) (voidability rule “established to protect
the inexperience and credulity of youth against the
wiles and machinations of designing men”).
The majority resisted this conclusion, positing instead that the justification of the Founding-era contract rule was that “individuals under the age of 21
have not reached the age of reason and lack the judgment and discretion to purchase firearms responsibly.” Pet.App.28a (majority). But while this purported
“lack [of] judgment and discretion” may have been the
Founders’ justification for limiting minors’ exercise of
civic rights like voting and jury service, see id. at 28a–
29a, the majority cited no evidence that this was the
purpose behind the contract voidability rule, and it
31
makes no sense. Why would the Founding generation
protect against minors’ purported lack of “judgment
and discretion to purchase firearms responsibly,” id.
at 28a, by making the contracts for those purchases
perfectly lawful but voidable at the option of the minor?
As to the “how,” any “burden on the right of
armed self-defense” imposed by the voidability rule is
also in no way “comparable” to Florida’s ban. Bruen,
597 U.S. at 29. For whatever limits the common law
did impose on 18-to-20-year-olds it imposed on legal
minors. The hallmark of minority status, at the
Founding as today, was that minors remained under
the care, custody, and protection of their parents—as
Blackstone put it, they were under “the empire of the
father, or other guardian.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *453 (St.
George Tucker ed., 1803). A minor’s need for “the right
of armed self-defense,” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29, was for
that reason less acute, because he remained under the
protection of his parents, who could engage in self-defense on his behalf. But “[a]n eighteen-year-old in
Florida,” precisely because he is no longer a minor, is
now “emancipated from the care and custody of his or
her parents, and they in turn are no longer responsible for his or her care and support.” Pet.App.141a
(Brasher, J., dissenting). And the burden on self-defense imposed by depriving an 18-year-old who is legally a full adult of access to firearms, with no one
bound by law to provide for his care and protection, is
totally unlike the burden of limiting the ability of actual minors to access firearms.
By focusing on the specific applications of Founding-era law—treating 18-year-olds like minors today
32
because they were minors in the eighteenth century—
the majority entirely missed the principle behind that
law—18-year-olds were subject to certain limits at the
Founding precisely because they were minors. The
Eleventh Circuit’s mistake can be brought into sharp
focus by noting another category of Americans who
could not enter contracts at the Founding: married
women. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra, at 441–43. It is difficult
to see how the en banc majority’s reasoning does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that married women
today may be barred from purchasing firearms. The
historical tradition for both groups is precisely the
same. But this conclusion is untenable, and this
Court’s precedent gives the reason why: the correct inquiry in interpreting the Second Amendment is not
whether particular modern applications precisely
match those at the Founding, but rather whether a
modern law “is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at
692. And because the voidability rule as applied to
married women (just like as applied to legal minors)
was justified at the Founding based on principles that
no longer apply to married women (or 18-to-20-yearolds) today, it cannot justify a modern ban on their exercise of Second Amendment rights.
iii. Finally, the common-law voidability rule cannot justify Florida’s age ban because neither Respondent nor the majority below has persuasively shown
that the rule actually applied to firearms in common
use. The majority acknowledged that the common-law
voidability rule did not apply to contracts “for necessaries,” Pet.App.17a, and it was well established at
common law that this category encompassed not “only
such articles as are absolutely necessary to support
33
life, but it includes also such articles as are suitable to
the state, station and degree in life of the person to
whom they are furnished,” Jordan v. Coffield, 70 N.C.
110, 114 (1874). Given that eighteen-year-olds were
counted as members of the militia by every state at or
around the time of ratification—and were legally required to “provide [them]sel[ves] with a good musket
or firelock . . . or with a good rifle” for use in militia
service, Militia Act of 1792, § 1, 1 Stat. 271—there can
be no doubt that the private arms those 18-year-olds
were mandated to acquire were considered necessaries. Indeed, an English court held in 1804 that “a
suit of regimentals,” or a military uniform, was a necessary for a minor enrolled in a voluntary corps. Coats
v. Wilson, 170 Eng. Rep. 769 (1804). The firearms 18to-20-year-olds were required to acquire for military
service were plainly no less “suitable to the state, station and degree in life” of minor militiamen. Jordan,
70 N.C. at 114.
Founding-era statutes confirm that firearms
were considered necessaries. A 1786 Massachusetts
law, for instance, barred local officials from executing
a warrant of distress for the collection of debts against
“any person[’s] . . . arms or household utensils, necessary for upholding life[.]” Act of Feb. 16, 1786, 1785
Mass. Acts 510, 516. Connecticut, Maryland, and Virginia had similar laws. THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE
COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 537 (J. Hammond Trumbull
ed., 1850) (Code of 1650); 30 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND
277, 280 (William Hand Browne ed., 1910) (Act of
1715); 1723 Va. Stat. 121. And the federal 1792 Militia
Act likewise exempted militia arms “from all suits,
distresses, executions or sales, for debt or for the
34
payment of taxes.” Militia Act of 1792, § 1, 1 Stat. 271,
272.
The evidence cited by the en banc majority for its
conclusion that firearms “were not necessaries,”
Pet.App.18a, is far from compelling. It invoked two
early American treatises, but those authorities merely
set forth lists of necessaries that did not include firearms. See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 274 (1809); 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF
THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 216–17
(1795). Because the lists did not purport to be exhaustive, that proves nothing. Nor does the single case
cited by the court—the 1822 South Carolina decision
in Saunders Glover & Co., 12 S.C.L. 572—establish
the point. As explained above, that case concerned pistols, not the muskets or rifles militiamen were obligated to acquire for militia service. Indeed, the case
does not even indicate whether the minor in question
was of militia age. This meagre evidence falls far short
of establishing that the sole “tradition of firearm regulation” relied upon by the Eleventh Circuit,
Pet.App.3a, restricted 18-to-20-year-olds’ access to
firearms at all.
The Eleventh Circuit was wrong to uphold Florida’s age ban, and this Court should grant the writ.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should
grant the petition for writ of certiorari.
35
May 16, 2025
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN PARKER SWEENEY
JAMES W. PORTER, III
W. CHADWICK LAMAR, JR.
BRADLEY ARANT BOULT
CUMMINGS LLP
1615 L Street N.W.
Suite 1350
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 393-7150
jsweeney@bradley.com
DAVID H. THOMPSON
Counsel of Record
PETER A. PATTERSON
JOHN D. OHLENDORF
COOPER & KIRK, PLLC
1523 New Hampshire
Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 220-9600
dthompson@cooperkirk.com
Counsel for Petitioner
APPENDIX
i
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED
STAT ES COU RT OF A PPEA LS FOR
T H E ELE V EN T H CI RCU I T, FI LED
MARCH 14, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a
APPENDIX B — OPINION OF THE UNITED
STAT ES COU RT OF A PPEA LS FOR
T H E ELE V EN T H CI RCU I T, FI LED
MARCH 9, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171a
A PPEN DI X C — OR DER OF T H E
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
FLORIDA, TALLAHASSEE DIVISION,
FILED JUNE 24, 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211a
A P P E N DI X D — R E L E VA N T
CONST I T U T IONA L PROV ISIONS ,
STAT U T E S , A N D R EGU L AT IONS
INVOLVED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261a
1a
Appendix
A
APPENDIX A — OPINION
OF THE
UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, FILED MARCH 14, 2025
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-12314
NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION,
RADFORD FANT,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
PAM BONDI, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA, et al.,
Defendants,
COMMISSIONER, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-00137-MW-MAF
Before Willi a m P ryor , Chief Judge, and J orda n ,
Rosenbaum, Jill Pryor, Newsom, Branch, Grant, Luck,
2a
Appendix A
Lagoa, Brasher, A budu, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.*
William Pryor, Chief Judge, delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which Jordan, Rosenbaum, Jill Pryor, Newsom,
Grant, A budu, and Wilson, Circuit Judges, joined.
Rosenbaum, Circuit Judge, filed a concurring opinion in
which Jordan, Circuit Judge, joined as to Parts I and II,
and in which A budu, Circuit Judge, joined as to Part III.
Newsom, Circuit Judge, filed a concurring opinion.
Wilson, Circuit Judge, filed a concurring opinion.
Branch, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion in which
Lagoa, Circuit Judge, joined.
Lagoa, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion in which
Branch, Circuit Judge, joined.
Brasher, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion in which
Branch, Luck, and Lagoa, Circuit Judges, joined.
William Pryor, Chief Judge:
This appeal requires us to decide whether a state law
that prohibits the purchase of firearms by minors violates
* Wilson, Circuit Judge, elected to continue in the decision
of this appeal, which was reheard en banc while he was in regular
active service. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). K idd, Circuit Judge, who joined
the Court after oral argument, did not participate in the decision
of this appeal.
3a
Appendix A
the Second and Fourteenth Amendments as applied to
individuals between the ages of 18 and 21. After the
Florida Legislature enacted this prohibition in response to
the massacre at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School,
the National Rifle Association and an individual member
sued the Commissioner of the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement. The district court granted summary
judgment for the Commissioner. We affirm because the
Florida law is consistent with our historical tradition of
firearm regulation.
I.
BACKGROUND
On February 11, 2017, Nikolas Cruz entered Sunrise
Tactical Supply in Coral Springs, Florida. See M arjory
S t on em a n D ougl a s H igh S c ho ol P u bl ic S a f et y
Commission, Initial Report 262–64 (2019). Cruz turned 18
years old five months earlier and could legally purchase a
firearm in the State of Florida. Id. at 231, 262. At Sunrise
Tactical, Cruz lawfully purchased a Smith & Wesson M&P
15 semiautomatic rifle with a sling and bipod attached.
Id. at 262–64.
A year later, on Valentine’s Day, Cruz arrived in
an Uber at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in
Parkland, Florida, at 2:19 p.m. carrying the rifle. Id. at
24, 57. Two minutes later, he walked into a school building,
entered a stairwell, and paused to load his rifle and don a
vest that held extra magazines of ammunition. Id. at 25.
When a student encountered Cruz in the stairwell as he
prepared for the attack, Cruz said, “you better get out of
here, something bad is about to happen.” Id.
4a
Appendix A
Seconds later, Cruz left the stairwell and opened
fire in the first-floor hallway. Id. Gina Montalto sat in
the alcove of a classroom, and Luke Hoyer and Martin
Duque stood outside the door. Id. Cruz fatally shot all
three. Cruz then shot and wounded another student who
was in the hall. Id.
Next, Cruz aimed his rif le at a student-filled
classroom. Id. He fired two series of shots into the room.
Id. These shots killed Alyssa Alhadeff, Alaina Petty, and
Alex Schachter and wounded five others. Id. at 25–26. In
the next student-filled classroom that Cruz approached,
he fatally shot Nicholas Dworet and Helena Ramsay and
wounded four others. Id. at 26.
Campus monitor Chris Hixon burst into the hallway
and ran toward Cruz; Cruz turned and shot him too.
Id. at 27. Hixon fell to the ground wounded and crawled
behind a nearby wall. Id. Cruz turned the rifle toward yet
another classroom and fired again. Id. at 28. These shots
killed Carmen Schentrup and wounded three others. Id.
Cruz then ran through the hallway, passed Hixon lying
wounded on the ground, and shot him again and killed
him. Id. at 28, 65.
Next, Cruz entered the stairwell. Id. at 28. There, he
encountered campus monitor Aaron Feis. Id. Cruz shot
and killed him before he continued to the second floor. Id.
at 28–29. He entered the hallway with his rifle raised to
fire but found the hallway empty. Id. at 29. As he moved
through the hall, he muttered, “no one is here.” Id.
5a
Appendix A
Meanwhile, on the third floor, panic ensued when
the fire alarm blared. Id. at 27. Students rushed for
the stairwell but reversed course when they heard the
gunshots below. Id. As Cruz stalked up the stairwell, one
third-floor teacher frantically tried to locate his keys so he
could let students back into his classroom. Id. at 31. When
Cruz entered the third-floor hallway, about 20 people were
still outside classrooms. Id. He opened fire on them. Id.
Scott Beigel and another teacher were holding doors open
for students when Cruz shot them and killed Beigel. Id.
Unable to access his classroom, the teacher searching
for his keys hid with several students in the alcove of
his classroom before he darted to another alcove to try
a different classroom door, which was also locked. Id. at
31–32. He then directed the students to flee with him to
the stairwell. Id. at 32. As they ran, Cruz opened fire on
them. Id. Jaime Guttenberg and Peter Wang were fatally
shot within feet of reaching the stairwell. Id. at 31–32.
Cruz then turned his attention to Meadow Pollack, who
was on the ground wounded, and Cara Loughran, who
remained in the alcove, and fatally shot them. Id. at 31–33.
He then entered the alcove to the men’s restroom and
fatally shot Joaquin Oliver too. Id. at 31, 33. Three others
were wounded during Cruz’s third-floor attack. Id. at 31.
Five minutes and 32 seconds after Cruz fired the first
shots, he fired the final shot. Id. at 25, 33. After shooting
students and teachers on the third floor, he shot at the
exterior windows of a room on that floor in a last-ditch
effort to establish a sniper position to target fleeing
students outside the building. Id. at 33. He then entered
the stairwell, placed his rifle, vest, and 180 live rounds on
6a
Appendix A
the ground and ran down the stairs. Id. at 34. He left the
building and ran with fleeing students to blend in. Id. at
34, 125. He walked to a nearby McDonald’s and sat down
at a table occupied by a man. Id. at 35. Unbeknownst to
the man, Cruz had shot and seriously injured his sister in
a first-floor classroom less than an hour before. Id. at 28,
35–36. Cruz was arrested a short time later. Id. at 36–37.
He killed 17 individuals and wounded 17 others during his
massacre. Id. at 7.
Less than a month later, Florida enacted the Marjory
Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act to
“address the crisis of gun violence, including but not
limited to, gun violence on school campuses.” 2018 Fla.
Laws 10. The law states that a “person younger than
21 years of age may not purchase a firearm.” Fla. Stat.
§ 790.065(13). It also prohibits a “licensed importer,
licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer” from “ma[king]
or facilitat[ing]” the “sale or transfer of a firearm to a
person younger than 21 years of age.” Id. A violation of
the Florida law is a third-degree felony punishable by up
to five years of imprisonment and a fine up to $5,000. Id.
§§ 790.065(13), 775.082(3)(e), 775.083(1)(c). The Florida law
contains exceptions permitting the purchase of a rifle or
shotgun by peace officers, correctional officers, or military
personnel under the age of 21. Id. § 790.065(13).
The National Rifle Association sued the Commissioner
of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement for
declaratory and injunctive relief and alleged that
the Florida law violates the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments. Radford Fant, who was between the ages of
7a
Appendix A
18 and 21 at the time, later joined as an individual plaintiff.
Although the Association and Fant purported to make
a facial challenge to the Florida law, they alleged that
it is unconstitutional only to the extent that it prohibits
individuals between the ages of 18 and 21 from purchasing
firearms. Colton Campbell, who is between the ages of
18 and 21, has since been substituted for Fant as the
individual plaintiff.
The parties cross-moved for summary judgment, and
the district court granted judgment for the Commissioner.
The district court ruled that the Florida law does not
violate the right to keep and bear arms of individuals
between 18 and 21 years of age.
This appeal followed. During its pendency, the
Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol
Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 213 L. Ed.
2d 387 (2022). The Supreme Court held that a firearm
regulation is constitutional if it “is consistent with this
Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id.
at 2126. We vacated a panel opinion that affirmed the
district court after the Bruen decision to rehear this
appeal en banc. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bondi, 61 F.4th 1317
(11th Cir. 2023), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 72 F.4th
1346 (11th Cir. 2023). And we stayed briefing until the
Supreme Court later decided, in United States v. Rahimi,
that a federal law forbidding persons subject to domesticviolence restraining orders from possessing firearms,
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i), was constitutional because it
was consistent with our historical tradition of regulating
firearms. 602 U.S. 680, 144 S. Ct. 1889, 1898, 1903, 219
L. Ed. 2d 351 (2024).
8a
Appendix A
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a summary judgment. Thai
Meditation Ass’n of Ala. v. City of Mobile, 83 F.4th 922,
926 (11th Cir. 2023). Summary judgment is proper where,
construing all facts in the non-movant’s favor, there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
The Second Amendment provides, “A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. The Amendment
secures a preexisting right held by “the people” that is
“exercised individually and belongs to all Americans.”
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581, 128 S. Ct.
2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008). The “‘central component’
of the Second Amendment” is the right to “self-defense.”
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767, 130 S.
Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010) (quoting Heller, 554
U.S. at 599). The Amendment guarantees Americans the
right to “have weapons” and to carry them “outside of an
organized militia.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 582, 584 (internal
quotation marks omitted). This guarantee extends to “all
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those
that were not in existence at the time of the founding.”
Id. at 582.
“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second
A mendment is not unlimited.” Id. at 626. “From
9a
Appendix A
Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators
and courts routinely explained that the right was not a
right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any
manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” Id. Since
the Founding, American law has regulated arms-bearing
conduct in many ways: from prohibitions on “gun use by
drunken New Year’s Eve revelers” to bans on “‘dangerous
and unusual weapons’” to restrictions on concealed carry.
Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1897 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627).
Although the Association and Campbell purport to
make a facial challenge to the Florida law, their challenge
is to the law as applied only to individuals between the
ages of 18 and 21. A facial challenge requires a plaintiff
to “‘establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the [law] would be valid,’ or . . . show[] that the law
lacks a ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” Moody v. NetChoice,
LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 144 S. Ct. 2383, 219 L. Ed. 2d 1075
(alteration rejected) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 745, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1987)). The
Association and Campbell do not challenge the Florida law
in that way. They argue that the law is unconstitutional
because it bars individuals between the ages of 18 and 21
from purchasing firearms—not because it prohibits all
minors from purchasing firearms.
When a person challenges a law regulating armsbearing conduct, courts must examine the “‘historical
tradition of firearm regulation’” in our nation to “delineate
the contours of the right.” Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1897
(quoting Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2126). A regulation is lawful
if it “fits within” and “is consistent with the principles
10a
Appendix A
that underpin” that tradition. Id. at 1897–98. This inquiry
turns on “[w]hy and how” the regulation burdens the
right to keep and bear arms. Id. at 1898. If it addresses
the same problem as historical restrictions, it shares
a “why” with those restrictions. Id. A shared “why” is
a “strong indicator” that a modern regulation “fall[s]
within a permissible category of regulations.” Id. And, if
a regulation shares a “why” with historical restrictions, it
is lawful if it is “‘similar’” to those restrictions in “how” it
burdens the right. Id. (quoting Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2132).
The burden to establish the lawfulness of a regulation lies
with the government. Id. at 1897.
Although a regulation “may not be compatible with
the right if it” restricts the right “to an extent beyond
what was done at the founding,” the regulation need “not
precisely match its historical precursors” either. Id. at
1898. A modern law could “‘pass constitutional muster’” if
it is “‘analogous enough’” to those precursors to “comport
with the principles underlying the Second Amendment,”
even if it is not a “‘dead ringer’ or a ‘historical twin.’”
Id. (quoting Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2133). To require that
a modern law perfectly match a law from the Founding
era erroneously “assumes that founding-era legislatures
maximally exercised their power to regulate.” Id. at 1925
(Barrett, J., concurring). The Constitution does not impose
a “‘use it or lose it’ view of legislative authority.” Id.
To determine whether the Florida law is consistent
with our regulatory tradition, we must first decide what
tradition is relevant to that inquiry. For purposes of this
appeal, the Founding era is the primary period against
11a
Appendix A
which we compare the Florida law. The Supreme Court
has “made clear that individual rights enumerated in the
Bill of Rights and made applicable against the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment have the same scope
as against the Federal Government.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at
2137. That is, “incorporated Bill of Rights protections,” like
the Second Amendment, “‘are all to be enforced against
the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according
to the same standards that protect those personal rights
against federal encroachment.’” McDonald, 561 U.S. at
765 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10, 84 S. Ct.
1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964)).
The Supreme Court has “generally assumed that
the scope” of those rights “is pegged to the public
understanding of the right when the Bill of Rights was
adopted in 1791.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2137. But the
Court did not definitively decide in Bruen the period
of history against which we should compare firearm
regulations. It acknowledged the “ongoing scholarly
debate on whether courts should primarily rely on the
prevailing understanding of an individual right when
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868 when
defining its scope (as well as the scope of the right against
the Federal Government).” Id. at 2138. But it declined to
decide the proper historical period because the “public
understanding of the right to keep and bear arms in both
1791 and 1868 was, for all relevant purposes, the same
with respect to public carry.” Id.
The Supreme Court relied heavily on sources from
the Founding era to interpret the Second Amendment in
12a
Appendix A
Heller. To interpret the phrase “to keep and bear arms,”
the Court used dictionaries from the Founding era,
“written documents of the founding period,” and “state
constitutional provisions written in the 18th century or the
first two decades of the [nineteenth century].” Heller, 554
U.S. at 581–92. To determine the meaning of the Second
Amendment’s operative clause, the Court also “look[ed]”
to the “historical background of the Second Amendment”
because “it has always been widely understood that the
Second Amendment . . . codified a pre-existing right.”
Id. at 592. That historical background spanned over 100
years, from before the Glorious Revolution to the first
decade of the nineteenth century. Id. at 592–95. The Court
also considered the debate over whether the right to keep
and bear arms “needed to be codified in the Constitution.”
Id. at 598. And it again considered “analogous armsbearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and
immediately followed adoption of the Second Amendment.”
Id. at 600–01.
The Supreme Court has warned against the overuse
of history from Reconstruction. Although the Supreme
Court looked to sources from Reconstruction in Heller, it
cautioned that because those sources come “75 years after
the ratification of the Second Amendment, they do not
provide as much insight into its original meaning as earlier
sources.” Id. at 614. And, in Bruen, the Court explained
that “when it comes to interpreting the Constitution, not
all history is created equal” because “‘[c]onstitutional
rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood
to have when the people adopted them.’” 142 S. Ct. at
2136 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35). The Second
Amendment was ratified, and its meaning fixed, in 1791.
13a
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Our conclusion that we first look to the Founding
understanding finds additional support in the Supreme
Court’s repeated interpretations of other amendments
based on their public meaning at the Founding. For
example, in Crawford v. Washington, the Court explained
that the “founding generation’s” understanding of the
“right to confront one’s accusers” derived from the
“common law.” 541 U.S. 36, 43, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L.
Ed. 2d 177 (2004). Crawford canvassed English legal
history, colonial practice, state law contemporary to the
ratification of the Sixth Amendment, ratification debates,
and early state practice to ascertain the scope of the right.
Id. at 42–50. Likewise, in Virginia v. Moore, the Court
explained that it “look[s] to the statutes and common
law of the founding era to determine the norms that the
Fourth Amendment was meant to preserve.” 553 U.S.
164, 168, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 170 L. Ed. 2d 559 (2008). And,
in Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan, the Court
considered legislative enactments, treatises, and conflictof-interest rules contemporaneous to the ratification of
the First Amendment to determine whether legislative
recusal rules violate the First Amendment. 564 U.S. 117,
122–25, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 180 L. Ed. 2d 150 (2011). These
precedents reflect the preeminence of Founding-era
sources to the meaning of the Bill of Rights. Because
the Supreme Court relies on sources from the Founding
era to interpret the Bill of Rights, including the Second
Amendment, we do too.
Nevertheless, postratification history of a “‘regular
course of practice’ can ‘liquidate [and] settle the meaning
of’ disputed or indeterminate ‘terms [and] phrases’ in the
14a
Appendix A
Constitution.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2136 (quoting Chiafalo
v. Washington, 591 U.S. 578, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2326, 207
L. Ed. 2d 761 (2020)). To be sure, Bruen did not “endorse
freewheeling reliance on historical practice from the midto-late 19th century to establish the original meaning of
the Bill of Rights.” Id. at 2163 (Barrett, J., concurring).
And “to the extent later history contradicts what the text
says, the text controls.” Id. at 2137 (majority opinion).
For example, in the context of the First Amendment,
the Supreme Court declined to rely on a practice of over
30 states from the “second half of the 19th century” yet
relied on other evidence from that era. Espinoza v. Mont.
Dep’t of Revenue, 591 U.S. 464, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2258–59,
207 L. Ed. 2d 679 (2020). The Court explained that it saw
“no inconsistency in recognizing that such evidence may
reinforce an early practice but cannot create one.” Id.
at 2259 (emphasis added). So we may look to historical
practice from the mid-to-late nineteenth century at least
to confirm the Founding-era understanding of the Second
Amendment. But we need not and do not decide in this
appeal how to address a conflict between the Foundingera and Reconstruction-era understandings of the right
because the law of both eras restricted the purchase of
firearms by minors. Cf. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2138 (declining
to address this issue because “the public understanding
of the right to keep and bear arms in both 1791 and 1868
was, for all relevant purposes, the same with respect to
public carry”).
At the Founding, a person was an “infant[]” or a
“minor[]” in the eyes of the law until age 21. 1 Zephaniah
Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut
15a
Appendix A
213 (1795); accord 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries
on the Laws of England *463 (George Sharswood ed.,
1893) (“[F]ull age in male or female is twenty-one years,”
and an individual “till that time is an infant, and so styled
in law.”); Samuel Johnson, I’nfant. n.s., A Dictionary
of the E nglish L a nguage (1773), https://perma.cc/
Q4JZ-DRGE (“Infants” were “young person[s] to the
age of one and twenty.”). And the colonies “adopted age
twenty-one as the near universal age of majority.” Vivian
E. Hamilton, Adulthood in Law and Culture, 91 Tul. L.
Rev. 55, 64 (2016). The “age of majority at twenty-one was
early established at common law” and evolved “from the
system of judicial combat and knight service, the age of
knighthood being increased . . . to the completion of twenty
years.” T. E. James, The Age of Majority, 4 A m. J. Legal
Hist. 22, 30 (1960). English law set the age of majority at
21 years of age because of the relative lack of maturity
and judgment of younger individuals. See 1 Blackstone,
supra, at *453. The English view was that a child does not
“arriv[e] at years of discretion” until that age. Id. When
a child turned 21 years of age, “the law . . . established”
that “the empire of the father, or other guardian,” should
“give[] place to the empire of reason.” Id.
The Founders’ generation shared the view that minors
lacked the reason and judgment necessary to be trusted
with legal rights. Gouverneur Morris warned that these
individuals “want prudence” and “have no will of their
own.” 4 The Writings of James M adison 119 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1903) (Constitutional Convention, August 7,
1787). Thomas Jefferson considered “infants” akin to
“maniacs,” “drunkards,” and others who “cannot take
16a
Appendix A
care of themselves.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Samuel Smith (May 3, 1823), https://perma.cc/YD6XH6PN. And, with respect to voting, John Adams explained
that these individuals were not “fit to be trusted by
the [p]ublic” because of their lack of “[j]udgment” and
“[w]ill.” Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May
26, 1776), https://perma.cc/HW9M-7YL2.
Because of their lack of reason, infants were subject
to the “power” of their parents until they reached age 21.
1 Blackstone, supra, at *452–53; 1 SWIFT, supra, at 213.
Parents “ha[d] the benefit” and “receive[d] the profits”
of their children’s labor. 1 Blackstone, supra, at *453.
Minors could not sue to vindicate their rights without
joining their guardians or some other “next friend” who
was not their guardian. Id. at *464. Parents controlled
children’s access to information, including books. Brown
v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 831–32, 131 S. Ct.
2729, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Nor
could they enlist in the military without parental consent.
Act of March 16, 1802, 2 Stat. 132, 135 (“[N]o person under
the age of twenty-one years shall be enlisted by any
officer, or held in the service of the United States, without
the consent of his parent.”). Families in New England
were arranged so that the “[p]atriarchal household
heads sp[oke] for their dependents in dealings with the
larger world.” Toby L. Ditz, Ownership and Obligation:
Inheritance and Patriarchal Households in Connecticut,
1750–1820, 47 Wm. & M ary Q. 235, 236 (1990). Dependent
minors “lacked the formal capacity to participate in public
life and [were] subject to the authority of household heads.”
Id. at 237.
17a
Appendix A
Among the many legal disabilities that “secure[d]
[minors] from hurting themselves by their own improvident
acts,” 1 Blackstone, supra, at *464, minors generally
lacked the capacity to contract, id. at *465, and to
purchase goods on account, Willi a m M acpherson,
Treatise on the Law Relating to Infants 303 (1843).
All “contracts with infants, except for necessaries, [were]
either void or voidable” because “infants . . . are supposed
to want judgment and discretion in their contracts and
transactions with others.” 1 Samuel Comyn, A Treatise
of the Law Relative to Contracts and Agreements Not
Under Seal 148 (1809). As a “general rule,” contracts for
the purchase of “personal property” involving minors
were “voidable.” 1 Swift, supra, at 215. By the early
nineteenth century, voidability was applied so “broadly”
that “it became almost impossible for children to form
any contracts.” Holly Brewer, By Birth or Consent:
Children, Law, and the A nglo -A merican Revolution
in Authority 271 (2005) (emphasis added). But a minor
could “bind himself by his contract for necessaries, for
diet[,] apparel, education, and lodging.” 1 Swift, supra,
at 216; accord Brewer , supra, at 271; 2 James K ent,
Commentaries on A merican Law 256 (William Kent ed.,
8th ed. 1854). Yet, an infant who “live[d] with his father or
guardian” who adequately cared for him, could not “bind
himself even for necessaries.” 2 K ent, supra, at 256–57
(emphasis added).
The inability to contract impeded minors from
acquiring firearms during the Founding era. In that era,
“contracts were more important for the basic transactions
of society” than today. Brewer , supra, at 271. The
18a
Appendix A
purchase of goods, including firearms, required the ability
to contract because people often bought goods on credit.
See, e.g., Wills v. Brown, 3 N.J.L. 548, 548 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1809) (dispute over a “running blacksmith account”);
Christie v. Woods, 2 Yeates 213, 215 (Pa. 1797) (dispute over
“goods [that] were sold on six months’ credit”); Saunders
Glover & Co. v. Ott’s Adm’r, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 572,
572 (1822) (dispute over goods, including “powder and
pistols,” purchased on credit); M acpherson, supra, at 316
(discussing disputes over clothing and jewelry bought on
credit). And because voidability threatened sellers with a
“high risk” that they could not recover goods sold if they
contracted with infants, “infants [were] effectively unable
to form contracts.” Brewer, supra, at 271. Importantly,
“liquor, pistols, powder, saddles, bridles, [and] whips”
were not necessaries. Ott’s Adm’r, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord)
at 572; see also 1 Swift, supra, at 216 (necessaries were
“diet[,] apparel, education, and lodging”); Brewer, supra,
at 266 (necessaries were food, clothing, education, and
medicine); 2 Kent, supra, at 256 (same). Minors also lacked
disposable income to otherwise purchase firearms because
they either worked for their parents for no wages, Robert
J. Spitzer, Historical Weapons Restrictions on Minors, 76
Rutgers U.L. Rev.: Commentaries 101, 108 (2024), or any
wages earned belonged to their parents, 1 Blackstone,
supra, at *453.
We draw two lessons from the legal treatment of
minors at the Founding. First, minors generally could not
purchase firearms because they lacked the judgment and
discretion to enter contracts and to receive the wages of
their labor. Second, minors were subject to the power of
19a
Appendix A
their parents and depended on their parents’ consent to
exercise rights and deal with others in society.
State militia laws from the Founding era confirm
this understanding. Because of the legal incapacity of
individuals under the age of 21, states enacted laws at
the Founding to address minors’ inability to purchase
firearms required for their militia service. The Second
Congress passed the Militia Act to enroll “able-bodied”
men between the ages of 18 and 45 in the militia. Act of
May 8, 1792, 1 Stat. 271, 271. The Act provided that “every
citizen so enrolled . . . shall . . . provide himself with a
good musket or firelock.” Id. But members of Congress
recognized that individuals between the ages of 18 and
21 would need their parents to provide them weapons to
comply with the Act. Representative John Vining “asked
by what means minors were to provide themselves with
the requisite articles” for militia service. 2 Joseph Gales,
The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the
United S tates 1854–55 (1834). And Representative
Jeremiah Wadsworth responded that “as to minors, their
parents or guardians would prefer furnishing them with
arms themselves, to depending on the United States” to
furnish them with arms. Id. at 1856.
States addressed the problem of providing minors
the firearms necessary for militia service in different
ways. Pennsylvania and Delaware exempted minors
from the firearm requirement entirely. 14 James T.
Mitchell & Henry Flanders, The Statutes at Large of
Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, at 456 (1909) (“[Y]oung
men under the age of twenty-one . . . shall be exempted
20a
Appendix A
from furnishing the necessary arms, ammunition and
accoutrements.”) (Statutes of 1793); 2 Laws of the State
of Delaware 1135–36 (New Castle, Samuel Adams & John
Adams 1797) (same) (Statutes of 1793). New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Vermont, North Carolina, Louisiana,
Maine, and Missouri required parents of minors to
acquire firearms for their militia service. The Laws of
the State of New H ampshire 421–22 (Portsmouth, John
Melcher 1797) (Act of 1792); 2 The Perpetual Laws of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts 181 (Boston, I. Thomas
& E. T. Andrews 1801) (Statutes of 1793); 2 The Laws of
the State of Vermont 131–32 (Randolph, Sereno Wright
1808) (Act of 1797); 2 Francois -X avier M artin, T he
Public Acts of the General Assembly of North Carolina
159 (Newbern, Martin & Ogden 1804) (Act of 1800);
Acts Passed at the First Session of the Legislative
Council of the T erritory of Orleans 284–86 (New
Orleans, James M. Bradford 1805) (Act of 1805); A n Act
to Organize, G overn, and Discipline the Militia , of the
State of Maine 21, 37 (Portland, Todd & Smith 1824) (Act
of 1821); 2 Laws of the State of Missouri 533, 554, 571, 574
(St. Louis, E. Charless 1825) (Act of 1825). And Virginia,
Connecticut, New York, Rhode Island, Maryland, New
Jersey, Ohio, Mississippi, Kentucky, Georgia, Indiana,
and Illinois implicitly required parents to supply minors
with firearms because those states held parents liable
for minors’ fines related to militia service, including the
failure to obtain a firearm. 9 William Walter Hening,
T he Statutes at L arge; Being a Collection of A ll
the L aws of Virginia from the First Session of the
Legislature in the Year 1619, at 270–71 (Richmond, J.
& G. Cochran Printers 1821) (Act of 1777); Acts and Laws
21a
Appendix A
of the State of Connecticut, in A merica 307–08, 312
(Hartford, Hudson & Goodwin 1796) (Act of 1792); 3 Laws
of the State of New York 58, 63–64 (New York, Thomas
Greenleaf 1797) (Act of 1793); The Public Laws of the
State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 436–
38 (Providence, Carter & Wilkinson 1798) (Act of 1798);
2 William K ilty, The Laws of M aryland ch. LIII, §§ I,
XV, XIX (Annapolis, Frederick Green 1800) (Supplement
of 1798); William Paterson, Laws of the State of New
Jersey 438–40 (New Brunswick, Abraham Blauvelt
1800) (Act of 1799); 2 Acts of the State of Ohio: Second
Session of the General A ssembly 31–32, 35 (Chillicothe,
N. Willis, reprinted by The Laning Co. 1901) (Statutes of
1803); Harry Toulmin, The Statutes of the Mississippi
Territory 80 (Natchez, Samuel Terrell 1807) (Statutes
of 1807); 2 Laws of K entucky 401, 405 (Lexington, John
Bradford 1807) (Statutes of 1807); Oliver H. Prince,
A Digest of the Laws of the State of Georgia 330–31
(Milledgeville, Grantland & Orme 1822) (Act of 1807); A n
Act Regulating the Militia, of the State of Indiana
19–20 (Corydon, Carpenter & Douglass 1824) (Act of
1824); Laws Passed by the Fourth General A ssembly
of the State of Illinois, at T heir Second Session 23
(Vandalia, Robert Blackwell 1826) (Act of 1826).
During the Founding era, minors generally lacked
unrestricted access to firearms. By 1826, at least 21
of the 24 states admitted to the Union—representing
roughly 89 percent of the population, Census for 1820,
at 18 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1821)—had enacted
laws that placed the onus on parents to provide minors
with firearms for militia service. These laws reflected
22a
Appendix A
that, at common law, minors could not purchase weapons
for themselves. Cf. Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146, 139
S. Ct. 682, 688, 203 L. Ed. 2d 11 (2019) (“In 1787, the
constitutions of eight States—accounting for 70% of the
U.S. population—forbade excessive fines.” And by 1868,
“the constitutions of 35 of the 37 States—accounting for
over 90% of the U.S. population—expressly prohibited
excessive fines.”).
University regulations from the Founding era also
confirm that minors needed parental consent to access
firearms. At the Founding, “[c]ollege authorities stood
in the place of parents to the students entrusted to
their care.” Brian Jackson, The Lingering Legacy of In
Loco Parentis: An Historical Survey and Proposal for
Reform, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 1135, 1135–36 (1991). Acting
in loco parentis, universities could impose “[a]ny rule
or regulation for the betterment of” their students’
“physical, moral, and mental welfare.” Id. at 1146; accord 1
Blackstone, supra, at *453 (A father could “delegate part
of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or
schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and
has such a portion of the power of the parent committed
to his charge . . . as may be necessary to answer the
purposes for which he is employed.”). And universities
“were permitted to deny students the autonomy and
rights enjoyed by others in order to preserve institutional
harmony.” Jackson, supra, at 1147.
Exercising this parental authority, universities
commonly restricted firearm access both on and off
campus. See generally Megan Walsh & Saul Cornell,
23a
Appendix A
Age Restrictions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms,
1791–1868, 108 M inn. L. R ev. 3049, 3069–75 (2024);
Spitzer, supra, at 112–19 (collecting dozens of public and
private university codes and concluding that “policies
restricting students’ access to weapons were common, if
not ubiquitous” in the 1700s and 1800s). For example, in
1795, Yale College prohibited students from “keep[ing]
any kind of fire-arms, or gun-powder.” The Laws of YaleCollege, in New Haven, in Connecticut, Enacted by the
President and Fellows, the Sixth Day of October, A.D.
1795, at 26 (New Haven, Thomas Green & Son 1800). In
1810, the University of Georgia prohibited students from
possessing firearms off campus. See The Minutes of the
Senatus Academicus 1799–1842, Univ. of Ga. Librs. 86
(Nov. 4, 1976), https://perma.cc/EW28-VU83 (prohibiting
students from possessing “any gun” or “other offensive
weapon in College” or “out of the college in any case
whatsoever”). Later, the University of Virginia prohibited
students from keeping “weapons or arms of any kind, or
gunpowder” on school grounds. University of Virginia
Board of Visitors Minutes, Encyclopedia Va. 6–7 (Oct. 5,
1824), https://perma.cc/F32R-AWK9. And students at the
University of North Carolina could not “keep . . . fire arms,
or gunpowder” nor “carry, keep, or own at the College . . .
any deadly weapon” nor “use fire arms without permission
from the President.” Acts of the General A ssembly and
Ordinances of the Trustees for the Organization and
Government of the University of North-Carolina 15
(Raleigh, The Raleigh Register 1838).
Mid-to-late-nineteenth-century laws consistent with
these principles further establish that our law historically
24a
Appendix A
precluded the purchase of firearms by individuals under
the age of 21. In the second half of the nineteenth century,
20 jurisdictions enacted laws that restricted access to
arms for minors. Most of those laws prohibited all methods
of providing arms to individuals under the age of 21. And
only a few of these laws allowed parents to provide arms
to their children.
Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, Indiana, Missouri,
Illinois, Maryland, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Iowa,
Louisiana, Wyoming, the District of Columbia, North
Carolina, and Texas prohibited selling, loaning, or giving
dangerous weapons, including pistols, to individuals under
the age of 21. 1855–56 Ala. Laws 17; Tenn. Code § 4864
(1858), reprinted in The Code of Tennessee Enacted
by the General A ssembly of 1857–’8, at 871 (Nashville,
E. G. Eastman & Co. 1858); 1860 Ky. Acts 245; 1875 Ind.
Acts 59; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1274 (1879), reprinted in 1
The Revised Statutes of the State of Missouri 1879,
at 224 (Jefferson, Carter & Regan 1879); 1881 Ill. Laws
73; 1882 Md. Laws 656; 1882 W. Va. Acts 421; 1883 Wis.
Sess. Laws 290 (vol. 1); 1884 Iowa Acts 86; 1890 La. Acts
39; 1890 Wyo. Terr. Sess. Laws 140; J. A. Van Orsdel &
Fenimore Chatterton, Revised Statutes of Wyoming
in Force December 1, 1899, at 1253 (Laramie, Chaplin,
Spafford & Mathison 1899) (codifying the territorial law);
27 Stat. 116–17 (1892); 1893 N.C. Sess. Laws 468–69; 1897
Tex. Gen. Laws 221–22; see also Saltonstall v. Riley, 28
Ala. 164, 172 (1856) (describing a “minor under the age of
twenty-one years”); Warwick v. Cooper, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed)
659, 660–61 (1858) (referring to 21 as the age of majority);
Newland v. Gentry, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 666, 671, 18 B.
25a
Appendix A
Mon. 666 (1857) (referring to 21 as the age of majority);
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 2559, supra, (setting the age of majority
at 21 for males and 18 for females); 64 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 1
(1881) (setting the age of majority at 21 for males and 18
for females); Hepp v. Huefner, 61 Wis. 148, 20 N.W. 923,
924 (Wis. 1884) (referring to 21 as the age of majority);
In re Mells, 64 Iowa 391, 20 N.W. 486, 486 (Iowa 1884)
(referring to 21 as the age of majority); State v. Kittelle,
110 N.C. 560, 15 S.E. 103, 103 (N.C. 1892) (referring to 21
as the age of majority); 1 John Sayles & Henry Sayles,
Sayles’ A nnotated Civil Statutes of the State of Texas
1009 (St. Louis, The Gilbert Book Co. 1898) (setting the
age of majority at 21 for males and unmarried females).
But, of those jurisdictions, only four excepted parents or
guardians from their prohibitions on providing arms to
individuals under the age of 21. 1860 Ky. Acts 245; Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 1274 (1879), supra; 1897 Tex. Gen. Laws 221–22;
1881 Ill. Laws 73 (employers, too).
Five other jurisdictions regulated access to arms
for individuals under the age of 21 in slightly different
ways. Mississippi prohibited the sale of deadly weapons
including pistols to individuals under the age of 21 but
did not prohibit other ways of providing arms to those
individuals. 1878 Miss. Laws 175; see also Acker v.
Trueland, 56 Miss. 30, 34 (1878) (referring to 21 as the
age of majority). Similarly, Delaware prohibited the sale
of “deadly weapon[s] . . . other than an ordinary pocket
knife” to minors. 16 Del. Laws 716 (1881); see also Revised
Statutes of the State of Delaware of Eighteen Hundred
and Fifty-T wo 484–85 (Wilmington, James & Webb 1874)
(setting the age of majority at 21 for males and 18 for
26a
Appendix A
females). Georgia prohibited “sell[ing], giv[ing] lend[ing],
or furnish[ing]” a pistol to a minor unless “circumstances
justif[ied]” the use of the weapon to “defend[] life, limb
or property.” 1876 Ga. Laws 112. Nevada and Kansas
went further. Nevada prohibited individuals under the
age of 21 from “wear[ing] or carry[ing] . . . dangerous or
deadly weapons[],” including pistols. 1885 Nev. Stat. 51.
And Kansas prohibited their “possession” of pistols and
“other dangerous weapon[s].” 1883 Kan. Sess. Laws 159;
see also Burgett v. Barrick, 25 Kan. 526, 527–29 (1881)
(referring to 21 as the age of majority).
The law of the Founding era, which restricted the
purchase of firearms by minors, continued into the
nineteenth century in the form of statutory prohibitions.
By the end of the nineteenth century, at least 19 states
and the District of Columbia—representing roughly 55
percent of the population of states admitted to the Union,
Census Off., Dep’t of the Interior, T welfth Census of
the U.S. Taken in the Year 1900, Census Reports, Vol. I:
Population 2 (1901) (1890 population data)—restricted the
purchase or use of certain firearms by minors. When the
common-law regime became less effective at restricting
minors’ access to firearms, statutes increasingly did the
work.
These mid-to-late-nineteenth-century laws also
carried the threat of criminal penalties. Alabama,
Kentucky, Indiana, Mississippi, Illinois, Maryland,
Kansas, and Wyoming imposed only fines for violations of
their statutes. 1855–56 Ala. Laws 17; 1860 Ky. Acts 245;
1875 Ind. Acts 59; 1878 Miss. Laws 175; 1881 Ill. Laws 73;
27a
Appendix A
1882 Md. Laws 656; 1883 Kan. Sess. Laws 159; 1890 Wyo.
Terr. Sess. Laws 140. But Tennessee, Georgia, Missouri,
Delaware, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Iowa, Nevada,
Louisiana, the District of Columbia, North Carolina, and
Texas threatened violators with imprisonment. T enn.
Code § 4864 (1858), supra; 1876 Ga. Laws 112; The Code
of the State of Georgia 782 (R. H. Clark, et al. eds., 2d
ed. 1873); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1274 (1879), supra; 16 Del. Laws
716 (1881); 1882 W. Va. Acts 421; 1883 Wis. Sess. Laws
290 (vol. 1); 1884 Iowa Acts 86; 1885 Nev. Stat. 51; 1890
La. Acts 39; 27 Stat. 116–17 (1892); 1893 N.C. Sess. Laws
468–69; 1897 Tex. Gen. Laws 221–22.
The age of the majority “remained unchanged” in
the United States “from the country’s founding well into
the twentieth century.” Hamilton, supra, at 64. When
World War II necessitated lowering the conscription age
to 18, states lowered the age of majority too. Id. And, in
1971, the ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
guaranteed the right to vote to individuals at the age of
18. But for much of the first two centuries of our nation,
our law limited the rights of individuals under the age of
21, including their purchase of firearms.
From this history emerges a straightfor ward
conclusion: the Florida law is consistent with our
regulatory tradition in why and how it burdens the right
of minors to keep and bear arms. See Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at
1898. Because minors have yet to reach the age of reason,
the Florida law prohibits them from purchasing firearms,
yet it allows them to receive firearms from their parents
or another responsible adult.
28a
Appendix A
The Florida law has the same “why” as the Foundingera limitations: individuals under the age of 21 have not
reached the age of reason and lack the judgment and
discretion to purchase firearms responsibly. To reduce the
likelihood that another individual like Nikolas Cruz would
lawfully purchase a firearm and use it to inflict grievous
harm on himself or others, the Florida law restricts
the purchase of firearms by individuals under the age
of 21. See Fla. Stat. § 790.065(13). Likewise, our legal
system “imposed age limits on all manner of activities
that required judgment and reason” at the Founding.
Brown, 564 U.S. at 834 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But
when an individual reaches the age of reason and the
need to protect him and the public from his immaturity
and impulsivity dissipates, the Florida law permits him
to purchase firearms. See Fla. Stat. § 790.065(13).
The Florida law is also consistent with our regulatory
tradition in “how” it burdens the right. Founding-era law
precluded individuals under the age of 21 from purchasing
arms because they lacked cash and the capacity to
contract. Access to arms was a matter of parental
consent. When Founding-era laws required minors to
carry arms for militia service, states required their
parents to provide the arms. And universities, standing
in for students’ parents, imposed significant restrictions
on both firearm access and use. Consistent with these
Founding-era limitations, states in the nineteenth century
expressly prohibited the sale of arms to minors with
some exceptions for parents to provide firearms to their
children. The Florida law burdens the right no more than
these historical restrictions because it prohibits purchase
but preserves access to firearms with parental consent.
29a
Appendix A
Notably, the Florida law is less restrictive than the
law at the Founding in some ways. The militia laws did not
empower any individuals under the age of 21 to purchase
arms. But the Florida law contains exceptions permitting
the purchase of a rifle or shotgun by peace officers,
correctional officers, or military personnel. Fla . Stat.
§ 790.065(13). This exception is more generous than the
Founding-era militia laws because it empowers minors to
purchase firearms when needed for public service.
The Florida law fits comfortably within postratification
tradition too. Indeed, many postratification laws went
further than the Florida law does. Fifteen jurisdictions
prohibited providing pistols and other dangerous weapons
under any circumstances to individuals under the age 21,
not just selling them. Only six jurisdictions permitted
parents to provide arms to their children regardless of
circumstances—a step back from the parental consent
of the Founding era. And Nevada and Kansas prohibited
possession by individuals under the age of 21. That
the Florida law is less restrictive than many of these
postratification laws further confirms that it fits within
our regulatory tradition.
To be sure, the common-law regime of the Founding
era differs from our modern regime of statutory
regulation. But Supreme Court precedents do not require
a modern law to “precisely match its historical precursors.”
Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1898. Those “precedents were not
meant to suggest a law trapped in amber.” Id. at 1897.
And we do not “assume[] that founding-era legislatures
maximally exercised their power to regulate” or that the
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Second Amendment imposes a “‘use it or lose it’ view of
legislative authority.” Id. at 1925 (Barrett, J., concurring).
That kind of assumption is especially unwarranted here
where the limitations on the legal rights of minors were
so pervasive that states had no need to enact restrictions
that prohibited their purchase of firearms. Instead, the
inability to contract and the lack of a right to their own
wages precluded minors from purchasing any goods on
their own, except for necessaries when their parents would
not provide them. See Brewer, supra, at 271; 2 K ent,
supra, at 256–57; 1 Blackstone, supra, at *466.
The question is whether the modern law is “‘analogous
enough,’” and the Florida law is. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1898
(quoting Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2133). Like the Foundingera legal regime, the Florida law prevents purchases by
minors. The difference between the Florida law and the
Founding-era regime is that the law at the Founding was
more restrictive than the Florida law because it prevented
the purchase of many goods besides firearms. The
Florida law does not violate the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments because it restricts the rights of minors less
than the Founding-era law did.
Although the Founding era lacked express prohibitions
on the purchase of firearms, the postratification period
did not. The laws from the mid-to-late nineteenth century
make explicit what was implicit at the Founding: laws may
regulate the purchase of firearms by minors. To that end,
18 jurisdictions expressly prohibited the sale of certain
arms to individuals under the age of 21 and attached
criminal penalties to those prohibitions.
31a
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The ways in which postratification laws are less
restrictive than the Florida law do not undermine our
conclusion either. Many of these laws arguably target only
abnormally dangerous weapons instead of all weapons.
See, e.g., Tenn. Code § 4864 (1858), supra (“pistol, bowieknife, dirk, Arkansas tooth-pick, hunter’s knife, or like
dangerous weapon, except a gun for hunting or weapon for
defence in travelling”); see also Brasher Dissenting Op. at
30 (“[T]hese laws reflect a tradition of regulating specific
weapons that were considered unusually dangerous
because they could so easily be concealed.”). And some of
these laws permitted women to purchase arms at 18 years
of age instead of 21. E.g., 1881 Ill. Laws 73; 64 Ill. Comp.
Stat. § 1 (1881). Even if we accept that the Florida law is
more restrictive than the postratification laws in these
ways, that fact does not make the Florida law inconsistent
with our regulatory tradition. At the Founding, the
law precluded the purchase of any kind of firearm by a
minor, whether male or female. So, to the extent that the
Florida law is more restrictive than postratification laws,
it does not matter because the Florida law is nevertheless
consistent with the law of the Founding.
Judge Brasher’s dissenting opinion offers tales
of Founder/President youths shooting guns, Brasher
Dissenting Op. at 12–13 (recounting how Thomas Jefferson
and John Adams and eldest son John Quincy Adams used
firearms as children for hunting and sport), to imply that
it would violate the Second and Fourteenth Amendments
to restrict the purchase of firearms by minors of any age,
see id. at 3 (“[T]he majority has read an age limit into the
Second Amendment and that amendment alone.”); id. at
32a
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12 (“[T]here are no Founding-era laws disarming anyone
based on age.”); id. at 14 (“[F]ederal legislation simply
required all national select militia members to arrive
armed for duty; there were no specific provisions about
minors.”); id. at 16 (“[T]here were no Founding-era laws
prohibiting young adults from purchasing any firearm at
all.”); id. at 27 (“There were no age-based limitations on
[the] right to keep and bear arms either before, during,
or immediately after the adoption of the Bill of Rights.”).
Judge Branch’s dissenting opinion also implies that any
age restriction is unconstitutional. See Branch Dissenting
Op. at 3 (“[T]he majority’s lone Founding-era analogue . . .
a contract-law doctrine . . . incidentally reached contracts
for firearms because it reached contracts by minors for
any non-necessity.”). But that position defies our legal
tradition, which “imposed age limits on all manner of
activities that required judgment and reason.” Brown,
564 U.S. at 834 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Perhaps because that position is so difficult to defend,
Judge Brasher’s dissent frames the Florida law as one
that supposedly targets “adults” between the ages of 18
and 21 even though the Florida law, by its terms, covers
all individuals under the age of 21. See, e.g., Brasher
Dissenting Op. at 1 (describing the Florida law as a
prohibition on “adult citizens between the ages of eighteen
to twenty-one from purchasing any kind of firearm”).
The dissent then suggests that its modern “adults” are
individuals who possess some unspecified set of legal
rights. See id. at 20 (noting that individuals over the age
of 18 “can [now] be held to long term contracts” in Florida
and that their parents lack an “obligation to protect them,
33a
Appendix A
provide for them, or ensure their safety”). And it concludes
that Florida cannot bar these “adults” from purchasing
firearms today regardless of their status at the Founding.
Campbell and the Association take a similar approach:
Although they concede that Florida may restrict the
purchase of firearms by minors, they argue that Florida’s
regulatory authority is somehow tied to the age of majority
that it currently uses for most other rights.
The dissent’s attempt to avoid the weight of legal
history by labeling individuals between the ages of 18 and
21 as “adults” is unavailing. The dissent fails to define its
category of “adults” for federal constitutional purposes; it
discounts the key fact that, at the Founding and until the
late twentieth century, the age of majority was 21. Instead
of reviewing the legal analogues for regulating the rights
of individuals under the age of 21 as minors, the dissent
treats contemporary “adults” as the so-called “analogues”
of the adults of the Founding era. Id. at 31 (“Not to
belabor the point, but eighteen-to twenty-one-year-olds
in Florida today are analogous to adults, not minors,
at the time these statutes were enacted.”). The dissent
fails to explain which, or how many, modern rights push
an individual across the threshold from minor to adult
under the Second Amendment. Taken to its logical end,
the dissent’s position would mean that the federal right
to keep and bear arms turns on a sliding scale defined by
contemporary state law that varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. The federal right could even mean something
entirely different in Florida next week depending on the
public policy choices of its legislature.
34a
Appendix A
That Florida has lowered the age of majority for some
rights does not mean that it has less power to restrict the
rights of minors than it did at the Founding. Although 21
was the near-universal age of majority at the Founding,
Hamilton, supra, at 64, Florida, in recent decades, has
lowered the age of majority for many rights to 18, see
Fla. Stat. § 743.07. But not all states have lowered the
age of majority like Florida. See, e.g., Miss. Code § 1-327 (establishing 21 years as the age of majority except
with respect to the capacity to enter contracts that
affect personal or real property); A la. Code § 26-1-1(a)
(establishing 19 years as the age of majority). And even
modern Florida laws bar individuals under the age of
21 from purchasing alcohol and tobacco. See Fla. Stat.
§ 562.11(1)(a) (alcohol); id. § 569.101(1) (tobacco). Judge
Brasher’s dissent would have us hold that the Second
Amendment turns on an evolving standard of adulthood
that is divorced from the text of the Amendment and from
our regulatory tradition. We decline to do so. See Thomas
M. Cooley, a Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations
Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States
of the A merican Union 54 (Boston, Little, Brown, &
Co. 1868) (“A principal share of the benefit expected
from written constitutions would be lost if the rules they
established were so flexible as to bend to circumstances
or be modified by public opinion.”).
In a real sense, Judge Brasher’s dissent erroneously
reviews the Florida law under an equal-protection
standard masquerading as an analysis under the Second
Amendment. It asserts that the Florida law cannot
stand because the principle that minors were subject
35a
Appendix A
to the power of their parents at the Founding does not
adequately support application of the law to individuals
between the ages of 18 and 21 today. Brasher Dissenting
Op. at 21 (asserting that “Florida cannot enforce its
ban based on a historical justification that does not
exist in the present day”). In effect, the dissent applies
heightened scrutiny and asks whether the Florida law is
sufficiently tailored to the dissent’s chosen justification.
But settled law makes clear that we ordinarily review
age classifications under the Equal Protection Clause for
rational basis, and the Florida law easily satisfies that
standard. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470, 111
S. Ct. 2395, 115 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1991) (Because “age is not a
suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause,”
a state “need therefore assert only a rational basis for
its age classification.”). Although the dissent contends
that age classifications that involve fundamental rights
receive strict scrutiny, Brasher Dissenting Op. at 22, the
Supreme Court has “recognized that even where there is
an invasion of protected freedoms ‘the power of the state
to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the
scope of its authority over adults,’” Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 638, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1968)
(quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170, 64 S.
Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944)). Indeed, the Supreme Court
has described the right to vote as “fundamental,” Harper
v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670, 86 S. Ct.
1079, 16 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1966), yet it has held that Congress
could not use its enforcement power under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to require states to lower
the voting age from 21 to 18, Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112, 130, 91 S. Ct. 260, 27 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1970). After all,
36a
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Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment itself uses 21
years as an age classification for that right. U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 2 (reducing the “basis of representation”
of any state that “denie[s]” the “right to vote” to “any
of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one
years of age”).
Florida did not lose its constitutional authority to
regulate minors’ access to firearms when it in recent
decades bestowed on individuals between the ages of 18
and 21 greater rights than they would have enjoyed at the
Founding. Indeed, that Florida distinguishes between the
purchase of a firearm and other rights is consistent with
the Founding-era legal regime, which also distinguished
between when individuals under the age of 21 could
exercise rights based on need and maturity. For example,
individuals under the age of 21 could enter valid contracts
to purchase necessaries if their parents did not provide
those necessaries. 2 K ent, supra, at 256–57. The law
also treated marriage contracts differently than other
contracts. See 1 Blackstone, supra, at *433, 436. Boys
could validly marry at the age of 14, and girls could at
the age of 12—the “years of discretion” for marriage. Id.
at *436. These Founding-era exceptions for the exercise
of rights based on need or judgments about maturity are
no different from Florida’s contemporary judgment that
only individuals with a greater degree of maturity should
be able to purchase firearms. And that judgment is one
reserved for legislatures whose role it is to formulate
policy about legal adulthood—not courts. To this point,
our dissenting colleagues offer no response.
37a
Appendix A
Nor does the fact that some states required minors
to serve in the militia establish that they had a right
to unfettered firearm access. Judge Brasher’s dissent
mistakes the duty of some minors to serve in the militia
for a right to purchase firearms. See Brasher Dissenting
Op. at 13–16. Although minors between the ages of 18
and 21 could serve in the militia, there was no national
requirement that they do so. Instead, Congress permitted,
but did not require, states to mandate militia service for
minors between 18 and 21 years of age. 1 Stat. at 271–72.
And, consistent with that authority, New Jersey, Ohio, and
Kansas exempted minors from service in the militia in the
nineteenth century. Acts of the Fifty-Fourth General
A ssembly of the State of New Jersey 3 (Trenton, Joseph
Justice 1829) (excluding minors under the age of 21 from
the militia); Acts of a General Nature, Passed by the
Forty Second General A ssembly of the State of Ohio
53 (Columbus, Samuel Medary 1844) (same); K an. Const.
of 1859, art. VIII, § 1 (same). Contrary to the dissent,
the militia laws establish no national “expectation of gun
ownership” by minors. Brasher Dissenting Op. at 14. They
establish only that many state legislatures determined
that minors could be required to bear arms provided by
their parents and to use those arms under the command
and supervision of militia officers.
We also reject, as contrary to Supreme Court
precedent, Judge Branch’s dissenting opinion that we
must rely only on firearm-specific regulations from the
Founding era and cannot consider the common law of
contracts that governed minors. See Branch Dissenting
Op. at 3. Reliance on the common-law regime of contracts
38a
Appendix A
is appropriate because the Florida law prohibits the
sale of firearms—a kind of contract. And it adheres
to Supreme Court precedent because, in Rahimi, the
Supreme Court relied on principles “[w]ell entrenched in
the common law” that were not limited to firearms. 144
S. Ct. at 1900. Specifically, the Supreme Court relied on
surety laws, which generally required that an individual
pledge to keep the peace and “could be invoked to prevent
all forms of violence.” Id. As the Rahimi Court explained,
“the Second Amendment permits more than just those
regulations identical to ones that could be found in 1791.”
Id. at 1897–98.
Nor does it make any sense for Judge Branch’s
dissenting opinion to suggest that our citation of a decision
refusing to enforce a creditor’s purported contract with a
minor, Ott’s Adm’r, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) at 572, somehow
proves that minors regularly purchased firearms in the
Founding era, see Branch Dissenting Op. at 7. Judge
Branch’s dissent cites no firearm-sales contract with a
minor enforced by any court, and it points to no evidence
that minors in any state regularly purchased firearms.
It bears repeating that it is unclear whether our
dissenting colleagues accept that any age restriction
for the sale of firearms is constitutional. If they do not,
their position would require enjoining the enforcement of
numerous federal and state laws, including a federal law
that prohibits licensed sellers from selling “any firearm or
ammunition” to an individual under the age of 18. See 18
U.S.C. § 922(b)(1). But if our dissenting colleagues accept
that some age restrictions are constitutional—and they
39a
Appendix A
do not say that they do—it is unclear what aspects of the
Founding-era legal regime they believe would support
that position. Would the common-law regime of contracts
be relevantly similar for limiting sales of firearms to any
minors? Or would a firearm-specific regulation from that
era be necessary? Would the common-law regime that
enshrined parental control be relevantly similar? Or
would the legislatures of that era have had to exercise
that control? And if the aspects of the common-law regime
that we have invoked are relevantly similar for upholding
modern laws that prohibit sales of firearms to minors
under the age of 18 years, what principle of constitutional
law do our dissenting colleagues believe empowers the
federal judiciary to override the judgment of the Florida
legislature to draw the line at 21 years, the same line that
prevailed during the Founding era and throughout most
of American history? Keep in mind that Congress too has
drawn the same line of 21 years for sales of firearms that
are not “a shotgun or rifle.” Id. On these questions, our
dissenting colleagues exercise a right to remain silent. See
Branch Dissenting Op. at 1 n.1 (“I express no opinion on
any restrictions placed upon Americans under 18 years
of age.”).
The recent contrary decision of our sister circuit—
which ignored how the common-law regime restricted
minors’ access to firearms—also fails to persuade
us. Reese v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms &
Explosives, 127 F.4th 583, 586 (5th Cir. 2025) (holding
unconstitutional a federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1), (c)
(1), that prohibits licensees from selling handguns to
minors between the ages of 18 and 21). Our sister circuit
40a
Appendix A
considered state militia laws and university regulations
without reference to the common law at the Founding.
See id. at 596–99. But even mid-nineteenth century
jurists described “the unwritten law” as the “basis of our
jurisprudence.” Commonwealth v. Chapman, 54 Mass.
(13 Met.) 68, 69, 13 Metc. 68 (1847). The common law
“furnishe[d] the rules by which public and private rights
[we]re established and secured, the social relations of all
persons regulated, their rights, duties, and obligations
determined, and all violations of duty redressed and
punished.” Id. From those jurists’ perspective, without the
common law, “the written law, embracing the constitution
and statute laws, would constitute but a lame, partial, and
impracticable system.” Id.; see also A ntonin Scalia &
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts 3 (2012) (“Ours is a common-law tradition
. . . . Statutes were a comparatively infrequent source
of English law through the mid-19th century.”). Indeed,
in the Founding era, “crimes were often defined by the
common law rather than by statute.” Stuart Banner,
T he D ecline of Natural L aw 50 (2021). And after
the American Revolution, the states quickly “passed
‘reception statutes’ to adopt English common law as
judicial precedent.” Bryan A. Garner, et al., The Law
of Judicial Precedent 738 (2016); see generally Ford W.
Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in
the United States, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 791, 798–800 (1951); see
also A nthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The
Law of Nations and the United States Constitution 10
(2017) (“Each state adopted the common law of England
and, by extension, key parts of the law of nations.”).
41a
Appendix A
The written laws of the Founding era must be
understood in the light of that predominant common-law
regime. See William Baude & Robert Leider, The GeneralLaw Right to Bear Arms, 99 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1467,
1468–70 (2024) (“The constitutionalization of a preexisting
right means that . . . the Constitution’s reference to a
legal right must be understood by learning the historical
customary law that defined and governed the right before
its codification.”); J. Joel Alicea, Bruen Was Right, 174
U. Pa. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2025) (manuscript at 32–33),
https://perma.cc/C592-T8GA (“[T]he more reasonable
reading is that Bruen does not, in fact, limit the category of
historical evidence to regulations. Bruen is an originalist
methodology . . . . In other contexts, the Court has rightly
looked to many different sources to determine the original
meaning of the Constitution.”); see generally Stewart Jay,
Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1231 (1985); Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R.
Clark, General Law in Federal Court, 54 Wm. & M ary L.
Rev. 655 (2013); Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General
Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503 (2006); William Baude, et al.,
General Law and the Fourteenth Amendment, 76 Stan.
L. Rev. 1185 (2024). That common-law regime restricted
minors’ ability to purchase firearms. The state statutes
that obligated parents to provide firearms for minors’
militia service confirm that minors had limited access, and
the many university regulations that restricted firearm
possession by students confirm that minors’ access was
a matter of parental consent. Because the Fifth Circuit
failed to consider the background common-law regime,
it misapprehended the import of these written laws. See
Reese, 127 F.4th at 597 (The “requirements that parents
42a
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furnish firearms for their sons’ militia service do not
mean that the military-age young men lacked the right
to keep and bear (or obtain) such arms themselves.”); id.
at 596 (“Actions taken in loco parentis say little about the
general scope of Constitutional rights and protections.”).
Nor are we persuaded that two other considerations
present in Rahimi command a different conclusion. First,
although the Supreme Court acknowledged in Rahimi
that section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) did not apply to an entire class
of “persons thought by a legislature to present a special
danger of misuse,” it did so because the Founding-era
comparators, surety and going-armed laws, did not apply
to entire classes either. 144 S. Ct. at 1901–02. Section
922(g)(8)(C)(i) “presumes, like the surety laws before it,
that the Second Amendment right may only be burdened
once a defendant has been found to pose a credible threat
to the physical safety of others.” Id. at 1902. Unlike the
surety and going-armed laws, the rule that minors had
not “arriv[ed] at years of discretion” and lacked legal
capacity applied during the Founding era to all individuals
under the age of 21. 1 Blackstone, supra, at *452–53. So,
it does not matter that the Florida law applies to a class
of individuals because the Founding-era comparators did
too.
Second, the lack of criminal penalties at the Founding
is not dispositive, especially in the light of the criminal
penalties that emerged during the nineteenth century.
Rahimi considered the penalty that attaches to a firearm
regulation as a “relevant,” but not necessary, “aspect of the
burden.” 144 S. Ct. at 1902. Violations of the Florida law
43a
Appendix A
carry the possibility of imprisonment of up to five years and
a fine of up to $5,000. Fla. Stat. §§ 790.065(13), 775.082(3)
(e), 775.083(1)(c). The law at the Founding did not impose
criminal penalties on individuals under the age of 21 who
purchased firearms. But postratification laws, which
prohibited the purchase of firearms by individuals under
the age of 21 consistent with Founding-era limitations,
did threaten violators with fines and imprisonment. E.g.,
T enn. Code § 4864 (1858), supra. And the law at the
Founding was not toothless either. Voidability threatened
sellers with a “high risk” that they could not recover goods
sold if they contracted with infants. Brewer, supra, at
271. As a criminal penalty might discourage an individual
in Florida from purchasing a firearm, voidability so
discouraged sellers such that “infants [were] effectively
unable to form contracts.” Id. Although there was no
risk of imprisonment until the nineteenth century, other
incentives nevertheless discouraged the sale of firearms
to individuals under the age of 21. The burden on the right
is not so different as to compel the conclusion that this
“relevant aspect” deserves dispositive weight.
Finally, we assume, but do not decide, that individuals
under the age of 21 are part of “the people” protected
by the Second Amendment. Some have argued that we
need not look beyond the text of the Second Amendment
to determine whether laws like the Florida law are
constitutional because these individuals are not part of
“the people” protected by the Amendment. See, e.g., Lara
v. Comm’r Pa. State Police, 125 F.4th 428, 447 (3d Cir.
2025) (Restrepo, J., dissenting) (“The public in 1791 did
not understand those under 21 to be part of ‘the people’
44a
Appendix A
protected by the Second Amendment.”); see also Bruen,
142 S. Ct. at 2129–30 (“When the Second Amendment’s
plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution
presumptively protects that conduct.”); cf. Brown, 564
U.S. at 821 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The practices and
beliefs of the founding generation establish that ‘the
freedom of speech,’ as originally understood, does not
include a right to speak to minors (or a right of minors
to access speech) without going through the minors’
parents or guardians.”). But others have pointed to the
Supreme Court’s statement that “the people” includes
“all members of the political community,” Heller, 554
U.S. at 580, to argue that these individuals are part of
“the people” protected by the Amendment and that “the
people” protected by the Second Amendment are the
same as “the people” protected by the First and Fourth
Amendments, see, e.g., Lara, 125 F.4th at 435–38 (majority
opinion); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259, 265, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 108 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1990)
(The text of the Constitution “suggests that ‘the people’
protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and
Second Amendments, . . . refers to a class of persons who
are part of a national community.”). Those amendments
protect individuals under the age of 21. See Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.
Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969) (free speech); New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341, 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d
720 (1985) (unreasonable searches and seizures). Because
the parties assume that minors are among “the people”
protected by the Second Amendment and the Florida law
is consistent with our regulatory tradition in any event, we
assume that the Second Amendment protects individuals
under the age of 21.
45a
Appendix A
The Florida law that prohibits minors from purchasing
firearms does not violate the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments because it is consistent with our historical
tradition of firearm regulation. From the Founding to the
late-nineteenth century, our law limited the purchase of
firearms by minors in different ways. The Florida law also
limits the purchase of firearms by minors. And it does
so for the same reason: to stop immature and impulsive
individuals, like Nikolas Cruz, from harming themselves
and others with deadly weapons. Those similarities are
sufficient to confirm the constitutionality of the Florida
law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The judgment in favor of the Commissioner is
AFFIRMED.
46a
Appendix A
Rosenbaum, Circuit Judge, joined by Jordan, Circuit
Judge, as to Parts I and II, and by A budu, Circuit Judge,
as to Part III, Concurring:
I join in the Majority Opinion’s excellent explanation
of why the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public
Safety Act, see Fla. Stat. § 790.065(13), “is consistent with
this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation,”
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17, 142
S. Ct. 2111, 213 L. Ed. 2d 387 (2022). I write separately
to add three thoughts.
First, in concluding Florida’s law is constitutional
under the Second Amendment, I agree with the Majority
Opinion that here, we need not rely heavily on the
Reconstruction Era laws that barred the sale of some
firearms to those under 21 (“Under-21s”). That’s so
because the Founding Era perceived the problem that
Under-21s “lacked the reason and judgment necessary
to be trusted with legal rights.” Maj. Op. at 15. So its
common law imposed “relevantly similar,” Bruen, 597
U.S. at 29, restrictions on Under-21s’ right to keep and
bear arms to the Florida law’s. But I write separately to
show that we could rely heavily on the Reconstruction
Era laws because they represent the states’ response to
a new and different problem—an unprecedented kind of
Under-21 firearm violence—that began to arise during
the nineteenth century. And they are also “relevantly
similar” to Florida’s law.
Second, modern medical science bolsters the Majority
Opinion’s conclusion that Florida’s law limits Under-21s’
47a
Appendix A
ability to buy firearms for the same reasons the common
law did during the Founding Era. As I’ve noted, the
Majority Opinion explains that the common law presumed
that Under-21s “lacked the reason and judgment necessary
to be trusted with legal rights.” Maj. Op. at 15. Modern
medicine confirms our Founders’ hunch. As it turns out,
the common-law principle is based on the manifestation
of what we now know to be scientific fact. The prefrontal
cortex, the part of the brain responsible for exercising
judgment and moderating behavior in social situations,
is one of the last regions of the brain to mature—and it
doesn’t hit that point until around the age of 25. So Florida
adhered to “this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation” when it enacted a law designed to moderate
the risk Under-21s’ limited reasoning and decisionmaking
ability may pose to themselves and the public at large.
Third, I agree with the Majority Opinion’s decision
to leave for another day whether Founding Era or
Reconstruction Era evidence controls Bruen’s historical
inquiry, Maj. Op. at 14, if a conflict arises between the
two or the Founding Era is silent on the issue. I write
separately to emphasize that good reasons favor that
decision. For starters, it’s not necessary to resolve
the question because no conflict exists here between
Founding Era and Reconstruction Era history. Second,
many constitutional scholars and courts have weighed in
on the side of Reconstruction Era history in a conflict or
Founding Era silence. And for good reason. Among others,
the Constitution’s meaning is fixed to the understanding
of those who ratified it, so we interpret the Constitution’s
provisions, including those guaranteeing our rights, at
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the time the people adopted them. District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed.
2d 637 (2008). And when we speak of the incorporation
of the Second Amendment right against the states, that
occurred in 1868 when Americans adopted the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 37–38. Finally,
modern Second Amendment jurisprudence is still in its
infancy. So allowing more time for courts and scholars
to weigh in on the question will help us reach the best
understanding.
I discuss each of my three points in more detail below.
I.
T he st at e s’ re sp onse t o a new problem —
an unprecedented kind of Under-21 firearm
violence—that began to arise during the nineteenth
century because of unprecedented societal and
technological change is “relevantly similar” to
Florida’s law.
The Majority Opinion explains why both Founding
Era and nineteenth-century laws are relevantly similar
to Florida’s law and why they show that Florida’s law is
constitutional. In this Part, I write to add a few thoughts
on the nineteenth-century history.
Before diving into that history, though, I pause to
review some principles that govern our historical inquiry.
The Supreme Court has recognized that times change,
and with them, so do technology and societal problems.
See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27; United States v. Rahimi,
602 U.S. 680, 691–92, 144 S. Ct. 1889, 219 L. Ed. 2d 351
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(2024). As a result, “[t]he regulatory challenges posed
by firearms today are not always the same as those that
preoccupied the Founders in 1791 or the Reconstruction
generation in 1868.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27. Yet the Second
Amendment was “intended to endure for ages to come, and
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
415, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819) (emphasis omitted).
In reconciling the Second Amendment with modern
society’s problems and technology, the Court has explained
that the Second Amendment is not “a law trapped in
amber.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 691. Indeed, “the Second
Amendment permits more than just those regulations
identical to ones that could be found in 1791.” Id. at 691–92.
So our inquiry asks whether the modern law is “relevantly
similar to laws that our tradition is understood to permit,
applying faithfully the balance struck by the founding
generation to modern circumstances.” Id. at 692 (cleaned
up). That question requires us to consider “[w]hy and
how the regulation burdens the right” to keep and bear
arms. Id. “For example, if laws at the founding regulated
firearm use to address particular problems, that will be a
strong indicator that contemporary laws imposing similar
restrictions for similar reasons fall within a permissible
category of regulations.” Id.
But sometimes new problems arise, and legislatures
must address “unprecedented societal concerns or
dramatic technological changes.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27;
see Bianchi v. Brown, 111 F.4th 438, 464 (4th Cir. 2024) (en
banc) (“These are not our forebears’ arms, and these are
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not our forebears’ calamities. We thus take the instruction
of Bruen to engage in a ‘more nuanced approach’ to
address these ‘unprecedented societal concerns.’” (quoting
Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27)).
When that happens, a challenged law often will not
simply be “an updated model of a historical counterpart.”
Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 739 (Barrett, J., concurring). But it
may well still be constitutional.
The question is whether “the challenged regulation
is consistent with the principles that underpin our
regulatory tradition,” id. at 692 (Roberts, C.J., majority)
(emphasis added), not whether the challenged regulation
has a historical “twin” or “cousin,” id. at 739 (Barrett, J.,
concurring). And to answer that question, we must view
the principles underlying our regulatory tradition through
the correct lens, adjusting the focus to “just the right level
of generality” so that we are continuing to respect the
Second Amendment, see id. at 740, while not “trap[ping]
[the law] in amber,” id. at 691 (Roberts, C.J., majority).
Put differently, we must ask ourselves whether we are
“endorsing outliers that our ancestors would never have
accepted.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30 (quoting Drummond v.
Robinson, 9 F.4th 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2021)).
Bruen suggests that analogical reasoning—comparing
the “why” and the “how” of historic laws to the challenged
law—is one way to resolve the questions our historical
inquiry poses. Still, the Court explained that it didn’t
conduct an “exhaustive survey of the features that render
regulations” consistent with our Nation’s tradition of
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firearm regulation. Id. at 29. Other factors also help us
assess whether a historic law can serve as a “relevantly
similar” analogue for a law that addresses “circumstances
beyond those the Founders specifically anticipated.” Id.
at 28–29. I mention two below.
First, if the “proliferation of” analogues to a challenged
law “coincides with the” new changes or technological
developments, that may suggest that the modern law
can pass constitutional muster. Antonyuk v. James, 120
F.4th 941, 1022 (2d Cir. 2024). Today’s laws, though they
may in some ways regulate arms-bearing behavior “to an
extent beyond what was done at the founding,” Rahimi,
602 U.S. at 692, or through “different means,” Bruen,
597 U.S. at 26, need only impose a “comparable burden”
that is “comparably justified” by new societal problems
and technological advancements, id. at 29. See, e.g.,
Bianchi, 111 F.4th at 464 (“[L]egislatures, since the time
of our founding, have responded to the most urgent and
visible threats posed by excessively harmful arms with
responsive and proportional legislation.”).
After all, “founding-era legislatures” generally did
not “maximally exercise[] their power to regulate,” and
the Constitution does not “adopt[] a ‘use it or lose it’ view
of legislative authority.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 739–40
(Barrett, J., concurring). So when governments enact a
new solution to solve a new problem, that law may still
“fit[] neatly within” our regulatory tradition despite
differences from its historical predecessors. Id. at 698
(Roberts, C.J., majority); see, e.g., United States v. Diaz,
116 F.4th 458, 471 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2024) (relying on one
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historical analogue to supply the “why” and on another
to separately supply the “how”).
Second, if a proposed historical analogue has been
“reasonably consistent and longstanding,” that favors the
conclusion that the modern law accords with a tradition of
firearm regulation. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 724 (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring); see Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (confirming
“nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt
on longstanding prohibitions”); Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30
(explaining laws are more likely constitutional where
there are “no disputes regarding the lawfulness of such
prohibitions”).
We generally don’t “repeat[]” unconstitutional acts
and allow them “to crystallize into a regular practice.”
Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 724 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)
(quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S.
459, 472–73, 35 S. Ct. 309, 59 L. Ed. 673 (1915)); accord
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27, 13 S. Ct. 3, 36
L. Ed. 869 (1892); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655,
688–90, 49 S. Ct. 463, 73 L. Ed. 894, 68 Ct. Cl. 786 (1929);
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 785,
122 S. Ct. 2528, 153 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2002); NLRB v. Noel
Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525–26, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 189 L.
Ed. 2d 538 (2014); cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 710, 723–24, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 138 L.
Ed. 2d 772 (1997) (finding no fundamental right where
longstanding laws regulate that purported right); Kerry
v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 95, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 192 L. Ed. 2d
183 (2015) (plurality opinion) (same); Dobbs v. Jackson
Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 239–41, 142 S. Ct.
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2228, 213 L. Ed. 2d 545 (2022) (same); Dep’t of State v.
Munoz, 602 U.S. 899, 911–12, 144 S. Ct. 1812, 219 L. Ed.
2d 507 (2024) (same). So regular or longstanding practices
can imply constitutionality.
And we view that implication of constitutionality
as even stronger if a particular practice has gone
unchallenged (or survived challenges) in jurisdictions
that enforce “analogous arms-bearing rights” through
“interpretation[s] of . . . state constitutional provisions
adopted by . . . state courts.” See Heller, 554 U.S. at 585
& nn.8–9, 600–05, 610–14 (identifying jurisdictions that
secure the same preexisting right as does the Second
Amendment). Presumably, lawyers over the past two
centuries would have sought to vindicate their clients’
constitutional rights. That they didn’t (or failed in doing
so) is highly probative of the conclusion that a similar,
modern regulation does not violate those rights. Cf.
Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27 (“[I]f . . . proposals were rejected
on constitutional grounds, that rejection surely would
provide some probative evidence of unconstitutionality.”).
To be clear, I’m not suggesting that “freewheeling
reliance on historical practice,” “unmoored from [the]
original meaning” of the Second and Fourteenth
A mendments, may establish modern reg ulations’
constitutionality. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 738 (Barrett, J.,
concurring) (cleaned up). “[T]he use of postenactment
history,” of course, “requires some justification other than
originalism simpliciter.† Id.
† Still, I do not imply that post-ratification history—or
“tradition”—has the limited use (or even the “irrelevan[ce]”) that
Judge Newsom suggests it does. Newsom Conc. Op. at 1 (citation
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But consistent and longstanding practices may
“reinforce our understanding of the Constitution’s original
meaning,” including “the scope of the pre-existing right
that the people enshrined in our fundamental law.” Id.
at 738–39 (citation omitted). And they may do so “even
when that practice began after the founding era.” Noel
Canning, 573 U.S. at 525.
For instance, if Founding Era practice plausibly
supports two interpretations of the Second Amendment’s
scope—one that suggests a modern law’s constitutionality
and emphasis omitted). Given the length of this opinion and the
varied subjects it addresses already, I will leave for another day
a fuller explanation of why I disagree. But for now, it suffices to
note two points. First, our Framers intended post-ratification
history, even some history from long after the Founding, to play
an important role in constitutional interpretation. Liquidating
constitutional indeterminacies is a prime example. See T he
F ederalist No. 37 (James Madison) (“All new laws . . . are
considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their
meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular
discussions and adjudications.”); see generally William Baude,
Constitutional Liquidation, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2019) (describing
the historical basis for constitutional liquidation and explaining
“[p]rivileging early practice through liquidation is tempting but
wrong”); see also Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as A Theory
of Legal Change, 38 H arv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 817, 855–57 (2015)
(explaining constitutional liquidation is not inconsistent with
originalism—and may be affirmatively originalist—because it
may reflect an “actual Founding-era legal rule”). And second, as
I’ve explained, we have long considered (in fact, one might say it’s
a tradition to consider) “tradition” in constitutional analysis. See
Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 726–29 & n.5 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)
(collecting cases spanning more than two centuries).
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and one that does not—a well-established, post-Founding
practice may confirm which of the two controls. See,
e.g., Hanson v. District of Columbia, 120 F.4th 223, 238
(D.C. Cir. 2024) (relying on post-Reconstruction and
early-twentieth century practice to define the “relevant
historical tradition” as “the regulation of weapons that are
particularly capable of unprecedented lethality and not,
as the dissent would have [had] it, upon the regulation of
Bowie knives specifically”); cf. Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 1022
(concluding public parks are sensitive places because the
late-nineteenth century “municipal tradition of regulating
firearms in urban public parks” was “apparently accepted
without any constitutional objection by anyone”).
Here, the nineteenth-century history calls for us to
employ both these tools.
First, in that century, a problem that didn’t and
couldn’t have existed during the Founding Era arose
for the first time: an unprecedented kind of lethal, gunrelated violence that Under-21s largely inflicted. The
new violence became possible because of revolutionary
advances in firearms technology. And the urbanization and
industrialization of the United States in the Antebellum,
Civil War, and Reconstruction periods enabled Under-21s
to buy these newly disruptive firearms for the first time.
This perfect storm caused the common-law concern that
Under-21s lack the necessary reason and judgment to buy
arms to manifest in a way far more dangerous than our
“Founders specifically anticipated.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 28.
To put a finer point on it, this new problem was a
more focused manifestation of Under-21s’ less-than-fullydeveloped reasoning ability that served as the basis for the
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common-law restrictions during the Founding Era. And it
demanded more focused solutions—laws that specifically
addres
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