Petition for Writ of Certiorari — National Rifle Association, Incorporated, Petitioner v. Mark Glass, Commissioner, Florida Department of Law Enforcement

Supreme Court briefMay 16, 2025

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NO. ______

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

________________

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

MARK GLASS, in his Official Capacity as

Commissioner of the Florida Department of Law

Enforcement,

Respondent.

________________

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit

________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

________________

JOHN PARKER SWEENEY

DAVID H. THOMPSON

JAMES W. PORTER, III

Counsel of Record

W. CHADWICK LAMAR, JR. PETER A. PATTERSON

BRADLEY ARANT BOULT

JOHN D. OHLENDORF

CUMMINGS LLP

COOPER & KIRK, PLLC

1615 L Street N.W.

1523 New Hampshire

Suite 1350

Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 393-7150

(202) 220-9600

jsweeney@bradley.com

dthompson@cooperkirk.com

Counsel for Petitioner

May 16, 2025

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Florida’s law banning 18-to-20-year-olds

from purchasing firearms violates the Second

Amendment.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner National Rifle Association of America,

Inc., was a plaintiff before the District Court and a

plaintiff-appellant in the Court of Appeals. Colton

Campbell was a plaintiff-appellant in the Court of

Appeals; he was added to the case on November 15,

2024, by order of the Eleventh Circuit granting the

plaintiff-appellants’ unopposed motion to substitute

Mr. Campbell for one of the previous individual

plaintiff-appellants before she turned 21. Mr.

Campbell has since moved out of the State of Florida,

and he is not a party to the proceeding in this Court.

Radford Fant was a plaintiff before the District Court

and a plaintiff-appellant in the Court of Appeals, but

he was dismissed from the case on November 24, 2022,

by order of the Eleventh Circuit, before he turned 21,

and he is not a party to the proceeding in this Court.

Brook Stefano and Dominic Kelsey were plaintiffsappellants in the Court of Appeals, but they also were

dismissed by order of the Eleventh Circuit before

turning 21, and they are not parties to the proceeding

in this Court. Petitioner continues to have members in

Florida who are between the ages of 18 and 21 and

would purchase firearms but for the challenged law,

and it stands ready to supply information identifying

at least one of them if requested by the Court.

Respondent Mark Glass, in his official capacity as

Commissioner of the Florida Department of Law

Enforcement, was the defendant-appellee in the Court

of Appeals. Rick Swearingen, the previous

Commissioner of the Florida Department of Law

Enforcement, was a defendant before the District

Court and also initially a defendant-appellee in the

iii

Court of Appeals, but Respondent Glass was

automatically substituted in his place pursuant to

FED. R. APP. P. 43(c)(2) upon assuming office. Pam

Bondi, then the Attorney General of Florida, was also

a defendant before the District Court in her official

capacity, but Ashley Moody, her immediate successor

in office, was substituted in her place on January 31,

2019, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d). Ms. Moody was

dismissed from the case by order of the District Court

on May 1, 2020, on sovereign immunity grounds.

Neither Ms. Bondi, Ms. Moody, nor the current

Attorney General of Florida appeared as parties before

the Court of Appeals, and they are not parties to the

proceeding in this Court.

iv

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

National Rifle Association of America, Inc., has no

parent corporation, and there is no publicly held

corporation that owns 10% or more of its stock.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

This case arises from the following proceedings:

•

National Rifle Association v. Bondi, No. 2112314 (11th Cir.) (judgment entered Mar.

14, 2025);

•

National Rifle Association v. Swearingen,

No. 18-cv-137 (N.D. Fla.) (judgment

entered June 24, 2021).

The following proceeding is also directly related to

this case under this Court’s Rule 14.1(b)(iii):

•

Doe v. Bondi, No. 18-12081 (11th Cir.)

(appeal voluntarily dismissed Nov. 19,

2019).

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................ i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ............................ ii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ............ iv

RELATED PROCEEDINGS ...................................... iv

TABLE OF APPENDICES ......................................... vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... vii

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ................. 1

OPINIONS BELOW .................................................... 5

JURISDICTION .......................................................... 5

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND

ORDINANCES INVOLVED ....................................... 5

STATEMENT .............................................................. 5

I.

Florida bans 18-to-20-year-olds from purchasing

firearms. ............................................................... 5

II.

The proceedings below. ....................................... 7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ................ 13

I.

Review is needed to resolve the conflict between

the circuits over the constitutionality of limits on

the right of 18-to-20-year-olds to purchase

firearms. ............................................................. 13

II.

Review is needed because the decision below

conflicts with this Court’s decisions in Heller and

Bruen. ................................................................. 20

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 34

vi

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, FILED

MARCH 14, 2025................................................... 1a

APPENDIX B — OPINION OF THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, FILED

MARCH 9, 2023................................................. 171a

APPENDIX C — ORDER OF THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA,

TALLAHASSEE

DIVISION,

FILED

JUNE 24, 2021 .................................................. 211a

APPENDIX D — RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,

AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED .................. 261a

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE

Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of

St. Johns County,

57 F.4th 791 (11th Cir. 2022) ......................... 11

Andrews v. Tennessee,

50 Tenn. 165 (1871) ........................................ 22

Coats v. Wilson,

170 Eng. Rep. 769 (1804) ................................ 33

District of Columbia v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570 (2008) ....... 1, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 32

Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue,

591 U.S. 464 (2020) ................................... 26, 27

Gamble v. United States,

587 U.S. 678 (2019) ......................................... 26

Hirschfeld v. BATFE,

14 F.4th 322 (4th Cir. 2021) ........................... 16

Hirschfeld v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

Firearms, and Explosives,

5 F.4th 407 (4th Cir. 2021) ....................... 16, 23

Jones v. Bonta,

34 F.4th 704 (9th Cir. 2022) ..................... 16, 23

Jones v. Bonta,

47 F.4th 1124 (9th Cir. 2022) (Mem.) ............ 16

Jordan v. Coffield,

70 N.C. 110 (1874) .................................... 32, 33

Lara v. Commissioner Pennsylvania State Police,

125 F.4th 428 (3d Cir. 2025) ....... 1, 2, 17, 18, 24

viii

Luis v. United States,

578 U.S. 5 (2016) ............................................. 21

McCulloch v. Maryland,

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)................... 29, 30

New Hampshire Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Noyes,

32 N.H. 345 (1855) .......................................... 30

New Jersey v. T.L.O.,

469 U.S. 325 (1985) ......................................... 21

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,

597 U.S. 1 (2022) .............. 2, 3, 8, 14, 15, 20, 21,

26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v.

City of New York,

590 U.S. 336 (2020) ......................................... 21

Reese v. BATFE,

127 F.4th 583 (5th Cir. 2025) .. 1, 13, 14, 15, 16,

21, 22, 24, 25

Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis,

121 F.4th 96 (10th Cir. 2024) ......... 1, 13, 19, 22

Saunders Glover & Co. v. Ott’s Adm’r,

12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 572

(S.C. Ct. App. 1822) .................................. 28, 34

Teixeira v. County of Alameda,

873 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2017) ........................... 21

Timbs v. Indiana,

586 U.S. 146 (2019) ......................................... 26

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,

393 U.S. 503 (1969) ......................................... 21

ix

United States v. Marzzarella,

614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) ........................ 21, 22

United States v. Rahimi,

602 U.S. 680 (2024) ......................... 4, 27, 29, 32

Worth v. Jacobson,

108 F.4th 677 (8th Cir. 2024) .......... 1, 2, 16, 17,

26, 27

CONSTITUTIONS, CODES, AND STATUTES

U.S. CONST.

art. II, § 1, cl. 5 ................................................ 20

amend. II ......................................................... 20

amend. XXVI, § 1 ............................................ 20

18 U.S.C.

§ 922(b)(1).......................................................... 6

§ 922(x) .............................................................. 6

Act of May 8, 1792, 1 Stat. 271 ..................... 22, 33, 34

FLA. STAT.

§ 775.082 .............................................................

§ 775.083 .............................................................

§ 790.064(1) ....................................................... 6

§ 790.065(2)(a)(4) .............................................. 6

§ 790.065(13) ..................................................... 6

§ 790.22(3) ......................................................... 6

§ 790.23(1)(a) ..................................................... 6

§ 790.233(1) ....................................................... 6

2018 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 2018-3, § 2 ............. 3, 30

1856 Ala. Laws 17 ..................................................... 26

1856 Tenn. Pub. Acts 92 ............................................ 26

1859 Ky. Acts 245 ...................................................... 26

x

1785 Mass. Acts 510 .................................................. 33

1723 Va. Stat. 121 ..................................................... 33

OTHER AUTHORITIES

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS

OF ENGLAND (St. George Tucker ed. 1803) .... 31,

32

2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW

(1809) ............................................................... 34

30 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 277 (William Hand

Browne ed., 1910) ........................................... 33

David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, History and

Tradition in Modern Circuit Cases on the

Second Amendment Rights of Young People, 43

S. ILL. UNIV. L.J. 119 (2018) ........................... 27

Mark W. Smith, Attention Originalists: The Second

Amendment was adopted in 1791, not 1868,

HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y PER CURIAM (Dec. 7,

2022), https://perma.cc/8CSW-QB2L ............. 26

1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE

STATE OF CONNECTICUT (1795) ....................... 34

THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF

CONNECTICUT 537 (J. Hammond Trumbull ed.,

1850) ................................................................ 33

1

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The right to keep and bear arms “belongs to all

Americans,” not “an unspecified subset.” District of

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580–81, 592 (2008).

Yet the federal courts of appeals are divided over the

extent to which the government may prevent 18-to-20year-old adults from exercising that right—including

over whether it may bar them from purchasing the

firearms they wish to keep and bear. In nearly every

State in the Union, including Florida, eighteen-yearolds are legal adults: they are entitled to vote, marry,

enter contracts, and join the military to fight and die

for their country. And as adults, there are no parents

or other legal guardians generally responsible for

their care and protection. In the jurisdictions within

the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, they also enjoy the

Second Amendment right to purchase firearms to defend themselves and their families, see Reese v.

BATFE, 127 F.4th 583 (5th Cir. 2025), but under the

Eleventh Circuit’s decision below and a similar ruling

by the Tenth Circuit, see Pet.App.1a–171a; Rocky

Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, 121 F.4th 96 (10th

Cir. 2024), states in those jurisdictions can and do bar

these legal adults, as a class, from purchasing any

firearms. This split between the circuits over so fundamental a question is intolerable, and it urgently

calls for this Court’s resolution.

In 2018, Florida enacted a flat ban on the purchase of firearms by 18-to-20-year-olds, and in the decision below the en banc Eleventh Circuit upheld that

ban. The majority’s opinion recognized that this result

was directly contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in

Reese, Pet.App.39a, and the opinion is also irreconcilable with the reasoning of decisions from the Third

2

and Eighth Circuits protecting 18-to-20-year-olds’

right to carry firearms, see Lara v. Commissioner

Pennsylvania State Police, 125 F.4th 428 (3d Cir.

2025); Worth v. Jacobson, 108 F.4th 677 (8th Cir.

2024). The Eleventh Circuit should have followed

these courts’ guidance. The text of the Second Amendment encompasses the purchase of firearms by 18-to20-year-olds, as the en banc majority below did not

dispute, Pet.App.43a–44a, and as the majority was

also forced to acknowledge, “the Founding era lacked

express prohibitions on the purchase of firearms” by

18-to-20-year-olds. Id. at 30a. Indeed, the eighteenthcentury laws that come closest to reflecting a “Founding-era policy on age and firearms”—militia laws

throughout the Nation obliging eighteen-year-olds to

muster for militia service bearing firearms they were

legally obligated to acquire for themselves—in fact “reflect the policy that eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds

should be armed.” Id. at 159a (Brasher, J., dissenting). That should have been the beginning and the end

of any suggestion that Florida’s age ban “is consistent

with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,

597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022).

But the majority below upheld Florida’s law anyway, based principally, if not entirely, on the notion

that the common law at the Founding made contracts

by minors for the purchase of goods—incidentally including firearms, according to the majority—“voidable” at the option of the minor. Pet.App.17a. That reasoning is unsustainable for multiple independent reasons. The Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on this commonlaw voidability rule ultimately depends on an “economic inference from indirect evidence,” rather than

3

any actual historical statute or legal rule directly limiting anyone’s acquisition of firearms. Id. at 125a

(Branch, J., dissenting). Nothing about the voidability

rule prevented minors from bartering for goods or purchasing them with cash—or even on credit, if the vendor was willing to take the risk. Moreover, the en banc

majority fails to persuasively establish that the

Founding-era voidability rule even applied to firearms

in the first place. The majority acknowledged that

there was a recognized exception covering contracts

for “necessaries,” Pet.App.36a, and the best reading of

the historical record is that this category included firearms, at least for 18-to-20-year-olds, given that most

states charged Americans in this age group with the

legal duty to acquire firearms for militia service.

What is more, even if the majority’s interpretation of this common-law contract rule were correct, it

is sharply disanalogous to modern age-based gun bans

in terms of both the “why” and the “how” of regulation.

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29. As to the “why,” the “right of an

infant to avoid his contract” at the Founding was designed “for his protection against his own improvidence and the designs of others,” Pet.App.155a

(Brasher, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)

(cleaned up)—a purpose totally unlike Florida’s asserted goal of “address[ing] the crisis of gun violence,”

2018 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 2018-3, § 2. And the

“burden on the right of armed self-defense” imposed

by the two rules, Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29, is likewise different beyond any comparison. The Founding-era

rule, even by the en banc majority’s lights, only limited the right to keep and bear arms of legal minors—

persons who were not treated as adults for most other

purposes and who remained within the care, custody,

4

and protection of their parents. But Florida’s law

strips the right to acquire firearms from legal adults—

18-to-20-year-olds who enjoy the practical and legal

benefits of adulthood, who are not within the custody

or protection of their parents, and who often have families of their own. “Eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds

in Florida today—in other words, adults—are analogous to legal adults at the time of the Founding, not

legal minors.” Pet.App.156a–157a (Brasher, J., dissenting).

The end result of this fundamental mismatch between Florida’s law and the Founding-era contract

voidability rule is that the majority below committed

the same error as the challenger in Rahimi: asking

whether the particular application of the challenged

regulation was “identical to ones that could be found

in 1791,” rather than whether it comports “with the

principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.”

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 691–92 (2024)

(emphasis added). For the principle of the Founders’

voidability rule is clear: the right to contract may be

limited to some extent for actual legal minors. But 18to-20-year-olds in Florida today are adults, not minors. A fundamental incident of adulthood in America

is the enjoyment of constitutional rights, including the

right to defend yourself, your family, and your home

with common firearms. Stripping away an 18-year-old

adult’s Second Amendment rights is thus fundamentally irreconcilable “with the principles that underpin

the Nation’s regulatory tradition,” id. at 681, and the

Court should grant the writ and reverse.

5

OPINIONS BELOW

The en banc opinion of the Court of Appeals is

reported at 133 F.4th 1108 and reproduced at

Pet.App.1a–170a. The panel opinion of the Court of

Appeals is reported at 61 F.4th 1317 and reproduced

at Pet.App.170a–210a. The opinion of the District

Court granting summary judgment to Respondent is

reported at 545 F. Supp. 3d 1247 and reproduced at

Pet.App.211a–260a. Prior orders of the District Court

disposing of issues not presented in this Petition are

not reported in the Federal Supplement but are available at 2020 WL 5646480, 2018 WL 11014101, and

2018 WL 11014100.

JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals issued its judgment on

March 14, 2025. Pet.App.1a, 45a. This Court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND

ORDINANCES INVOLVED

The relevant portions of Amendments II and XIV

to the United States Constitution and Section 790.065

of the Florida Statutes are reproduced in the Appendix beginning at Pet.App.261a–267a.

STATEMENT

I.

Florida bans 18-to-20-year-olds from purchasing firearms.

Since 2018, Florida has completely banned 18-to20-year-olds from purchasing any firearm, of any

kind, for any purpose. Section 790.065(13) provides, in

full:

6

A person younger than 21 years of age may

not purchase a firearm. The sale or transfer

of a firearm to a person younger than 21

years of age may not be made or facilitated

by a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer. A person who violates this subsection commits a felony of the

third degree, punishable as provided in

§ 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084. The prohibitions of this subsection do not apply to

the purchase of a rifle or shotgun by a law

enforcement officer or correctional officer, as

those terms are defined in § 943.10(1), (2),

(3), (6), (7), (8), or (9), or a servicemember as

defined in § 250.01.

FLA. STAT. § 790.065(13).

Enacted in the wake of the tragic 2018 school

shooting in Parkland, Florida, Florida’s age ban supplements several other provisions of federal and state

law that are not challenged here. Federal law independently bars minors under 18 from purchasing

and/or possessing firearms, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(b)(1),

(x), and also prohibits federally licensed firearm dealers from selling handguns (but not long guns) to individuals under 21, id. § 922(b)(1). And Florida law likewise generally prohibits the purchase or possession of

a firearm by minors under 18, FLA. STAT. § 790.22(3),

convicted felons, id. § 790.23(1)(a), individuals enjoined from committing acts of domestic violence, id.

§ 790.233(1), and anyone adjudicated mentally defective or committed to a mental institution, id.

§§ 790.064(1), 790.065(2)(a)(4).

7

Petitioner National Rifle Association of America,

Inc. (“NRA”) has, as members, 18-to-20-year-old Florida residents who wish to acquire common handguns,

long guns, or both for lawful purposes but are prohibited from doing so by Florida’s age ban. 11th Cir. Doc.

21 at App.34–35 (Aug. 24, 2021).1

II.

The proceedings below.

A. Petitioner NRA (then joined by individual

plaintiff Radford Fant, who later turned 21) brought

this lawsuit challenging Florida’s age ban on March 9,

2021, alleging that it violated the Second Amendment

and seeking an injunction restraining its continued

enforcement. Id. at App.26–30. The district court had

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. The individual plaintiff initially sought to proceed in the

case pseudonymously, given the acrimonious nature

of the public debate over the ban in Florida at the

time, but the district court denied his request, and the

parties proceeded to file cross-motions for summary

judgment.

On June 24, 2021, the district court granted Respondent’s motion, denied Petitioner’s cross-motion,

and entered judgment for the State. The court, analyzing the challenge before this Court’s decision in

Bruen, disposed of Petitioner’s Second Amendment

claim under the first step of the then-prevailing “twostep” analysis. It did not find that Florida’s age ban

was supported by any tradition of similar regulation

at or around the time the Second Amendment was

1 The previous individual plaintiffs are all no longer subject

to Florida’s ban, but NRA stands ready to provide evidence that

it continues to have members subject to the ban at the Court’s

request.

8

ratified; nor did it credit Respondent’s argument that

“the relevant time period is not when the Second

Amendment was ratified, but rather when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.” Pet.App.225a n.11.

Instead, the court held that Florida’s age-based ban

on purchasing firearms was “outside the Second

Amendment’s scope” based on the dicta in Heller assuming that certain “longstanding” restrictions are

“presumptively lawful.” Id. at 253a. It concluded that

age-based limits were “longstanding in time” “at least

relative to the other prohibitions listed in Heller[,]”

some of which date only to the mid-twentieth-century,

and are “sufficiently analogous” to some of the restrictions listed in Heller’s dicta, insofar as age-based

limits “target groups thought to be especially dangerous with firearms.” Id. at 244a, 246a–248a.

B. Petitioner appealed, and on March 9, 2023, a

panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit affirmed. The panel’s decision was handed

down after Bruen, and it proceeded by “assum[ing] for

now that ‘the Second Amendment’s plain text’ covers

18-to-20-year-olds when they buy firearms,”

Pet.App.185a (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17), and

then upholding the age ban as justified by a collection

of laws from “nineteen states and the District of Columbia” that “banned the sale and even the giving or

loaning of handguns and other deadly weapons to 18to-20-year-olds by the close of the nineteenth century.” Id. at 198a. While the earliest of these laws did

not appear until over six decades after the Founding,

the panel concluded that in a challenge to a state law,

Bruen’s historical analysis must focus on “historical

sources from the Reconstruction Era” rather “than

those from the Founding Era” because “the

9

Fourteenth Amendment is what caused the Second

Amendment to apply to the States.” Id. at 178a.

C. Petitioner moved for rehearing of the panel’s

resolution of its Second Amendment challenge, which

the en banc court granted. On March 14, 2025, the full

court likewise affirmed the district court and upheld

Florida’s ban, in a fractured decision. Chief Judge William Pryor, writing for the majority, departed from

the earlier panel decision in determining the temporal

focus of historical inquiry: rather than looking to the

Reconstruction Era, Chief Judge Pryor “first look[ed]

to the Founding,” when “[t]he Second Amendment

was ratified, and its meaning fixed.” Pet.App.12a–

13a. The en banc majority concluded that “the Florida

law is consistent with our regulatory tradition” because “minors generally lacked the capacity to contract” in 1791 and this “inability to contract,” in the

majority’s view, “impeded minors from acquiring firearms during the Founding era.” Id. at 17a, 27a.

The court acknowledged that “the Founding era

lacked express prohibitions on the purchase of firearms” by any age group. Id. at 30a. Instead, the majority placed all of its weight on the general legal principle that “[a]t the Founding, a person was an ‘infant’

or ‘minor’ in the eyes of the law until age 21,” and that

“[a]s a general rule, contracts for the purchase of personal property involving minors were voidable.” Id. at

14a, 17a (cleaned up). That general voidability rule,

the court concluded, “impeded minors from acquiring

firearms during the Founding era.” Id. at 17a.

The en banc court further held that Florida’s age

ban is “analogous enough” to this “Founding-era legal

regime,” id. at 30a, even though Florida’s law—unlike

10

the Founding-era rule about the voidability of contracts—applies to 18-to-20-year-olds who are legal

adults, not “infants” or “minors.” “[T]he key fact,” according to majority, was that “at the Founding and until the late twentieth century, the age of majority was

21.” Id. at 33a.

D. Judge Rosenbaum, Judge Newsom, and

Judge Wilson all published separate concurring opinions. Judge Rosenbaum—the author of the panel opinion—wrote to defend the views she articulated for the

panel that the late-nineteenth-century age-based restrictions enacted in several states “provide[ ] evidence of the constitutionality of laws like Florida’s”

and that to the extent there is any “conflict between

the Founding-era and Reconstruction-era understandings” of the Second Amendment, “we should enforce Americans’ understanding of the right to keep

and bear arms in 1868.” Id. at 76a, 97a, 100a (Rosenbaum, J., concurring). She also articulated at length

the view that “modern medicine and social science

confirm” that 18-to-20-year-olds should not be trusted

with firearms. Id. at 96a.

Judge Newsom, by contrast, wrote to reiterate

his view that “evidence that significantly post-dates

[the Second Amendment’s] adoption isn’t just secondbest—it’s positively irrelevant.” Id. at 104a (Newsom,

J., concurring). This case, however, Judge Newsom believed “presents one of the exceedingly rare circumstances in which post-ratification evidence is fair

game.” Id. at 105a. According to Judge Newsom, the

late-nineteenth-century “flurry” of age bans in the

states shows that the total absence of age-based restrictions at the Founding and for sixty years thereafter should be attributed to the fact that the contract-

11

law principles cited by the majority made explicit age

limits “unnecessary,” not to any Founding-era understanding that 18-to-20-year-olds enjoyed a “substantive constitutional right” to keep and bear arms. Id. at

108a–109a.

Judge Wilson, in turn, concurred to highlight

what he believed to be an inconsistency between the

dissenting judges’ interpretation of the Second

Amendment in this case and the views expressed by

some of those judges in Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School

Board of St. Johns County, 57 F.4th 791 (11th Cir.

2022) (en banc), a recent case involving “students’ privacy interests in school bathrooms,” Pet.App.110a

(Wilson, J., concurring). Judge Wilson also expressed

dissatisfaction with “Bruen’s myopic focus on history

and tradition,” which he characterized as requiring a

“game of historical Where’s Waldo.” Id. at 111a, 114a.

E. Judges Branch, Lagoa, and Brasher all published dissents. Judge Brasher’s principal dissent,

joined by Judges Branch, Lagoa, and Luck, began by

noting that at the “text” stage of the Bruen inquiry,

Respondent did not contest that “ ‘people’ includes

adults over the age of eighteen” or that “the ability to

purchase a firearm implicates the ability to ‘keep and

bear’ one.” Id. at 144a–145a (Brasher, J., dissenting).

And Judge Brasher would have held that Respondent

“has presented no analogous Founding-era regulation

that precluded young adults from purchasing firearms” under Bruen’s second, historical inquiry. Id. at

146a.

Like the majority, Judge Brasher concluded that

“the Founding era” “should be the focus in our analysis.” Id. And “an extensive catalogue of colonial and

12

state militia statutes establishes that eighteen- to

twenty-one-year-olds were universally required to

have access to firearms.” Id. at 149a. The common law

“age of contracting” relied upon by the majority, Judge

Brasher explained, was not to the contrary because it

did not “reflect the Founding generation’s views on the

contours of the right to keep and bear arms, which is

the right at issue here.” Id. at 153a. Even more fundamentally, the “principle” behind the common law age

of contracting—which was designed for the “protection” of a minor “against his own improvidence and

the designs of others”—“doesn’t provide a comparable

justification for Florida’s ban.” Id. at 155a–156a

(cleaned up).

Judge Branch separately dissented in a brief

opinion which emphasized that because “none of the

majority’s Founding-era historical sources demonstrates that minors could not, as a legal matter, buy

goods on credit,” the majority was left relying on only

“economic inference from indirect evidence” that minors at the Founding were not able to contract to purchase firearms. Id. at 124a–125a (Branch, J., dissenting). And there is at least some “direct, contemporaneous historical evidence”—including, Judge Branch

noted, the very South Carolina state court decision

that the majority relied upon—“that minors at the

Founding could and did purchase goods, including

firearms, on credit.” Id. at 125a–126a.

Finally, Judge Lagoa, in addition to joining

Judge Brasher’s and Judge Branch’s dissents, published a brief separate dissent responding to Judge

Wilson’s concurrence discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s recent Adams decision. Id. at 129a–135a (Lagoa,

J., dissenting).

13

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

Review is needed to resolve the conflict between the circuits over the constitutionality of limits on the right of 18-to-20-yearolds to purchase firearms.

The federal courts of appeals are intractably divided over the constitutionality of laws that restrict

the ability of 18-to-20-year-olds to acquire or carry

firearms. Most immediately, while the Eleventh Circuit below upheld Florida’s ban on adults in this age

group purchasing any firearm from any source, and a

panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently

upheld a similar Colorado age ban, a panel of the Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeals recently found unconstitutional the federal ban on 18-to-20-year-olds purchasing handguns from licensed dealers, in a decision that

is directly and unequivocally in conflict with this

one—and that the court below recognized and deliberately departed from. Compare Reese, 127 F.4th at 600,

with Pet.App.39a (“The recent contrary decision of our

sister circuit [in Reese] . . . fails to persuade us.”), and

Rocky Mountain Gun Owners, 121 F.4th at 119–20.

And beyond the right to purchase firearms, some

courts of appeals have likewise addressed—and invalidated—age-based restrictions on carrying firearms,

based on reasoning that is irreconcilable with the

Eleventh Circuit’s below. This Court’s review is

needed to resolve the conflict between the circuits over

this acutely important question.

A. The clear majority of federal courts of appeals

have held that 18-to-20-year-olds enjoy full Second

Amendment rights. Of the seven federal courts of appeals that have considered the constitutionality of a

14

restriction on this age group’s right to keep and bear

arms, five have issued opinions invalidating those restrictions: three that remain the law of the circuit and

two that were subsequently vacated but retain persuasive value.

In Reese, a unanimous panel of the Fifth Circuit

recently struck down 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) & (c)(1), the

federal statutory provisions barring that age group

from purchasing handguns from a licensed firearms

dealer. 127 F.4th at 586, 600. The Reese court concluded that “the text of the Amendment’s prefatory

clause considered along with the overwhelming evidence of their militia service at the founding indicates

that eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds were indeed part of

‘the people’ for Second Amendment purposes.” Id. at

595 (citations omitted). And under Bruen’s second,

historical inquiry, the Fifth Circuit held that the challenged restriction was unsupported by historical tradition, reasoning that “[t]he federal government has

presented scant evidence that eighteen-to-twentyyear-olds’ firearm rights during the founding-era were

restricted in a similar manner to the contemporary

federal handgun purchase ban, and its 19th century

evidence ‘cannot provide much insight into the meaning of the Second Amendment when it contradicts earlier evidence.’ ” Id. at 600 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at

66).

Reese addressed, and rejected, each of the pieces

of historical evidence relied upon by the court below.

Contra Pet.App.41a (asserting that Reese “failed to

consider the background common-law regime”). The

Fifth Circuit noted “the common law’s recognition of

21 years as the date of legal maturity at the time of

the founding,” and that under this rule “eighteen-to-

15

twenty-year-olds did not enjoy the full range of civil

and political rights in the founding-era,” including the

rights to vote or serve on juries. Reese, 127 F.4th at

590–91 (quotation marks omitted). But this general

legal principle, the court held, did not demonstrate

that restrictions on this age cohort’s Second Amendment rights are constitutional, since “[t]he terms ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ lack content without reference to

the right at issue.” Id. at 592 (quoting NRA v. BATFE,

700 F.3d 185, 204 n.17 (5th Cir. 2012), abrogated by

Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and Reese, 127 F.4th 583

(5th Cir. 2025)). “The fact that eighteen-to-twentyyear-olds were minors unable to vote (or exercise

other civic rights)” accordingly “does not mean they

were deprived of the individual right to self-defense.”

Id.

Nor was the Reese court swayed by the three categories of supplemental evidence that the Eleventh

Circuit relied upon below: laws requiring parents to

acquire firearms for their children’s militia service,

university policies, and late nineteenth-century age

restrictions. Laws that “required parents to furnish

firearms for young men’s militia duty” did “not mean

that the military-age young men lacked the right to

keep and bear (or obtain) such arms themselves,” the

Fifth Circuit explained, because such laws “just as

readily imply that eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds were

expected to keep and bear arms, even if provided by

parents.” Id. at 597. University policies “prohibit[ing]

firearm possession by public university students . . .

say little about the general scope of Constitutional

rights and protections” because “universities had

heightened authority over student conduct in loco

parentis.” Id. at 596. And because the Second

16

Amendment’s meaning was fixed by “the public understanding of the right when the Bill of Rights was

adopted in 1791,” Reese held that the age limits enacted by a minority of states in the late nineteenth

century “were passed too late in time to outweigh the

tradition of pervasively acceptable firearm ownership

by eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds at the crucial period

of our nation’s history.” Id. at 599–600 (cleaned up).

The Fourth and Ninth Circuits previously

reached similar conclusions, albeit in decisions that

were subsequently vacated. In Hirschfeld v. Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, the

Fourth Circuit likewise held that 18 U.S.C. § 922’s age

ban is unconstitutional. 5 F.4th 407, 452 (4th Cir.

2021). That opinion was ultimately vacated as moot,

however, after all of the plaintiffs turned 21. Hirschfeld v. BATFE, 14 F.4th 322 (4th Cir. 2021). And the

Ninth Circuit found likely unconstitutional a California law banning 18-to-20-year-olds from purchasing

semiautomatic centerfire rifles, Jones v. Bonta, 34

F.4th 704, 733 (9th Cir. 2022), though it reached that

decision before this Court’s decision in Bruen, and its

opinion has accordingly been vacated for further analysis under the Bruen framework, 47 F.4th 1124 (9th

Cir. 2022) (Mem.).

Two additional circuits have similarly enforced

the Second Amendment rights of 18-to-20-year-olds

against state laws restricting their right to carry firearms. In Worth, the Eighth Circuit invalidated a Minnesota law prohibiting anyone under 21 from carrying

firearms in public. 108 F.4th at 698. The court concluded that “[o]rdinary, law-abiding, adult citizens

that are 18 to 20-year-olds are members of the people”

within the meaning of the Second Amendment and

17

that “Minnesota did not proffer an analogue that

meets the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the Carry Ban for 18 to

20-year-old Minnesotans.” Id. at 689, 698.

Like the Reese court, the Eighth Circuit concluded that at the Founding there were insufficient

analogues “to demonstrate that the Nation’s historical

tradition of firearm regulation supports the Carry

Ban.” Id. at 696. Also like Reese, Worth specifically rejected the government’s reliance on the Founding-era

“common law” rule that “individuals did not have

rights until they turned 21 years old,” reasoning that

arguments “focusing on the original contents of a right

instead of the original definition” are “bordering on

the frivolous.” Id. at 689–90 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S.

at 582). “The Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all members of the political community, even

those that were not included at the time of the founding,” and “[e]ven if the 18 to 20-year-olds were not

members of the political community at common law,

they are today.” Id. at 690–91 (cleaned up). Finally,

the government’s Reconstruction-era laws, the Eighth

Circuit held, both “carry less weight than Foundingera evidence” and “have serious flaws even beyond

their temporal distance from the founding.” Id. at 697

(cleaned up).

The Third Circuit recently reached the same conclusion. In Lara, that court struck down state laws

that barred 18-to-20-year-olds from carrying firearms

whenever the State is under a declared state of emergency. 125 F.4th at 432, 446. It held “that 18-to-20year-olds are, like other subsets of the American public, presumptively among ‘the people’ to whom Second

Amendment rights extend,” and that the state failed

to show that its age-based restriction “is consistent

18

with the principles that underpin founding-era firearm regulations.” Id. at 438, 445. Like the Fifth and

Eighth Circuits, the Lara court did not find it dispositive that at “the Founding . . . those who were under

the age of 21 were considered ‘infants’ or ‘minors’ in

the eyes of the law,” because “the legal status of 18-to20-year-olds during that period” is not binding today,

now that this legal status has changed. Id. at 436–37

(cleaned up). Indeed, the court explained, if “we were

rigidly limited by eighteenth-century conceptual

boundaries, ‘the people’ would consist solely of white,

landed men, and that is obviously not the state of the

law.” Id. at 437. The Third Circuit likewise rejected

the relevance of the late-nineteenth-century age bans

because “the constitutional right to keep and bear

arms should be understood according to its public

meaning in 1791.” Id. at 441.

B. Most federal courts of appeals to have considered the question presented, or closely related ones,

have thus reached conclusions that correctly apply

this Court’s precedent. But two federal appellate

courts have reached a directly contrary conclusion and

upheld restrictions barring 18-to-20-year-olds from

acquiring firearms. The en banc Eleventh Circuit below upheld Florida’s age ban on purchasing any firearm based on reasoning that is directly and avowedly

contrary to the consensus represented in the decisions

just discussed. Indeed, the en banc majority recognized that its decision was “contrary” to Reese, which

“fails to persuade us.” Pet.App.39a; see also id. at 138a

(Brasher, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s

“conclusion splits with at least three sister circuits”).

The Tenth Circuit likewise recently upheld a Colorado age ban on purchasing firearms, similar to

19

Florida’s, based on reasoning that contradicts the decisions of the Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits. Rocky

Mountain Gun Owners concluded that Colorado’s ban

fell within the category of “laws imposing conditions

and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms,”

which it read this Court’s precedent to deem “presumptively lawful.” 121 F.4th at 119 (quoting Heller,

554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26). It thus concluded that

Colorado’s age ban on the purchase of firearms did not

even “implicate the plain text of the Second Amendment.” Rocky Mountain Gun Owners, 121 F.4th at

120. And the court also credited—and discussed at

length over the course of three pages—the “scientific

consensus” that the challenged age ban “will likely reduce the numbers of firearm homicides, nonhomicide

violent crimes, suicides, and accidental firearm injuries in Colorado.” Id. at 127.

C. Accordingly, the decision below forms part of

a three-to-two circuit split over the extent to which the

Second Amendment protects the right of 18-to-20year-olds to keep and bear arms. That includes a split

over the precise question presented: whether the government may ban 18-to-20-year-olds from purchasing

common firearms. This question is a foundational one:

whether an age cohort comprising millions of Americans may be categorically excluded from one of our

fundamental, enumerated constitutional protections.

In states across the country, 18-to-20-year-olds are

considered legal adults for virtually all purposes: they

may make contracts, vote, serve on juries, petition the

government, freely express their views, and serve in

(or be conscripted into) the armed services. In the

Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits the government is

barred from infringing their Second Amendment

20

rights. Yet in the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, the

states are free to effectively foreclose their right to defend themselves and their families with common firearms. That situation is intolerable and urgently calls

for this Court’s review.

II.

Review is needed because the decision below conflicts with this Court’s decisions in

Heller and Bruen.

This Court’s review is also warranted because

the Eleventh Circuit’s decision below conflicts with

this Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence. Florida’s age ban is flatly contrary to the right to keep and

bear arms as interpreted by this Court in Heller,

McDonald, Bruen, and Rahimi, and the court below

was wrong to uphold it.

A. Bruen instructs courts assessing a Second

Amendment challenge to ask, first, “whether the plain

text of the Second Amendment protects [the plaintiffs’] proposed course of conduct” and, if so, whether

the “government [can] justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nations historical tradition of firearm regulation.” 597 U.S. at 24, 32.

Petitioner’s proposed course of conduct falls squarely

within the Second Amendment’s textual reach.

18-to-20-year-olds like Petitioner’s members are

presumptively among “the people” who enjoy the right

to keep and bear arms. U.S. CONST. amend. II. The

Second Amendment does not include any express age

limit—unlike other provisions of the Constitution.

E.g. id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 5; id. at amend. XXVI, § 1.

And the “normal and ordinary” meaning of “the people” includes all the people—“all Americans,” or all

“who are part of [the] national community,” as Heller

21

put it. 554 U.S. at 576, 580–81 (cleaned up). Moreover,

the two other provisions in the Bill of Rights that explicitly protect a right of “the people”—the First and

the Fourth Amendments—extend to the whole people,

including those under 21. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des

Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511

(1969); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985).

“The people” “seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution,” Heller, 554

U.S. at 580 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990)), and to cabin its

scope with an unenumerated age limitation for purposes of the Second Amendment only would be to treat

that provision as “a second-class right, subject to an

entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of

Rights guarantees,” Bruen, 594 U.S. at 70 (quoting

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010)

(plurality)).

The Second Amendment’s text also covers the

“proposed course of conduct” these 18-to-20-year-old

“people” wish to engage in, id. at 32: acquiring firearms in common use. Constitutional rights “implicitly

protect those closely related acts necessary to their exercise.” Luis v. United States, 578 U.S. 5, 26 (2016)

(Thomas, J., concurring). Here, the Second Amendment explicitly protects the right to “have weapons,”

Heller, 554 U.S. at 582, and one “necessary concomitant of this right,” New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n

v. City of New York, 590 U.S. 336, 364 (2020) (Alito,

J., dissenting), is obviously the right to acquire those

arms in the first place. Numerous courts of appeals

have held this. See Reese, 127 F.4th at 589–90;

Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670, 677 (9th

Cir. 2017) (en banc); United States v. Marzzarella, 614

22

F.3d 85, 92 n.8 (3d Cir. 2010), abrogated on other

grounds by Bruen, 597 U.S. 1; see also Andrews v. Tennessee, 50 Tenn. 165, 178 (1871) (“The right to keep

arms, necessarily involves the right to purchase

them.”).

Neither the court below nor the Tenth Circuit

panel in Rocky Mountain Gun Owners disputed the

conclusion that the plain text of the Second Amendment protects the purchase of firearms by peaceable

18-to-20-year-old Americans. See Pet.App.43a–44a;

121 F.4th at 114–18. They did not dispute it because

the conclusion is unassailable.

B. Nor can Florida’s absolute ban on the purchase of firearms by 18-to-20-year-olds be justified as

“consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of

firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24. Neither

Founding-era nor Reconstruction-era firearm regulations support Florida’s age ban, and neither does the

evidence offered by the majority below.

1. The clearest Founding-era evidence of our historical traditions surrounding the right of 18-to-20year-olds to keep and bear arms comes from the

Founders’ understanding of militia service. Although

the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause cannot be

read to “limit or expand the scope of the operative

clause,” it nonetheless “announces the purpose for

which the right was codified: to prevent elimination of

the militia.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 578, 599. And there is

no doubt that 18-to-20-year-olds were understood to

be part of the militia at the time the Second Amendment was adopted: the Militia Act of 1792 set the minimum age of militia service at 18, Act of May 8, 1792,

1 Stat. 271, and all states likewise adopted “the

23

minimum age of eighteen . . . at or immediately after

ratification of the Second Amendment,” Reese, 127

F.4th at 594.

These “Founding-era militia laws provide powerful historical evidence” that the Second Amendment

“encompassed 18-year-olds.” Hirschfeld, 5 F.4th at

424. “The Second Amendment refers to the militia,

and young adults had to be in the militia and bring

their own firearms. This reference implies at least

that young adults needed to have their own firearms.”

Jones, 34 F.4th at 721. Moreover, if the Second

Amendment was codified to prevent the disarmament

of the militia, and 18-to-20-year-olds were universally

understood to be part of the militia, then the Second

Amendment necessarily must protect that age cohort’s right to keep and bear arms. After Heller, there

is no doubt that ‘the militia’ was ‘a subset of the people’ protected by its operative clause,” Reese, 127 F.4th

at 593, and “because the militia is a subset of ‘the people,’ those in the militia share the same rights as ‘the

people,’ ” Hirschfeld, 5 F.4th at 427.

The majority’s reasons for rejecting the relevance

of the Founding-era militia laws, below, do not withstand scrutiny. It asserted that while “minors between the ages of 18 and 21 could serve in the militia,

there was no national requirement that they do so,”

and that three states in the mid-nineteenth-century

in fact “exempted minors from service.” Pet.App.37a.

There are multiple problems with this response. For

starters, it confuses the organized militia—those actually called into service at any given time—with the

unorganized, or “general” militia—the body of “all

able-bodied men.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 596. It is the latter group that the Second Amendment protects. Id.

24

And the fact that “the minimum age of eighteen prevailed” in every single state “at or immediately after

ratification of the Second Amendment,” Reese, 127

F.4th at 594, conclusively shows that the Founders

understood 18-to-20-year-olds to be part of the general

militia—and thus necessarily within the Second

Amendment’s protective sphere.

The en banc majority also insisted that “the duty

of some minors to serve in the militia” did not imply

“a right to purchase firearms.” Pet.App.37a. But because “militiamen were expected to appear bearing

arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time,” Reese, 127 F.4th at 593 (quotation marks omitted), militia service entailed on obligation to acquire firearms. And as Judge Brasher explained below, “as a matter of both formal logic and

common sense, a legal obligation to acquire a private

firearm necessarily presupposes the legal ability to acquire one.” Pet.App.151a (Brasher, J., dissenting).

“That young adults had to serve in the militia indicates that founding-era lawmakers believed those

youth could, and indeed should, keep and bear arms.”

Lara, 125 F.4th at 444.

Nor does the fact that some states “required parents of minors to acquire firearms for their militia service,” Pet.App.20a, undermine the force of the Founding-era militia laws. “[T]here is no evidence that legal

barriers (as opposed to financial ones) were the primary impediment to eighteen-year-olds arming themselves.” Id. at 158a (Brasher, J., dissenting). As the

majority itself noted, after all, the law generally entitled parents of 18-to-20-year-olds “to receive the

wages of their labor.” Id. at 18a. More fundamentally,

these laws mandating parental purchase of firearms

25

“just as readily imply that eighteen-to-twenty-yearolds were expected to keep and bear arms, even if provided by parents.” Reese, 127 F.4th at 597. Thus, “[t]o

the extent those laws reflect a Founding-era policy on

age and firearms, they reflect the policy that eighteento

twenty-one-year-olds

should

be

armed.”

Pet.App.159a (Brasher, J., dissenting).

By contrast to this strong historical evidence that

law-abiding 18-to-20-year-old citizens were understood at the Founding to enjoy the Second Amendment’s protections, the State and its experts have not

identified, and we are not aware of, any evidence

whatsoever of colonial or Founding-era laws restricting the keeping, carrying, or acquisition of firearms by

individuals aged 18 or over because of their age. The

closest anyone has been able to come are the handful

of nineteenth-century university restrictions on students keeping firearms, but those are “uniquely poor

analogues.” Id. at 168a. These school rules, as the majority acknowledged, were rooted in the authority of

the college to act “in loco parentis.” Id. at 22a (majority). They thus represent nothing more than the fact

that parents could restrict their children in all sorts of

ways. “A campus code says no more about the Constitution than does a particular parent’s house rules.” Id.

at 169a (Brasher, J., dissenting).

Ultimately, the en banc majority was forced to

concede that “the Founding era lacked express prohibitions on the purchase of firearms.” Id. at 30a (majority). That concession should have been dispositive.

2. Given the powerful and uniform historical evidence that 18-year-olds fully enjoyed the Second

Amendment right to acquire firearms at the

26

Founding, the restrictions enacted by a minority of

states in the late nineteenth century cannot justify

Florida’s law. There are just three putative analogues

that predate the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification in 1868: from Alabama, Tennessee, and Kentucky. See 1856 Ala. Laws 17; 1856 Tenn. Pub. Acts

92; 1859 Ky. Acts 245, § 23. Another seventeen jurisdictions followed suit in the ensuing decades—most in

the 1880s and ‘90s. See Pet.App.23a–27a. These state

laws are both too late and too little.

“[F]or decades,” this Court “has generally assumed that the public understanding of the right

when the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791 governs”

in cases involving federal law. Worth, 108 F.4th at 693

(cleaned up); see also Gamble v. United States, 587

U.S. 678, 702 (2019) (noting that the relevant inquiry

is “the public understanding in 1791 of the right codified by the Second Amendment”). And the Court has

made emphatically clear that once “a Bill of Rights

protection is incorporated, there is no daylight between the federal and state conduct it prohibits or requires.” Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146, 150 (2019). It

follows that 1791 is the focal point for inquiry into the

Second Amendment’s historically understood limits.

See Mark W. Smith, Attention Originalists: The Second Amendment was adopted in 1791, not 1868, HARV.

J.L. & PUB. POL’Y PER CURIAM (Dec. 7, 2022),

https://perma.cc/8CSW-QB2L. A collection of laws dating back no earlier than sixty years after the Second

Amendment’s ratification cannot establish a “tradition of firearm regulation” justifying Florida’s law,

particularly where those late-breaking laws “contradict[ ] earlier evidence.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24, 66; see

also Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 591 U.S.

27

464, 482 (2020) (collection of over 30 state laws that

“arose in the second half of the 19th century. . . cannot

by itself establish an early American tradition” justifying the laws under the First Amendment).

In any event, these Reconstruction-era laws

“have serious flaws even beyond their temporal distance from the founding.” Worth, 108 F.4th at 697 (internal quotation marks omitted). By the turn of the

twentieth century, less than half of the States had

adopted age-based firearm restrictions of any sort.

Those laws typically applied only to certain types of

weapons, or to carrying firearms concealed rather

than openly, and several contained “exceptions for

self-defense, hunting, or home possession.” David B.

Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, History and Tradition

in Modern Circuit Cases on the Second Amendment

Rights of Young People, 43 S. ILL. UNIV. L.J. 119, 142

(2018). This smattering of late-breaking age restrictions does not suffice to show a “[w]ell entrenched,” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 695, or “well-established and representative,” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30, historical tradition of firearm regulation.

Even more fundamentally, because the age of

majority generally was 21 at the time, these nineteenth-century laws applied only to limit the Second

Amendment rights of actual minors—individuals

who, at the time, remained under the legal custody

and protection of their parents. Because they were

“based on one’s status as a minor,” Worth, 108 F.4th

at 698, the “[w]hy and how” of these laws, Rahimi, 602

U.S. at 692, were thus both fundamentally different

from Florida’s law. “Not to belabor the point, but

eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds in Florida today are

analogous to adults, not minors, at the time these

28

statutes were enacted.” Pet.App.167a (Brasher, J.,

dissenting).

3. The en banc majority below nonetheless held

that Florida’s law “is consistent with our historical

tradition of firearm regulation,” based virtually entirely on the general common-law rule at the Founding that “a person was an ‘infant’ or a ‘minor’ in the

eyes of the law until age 21” and many contracts they

entered “were ‘voidable.’ ” Pet.App.14a, 17a, 45a; see

also id. at 127a (Branch, J., dissenting) (noting that

“the Commissioner’s case, and the majority’s reasoning, hinge entirely upon this lone contract-law doctrine”). This general contract-law voidability rule cannot bear the extraordinary weight the majority placed

on it for at least three independent reasons.

i. First, rather than identifying any direct “historical tradition of firearm regulation,” Bruen, 597

U.S. at 24, the en banc majority’s reasoning rests on a

far flimsier reed: mere “economic inference from indirect evidence.” Pet.App.125a (Branch, J., dissenting).

The majority did not cite a single Founding-era statute, ordinance, or rule actually regulating firearms—

in fact it conceded that no such law existed. Id. at 30a.

Although it asserted that the general common-law

voidability rule incidentally “restricted the purchase

of firearms by minors,” id. at 26a, it was able to identify only a single case actually applying the rule to any

firearm—and that case involved “pistols,” Saunders

Glover & Co. v. Ott’s Adm’r, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 572,

572 (S.C. Ct. App. 1822), a type of firearm that may

well have been considered “dangerous and unusual”

at the time, Bruen, 597 U.S. at 47, in contrast to the

long guns that were in common use and that 18-to-20year-olds were obliged to acquire for militia service.

29

The point is not that the majority’s decision

hanged entirely on “general common-law proscriptions” rather than “firearm-specific regulations,”

Pet.App.81a (Rosenbaum, J., concurring), because the

majority did not even identify any common-law proscription that actually restricted the purchase of firearms. Even by the majority’s telling, the common law

at most rendered minors’ contracts voidable; it did not

proscribe them. The majority’s conclusion that “minors generally could not purchase firearms” at the

Founding, id. at 18a (majority), is thus based not on

any law saying this but rather on the inference that

the “ex ante effect[s]” of the voidability rule created

“practical difficulties” for minors who wished to purchase firearms on credit, id. at 124a–125a (Branch, J.,

dissenting). That inference does not show that laws

banning 18-to-20-year-olds are “consistent with this

Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation” at

the Founding. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17.

ii. If the majority had shown that the common

law at the Founding barred minors from acquiring

firearms, this evidence would still fail to justify Florida’s ban for an even more fundamental reason: a restriction on the Second Amendment rights of minors

at the Founding is simply not analogous to a restriction on the Second Amendment rights of adults

today. It is “the principles that underpin the Nation’s

regulatory tradition” that bind us today, not those

principles’ specific eighteenth-century application,

and analogizing to Founding-era restrictions on minors to justify a modern ban on adults commits the

very same error this Court condemned in Rahimi:

treating the Second Amendment as “a law trapped in

amber,” 602 U.S. at 681, 691, rather than “a

30

constitution, intended to endure for ages to come,”

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415

(1819).

This Court’s precedent requires inquiry into

“how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding

citizen’s right to armed self-defense,” Bruen, 597 U.S.

at 29, and the common-law voidability rule fails on

both metrics. Florida’s age ban wears its purpose on

its face: to “address the crisis of gun violence, including but not limited to, gun violence on school campuses.” 2018 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 2018-3, § 2. But

the “why” of the voidability rule—even assuming it

applied, incidentally, to contracts for the purchase of

firearms—was nothing like this. Rather than protecting public safety from minors, the Founding-era contract rule was designed to protect the minor himself:

it was “conferred by law for his protection against his

own improvidence and the designs of others.”

Pet.App.155a (Brasher, J., dissenting); see also New

Hampshire Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Noyes, 32 N.H. 345,

351–52 (1855) (voidability rule “established to protect

the inexperience and credulity of youth against the

wiles and machinations of designing men”).

The majority resisted this conclusion, positing instead that the justification of the Founding-era contract rule was that “individuals under the age of 21

have not reached the age of reason and lack the judgment and discretion to purchase firearms responsibly.” Pet.App.28a (majority). But while this purported

“lack [of] judgment and discretion” may have been the

Founders’ justification for limiting minors’ exercise of

civic rights like voting and jury service, see id. at 28a–

29a, the majority cited no evidence that this was the

purpose behind the contract voidability rule, and it

31

makes no sense. Why would the Founding generation

protect against minors’ purported lack of “judgment

and discretion to purchase firearms responsibly,” id.

at 28a, by making the contracts for those purchases

perfectly lawful but voidable at the option of the minor?

As to the “how,” any “burden on the right of

armed self-defense” imposed by the voidability rule is

also in no way “comparable” to Florida’s ban. Bruen,

597 U.S. at 29. For whatever limits the common law

did impose on 18-to-20-year-olds it imposed on legal

minors. The hallmark of minority status, at the

Founding as today, was that minors remained under

the care, custody, and protection of their parents—as

Blackstone put it, they were under “the empire of the

father, or other guardian.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *453 (St.

George Tucker ed., 1803). A minor’s need for “the right

of armed self-defense,” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29, was for

that reason less acute, because he remained under the

protection of his parents, who could engage in self-defense on his behalf. But “[a]n eighteen-year-old in

Florida,” precisely because he is no longer a minor, is

now “emancipated from the care and custody of his or

her parents, and they in turn are no longer responsible for his or her care and support.” Pet.App.141a

(Brasher, J., dissenting). And the burden on self-defense imposed by depriving an 18-year-old who is legally a full adult of access to firearms, with no one

bound by law to provide for his care and protection, is

totally unlike the burden of limiting the ability of actual minors to access firearms.

By focusing on the specific applications of Founding-era law—treating 18-year-olds like minors today

32

because they were minors in the eighteenth century—

the majority entirely missed the principle behind that

law—18-year-olds were subject to certain limits at the

Founding precisely because they were minors. The

Eleventh Circuit’s mistake can be brought into sharp

focus by noting another category of Americans who

could not enter contracts at the Founding: married

women. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra, at 441–43. It is difficult

to see how the en banc majority’s reasoning does not

necessarily lead to the conclusion that married women

today may be barred from purchasing firearms. The

historical tradition for both groups is precisely the

same. But this conclusion is untenable, and this

Court’s precedent gives the reason why: the correct inquiry in interpreting the Second Amendment is not

whether particular modern applications precisely

match those at the Founding, but rather whether a

modern law “is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at

692. And because the voidability rule as applied to

married women (just like as applied to legal minors)

was justified at the Founding based on principles that

no longer apply to married women (or 18-to-20-yearolds) today, it cannot justify a modern ban on their exercise of Second Amendment rights.

iii. Finally, the common-law voidability rule cannot justify Florida’s age ban because neither Respondent nor the majority below has persuasively shown

that the rule actually applied to firearms in common

use. The majority acknowledged that the common-law

voidability rule did not apply to contracts “for necessaries,” Pet.App.17a, and it was well established at

common law that this category encompassed not “only

such articles as are absolutely necessary to support

33

life, but it includes also such articles as are suitable to

the state, station and degree in life of the person to

whom they are furnished,” Jordan v. Coffield, 70 N.C.

110, 114 (1874). Given that eighteen-year-olds were

counted as members of the militia by every state at or

around the time of ratification—and were legally required to “provide [them]sel[ves] with a good musket

or firelock . . . or with a good rifle” for use in militia

service, Militia Act of 1792, § 1, 1 Stat. 271—there can

be no doubt that the private arms those 18-year-olds

were mandated to acquire were considered necessaries. Indeed, an English court held in 1804 that “a

suit of regimentals,” or a military uniform, was a necessary for a minor enrolled in a voluntary corps. Coats

v. Wilson, 170 Eng. Rep. 769 (1804). The firearms 18to-20-year-olds were required to acquire for military

service were plainly no less “suitable to the state, station and degree in life” of minor militiamen. Jordan,

70 N.C. at 114.

Founding-era statutes confirm that firearms

were considered necessaries. A 1786 Massachusetts

law, for instance, barred local officials from executing

a warrant of distress for the collection of debts against

“any person[’s] . . . arms or household utensils, necessary for upholding life[.]” Act of Feb. 16, 1786, 1785

Mass. Acts 510, 516. Connecticut, Maryland, and Virginia had similar laws. THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE

COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 537 (J. Hammond Trumbull

ed., 1850) (Code of 1650); 30 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND

277, 280 (William Hand Browne ed., 1910) (Act of

1715); 1723 Va. Stat. 121. And the federal 1792 Militia

Act likewise exempted militia arms “from all suits,

distresses, executions or sales, for debt or for the

34

payment of taxes.” Militia Act of 1792, § 1, 1 Stat. 271,

272.

The evidence cited by the en banc majority for its

conclusion that firearms “were not necessaries,”

Pet.App.18a, is far from compelling. It invoked two

early American treatises, but those authorities merely

set forth lists of necessaries that did not include firearms. See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 274 (1809); 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF

THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 216–17

(1795). Because the lists did not purport to be exhaustive, that proves nothing. Nor does the single case

cited by the court—the 1822 South Carolina decision

in Saunders Glover & Co., 12 S.C.L. 572—establish

the point. As explained above, that case concerned pistols, not the muskets or rifles militiamen were obligated to acquire for militia service. Indeed, the case

does not even indicate whether the minor in question

was of militia age. This meagre evidence falls far short

of establishing that the sole “tradition of firearm regulation” relied upon by the Eleventh Circuit,

Pet.App.3a, restricted 18-to-20-year-olds’ access to

firearms at all.

The Eleventh Circuit was wrong to uphold Florida’s age ban, and this Court should grant the writ.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court should

grant the petition for writ of certiorari.

35

May 16, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN PARKER SWEENEY

JAMES W. PORTER, III

W. CHADWICK LAMAR, JR.

BRADLEY ARANT BOULT

CUMMINGS LLP

1615 L Street N.W.

Suite 1350

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 393-7150

jsweeney@bradley.com

DAVID H. THOMPSON

Counsel of Record

PETER A. PATTERSON

JOHN D. OHLENDORF

COOPER & KIRK, PLLC

1523 New Hampshire

Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 220-9600

dthompson@cooperkirk.com

Counsel for Petitioner

APPENDIX

i

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED

STAT ES COU RT OF A PPEA LS FOR

T H E ELE V EN T H CI RCU I T, FI LED

MARCH 14, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

APPENDIX B — OPINION OF THE UNITED

STAT ES COU RT OF A PPEA LS FOR

T H E ELE V EN T H CI RCU I T, FI LED

MARCH 9, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171a

A PPEN DI X C — OR DER OF T H E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF

FLORIDA, TALLAHASSEE DIVISION,

FILED JUNE 24, 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211a

A P P E N DI X D — R E L E VA N T

CONST I T U T IONA L PROV ISIONS ,

STAT U T E S , A N D R EGU L AT IONS

INVOLVED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261a

1a

Appendix

A

APPENDIX A — OPINION

OF THE

UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, FILED MARCH 14, 2025

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-12314

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION,

RADFORD FANT,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

PAM BONDI, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA, et al.,

Defendants,

COMMISSIONER, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT

OF LAW ENFORCEMENT,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-00137-MW-MAF

Before Willi a m P ryor , Chief Judge, and J orda n ,

Rosenbaum, Jill Pryor, Newsom, Branch, Grant, Luck,

2a

Appendix A

Lagoa, Brasher, A budu, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.*

William Pryor, Chief Judge, delivered the opinion of the

Court, in which Jordan, Rosenbaum, Jill Pryor, Newsom,

Grant, A budu, and Wilson, Circuit Judges, joined.

Rosenbaum, Circuit Judge, filed a concurring opinion in

which Jordan, Circuit Judge, joined as to Parts I and II,

and in which A budu, Circuit Judge, joined as to Part III.

Newsom, Circuit Judge, filed a concurring opinion.

Wilson, Circuit Judge, filed a concurring opinion.

Branch, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion in which

Lagoa, Circuit Judge, joined.

Lagoa, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion in which

Branch, Circuit Judge, joined.

Brasher, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion in which

Branch, Luck, and Lagoa, Circuit Judges, joined.

William Pryor, Chief Judge:

This appeal requires us to decide whether a state law

that prohibits the purchase of firearms by minors violates

* Wilson, Circuit Judge, elected to continue in the decision

of this appeal, which was reheard en banc while he was in regular

active service. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). K idd, Circuit Judge, who joined

the Court after oral argument, did not participate in the decision

of this appeal.

3a

Appendix A

the Second and Fourteenth Amendments as applied to

individuals between the ages of 18 and 21. After the

Florida Legislature enacted this prohibition in response to

the massacre at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School,

the National Rifle Association and an individual member

sued the Commissioner of the Florida Department of

Law Enforcement. The district court granted summary

judgment for the Commissioner. We affirm because the

Florida law is consistent with our historical tradition of

firearm regulation.

I.

BACKGROUND

On February 11, 2017, Nikolas Cruz entered Sunrise

Tactical Supply in Coral Springs, Florida. See M arjory

S t on em a n D ougl a s H igh S c ho ol P u bl ic S a f et y

Commission, Initial Report 262–64 (2019). Cruz turned 18

years old five months earlier and could legally purchase a

firearm in the State of Florida. Id. at 231, 262. At Sunrise

Tactical, Cruz lawfully purchased a Smith & Wesson M&P

15 semiautomatic rifle with a sling and bipod attached.

Id. at 262–64.

A year later, on Valentine’s Day, Cruz arrived in

an Uber at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in

Parkland, Florida, at 2:19 p.m. carrying the rifle. Id. at

24, 57. Two minutes later, he walked into a school building,

entered a stairwell, and paused to load his rifle and don a

vest that held extra magazines of ammunition. Id. at 25.

When a student encountered Cruz in the stairwell as he

prepared for the attack, Cruz said, “you better get out of

here, something bad is about to happen.” Id.

4a

Appendix A

Seconds later, Cruz left the stairwell and opened

fire in the first-floor hallway. Id. Gina Montalto sat in

the alcove of a classroom, and Luke Hoyer and Martin

Duque stood outside the door. Id. Cruz fatally shot all

three. Cruz then shot and wounded another student who

was in the hall. Id.

Next, Cruz aimed his rif le at a student-filled

classroom. Id. He fired two series of shots into the room.

Id. These shots killed Alyssa Alhadeff, Alaina Petty, and

Alex Schachter and wounded five others. Id. at 25–26. In

the next student-filled classroom that Cruz approached,

he fatally shot Nicholas Dworet and Helena Ramsay and

wounded four others. Id. at 26.

Campus monitor Chris Hixon burst into the hallway

and ran toward Cruz; Cruz turned and shot him too.

Id. at 27. Hixon fell to the ground wounded and crawled

behind a nearby wall. Id. Cruz turned the rifle toward yet

another classroom and fired again. Id. at 28. These shots

killed Carmen Schentrup and wounded three others. Id.

Cruz then ran through the hallway, passed Hixon lying

wounded on the ground, and shot him again and killed

him. Id. at 28, 65.

Next, Cruz entered the stairwell. Id. at 28. There, he

encountered campus monitor Aaron Feis. Id. Cruz shot

and killed him before he continued to the second floor. Id.

at 28–29. He entered the hallway with his rifle raised to

fire but found the hallway empty. Id. at 29. As he moved

through the hall, he muttered, “no one is here.” Id.

5a

Appendix A

Meanwhile, on the third floor, panic ensued when

the fire alarm blared. Id. at 27. Students rushed for

the stairwell but reversed course when they heard the

gunshots below. Id. As Cruz stalked up the stairwell, one

third-floor teacher frantically tried to locate his keys so he

could let students back into his classroom. Id. at 31. When

Cruz entered the third-floor hallway, about 20 people were

still outside classrooms. Id. He opened fire on them. Id.

Scott Beigel and another teacher were holding doors open

for students when Cruz shot them and killed Beigel. Id.

Unable to access his classroom, the teacher searching

for his keys hid with several students in the alcove of

his classroom before he darted to another alcove to try

a different classroom door, which was also locked. Id. at

31–32. He then directed the students to flee with him to

the stairwell. Id. at 32. As they ran, Cruz opened fire on

them. Id. Jaime Guttenberg and Peter Wang were fatally

shot within feet of reaching the stairwell. Id. at 31–32.

Cruz then turned his attention to Meadow Pollack, who

was on the ground wounded, and Cara Loughran, who

remained in the alcove, and fatally shot them. Id. at 31–33.

He then entered the alcove to the men’s restroom and

fatally shot Joaquin Oliver too. Id. at 31, 33. Three others

were wounded during Cruz’s third-floor attack. Id. at 31.

Five minutes and 32 seconds after Cruz fired the first

shots, he fired the final shot. Id. at 25, 33. After shooting

students and teachers on the third floor, he shot at the

exterior windows of a room on that floor in a last-ditch

effort to establish a sniper position to target fleeing

students outside the building. Id. at 33. He then entered

the stairwell, placed his rifle, vest, and 180 live rounds on

6a

Appendix A

the ground and ran down the stairs. Id. at 34. He left the

building and ran with fleeing students to blend in. Id. at

34, 125. He walked to a nearby McDonald’s and sat down

at a table occupied by a man. Id. at 35. Unbeknownst to

the man, Cruz had shot and seriously injured his sister in

a first-floor classroom less than an hour before. Id. at 28,

35–36. Cruz was arrested a short time later. Id. at 36–37.

He killed 17 individuals and wounded 17 others during his

massacre. Id. at 7.

Less than a month later, Florida enacted the Marjory

Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act to

“address the crisis of gun violence, including but not

limited to, gun violence on school campuses.” 2018 Fla.

Laws 10. The law states that a “person younger than

21 years of age may not purchase a firearm.” Fla. Stat.

§ 790.065(13). It also prohibits a “licensed importer,

licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer” from “ma[king]

or facilitat[ing]” the “sale or transfer of a firearm to a

person younger than 21 years of age.” Id. A violation of

the Florida law is a third-degree felony punishable by up

to five years of imprisonment and a fine up to $5,000. Id.

§§ 790.065(13), 775.082(3)(e), 775.083(1)(c). The Florida law

contains exceptions permitting the purchase of a rifle or

shotgun by peace officers, correctional officers, or military

personnel under the age of 21. Id. § 790.065(13).

The National Rifle Association sued the Commissioner

of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement for

declaratory and injunctive relief and alleged that

the Florida law violates the Second and Fourteenth

Amendments. Radford Fant, who was between the ages of

7a

Appendix A

18 and 21 at the time, later joined as an individual plaintiff.

Although the Association and Fant purported to make

a facial challenge to the Florida law, they alleged that

it is unconstitutional only to the extent that it prohibits

individuals between the ages of 18 and 21 from purchasing

firearms. Colton Campbell, who is between the ages of

18 and 21, has since been substituted for Fant as the

individual plaintiff.

The parties cross-moved for summary judgment, and

the district court granted judgment for the Commissioner.

The district court ruled that the Florida law does not

violate the right to keep and bear arms of individuals

between 18 and 21 years of age.

This appeal followed. During its pendency, the

Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol

Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 213 L. Ed.

2d 387 (2022). The Supreme Court held that a firearm

regulation is constitutional if it “is consistent with this

Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id.

at 2126. We vacated a panel opinion that affirmed the

district court after the Bruen decision to rehear this

appeal en banc. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bondi, 61 F.4th 1317

(11th Cir. 2023), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 72 F.4th

1346 (11th Cir. 2023). And we stayed briefing until the

Supreme Court later decided, in United States v. Rahimi,

that a federal law forbidding persons subject to domesticviolence restraining orders from possessing firearms,

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i), was constitutional because it

was consistent with our historical tradition of regulating

firearms. 602 U.S. 680, 144 S. Ct. 1889, 1898, 1903, 219

L. Ed. 2d 351 (2024).

8a

Appendix A

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a summary judgment. Thai

Meditation Ass’n of Ala. v. City of Mobile, 83 F.4th 922,

926 (11th Cir. 2023). Summary judgment is proper where,

construing all facts in the non-movant’s favor, there is no

genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

The Second Amendment provides, “A well regulated

Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,

the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not

be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. The Amendment

secures a preexisting right held by “the people” that is

“exercised individually and belongs to all Americans.”

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581, 128 S. Ct.

2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008). The “‘central component’

of the Second Amendment” is the right to “self-defense.”

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767, 130 S.

Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010) (quoting Heller, 554

U.S. at 599). The Amendment guarantees Americans the

right to “have weapons” and to carry them “outside of an

organized militia.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 582, 584 (internal

quotation marks omitted). This guarantee extends to “all

instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those

that were not in existence at the time of the founding.”

Id. at 582.

“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second

A mendment is not unlimited.” Id. at 626. “From

9a

Appendix A

Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators

and courts routinely explained that the right was not a

right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any

manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” Id. Since

the Founding, American law has regulated arms-bearing

conduct in many ways: from prohibitions on “gun use by

drunken New Year’s Eve revelers” to bans on “‘dangerous

and unusual weapons’” to restrictions on concealed carry.

Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1897 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627).

Although the Association and Campbell purport to

make a facial challenge to the Florida law, their challenge

is to the law as applied only to individuals between the

ages of 18 and 21. A facial challenge requires a plaintiff

to “‘establish that no set of circumstances exists under

which the [law] would be valid,’ or . . . show[] that the law

lacks a ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” Moody v. NetChoice,

LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 144 S. Ct. 2383, 219 L. Ed. 2d 1075

(alteration rejected) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481

U.S. 739, 745, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1987)). The

Association and Campbell do not challenge the Florida law

in that way. They argue that the law is unconstitutional

because it bars individuals between the ages of 18 and 21

from purchasing firearms—not because it prohibits all

minors from purchasing firearms.

When a person challenges a law regulating armsbearing conduct, courts must examine the “‘historical

tradition of firearm regulation’” in our nation to “delineate

the contours of the right.” Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1897

(quoting Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2126). A regulation is lawful

if it “fits within” and “is consistent with the principles

10a

Appendix A

that underpin” that tradition. Id. at 1897–98. This inquiry

turns on “[w]hy and how” the regulation burdens the

right to keep and bear arms. Id. at 1898. If it addresses

the same problem as historical restrictions, it shares

a “why” with those restrictions. Id. A shared “why” is

a “strong indicator” that a modern regulation “fall[s]

within a permissible category of regulations.” Id. And, if

a regulation shares a “why” with historical restrictions, it

is lawful if it is “‘similar’” to those restrictions in “how” it

burdens the right. Id. (quoting Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2132).

The burden to establish the lawfulness of a regulation lies

with the government. Id. at 1897.

Although a regulation “may not be compatible with

the right if it” restricts the right “to an extent beyond

what was done at the founding,” the regulation need “not

precisely match its historical precursors” either. Id. at

1898. A modern law could “‘pass constitutional muster’” if

it is “‘analogous enough’” to those precursors to “comport

with the principles underlying the Second Amendment,”

even if it is not a “‘dead ringer’ or a ‘historical twin.’”

Id. (quoting Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2133). To require that

a modern law perfectly match a law from the Founding

era erroneously “assumes that founding-era legislatures

maximally exercised their power to regulate.” Id. at 1925

(Barrett, J., concurring). The Constitution does not impose

a “‘use it or lose it’ view of legislative authority.” Id.

To determine whether the Florida law is consistent

with our regulatory tradition, we must first decide what

tradition is relevant to that inquiry. For purposes of this

appeal, the Founding era is the primary period against

11a

Appendix A

which we compare the Florida law. The Supreme Court

has “made clear that individual rights enumerated in the

Bill of Rights and made applicable against the States

through the Fourteenth Amendment have the same scope

as against the Federal Government.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at

2137. That is, “incorporated Bill of Rights protections,” like

the Second Amendment, “‘are all to be enforced against

the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according

to the same standards that protect those personal rights

against federal encroachment.’” McDonald, 561 U.S. at

765 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10, 84 S. Ct.

1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964)).

The Supreme Court has “generally assumed that

the scope” of those rights “is pegged to the public

understanding of the right when the Bill of Rights was

adopted in 1791.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2137. But the

Court did not definitively decide in Bruen the period

of history against which we should compare firearm

regulations. It acknowledged the “ongoing scholarly

debate on whether courts should primarily rely on the

prevailing understanding of an individual right when

the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868 when

defining its scope (as well as the scope of the right against

the Federal Government).” Id. at 2138. But it declined to

decide the proper historical period because the “public

understanding of the right to keep and bear arms in both

1791 and 1868 was, for all relevant purposes, the same

with respect to public carry.” Id.

The Supreme Court relied heavily on sources from

the Founding era to interpret the Second Amendment in

12a

Appendix A

Heller. To interpret the phrase “to keep and bear arms,”

the Court used dictionaries from the Founding era,

“written documents of the founding period,” and “state

constitutional provisions written in the 18th century or the

first two decades of the [nineteenth century].” Heller, 554

U.S. at 581–92. To determine the meaning of the Second

Amendment’s operative clause, the Court also “look[ed]”

to the “historical background of the Second Amendment”

because “it has always been widely understood that the

Second Amendment . . . codified a pre-existing right.”

Id. at 592. That historical background spanned over 100

years, from before the Glorious Revolution to the first

decade of the nineteenth century. Id. at 592–95. The Court

also considered the debate over whether the right to keep

and bear arms “needed to be codified in the Constitution.”

Id. at 598. And it again considered “analogous armsbearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and

immediately followed adoption of the Second Amendment.”

Id. at 600–01.

The Supreme Court has warned against the overuse

of history from Reconstruction. Although the Supreme

Court looked to sources from Reconstruction in Heller, it

cautioned that because those sources come “75 years after

the ratification of the Second Amendment, they do not

provide as much insight into its original meaning as earlier

sources.” Id. at 614. And, in Bruen, the Court explained

that “when it comes to interpreting the Constitution, not

all history is created equal” because “‘[c]onstitutional

rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood

to have when the people adopted them.’” 142 S. Ct. at

2136 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35). The Second

Amendment was ratified, and its meaning fixed, in 1791.

13a

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Our conclusion that we first look to the Founding

understanding finds additional support in the Supreme

Court’s repeated interpretations of other amendments

based on their public meaning at the Founding. For

example, in Crawford v. Washington, the Court explained

that the “founding generation’s” understanding of the

“right to confront one’s accusers” derived from the

“common law.” 541 U.S. 36, 43, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L.

Ed. 2d 177 (2004). Crawford canvassed English legal

history, colonial practice, state law contemporary to the

ratification of the Sixth Amendment, ratification debates,

and early state practice to ascertain the scope of the right.

Id. at 42–50. Likewise, in Virginia v. Moore, the Court

explained that it “look[s] to the statutes and common

law of the founding era to determine the norms that the

Fourth Amendment was meant to preserve.” 553 U.S.

164, 168, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 170 L. Ed. 2d 559 (2008). And,

in Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan, the Court

considered legislative enactments, treatises, and conflictof-interest rules contemporaneous to the ratification of

the First Amendment to determine whether legislative

recusal rules violate the First Amendment. 564 U.S. 117,

122–25, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 180 L. Ed. 2d 150 (2011). These

precedents reflect the preeminence of Founding-era

sources to the meaning of the Bill of Rights. Because

the Supreme Court relies on sources from the Founding

era to interpret the Bill of Rights, including the Second

Amendment, we do too.

Nevertheless, postratification history of a “‘regular

course of practice’ can ‘liquidate [and] settle the meaning

of’ disputed or indeterminate ‘terms [and] phrases’ in the

14a

Appendix A

Constitution.” Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2136 (quoting Chiafalo

v. Washington, 591 U.S. 578, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2326, 207

L. Ed. 2d 761 (2020)). To be sure, Bruen did not “endorse

freewheeling reliance on historical practice from the midto-late 19th century to establish the original meaning of

the Bill of Rights.” Id. at 2163 (Barrett, J., concurring).

And “to the extent later history contradicts what the text

says, the text controls.” Id. at 2137 (majority opinion).

For example, in the context of the First Amendment,

the Supreme Court declined to rely on a practice of over

30 states from the “second half of the 19th century” yet

relied on other evidence from that era. Espinoza v. Mont.

Dep’t of Revenue, 591 U.S. 464, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2258–59,

207 L. Ed. 2d 679 (2020). The Court explained that it saw

“no inconsistency in recognizing that such evidence may

reinforce an early practice but cannot create one.” Id.

at 2259 (emphasis added). So we may look to historical

practice from the mid-to-late nineteenth century at least

to confirm the Founding-era understanding of the Second

Amendment. But we need not and do not decide in this

appeal how to address a conflict between the Foundingera and Reconstruction-era understandings of the right

because the law of both eras restricted the purchase of

firearms by minors. Cf. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2138 (declining

to address this issue because “the public understanding

of the right to keep and bear arms in both 1791 and 1868

was, for all relevant purposes, the same with respect to

public carry”).

At the Founding, a person was an “infant[]” or a

“minor[]” in the eyes of the law until age 21. 1 Zephaniah

Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut

15a

Appendix A

213 (1795); accord 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries

on the Laws of England *463 (George Sharswood ed.,

1893) (“[F]ull age in male or female is twenty-one years,”

and an individual “till that time is an infant, and so styled

in law.”); Samuel Johnson, I’nfant. n.s., A Dictionary

of the E nglish L a nguage (1773), https://perma.cc/

Q4JZ-DRGE (“Infants” were “young person[s] to the

age of one and twenty.”). And the colonies “adopted age

twenty-one as the near universal age of majority.” Vivian

E. Hamilton, Adulthood in Law and Culture, 91 Tul. L.

Rev. 55, 64 (2016). The “age of majority at twenty-one was

early established at common law” and evolved “from the

system of judicial combat and knight service, the age of

knighthood being increased . . . to the completion of twenty

years.” T. E. James, The Age of Majority, 4 A m. J. Legal

Hist. 22, 30 (1960). English law set the age of majority at

21 years of age because of the relative lack of maturity

and judgment of younger individuals. See 1 Blackstone,

supra, at *453. The English view was that a child does not

“arriv[e] at years of discretion” until that age. Id. When

a child turned 21 years of age, “the law . . . established”

that “the empire of the father, or other guardian,” should

“give[] place to the empire of reason.” Id.

The Founders’ generation shared the view that minors

lacked the reason and judgment necessary to be trusted

with legal rights. Gouverneur Morris warned that these

individuals “want prudence” and “have no will of their

own.” 4 The Writings of James M adison 119 (Gaillard

Hunt ed., 1903) (Constitutional Convention, August 7,

1787). Thomas Jefferson considered “infants” akin to

“maniacs,” “drunkards,” and others who “cannot take

16a

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care of themselves.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to

Samuel Smith (May 3, 1823), https://perma.cc/YD6XH6PN. And, with respect to voting, John Adams explained

that these individuals were not “fit to be trusted by

the [p]ublic” because of their lack of “[j]udgment” and

“[w]ill.” Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May

26, 1776), https://perma.cc/HW9M-7YL2.

Because of their lack of reason, infants were subject

to the “power” of their parents until they reached age 21.

1 Blackstone, supra, at *452–53; 1 SWIFT, supra, at 213.

Parents “ha[d] the benefit” and “receive[d] the profits”

of their children’s labor. 1 Blackstone, supra, at *453.

Minors could not sue to vindicate their rights without

joining their guardians or some other “next friend” who

was not their guardian. Id. at *464. Parents controlled

children’s access to information, including books. Brown

v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 831–32, 131 S. Ct.

2729, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Nor

could they enlist in the military without parental consent.

Act of March 16, 1802, 2 Stat. 132, 135 (“[N]o person under

the age of twenty-one years shall be enlisted by any

officer, or held in the service of the United States, without

the consent of his parent.”). Families in New England

were arranged so that the “[p]atriarchal household

heads sp[oke] for their dependents in dealings with the

larger world.” Toby L. Ditz, Ownership and Obligation:

Inheritance and Patriarchal Households in Connecticut,

1750–1820, 47 Wm. & M ary Q. 235, 236 (1990). Dependent

minors “lacked the formal capacity to participate in public

life and [were] subject to the authority of household heads.”

Id. at 237.

17a

Appendix A

Among the many legal disabilities that “secure[d]

[minors] from hurting themselves by their own improvident

acts,” 1 Blackstone, supra, at *464, minors generally

lacked the capacity to contract, id. at *465, and to

purchase goods on account, Willi a m M acpherson,

Treatise on the Law Relating to Infants 303 (1843).

All “contracts with infants, except for necessaries, [were]

either void or voidable” because “infants . . . are supposed

to want judgment and discretion in their contracts and

transactions with others.” 1 Samuel Comyn, A Treatise

of the Law Relative to Contracts and Agreements Not

Under Seal 148 (1809). As a “general rule,” contracts for

the purchase of “personal property” involving minors

were “voidable.” 1 Swift, supra, at 215. By the early

nineteenth century, voidability was applied so “broadly”

that “it became almost impossible for children to form

any contracts.” Holly Brewer, By Birth or Consent:

Children, Law, and the A nglo -A merican Revolution

in Authority 271 (2005) (emphasis added). But a minor

could “bind himself by his contract for necessaries, for

diet[,] apparel, education, and lodging.” 1 Swift, supra,

at 216; accord Brewer , supra, at 271; 2 James K ent,

Commentaries on A merican Law 256 (William Kent ed.,

8th ed. 1854). Yet, an infant who “live[d] with his father or

guardian” who adequately cared for him, could not “bind

himself even for necessaries.” 2 K ent, supra, at 256–57

(emphasis added).

The inability to contract impeded minors from

acquiring firearms during the Founding era. In that era,

“contracts were more important for the basic transactions

of society” than today. Brewer , supra, at 271. The

18a

Appendix A

purchase of goods, including firearms, required the ability

to contract because people often bought goods on credit.

See, e.g., Wills v. Brown, 3 N.J.L. 548, 548 (N.J. Sup.

Ct. 1809) (dispute over a “running blacksmith account”);

Christie v. Woods, 2 Yeates 213, 215 (Pa. 1797) (dispute over

“goods [that] were sold on six months’ credit”); Saunders

Glover & Co. v. Ott’s Adm’r, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 572,

572 (1822) (dispute over goods, including “powder and

pistols,” purchased on credit); M acpherson, supra, at 316

(discussing disputes over clothing and jewelry bought on

credit). And because voidability threatened sellers with a

“high risk” that they could not recover goods sold if they

contracted with infants, “infants [were] effectively unable

to form contracts.” Brewer, supra, at 271. Importantly,

“liquor, pistols, powder, saddles, bridles, [and] whips”

were not necessaries. Ott’s Adm’r, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord)

at 572; see also 1 Swift, supra, at 216 (necessaries were

“diet[,] apparel, education, and lodging”); Brewer, supra,

at 266 (necessaries were food, clothing, education, and

medicine); 2 Kent, supra, at 256 (same). Minors also lacked

disposable income to otherwise purchase firearms because

they either worked for their parents for no wages, Robert

J. Spitzer, Historical Weapons Restrictions on Minors, 76

Rutgers U.L. Rev.: Commentaries 101, 108 (2024), or any

wages earned belonged to their parents, 1 Blackstone,

supra, at *453.

We draw two lessons from the legal treatment of

minors at the Founding. First, minors generally could not

purchase firearms because they lacked the judgment and

discretion to enter contracts and to receive the wages of

their labor. Second, minors were subject to the power of

19a

Appendix A

their parents and depended on their parents’ consent to

exercise rights and deal with others in society.

State militia laws from the Founding era confirm

this understanding. Because of the legal incapacity of

individuals under the age of 21, states enacted laws at

the Founding to address minors’ inability to purchase

firearms required for their militia service. The Second

Congress passed the Militia Act to enroll “able-bodied”

men between the ages of 18 and 45 in the militia. Act of

May 8, 1792, 1 Stat. 271, 271. The Act provided that “every

citizen so enrolled . . . shall . . . provide himself with a

good musket or firelock.” Id. But members of Congress

recognized that individuals between the ages of 18 and

21 would need their parents to provide them weapons to

comply with the Act. Representative John Vining “asked

by what means minors were to provide themselves with

the requisite articles” for militia service. 2 Joseph Gales,

The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the

United S tates 1854–55 (1834). And Representative

Jeremiah Wadsworth responded that “as to minors, their

parents or guardians would prefer furnishing them with

arms themselves, to depending on the United States” to

furnish them with arms. Id. at 1856.

States addressed the problem of providing minors

the firearms necessary for militia service in different

ways. Pennsylvania and Delaware exempted minors

from the firearm requirement entirely. 14 James T.

Mitchell & Henry Flanders, The Statutes at Large of

Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, at 456 (1909) (“[Y]oung

men under the age of twenty-one . . . shall be exempted

20a

Appendix A

from furnishing the necessary arms, ammunition and

accoutrements.”) (Statutes of 1793); 2 Laws of the State

of Delaware 1135–36 (New Castle, Samuel Adams & John

Adams 1797) (same) (Statutes of 1793). New Hampshire,

Massachusetts, Vermont, North Carolina, Louisiana,

Maine, and Missouri required parents of minors to

acquire firearms for their militia service. The Laws of

the State of New H ampshire 421–22 (Portsmouth, John

Melcher 1797) (Act of 1792); 2 The Perpetual Laws of the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts 181 (Boston, I. Thomas

& E. T. Andrews 1801) (Statutes of 1793); 2 The Laws of

the State of Vermont 131–32 (Randolph, Sereno Wright

1808) (Act of 1797); 2 Francois -X avier M artin, T he

Public Acts of the General Assembly of North Carolina

159 (Newbern, Martin & Ogden 1804) (Act of 1800);

Acts Passed at the First Session of the Legislative

Council of the T erritory of Orleans 284–86 (New

Orleans, James M. Bradford 1805) (Act of 1805); A n Act

to Organize, G overn, and Discipline the Militia , of the

State of Maine 21, 37 (Portland, Todd & Smith 1824) (Act

of 1821); 2 Laws of the State of Missouri 533, 554, 571, 574

(St. Louis, E. Charless 1825) (Act of 1825). And Virginia,

Connecticut, New York, Rhode Island, Maryland, New

Jersey, Ohio, Mississippi, Kentucky, Georgia, Indiana,

and Illinois implicitly required parents to supply minors

with firearms because those states held parents liable

for minors’ fines related to militia service, including the

failure to obtain a firearm. 9 William Walter Hening,

T he Statutes at L arge; Being a Collection of A ll

the L aws of Virginia from the First Session of the

Legislature in the Year 1619, at 270–71 (Richmond, J.

& G. Cochran Printers 1821) (Act of 1777); Acts and Laws

21a

Appendix A

of the State of Connecticut, in A merica 307–08, 312

(Hartford, Hudson & Goodwin 1796) (Act of 1792); 3 Laws

of the State of New York 58, 63–64 (New York, Thomas

Greenleaf 1797) (Act of 1793); The Public Laws of the

State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 436–

38 (Providence, Carter & Wilkinson 1798) (Act of 1798);

2 William K ilty, The Laws of M aryland ch. LIII, §§ I,

XV, XIX (Annapolis, Frederick Green 1800) (Supplement

of 1798); William Paterson, Laws of the State of New

Jersey 438–40 (New Brunswick, Abraham Blauvelt

1800) (Act of 1799); 2 Acts of the State of Ohio: Second

Session of the General A ssembly 31–32, 35 (Chillicothe,

N. Willis, reprinted by The Laning Co. 1901) (Statutes of

1803); Harry Toulmin, The Statutes of the Mississippi

Territory 80 (Natchez, Samuel Terrell 1807) (Statutes

of 1807); 2 Laws of K entucky 401, 405 (Lexington, John

Bradford 1807) (Statutes of 1807); Oliver H. Prince,

A Digest of the Laws of the State of Georgia 330–31

(Milledgeville, Grantland & Orme 1822) (Act of 1807); A n

Act Regulating the Militia, of the State of Indiana

19–20 (Corydon, Carpenter & Douglass 1824) (Act of

1824); Laws Passed by the Fourth General A ssembly

of the State of Illinois, at T heir Second Session 23

(Vandalia, Robert Blackwell 1826) (Act of 1826).

During the Founding era, minors generally lacked

unrestricted access to firearms. By 1826, at least 21

of the 24 states admitted to the Union—representing

roughly 89 percent of the population, Census for 1820,

at 18 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1821)—had enacted

laws that placed the onus on parents to provide minors

with firearms for militia service. These laws reflected

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Appendix A

that, at common law, minors could not purchase weapons

for themselves. Cf. Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146, 139

S. Ct. 682, 688, 203 L. Ed. 2d 11 (2019) (“In 1787, the

constitutions of eight States—accounting for 70% of the

U.S. population—forbade excessive fines.” And by 1868,

“the constitutions of 35 of the 37 States—accounting for

over 90% of the U.S. population—expressly prohibited

excessive fines.”).

University regulations from the Founding era also

confirm that minors needed parental consent to access

firearms. At the Founding, “[c]ollege authorities stood

in the place of parents to the students entrusted to

their care.” Brian Jackson, The Lingering Legacy of In

Loco Parentis: An Historical Survey and Proposal for

Reform, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 1135, 1135–36 (1991). Acting

in loco parentis, universities could impose “[a]ny rule

or regulation for the betterment of” their students’

“physical, moral, and mental welfare.” Id. at 1146; accord 1

Blackstone, supra, at *453 (A father could “delegate part

of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or

schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and

has such a portion of the power of the parent committed

to his charge . . . as may be necessary to answer the

purposes for which he is employed.”). And universities

“were permitted to deny students the autonomy and

rights enjoyed by others in order to preserve institutional

harmony.” Jackson, supra, at 1147.

Exercising this parental authority, universities

commonly restricted firearm access both on and off

campus. See generally Megan Walsh & Saul Cornell,

23a

Appendix A

Age Restrictions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms,

1791–1868, 108 M inn. L. R ev. 3049, 3069–75 (2024);

Spitzer, supra, at 112–19 (collecting dozens of public and

private university codes and concluding that “policies

restricting students’ access to weapons were common, if

not ubiquitous” in the 1700s and 1800s). For example, in

1795, Yale College prohibited students from “keep[ing]

any kind of fire-arms, or gun-powder.” The Laws of YaleCollege, in New Haven, in Connecticut, Enacted by the

President and Fellows, the Sixth Day of October, A.D.

1795, at 26 (New Haven, Thomas Green & Son 1800). In

1810, the University of Georgia prohibited students from

possessing firearms off campus. See The Minutes of the

Senatus Academicus 1799–1842, Univ. of Ga. Librs. 86

(Nov. 4, 1976), https://perma.cc/EW28-VU83 (prohibiting

students from possessing “any gun” or “other offensive

weapon in College” or “out of the college in any case

whatsoever”). Later, the University of Virginia prohibited

students from keeping “weapons or arms of any kind, or

gunpowder” on school grounds. University of Virginia

Board of Visitors Minutes, Encyclopedia Va. 6–7 (Oct. 5,

1824), https://perma.cc/F32R-AWK9. And students at the

University of North Carolina could not “keep . . . fire arms,

or gunpowder” nor “carry, keep, or own at the College . . .

any deadly weapon” nor “use fire arms without permission

from the President.” Acts of the General A ssembly and

Ordinances of the Trustees for the Organization and

Government of the University of North-Carolina 15

(Raleigh, The Raleigh Register 1838).

Mid-to-late-nineteenth-century laws consistent with

these principles further establish that our law historically

24a

Appendix A

precluded the purchase of firearms by individuals under

the age of 21. In the second half of the nineteenth century,

20 jurisdictions enacted laws that restricted access to

arms for minors. Most of those laws prohibited all methods

of providing arms to individuals under the age of 21. And

only a few of these laws allowed parents to provide arms

to their children.

Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, Indiana, Missouri,

Illinois, Maryland, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Iowa,

Louisiana, Wyoming, the District of Columbia, North

Carolina, and Texas prohibited selling, loaning, or giving

dangerous weapons, including pistols, to individuals under

the age of 21. 1855–56 Ala. Laws 17; Tenn. Code § 4864

(1858), reprinted in The Code of Tennessee Enacted

by the General A ssembly of 1857–’8, at 871 (Nashville,

E. G. Eastman & Co. 1858); 1860 Ky. Acts 245; 1875 Ind.

Acts 59; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1274 (1879), reprinted in 1

The Revised Statutes of the State of Missouri 1879,

at 224 (Jefferson, Carter & Regan 1879); 1881 Ill. Laws

73; 1882 Md. Laws 656; 1882 W. Va. Acts 421; 1883 Wis.

Sess. Laws 290 (vol. 1); 1884 Iowa Acts 86; 1890 La. Acts

39; 1890 Wyo. Terr. Sess. Laws 140; J. A. Van Orsdel &

Fenimore Chatterton, Revised Statutes of Wyoming

in Force December 1, 1899, at 1253 (Laramie, Chaplin,

Spafford & Mathison 1899) (codifying the territorial law);

27 Stat. 116–17 (1892); 1893 N.C. Sess. Laws 468–69; 1897

Tex. Gen. Laws 221–22; see also Saltonstall v. Riley, 28

Ala. 164, 172 (1856) (describing a “minor under the age of

twenty-one years”); Warwick v. Cooper, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed)

659, 660–61 (1858) (referring to 21 as the age of majority);

Newland v. Gentry, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 666, 671, 18 B.

25a

Appendix A

Mon. 666 (1857) (referring to 21 as the age of majority);

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 2559, supra, (setting the age of majority

at 21 for males and 18 for females); 64 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 1

(1881) (setting the age of majority at 21 for males and 18

for females); Hepp v. Huefner, 61 Wis. 148, 20 N.W. 923,

924 (Wis. 1884) (referring to 21 as the age of majority);

In re Mells, 64 Iowa 391, 20 N.W. 486, 486 (Iowa 1884)

(referring to 21 as the age of majority); State v. Kittelle,

110 N.C. 560, 15 S.E. 103, 103 (N.C. 1892) (referring to 21

as the age of majority); 1 John Sayles & Henry Sayles,

Sayles’ A nnotated Civil Statutes of the State of Texas

1009 (St. Louis, The Gilbert Book Co. 1898) (setting the

age of majority at 21 for males and unmarried females).

But, of those jurisdictions, only four excepted parents or

guardians from their prohibitions on providing arms to

individuals under the age of 21. 1860 Ky. Acts 245; Mo. Rev.

Stat. § 1274 (1879), supra; 1897 Tex. Gen. Laws 221–22;

1881 Ill. Laws 73 (employers, too).

Five other jurisdictions regulated access to arms

for individuals under the age of 21 in slightly different

ways. Mississippi prohibited the sale of deadly weapons

including pistols to individuals under the age of 21 but

did not prohibit other ways of providing arms to those

individuals. 1878 Miss. Laws 175; see also Acker v.

Trueland, 56 Miss. 30, 34 (1878) (referring to 21 as the

age of majority). Similarly, Delaware prohibited the sale

of “deadly weapon[s] . . . other than an ordinary pocket

knife” to minors. 16 Del. Laws 716 (1881); see also Revised

Statutes of the State of Delaware of Eighteen Hundred

and Fifty-T wo 484–85 (Wilmington, James & Webb 1874)

(setting the age of majority at 21 for males and 18 for

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Appendix A

females). Georgia prohibited “sell[ing], giv[ing] lend[ing],

or furnish[ing]” a pistol to a minor unless “circumstances

justif[ied]” the use of the weapon to “defend[] life, limb

or property.” 1876 Ga. Laws 112. Nevada and Kansas

went further. Nevada prohibited individuals under the

age of 21 from “wear[ing] or carry[ing] . . . dangerous or

deadly weapons[],” including pistols. 1885 Nev. Stat. 51.

And Kansas prohibited their “possession” of pistols and

“other dangerous weapon[s].” 1883 Kan. Sess. Laws 159;

see also Burgett v. Barrick, 25 Kan. 526, 527–29 (1881)

(referring to 21 as the age of majority).

The law of the Founding era, which restricted the

purchase of firearms by minors, continued into the

nineteenth century in the form of statutory prohibitions.

By the end of the nineteenth century, at least 19 states

and the District of Columbia—representing roughly 55

percent of the population of states admitted to the Union,

Census Off., Dep’t of the Interior, T welfth Census of

the U.S. Taken in the Year 1900, Census Reports, Vol. I:

Population 2 (1901) (1890 population data)—restricted the

purchase or use of certain firearms by minors. When the

common-law regime became less effective at restricting

minors’ access to firearms, statutes increasingly did the

work.

These mid-to-late-nineteenth-century laws also

carried the threat of criminal penalties. Alabama,

Kentucky, Indiana, Mississippi, Illinois, Maryland,

Kansas, and Wyoming imposed only fines for violations of

their statutes. 1855–56 Ala. Laws 17; 1860 Ky. Acts 245;

1875 Ind. Acts 59; 1878 Miss. Laws 175; 1881 Ill. Laws 73;

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Appendix A

1882 Md. Laws 656; 1883 Kan. Sess. Laws 159; 1890 Wyo.

Terr. Sess. Laws 140. But Tennessee, Georgia, Missouri,

Delaware, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Iowa, Nevada,

Louisiana, the District of Columbia, North Carolina, and

Texas threatened violators with imprisonment. T enn.

Code § 4864 (1858), supra; 1876 Ga. Laws 112; The Code

of the State of Georgia 782 (R. H. Clark, et al. eds., 2d

ed. 1873); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1274 (1879), supra; 16 Del. Laws

716 (1881); 1882 W. Va. Acts 421; 1883 Wis. Sess. Laws

290 (vol. 1); 1884 Iowa Acts 86; 1885 Nev. Stat. 51; 1890

La. Acts 39; 27 Stat. 116–17 (1892); 1893 N.C. Sess. Laws

468–69; 1897 Tex. Gen. Laws 221–22.

The age of the majority “remained unchanged” in

the United States “from the country’s founding well into

the twentieth century.” Hamilton, supra, at 64. When

World War II necessitated lowering the conscription age

to 18, states lowered the age of majority too. Id. And, in

1971, the ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment

guaranteed the right to vote to individuals at the age of

18. But for much of the first two centuries of our nation,

our law limited the rights of individuals under the age of

21, including their purchase of firearms.

From this history emerges a straightfor ward

conclusion: the Florida law is consistent with our

regulatory tradition in why and how it burdens the right

of minors to keep and bear arms. See Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at

1898. Because minors have yet to reach the age of reason,

the Florida law prohibits them from purchasing firearms,

yet it allows them to receive firearms from their parents

or another responsible adult.

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Appendix A

The Florida law has the same “why” as the Foundingera limitations: individuals under the age of 21 have not

reached the age of reason and lack the judgment and

discretion to purchase firearms responsibly. To reduce the

likelihood that another individual like Nikolas Cruz would

lawfully purchase a firearm and use it to inflict grievous

harm on himself or others, the Florida law restricts

the purchase of firearms by individuals under the age

of 21. See Fla. Stat. § 790.065(13). Likewise, our legal

system “imposed age limits on all manner of activities

that required judgment and reason” at the Founding.

Brown, 564 U.S. at 834 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But

when an individual reaches the age of reason and the

need to protect him and the public from his immaturity

and impulsivity dissipates, the Florida law permits him

to purchase firearms. See Fla. Stat. § 790.065(13).

The Florida law is also consistent with our regulatory

tradition in “how” it burdens the right. Founding-era law

precluded individuals under the age of 21 from purchasing

arms because they lacked cash and the capacity to

contract. Access to arms was a matter of parental

consent. When Founding-era laws required minors to

carry arms for militia service, states required their

parents to provide the arms. And universities, standing

in for students’ parents, imposed significant restrictions

on both firearm access and use. Consistent with these

Founding-era limitations, states in the nineteenth century

expressly prohibited the sale of arms to minors with

some exceptions for parents to provide firearms to their

children. The Florida law burdens the right no more than

these historical restrictions because it prohibits purchase

but preserves access to firearms with parental consent.

29a

Appendix A

Notably, the Florida law is less restrictive than the

law at the Founding in some ways. The militia laws did not

empower any individuals under the age of 21 to purchase

arms. But the Florida law contains exceptions permitting

the purchase of a rifle or shotgun by peace officers,

correctional officers, or military personnel. Fla . Stat.

§ 790.065(13). This exception is more generous than the

Founding-era militia laws because it empowers minors to

purchase firearms when needed for public service.

The Florida law fits comfortably within postratification

tradition too. Indeed, many postratification laws went

further than the Florida law does. Fifteen jurisdictions

prohibited providing pistols and other dangerous weapons

under any circumstances to individuals under the age 21,

not just selling them. Only six jurisdictions permitted

parents to provide arms to their children regardless of

circumstances—a step back from the parental consent

of the Founding era. And Nevada and Kansas prohibited

possession by individuals under the age of 21. That

the Florida law is less restrictive than many of these

postratification laws further confirms that it fits within

our regulatory tradition.

To be sure, the common-law regime of the Founding

era differs from our modern regime of statutory

regulation. But Supreme Court precedents do not require

a modern law to “precisely match its historical precursors.”

Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1898. Those “precedents were not

meant to suggest a law trapped in amber.” Id. at 1897.

And we do not “assume[] that founding-era legislatures

maximally exercised their power to regulate” or that the

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Second Amendment imposes a “‘use it or lose it’ view of

legislative authority.” Id. at 1925 (Barrett, J., concurring).

That kind of assumption is especially unwarranted here

where the limitations on the legal rights of minors were

so pervasive that states had no need to enact restrictions

that prohibited their purchase of firearms. Instead, the

inability to contract and the lack of a right to their own

wages precluded minors from purchasing any goods on

their own, except for necessaries when their parents would

not provide them. See Brewer, supra, at 271; 2 K ent,

supra, at 256–57; 1 Blackstone, supra, at *466.

The question is whether the modern law is “‘analogous

enough,’” and the Florida law is. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1898

(quoting Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2133). Like the Foundingera legal regime, the Florida law prevents purchases by

minors. The difference between the Florida law and the

Founding-era regime is that the law at the Founding was

more restrictive than the Florida law because it prevented

the purchase of many goods besides firearms. The

Florida law does not violate the Second and Fourteenth

Amendments because it restricts the rights of minors less

than the Founding-era law did.

Although the Founding era lacked express prohibitions

on the purchase of firearms, the postratification period

did not. The laws from the mid-to-late nineteenth century

make explicit what was implicit at the Founding: laws may

regulate the purchase of firearms by minors. To that end,

18 jurisdictions expressly prohibited the sale of certain

arms to individuals under the age of 21 and attached

criminal penalties to those prohibitions.

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The ways in which postratification laws are less

restrictive than the Florida law do not undermine our

conclusion either. Many of these laws arguably target only

abnormally dangerous weapons instead of all weapons.

See, e.g., Tenn. Code § 4864 (1858), supra (“pistol, bowieknife, dirk, Arkansas tooth-pick, hunter’s knife, or like

dangerous weapon, except a gun for hunting or weapon for

defence in travelling”); see also Brasher Dissenting Op. at

30 (“[T]hese laws reflect a tradition of regulating specific

weapons that were considered unusually dangerous

because they could so easily be concealed.”). And some of

these laws permitted women to purchase arms at 18 years

of age instead of 21. E.g., 1881 Ill. Laws 73; 64 Ill. Comp.

Stat. § 1 (1881). Even if we accept that the Florida law is

more restrictive than the postratification laws in these

ways, that fact does not make the Florida law inconsistent

with our regulatory tradition. At the Founding, the

law precluded the purchase of any kind of firearm by a

minor, whether male or female. So, to the extent that the

Florida law is more restrictive than postratification laws,

it does not matter because the Florida law is nevertheless

consistent with the law of the Founding.

Judge Brasher’s dissenting opinion offers tales

of Founder/President youths shooting guns, Brasher

Dissenting Op. at 12–13 (recounting how Thomas Jefferson

and John Adams and eldest son John Quincy Adams used

firearms as children for hunting and sport), to imply that

it would violate the Second and Fourteenth Amendments

to restrict the purchase of firearms by minors of any age,

see id. at 3 (“[T]he majority has read an age limit into the

Second Amendment and that amendment alone.”); id. at

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12 (“[T]here are no Founding-era laws disarming anyone

based on age.”); id. at 14 (“[F]ederal legislation simply

required all national select militia members to arrive

armed for duty; there were no specific provisions about

minors.”); id. at 16 (“[T]here were no Founding-era laws

prohibiting young adults from purchasing any firearm at

all.”); id. at 27 (“There were no age-based limitations on

[the] right to keep and bear arms either before, during,

or immediately after the adoption of the Bill of Rights.”).

Judge Branch’s dissenting opinion also implies that any

age restriction is unconstitutional. See Branch Dissenting

Op. at 3 (“[T]he majority’s lone Founding-era analogue . . .

a contract-law doctrine . . . incidentally reached contracts

for firearms because it reached contracts by minors for

any non-necessity.”). But that position defies our legal

tradition, which “imposed age limits on all manner of

activities that required judgment and reason.” Brown,

564 U.S. at 834 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

Perhaps because that position is so difficult to defend,

Judge Brasher’s dissent frames the Florida law as one

that supposedly targets “adults” between the ages of 18

and 21 even though the Florida law, by its terms, covers

all individuals under the age of 21. See, e.g., Brasher

Dissenting Op. at 1 (describing the Florida law as a

prohibition on “adult citizens between the ages of eighteen

to twenty-one from purchasing any kind of firearm”).

The dissent then suggests that its modern “adults” are

individuals who possess some unspecified set of legal

rights. See id. at 20 (noting that individuals over the age

of 18 “can [now] be held to long term contracts” in Florida

and that their parents lack an “obligation to protect them,

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Appendix A

provide for them, or ensure their safety”). And it concludes

that Florida cannot bar these “adults” from purchasing

firearms today regardless of their status at the Founding.

Campbell and the Association take a similar approach:

Although they concede that Florida may restrict the

purchase of firearms by minors, they argue that Florida’s

regulatory authority is somehow tied to the age of majority

that it currently uses for most other rights.

The dissent’s attempt to avoid the weight of legal

history by labeling individuals between the ages of 18 and

21 as “adults” is unavailing. The dissent fails to define its

category of “adults” for federal constitutional purposes; it

discounts the key fact that, at the Founding and until the

late twentieth century, the age of majority was 21. Instead

of reviewing the legal analogues for regulating the rights

of individuals under the age of 21 as minors, the dissent

treats contemporary “adults” as the so-called “analogues”

of the adults of the Founding era. Id. at 31 (“Not to

belabor the point, but eighteen-to twenty-one-year-olds

in Florida today are analogous to adults, not minors,

at the time these statutes were enacted.”). The dissent

fails to explain which, or how many, modern rights push

an individual across the threshold from minor to adult

under the Second Amendment. Taken to its logical end,

the dissent’s position would mean that the federal right

to keep and bear arms turns on a sliding scale defined by

contemporary state law that varies from jurisdiction to

jurisdiction. The federal right could even mean something

entirely different in Florida next week depending on the

public policy choices of its legislature.

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That Florida has lowered the age of majority for some

rights does not mean that it has less power to restrict the

rights of minors than it did at the Founding. Although 21

was the near-universal age of majority at the Founding,

Hamilton, supra, at 64, Florida, in recent decades, has

lowered the age of majority for many rights to 18, see

Fla. Stat. § 743.07. But not all states have lowered the

age of majority like Florida. See, e.g., Miss. Code § 1-327 (establishing 21 years as the age of majority except

with respect to the capacity to enter contracts that

affect personal or real property); A la. Code § 26-1-1(a)

(establishing 19 years as the age of majority). And even

modern Florida laws bar individuals under the age of

21 from purchasing alcohol and tobacco. See Fla. Stat.

§ 562.11(1)(a) (alcohol); id. § 569.101(1) (tobacco). Judge

Brasher’s dissent would have us hold that the Second

Amendment turns on an evolving standard of adulthood

that is divorced from the text of the Amendment and from

our regulatory tradition. We decline to do so. See Thomas

M. Cooley, a Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations

Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States

of the A merican Union 54 (Boston, Little, Brown, &

Co. 1868) (“A principal share of the benefit expected

from written constitutions would be lost if the rules they

established were so flexible as to bend to circumstances

or be modified by public opinion.”).

In a real sense, Judge Brasher’s dissent erroneously

reviews the Florida law under an equal-protection

standard masquerading as an analysis under the Second

Amendment. It asserts that the Florida law cannot

stand because the principle that minors were subject

35a

Appendix A

to the power of their parents at the Founding does not

adequately support application of the law to individuals

between the ages of 18 and 21 today. Brasher Dissenting

Op. at 21 (asserting that “Florida cannot enforce its

ban based on a historical justification that does not

exist in the present day”). In effect, the dissent applies

heightened scrutiny and asks whether the Florida law is

sufficiently tailored to the dissent’s chosen justification.

But settled law makes clear that we ordinarily review

age classifications under the Equal Protection Clause for

rational basis, and the Florida law easily satisfies that

standard. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470, 111

S. Ct. 2395, 115 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1991) (Because “age is not a

suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause,”

a state “need therefore assert only a rational basis for

its age classification.”). Although the dissent contends

that age classifications that involve fundamental rights

receive strict scrutiny, Brasher Dissenting Op. at 22, the

Supreme Court has “recognized that even where there is

an invasion of protected freedoms ‘the power of the state

to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the

scope of its authority over adults,’” Ginsberg v. New York,

390 U.S. 629, 638, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1968)

(quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170, 64 S.

Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944)). Indeed, the Supreme Court

has described the right to vote as “fundamental,” Harper

v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670, 86 S. Ct.

1079, 16 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1966), yet it has held that Congress

could not use its enforcement power under Section 5 of

the Fourteenth Amendment to require states to lower

the voting age from 21 to 18, Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.

112, 130, 91 S. Ct. 260, 27 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1970). After all,

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Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment itself uses 21

years as an age classification for that right. U.S. Const.

amend. XIV, § 2 (reducing the “basis of representation”

of any state that “denie[s]” the “right to vote” to “any

of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one

years of age”).

Florida did not lose its constitutional authority to

regulate minors’ access to firearms when it in recent

decades bestowed on individuals between the ages of 18

and 21 greater rights than they would have enjoyed at the

Founding. Indeed, that Florida distinguishes between the

purchase of a firearm and other rights is consistent with

the Founding-era legal regime, which also distinguished

between when individuals under the age of 21 could

exercise rights based on need and maturity. For example,

individuals under the age of 21 could enter valid contracts

to purchase necessaries if their parents did not provide

those necessaries. 2 K ent, supra, at 256–57. The law

also treated marriage contracts differently than other

contracts. See 1 Blackstone, supra, at *433, 436. Boys

could validly marry at the age of 14, and girls could at

the age of 12—the “years of discretion” for marriage. Id.

at *436. These Founding-era exceptions for the exercise

of rights based on need or judgments about maturity are

no different from Florida’s contemporary judgment that

only individuals with a greater degree of maturity should

be able to purchase firearms. And that judgment is one

reserved for legislatures whose role it is to formulate

policy about legal adulthood—not courts. To this point,

our dissenting colleagues offer no response.

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Appendix A

Nor does the fact that some states required minors

to serve in the militia establish that they had a right

to unfettered firearm access. Judge Brasher’s dissent

mistakes the duty of some minors to serve in the militia

for a right to purchase firearms. See Brasher Dissenting

Op. at 13–16. Although minors between the ages of 18

and 21 could serve in the militia, there was no national

requirement that they do so. Instead, Congress permitted,

but did not require, states to mandate militia service for

minors between 18 and 21 years of age. 1 Stat. at 271–72.

And, consistent with that authority, New Jersey, Ohio, and

Kansas exempted minors from service in the militia in the

nineteenth century. Acts of the Fifty-Fourth General

A ssembly of the State of New Jersey 3 (Trenton, Joseph

Justice 1829) (excluding minors under the age of 21 from

the militia); Acts of a General Nature, Passed by the

Forty Second General A ssembly of the State of Ohio

53 (Columbus, Samuel Medary 1844) (same); K an. Const.

of 1859, art. VIII, § 1 (same). Contrary to the dissent,

the militia laws establish no national “expectation of gun

ownership” by minors. Brasher Dissenting Op. at 14. They

establish only that many state legislatures determined

that minors could be required to bear arms provided by

their parents and to use those arms under the command

and supervision of militia officers.

We also reject, as contrary to Supreme Court

precedent, Judge Branch’s dissenting opinion that we

must rely only on firearm-specific regulations from the

Founding era and cannot consider the common law of

contracts that governed minors. See Branch Dissenting

Op. at 3. Reliance on the common-law regime of contracts

38a

Appendix A

is appropriate because the Florida law prohibits the

sale of firearms—a kind of contract. And it adheres

to Supreme Court precedent because, in Rahimi, the

Supreme Court relied on principles “[w]ell entrenched in

the common law” that were not limited to firearms. 144

S. Ct. at 1900. Specifically, the Supreme Court relied on

surety laws, which generally required that an individual

pledge to keep the peace and “could be invoked to prevent

all forms of violence.” Id. As the Rahimi Court explained,

“the Second Amendment permits more than just those

regulations identical to ones that could be found in 1791.”

Id. at 1897–98.

Nor does it make any sense for Judge Branch’s

dissenting opinion to suggest that our citation of a decision

refusing to enforce a creditor’s purported contract with a

minor, Ott’s Adm’r, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) at 572, somehow

proves that minors regularly purchased firearms in the

Founding era, see Branch Dissenting Op. at 7. Judge

Branch’s dissent cites no firearm-sales contract with a

minor enforced by any court, and it points to no evidence

that minors in any state regularly purchased firearms.

It bears repeating that it is unclear whether our

dissenting colleagues accept that any age restriction

for the sale of firearms is constitutional. If they do not,

their position would require enjoining the enforcement of

numerous federal and state laws, including a federal law

that prohibits licensed sellers from selling “any firearm or

ammunition” to an individual under the age of 18. See 18

U.S.C. § 922(b)(1). But if our dissenting colleagues accept

that some age restrictions are constitutional—and they

39a

Appendix A

do not say that they do—it is unclear what aspects of the

Founding-era legal regime they believe would support

that position. Would the common-law regime of contracts

be relevantly similar for limiting sales of firearms to any

minors? Or would a firearm-specific regulation from that

era be necessary? Would the common-law regime that

enshrined parental control be relevantly similar? Or

would the legislatures of that era have had to exercise

that control? And if the aspects of the common-law regime

that we have invoked are relevantly similar for upholding

modern laws that prohibit sales of firearms to minors

under the age of 18 years, what principle of constitutional

law do our dissenting colleagues believe empowers the

federal judiciary to override the judgment of the Florida

legislature to draw the line at 21 years, the same line that

prevailed during the Founding era and throughout most

of American history? Keep in mind that Congress too has

drawn the same line of 21 years for sales of firearms that

are not “a shotgun or rifle.” Id. On these questions, our

dissenting colleagues exercise a right to remain silent. See

Branch Dissenting Op. at 1 n.1 (“I express no opinion on

any restrictions placed upon Americans under 18 years

of age.”).

The recent contrary decision of our sister circuit—

which ignored how the common-law regime restricted

minors’ access to firearms—also fails to persuade

us. Reese v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms &

Explosives, 127 F.4th 583, 586 (5th Cir. 2025) (holding

unconstitutional a federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1), (c)

(1), that prohibits licensees from selling handguns to

minors between the ages of 18 and 21). Our sister circuit

40a

Appendix A

considered state militia laws and university regulations

without reference to the common law at the Founding.

See id. at 596–99. But even mid-nineteenth century

jurists described “the unwritten law” as the “basis of our

jurisprudence.” Commonwealth v. Chapman, 54 Mass.

(13 Met.) 68, 69, 13 Metc. 68 (1847). The common law

“furnishe[d] the rules by which public and private rights

[we]re established and secured, the social relations of all

persons regulated, their rights, duties, and obligations

determined, and all violations of duty redressed and

punished.” Id. From those jurists’ perspective, without the

common law, “the written law, embracing the constitution

and statute laws, would constitute but a lame, partial, and

impracticable system.” Id.; see also A ntonin Scalia &

Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of

Legal Texts 3 (2012) (“Ours is a common-law tradition

. . . . Statutes were a comparatively infrequent source

of English law through the mid-19th century.”). Indeed,

in the Founding era, “crimes were often defined by the

common law rather than by statute.” Stuart Banner,

T he D ecline of Natural L aw 50 (2021). And after

the American Revolution, the states quickly “passed

‘reception statutes’ to adopt English common law as

judicial precedent.” Bryan A. Garner, et al., The Law

of Judicial Precedent 738 (2016); see generally Ford W.

Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in

the United States, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 791, 798–800 (1951); see

also A nthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The

Law of Nations and the United States Constitution 10

(2017) (“Each state adopted the common law of England

and, by extension, key parts of the law of nations.”).

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Appendix A

The written laws of the Founding era must be

understood in the light of that predominant common-law

regime. See William Baude & Robert Leider, The GeneralLaw Right to Bear Arms, 99 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1467,

1468–70 (2024) (“The constitutionalization of a preexisting

right means that . . . the Constitution’s reference to a

legal right must be understood by learning the historical

customary law that defined and governed the right before

its codification.”); J. Joel Alicea, Bruen Was Right, 174

U. Pa. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2025) (manuscript at 32–33),

https://perma.cc/C592-T8GA (“[T]he more reasonable

reading is that Bruen does not, in fact, limit the category of

historical evidence to regulations. Bruen is an originalist

methodology . . . . In other contexts, the Court has rightly

looked to many different sources to determine the original

meaning of the Constitution.”); see generally Stewart Jay,

Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. Pa.

L. Rev. 1231 (1985); Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R.

Clark, General Law in Federal Court, 54 Wm. & M ary L.

Rev. 655 (2013); Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General

Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503 (2006); William Baude, et al.,

General Law and the Fourteenth Amendment, 76 Stan.

L. Rev. 1185 (2024). That common-law regime restricted

minors’ ability to purchase firearms. The state statutes

that obligated parents to provide firearms for minors’

militia service confirm that minors had limited access, and

the many university regulations that restricted firearm

possession by students confirm that minors’ access was

a matter of parental consent. Because the Fifth Circuit

failed to consider the background common-law regime,

it misapprehended the import of these written laws. See

Reese, 127 F.4th at 597 (The “requirements that parents

42a

Appendix A

furnish firearms for their sons’ militia service do not

mean that the military-age young men lacked the right

to keep and bear (or obtain) such arms themselves.”); id.

at 596 (“Actions taken in loco parentis say little about the

general scope of Constitutional rights and protections.”).

Nor are we persuaded that two other considerations

present in Rahimi command a different conclusion. First,

although the Supreme Court acknowledged in Rahimi

that section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) did not apply to an entire class

of “persons thought by a legislature to present a special

danger of misuse,” it did so because the Founding-era

comparators, surety and going-armed laws, did not apply

to entire classes either. 144 S. Ct. at 1901–02. Section

922(g)(8)(C)(i) “presumes, like the surety laws before it,

that the Second Amendment right may only be burdened

once a defendant has been found to pose a credible threat

to the physical safety of others.” Id. at 1902. Unlike the

surety and going-armed laws, the rule that minors had

not “arriv[ed] at years of discretion” and lacked legal

capacity applied during the Founding era to all individuals

under the age of 21. 1 Blackstone, supra, at *452–53. So,

it does not matter that the Florida law applies to a class

of individuals because the Founding-era comparators did

too.

Second, the lack of criminal penalties at the Founding

is not dispositive, especially in the light of the criminal

penalties that emerged during the nineteenth century.

Rahimi considered the penalty that attaches to a firearm

regulation as a “relevant,” but not necessary, “aspect of the

burden.” 144 S. Ct. at 1902. Violations of the Florida law

43a

Appendix A

carry the possibility of imprisonment of up to five years and

a fine of up to $5,000. Fla. Stat. §§ 790.065(13), 775.082(3)

(e), 775.083(1)(c). The law at the Founding did not impose

criminal penalties on individuals under the age of 21 who

purchased firearms. But postratification laws, which

prohibited the purchase of firearms by individuals under

the age of 21 consistent with Founding-era limitations,

did threaten violators with fines and imprisonment. E.g.,

T enn. Code § 4864 (1858), supra. And the law at the

Founding was not toothless either. Voidability threatened

sellers with a “high risk” that they could not recover goods

sold if they contracted with infants. Brewer, supra, at

271. As a criminal penalty might discourage an individual

in Florida from purchasing a firearm, voidability so

discouraged sellers such that “infants [were] effectively

unable to form contracts.” Id. Although there was no

risk of imprisonment until the nineteenth century, other

incentives nevertheless discouraged the sale of firearms

to individuals under the age of 21. The burden on the right

is not so different as to compel the conclusion that this

“relevant aspect” deserves dispositive weight.

Finally, we assume, but do not decide, that individuals

under the age of 21 are part of “the people” protected

by the Second Amendment. Some have argued that we

need not look beyond the text of the Second Amendment

to determine whether laws like the Florida law are

constitutional because these individuals are not part of

“the people” protected by the Amendment. See, e.g., Lara

v. Comm’r Pa. State Police, 125 F.4th 428, 447 (3d Cir.

2025) (Restrepo, J., dissenting) (“The public in 1791 did

not understand those under 21 to be part of ‘the people’

44a

Appendix A

protected by the Second Amendment.”); see also Bruen,

142 S. Ct. at 2129–30 (“When the Second Amendment’s

plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution

presumptively protects that conduct.”); cf. Brown, 564

U.S. at 821 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The practices and

beliefs of the founding generation establish that ‘the

freedom of speech,’ as originally understood, does not

include a right to speak to minors (or a right of minors

to access speech) without going through the minors’

parents or guardians.”). But others have pointed to the

Supreme Court’s statement that “the people” includes

“all members of the political community,” Heller, 554

U.S. at 580, to argue that these individuals are part of

“the people” protected by the Amendment and that “the

people” protected by the Second Amendment are the

same as “the people” protected by the First and Fourth

Amendments, see, e.g., Lara, 125 F.4th at 435–38 (majority

opinion); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494

U.S. 259, 265, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 108 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1990)

(The text of the Constitution “suggests that ‘the people’

protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and

Second Amendments, . . . refers to a class of persons who

are part of a national community.”). Those amendments

protect individuals under the age of 21. See Tinker v. Des

Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.

Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969) (free speech); New Jersey

v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341, 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d

720 (1985) (unreasonable searches and seizures). Because

the parties assume that minors are among “the people”

protected by the Second Amendment and the Florida law

is consistent with our regulatory tradition in any event, we

assume that the Second Amendment protects individuals

under the age of 21.

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The Florida law that prohibits minors from purchasing

firearms does not violate the Second and Fourteenth

Amendments because it is consistent with our historical

tradition of firearm regulation. From the Founding to the

late-nineteenth century, our law limited the purchase of

firearms by minors in different ways. The Florida law also

limits the purchase of firearms by minors. And it does

so for the same reason: to stop immature and impulsive

individuals, like Nikolas Cruz, from harming themselves

and others with deadly weapons. Those similarities are

sufficient to confirm the constitutionality of the Florida

law.

IV. CONCLUSION

The judgment in favor of the Commissioner is

AFFIRMED.

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Appendix A

Rosenbaum, Circuit Judge, joined by Jordan, Circuit

Judge, as to Parts I and II, and by A budu, Circuit Judge,

as to Part III, Concurring:

I join in the Majority Opinion’s excellent explanation

of why the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public

Safety Act, see Fla. Stat. § 790.065(13), “is consistent with

this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation,”

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17, 142

S. Ct. 2111, 213 L. Ed. 2d 387 (2022). I write separately

to add three thoughts.

First, in concluding Florida’s law is constitutional

under the Second Amendment, I agree with the Majority

Opinion that here, we need not rely heavily on the

Reconstruction Era laws that barred the sale of some

firearms to those under 21 (“Under-21s”). That’s so

because the Founding Era perceived the problem that

Under-21s “lacked the reason and judgment necessary

to be trusted with legal rights.” Maj. Op. at 15. So its

common law imposed “relevantly similar,” Bruen, 597

U.S. at 29, restrictions on Under-21s’ right to keep and

bear arms to the Florida law’s. But I write separately to

show that we could rely heavily on the Reconstruction

Era laws because they represent the states’ response to

a new and different problem—an unprecedented kind of

Under-21 firearm violence—that began to arise during

the nineteenth century. And they are also “relevantly

similar” to Florida’s law.

Second, modern medical science bolsters the Majority

Opinion’s conclusion that Florida’s law limits Under-21s’

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Appendix A

ability to buy firearms for the same reasons the common

law did during the Founding Era. As I’ve noted, the

Majority Opinion explains that the common law presumed

that Under-21s “lacked the reason and judgment necessary

to be trusted with legal rights.” Maj. Op. at 15. Modern

medicine confirms our Founders’ hunch. As it turns out,

the common-law principle is based on the manifestation

of what we now know to be scientific fact. The prefrontal

cortex, the part of the brain responsible for exercising

judgment and moderating behavior in social situations,

is one of the last regions of the brain to mature—and it

doesn’t hit that point until around the age of 25. So Florida

adhered to “this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm

regulation” when it enacted a law designed to moderate

the risk Under-21s’ limited reasoning and decisionmaking

ability may pose to themselves and the public at large.

Third, I agree with the Majority Opinion’s decision

to leave for another day whether Founding Era or

Reconstruction Era evidence controls Bruen’s historical

inquiry, Maj. Op. at 14, if a conflict arises between the

two or the Founding Era is silent on the issue. I write

separately to emphasize that good reasons favor that

decision. For starters, it’s not necessary to resolve

the question because no conflict exists here between

Founding Era and Reconstruction Era history. Second,

many constitutional scholars and courts have weighed in

on the side of Reconstruction Era history in a conflict or

Founding Era silence. And for good reason. Among others,

the Constitution’s meaning is fixed to the understanding

of those who ratified it, so we interpret the Constitution’s

provisions, including those guaranteeing our rights, at

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the time the people adopted them. District of Columbia

v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed.

2d 637 (2008). And when we speak of the incorporation

of the Second Amendment right against the states, that

occurred in 1868 when Americans adopted the Fourteenth

Amendment. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 37–38. Finally,

modern Second Amendment jurisprudence is still in its

infancy. So allowing more time for courts and scholars

to weigh in on the question will help us reach the best

understanding.

I discuss each of my three points in more detail below.

I.

T he st at e s’ re sp onse t o a new problem —

an unprecedented kind of Under-21 firearm

violence—that began to arise during the nineteenth

century because of unprecedented societal and

technological change is “relevantly similar” to

Florida’s law.

The Majority Opinion explains why both Founding

Era and nineteenth-century laws are relevantly similar

to Florida’s law and why they show that Florida’s law is

constitutional. In this Part, I write to add a few thoughts

on the nineteenth-century history.

Before diving into that history, though, I pause to

review some principles that govern our historical inquiry.

The Supreme Court has recognized that times change,

and with them, so do technology and societal problems.

See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27; United States v. Rahimi,

602 U.S. 680, 691–92, 144 S. Ct. 1889, 219 L. Ed. 2d 351

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(2024). As a result, “[t]he regulatory challenges posed

by firearms today are not always the same as those that

preoccupied the Founders in 1791 or the Reconstruction

generation in 1868.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27. Yet the Second

Amendment was “intended to endure for ages to come, and

consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human

affairs.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,

415, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819) (emphasis omitted).

In reconciling the Second Amendment with modern

society’s problems and technology, the Court has explained

that the Second Amendment is not “a law trapped in

amber.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 691. Indeed, “the Second

Amendment permits more than just those regulations

identical to ones that could be found in 1791.” Id. at 691–92.

So our inquiry asks whether the modern law is “relevantly

similar to laws that our tradition is understood to permit,

applying faithfully the balance struck by the founding

generation to modern circumstances.” Id. at 692 (cleaned

up). That question requires us to consider “[w]hy and

how the regulation burdens the right” to keep and bear

arms. Id. “For example, if laws at the founding regulated

firearm use to address particular problems, that will be a

strong indicator that contemporary laws imposing similar

restrictions for similar reasons fall within a permissible

category of regulations.” Id.

But sometimes new problems arise, and legislatures

must address “unprecedented societal concerns or

dramatic technological changes.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27;

see Bianchi v. Brown, 111 F.4th 438, 464 (4th Cir. 2024) (en

banc) (“These are not our forebears’ arms, and these are

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not our forebears’ calamities. We thus take the instruction

of Bruen to engage in a ‘more nuanced approach’ to

address these ‘unprecedented societal concerns.’” (quoting

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27)).

When that happens, a challenged law often will not

simply be “an updated model of a historical counterpart.”

Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 739 (Barrett, J., concurring). But it

may well still be constitutional.

The question is whether “the challenged regulation

is consistent with the principles that underpin our

regulatory tradition,” id. at 692 (Roberts, C.J., majority)

(emphasis added), not whether the challenged regulation

has a historical “twin” or “cousin,” id. at 739 (Barrett, J.,

concurring). And to answer that question, we must view

the principles underlying our regulatory tradition through

the correct lens, adjusting the focus to “just the right level

of generality” so that we are continuing to respect the

Second Amendment, see id. at 740, while not “trap[ping]

[the law] in amber,” id. at 691 (Roberts, C.J., majority).

Put differently, we must ask ourselves whether we are

“endorsing outliers that our ancestors would never have

accepted.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30 (quoting Drummond v.

Robinson, 9 F.4th 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2021)).

Bruen suggests that analogical reasoning—comparing

the “why” and the “how” of historic laws to the challenged

law—is one way to resolve the questions our historical

inquiry poses. Still, the Court explained that it didn’t

conduct an “exhaustive survey of the features that render

regulations” consistent with our Nation’s tradition of

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firearm regulation. Id. at 29. Other factors also help us

assess whether a historic law can serve as a “relevantly

similar” analogue for a law that addresses “circumstances

beyond those the Founders specifically anticipated.” Id.

at 28–29. I mention two below.

First, if the “proliferation of” analogues to a challenged

law “coincides with the” new changes or technological

developments, that may suggest that the modern law

can pass constitutional muster. Antonyuk v. James, 120

F.4th 941, 1022 (2d Cir. 2024). Today’s laws, though they

may in some ways regulate arms-bearing behavior “to an

extent beyond what was done at the founding,” Rahimi,

602 U.S. at 692, or through “different means,” Bruen,

597 U.S. at 26, need only impose a “comparable burden”

that is “comparably justified” by new societal problems

and technological advancements, id. at 29. See, e.g.,

Bianchi, 111 F.4th at 464 (“[L]egislatures, since the time

of our founding, have responded to the most urgent and

visible threats posed by excessively harmful arms with

responsive and proportional legislation.”).

After all, “founding-era legislatures” generally did

not “maximally exercise[] their power to regulate,” and

the Constitution does not “adopt[] a ‘use it or lose it’ view

of legislative authority.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 739–40

(Barrett, J., concurring). So when governments enact a

new solution to solve a new problem, that law may still

“fit[] neatly within” our regulatory tradition despite

differences from its historical predecessors. Id. at 698

(Roberts, C.J., majority); see, e.g., United States v. Diaz,

116 F.4th 458, 471 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2024) (relying on one

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historical analogue to supply the “why” and on another

to separately supply the “how”).

Second, if a proposed historical analogue has been

“reasonably consistent and longstanding,” that favors the

conclusion that the modern law accords with a tradition of

firearm regulation. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 724 (Kavanaugh,

J., concurring); see Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (confirming

“nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt

on longstanding prohibitions”); Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30

(explaining laws are more likely constitutional where

there are “no disputes regarding the lawfulness of such

prohibitions”).

We generally don’t “repeat[]” unconstitutional acts

and allow them “to crystallize into a regular practice.”

Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 724 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)

(quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S.

459, 472–73, 35 S. Ct. 309, 59 L. Ed. 673 (1915)); accord

McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27, 13 S. Ct. 3, 36

L. Ed. 869 (1892); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655,

688–90, 49 S. Ct. 463, 73 L. Ed. 894, 68 Ct. Cl. 786 (1929);

Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 785,

122 S. Ct. 2528, 153 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2002); NLRB v. Noel

Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525–26, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 189 L.

Ed. 2d 538 (2014); cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.

702, 710, 723–24, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 138 L.

Ed. 2d 772 (1997) (finding no fundamental right where

longstanding laws regulate that purported right); Kerry

v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 95, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 192 L. Ed. 2d

183 (2015) (plurality opinion) (same); Dobbs v. Jackson

Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 239–41, 142 S. Ct.

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2228, 213 L. Ed. 2d 545 (2022) (same); Dep’t of State v.

Munoz, 602 U.S. 899, 911–12, 144 S. Ct. 1812, 219 L. Ed.

2d 507 (2024) (same). So regular or longstanding practices

can imply constitutionality.

And we view that implication of constitutionality

as even stronger if a particular practice has gone

unchallenged (or survived challenges) in jurisdictions

that enforce “analogous arms-bearing rights” through

“interpretation[s] of . . . state constitutional provisions

adopted by . . . state courts.” See Heller, 554 U.S. at 585

& nn.8–9, 600–05, 610–14 (identifying jurisdictions that

secure the same preexisting right as does the Second

Amendment). Presumably, lawyers over the past two

centuries would have sought to vindicate their clients’

constitutional rights. That they didn’t (or failed in doing

so) is highly probative of the conclusion that a similar,

modern regulation does not violate those rights. Cf.

Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27 (“[I]f . . . proposals were rejected

on constitutional grounds, that rejection surely would

provide some probative evidence of unconstitutionality.”).

To be clear, I’m not suggesting that “freewheeling

reliance on historical practice,” “unmoored from [the]

original meaning” of the Second and Fourteenth

A mendments, may establish modern reg ulations’

constitutionality. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 738 (Barrett, J.,

concurring) (cleaned up). “[T]he use of postenactment

history,” of course, “requires some justification other than

originalism simpliciter.† Id.

† Still, I do not imply that post-ratification history—or

“tradition”—has the limited use (or even the “irrelevan[ce]”) that

Judge Newsom suggests it does. Newsom Conc. Op. at 1 (citation

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But consistent and longstanding practices may

“reinforce our understanding of the Constitution’s original

meaning,” including “the scope of the pre-existing right

that the people enshrined in our fundamental law.” Id.

at 738–39 (citation omitted). And they may do so “even

when that practice began after the founding era.” Noel

Canning, 573 U.S. at 525.

For instance, if Founding Era practice plausibly

supports two interpretations of the Second Amendment’s

scope—one that suggests a modern law’s constitutionality

and emphasis omitted). Given the length of this opinion and the

varied subjects it addresses already, I will leave for another day

a fuller explanation of why I disagree. But for now, it suffices to

note two points. First, our Framers intended post-ratification

history, even some history from long after the Founding, to play

an important role in constitutional interpretation. Liquidating

constitutional indeterminacies is a prime example. See T he

F ederalist No. 37 (James Madison) (“All new laws . . . are

considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their

meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular

discussions and adjudications.”); see generally William Baude,

Constitutional Liquidation, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2019) (describing

the historical basis for constitutional liquidation and explaining

“[p]rivileging early practice through liquidation is tempting but

wrong”); see also Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as A Theory

of Legal Change, 38 H arv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 817, 855–57 (2015)

(explaining constitutional liquidation is not inconsistent with

originalism—and may be affirmatively originalist—because it

may reflect an “actual Founding-era legal rule”). And second, as

I’ve explained, we have long considered (in fact, one might say it’s

a tradition to consider) “tradition” in constitutional analysis. See

Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 726–29 & n.5 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)

(collecting cases spanning more than two centuries).

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and one that does not—a well-established, post-Founding

practice may confirm which of the two controls. See,

e.g., Hanson v. District of Columbia, 120 F.4th 223, 238

(D.C. Cir. 2024) (relying on post-Reconstruction and

early-twentieth century practice to define the “relevant

historical tradition” as “the regulation of weapons that are

particularly capable of unprecedented lethality and not,

as the dissent would have [had] it, upon the regulation of

Bowie knives specifically”); cf. Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 1022

(concluding public parks are sensitive places because the

late-nineteenth century “municipal tradition of regulating

firearms in urban public parks” was “apparently accepted

without any constitutional objection by anyone”).

Here, the nineteenth-century history calls for us to

employ both these tools.

First, in that century, a problem that didn’t and

couldn’t have existed during the Founding Era arose

for the first time: an unprecedented kind of lethal, gunrelated violence that Under-21s largely inflicted. The

new violence became possible because of revolutionary

advances in firearms technology. And the urbanization and

industrialization of the United States in the Antebellum,

Civil War, and Reconstruction periods enabled Under-21s

to buy these newly disruptive firearms for the first time.

This perfect storm caused the common-law concern that

Under-21s lack the necessary reason and judgment to buy

arms to manifest in a way far more dangerous than our

“Founders specifically anticipated.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 28.

To put a finer point on it, this new problem was a

more focused manifestation of Under-21s’ less-than-fullydeveloped reasoning ability that served as the basis for the

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common-law restrictions during the Founding Era. And it

demanded more focused solutions—laws that specifically

addres

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — National Rifle Association, Incorporated, Petitioner v. Mark Glass, Commissioner, Florida Department of Law Enforcement | Frix