Opposition Brief — Jeffrey Clyde Pitts, Petitioner v. Mississippi

Supreme Court briefJul 28, 2025

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No. 24-1159

In the Supreme Court of the United States

JEFFREY CLYDE PITTS,

Petitioner,

THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Mississippi

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

LYNN FITCH

Attorney General

ASHLEY SULSER

Assistant Attorney

General

Counsel of Record

MISSISSIPPI ATTORNEY

GENERAL’S OFFICE

P.O. Box 220

Jackson, MS 39205-0220

ashley.sulser@ago.ms.gov

(601) 359-3680

Counsel for Respondent

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether this Court should review the Mississippi

state courts’ rejection of petitioner’s Confrontation

Clause challenge to his four-year-old daughter’s

testimony that he sexually abused her, when the trial

proceedings satisfied confrontation’s essential

elements, the trial court determined that a screen

procedure was necessary to protect the child witness

from trauma, and independent evidence—including

witness testimony, statements to authorities, and a

videotaped forensic interview of the child witness—

overwhelmingly established petitioner’s guilt.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ......................................... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... iii

OPINIONS BELOW ....................................................1

JURISDICTION ..........................................................1

STATEMENT ..............................................................1

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION..........11

CONCLUSION ..........................................................23

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

California v. Green,

399 U.S. 149 (1970) ..........................................9, 15

Chapman v. California,

386 U.S. 18 (1967) ................................................21

Coy v. Iowa,

487 U.S. 1012 (1990)....... 3, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17,

18, 20, 21

Davis v. Alaska,

415 U.S. 308 (1974) ........................................14, 15

Maryland v. Craig,

497 U.S. 836 (1990) .....3, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15-18, 20

Mattox v. United States,

156 U.S. 237 (1895) ..............................................14

Constitutional Provision

U.S. Const. amend. VI .... 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 19

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 3509 ........................................................19

28 U.S.C. § 1257 ..........................................................1

Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-95 ..........................................2

Miss. Code Ann. § 99-43-1 ........................................10

Miss. Code Ann. § 99-43-101 .............. 3, 10, 11, 12, 14

Rules

Miss. R. Evid. 803(25) .................................................2

Miss. R. Evid. 803, advisory comm. note....................2

S. Ct. R. 10 .................................................................20

Other Authorities

5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1367 (3d ed. 1940) ............14

5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1395 (3d ed. 1940) ......14, 15

OPINIONS BELOW

The Mississippi Supreme Court’s opinion (App.1a43a) is reported at 405 So. 3d 1238. The Mississippi

Court of Appeals’ opinion (App.44a-107a) is reported

at 405 So. 3d 20.

JURISDICTION

The Mississippi Supreme Court entered judgment

on March 20, 2025. App.1a, 32a. The petition for

certiorari was filed on May 9, 2025. This Court’s

jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

STATEMENT

1. In May 2020, petitioner Jeffrey Clyde Pitts

spent the weekend with AGC, his four-year-old

daughter. App.2a. Days later, AGC told her mother

and grandmother that she “saw” petitioner’s “gina”

and it was “this big.” App.2a, 50a. (As her mother

explained, AGC knew “the anatomically correct words

to describe female anatomy” but not “the male

anatomy.” App.2a.) When AGC was later asked where

this happened, she said that “she saw ‘it’ when she

and [petitioner] were in bed taking an afternoon nap”

and that petitioner “was naked.” Ibid. AGC said that

she had “touched” petitioner’s “‘vagina’” and that

petitioner “‘put his finger in my vagina, in my gina

and in my bootie and he made it go real fast.’” App.2a3a. AGC repeated “several times” that petitioner “put

his finger in her ‘bootie’ and vagina,” and that “‘it kind

of burned a little like when [petitioner] put his finger

in my gina.’” App.3a.

AGC’s mother reported this to the state childprotection agency, the sheriff’s office, and the local

police department. App.3a. Police “followed up” by

(among other things) contacting the Child Advocacy

Center and observing a “forensic interview” that a

trained social worker conducted with AGC. Ibid. In

that videotaped interview, AGC disclosed that

petitioner “‘dug his finger in [her] vagina’” while she

was “‘trying to sleep,’” that when petitioner “‘was done

he said touch mine, touch mine,’” and that “no one else

had ever done such acts” to her. App.3a-4a.

2. In August 2020, a grand jury indicted petitioner

for sexual battery. App.4a, 45a; see Miss. Code Ann.

§ 97-3-95(1)(d) (an adult “is guilty of sexual battery if

he or she engages in sexual penetration with: ... (d) A

child under the age of fourteen (14) years of age”).

The case went to trial. App.4a. Before testimony

began, the trial court held a hearing under

Mississippi Rule of Evidence 803(25) on the

admissibility of AGC’s descriptions of petitioner’s

sexual misconduct to others—including her mother,

her grandmother, and the social worker. App.4a-5a,

45a-46a. That rule excepts from the bar on hearsay a

“statement by a child of tender years” that

“describ[es] any act of sexual contact” if, “after a

hearing,” the court “determines that the statement’s

time, content, and circumstances provide substantial

indicia of reliability” and the child “testifies” or is

“unavailable” and “other evidence corroborates the

act.” Miss. R. Evid. 803(25); see id. advisory comm.

note (listing “sufficient indicia of reliability” factors).

The trial court heard testimony on AGC’s statements

from her mother, her grandmother, and the social

worker who conducted the forensic interview;

reviewed the mother’s and grandmother’s written

statements; watched AGC’s videotaped interview;

and considered argument from counsel. App.4a, 45a46a. The court then “analyz[ed] each and every”

tender-years “factor” and ruled that “most” of the

factors proved that AGC’s “statements” had

“substantial indicia of reliability” and thus were

“admissible.” App.4a-5a, 45a-46a; see App.85a-86a.

At trial, AGC testified as a witness for the State.

App.8a-10a, 49a. Before she took the stand, the State

moved to put a “screen” in front of her “to protect her

from the trauma of having to look at [petitioner] while

she testified.” App.49a; see App.5a. The court held a

hearing on that motion. App.5a-8a, 49a, 53a-54a, 67a,

70a-71a. The State argued that AGC had a “right” to

a screen under state law; that the screen was

necessary because AGC was “a four-year-old child”

and “her guardian[ ]” “believe[d] that it will be

difficult” for her “to testify” while petitioner “is

staring at her”; and that “the screen would be effective

in preventing AGC from becoming distracted due to

her young age.” App.6a-7a; see App.54a, 67a; Miss.

Code Ann. § 99-43-101(2)(g) (“a child shall have” the

right to testify with “the use of a properly constructed

screen” that permits “the judge and jury to see the

child … but would obscure the child’s view of the

defendant or the public or both”). The defense

objected, claiming that a screen would violate

petitioner’s “right to confrontation” and that the State

wanted to keep AGC from showing “affection” for

petitioner in front of the jury. App.6a. The trial court

considered this Court’s decisions in Coy v. Iowa, 487

U.S. 1012 (1988), and Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S.

836 (1990), and state law. App.7a, 70a-71a. The court

then ruled that a screen could be used but “only” if

there also was a “zoom” video in place “so that the

defendant c[ould] observe the witness” during her

testimony. App.7a; see App.49a, 67a.

During AGC’s testimony, a “screen” was “set up”

so that petitioner could not “be seen from the witness

stand,” the testimony could be “hear[d] through the

court speakers,” and a “zoom video” was “set up” for

petitioner to “view the child as she testifie[d].”

App.54a (quotation marks omitted); see App.7a.

Petitioner had “unfettered access to his attorney at all

times” while AGC testified, and he could “hear the

child’s testimony live and view her” on a monitor “in

real-time.” App.71a. And the “jury, judge, and defense

attorney” could “view” AGC in-person and see “her

demeanor at every moment during every word of her

testimony.” Ibid.

AGC testified on direct examination that “she

slept in her own bed” at her mother’s house but “when

she stayed at [petitioner’s] residence, she slept with

him in his bed”; that petitioner “touch[ed] her the last

time that she stayed with him” in her “‘bootie’” and

“‘vagina’”; that petitioner had put “‘his finger’” on the

“‘inside’ of her vagina” “‘a few times’”; that “it felt

‘[n]ot good’ when [petitioner] put his finger in her

vagina”; that this was a “different occurrence” than

when petitioner “put diaper cream on her”; and that

nobody else had “ever touched her” in her vagina as

petitioner had. App.8a-9a; see App. 49a. The defense’s

cross-examination sought to prove that AGC was

“confus[ed],” that she would “tell big stories and

exaggerate,” and that “her memory was incomplete.”

App.9a. AGC confirmed on cross-examination that

“she loved her father” and “wanted to see” him. Ibid.

But when defense counsel pressed AGC to explain

why she did not get “to see” petitioner “anymore,” she

said it was “‘[b]ecause he did a bad thing to me.’” Ibid.

AGC added that she “‘thought’” her mother would be

“‘mad’” about petitioner’s acts so AGC did not tell her

mother “right away”; that she “‘already knew’” that

petitioner had done a “bad thing to her” when she first

“‘told [her] momma’”; and that it “‘did hurt’” when

petitioner “put his finger in her vagina.” App.9a-10a.

AGC further testified that she wanted to “‘go live

with’” petitioner and “‘will just sleep somewhere else’”

when she is with him, but she again confirmed that

“‘[h]e just did that, but—he really did,’” that nobody

“told her” to say “that [petitioner] really did ‘that,’”

and that she “‘already knew it because [she had] been

to his house.’” App.10a (emphases added). When

asked on redirect examination to explain “what ‘that’

meant,” AGC responded: “‘I don’t want him to put it

in my vagina again.’” Ibid. (emphasis added).

The State called four other witnesses. App.49a50a. Two police officers testified on their

investigation, on AGC’s mother’s report of sexual

abuse, and on their efforts to schedule AGC’s forensic

interview. App.49a. AGC’s grandmother testified that

AGC said she “‘saw’” petitioner’s “‘gina’” and that it

was “this big,” and that AGC repeated those

statements to her mother. App.49a-50a. AGC’s

mother testified that AGC told her essentially “‘the

same story’” about petitioner’s “‘vagina’” and said “‘it

was like an elephant trunk,’” which led her to report

AGC’s statements to state and local authorities.

App.50a.

The defense called petitioner and six family-andfriend witnesses. App.50a-52a. Petitioner claimed

that, when AGC stayed with him in May 2020, she

said that her “‘vagina itches really bad’” so petitioner

“slathered” on some diaper cream that “just went on

the inside of her crease,” “on and up kind of over her

mound and then down the side of her leg,” and not

“anywhere near her opening.” App.51a. He also said

he “alerted” AGC’s mother about the “itching” and

diaper-cream “application” when he dropped AGC off

after the weekend. Ibid. Five of petitioner’s family

members testified that he loved his children, that he

was a “‘good parent,’” and that they “never observed”

petitioner “mistreating children.” App.50a-52a.

Petitioner’s neighbor added that “she saw ‘nothing’

out of the ordinary” on “the weekend in question.”

App.51a.

The defense also called a Child Advocacy Center

employee to testify about AGC’s forensic interview.

App.52a. Through that witness, the defense had the

videotape of the forensic interview admitted “into

evidence.” Ibid. The video “was played to the jury in

its entirety.” App.3a. During the interview, AGC told

the social worker that “‘[w]hen I was trying to sleep’”

petitioner “‘dug his finger in my vagina, [and] ... when

he was done he said touch mine, touch mine.’” App.3a4a, 73a-74a. AGC denied that “anyone told her what

to say during the interview.” App.4a. The defense also

introduced the written statements given by AGC’s

mother and grandmother in reporting petitioner’s

acts to authorities. App.73a; see App.3a.

The jury convicted petitioner of sexual battery.

App.52a. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison with

10 years suspended and ordered to register as a sex

offender. Ibid.

3. The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed.

App.44a-87a. It reached two conclusions relevant

here.

First, the court of appeals rejected petitioner’s

Confrontation Clause challenge to the screen

procedure used for AGC’s testimony. App.53a-72a.

The court of appeals ruled that the trial court’s use of

the screen aligned with this Court’s decisions in Coy

v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), and Maryland v. Craig,

497 U.S. 836 (1990). App.53a-72a.

In Coy, this Court held that the Confrontation

Clause “guarantees [a] defendant a face-to-face

meeting with witnesses,” but the Court observed that

“exceptions” may “exist” “when necessary to further

an important public policy.” 487 U.S. at 1017, 1021.

In Craig, this Court held that face-to-face

confrontation is not required when, for example, a

trial judge makes “a proper finding of necessity” that

a child witness needs protection and orders a

procedure that “preserves the essence of effective

confrontation” by “subjecting” the child’s testimony to

“rigorous adversarial testing.” 497 U.S. 836 at 857.

The court of appeals ruled that the trial court’s

decision to allow a screen comported with Craig and

so did not “violate[ ]” petitioner’s “confrontation

rights.” App.72a. After observing that the State had

an important interest in protecting child-abuse

victims, Craig approved the use of a “one-way”

television procedure for child-witness testimony

outside the courtroom (at least) where a trial court

makes a “case-specific” finding that the child would be

emotionally “traumatized” by the “presence of the

defendant.” App.60a-63a (discussing 497 U.S. at 84156). Following those guideposts, the court of appeals

determined here that the State had a strong interest

in protecting child-abuse victims, as shown by its

statutory standards on child testimony (App.66a67a); that this statutory framework expressly

preserves a defendant’s “right to be confronted with

[adverse] witness[es]” and “balance[s]” a defendant’s

rights with “certain protective rights” for child

witnesses (App.66a-67a (quotation marks omitted));

that the trial court was “aware of the statute and the

requirements of Craig and Coy” (App.71a); that the

trial court asked about the “necessity of the screen,”

heard concerns about potential “trauma” to AGC from

testifying with petitioner “‘staring’” at her, and

“clear[ly]” “made a finding of necessity” (App.67a

n.11); and that, even with the screen in place,

petitioner was afforded “each of the essential

elements” of confrontation during AGC’s testimony

(App.71a-72a).

Second, the court of appeals held that, even if the

trial court’s screen procedure were error, it was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. App.72a-75a.

The court focused its “‘assessment of harmlessness’”

on “‘the remaining evidence’” besides AGC’s trial

testimony. App.74a (quoting Coy, 487 U.S. at 102122) (emphasis omitted). Among such proof, petitioner

“himself” introduced the “most incriminating

evidence” at trial: the written statements of AGC’s

mother and grandmother and AGC’s videotaped

“forensic interview,” which the jury saw at the

defense’s request. App.73a. That evidence, the court

ruled,

was

“[s]ubstantial”

and

admissible

independent of AGC’s trial testimony, and could not

be “ignore[d]” by “speculat[ing]” about petitioner’s

“trial strategy.” App.74a-75a.

Judge Wilson, joined by one judge and in part by

another judge, dissented from these rulings. App.87a103a. Judge Wilson believed that the trial court’s “use

of a screen” conflicted with Coy and Craig and that

the trial court made no findings on the necessity of

the screen. App.95a-97a. Judge Wilson added that he

disagreed with the court of appeals’ alternative

harmless-error ruling. App.98a-103a. Although a

“jury could certainly find” that AGC’s statements in

her forensic interview—which petitioner admitted at

trial—were “truthful and credible,” Judge Wilson

thought that the court of appeals could not “consider”

that evidence if AGC’s trial testimony was

inadmissible. App.101a-102a.

4. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted

certiorari and affirmed. App.1a-32a.

The supreme court rejected petitioner’s argument

that the trial court’s screen procedure “violated” the

Confrontation Clause because the court made no

“specific finding” that AGC would have suffered

“emotional trauma” from testifying without a screen.

App.11a; see App.11a-32a. The supreme court held

that the use of the screen honored petitioner’s

confrontation rights and aligned with this Court’s

precedents, for two main reasons. App.14a-32a.

First, the supreme court determined that the trial

court’s use of the screen procedure met the essential

elements of confrontation and thus assured the

reliability of AGC’s testimony. App.14a-17a, 28a-30a.

The supreme court recognized that “a full and

complete cross examination” is “the most sacred

element of confrontation,” App.17a (collecting cases),

and that this Court has “defined” the “elements of

confrontation” as testimony “‘under oath’” and

“‘subject to cross-examination’” that allows the “‘jury’”

to “‘observe the demeanor of the witness,’” App.16a

(quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157

(1970)); see App.14a-17a. The “screen” procedure used

here, the supreme court ruled, “satisfied” these

elements. App.28a. AGC testified “under oath in real

time” and was aware of the “seriousness of telling the

truth”; she was “subjected to a full, fair, and complete

cross-examination”; her “demeanor” and “quality,

age, education, understanding, behavior, and

inclination” were “observable to the jury and to the

trial judge”; and petitioner was able “to observe”

AGC’s testimony “via Zoom video” and to “assist his

counsel while AGC was vigorously cross-examined.”

App.28a-29a (emphases omitted).

Second, the supreme court rejected petitioner’s

claim that the trial court’s procedure conflicted with

Coy or Craig. App.20a-26a. The supreme court

explained that Craig ruled that face-to-face

“‘confrontation’” is not an “‘indispensable element of

the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee’” and that a

defendant’s rights may be met by a different

procedure where “‘necessary to further an important

public policy’” and “‘the reliability of the testimony is

otherwise assured.’” App.26a (quoting 497 U.S. at

849-50) (emphasis omitted). Those features were

present here where the state constitution’s victimsrights provision and statutes required courts to

“protect victims’ rights,” address live courtroom

testimony, and preserve defendants’ “right to be

confronted” with witnesses and “cross-examine” child

witnesses (App.19a-20a (discussing Miss. Code Ann.

§§ 99-43-1, -101(2)(g), -101(5)(d)); App.26a-28a) and

“[e]very element of the right to confrontation was

satisfied” at trial (App. 28a; see App.28a-30a). And,

the supreme court ruled, the trial court’s screen

ruling aligned with this Court’s decisions in Coy and

Craig: Coy involved a factual dispute over the

perpetrator’s identity whereas petitioner’s identity

was not in dispute (App.22a); Craig assessed a

different statutory procedure where witness

testimony occurred outside the presence of the judge,

jury, and defendant (App.23a, 25a); and Craig

recognized that “face-to-face confrontation” is not an

“absolute” right (App.24a (emphasis omitted)).

Justice Maxwell, joined by two other justices,

concurred in the judgment and explained that he

would have “dismiss[ed]” the case “as improvidently

granted.” App.32a.

Justice King dissented. App.32a-43a. He believed

that the case required reversal because the trial court

ordered the screen only due to the “mandatory

command of” the State’s screen-procedure statute

(Miss. Code Ann. § 99-43-101(2)(g)), because the case

was “similar[ ]” to Coy, and because there was no

“individualized evidence” for “a public policy

exception as outlined in Craig.” App.34a; see App.42a43a. Justice King thought that an excerpt from the

trial court’s tender-years hearing showed that AGC

had a positive “emotional attitude” toward petitioner

(App.34a-35a) and that, under Craig, no “evidence of

necessity” supported “a case-specific finding” that

petitioner’s “presence in the courtroom would be the

source of trauma to” AGC (App.41a).

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

Petitioner asks this Court to grant review to

decide “[w]hether the Confrontation Clause permits

the use of a screen at trial that blocks a child witness’s

view of the defendant, without any individualized

finding by the trial court that the screen is necessary

to prevent trauma to the child.” Pet. i. This case does

not present that question, the state courts’ rulings are

correct and do not conflict with this Court’s or any

appellate court’s precedents, and this case is a poor

vehicle for plenary review or for resolving the narrow,

fact-bound question the petition purports to present.

The petition should be denied.

1. The question that petitioner asks this Court to

decide is not presented. The trial court determined

that using a screen was needed to protect AGC from

trauma. Contra Pet. i, 2, 19, 22. And that court did not

allow the screen simply because “the prosecutor”

asked for it or because it appeared to be “mandatory”

under state law. Contra Pet. 2, 4-5, 19, 22, 26.

a. Petitioner claims that the trial court allowed the

prosecution to use a screen for AGC’s testimony

without” making “any” “individualized finding” on its

necessity. Pet. i, 2, 19, 22. That is not so. The trial

court allowed a screen after determining that it was

needed under the circumstances to protect AGC, a

four-year-old witness in a sexual-assault case.

Before ruling on the use of a screen, the trial court

had considered extensive evidentiary submissions,

argument by counsel, and authorities cited by the

parties. App.4a-7a, 67a, 70a-71a. The court had

already conducted a complete evidentiary hearing on

the reliability of AGC’s out-of-court statements.

App.4a-5a, 85a-86a. The court had reviewed

testimony and written statements from AGC’s mother

and grandmother and reviewed the hour-long

videotaped forensic interview of AGC herself. App.4a5a; see App.101a-102a. When the State later

requested a screen, the prosecutor maintained that

AGC had a “right” to a screen under Miss. Code Ann.

§ 99-43-101(2)(g), but the prosecutor also explained

that a screen was necessary in this case given AGC’s

age, her guardian’s concern that it would be “difficult”

for her to “testify” while petitioner “is staring at her,”

and the risk of AGC “becoming distracted” by

petitioner’s presence. App.6a-7a; see App.54a, 67a.

The defense disputed the need for a screen and

objected on “confrontation” grounds. App.6a. The trial

court considered all this, the relevant state statute,

and this Court’s decisions in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.

1012 (1988) and Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836

(1990), before ruling that a “screen” could be used

with a “video” to ensure that petitioner could “observe

the witness.” App.7a, 70a-71a. As the court of appeals

explained, the record thus shows that the trial court

“was aware of the statute and the requirements of

Craig and Coy” (App.71a) and it is “clear” that “the

judge made a finding of necessity”—even if it did not

recite the “magic words” of a “specific finding”

(App.67a n.11). So this case does not involve the lack

of “any individualized finding” that petitioner claims

the Confrontation Clause demands. Contra Pet. i.

b. Petitioner also claims that the trial court

ordered the screen only because “the prosecutor”

asked for it and because a screen was “mandatory”

under state law. Pet. 2, 4-5, 19, 22, 26. That is

incorrect. The prosecutor did argue that the screenprocedure statute does not require “proof” that AGC

was “scared of the defendant.” App.6a. And the trial

court observed that the statute “appears to be

mandatory.” App.7a. But the trial court did not order

a screen solely on that basis. It considered several

factors in allowing the screen procedure. As

explained, it heard evidence and argument on the

reliability of AGC’s out-of-court statements and was

aware of the requirements of this Court’s precedents

before ruling. See App.4a-7a, 67a, 70a-71a. And as the

state appellate courts observed, the statutory

framework also says that defendants “‘shall be

afforded the rights applicable to defendants during

trial, including ... the right to be confronted with

[adverse] witness[es]” and “the right to cross-examine

[a] child [witness].” App.20a (quoting Miss. Code Ann.

§ 99-43-101(5)(d)); see App.66a-67a. As the court of

appeals noted, that framework “contemplates and

incorporates the importance of confrontation rights of

the defendant” and “balance[s] the defendant’s rights”

with “certain protective rights” for child witnesses.

App.67a. Petitioner is therefore wrong to claim that

the state courts crafted and applied a rule that

requires “a screen” to “be placed between the

defendant” and a witness “whenever the prosecutor

asks for one.” Contra Pet. 19, 22.

This case is not a vehicle for resolving the question

set forth in the petition. The Court should deny the

petition on this basis alone.

2. In any event, the state-court rulings comport

with this Court’s precedents. Contra Pet. 2-3, 15-22.

a. The trial court

confrontation rights.

accorded

petitioner

his

The Confrontation Clause grants the “accused” a

“right” to “be confronted with the witnesses against

him” “in all criminal prosecutions.” U.S. Const.

amend. VI. The confrontation right’s “primary object”

is to allow a defendant the “opportunity” for “crossexamination” where the witness must “stand face to

face with the jury” so they may “judge” the credibility

and “demeanor” of the witness. Mattox v. United

States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). That

“‘opportunity of cross-examination’” is the “‘main and

essential purpose of confrontation.’” Davis v. Alaska,

415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974) (quoting 5 J. Wigmore,

Evidence § 1395, p. 123 (3d ed. 1940) (Wigmore)

(emphasis in original)). To effectuate that aim, this

Court has maintained that “confrontation” demands

testimony “under oath,” subject to “crossexamination,” with the jury’s “observ[ation]” of the

“demeanor of the witness.” California v. Green, 399

U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (citing 5 Wigmore § 1367). Those

elements “ensure the reliability of the evidence”—

testimony

under

“oath,”

“cross-examination,”

“physical presence,” and “observation by the trier of

fact”—but do not include an “indispensable” right to

the defendant’s own “face-to-face confrontation” with

the witness. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46,

850 (1990); see Davis, 415 U.S. at 316 (the defendant

“‘demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of

gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by

him, but for the purpose of cross-examination’”)

(quoting 5 Wigmore § 1395, p. 123).

Here, as both appellate courts ruled, AGC’s trial

testimony satisfied each essential element of

confrontation. Craig, 497 U.S. at 846; Green, 399 U.S.

at 158; see App.8a-10a, 28a-29a, 54a-55a, 71a-72a.

AGC testified under oath in real time and

acknowledged the “importance of telling the truth.”

App.8a, 28a. Petitioner’s counsel “subject[ed]” the

child to a “full and thorough cross-examination,” as

was “obvious” from the record. App.71a; see App.8a10a. AGC’s testimony was live, in the courtroom, in

direct “view” of the “jury, judge, and defense

attorney”—who could observe “her demeanor at every

moment during every word of her testimony.”

App.71a; see App.28a-29a. Although a screen

prevented petitioner from being “‘seen’” by AGC

“‘from the witness stand,’” a video monitor ensured

that he could “hear the child’s testimony live and view

her” in real time. App.54a, 71a. “At all times,”

petitioner “was able to watch, hear, and assist his

counsel while AGC was vigorously cross-examined.”

App.28a; see App.54a, 71a.

What happened here comports with this Court’s

precedents, which confirm that the Confrontation

Clause does not categorically require “face-to-face

confrontation.” Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020-21; see Craig,

497 U.S. at 850. While “protecting victims of sexual

abuse” is not a per se exception to “face-to-face”

confrontation, Coy explained that “exceptions” may

exist for “particular witnesses” who “need[ ] special

protection.” 487 U.S. at 1020, 1021. The Court

stressed that the “rights conferred by the

Confrontation Clause are not absolute” and that

exceptions may be “necessary to further an important

public policy.” Id. at 1020, 1021. Craig confirmed that

protecting “the physical and psychological well-being

of child abuse victims” may justify an exception to

face-to-face confrontation in “some” child-abuse

“cases.” 497 U.S. at 853. A “special procedure that

permits a child witness ... to testify at trial against a

defendant” who allegedly abused him or her may be

used, this Court explained, when “necessary to

protect the welfare of the particular child witness who

seeks to testify.” Id. at 855. That “special procedure”

should “adequately ensure[ ]” that the testimony

given “is both reliable and subject to rigorous

adversarial testing,” including by maintaining “the

presence of ... other elements of confrontation” such

as “oath, cross-examination, and observation of the

witness’ demeanor.” Id. at 851, 855.

As explained above, the screen procedure used

here was consistent with Coy and Craig. The trial

court allowed a screen during AGC’s testimony only

after it considered extensive evidentiary submissions,

reviewed testimony and written statements from

AGC’s mother and grandmother, reviewed the hourlong videotaped forensic interview of AGC, and held

an evidentiary hearing on AGC’s out-of-court

statements and a hearing on the screen procedure.

App.4a-7a, 54a, 67a, 71a-72a, 85a-86a, 101a-102a.

The screen “protected and ensured” the “essential

elements” of “confrontation,” including “‘physical

presence, oath, cross-examination, and observation of

demeanor by the trier of fact.’” App.71a (quoting

Craig, 497 U.S. at 861). And that approach provided

the “functional[ ] equivalent” of typical “live, inperson testimony” while serving the State’s

“transcendent interest” in “protecting the child

witness from trauma.” Craig, 497 U.S. at 851, 855,

856 (quotation marks omitted).

b. Petitioner’s arguments for further review lack

merit. Pet.15-28.

First, petitioner says that the state courts applied

a rule “opposite” from that of Coy and Craig. Pet. 19;

see id. 15-22. In his view, those decisions establish

that a trial court may “depart from literal face-to-face

confrontation” “only” if it makes “an individualized,

case-specific finding that departure is necessary to

protect the child from trauma that would be caused

by seeing the defendant while testifying.” Pet. 17-18

(citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-56). Petitioner says that

the state courts violated that rule by allowing a

“screen” to “be placed between the defendant and the

child witness” just because “the prosecutor ask[ed] for

one,” “without any individualized, case-specific

finding of necessity.” Pet. 19.

This argument fails on both the law and the facts.

On the law: This Court’s cases do not embrace the

categorical rule that petitioner identifies. As

explained, Coy recognized that “exceptions” may

“exist” to a defendant’s “right to a face-to-face

encounter” with adverse witnesses when “special

protection” is needed. 487 U.S. at 1020, 1021. And

Craig confirmed that an exception exists for child

witnesses in sexual-abuse cases when “necessary to

protect the welfare of the particular child witness who

seeks to testify.” Id. at 855.

On the facts: As explained, although the trial court

observed that the statute “appears to be mandatory,”

App.7a, the court did not approve the screen on that

basis. The court heard evidence and saw AGC’s

forensic interview, had an “on-the-record discussion”

with the defense and prosecution on this Court’s

decisions in Coy and Craig, and “inquired of the State

as to the necessity of the screen.” App.70a-71a; see

App.4a-5a, 67a. “Only then did the court authorize the

use of the screen.” App.71a. And although petitioner

claims that the trial court did not make the finding

that this Court’s cases require, Pet. 19, the court

examined all that it needed to. It “inquired of the

State as to the necessity of the screen” before ordering

it, App.67a, 71a, and heard argument that a screen

was necessary based on AGC’s tender age, that her

guardian was concerned that it would be “difficult” for

AGC to “testify” while petitioner “is staring at her,”

and that there was a risk of AGC “becoming

distracted” by petitioner’s presence. App.6a-7a; see

App.54a, 67a.

Second, petitioner argues that the state supreme

court’s ruling conflicts with other appellate decisions.

Pet. 22-24. He points to a handful of decisions that

faulted trial courts for blocking defendants from the

view of witnesses without making “an individualized,

case-specific finding” that the procedure was

“necessary to prevent trauma to [a] child.” Pet. 22.

And he points to cases where trial courts “approved

departures from face-to-face confrontation” only after

making “individualized” findings of necessity. Pet. 24.

But as explained, the trial court here did “ma[k]e a

finding of necessity” (App.67a) before allowing the use

of a screen during AGC’s testimony. None of the cases

petitioner identifies suggests that courts must use

“magic words” when “finding” that a screen is

necessary in a particular case. App.67a n.11. And

petitioner’s cited cases (Pet. 22-24) just apply the

legal standards set out in this Court’s Confrontation

Clause precedents to reach the result that the

particular facts demanded. That is what the state

courts did here.

Third, petitioner claims that Mississippi’s statute

on screen procedures is unlike “similar” federal and

state laws on child-witness testimony. Pet. 24-26. He

says that the relevant federal law—18 U.S.C.

§ 3509—and other state laws “require[ ]” an

“individualized finding[ ] that departure from face-toface confrontation is necessary,” but that

Mississippi’s law “purports to allow” a “depart[ure]

from face-to-face confrontation whenever a child

witness testifies” “without any” such finding. Pet. 24,

25. But again, the state courts here recognized that

Mississippi’s statutory framework respects “the right

to be confronted with [adverse] witness[es]” and “the

right to cross-examine [a] child [witness]” and, as this

Court’s precedents allow, “balance[s] the defendant’s

[confrontation] rights” with “certain protective rights”

for child witnesses. App.66a-67a (quotation marks

omitted); see App.20a. In any event, petitioner’s view

of Mississippi’s law does not help him. The trial court

observed that the statute “appears to be mandatory”

(App.7a), but the court did not allow a screen on that

basis. The court “made a finding of necessity”

(App.67a) before allowing a screen. See supra 2-3, 1214.

Last, petitioner claims that granting review “is

important” because otherwise prosecutors in

Mississippi will be “entitled to infringe [a] defendant’s

right to face-to-face confrontation without making the

showing that Coy and Craig require.” Pet. 26; see Pet.

26-28. But that is not so because that is not what

happened here. The prosecutor here did show that

using a screen was necessary in the circumstances,

including AGC’s age, her guardian’s concern that it

would be “difficult” to “testify” while petitioner “is

staring at her,” and the risk of AGC “becoming

distracted” by petitioner’s presence. App.6a-7a; see

App.54a, 67a. And the trial court allowed a screen on

that basis. See supra 2-3, 12-14.

3. This case is also a poor vehicle for plenary

review or for resolving the narrow question on which

petitioner seeks review. The case presents at most a

fact-bound dispute and this Court’s answer to the

question presented would not affect the outcome.

Petitioner does not truly seek plenary review of

the state court’s rulings here. He does not claim that

lower courts are divided over a question of law or that

this Court’s intervention would have broad impact.

Petitioner instead invites the Court to address

allegedly “erroneous factual findings”—an invitation

that is “rarely” accepted (S. Ct. R. 10)—and

repeatedly couches the petition as a bid for a rare

summary reversal (Pet. 3, 15, 28). But, as explained,

the state-court rulings align with this Court’s

precedents and correctly resolved

evidentiary issues against petitioner.

fact-bound

And even if the trial court’s screen procedure was

error, the error was harmless. A constitutional error

is harmless when the reviewing court determines the

error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).

Claimed face-to-face confrontation errors are “subject

to that harmless-error analysis.” Coy v. Iowa, 487

U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988). The assessment excludes from

“consideration” the witness’s testimony taken in

violation of the defendant’s confrontation right and

focuses on the “remaining evidence.” Id. at 1021-22.

As the state court of appeals ruled, if the trial

court’s screen procedure “were error, it was

harmless.” App.73a; see App.72a-75a. That conclusion

was correct and was left undisturbed on further state

review. Even without AGC’s testimony, the

“remaining evidence” against petitioner was

overwhelming. App.73a; see App.2a-4a. AGC’s mother

and grandmother testified on AGC’s “consistent

disclosure” of petitioner’s sexual abuse. App.73a. And

the “most incriminating evidence” was submitted by

petitioner “himself.” App.73a. The defense introduced

the mother’s and grandmother’s written statements

in evidence. Ibid. The defense also called an employee

of the Child Advocacy Center to testify and had AGC’s

videotaped forensic interview “played to the jury in its

entirety.” App.3a; see App.52a, 73a-74a. AGC’s

description of petitioner’s sex acts in the video were

“consistent” with her testimony: she told the

interviewer that “‘[w]hen I was trying to sleep’”

petitioner “‘dug his finger in my vagina, [and] ... when

he was done he said touch mine, touch mine’” and

AGC denied that “anyone told her what to say during

the interview.” App.3a-4a, 73a. As the court of appeals

concluded, “[t]he screen did not prejudice the jury

against [petitioner]; the evidence did.” App.73a.

Petitioner argues that without “AGC’s testimony”

the State’s case “would have fallen apart” and that

her testimony “was by far the most important

evidence supporting the jury’s verdict.” Pet. 27. But

that ignores the “overwhelming” evidence of guilt that

petitioner himself introduced at trial: the mother’s

and grandmother’s statements and AGC’s forensic

interview played to the jury. App.73a; see App. 3a,

52a, 73a-74a. Petitioner also says that the mother’s

and grandmother’s trial testimony was “hearsay” that

would not have been admitted without AGC’s

testimony. Pet. 27 n.2. But petitioner himself

introduced those witnesses’ written statements and

the videotaped interview. App.73a. Last, petitioner

contends that this Court should “resolve the question

presented” and “remand the case for the lower courts”

to consider harmlessness “in the first instance.” Pet.

27-28. Again, that approach would be pointless: the

court of appeals already ruled that the evidence

against petitioner was “overwhelming” and that any

error here was “harmless” (App.73a), and the petition

does not seek review on that issue (Pet. i), which in

any event merely presents no more than an alleged

evidentiary error of state law.

CONCLUSION