Amicus Curiae Brief — Louisiana, Appellant v. Phillip Callais, et al.

Nos. 24-109, 24-110

IN THE

LOUISIANA,

v.

Appellant,

PHILLIP CALLAIS, ET AL.,

Appellees.

PRESS ROBINSON, ET AL.,

Appellants,

v.

PHILLIP CALLAIS, ET AL.,

Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

BRIEF OF FORMER REPUBLICAN

GOVERNORS ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER,

CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, MARC

RACICOT, AND WILLIAM F. WELD

AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

ROBINSON APPELLANTS

ALEXANDER F. ATKINS

MAITHREYI RATAKONDA*

CHRISTINE P. SUN

STATES UNITED

DEMOCRACY CENTER

45 Main Street, Suite 320

Brooklyn, NY 11201

(202) 999-9305

Mai@statesunited.org

KATHLEEN HARTNETT

COOLEY LLP

3 Embarcadero Center

20th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94111

Counsel for Amici Curiae

September 3, 2025

*Counsel of Record

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE .............................. 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..................................... 2

ARGUMENT................................................................ 3

I.

Fair Representation Through Districting Is

Essential to American Democracy. .................. 3

II.

The Voting Rights Act Responds to a Long and

Continued History of Discrimination in the

Political Process. ............................................... 6

III.

Section 2 of the VRA, as Applied Through the

Gingles Framework, Provides a Restrained

and Constitutional Approach to Countering

Racial Vote Dilution. ...................................... 12

IV.

The Totality-of-the-Circumstances Inquiry

Ensures That Majority-Minority Districts Are

Mandated Only When Necessitated by

Current Conditions. ........................................ 15

V.

Louisiana’s Creation of a Second MajorityMinority District Remedied Racial Vote

Dilution Forbidden by the Equal Protection

Clause.............................................................. 19

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 22

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579 (2018)................... 19, 20

Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997) ................... 18

Allen v. Milligan,

599 U.S. 1 (2023).................. 2, 10, 12, 13, 14, 18, 20

Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep.

Redistricting Comm’n,

576 U.S. 787 (2015).................................................. 4

Bartlett v. Strickland,

556 U.S. 1 (2009).................................................... 18

Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of

Elections, 580 U.S. 178 (2017) .............................. 21

Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,

594 U.S. 647 (2021).................................................. 7

City of Rome v. United States,

446 U.S. 156 (1980)............................................ 7, 13

Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285 (2017) ...................... 18

Johnson v. De Grandy,

512 U.S. 997 (1994).................................... 6, 8, 9, 18

Katzenbach v. Morgan,

384 U.S. 641 (1966).................................................. 7

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.

Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006)................................. 5, 20

Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325

(E.D. La. 1983) ......................................................... 9

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

McCulloch v. Maryland,

17 U.S. 316 (1819).................................................... 3

McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n,

572 U.S. 185 (2014).................................................. 4

Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) ...................... 5

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ................... 4, 5

Robinson v. Ardoin, 605 F. Supp. 3d

759 (M.D. La. 2022) ..................... 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 20

Robinson v. Ardoin, 86 F.4th 574

(5th Cir. 2023) .................................................... 8, 20

Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) ......................... 6

Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)............................. 5

Shelby Cnty. v. Holder,

570 U.S. 529 (2013)............................................ 9, 17

South Carolina v. Katzenbach,

383 U.S. 301 (1966)............................................ 7, 13

Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v.

President & Fellows of Harvard

Coll., 600 U.S. 181 (2023) ................................ 19, 21

Terrebonne Par. Branch NAACP v.

Jindal, 274 F. Supp. 3d 395

(M.D. La. 2017) ........................................................ 9

Thornburg v. Gingles,

478 U.S. 30 (1986)........................................ 2, 15, 16

Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216

(5th Cir. 2016) ........................................................ 10

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Voinovich v. Quilter,

507 U.S. 146 (1993)............................................ 7, 18

Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections

Comm’n, 595 U.S. 398 (2022) .................... 16, 19, 20

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 ....................................... 7

U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 2 ......................................... 7

Statutes

52 U.S.C. § 10301 .................................................. 7, 12

Other Materials

111 Cong. Rec. 8369 (1965) ....................................... 12

Alexander Hamilton, The Debates in

the Convention of The State of New

York, reprinted in 2 The Debates in

the Several State Conventions on the

Adoption of the Federal Constitution

(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) ........................... 3

The Federalist No. 37 (James

Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

1961) ......................................................................... 4

President George W. Bush, President

Bush Signs Voting Rights Act

Reauthorization and Amendments

Act of 2006 (July 27, 2006) .................................... 11

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

President Ronald Reagan, Remarks on

Signing the Voting Rights Act

Amendments of 1982 (June 29,

1982) ....................................................................... 11

Senators Lisa Murkowski and Joe

Manchin III, Bipartisan Voting

Rights Act Reauthorization Letter

(May 17, 2021) ....................................................... 11

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1

Amici curiae are a group of former Republican

governors. They bring a unique perspective as the

chief executives of their respective states and as

individuals elected by their entire state’s population.

Based on that experience, this group of former

governors believes that ensuring fair representation is

one of the central pillars of our democracy, and that

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as applied through

the Gingles framework, strikes the correct balance

between safeguarding fair representation and

avoiding undue consideration of race under the

Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. They write

to urge the Court to continue permitting states to

draw majority-minority districts while adhering to

traditional districting principles to remedy violations

of Section 2, so as to guard against the harm that

racial vote dilution continues to inflict on our

democracy.

Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger was the

thirty-eighth governor of California, serving in that

role from 2003 until 2011.

Governor Christine Todd Whitman was the

fiftieth governor of New Jersey, serving in that role

from 1994 until 2001.

Governor Marc Racicot was the twenty-first

governor of Montana, serving in that role from 1993 to

2001.

1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,

and no person other than amici or their counsel made a monetary

contribution to this brief’s preparation or submission.

2

Governor William F. Weld was the sixty-eighth

governor of Massachusetts, serving in that role from

1991 to 1997.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Voting Rights Act rests on the fundamental

principle,

enshrined

in

the

Reconstruction

Amendments, that fair representation is essential to

democracy, while racially discriminatory voting

practices threaten both the theoretical underpinnings

and practical functioning of democratic government.

Racial vote dilution and the resulting suppression of

minority voices and power—an unfortunate yet

longstanding aspect of our political system —poses a

grave threat to fair representation.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act serves as an

effective means of enforcing the Fourteenth and

Fifteenth Amendments by guarding against racial

discrimination in voting, including vote dilution,

whether it is intentional or not. Section 2 has been

successfully applied in the districting context for

nearly 40 years using the framework this Court set

forth in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), and

recently reaffirmed in Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1

(2023).

As former governors of diverse states, amici

recognize the crucial role that Section 2, as applied

through the Gingles framework, plays in protecting

the rights of minority voters to fair representation. Its

stringent requirements provide a restrained and

constitutional approach to countering racial vote

dilution in districting. The Gingles preconditions and

totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry ensure that a

3

Section 2 remedy is imposed only when current

conditions deprive voters of their constitutional rights.

As such, Section 2 effectively has time limits built in,

obviating any need to impose an artificial endpoint to

its protections. And when federal courts determine

that Section 2 has been violated, states have a

compelling interest in remedying that violation.

For decades, this Court and lower courts have

thoughtfully applied the Gingles framework across a

range of scenarios to effectively determine whether a

remedy is constitutionally warranted. There is thus no

need or basis to alter the current operation of Section

2 under Gingles. This Court should thus reject

Appellees’ suggestion that the creation of a majorityminority district in response to Section 2 liability

violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.

ARGUMENT

I.

Fair Representation Through Districting Is

Essential to American Democracy.

Our system of republican government rests on the

theory that the government is legitimate because it

operates on the consent of the governed. See, e.g.,

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 316–17 (1819)

(“The government of the Union is a government of the

people; it emanates from them; its powers are granted

by them; and are able to be exercised directly on them

. . . for their benefit.”); Alexander Hamilton, The

Debates in the Convention of The State of New York,

reprinted in 2 The Debates in the Several State

Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal

Constitution 257 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836)

4

(“[T]he true principle of a republic is, that the people

should choose whom they please to govern them.”).

To ensure this governing theory holds in practice,

voting districts must be drawn fairly. That is, they

must be drawn to ensure that voters “choose their

representatives, not the other way around.” Ariz.

State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n,

576 U.S. 787, 824 (2015); see also Reynolds v. Sims,

377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“The right to vote freely for

the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a

democratic society.”).

When voters have the opportunity to choose their

representatives, they “support candidates who share

their beliefs and interests,” and in turn, “candidates

who are elected can be expected to be responsive to

those concerns.” McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n,

572 U.S. 185, 192 (2014). That relationship is “a

central feature of democracy.” Id.; see also The

Federalist No. 37, at 227 (James Madison) (Clinton

Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The genius of republican liberty

seems to demand . . . not only that all power should be

derived from the people, but that those intrusted with

it should be kept in dependence on the people . . . .”).

The districting process is critical to determining

whether all citizens in a state can fairly elect their

chosen representatives. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at

565–66 (“[T]he achieving of fair and effective

representation for all citizens is concededly the basic

aim of legislative apportionment.”). If districting

interferes with citizens’ ability to elect their

representatives and hold them accountable,

5

democracy itself is degraded. See id. at 555 (“[T]he

right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or

dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as

effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of

the franchise.”).

To ensure fair districts that embody bedrock

tenets of American democracy, states typically follow

“traditional

districting

principles[,]

such

as

maintaining communities of interest and traditional

boundaries.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.

Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 433 (2006) (quoting Abrams v.

Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 92 (1997)). These principles

recognize the importance not just of establishing

reasonable geographic boundaries for districts, but

also of considering the characteristics of the people

within them. Thus, maintaining communities of

interest is an important component of districting—one

this Court has recognized includes communities whose

interests include a common racial identity. Miller v.

Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995). Accordingly, “when

members of a racial group live together in one

community, a reapportionment plan that concentrates

members of the group in one district and excludes

them from others may reflect wholly legitimate

purposes.” Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993); see

also Miller, 515 U.S. at 920 (“A State is free to

recognize communities that have a particular racial

makeup, provided its action is directed toward some

common thread of relevant interests.”).

Contrary to these principles and basic notions of

representative democracy, districts can be drawn in

ways that effectively dilute the votes of racial

6

minorities, either by “packing” them into a single

district or “cracking” them across multiple districts.

See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1007

(1994) (“[M]anipulation of district lines can dilute the

voting strength of politically cohesive minority group

members, whether by fragmenting the minority voters

among several districts where a bloc-voting majority

can routinely outvote them, or by packing them into

one or a small number of districts to minimize their

influence in the districts next door.”).

Racial vote dilution is harmful not just because it

causes the political process not to be equally open to

racial minorities, but because when a representative

does not depend on a minority group for support, the

representative can ignore their interests. See, e.g.,

Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982) (“Voting

along racial lines allows those elected to ignore black

interests without fear of political consequences.”). In

such circumstances, racial minorities are not truly

“represented,” and our representative democracy is

undermined.

As former governors of diverse states, amici are

acutely attuned to the need to avoid the disastrous

effects that unfair districting practices wreak on

effective governance.

II. The Voting Rights Act Responds to a Long

and Continued History of Discrimination in

the Political Process.

Congress enacted the 1965 Voting Rights Act

(“VRA”) “to banish the blight of racial discrimination

in voting, which ha[d] infected the electoral process in

7

parts of our country for nearly a century.” South

Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).

In crafting the VRA, Congress recognized that

representative democracy requires that every person

be provided an equal say in the election of their

representatives, and that racial vote dilution thwarts

that objective. Congress thus designed the VRA to

guarantee that the political process would be “equally

open” to all, 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b), pursuant to its

authority to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth

Amendments. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S.

Const. amend. XV, § 2; see also, e.g., Katzenbach, 383

U.S. at 308 (“Congress assumed the power to prescribe

these remedies from § 2 of the Fifteenth

Amendment”); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,

652 (1966) (“There can be no doubt that § 4(e) [of the

VRA] may be regarded as an enactment to enforce the

Equal Protection Clause.”).2

This Court has consistently acknowledged our

Nation’s history of racial discrimination in the

political process. See, e.g., Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at

310–13 (collecting cases condemning “the variety and

persistence of [tests] and similar institutions designed

to deprive Negroes of the right to vote”). And this

2 See also Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 594 U.S. 647,

655 (2021) (“Congress enacted the [VRA] . . . in an effort to

achieve at long last what the Fifteenth Amendment had sought

to bring about 95 years earlier: an end to the denial of the right

to vote based on race.”); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 152

(1993) (similar); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173

(1980) (similar).

8

Court has recounted how, in “a substantial number of

voting jurisdictions,” the “past reality” of those

“reprehensible practices” included “ballot box stuffing,

outright violence,” and “the poll tax.” Johnson v. De

Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1018 (1994). Louisiana is one of

those jurisdictions.

In the litigation that precipitated the enactment of

the map challenged in this case, two federal courts

found that there was “no sincere dispute” that

Louisiana has a “history of voting-related

discrimination.” Robinson v. Ardoin, 605 F. Supp. 3d

759, 848 (M.D. La. 2022); Robinson v. Ardoin, 86 F.4th

574 (5th Cir. 2023).3 This discrimination included “poll

taxes, property ownership requirements, and literacy

tests,” as well as “the Grandfather Clause, . . .

[r]egistration purges, the Understanding Clause, and

other restrictions,” which “disenfranchised Black

voters to the point that, between 1910 and 1948, fewer

than 1% of Black Louisianans of voting age were able

to register to vote.” 605 F. Supp. 3d at 846. And “[b]y

the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, only one

third of the Black population was registered.” Id.

Unfortunately,

courts

have

found

that

discrimination in the political process that made the

VRA a necessity continues to exist today as “some

3 The Fifth Circuit held that “[t]he district court did not clearly

err in its necessary fact-findings nor commit legal error in its

conclusions that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their

claim that there was a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights

Act in the Legislature's planned redistricting.” Robinson, 86

F.4th at 583.

9

jurisdictions . . . moved from direct, overt impediments

to the right to vote to more sophisticated devices that

dilute minority voting strength.” See De Grandy, 512

U.S. at 1018 (quoting S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 10 (1982))

(cleaned up). In 1983, for example, a district court

concluded that “Louisiana's history of racial

discrimination, both de jure and de facto, continue[d]

to have an adverse effect on the ability of its black

residents to participate fully in the electoral process.”

Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 339–40, 351 (E.D.

La. 1983) (holding that the State’s congressional

redistricting created a “prima facie case of vote

dilution” under the VRA).4

Looking to the present, the district court in

Robinson found voting-related discrimination in

Louisiana to be “ongoing,” crediting expert testimony

establishing that Black voter suppression continues as

4 Section 5 of the VRA required jurisdictions with a long history

of discriminatory voting practices to have any changes in their

election processes “precleared” by the U.S. Department of Justice

to ensure they wouldn’t perpetuate discrimination. See, e.g.,

Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 536–39 (2013). “From 1965

to 1999, the U.S. Attorney General issued 66 objection letters to

more than 200 [such] voting changes [in Louisiana], and from

1990 until the end of preclearance in 2013, an additional 79

objection letters were issued.” Robinson, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 846.

In 2017, a district court observed that “Louisiana federal courts

ha[d] [] found that Louisiana consistently ignored its

preclearance requirements under Section 5.” Terrebonne Par.

Branch NAACP v. Jindal, 274 F. Supp. 3d 395, 440 (M.D. La.

2017), rev'd sub nom. Fusilier v. Landry, 963 F.3d 447 (5th Cir.

2020).

10

a result of “modern day practices such as restricting

access to polling places, restrictions on early voting,

and limited mail voting.” Robinson, 605 F. Supp. 3d at

846–48 (discussing a report by the U.S. Commission

on Civil Rights that “found that there are fewer polling

locations per voter in heavily Black areas,” including

in Caddo Parish, which “was found to have only one

polling location for its 260,000 residents”).

Louisiana is not the only state where courts have

found discrimination in the political process to

continue in recent times. In 2016, for example, the

Fifth Circuit held that a Texas voter-ID law violated

the VRA due to its discriminatory effects on racial

minorities, noting the district court’s “well-supported”

findings of “contemporary examples of state-sponsored

discrimination.” Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 257,

264–65 (5th Cir. 2016).5 See also, e.g., Allen v.

Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 23 (2023) (affirming district

court’s “careful factual findings”) (citing Singleton v.

Merrill, 582 F. Supp. 3d 924, 1020–21 (N.D. Ala. 2022)

(finding that Alabama had “recent instances of official

discrimination” involving districting)).

The VRA has thus proven essential to combatting

racial discrimination in voting, in Louisiana and

around the country, through the present day. In the

decades following its enactment, leaders of both

5 The Fifth Circuit in Veasey also credited the district court’s

discussion of how, “[i]n every redistricting cycle since 1970, Texas

ha[d] been found to have violated the VRA with racially

gerrymandered districts.” Id. at 258 (quoting Veasey v. Perry, 71

F. Supp. 3d 627, 636 & n.23 (S.D. Tex. 2014)).

11

political parties have recognized the VRA’s enduring

importance. See, e.g., President Ronald Reagan,

Remarks on Signing the Voting Rights Act

Amendments

of

1982

(June

29,

1982),

https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/remar

ks-signing-voting-rights-act-amendments-1982 (“This

act ensures equal access to the political process for all

our citizens.”); President George W. Bush, President

Bush Signs Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and

Amendments Act of 2006 (July 27, 2006),

https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/07/2006

0727.html (“For some parts of our country, the Voting

Rights Act marked the first appearance of African

Americans on the voting rolls since Reconstruction.”);

Senators Lisa Murkowski and Joe Manchin III,

Bipartisan Voting Rights Act Reauthorization Letter

(May

17,

2021),

https://www.murkowski.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05.

17.21%20Bipartisan%20Voting%20Rights%20Act%20

Reauthorization%20Letter.pdf

(discussing

“the

positive impact [the VRA] has had on individual

Americans’ ability to exercise their most fundamental

right—the right to vote—and the strength of

democracy writ large”).

Amici share the views of these public officials

regarding the essential values embodied in, and

protected by, the VRA. To ensure that the VRA

continues to serve the role that Congress intended, the

Court must not weaken its protections.

12

III. Section 2 of the VRA, as Applied Through the

Gingles Framework, Provides a Restrained

and Constitutional Approach to Countering

Racial Vote Dilution.

Section 2 of the VRA provides an essential

safeguard to ensure that states and local governments

do not administer elections in a way that “results in a

denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen . . . to

vote on account of race or color.” See 52 U.S.C. §

10301(a). As Senator Joseph Tydings, one of the VRA’s

primary sponsors, explained, Section 2 “is a practical

and effective answer to the problem of racial

discrimination in voting” and achieves the

“restrained” and “appropriate” remedy called for by

the Act. See 111 Cong. Rec. 8369 (1965) (statement of

Sen. Joseph Tydings).

As originally drafted, however, Section 2 “had

little independent force,” because, although it

“prohibit[ed] States from acting with a ‘racially

discriminatory motivation,’” it “d[id] not prohibit laws

that [we]re discriminatory only in effect.” Allen v.

Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 10–11 (2023) (quoting City of

Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61–65 (1980)). In 1981,

Congress thus took up the contentious issue of

whether to expand the reach of Section 2, a monthslong debate which concluded with a compromise:

“Section 2 would include the effects test that many

desired but also a robust disclaimer against

proportionality.” Id. at 13. The Senate passed the

13

amendment “by an overwhelming margin, 85–8,” and

President Reagan signed it into law. Id.6

In 1986, the case of Thornburg v. Gingles gave

this Court its “first opportunity since the 1982

amendments to address how the new § 2 would

operate.” Milligan, 599 U.S. at 17. The Court

explained that Section 2 of the VRA guards against

“‘electoral structure[s] [that] operate[] to minimize or

cancel out’ minority voters’ ‘ability to elect their

preferred candidates.’” Id. at 17–18 (quoting Gingles,

478 U.S. 30, 48). To accomplish this purpose, Gingles

established a comprehensive framework for proving a

Section 2 violation, which “has governed [the Court’s]

Voting Rights Act jurisprudence since it was decided .

. . .” Id. at 19.

Not even three years ago, in Allen v. Milligan, 599

U.S. 1 (2023), this Court had an opportunity to

reconsider, but instead reaffirmed, the Gingles

framework. Similar to the arguments animating this

case, Alabama had argued that Gingles was

“inconsistent with . . . the Constitution’s prohibition

on racial discrimination in voting,” and proposed a

“race-blind” approach in order to avoid “requiring

racial proportionality in districting.” See id. at 23–24.

But this Court found “Alabama’s new approach to § 2

6 Over 40 years ago, this Court held “that, even if § 1 of the

[Fifteenth]

Amendment

prohibits

only

purposeful

discrimination,” the VRA's “ban on electoral changes that are

discriminatory in effect is an appropriate method of promoting

the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment.” City of Rome v.

United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173–77 (1980). See also South

Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308–09 (1966).

14

compelling neither in theory nor in practice,” and thus

“decline[d] to adopt an interpretation of § 2 that would

‘revise and reformulate the Gingles threshold inquiry

that has been the baseline of [the Court’s] § 2

jurisprudence’ for nearly forty years.” Id. at 24, 26

(quoting Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 16 (2009)

(plurality opinion)). There is no reason for the Court

to alter that baseline now.7

As currently applied, Gingles ensures that

implementation of Section 2 is carefully calibrated to

protect against the subordination of minority groups

in the political process without requiring

proportionality. Far from that, the Gingles framework

imposes a series of “preconditions” to ensure that the

drawing of majority-minority districts is mandated

only when necessary to remedy proven racial vote

dilution. Gingles does not require creation of a

majority-minority district just because the first

precondition—that the minority community is

sufficiently large and compact to do so—is satisfied.

Section 2 plaintiffs must additionally prove that the

minority community is also politically cohesive, in

that its members tend to vote similarly—the second

precondition—and that the majority group usually

votes as a bloc to defeat the minority group’s chosen

candidate—the third precondition. See id. at 18.

7 “Congress has never disturbed . . . § 2 as Gingles construed

it,” and this Court has “applied Gingles in one § 2 case after

another, to different kinds of electoral systems and to different

jurisdictions in States all over the country.” Id. at 19 (collecting

cases).

15

The three Gingles preconditions thus work

together to carefully identify a very real political

harm: When voting is racially polarized and minority

voters lack districts in which their electoral

preferences can prevail, “the majority, by virtue of its

numerical superiority, will regularly defeat the

choices of minority voters.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48.

This is not just a theoretical concern. In the

Robinson litigation underlying this case, the district

court concluded that “Black voters in Louisiana are

politically cohesive,” but that “White voters in

Louisiana vote ‘sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat

[Black voters’] preferred candidate.’” Robinson, 605 F.

Supp. 3d at 841 (alteration in original) (quoting

Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 302 (2017)). Consistent

with that finding of racially polarized voting, it was

therefore “undisputed that there ha[d] not been a

Black candidate elected to statewide office in

Louisiana since Reconstruction.” Id. at 845.8

IV. The Totality-of-the-Circumstances Inquiry

Ensures That Majority-Minority Districts

Are Mandated Only When Necessitated by

Current Conditions.

The Gingles framework does not provide for the

creation of a majority-minority district unless the

“totality of circumstances” shows that the political

process is not “equally open to minority voters.” Wis.

8 During this same period, only five Black Louisianans had

been elected to Congress, and not one of them was elected from a

non-majority-Black district. See id.

16

Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 595 U.S. 398,

402 (2022). The totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry

requires courts to conduct “an intensely local

appraisal” and a “searching practical evaluation of the

past and present reality.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79

(emphasis added). Indeed, all but one of the nine

“Senate Factors” underlying the totality inquiry

require consideration of recent and even ongoing

circumstances, with only Senate Factor 1 focused

principally on the past.

This case exemplifies how the totality inquiry

examines the “present reality.” The Robinson courts

found that voting in Louisiana not only has been, but

is racially polarized; that Louisiana’s current

congressional delegation and state legislature have

disproportionately low numbers of Black lawmakers;

and that “modern day practices” have contributed to

modern day voter suppression, such as the “recent

closing and consolidation of predominately Black

polling places.” See Robinson, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 839–

51 (emphasis added).

Appellees nonetheless argue that Section 2’s

“burdens” (i.e., protections) “cannot be justified by

Black Louisianans’ needs.” See Appellees’ Br. 37. And

on this basis, they ask this Court to impose a “time

limit” on Section 2, so that “race-based redistricting

cannot extend indefinitely into the future.” See id.

(quoting Milligan, 599 U.S. at 45 (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring)).

Appellees’ request is at odds not only with the

majority opinion in Milligan, but also with this Court’s

decision in carrying out its “gravest and most delicate

17

duty” in declaring the VRA’s coverage formula under

Section 4(b) unconstitutional. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder,

570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013) (quoting Blodgett v.

Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J.,

concurring)). The Shelby County decision concludes

with assurance that it “in no way affects the

permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination

in voting found in § 2,” and then states that “Congress

must ensure that [] legislation . . . to remedy th[e]

problem [of racial discrimination in voting] speaks to

current conditions.” Id. at 557. Section 2 of the VRA,

as applied through the Gingles framework, does

exactly that.

The Gingles preconditions and the totality-of-thecircumstances inquiry—unlike Section 4(b)’s coverage

formula—are predominately concerned with “current

conditions.” See id. In this way, the Court’s Gingles

framework effectively builds “time limits on racebased state action” directly into Section 2. See

Appellees’ Br. 37 (citing Students for Fair Admissions,

Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S.

181, 212–13 (2023); id. at 260 (Thomas, J.,

concurring); id. at 311, 314 (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring)). This is part of the reason why courts

frequently reject Section 2 claims under the existing

Gingles framework—because the “present reality” in

the challenged jurisdiction does not constitute a

18

violation. See Supp. Br. for Robinson Appellants 20

(collecting cases); Milligan, 599 U.S. at 29.9

In the instant case, it is all but certain that the

Robinson courts would not have found a likely Section

2 violation were there not in fact, for example, racially

polarized voting in Louisiana. See Voinovich v.

Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993) (rejecting Section 2 claim

where the evidence did not support a finding of

racially polarized voting).

Accordingly, the Court need not be concerned that

Section 2’s protections will “extend indefinitely into

the future.” Appellees’ Br. 37 (quoting Milligan, 599

U.S. at 45 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)). They will

extend only so far as they are supported by current

conditions on the ground. Section 2’s protections are

thus “limited in time” and will be “employed no more

broadly than the interest demands.” See Students for

Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of

9 See also, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 302–06 (2017)

(rejecting Section 2 claim where plaintiff could not “demonstrate

the third Gingles prerequisite—effective white bloc-voting”);

Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009) (plurality opinion)

(rejecting Section 2 claim where a reasonably compact majorityminority district could not be drawn); Abrams v. Johnson, 521

U.S. 74 (1997) (holding that court-ordered redistricting plan did

not violate Section 2 where Black population was not sufficiently

compact for a second majority-Black district and there was

insufficient racial polarization); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S.

997 (1994) (holding that Florida House districts did not violate

Section 2 where, in spite of continuing discrimination and racial

bloc voting, minority voters formed effective voting majorities in

a number of districts roughly proportional to their shares of the

voting-age population).

19

Harvard Coll. (SFFA), 600 U.S. 181, 311, 313 (2023)

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (internal citation

omitted). When jurisdictions nationwide reach a point

where the totality of the circumstances show that the

political process is “equally open to minority voters,”

Wis. Legislature v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 595 U.S.

398, 402 (2022), Section 2’s work will be done.

V. Louisiana’s Creation of a Second MajorityMinority District Remedied Racial Vote

Dilution Forbidden by the Equal Protection

Clause.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment “prohibits intentional ‘vote dilution’—

‘invidiously . . . minimiz[ing] or cancel[ing] out the

voting potential of racial or ethnic minorities,’” which

is enforced, in part, through Section 2 of the VRA

under Gingles. Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 586

(2018) (alteration in original) (quoting City of Mobile

v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66–67 (1980) (plurality

opinion)). But the Equal Protection Clause also

prohibits “racial gerrymandering,” which this Court

has defined as “intentionally assigning citizens to a

district on the basis of race without sufficient

justification” (i.e., without a compelling state interest).

See Abbott, 585 U.S. at 585–86 (citing Shaw v. Reno,

509 U.S. 630, 641 (1993)).

“In an effort to harmonize these conflicting

demands,” this Court has repeatedly “assumed that

compliance with the VRA is a compelling state

interest” for purposes of strict scrutiny, and “that

compliance with the VRA may justify the

20

consideration of race in a way that would not

otherwise be allowed.” Id. at 587; see also Wis.

Legislature, 595 U.S. at 401 (citing Cooper v. Harris,

581 U.S. 285, 291–93 (2017)).10 Indeed, “for the last

four decades, this Court and the lower federal courts

have . . . under certain circumstances, [] authorized

race-based redistricting as a remedy for state

districting maps that violate § 2.” Milligan, 599 U.S.

at 41.

In this case, the Robinson district court concluded

that the totality of the circumstances showed that the

political process was not equally open to Black

Louisianans. See Robinson, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 851.

Based on that conclusion, including satisfaction of the

Gingles preconditions, the court held—and the Fifth

Circuit affirmed—that Louisiana’s original map likely

violated Section 2 of the VRA, and that a second

majority-minority district was needed to remedy the

violation. Id. at 851, 858; see also Robinson v. Ardoin,

86 F.4th 574, 601 (5th Cir. 2023) (“We cannot conclude

on this record that the Legislature would not take

advantage of an opportunity to consider a new map

now that we have affirmed the district court’s

10 Justice Scalia once posited that, if VRA compliance “were not

a compelling state interest, then a State could be placed in the

impossible position of having to choose between compliance with

[the VRA] and compliance with the Equal Protection Clause.”

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 518

(2006) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and

dissenting in part).

21

conclusion that the Plaintiffs have a likelihood of

success on the merits.”).

The Section 2 violation in Robinson thus

presented an “exceedingly persuasive justification

that is measurable and concrete enough to permit

judicial review,” which gave Louisiana a compelling

interest in “remediating [a] specific, identified

instance[] of past discrimination that violated the

Constitution or a statute.” See SFFA, 600 U.S. at 207,

217. And Louisiana’s remediation of the Section 2

violation—enactment of a new map with a second

majority-minority district—is also “‘sufficiently

measurable to permit judicial [review]’ under the

rubric of strict scrutiny.” Id. at 214 (quoting Fisher v.

Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 579 U.S. 365, 381 (2016)).

This Court has explained that “a State’s

consideration of race in making a districting decision

is narrowly tailored and thus satisfies strict scrutiny

if the State has ‘good reasons’ for believing that its

decision is necessary in order to comply with the

VRA.” Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 587 (2018)

(quoting Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 293 (2017));

see also Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections,

580 U.S. 178, 193 (2017) (“[T]he narrow tailoring

requirement insists only that the legislature have a

strong basis in evidence in support of the (race-based)

choice that it has made.” (citation omitted)).

It is hard to imagine a better reason or a stronger

basis for the Louisiana State Legislature to believe

that drawing a second majority-minority district was

22

necessary to avoid unconstitutional discrimination

under the VRA than two federal courts saying so.

The State’s creation of a second majority-minority

congressional district does not violate the Fourteenth

or Fifteenth Amendments. Instead, it remedies an

effective violation of those Amendments as enforced

through Section 2 of the VRA.

CONCLUSION

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is essential to

protecting against racial vote dilution and the

suppression of minority voices in our political process.

Given the stringent requirements that the Gingles

framework imposes to ensure a remedy is mandated

only when constitutionally warranted by current

conditions, there is no need or basis to alter the

current operation of Section 2 under Gingles. The

Court should reject Appellees’ suggestion that the

creation of a majority-minority district in response to

Section 2 liability violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth

Amendments.

23

Respectfully submitted,

ALEXANDER F. ATKINS

MAITHREYI RATAKONDA*

CHRISTINE P. SUN

STATES UNITED

DEMOCRACY CENTER

45 Main Street, Suite 320

Brooklyn, NY 11201

(202) 999-9305

Mai@statesunited.org

KATHLEEN HARTNETT

COOLEY LLP

3 Embarcadero Center

20th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94111

Counsel for Amici Curiae

September 3, 2025

*Counsel of Record