Reply Brief — Project Veritas, et al., Petitioners v. Nathan Vasquez, in His Official Capacity as Multnomah County District Attorney, et al.

No. 24-1061

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

PROJECT VERITAS, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

NATHAN VASQUEZ, IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS MULTNOMAH COUNTY

DISTRICT ATTORNEY, et al.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF

BENJAMIN BARR*

Counsel of Record

BARR & KLEIN PLLC

1050 30th Street NW

Washington, DC 20007

(202) 595-4671

ben@barrklein.com

STEPHEN R. KLEIN

BARR & KLEIN PLLC

1629 K Street NW, Suite 300

Washington, DC 20006

Counsel for Petitioners

120513

A

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

* Admitted in Illinois and not a member of the D.C. Bar. Practicing

law in the District of Columbia in federal courts pursuant to D.C.

Court of Appeals Rule 49(c)(3).

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

I.

This Case Presents a Strong Procedural

Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

A. The Questions Presented Fairly Include

Facial and As-Applied Challenges . . . . . . . .1

B. The Severability of the Law’s Content

Based Provisions is Fairly Included

Within the Questions Presented . . . . . . . . . .3

C. This Case is an Ideal Vehicle for Review . . .4

II. The En Banc Opinion was Wrongly Decided. . . .5

A. Oregon Revised Statutes § 165.540 is

Not Content Neutral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

B. Oregon Revised Statutes § 165.540

Does not Address any Recognizable

Government Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

ii

Table of Contents

Page

C. Oregon Revised Statutes § 165.540 is

not Narrowly Tailored . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

III. The Ninth Circuit’s Ruling on Content

1HXWUDOLW\&RQÁLFWVZLWK'HFLVLRQVRIWKLV

Court and Other Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

A. Reed Affirms That Oregon Revised

Statutes § 165.540 is Facially Content

Based . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

B. T he Deci sion Below Deepens a

Circuit Split Arising from Ag-Gag

Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

iii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v.

Alvarez,

679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8, 9

Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds,

8 F.4th 781 (8th Cir. 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Kelly,

9 F.4th 1219 (10th Cir. 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Cahaly v. Larosa,

796 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,

558 U.S. 310 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

City of Austin v. Reagan National Advertising,

596 U.S. 61 (2022). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Fields v. Philadelphia,

862 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Florida Star v. B.J.F.,

491 U.S. 524 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez,

531 U.S. 533 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

iv

Cited Authorities

Page

1RUWRQY&LW\RI6SULQJÀHOG

806 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Ohio v. Robinette,

519 U.S. 33 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.

North Carolina Farm Bureau,

60 F.4th 815 (4th Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn.,

505 U.S. 377 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz.,

707 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Reed v. Town of Gilbert,

576 U.S. 155 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5, 6, 10

Snyder v. Phelps,

562 U.S. 443 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Turner v. Driver,

848 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2017). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 11, 12

v

Cited Authorities

Page

Statutes

O.R.S. § 165.540 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1, 5, 6, 8, 10

O.R.S. § 165.540(5)(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

O.R.S. § 165.540(5)(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

1

INTRODUCTION

The brief in opposition captures the extremity of

Oregon Revised Statutes § 165.540. Respondents Nathan

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made the recording; it also belongs to the people whose

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not in any state, not even in the footnotes of a fantastical

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FRRZQHUVKLSHYHUH[LVWHG7KLV´EDVLFLQVLJKWµWRMXVWLI\

a blanket restriction of unannounced audio recording is

akin to a blanket restriction of unannounced photography

EHFDXVH LW VWHDOV WKH VXEMHFW·V VRXO Id. With such an

extreme and wholly unsupported interest of individual or

conversational privacy, Oregon’s recording law fails any

measure of scrutiny. Compare App.36-48, 196-203 with

App.81-86, 117-123. This Court should grant certiorari to

WKHSHWLWLRQRI3URMHFW9HULWDVDQG3URMHFW9HULWDV$FWLRQ

)XQG FROOHFWLYHO\ ´9HULWDVµ  WR UHDIÀUP WKDW WKH )LUVW

Amendment protects individuals from governmental

censorship masquerading as privacy.

ARGUMENT

I.

This Case Presents a Strong Procedural Posture

A.

The Questions Presented Fairly Include Facial

and As-Applied Challenges

Veritas consistently pressed both facial and asapplied challenges to Oregon’s recording ban, and both

forms of its First Amendment claim are presented to

this Court. Contra Opp.17-21. From the outset, Veritas’s

2

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WRREWDLQDGHFODUDWLRQWKDWWKHODZ´LVXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO

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doubt that both aspects were raised: indeed, the court

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LQFOXGHGDIDFLDOFKDOOHQJHDV´WKHSDUWLHVDJUHHRQWKLV

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pursued relief on both grounds, and the Ninth Circuit

ultimately ruled that Oregon’s law is constitutional.

This Court’s precedent makes clear that whether a

claim is styled as facial or as applied does not determine

whether it may be heard or decided. Rather, it affects only

how far reaching the relief will be if the claim succeeds.

As this Court explained in Citizens United v. Federal

Election Commission ´WKH GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ IDFLDO

DQGDVDSSOLHGFKDOOHQJHVLVQRWVRZHOOGHÀQHGµWKDWLW

automatically controls the pleadings or outcome in every

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both instructive and necessary, for it goes to the breadth of

the remedy . . . QRWZKDWPXVWEHSOHDGHGLQDFRPSODLQWµ

Id. Once a constitutional claim is properly before the

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whether that means invalidating the law in its entirety or

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considered below. In this case, Veritas’s First Amendment

claim was squarely presented and decided at each step, so

the Court has the authority to address the law’s validity

in either form.

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EHJLQQLQJ³WKDW 2UHJRQ·V VWDWXWH FDQQRW EH HQIRUFHG

consistent with the First Amendment, whether in whole

or in part. Accordingly, the petition presents a proper and

3

important vehicle for resolving the constitutionality of this

law. Upholding free speech rights here does not depend

RQDVHPDQWLFFODVVLÀFDWLRQRIWKHFKDOOHQJHLWGHSHQGVRQ

recognizing that Oregon’s ban cannot survive the required

scrutiny. Both the facial and as-applied claims warrant

correction of the Ninth Circuit’s decision and merit this

Court’s intervention.

B. The Severability of the Law’s Content Based

Provisions is Fairly Included Within the

Questions Presented

The State’s severability gambit cannot erase the

clear import of the statutory text challenged in this

controversy.1 Contra Opp.16-17. At the certiorari stage, the

question is whether Oregon’s ban raises a substantial First

Amendment issue. It plainly does. By its terms, the law

criminalizes virtually all unannounced audio recording

of almost any conversation, with narrow exceptions for

preferred content and circumstances. App.209-217. Those

H[FHSWLRQVDUHZRYHQLQWRWKHVWDWXWH·VIDEULF7KH\GHÀQH

the scope of prohibited versus permitted speech. In

evaluating content neutrality and tailoring, a court must

consider the law as it stands, including its selective reach.

7KH 6WDWH·V EULHÀQJ DFNQRZOHGJHV WKDW WKH LVVXH RI

severability follows the content-based determination, or

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1LQWK&LUFXLWPDMRULW\LWVHOIUHFRJQL]HGWKDWLWFRXOGVHYHU

the exceptions only after determining whether any part

1. Relatedly, the State did not timely press a severability

argument below. App.124; see Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez,

531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001).

4

of the law failed scrutiny. App.49-52. The State further

DFNQRZOHGJHV WKDW DEVHQW VHYHUDELOLW\ ´WKH DQDO\VLV

would proceed under intermediate rather than strict

VFUXWLQ\µ 2SS 7KDW LV WKH DQDO\VLV ZRXOG SURFHHG

under Veritas’s second question presented. Severability

LV WKXV D ´SUHGLFDWH WR DQ LQWHOOLJHQW UHVROXWLRQµ RI WKH

second question presented and fairly included therein.

Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996); Pet.i-ii.

C.

This Case is an Ideal Vehicle for Review

The petition presents an excellent vehicle to resolve

the important First Amendment questions surrounding

audio recording laws. The issue is squarely presented on a

IXOOUHFRUG7KHHQEDQF1LQWK&LUFXLWRSLQLRQGHÀQLWLYHO\

XSKHOG2UHJRQ·VODZFUHDWLQJDGLUHFWFRQÁLFWZLWKPXOWLSOH

RWKHUFLUFXLWV7KHGHFLVLRQFRPHVZLWKDGHWDLOHGPDMRULW\

opinion, a concurrence disputing whether recording is

even speech, and a vigorous dissent highlighting the

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of viewpoints. App.1-94. There are no factual disputes or

procedural obstacles here: the case was decided as a pure

question of law on a motion to dismiss, so the Court can

cleanly address the First Amendment issues. App.177-204.

This case is an ideal vehicle because it encapsulates

the issue in a straightforward way: Oregon’s law is one of

the nation’s broadest restrictions of recording, enforced

E\FULPLQDOSHQDOWLHV7KHFRQÁLFWZLWKRWKHUFLUFXLWVLV

well developed, and there are no procedural anomalies.

In short, this petition offers the Court the opportunity

WRSURWHFWFRUH)LUVW$PHQGPHQWYDOXHV³WKHJDWKHULQJ

and dissemination of information about matters of public

FRQFHUQ³DQGWRUHVROYHFRQÁLFWVLQWKHORZHUFRXUWVRQ

5

how Reed v. Town of Gilbert and related precedent apply to

laws restricting the creation of speech. 576 U.S. 155 (2015).

The case is ready for review, and the question presented

is of national importance. See, e.g., Law Professors Amici

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on undercover investigations and newsgathering, like

criminalizing unannounced recordings, is an issue of

pressing importance and one not previously decided by the

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It proves too much for the State to even attempt to

LQMHFWSURFHGXUDOSUREOHPVLQWRDFDVHWKDWUDLVHVVHULRXV

issues of censorship and has reached this Court with

starkly contrasting substantive opinions from an en banc

panel of a court of appeals. The issue of severability and

Veritas’s applied challenges are fairly included in the two

questions presented. Pet.i-ii. This case is a sturdy vehicle;

the law at issue is not.

II. The En Banc Opinion was Wrongly Decided

A.

Oregon Revised Statutes § 165.540 is Not

Content Neutral

Respondents’ content-neutrality claim misreads City

of Austin v. Reagan National Advertising, 596 U.S. 61

(2022). Opp.21-24. There, this Court held only that a

regulation distinguishing on-premises from off-premises

signs was not aimed at the communicative topic of the

sign. City of Austin, 596 U.S. at 71–72. This is a far cry

from Oregon’s law, which differentiates speech based on

LWVVXEMHFWPDWWHUDQGWKHVSHDNHU·VLGHQWLW\7RNQRZLID

recording falls under the felony exception, one must assess

what was happening and said during the conversation.

6

O.R.S. § 165.540(5)(a) (App.213). To invoke the law

enforcement exception, one must identify the participants

and the context. O.R.S. § 165.540(5)(b) (App.213-214).

7HOOLQJMRXUQDOLVWVWKH\FDQHDVLO\UHFRUGVRPHVWRULHVEXW

not others is picking and choosing news by topic, which

is content-based censorship in disguise. These are not

FRQWHQWQHXWUDOWLPHPDQQHUSODFHRU´FLUFXPVWDQFHVµ

rules. Opp. 10; App.29-30. This doctrinal error is one the

Ninth Circuit is familiar with.

The en banc panel, for all its efforts, simply could

not resist repeating the same mistakes made by the

Ninth Circuit in Reed. Once again, it leapt directly to an

examination of legislative intent and grasping desperately

IRUEHQLJQMXVWLÀFDWLRQV³ZLWKRXWÀUVWWDNLQJ´WKHFUXFLDO

ÀUVWVWHSLQWKHFRQWHQWQHXWUDOLW\DQDO\VLVGHWHUPLQLQJ

ZKHWKHUWKHODZLVFRQWHQWEDVHGRQLWVIDFHµReed, 576

U.S. at 165; see Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 707 F.3d

1057, 1070–72 (9th Cir. 2013). The Ninth Circuit was

rebuked by this Court yet stubbornly doubled down on

the same approach here. App.27-35. A similar course

correction is needed for a circuit in open rebellion against

this Court’s settled First Amendment standards.

B. Oregon Revised Statutes § 165.540 Does

not Address any Recognizable Government

Interest

7KH 6WDWH FRQMXUHV D SKDQWDVPLF SULYDF\ ULJKW WR

FRQÁDWH WKH KXVKHG UHYHUHQFH RI D FRQIHVVLRQDO ERRWK

with sidewalk chatter. Opp.25-29. Indeed, Oregon’s novel

GHÀQLWLRQ RI SULYDF\ WR WKH H[WHQW LW LV HYHQ GHÀQHG 

is oblivious to decades of First Amendment precedent

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7

in public. Such speech contributes meaningfully to public

discourse precisely because it occurs in the public view,

where listeners have the right not only to hear but also to

document and disseminate information about it. A default

interest in public privacy stretches the concept so thin it

would cover a loud political debate on a sidewalk with the

VDPHFRQÀGHQWLDOLW\DVZKLVSHUHGLQWLPDFLHVVKDUHGZLWK

a therapist. See Opp.25-26. But as this Court reiterated in

Snyder v. Phelps, speech occurring in a public setting on

matters of public concern receives heightened protection

precisely because it is not private. 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011);

see also Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989);

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 387–88

(1992). The State’s attempt to transform every park bench

and café patio into a sanctuary of privacy is as untenable

constitutionally as it is fanciful in reality.

One of the most dangerous parts of the State’s

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to convert the technological ease and effectiveness of

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FHQVRUVKLS 2SS $XGLR UHFRUGLQJV ´¶PD\ EH PDGH

HDVLO\VWRUHGLQGHÀQLWHO\GLVVHPLQDWHGZLGHO\DQGSOD\HG

UHSHDWHGO\>@·µId. (quoting App.39-40). This is a big step

up from the printing press. But the State twists the

power of the medium into a privacy interest, regardless

of the circumstances in which conversations are recorded.

Bizarrely, the interest makes private even the words of a

VXEMHFWZKRNQRZLQJO\VSHDNVSXEOLFO\2SS7KLVLVQRW

a reasonable standard; it is no standard at all.

8

C.

Oregon Revised Statutes § 165.540 is not

Narrowly Tailored

Oregon’s recording law has a demonstrable problem

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of nearly all conversations, no matter how public or

QRQFRQÀGHQWLDO VZHHSLQJ LQ D YDVW DPRXQW RI VSHHFK

that carries no plausible privacy expectation. As the

Seventh Circuit observed in striking a similar law, Illinois

´EDQQ>HG@QHDUO\DOODXGLRUHFRUGLQJZLWKRXWFRQVHQWRI

WKH SDUWLHV³LQFOXGLQJ DXGLR UHFRUGLQJ WKDW LPSOLFDWHV

QR SULYDF\ LQWHUHVWV DW DOOµ American Civil Liberties

Union of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 606 (7th Cir.

2012). Oregon’s ban applies to loud exchanges on a public

sidewalk, to heated arguments at protests, or to a public

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where speakers cannot reasonably claim privacy. By

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genuinely private communications, Oregon has burdened

´VXEVWDQWLDOO\PRUHVSHHFKWKDQLVQHFHVVDU\Id.

The State leans on privacy as a talismanic interest,

yet the law is fatally underinclusive and overinclusive

with respect to any version of that interest. The law

oddly permits unnoticed recording in some of the most

sensitive scenarios (e.g., during life-endangering felonies

or police-citizen encounters), while forbidding it in many

less sensitive ones (e.g., noisy exchanges on a street

or in a park). This patchwork undermines the State’s

argument that its notice rule serves privacy at all. See

also Pet.31-32; contra Opp.24 (claiming the statute’s

RWKHU H[FHSWLRQV ZHUH RQO\ ´PHQWLRQ>HG@ LQ SDVVLQJµ 

The lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in many

prohibited situations also shows the law is not narrowly

9

tailored because it sweeps in openly audible conversations

and matters of public concern where privacy is minimal

or nonexistent.

Crucially, Oregon has less restrictive means to

protect legitimate privacy interests. Nearly a dozen

states have all-party consent laws for audio recording, but

they typically exempt conversations with no reasonable

expectation of privacy. App.171-76. Oregon chose an

exceptionally broad approach, even though privacy

could be safeguarded by a narrower statute targeting

only truly confidential circumstances. And the law’s

FRQWHQWEDVHGH[FHSWLRQVIXUWKHULOOXVWUDWHWKHSRRUÀW

conversations during some felonies may be recorded,

and police interactions may be recorded without notice,

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LWÀQGVWKHFRQWHQWYDOXDEOH7KHVHFDUYHRXWVHYLVFHUDWH

Oregon’s claim that the law is appropriately tailored

to privacy. Rather, they suggest the law favors certain

recordings (select crime evidence or police monitoring)

while arbitrarily suppressing others. In short, Oregon’s

EODQNHW EDQ ´LQFOXGH>V@ DXGLR UHFRUGLQJ WKDW LPSOLFDWHV

QRSULYDF\LQWHUHVWVDWDOOµDQGWKXV´UHVWULFWVIDUPRUH

VSHHFKWKDQQHFHVVDU\µWRDFKLHYHLWVDLPVAlvarez, 679

F.3d at 606. Under strict or intermediate scrutiny, such

DEURDGO\VWLÁLQJODZFDQQRWVWDQG

10

III. The Ninth Circuit’s Ruling on Content Neutrality

&RQÁLFWVZLWK'HFLVLRQVRIWKLV&RXUWDQG2WKHU

Circuits

A.

Reed $IÀUPV 7KDW 2UHJRQ 5HYLVHG 6WDWXWHV

§ 165.540 is Facially Content Based

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Oregon’s blanket notice requirement for recording is a

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Opp.2. By allowing some unannounced recordings, but

not others, based on their content, Oregon’s law regulates

VSHHFKEDVHGRQVXEMHFWPDWWHUDQGVSHDNHULGHQWLW\See

App.109-115. That triggers strict scrutiny, under which

the law cannot survive. Reed, 576 U.S. 155.

The en banc panel and the State attempt to avoid that

conclusion by contending that the law does not single out

DQ\ YLHZSRLQW DQG LV MXVWLÀHG E\ DQ H[SDQVLYH LQWHUHVW

in privacy. App.27-30; Opp.11-12. But Reed squarely

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of a content-neutral motive can save a law that, on its

face, draws distinctions based on the topic discussed

or the circumstance of the speech. 576 U.S. at 165. In

Oregon, whether a person may record and later publish

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is, its content. Far from being content agnostic, the law’s

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exchange being recorded. Because of this, there is no need

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to determine that strict scrutiny applies. It is curious,

however, that the State does not address what purpose

the law enforcement or felony exceptions could possibly

11

serve other than the capture and preservation of certain

content.

B. The Decision Below Deepens a Circuit Split

Arising from Ag-Gag Laws

7KLVFKDOOHQJHDOVRSUHVHQWVDFRPSHOOLQJMXULVGLFWLRQDO

map with circuit splits across the Fourth, Seventh,

Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. Opening Br. 16-21; see also

North Carolina Farm Bureau Federation Amici Br. at 7

(discussing a similar circuit split while adding the Fifth

Circuit to its tally).

The Fourth Circuit in People for the Ethical

Treatment of Animals v. North Carolina Farm Bureau

HQMRLQHG1RUWK&DUROLQD·VEDQRQXQGHUFRYHUUHFRUGLQJV

QRWLQJWKDW´VFRUHVRI6XSUHPH&RXUWDQGFLUFXLWFDVHVµ

protect the right to gather information and that recordings

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DFFHVV WR LQIRUPDWLRQµ  )WK   Q WK &LU

2023). The Fourth Circuit struck down North Carolina’s

´3URSHUW\ 3URWHFWLRQ $FWµ DV FRQWHQW EDVHG ÀQGLQJ LW

discriminated by speaker identity and viewpoint. That

law only penalized employees who record to harm their

HPSOR\HU³D FDUYHRXW WDUJHWLQJ FHUWDLQ VSHDNHUV DQG

only negative, disloyal speech. Id. at 823-24. The court did

not search for a benign legislative intent or purpose. The

)RXUWKDQG6HYHQWK&LUFXLWVKDYHDOVRH[SUHVVO\UHMHFWHG

the Ninth Circuit’s search for benign legislative intent as

an appropriate step in conducting a facial content-based

analysis. See Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399, 405 (4th

Cir. 2015); 1RUWRQ Y &LW\ RI 6SULQJÀHOG, 806 F.3d 411,

412 (7th Cir. 2015).

12

In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds, the

Eighth Circuit followed a strict content-based test and

noted that Iowa’s law criminalizing lies to gain access to

agricultural facilities was content based because it turned

on the falsity or truth of speech. 8 F.4th 781, 787 (8th Cir.

2021). And the Tenth Circuit in Animal Legal Defense

Fund v. Kelly similarly held that laws prohibiting collecting

or recording information on public lands were content or

viewpoint discriminatory, because they penalized only

those recordings with an intent to damage operations.

9 F.4th 1219, 1231 (10th Cir. 2021). These rulings mirror

the consensus that recording is protected expressive

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viewpoints must face strict scrutiny. In stark contrast, the

Ninth Circuit allowed Oregon’s selective ban to stand by

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against certain types of recordings. App.30-35. In fact,

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Third Circuit in Fields v. Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353 (3d

Cir. 2017) and the Fifth Circuit in Turner v. Driver, 848

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of public concern. By upholding Oregon’s law, the Ninth

Circuit parted ways with at least four other circuits over

how the First Amendment applies to audio recordings and

over content-based determinations, underscoring a clear

split ripe for this Court’s resolution.

13

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

BENJAMIN BARR*

Counsel of Record

BARR & KLEIN PLLC

1050 30th Street NW

Washington, DC 20007

(202) 595-4671

ben@barrklein.com

STEPHEN R. KLEIN

BARR & KLEIN PLLC

1629 K Street NW, Suite 300

Washington, DC 20006

Counsel for Petitioners

* Admitted in Illinois and not a member of the D.C. Bar. Practicing

law in the District of Columbia in federal courts pursuant to D.C.

Court of Appeals Rule 49(c)(3).