Amicus Curiae Brief — Manuel Adams, Jr., Petitioner v. City of Harahan, Louisiana

No. 24-102

In the Supreme Court of the United States

___________

MANUEL ADAMS, JR., PETITIONER

v.

CITY OF HARAHAN

___________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

___________

BRIEF OF PROFESSOR MICHAEL H. LEROY

AS AMICUS CURIAE

SUPPORTING PETITIONER

___________

Peter A. Bruland

Counsel of Record

Benjamin M. Mundel

Aaron P. Haviland

Susan K. Whaley

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

1501 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 736-8000

pbruland@sidley.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................

iii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ......................

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..............................

1

ARGUMENT .........................................................

2

I. The freedom to pursue an occupation of

one’s own choosing is deeply embedded in

Anglo-American law. .....................................

2

A. An individual’s liberty interest in pursuing his chosen profession traces back

to English common law. ..........................

3

B. The freedom to practice a chosen trade

was among the Founding generation’s

central motivations. ................................

5

C. Occupational liberty was a recurring

theme during the Antebellum and

Reconstruction eras. ................................

7

D. Twentieth-century cases consistently

recognized that the Due Process Clause

protects occupational liberty. ..................

10

II. The Court should grant review to clarify

the proper standard for vindicating this

important freedom.........................................

12

CONCLUSION .....................................................

13

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page

Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v. United States,

286 U.S. 427 (1932) ...................................

3

City of Memphis v. Winfield,

27 Tenn. 707 (1848)................................... 7, 8

Conn v. Gabbert,

526 U.S. 286 (1999) ............................... 2, 11, 12

Corfield v. Coryell,

6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)............. 2, 7

Dent v. West Virginia,

129 U.S. 114 (1889) ...................................

10

Drexel & Co. v. Commonwealth,

46 Pa. 31 (1863) .........................................

8

Golden Glow Tanning Salon, Inc. v.

City of Columbus,

52 F.4th 974 (5th Cir. 2022) .....................

3

Greene v. McElroy,

360 U.S. 474 (1959) ................................... 2, 11

Lufkin Rule Co. v. Fringeli,

49 N.E. 1030 (Ohio 1898) ..........................

8

McDonald v. City of Chicago,

561 U.S. 742 (2010) ...................................

9

Meyer v. Nebraska,

262 U.S. 390 (1923) ................................... 2, 11

Ross v. Sadgbeer,

21 Wend. 166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839) ...........

8

Saenz v. Roe,

526 U.S. 489 (1999) ...................................

9

Sewall v. Jones,

26 Mass. 412 (1830) ..................................

8

Slaughter-House Cases,

83 U.S. (16. Wall.) 36 (1872) ..................... 2, 9

Smith v. Spooner,

20 Mass. 229 (1825) ..................................

8

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – continued

Truax v. Raich,

239 U.S. 33 (1915) .....................................

Page

10

FOREIGN CASES

Allen v. Tooley (1614),

80 Eng. Rep. 1055 (K.B.)...........................

The Case of the Tailors (1615),

77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B.)...........................

John Dyer’s Case (1414),

2 Hen. V, 5 pl. 26 (K.B.) ............................

Mitchel v. Reynolds (1711),

24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B.).............................

5

4

3

3

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

Cong. Globe, 38th Cong.,

1st Sess. 193 (1864) ...................................

Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong.,

1st Sess. App. 86 (1871) ............................

9

9

SCHOLARLY AUTHORITIES

Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C.

Leibowitz, Monopolies and the

Constitution: A History of Crony

Capitalism, 36 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y

983 (2013) ..................................................

Franklin D. Jones, Historical Development

of the Law of Business Competition,

36 Yale L.J. 42 (1926) ...............................

Michael H. LeRoy, Targeting White

Supremacy in the Workplace,

29 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 107 (2018) ..........

4, 6

6

8

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – continued

Timothy Sandefur, The Right to Earn a

Living, 6 Chap. L. Rev 207 (2003) ............

Page

6, 7

OTHER AUTHORITIES

1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on

the Laws of England (Philadelphia,

Union Library 1771) .................................

Edward Coke, The Second Part of the

Institutes of the Lawes of England

(London, E&R Brooke 1797) .....................

Edward Coke, The Third Part of the

Institutes of the Lawes of England

(London, E&R Brooke 1797) .....................

Benjamin Franklin, Causes of the

American Discontents Before 1768 (Jan.

5–7, 1768) ..................................................

Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address

(Mar. 4, 1801) ............................................

Letter from James Madison to Thomas

Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788) ...........................

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James

Madison (Dec. 20, 1787) ............................

George Mason, Objections to This

Constitution of Government (Sept. 1787) .

George Mason, Va. Decl. of Rights

§ 1 (1776) ...................................................

William Alexander Sanderson, Restraint of

Trade in English Law (1926) ....................

4

4

5

5

7

7

7

6

5

4

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1

Professor Michael H. LeRoy is the LER Alumni Professor of Labor and Employment Relations at the

University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. 2 He has

spent more than thirty years publishing and teaching

the law of labor and employment and has an interest

in the sound development of this field. Professor

LeRoy offers this brief to elaborate on the historical

roots and critical importance of the liberty interest

that this case implicates.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The freedom to pursue one’s chosen occupation has

deep roots in Anglo-American law. From the Middle

Ages onward, English courts recognized occupationalliberty claims, invaliding both private agreements

and royal monopolies that barred workers from their

chosen fields. The Founding generation not only

shared those principles but also invoked British infringement on occupational liberty as grounds for independence. And both early American courts and the

Reconstruction Congress acknowledged and upheld

that freedom. This Court has too. From the nineteenth century onward, the Court has repeatedly recognized—and reaffirmed—that the Constitution protects the freedom to pursue one’s occupation.

1 Counsel

of record for all parties received timely notice of

amicus’s intent to file this brief. No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity

aside from amicus and his counsel funded its preparation or

submission.

2 Amicus files this brief in his individual capacity only, not as

a representative of the University of Illinois, UrbanaChampaign or any of its academic or administrative units.

2

The Court should grant review to clarify what

standard applies when a plaintiff seeks to vindicate

that important freedom. Few liberties are so deeply

rooted or so consequential for ordinary Americans.

Yet the decision below puts occupational-liberty

claims all but out of reach—breaking with four other

circuits along the way. This Court’s review is badly

needed, and the interests at stake are too important

to save for another day.

ARGUMENT

I. The freedom to pursue an occupation of

one’s own choosing is deeply embedded in

Anglo-American law.

This Court has long recognized that the Constitution protects the freedom to pursue one’s chosen occupation without arbitrary government interference.

At times, that principle has been described as a “liberty” interest protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments under the doctrine of procedural due

process. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492

(1959); see also Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–

92 (1999) (citing Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114

(1889); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915)). At other

times, this Court has stated that the freedom is protected under the doctrine of substantive due process.

See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). And

on occasion, Justices of this Court have also described

the right to pursue an occupation as one of the privileges and immunities of citizenship. See SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 113–14 (1872)

(Bradley, J., dissenting); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas.

546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (Washington, J.).

Whatever its textual and doctrinal underpinnings,

however, there can be no doubt that this freedom has

3

a deep historical pedigree. See generally Golden Glow

Tanning Salon, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 52 F.4th

974, 982–84 (5th Cir. 2022) (Ho, J., concurring).

A. An individual’s liberty interest in pursuing his chosen profession traces back

to English common law.

1. The English common law long upheld an individual’s freedom to pursue his own occupation. The

roots of that freedom stretch back at least to 1414,

when the King’s Bench decided John Dyer’s Case

(1414), 2 Hen. V, 5, pl. 26 (K.B.). The defendant there

was sued for violating the terms of an agreement not

to work in his trade for six months. Id. The court held

the restriction invalid. In its view, the restraint at

issue was not only unenforceable but also criminal: “if

the plaintiff were here he should go to prison until he

paid a fine to the King.” Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v.

United States, 286 U.S. 427, 436 n.1 (1932) (quoting

Dyer’s Case, 2 Henry V, 5, pl. 26).

The same principle found expression in Mitchel v.

Reynolds (1711), 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 347 (Q.B.). There,

an apprentice baker sold his bakehouse in consideration of a five-year bond not to practice his trade within the Parish of St. Holborn. He later broke that

promise and was sued for damages. Id. While the

court ruled against the baker, reasoning that his restraint was geographically limited, it added that a

“general” restraint “not to exercise a trade throughout the kingdom” would be “void.” Id. at 348. It stated: “[T]here is more than a presumption against it,

because it can never be useful to any man to restrain

another from trading in all places, tho[ugh] it may be,

to restrain him from trading in some, unless he intends a monopoly, which is a crime.” Id. at 351.

4

2. English courts also protected individual liberty

to pursue an occupation without state encroachment.

In medieval and early-modern England, the Crown

created royal “monopolies”—“exclusive grant[s] of

power” from the government to “work in a particular

trade or to sell a specific good.” Steven G. Calabresi &

Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: A History of Crony Capitalism, 36 Harv. J.L. &

Pub. Pol’y 983, 984 (2013). Originally meant to foster

new industries, such governmental monopolies could

also—when abused—preclude those without a royal

grant from working a particular trade. When such

abuses began to recur in the early seventeenth century, see 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the

Laws of England 427 (Philadelphia, Union Library

1771), courts stepped in to protect occupational freedom. As Lord Chief Justice Coke explained in The

Case of the Tailors (1615), “the common law abhors”

state monopolies that “prohibit any from working in

any lawful trade.” 77 Eng. Rep. 1218, 1219 (K.B.).

Coke echoed that theme in his in his influential treatise, declaring: “if a [grant] be made to any man, to

have the sole making of cards, or the sole dealing

with any other trade, that [grant] is against the liberty and freedome of the subject” and “against the law

of the land.” Edward Coke, The Second Part of the

Institutes of the Lawes of England 47 (London, E&R

Brooke 1797).

That is not to say that English law recognized no

constraints on an individual’s occupational pursuits.

For example, a 1363 statute limited a person to one

fixed and permanent craft. See William Alexander

Sanderson, Restraint of Trade in English Law, 11,

note e (1926) (discussing 37 Edw. 3, cc. 5, 6, which

“forb[ade] merchants to trade in more than one ware

and direct[ed] artificers and ‘handicraft people’ to

5

hold them every one to one mystery ….”). Likewise,

while it was “lawful for any man to use any trade

thereby to maintain himself and his family,” the law

still could “provid[e] a punishment” for one who purported to perform a trade in which “he hath no skill.”

Allen v. Tooley (1614), 80 Eng. Rep. 1055, 1055 (K.B.).

Still, courts remained deeply skeptical of attempts

to prevent a man from practicing his chosen trade—

particularly when that restraint came from the state

itself. As Coke explained, “it appeareth that a mans

trade is accounted his life, becau[s]e it maintaineth

his life”—so a restriction that “taketh away a man’s

trade, taketh away his life.” Edward Coke, The Third

Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England 181

(London, E&R Brooke 1797).

B. The freedom to practice a chosen trade

was among the Founding generation’s

central motivations.

Skepticism of governmental attempts to restrict occupational freedom, particular through royal monopolies, also took hold across the Atlantic. Indeed, the

Crown’s infringement of this liberty interest became

an important justification for the colonists’ break

with England.

1. Occupational liberty was prominent in the writings of the Founding generation. Benjamin Franklin,

for example, declared: “There cannot be a stronger

natural right than that of a man’s making the best

profit he can of the natural produce of his lands[.]”

Benjamin Franklin, Causes of the American Discontents Before 1768 (Jan. 5–7, 1768), bit.ly/3SN5j7m.

Along similar lines, George Mason wrote in the Virginia Declaration of Rights that the “inherent rights”

that men retain when they “enter into a state of soci-

6

ety” include “the enjoyment of life and liberty, with

the means of acquiring and possessing property, and

pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.” Va.

Decl. of Rights § 1 (1776), bit.ly/3YNTilM.

For the Framers, perhaps the most pressing threat

to their liberty was the existence of governmentsanctioned monopolies, which came into being despite

the efforts of English courts to protect the right to

work. See Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra at 1007–08.

Historians deem such monopolistic behavior “one of

the most potent causes of the American Revolution.”

Franklin D. Jones, Historical Development of the Law

of Business Competition, 36 Yale L.J. 42, 51–52

(1926). In fact, it was the Crown’s support for the

East India Company—which made it impossible for

colonial merchants to compete on an equal footing in

the tea trade—that led American colonists to dump

British tea into Boston Harbor on December 16, 1773.

See Timothy Sandefur, The Right to Earn a Living, 6

Chap. L. Rev 207, 218 (2003).

2. The threat that state monopolies posed to occupational liberty was the subject of intense debate at

the Constitutional Convention. The Framers considered—and ultimately rejected—a proposal to give the

federal government the power to grant “charters of

incorporation.” Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra at 1011

(citation omitted). Meanwhile, Mason ultimately refused to sign the Constitution in part because he believed that the Necessary and Proper Clause gave

Congress the power to “grant monopolies in trade and

commerce[.]” George Mason, Objections to This Constitution of Government (Sept. 1787), bit.ly/3WQxx2h.

And occupational liberty remained top-of-mind for

the Framers even after the Convention. Before the

7

Constitution was even ratified, for example, Thomas

Jefferson wrote James Madison to complain about the

omission of a bill of rights—including a right “providing clearly & without the aid of sophisms for … restriction against monopolies.” Letter from Thomas

Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787),

bit.ly/4ctqQsF. Madison later agreed that monopolies

“are justly classed among the greatest nuisances in

Government.” Letter from James Madison to Thomas

Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), bit.ly/3Ap0V86. While the

eventual Bill of Rights did not incorporate the right

that Jefferson had envisioned, he returned to the

theme in his first inaugural address—admonishing

that “a wise and frugal Government” is one that

“shall leave [men] otherwise free to regulate their

own pursuits of industry and improvement ….”

Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4,

1801), bit.ly/3T5XVE2.

C. Occupational liberty was a recurring

theme during the Antebellum and

Reconstruction eras.

1. These threads carried forward to the Antebellum

period, when numerous judicial opinions recognized

the common-law right to earn a living. See Sandefur,

supra, at 225–26, 263–66 (collecting cases). Most notably, in the 1823 case Corfield v. Coryell, Justice

Bushrod Washington wrote that he considered the

right “to pass through, or to reside in any other state,

for purposes of trade, agriculture, [or] professional

pursuits” to be one of the “fundamental” rights that

belongs “to the citizens of all free governments.” 6 F.

Cas. at 551–52. Likewise, in the 1848 case City of

Memphis v. Winfield, the Tennessee Supreme Court

held that a statute imposing a 10 P.M. curfew on

Black inhabitants was “both unnecessary and oppres-

8

sive”—and therefore “void”—because “in cities, very

often, the most profitable employment is to be found

in the night.” 27 Tenn. 707, 708–10 (1848). As the

court explained, “[t]he lot of a free negro is hard

enough at best, … and it is both cruel and useless to

add to his troubles by unnecessary and painful restraints in the use of such liberty as is allowed him.

He must live, and, in order to do so, he must work[.]”

Id. at 709. See also Smith v. Spooner, 20 Mass. 229,

230 (1825); Sewall v. Jones, 26 Mass. 412, 414 (1830);

Drexel & Co. v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. 31, 36 (1863).

Nineteenth-century courts were also skeptical of attempts to impose contractual restraints on occupational freedom. For example, in the 1839 case Ross v.

Sadgbeer, the New York Supreme Court of Judicature explained that “the law will not permit” a “contract to deprive a man of his livelihood, and the public of a useful member, without any benefit to the

plaintiff.” 21 Wend. 166, 167 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839).

And in the 1898 case Lufkin Rule Co. v. Fringeli, the

Ohio Supreme Court explained that the presumption

that general restraints on trade are illegal “arises

from the fact that any restraint of the kind tends to

oppression, by depriving the individual of the right to

engage in a pursuit or trade with which he is generally most familiar, and consequently the community of

the services of a skillful laborer.” 49 N.E. 1030, 1032

(Ohio 1898).

2. Occupational liberty was also a focus of the abolitionist movement and the Reconstruction Congress.

See generally Michael H. LeRoy, Targeting White Supremacy in the Workplace, 29 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev.

107, 108 (2018) (discussing the history of civil rights

legislation from the Reconstruction era). Representative Evan Ingersoll of Illinois, speaking on June 15,

9

1864, offered his support for an amendment to abolish slavery because doing so would “secure to the oppressed slave his natural and God-given rights,” including the “right to till the soil, to earn his bread by

the sweat of his brow, and enjoy the rewards of his

own labor.” Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990

(1864) (statement of Rep. Ingersoll). And Representative John Bingham of Ohio, one of the principal

drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment, described

constitutional liberty as including the right “to work

in an honest calling and contribute by your toil in

some sort to the support of yourself, to the support of

your fellowmen, and to be secure in the enjoyment of

the fruits of your toil.” Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st

Sess. App. 86 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham).

To be sure, this Court did not immediately embrace

the view that the Fourteenth Amendment protects

the freedom at issue here. In the Slaughter-House

Cases, decided in 1872, the Court reviewed several

consolidated challenges to a Louisiana statute that

established a monopoly in the state slaughter-house

industry. 83 U.S. at 57. The plaintiffs, an association

of butchers, argued that the monopoly violated their

“right to exercise their trade,” as guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 60. This Court disagreed, holding that the Privileges or Immunities

Clause protected only the rights of United States citizenship, not the rights of State citizenship, and that

only the latter included the right to work. Id. at 78–

79. But see Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 521–28 (1999)

(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the SlaughterHouse Cases were wrongly decided); McDonald v. City

of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 851–52 (2010) (Thomas, J.,

concurring) (same).

10

But this Court soon recognized the right to pursue

an occupation of one’s choosing as a liberty interest

under the Due Process Clause. In Dent v. West Virginia, the Court reviewed the conviction of a physician who had practiced unlicensed medicine, in violation of a state statute. 129 U.S. at 121. This Court ultimately affirmed the conviction on the ground that

the statute was a reasonable regulation imposed by

the state to promote the general welfare. Id. at 121–

22, 128. Along the way, however, the Court deemed it

“undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United

States to follow any lawful calling, business, or profession he may choose,” adding that “[t]his right may

in many respects be considered as a distinguishing

feature of our republican institutions.” Id. at 121.

D. Twentieth-century cases consistently

recognized that the Due Process Clause

protects occupational liberty.

This Court reaffirmed the Dent principle in a series

of twentieth-century cases, repeatedly invoking the

liberty to pursue a chosen occupation. One such case

was Truax v. Raich, decided in 1915. The Court there

held that an Arizona statute restricting the employment of non-citizen workers violated the Equal Protection Clause. 239 U.S. at 35, 39–43. In doing so, it

explained that “the right to work for a living in the

common occupations of the community is of the very

essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that

it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to

secure.” Id. at 41. If that right “could be refused solely upon the ground of race or nationality,” the Court

reasoned, “the prohibition of the denial to any person

of the equal protection of the laws would be a barren

form of words.” Id.

11

Occupational liberty also featured in Meyer v. Nebraska, decided in 1923. Meyer held that a Nebraska

statute that forbade the teaching of German in classrooms violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it

“unreasonably infringe[d] the liberty guaranteed …

by the Fourteenth Amendment.” 262 U.S. at 399.

While the Court did “not attempt[] to define with exactness the liberty” guaranteed in the Fourteenth

Amendment, it explained that liberty “denotes not

merely freedom from bodily restraint” but also various other freedoms—including “the right … to engage

in any of the common occupations of life.” Id.

The Court revisited occupational liberty in greater

depth in Green v. McElroy, decided in 1959. The

plaintiff in Green was an aeronautical engineer

whose security clearance had been revoked by the

government, effectively preventing him from obtaining a job in his field. 360 U.S. at 475–76. He sued, arguing that the government’s decision—which rested

on confidential statements made by informants after

a procedure authorized by neither Congress nor the

President—unconstitutionally deprived him of “liberty” and “property” without “due process of law.” Id. at

492 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V). This Court

agreed, explaining that “the right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession

free from unreasonable governmental interference

comes within the ‘liberty’ and ‘property’ concepts” of

the Due Process Clause, and that the government

had violated the engineer’s due process rights by failing to provide a fair procedure. Id. at 492, 508.

The issue also arose in Conn v. Gabbert, decided

forty years later. Conn was a dispute between a defense lawyer and a California prosecutor. The defense

lawyer claimed that the prosecutor violated his pro-

12

cedural due process rights by causing police to search

him just before his client testified to a grand jury. 526

U.S. at 287–89. The Court disagreed that the prosecutor had interfered with the defense lawyer’s constitutional right to practice his profession, reasoning

that such a “brief interruption” was not actionable.

Id. at 292. In so holding, however, the Court reaffirmed the principles that it recognized in earlier cases like Dent and Truax. See id.

II. The Court should grant review to clarify

the proper standard for vindicating this

important freedom.

Coke and Blackstone, Madison and Jefferson, the

Reconstruction Congress: all cared deeply about the

liberty interest at issue here—and for good reason.

The freedom to pursue one’s chosen occupation is a

foundation stone of Anglo-American law, and for centuries courts have carefully protected that interest.

As the petitioner explains, however, the decision below “guts this right for every person living in the

Fifth Circuit,” Pet. 4, creating an “intractable circuit

conflict” in the process, id. at 1.

No matter which side of that split is correct, the

question presented matters too much to leave for another day. If the Fifth Circuit is right, then employers

throughout the First, Third, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits—from small businesses to cash-strapped municipalities—can be threatened with damages liability

under circumstances that cannot lawfully support an

occupational-liberty claim. On the other hand, if the

First, Third, Ninth, and D.C. circuits are right, then

thirty-eight million Louisianans, Mississippians, and

Texans are now all but unable to vindicate their interests in occupational liberty. Meanwhile, employers

13

and employees in the other circuits will have to guess

which rule applies until this Court intervenes.

Few petitions involve liberty interests with such a

long pedigree—or such tremendous consequence to

ordinary Americans. If the freedom to pursue an occupation of one’s choosing was vital enough to cross

the Atlantic, then it is too important to leave up to

geographical happenstance: the Constitution should

mean the same thing in Harahan, Louisiana as it

does in Hallowell, Maine. This Court should grant review, resolve the circuit split, and clarify the proper

standard for occupational-liberty claims.

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant the petition.

Respectfully submitted,

Peter A. Bruland

Counsel of Record

Benjamin M. Mundel

Aaron P. Haviland

Susan K. Whaley

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

1501 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 736-8000

pbruland@sidley.com

August 30, 2024

Counsel for Amicus Curiae