Respondents Brief — Cotter Corporation, et al., Petitioners v. Nikki Steiner Mazzocchio, et al.

Supreme Court briefJun 26, 2025

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No. 24-1001

IN THE

COTTER CORPORATION; COMMONWEALTH EDISON

COMPANY,

Petitioners,

v.

NIKKI STEINER MAZZOCCHIO; ANGELA STEINER KRAUS,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eighth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Ryan Keane

Tanner A. Kirksey

KEANE LAW, LLC

7711 Bonhomme Ave.

Suite 600

St. Louis, MO 63105

Kevin Thompson

David R Barney, Jr.

THOMPSON BARNEY

2030 Kanawha Blvd.

E. Charleston, WV 25311

Barry J. Cooper, Jr.

Counsel of Record

Victor Cobb

COOPER LAW FIRM

834 Elmwood Park Blvd.

Suite 130

Harahan, LA 70123

barryjcooperjr@gmail.com

(504) 291-1347

Anthony D. Gray

JOHNSON GRAY, LLC

2705 Dougherty Ferry Rd.

Suite 100

St. Louis, MO 63122

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Price-Anderson Act creates a federal cause of

action, dubbed a “public liability action,” for, as

relevant here, litigation over harms arising from

radioactive material. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(ii), (q), (w).

“[T]he substantive rules for decision in such action

shall be derived from the law of the State in which the

nuclear incident involved occurs, unless such law is

inconsistent with the provisions of [Section 2210].” 42

U.S.C. § 2014(ii).

The question presented is: Whether state tort law

concerning the standard of care—if consistent with the

provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2210—applies to a public

liability action under the Price-Anderson Act.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ........................................... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................ ii

INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 2

A. Legal background .......................................... 2

B. Factual background ....................................... 5

C. Procedural background ................................. 8

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT .................. 11

I.

This case is a poor vehicle for addressing

the question presented ....................................... 11

II. Petitioners’ novel reading of the statute is

incorrect .............................................................. 19

III. There is no split worth of this Court’s

attention .............................................................. 24

IV. Petitioners’ claims about the importance of

the question presented are vastly

overblown ............................................................ 29

CONCLUSION........................................................... 33

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

In the Matter of A.N. Tschaede,

23 N.R.C. 461 (1986) ............................................24

Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries,

586 U.S. 446 (2019) ..............................................16

Bohrmann v. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co.,

926 F. Supp. 211 (D. Me. 1996) .....................15, 31

Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,

489 U.S. 141 (1989) ..............................................22

Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp.,

790 F.3d 1088 (10th Cir. 2015) ......................21, 22

Corcoran v. New York Power Auth.,

935 F. Supp. 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ........................31

Cotter Corp., N.S.L. v. United States,

127 F.4th 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2025) ...........................30

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,

304 U.S. 64 (1938) ................................................20

Est. of Ware v. Hosp. of the Univ. of Pa.,

871 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2017)............................26, 28

Finestone v. Fla. Power & Light Co.,

272 Fed. Appx. 761 (11th Cir. 2008)..............28, 32

Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media,

588 U.S. 427 (2019) ..............................................29

Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York,

326 U.S. 99 (1945) ................................................20

In re Hanford Nuclear Rsrv. Litig.,

534 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2008) ..........................27, 28

iv

McCafferty v. Centerior Serv. Co.,

983 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Ohio 1997) ......................32

McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Gen. Grp.,

869 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2017)..................................26

Nat’l Football League v. Ninth Inning, Inc.,

141 S. Ct. 56 (2020) ..............................................11

Nieman v. NLO, Inc.,

108 F.3d 1546 (6th Cir. 1997) ........................26, 27

O’Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,

13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1994) ..........................27, 29

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.

Conservation & Dev. Comm’n,

461 U.S. 190 (1983) ..............................................22

Roberts v. Fla. Power & Light Co.,

146 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 1998) ......................28, 29

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Jarkesy,

603 U.S. 109 (2024) ..............................................32

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,

464 U.S. 238 (1984) ..............................3, 16, 22, 23

Taylor v. Interstate Nuclear Servs., Inc.,

1999 WL 35809694 (D.N.M. Apr. 7, 1999) ..........31

In re TMI,

67 F.3d 1103 (3d Cir. 1995)............................31, 32

In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II,

940 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1991)............................24, 25

Virginia Uranium, Inc., v. Warren,

587 U.S. 761 (2019) ..............................................23

Wyeth v. Levine,

555 U.S. 555 (2009) ..............................................32

v

Zivotofsky v. Clinton,

566 U.S. 189 (2012) ..............................................12

Constiutitional Provisions

U.S. Const., art. III .................................................4, 25

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 2402 ..........................................................32

42 U.S.C.

§ 2014 ......................................................................2

§ 2014(k) .................................................................2

§ 2014(ii)

......................3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 19, 20, 21, 23, 29

§ 2014(ii)(q) .............................................................3

§ 2014(ii)(w) ..................................................1, 3, 19

§ 2014(hh) ...............................................................4

§ 2210 ..............................2, 4, 10, 11, 12, 19, 20, 21

§ 2210(a)..................................................................2

§ 2210(b)..................................................................2

§ 2210(c) ..................................................................2

§ 2210(e) ..................................................................3

§ 2210(n)(1) ...........................................................20

§ 2210(s) ..........................................................20, 23

Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) ..................2, 3

Pub. L. No. 94-197, 89 Stat. 1111 (1975) ....................3

Pub. L. No. 100-408, 102 Stat. 1066 (1988) ................3

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.067 (2005) .................................19

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 644.006 et seq. (Missouri

Clean Water Law) (1973) ..................................8, 15

Regulations

10 C.F.R. § 20.105 (1970) ...........................................14

vi

10 C.F.R. § 20.106(a) (1970) .......................................14

10 C.F.R. § 20.201(b) (1970) .......................................18

10 C.F.R. § 20.1001(a) ..................................................4

10 C.F.R. § 20.1001(b) ............................................4, 24

10 C.F.R. § 20.1002 .....................................................14

10 C.F.R. § 20.1101(b) ..................................................4

10 C.F.R. § 20.1501 .....................................................18

Legislative Materials

H.R. Rep. No. 100-104 (1987) .....................................23

S. Rep. No. 85-296 (1957) ...........................................23

S. Rep. No. 89-1605 (1966) ...................................16, 23

S. Rep. No. 94-454 (1975) ...........................................30

S. Rep. No. 100-218 (1987) ...........................................3

Other Authorities

Restatement (Third) of Torts (2005) ..........................16

U.S. Department of Energy, Price-Anderson Act:

Report to Congress (2023),

https://perma.cc/JCS5-8U5X ................................24

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, The Price-

Anderson Act: 2021 Report to Congress

(Dec. 2021), https://perma.cc/BN82-HULN ...29, 30

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Enforcement Process Diagram (July 7, 2020),

https://perma.cc/NDA5-XCJY ........................18, 30

INTRODUCTION

Respondents Nikki Steiner Mazzocchio and

Angela Steiner Kraus are sisters who developed blood

cancer as a result of their exposure to radioactive

waste material mishandled by petitioners and other

defendants. They filed suit, raising, as relevant here,

a claim under the Price-Anderson Act (PAA), which

creates a federal cause of action for litigation over

harms arising from radioactive material. 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2014(ii), (w). By default, the “substantive rules for

decision” in a PAA case are “derived from the law of

the State” where the injury occurred. Id. By this point

in the litigation, petitioners appear to acknowledge

that this default rule applies here: This case should be

governed by the “substantive” law “of the State” (here,

Missouri law). See Pet. 8.

Petitioners nonetheless ask this Court to grant

review and hold that respondents must prove a

violation of a federal regulation, not just of state law.

Their logic? “[F]ederal law is the ‘law of the State.’”

Pet. 24.

This Court should deny the petition. No circuit

has ever considered—let alone accepted—petitioners’

up-is-down reading of the PAA. Indeed, petitioners’

reading of the statute was not even raised in the court

below, where petitioners floated an entirely different

textual analysis.

A grant of certiorari would be particularly

mistaken at this juncture. This case comes to the

Court on the appeal of a question certified for

interlocutory review. This Court does not need to

consider weighing in on the question presented until

the courts below have had the chance to assess

2

petitioners’ reading. And this Court should not credit

petitioners’ alarmist claims that the opinion below

threatens the entire nuclear industry in the

meantime: Thanks to a federal indemnification and

insurance scheme, the potential defendants Congress

cared most about know they are not on the hook for

any damages.

The petition should be denied.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Legal background

1. The Price-Anderson Act (PAA), codified at 42

U.S.C. § 2210, with relevant definitions in 42 U.S.C.

§ 2014, was enacted in 1957 with two goals. First,

Congress sought to protect the public by ensuring

adequate funds would be available to compensate

victims in the event of a nuclear incident. Second, the

PAA sought to encourage the development of the

atomic energy industry. Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 1, 71

Stat. 576 (1957).

To accomplish those goals, Congress mandated

that key players in the nuclear industry, such as

nuclear power plant operators, be required to

purchase financial protection in the form of the

maximum available commercial liability insurance.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210(a), (b), 2014(k). In addition, the

United States government would execute indemnity

agreements with those players to ensure the

companies wouldn’t have to pay even if private

insurance limits were exceeded. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2210(c). Eventually, Congress also mandated that

those players participate in a pooled insurance

scheme, whereby liability above a threshold results in

3

an equal premium adjustment for all participants in

the scheme. Pub. L. No. 94-197, §§ 2-3, 89 Stat. 1111,

1111-12 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

§ 2014). Finally, the PAA capped the amount of

liability for each nuclear incident. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2210(e).

The end result is that today, through a

combination of commercial insurance, pooled

insurance, federal government indemnification, and a

cap on the amount of liability, those key players in the

nuclear industry will not pay a dime of damages.

2. In addition to ensuring the financial stability of

the nuclear industry, the PAA creates a channeling

provision allowing for the consolidation of litigation

over nuclear incidents. Prior to 1988, liability for the

vast majority of nuclear incidents (all but so-called

“extraordinary nuclear occurrences”) was governed

entirely by state tort law. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee

Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 254-56 (1984). Following the

Three Mile Island accident, a slew of state tort cases

was filed in both federal and state court. Congress

wanted a mechanism to consolidate those claims in

federal court. S. Rep. No. 100-218, at 13 (1987).

The result was an amendment to the PAA in 1988

creating a “public liability action,” a federal cause of

action for injuries arising out of radioactive material.

Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L.

No. 100-408, 102 Stat. 1066 (1988); 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2014(ii), (q), (w). The “public liability action” retains

state law as the governing substantive law: A “public

liability action shall be deemed to be an action arising

under [42 U.S.C. §] 2210,” and “the substantive rules

for decision in such action shall be derived from the

law of the State in which the nuclear incident involved

4

occurs, unless such law is inconsistent with the

provisions of such section.” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(ii).1

Section 2210, in turn, contains provisions that, for

instance, limit punitive damages awards or require

defendants to waive state-law defenses in some

circumstances.

The amended PAA thus creates a scheme in which

state torts, with state-law elements, are restyled as

federal claims for purposes of Article III jurisdiction.

3. The PAA built on the Atomic Energy Act, which

created an agency to govern civilian use of nuclear

material. Known today as the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC),2 that agency issues licenses to

entities that handle radioactive material. Some

licenses authorize operating a nuclear power plant;

others authorize taking title to or transporting

radioactive material.

In addition, the NRC issues regulations governing

the handling of radioactive material. As relevant here,

some of those regulations set out dosage limits—levels

of radiation to which workers and members of the

public can be exposed. Those limits apply to “activities

conducted under licenses issued by the [NRC].” 10

C.F.R. § 20.1001(a). The regulations provide that

“nothing” in them “shall be construed as limiting

actions that may be necessary to protect health and

safety.” 10 C.F.R. § 20.1001(b). In 1991, the NRC

1

At the time of the lower court decision in this case, this section

was codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh). It has since been recodified

as 42 U.S.C. § 2014(ii), but the text of the provision has not

changed.

2

Prior to 1974, this agency was known as the Atomic Energy

Commission.

5

added mandatory language requiring that licensees

must ensure that radiation emissions are “as low as

reasonably achievable.” 10 C.F.R. § 20.1101(b).

B. Factual background

Because this case comes to the Court at the

pleading stage, all facts alleged in respondents’

complaint are taken as true.

1. Between 1942 and 1957, uranium was

processed in downtown St. Louis, Missouri, as part of

the Manhattan Project. First Am. Comp. ¶ 34, ECF

No. 44. Radioactive waste material from that

processing was transported and stored at a site near

the St. Louis Lambert International Airport. Id. ¶ 36.

Defendant St. Louis Airport Authority later purchased

that land. Id. ¶ 37. The St. Louis Airport Authority

was never licensed by the NRC (or its predecessor) and

is not a petitioner here.

In the late 1960s, private companies purchased

the radioactive waste stored at the airport site. FAC

¶ 41. The waste was then transported to a site on

Latty Avenue which abuts Coldwater Creek. Id. ¶ 42.

In 1969, petitioner Cotter Corporation, the second

defendant in this case, received a license from the

Atomic Energy Commission (the NRC’s predecessor)

to purchase and assume responsibility for the

radioactive waste material stockpiled at the Latty

Avenue site. Id. ¶ 42. Cotter was not required to obtain

financial protection or an indemnification agreement

with the federal government and did not do so. Id.

¶ 46.

After purchasing the radioactive waste, Cotter

began drying it (to make it lighter and easier to

transport) and loading it on railcars next to Coldwater

6

Creek. FAC ¶ 47. From the start, Cotter failed to fulfill

its licensee obligations. The Atomic Energy

Commission cited Cotter for its “totally inadequate”

sample surveys, which failed to “determine [the]

concentrations of radioactive materials” the public

was exposed to. Id. ¶ 48. The settling ponds and

equipment used in Cotter’s drying operation were in a

state of disrepair. Id. The Atomic Energy Commission

and the local health department also expressed

concern about a “dust problem” and visible air

contaminants. Id. In addition, health and

environmental experts expressed concerns and noted

violations of federal regulations. Id.

Eventually, Cotter’s drying equipment entirely

broke down, and Cotter appeared to abandon the site.

FAC ¶ 49. Cotter eventually returned to dispose of the

radioactive waste material that remained at the site

by simply mixing it with soil and dumping it into a

landfill in the St. Louis area. Id. ¶ 50.

In 1974, Cotter certified that there was no longer

any radioactive contamination at the Latty Avenue

site, despite knowing of radiation surveys that

indicated otherwise. FAC ¶¶ 13, 57, 58. Based on

Cotter’s representations, the Atomic Energy

Commission agreed to terminate its license. Id. ¶ 59.

Around that time, Cotter was purchased by petitioner

Commonwealth Edison, the third defendant in this

case. Id. ¶¶ 13, 55. Commonwealth Edison was never

licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission or the

NRC. Id. ¶ 89.

Two years later, surveys conducted by the NRC

revealed persistent radioactive contamination at the

Latty Avenue site. FAC ¶ 61. The NRC informed

Cotter that the survey “raised a serious question” as to

7

the accuracy of Cotter’s statements made in support of

its application for termination of its license. Id.

In 1978, the fourth defendant, DJR Holdings,

purchased the Latty Avenue site. DJR was never

licensed by the NRC or its predecessor and is not a

petitioner here. DJR conducted decontamination

operations on the site, moving radioactive material

from the soil closest to Coldwater Creek to another

part of the property. FAC ¶¶ 65, 70-71.

By the 1980s, because of defendants’ actions, the

radioactive waste material left over from the

Manhattan Project had contaminated both Coldwater

Creek and the Latty Avenue site. Both contained high

levels of radioactive isotopes, some of “the most toxic

materials known to man.” FAC ¶¶ 24-25. When

radioactive isotopes pass through human cells, they

can cause genetic mutations leading to cancer. Id.

¶ 27.

2. From 1984 to 2014, respondent Nikki Steiner

Mazzocchio lived in an apartment building abutting

Coldwater Creek near the Latty Avenue site. FAC

¶ 10. Respondent Angela Steiner Kraus, Ms.

Mazzocchio’s sister, lived in the same apartment

building from 1998 to 2002. Id. ¶ 11. Both plaintiffs’

apartments flooded multiple times with waters from

the creek. Id. ¶ 10-11. Ms. Kraus regularly spent time

in and around Coldwater Creek, gardening, trail

running, and splashing her face with the creek water.

Id. ¶ 11. And both sisters consumed produce grown in

Ms. Kraus’s garden, right by Coldwater Creek. Id.

As a result of their exposure to radioactive

isotopes, both Ms. Mazzocchio and Ms. Kraus—like

many other people living in the vicinity of the creek—

developed cancer. Within weeks of each other, Ms.

8

Mazzocchio and Ms. Kraus, who have no family

history of cancer, were diagnosed with an incurable

blood cancer called multiple myeloma. FAC ¶¶ 10-11,

81-82.

C. Procedural background

1. Ms. Mazzocchio and Ms. Kraus initially filed a

complaint against defendants in Missouri state court.

After removal and several years of litigation,

respondents filed their first amended complaint.

The operative complaint raises Price-Anderson

Act claims against four defendants: The St. Louis

Airport

Authority,

Cotter

Corporation,

Commonwealth Edison, and DJR Holdings.

Petitioners’ question presented centers on just one

of the claims raised by Ms. Mazzocchio and Ms.

Kraus—their common-law negligence claim. But

respondents in fact raised four sets of claims:

•

Negligence per se: Respondents allege that

defendants violated the Missouri Clean Water Law

and that this violation constituted negligence per

se. Respondents also allege that defendants

violated various federal regulations, including

radiation dosage limits and rules about sampling

and testing.

•

Civil conspiracy: Respondents allege that

defendants conspired to wrongfully release

radioactive waste material and to obtain

termination of Cotter’s license based on inaccurate

information.

•

Strict liability: Respondents allege that because

radioactive waste material is ultrahazardous,

9

defendants are liable for any harms resulting from

that material.

•

Common-law negligence: Respondents allege that

defendants were negligent when they mishandled

radioactive waste material. They also alleged that

defendants negligently failed to warn the public of

the risks of radiation at the Latty Avenue site.

2. Defendants moved to dismiss. They argued that

the standard of care element of plaintiffs’ common-law

negligence claim must be based on federal dosage

regulations, not state law. The district court denied

the motion. First, it pointed out that the standard of

care argument could not be dispositive as to “the other

three Defendants” or as to “some claims” against

Cotter. Pet. App. 22a. Second, even as to the commonlaw negligence claim against Cotter, the district court

found that federal dose regulations did not “provide

the exclusive standard of care.” Id. 21a. Cotter’s

argument to the contrary was “not based on any

provisions in the PAA” and “conflicts with the plain

language of the PAA, Atomic Energy Act, and federal

regulations and causes consequences seemingly

contrary to Congressional intent.” Id.

The district court noted that defendants only

“allude[d] to” and “never develop[ed]” the issues of

field and conflict preemption. Pet. App. 44a. n.29.

Accordingly, the court held that defendants had not

established a “per se rule” that federal regulations

governed their claim. Id. 45a. Instead, it determined

that “the applicable standard of care depends on the

facts of each case and the claims against each

defendant.” Id. 45a.

The district court certified the following question

for interlocutory appeal: “Whether federal dosage

10

regulations should be exclusively utilized as the

standard of care in a Price-Anderson Act public

liability action.” Pet. App. 18a.

3. The appeal turned on the construction of 42

U.S.C. § 2014(ii). That section provides that “[a] public

liability action shall be deemed to be an action arising

under section 2210 of this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(ii).

It then declares that “the substantive rules for

decision in such action shall be derived from the law of

the State . . . unless such law is inconsistent with the

provisions of such section.” Id.

The defendants argued that the phrase “such

section” incorporated the whole federal scheme of

nuclear safety regulation. Pet. App. 9a. Ms.

Mazzocchio and Ms. Kraus responded that the phrase

“such section” referred solely to Section 2210, and that

Missouri substantive law governing standards of care

was in no way “inconsistent” with Section 2210, which

contains rules about, for instance, punitive damages,

indemnification, and liability caps. Id.

The Eighth Circuit agreed with Ms. Mazzocchio

and Ms. Kraus and rejected defendants’ argument.

The Eighth Circuit held that “such section” in the

public liability action provision refers only to Section

2210. Pet. App. 9a. Because nothing in Section 2210

mentioned dosage requirements, much less indicated

that such dosage requirements would trump

Missouri’s standard of care, the Eighth Circuit held

that Missouri state law should govern. Id.

The Eighth Circuit explained that this Court has

“spoke[n] about the role of state tort law in broad

terms” and “was clear that state law standards of

negligence and strict liability would continue to play a

role in compensating those injured in a nuclear

11

accident.” Pet. App. 8a. And while “evidence of

compliance with federal safety standards” might be

“relevant to a negligence claim,” it was not

“dispositive.” Id. 10a n.2 (citations omitted). Moreover,

the Eighth Circuit explained that in the 1988 PAA

amendments, “Congress did not repudiate the Court’s

understanding of the role that state tort law plays in

a public liability action” but in fact “approved it.” Id.

8a.

3. Two of the four defendants—Cotter and

Commonwealth

Edison—have

petitioned

for

certiorari. Petitioners no longer argue that “such

section” in 42 U.S.C. § 2014(ii) refers to the whole

federal regulatory code. Pet. 8. Petitioners thus appear

to agree that the “substantive rules for decision” in

this case must be derived from the “law of the State.”

Petitioners instead now argue that the “law of the

State” in this case is actually federal law. Id. 24.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I.

This case is a poor vehicle for addressing the

question presented.

This case’s “interlocutory posture is a factor

counseling against this Court’s review at this time.”

Nat’l Football League v. Ninth Inning, Inc., 141 S. Ct.

56, 57 (mem.) (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., statement

respecting denial of certiorari). The case comes to this

Court on an appeal of a certified question, after the

courts below denied defendants’ motion to dismiss.

This Court should wait for the case to play out before

considering whether to intervene.

1. First, petitioners are asking this Court to

consider an argument they never made below. As the

12

Court has instructed time and again, this Court is “a

court of final review and not first view.” Zivotofsky v.

Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012) (citation omitted). It

should wait for the courts below to pass upon

petitioners’ new legal theory before considering

wading into this case.

Petitioners argued in the district court that

Respondents “can only have a federal claim” because

42 U.S.C. § 2014(ii) states that “[a] public liability

action shall be deemed to be an action arising under

section 2210 of this title.” D. Mot. to Dismiss Reply Br.

2, ECF No. 59 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2014(ii)). Per the

district court, petitioners only “allude[d]” to field

preemption and “never develop[ed] the issue.” Pet.

App. 44a.

In the Eighth Circuit, petitioners tried a different

approach, arguing that the phrase “such section”

“refer[s] to the whole Act,” not just to 42 U.S.C. § 2210.

Petr. C.A. Reply Br. 11. They argued that Missouri

standards of care were inconsistent with the “whole

Act.” Id. 12.

Before this Court, petitioners shift gears yet

again. They now abandon any argument that “such

section” is broader than 42 U.S.C. § 2210, that the

Missouri standards of care are “inconsistent with” that

section, or that the “law of the State” does not govern

this case. Pet. 8, 24. Instead, they argue for the first

time in this litigation that the PAA preempts the

entire field here—that “federal law is the ‘law of the

State,” because federal regulations preempt any state

standards of care. Pet. 24. That reading of the statute

bears no resemblance to what petitioners urged below,

and this Court should wait for a lower court to consider

the reading before it considers weighing in.

13

2. Second, this Court should not grant certiorari

in this interlocutory posture because an opinion from

this Court may wind up being largely advisory. The

courts below rejected only a “per se rule that federal

regulations preempt state law standards of care in

every public liability action.” Pet. App. 45a. They left

open the possibility that petitioners might be able to

invoke “specific statutory provisions that conflict with

state standards of care.” Id. 9a. But at this point,

petitioners had invoked at most only “some brooding

federal interest.” Id. (citation omitted). The courts

below simply thought that making such a “factintensive” determination at the pleading stage would

be “premature.” Id. 45a. This Court should not

consider granting certiorari before the district court

has examined those “specific statutory provisions.” Id.

9a.

Indeed, this Court’s opinion might be largely

advisory even if, after examining those “specific

statutory provisions,” the district court concludes that

state law governs. The Eighth Circuit has now

emphasized that “evidence of compliance with federal

safety standards” can be “relevant” to state standards

of care. Id. 10a n.2 (citations omitted).

3. Finally, this Court should not grant certiorari

in this interlocutory posture because the answer to the

question presented is not determinative for the

outcome of this litigation and may turn out not to

matter much at all. Recall that respondents have

brought suit against four different defendants on four

different theories of liability. This Court’s intervention

not only will not end the litigation; it will not even

affect the majority of claims and defendants, and it

certainly will not affect the damages at stake. At most,

14

if this Court were to grant certiorari and reverse, the

decision would affect how plaintiffs prove one theory

of liability against one defendant.

a. The petition does not dispute that, at the very

least, state standards of care will govern claims

against two of the four defendants—St. Louis Airport

Authority and DJR Holdings. The federal regulations

petitioners cite apply, by their terms, only to “persons

licensed by the Commission.” 10 C.F.R. § 20.1002; see

also 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.105, 20.106(a) (1970). These two

defendants were never licensed by the NRC to handle

the radioactive waste material at issue. Thus, the

provision that petitioners claim supplies the standard

of care does not apply to those defendants.

As the district court explained, there can be no

doubt that state law supplies the standard of care

against those defendants. “Surely,” the district court

explained, it would be absurd to “hold that nonlicensees owe a duty of care that is solely imposed on

NRC licensees.” Pet. App. 40a. It would be equally

absurd to hold that they “owe no duty of care and thus,

escape liability completely.” Id.

The petition raises no argument to the contrary.

Indeed, the non-licensee defendants do not bother to

join the petition.

b. That leaves defendant Cotter Corporation.3

Cotter was licensed by the NRC between 1969 and

1974. FAC ¶¶ 45, 57. Even as to Cotter, there can be

no doubt that three of the four claims—negligence per

3

The fourth defendant, Commonwealth Edison, was not

licensed by the NRC but is Cotter’s parent company.

15

se, civil conspiracy, and strict liability—do not require

proof that a federal regulation was violated.

Start with respondents’ negligence per se claim

(where statutes, rather than common law, determine

the standard of care). The negligence per se claim

alleges that petitioners violated the Missouri Clean

Water Law. FAC ¶ 117. Petitioners argue only that

“nuclear safety statutes” are preempted. Pet. 3. They

do not dispute that respondents can raise a negligence

per se claim under a statute like the Missouri Clean

Water Law, which is not a “nuclear safety statute.” Id.

Respondents thus can proceed on their negligence per

se claim without proving a violation of federal

regulations.

Similarly, the petition does not dispute that

respondents can establish civil conspiracy without

reference to federal regulations. Civil conspiracy is an

intentional tort, and petitioners do not contest that

“federal safety standards have no bearing on a

defendant’s liability for its intentional acts.”

Bohrmann v. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co., 926 F.

Supp. 211, 221 (D. Me. 1996). Here, respondents allege

that Cotter and ComEd knew that the Latty Avenue

site was contaminated and “jointly conspired to

perpetrate the fraud that there was no radioactive

contamination remaining with respect to Cotter’s

abandoned operations.” FAC ¶ 14.

Finally, it’s not even clear that petitioners intend

to argue that respondents cannot raise a strict liability

claim. The petition’s question presented is limited to

the correct “standard of care”—an element of a

negligence claim, but not of a strict liability claim. Pet.

i. In a “negligence case,” “[t]ort law imposes ‘a duty to

exercise reasonable care” on those whose conduct

16

presents a risk of harm to others. Air & Liquid Sys.

Corp. v. DeVries, 586 U.S. 446, 452 (2019) (quoting

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. and Emot. Harm

§ 7 (2005)). By contrast, an argument that a defendant

should be strictly liable “begin[s] with the premise

that the accident has happened even though the

defendant has fully exercised reasonable care while

engaging in the activity.” Restatement (Third) of

Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 20. Because “strict

liability signifies liability without fault, or at least

without any proof of fault,” strict liability claims

contain no standard of care element. Id. ch. 4 Scope

Note.

Nor do petitioners make any argument that

clarifies their position on strict liability. They do not

address, for instance, the strong evidence that

Congress intended to preserve strict liability claims.

See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,

244-45, 258 (1984) (allowing state-law strict liability

claim); S. Rep. 89-1605, at 12 (explaining that

claimants will have the “benefit of a rule of strict

liability if applicable State law so provides”).

Petitioners have good reason to remain

ambiguous about their position regarding strict

liability. After all, if petitioners argued that personal

injury torts with no standard-of-care element are

abrogated altogether, they would have to concede that

other claims with no standard-of-care element are

similarly abrogated, including property claims like

trespass and nuisance. That petitioners’ question

presented is unclear regarding whether petitioners

intend to challenge respondents’ strict liability claim

is another reason to deny certiorari.

17

c. What is left is respondents’ common-law

negligence claim against Cotter. But it’s not even clear

that the question presented makes a difference as to

that claim. The factual record on which federal

regulations apply is as yet undeveloped. The district

court “doubt[ed] whether the specific [] regulation

Defendants seeks to require here” was “even

applicable (even as to Defendant Cotter).” Pet. App.

40a n.25. And to the extent that Cotter’s negligence lay

in its failing to warn the public about excessive

radiation, that breach took place after its NRC license

was terminated—that is, after NRC regulations no

longer applied. FAC ¶ 105. At that point, Cotter was

in the same position as the other unlicensed

defendants. For the reasons explained supra, at 14, a

state-law standard of care thus must govern

respondents’ duty-to-warn claim.

d. Finally, assume for a moment petitioners turn

out to be right, and there’s at least one theory of

common-law negligence respondents can’t pursue

without proving a violation of a federal regulation.

Certiorari still wouldn’t be warranted, because that

theory of liability will go forward even under

petitioners’ theory. Respondents have at this stage

sufficiently alleged a violation of federal regulations.

First, respondents pleaded a violation of the

federal dosage limits. Respondents alleged that

“Cotter released radiation into unrestricted areas in

the environment in excess of the levels permitted by

federal regulations in effect at the time” and cited

surveys showing radiation levels that could support

their claim. FAC ¶¶ 52, 71. At the pleading stage,

that’s more than enough.

18

Petitioners argue that respondents “do not allege

that federal regulators ever cited Cotter for violating

the applicable radiation limits.” Pet. 10 (emphasis

added). But of course, there is no rule saying that a

defendant is immune from liability just because the

federal government did not catch them violating

federal regulations at the time. The NRC itself

acknowledges that it does not issue citations for many

violations of federal regulations. NRC, Enforcement

Process

Diagram

(July 7,

2020),

https://perma.cc/NDA5-XCJY.

Moreover, recall that Cotter was cited for “totally

inadequate” surveys to test for radiation. FAC ¶ 48. It

is hard to see how the Government could cite Cotter

for exceeding radiation limits when Cotter refused to

collect the very data that would show that it was

exceeding those limits.

Second, the dosage limits are not the only federal

regulations at issue. The district court was “not

convinced” that the dosage regulations petitioners cite

“would provide the exclusive standard of care against

Defendant Cotter based on Plaintiffs’ allegations.” Pet.

App. 45a n.30. The district court pointed out that

“there are other possible sources of federal law.” Id.

For example, respondents alleged violations of a

regulation governing testing and sampling. See 10

C.F.R. § 20.201(b) (1970) (now codified at 10 C.F.R.

§ 20.1501); FAC ¶ 48.

e. Not only would any of these theories of liability

render the question presented immaterial as to

Cotter’s liability, but the amount of damages Cotter is

on the hook for will not change either, regardless of the

answer to the question presented. Cotter has conceded

that Missouri law determines its share of damages.

19

Cotter Corp.’s Third-Party Comp. Cross-cls., ¶ 71.

Missouri law allows joint and several liability and

contribution. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.067 (2005). So under

Missouri law, the question is not which counts

respondents prove against Cotter, but instead what

percentage of the damage is Cotter’s fault. Id.

And of course, if the question presented turns out

to be outcome-determinative in spite of all that, this

Court will have another chance to address it at the

case’s conclusion.

II. Petitioners’ novel reading of the statute is

incorrect.

1. Start with the text of the statute. A “public

liability action” is a suit “resulting from a nuclear

incident.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(ii), (w). Under the PriceAnderson Act, a “public liability action shall be

deemed to be an action arising under section 2210 of

this title, and the substantive rules for decision in such

action shall be derived from the law of the State in

which the nuclear incident involved occurs, unless

such law is inconsistent with the provisions of such

section.” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(ii). Because the standard of

care for a negligence claim is a “substantive rule[] for

decision” and is not “inconsistent with the provisions”

of Section 2210, it must be “derived from the law of the

State.” Id.

No one disputes that the standard of care is a

“substantive rule[] for decision.” A substantive rule of

decision is a “legal rule[]” that “determine[s] the

outcome of a litigation,” not just its procedural

“manner and [] means.” Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York,

326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). The standard of care is the

classic “substantive rule for decision.” Think Erie

20

itself: The Erie Railroad’s standard of care was

determined “under the law of Pennsylvania” because

it was substantive and not procedural. Erie R.R. Co. v.

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 70 (1938).

Nor do petitioners contend any longer that the

state-law standards of care respondents cite are

“inconsistent with the provisions of such section.” As

the Eighth Circuit recognized—and petitioners, at this

point, do not dispute—“such section” “quite clearly

refer[s] to § 2210.” Pet. App. 9a. Section 2210 says

nothing about the standard of care, and it certainly

does not mention federal dosage regulations.

Therefore, they cannot conflict.

Contrast that with substantive state laws that

may well be “inconsistent with” provisions of Section

2210. For instance, a state law about punitive

damages could be inconsistent with Section 2210(s),

which forecloses punitive damages against parties on

whose behalf the United States is obliged to make

payments pursuant to a contract. State law tort

defenses might be inconsistent with Section

2210(n)(1), which allows an indemnification

agreement to foreclose defenses in the case of certain

extraordinary nuclear occurrences. 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2210(s), (n)(1).

As such, the standard of care in a public liability

action for negligence must be “derived from the law of

the State in which the nuclear incident involved

occur[ed]”—in this case, the laws of Missouri. See 42

U.S.C. § 2014(ii).

2. Petitioners appear to agree that the standard of

care in this case must be “derived from the law of the

State.” Pet. 24. But rather than give this phrase its

21

natural meaning, they argue that “federal law is ‘the

law of the State.’” Pet. 24.

Petitioners’ explanation appears to go as follows:

All state common law that relates to radioactive waste

material is automatically preempted by federal law.

Therefore, there is no “law of the State” to supply a

standard of care. So the only “law of the State” left to

apply is federal law.

But Congress certainly thought there was a “law

of the State”—it wrote that mandate into the statute.

Requiring the substantive law of the State to govern

public liability actions would be a passing strange way

to express petitioners’ rule: That public liability

actions be litigated according to federal law, with state

law only used to “fill gaps” (Pet. 25).

Moreover, on petitioners’ reading, the final clause

of the public liability action provision would be

entirely superfluous. That final clause states that the

“law of the State” does not apply if it “is inconsistent

with the provisions of” Section 2210. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2014(ii). If petitioners are right that the whole field

of state tort law is field preempted, there would be no

need for that clause, which provides only what thenJudge Gorsuch described as a “modest form of conflict

preemption.” Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 790 F.3d

1088, 1095 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J.).

Even if the statute were “susceptible to more than

one reading,” this Court would “have the duty to

accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.” Id.

(Gorsuch, J.). And of course, nothing in the text of the

PAA renders it susceptible to petitioners’ reading, “let

alone favors it so clearly that we might overcome the

presumption against preemption.” Id. What’s more,

“[t]he case for federal pre-emption is particularly weak

22

where Congress has indicated its awareness of the

operation of state law in a field of federal interest, and

has nonetheless decided to stand by both concepts and

to tolerate whatever tension there [is] between them.”

Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489

U.S. 141, 167 (1989) (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee

Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984)).

3. Petitioners’ novel argument is also inconsistent

with this Court’s precedent. Petitioners cite Pacific

Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation &

Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983), for the premise

that “the federal government has occupied the entire

field of nuclear safety concerns.” Id. at 212; see Pet. 22.

But as then-Judge Gorsuch explained, Pacific Gas was

about preemption of “before-the-fact nuclear safety

regulations.” Cook, 790 F.3d at 1098. It did not affect

“traditional after-the-fact tort remedies.” Id.

Were there any doubt, this Court’s opinion the

very next year in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464

U.S. 238 (1984), made clear that federal regulation

does not preempt those after-the-fact tort remedies. In

Silkwood, this Court held that “persons injured by

nuclear accidents were free to utilize existing state

tort law remedies.” Id. at 252. This Court allowed that

“the award of damages based on the state law of

negligence or strict liability is regulatory in the sense

that a nuclear plant will be threatened with damages

liability if it does not conform to state standards.” Id.

But “that regulatory consequence was something that

Congress was quite willing to accept.” Id.

Even the dissenting justices in Silkwood, who

objected to the award of punitive damages in nuclear

incident cases, recognized that Congress intended

such cases to be governed by state tort law, including

23

a “jury-imposed negligence standard.” See id. at 268

(Blackmun, J., dissenting). As this Court later wrote,

Silkwood made clear that state tort law “fell beyond

any fair understanding of the NRC’s reach.” Virginia

Uranium, Inc., v. Warren, 587 U.S. 761, 773-74 (2019).

In 1988, Congress partially abrogated Silkwood’s

holding that state punitive damages rules govern

nuclear incident cases, forbidding punitive damages

against parties on whose behalf the United States

must make payments pursuant to an indemnification

agreement. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(s). But it did not suggest

any disagreement with the other portion of Silkwood,

explaining that state tort law elements govern

underlying liability. To the contrary: The 1988

amendments to the PAA codified that piece of

Silkwood, making clear that the “law of the State”

would supply any “substantive rules for decision.” See

42 U.S.C. § 2014(ii).

4. Legislative history confirms that, from the

start, the PAA evinced a “policy of only interfering

with state tort law to the minimum extent necessary.”

H.R. Rep. No. 100-104, pt. 1, at 20 (1987); see also S.

Rep. No. 85-296, at 9 (1957) (emphasizing that bill will

result in “no interference with the State law”); S. Rep.

No. 89-1605, at 12 (1966) (“[A] claimant would have

exactly the same rights . . . under [then-]existing

law—including, perhaps, benefit of a rule of strict

liability if applicable State law so provides.”).

And the relevant expert agencies have agreed that

the PAA does not preempt the field of state tort law.

The U.S. Department of Energy acknowledges that the

PAA preserves “the existing tort law of the State.” U.S.

Dep’t of Energy, Price-Anderson Act: Report to

Congress 5 (2023), https://perma.cc/JCS5-8U5X. The

24

NRC’s regulations explain that they should not be

“construed as limiting actions that may be necessary

to protect health and safety.” 10 C.F.R. § 20.1001(b).

In addition, the NRC rejected an argument “that full

compliance with the Commission’s regulations . . . is

evidence acceptable in a court of law that the licensee

was not negligent.” In the Matter of A.N. Tschaede, 23

N.R.C. 461, 461 (1986). The NRC explained that it “did

not intend the standards to establish absolute safe

levels of exposure below which no injury could occur.”

Id. at 464.

Text, structure, precedent, and other interpretive

tools thus all line up against petitioners’ argument.

III. There is no split worthy of this Court’s

attention.

No circuit has considered petitioners’ novel

reading of the text of the PAA, that “federal law is ‘the

law of the State.’” Indeed, no circuit before the Eighth

seems to have considered the statute’s text much at

all.

In any case, petitioners vastly overstate any

division among the circuits as to whether federal

regulations provide the exclusive standard of care:

Most of the language they cite is dicta, and it’s not

clear this case would turn out differently even in the

one circuit (the Eleventh) where it’s not.

1. Per petitioners, the rule that “states are

preempted from imposing a non-federal duty in tort”

stems from a 1991 Third Circuit case. Petitioners cite

In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832, 859

(3d Cir. 1991), for the proposition that “the plaintiffs’

25

rights will necessarily be determined . . . by reference

to federal law.” Pet. 13.4

But that case was not about the standard of care

at all. Recall that the PAA transforms state causes of

action into federal claims. The question in the Third

Circuit case was whether the PAA’s unique

structure—in which the claim is modeled on state

substantive law—nevertheless grants courts federal

question jurisdiction for Article III purposes. TMI II,

940 F.2d at 835-36, 854-55. The Third Circuit

answered in the affirmative. It explained that

although a PAA claim “may have had its origins in

state law,” Congress had “expressed its intention that

state law provides the content of and operates as

federal law.” Id.

In addition, the Third Circuit rattled off several

federal questions that would likely have to be

answered in the course of analyzing a public liability

action: Whether licensees would be required to waive

defenses, whether punitive damages awards were

precluded, and, yes, whether plaintiffs’ rights would

be determined “in part” (a phrase petitioners omit

from their quotation, see Pet. 13) “by reference to

federal law.” TMI II, 940 F.2d at 858-60. All the Third

Circuit said about the standard of care in a public

liability action, then, is that it might involve a federal

question at some point in the litigation, and that

federal courts thus had jurisdiction.

The other Third Circuit case petitioners cite for

their purported split is McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox

Power Gen. Grp., 869 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2017). But

4

Petitioners refer to this case as TMI I. The Third Circuit refers

to this case as TMI II.

26

neither party in McMunn was arguing for a state

standard of care. Instead, the plaintiffs there took the

position that terms in defendants’ federal license

should set the standard of care. Id. at 260. The Third

Circuit rejected that argument. Id. at 260-67.

Were there any doubt, the Third Circuit has

recently confirmed (in a case the petition omits) that

federal regulations do not supply the exclusive

standard of care in public liability actions. See Est. of

Ware v. Hosp. of the Univ. of Pa., 871 F.3d 273, 278

n.3, 285 (3d Cir. 2017) (there is no “legal source that

would limit liability under the [PAA] to cases where

exposure exceeds” federal dosage limits).

2. Petitioners are wrong about what the Sixth,

Seventh, and Ninth Circuits say, too. The cases

petitioners cite hold that state, not federal law,

governs. Thus, the language petitioners reference is,

at best, dicta.

Petitioners cite a Sixth Circuit case about the

statute of limitations in a Price Anderson Act public

liability action. Pet. 14 (citing Nieman v. NLO, Inc.,

108 F.3d 1546, 1553 (6th Cir. 1997)). Nieman made

two points, neither relevant to the question presented

here. First, it held that there were no “separate causes

of action” under state law—all claims arising from

nuclear incidents were public liability claims under

the PAA. Nieman, 108 F.3d at 1553. That holding isn’t

at issue here; respondents accept that all their claims

arise under the PAA, rather than directly under state

law. Second, the Sixth Circuit held that state tort law

determined the statute of limitations. Id. at 1547-48,

1554-59. Needless to say, anything the Sixth Circuit

said about federal regulations en route to choosing

state law is dicta.

27

In the Seventh Circuit case, the court again looked

to state law to determine the standard of care

applicable in public liability actions. O’Conner v.

Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1105 (7th

Cir. 1994). Reviewing cases from the Illinois Supreme

Court, the Seventh Circuit concluded that, as a matter

of Illinois law, the state standard of care was set by

reference to federal regulations. Petitioners never

argue here that Missouri law chooses federal

regulation to set the state standard of care.

Petitioners cite the Seventh Circuit’s language

that, “[e]ven if” Illinois law did not explicitly require

consulting federal regulations, such “regulations must

provide the sole measure of defendants’ duty.” Pet 14.

But that language was dicta. The Seventh Circuit

speculated as much only after resolving the case on

state-law grounds. The Seventh Circuit has neither

repeated nor relied on that language in the 30 years

since.

The Ninth Circuit case petitioners cite likewise

held that federal courts must base the standard of care

on “what the Washington Supreme Court would likely

do,” not on federal regulations. In re Hanford Nuclear

Rsrv. Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1004 (9th Cir. 2008).

Indeed, the Ninth Circuit held that defendants were

“subject to strict liability” under Washington state

law. Id. at 1007. To be sure, the Ninth Circuit

speculated that there might be other circumstances

where federal regulations “would preempt” state

standards of care, but that speculation had nothing to

do with the outcome there. Id. at 1003.

3. That leaves Roberts v. Fla. Power & Light Co.,

146 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 1998), as the only case

petitioners cite to have actually held that a federal,

28

rather than state, standard of care must apply to a

negligence action under the PAA. But as the district

court explained, Roberts is factually distinguishable.

Roberts was a case about a worker at a nuclear power

plant—the context in which the argument for

“exclusive use of federal dosage regulations is

strongest based on ordinary preemption principles.”

Pet. App. 44a. Respondents’ case does not involve a

nuclear plant (indeed, most of the defendants were not

licensed at all), making the case for exclusive use of

federal regulations far weaker.

In any event, Roberts’ one paragraph of analysis

relied heavily on its reading of the Third Circuit’s

caselaw. In the years since Roberts, the Third Circuit

itself has made clear Roberts’ reading was incorrect.

See supra, at 26 (discussing Ware). The Eleventh

Circuit thus may reconsider even its holding as to

federally licensed facilities. See, e.g., Finestone v. Fla.

Power & Light Co., 272 Fed. Appx. 761, 765 (11th Cir.

2008) (noting that plaintiffs would need to petition for

rehearing en banc to reconsider Roberts; plaintiffs did

not do so).

4. Finally, this case wouldn’t be worthy of this

Court’s attention even if petitioners could show that

the Eleventh Circuit (or any other) would apply

federal, rather than state, law to the standard of care

in this case. Petitioners’ argument is that “the law of

the State” under the PAA is federal law. Not one of the

circuits cited in the petition has considered—let alone

adopted—that argument. Indeed, not one of the

circuits even engaged with the language of 42 U.S.C.

§ 2014(ii). Instead, the cases petitioner points to relied

on policy considerations about “the carefully crafted

balance between private involvement and safety that

29

Congress has achieved.” See Roberts, 146 F.3d at 1308

(quoting O’Conner, 13 F.3d at 1105).

That sort of sense-of-the-statute analysis is “a

relic from a bygone era of statutory construction.” Food

Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 588 U.S. 427, 437

(2019) (citation omitted). Petitioners appear to

recognize as much, which is presumably why they do

not defend the reasoning of those lower court

decisions. This Court should not grant review based on

a purported split where even petitioners do not

endorse their side of that split.

IV. Petitioners’ claims about the importance of the

question presented are vastly overblown.

With no plausible textual argument and no court

of appeals that has adopted its proffered reading,

petitioners resort to consequentialism, fearmongering

that the nuclear industry will go belly-up should the

Eighth Circuit’s opinion stand. But petitioners’

doomsday scenario turns out to be implausible on

closer inspection.

1. Petitioners predict that the Eighth Circuit’s

rule will result in so much liability that companies will

be “forced to abandon the nuclear energy and defense

industries altogether.” Pet. 12; see also Pet. 4. But

remember, key players in the nuclear industry are

protected from catastrophic liability: Congress

implemented a system of insurance, self-insurance,

and indemnification, combined with liability caps that

ensure that none of them will pay a dime in damages.

Supra, at 3-4.

The petition notes that liability for nuclear

incidents between 1957 and 2018 has totaled $522

million in insured losses. Pet. 20 (citing NRC, The

30

Price-Anderson Act: 2021 Report to Congress xx, 1-2 &

n.4 (Dec. 2021), https://perma.cc/BN82-HULN). Put

that number in perspective: Congress has mandated

that important players in the nuclear industry

maintain commercial liability insurance that will

cover $500 million per nuclear incident. NRC Report,

supra, at xvii. That means that even counting lawsuits

prior to 1988—when plaintiffs were suing entirely

under state causes of action—the aggregate liability

for all nuclear incidents barely exceeded the

commercial liability coverage for just one nuclear

incident.

To be sure, Cotter isn’t fully part of that scheme.

It was not one of the nuclear industry players required

to maintain financial protection or secure an

indemnification agreement. (Though Cotter may still

avoid paying damages: The Federal Circuit recently

ruled that Cotter may be indemnified. Cotter Corp.,

N.S.L. v. United States, 127 F.4th 1353, 1366 (Fed.

Cir. 2025).) But that was Congress’s considered

decision. Congress was primarily concerned with

entities like nuclear power plants, whose facilities

generated critical electricity and who faced the

greatest exposure in the event of a nuclear disaster. As

to those entities, Congress created an extensive

financial backstop. Congress simply was not

concerned about players like Cotter, which it believed

could use ordinary insurance strategies to manage

risk. S. Rep. 94-454, at 14 (1975).

2. Petitioners’ second sky-is-falling claim—that

using state-law negligence standards in public

liability actions “effects a startling expansion of

liability” (Pet. 16)—fares no better.

31

In the mine run of cases, the difference between

liability predicated on violations of federal regulations

and liability predicated on state-law negligence

standards will be no difference at all. See, e.g., Taylor

v. Interstate Nuclear Servs., Inc., 1999 WL 35809694,

at *11 (D.N.M. Apr. 7, 1999) (state standard of care

turned out to be “exactly the same” as federal

regulations); Corcoran v. New York Power Auth., 935

F. Supp. 376, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (to prove violation

of state law, plaintiffs had to prove violation of federal

dose limits). And even where state law does not

automatically track federal law, federal regulations

are often still relevant to identifying the state-law

standard of care in a negligence action. See, e.g.,

Bohrmann v. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co., 926 F.

Supp. 211, 221 (D. Me. 1996) (violation of state law

“may be difficult to establish in the absence of proving

a violation of the federal safety standards”). The

Eighth Circuit noted as much in this very case. Pet.

App. 10a n.2.

For claims arising after 1991, the delta between

federal regulations and state-law negligence

standards is smaller still, for two reasons. First, in

1991, the NRC issued new regulations reducing the

annual permissible exposure rate fivefold from the

rates that governed in the 1960s and 1970s. See In re

TMI, 67 F.3d 1103, 1111 n.18 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations

omitted). Almost by definition, then, a modern-day

operator who has complied with federal regulations

will have taken the kind of due care that would satisfy

a state-law standard of care, too.

Second, also in 1991, the NRC mandated that the

nuclear industry was required to keep radiation

releases “as low as reasonably achievable”—even if

32

that required them to maintain an exposure rate even

lower than the stringent federal regulations. See

Finestone v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 272 Fed. Appx.

761, 765-66 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted) (“as low

as is reasonably achievable” standard governs post1991 claims); McCafferty v. Centerior Serv. Co., 983 F.

Supp. 715, 720 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (same). As the Third

Circuit put it, an “as low as is reasonably achievable”

standard is “essentially” the same as a common-law

negligence standard. In re TMI, 67 F.3d at 1115

(citation omitted). At this point, then, state and federal

standards of care have more or less converged, and the

question presented does not particularly matter.

Petitioners protest that the problem isn’t the

state-law negligence standard itself, but “lay juries”

who will “Monday morning quarterback” defendants’

decisions. Pet. 4, 20. But of course, if Congress was

worried about lay juries, it could have required a

bench trial for Price Anderson Act claims. It has done

so for other kinds of cases. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2402

(bench trial for Federal Tort Claims Act cases). It

didn’t, presumably because juries occupy “so firm a

place in our history and jurisprudence.” Sec. & Exch.

Comm’n v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109, 121 (2024) (citation

omitted). We trust juries to make all sorts of important

decisions, including in highly complex areas of the law

governed by comprehensive federal regulations. See,

e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 559-63, 581 (2009)

(allowing jury to decide, in a state tort suit, whether

intra-arterial injection warning on antihistamine drug

label constituted a failure to warn under FDA

regulations). Petitioners offer no reason this case

would be any different.

33

3. One final note: The question presented is

relevant to a dwindling category of lawsuits. Resolving

the question presented requires this Court to wade

into petitioners’ interpretation of 50-year-old

regulations, which have changed a dozen times since.

See Pet. 26 (citing federal regulations from 1970 as

governing). And the egregiously careless conduct at

issue in this case—mixing nuclear waste into soil

without taking any precautions—is similarly an

artifact of the 1960s and 1970s; no modern-day

nuclear operator or handler of radioactive waste

material would do the same.

To be sure, as petitioners note, cases may continue

to arise from decades-old conduct, governed by

decades-old regulations. But their numbers will

dwindle. Arguments over the details of that era are not

worth this Court’s time.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ

of certiorari should be denied.

34

Respectfully submitted,

Ryan Keane

Tanner A. Kirksey

KEANE LAW, LLC

7711 Bonhomme Ave.

Suite 600

St. Louis, MO 63105

Kevin Thompson

David R Barney, Jr.

THOMPSON BARNEY

2030 Kanawha Blvd.

E. Charleston, WV 25311

June 26, 2025

Barry J. Cooper, Jr.

Counsel of Record

Victor Cobb

COOPER LAW FIRM

834 Elmwood Park Blvd.

Suite 130

Harahan, LA 70123

barryjcooperjr@gmail.com

(504) 291-1347

Anthony D. Gray

JOHNSON GRAY, LLC

2705 Dougherty Ferry Rd.

Suite 100

St. Louis, MO 63122

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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