Respondents Brief — Cotter Corporation, et al., Petitioners v. Nikki Steiner Mazzocchio, et al.
Supreme Court briefJun 26, 2025
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No. 24-1001
IN THE
COTTER CORPORATION; COMMONWEALTH EDISON
COMPANY,
Petitioners,
v.
NIKKI STEINER MAZZOCCHIO; ANGELA STEINER KRAUS,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
Ryan Keane
Tanner A. Kirksey
KEANE LAW, LLC
7711 Bonhomme Ave.
Suite 600
St. Louis, MO 63105
Kevin Thompson
David R Barney, Jr.
THOMPSON BARNEY
2030 Kanawha Blvd.
E. Charleston, WV 25311
Barry J. Cooper, Jr.
Counsel of Record
Victor Cobb
COOPER LAW FIRM
834 Elmwood Park Blvd.
Suite 130
Harahan, LA 70123
barryjcooperjr@gmail.com
(504) 291-1347
Anthony D. Gray
JOHNSON GRAY, LLC
2705 Dougherty Ferry Rd.
Suite 100
St. Louis, MO 63122
QUESTION PRESENTED
The Price-Anderson Act creates a federal cause of
action, dubbed a “public liability action,” for, as
relevant here, litigation over harms arising from
radioactive material. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(ii), (q), (w).
“[T]he substantive rules for decision in such action
shall be derived from the law of the State in which the
nuclear incident involved occurs, unless such law is
inconsistent with the provisions of [Section 2210].” 42
U.S.C. § 2014(ii).
The question presented is: Whether state tort law
concerning the standard of care—if consistent with the
provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2210—applies to a public
liability action under the Price-Anderson Act.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED ........................................... i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................ ii
INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 2
A. Legal background .......................................... 2
B. Factual background ....................................... 5
C. Procedural background ................................. 8
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT .................. 11
I.
This case is a poor vehicle for addressing
the question presented ....................................... 11
II. Petitioners’ novel reading of the statute is
incorrect .............................................................. 19
III. There is no split worth of this Court’s
attention .............................................................. 24
IV. Petitioners’ claims about the importance of
the question presented are vastly
overblown ............................................................ 29
CONCLUSION........................................................... 33
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
In the Matter of A.N. Tschaede,
23 N.R.C. 461 (1986) ............................................24
Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries,
586 U.S. 446 (2019) ..............................................16
Bohrmann v. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co.,
926 F. Supp. 211 (D. Me. 1996) .....................15, 31
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141 (1989) ..............................................22
Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp.,
790 F.3d 1088 (10th Cir. 2015) ......................21, 22
Corcoran v. New York Power Auth.,
935 F. Supp. 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ........................31
Cotter Corp., N.S.L. v. United States,
127 F.4th 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2025) ...........................30
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938) ................................................20
Est. of Ware v. Hosp. of the Univ. of Pa.,
871 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2017)............................26, 28
Finestone v. Fla. Power & Light Co.,
272 Fed. Appx. 761 (11th Cir. 2008)..............28, 32
Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media,
588 U.S. 427 (2019) ..............................................29
Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York,
326 U.S. 99 (1945) ................................................20
In re Hanford Nuclear Rsrv. Litig.,
534 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2008) ..........................27, 28
iv
McCafferty v. Centerior Serv. Co.,
983 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Ohio 1997) ......................32
McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Gen. Grp.,
869 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2017)..................................26
Nat’l Football League v. Ninth Inning, Inc.,
141 S. Ct. 56 (2020) ..............................................11
Nieman v. NLO, Inc.,
108 F.3d 1546 (6th Cir. 1997) ........................26, 27
O’Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,
13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1994) ..........................27, 29
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Comm’n,
461 U.S. 190 (1983) ..............................................22
Roberts v. Fla. Power & Light Co.,
146 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 1998) ......................28, 29
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Jarkesy,
603 U.S. 109 (2024) ..............................................32
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
464 U.S. 238 (1984) ..............................3, 16, 22, 23
Taylor v. Interstate Nuclear Servs., Inc.,
1999 WL 35809694 (D.N.M. Apr. 7, 1999) ..........31
In re TMI,
67 F.3d 1103 (3d Cir. 1995)............................31, 32
In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II,
940 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1991)............................24, 25
Virginia Uranium, Inc., v. Warren,
587 U.S. 761 (2019) ..............................................23
Wyeth v. Levine,
555 U.S. 555 (2009) ..............................................32
v
Zivotofsky v. Clinton,
566 U.S. 189 (2012) ..............................................12
Constiutitional Provisions
U.S. Const., art. III .................................................4, 25
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 2402 ..........................................................32
42 U.S.C.
§ 2014 ......................................................................2
§ 2014(k) .................................................................2
§ 2014(ii)
......................3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 19, 20, 21, 23, 29
§ 2014(ii)(q) .............................................................3
§ 2014(ii)(w) ..................................................1, 3, 19
§ 2014(hh) ...............................................................4
§ 2210 ..............................2, 4, 10, 11, 12, 19, 20, 21
§ 2210(a)..................................................................2
§ 2210(b)..................................................................2
§ 2210(c) ..................................................................2
§ 2210(e) ..................................................................3
§ 2210(n)(1) ...........................................................20
§ 2210(s) ..........................................................20, 23
Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) ..................2, 3
Pub. L. No. 94-197, 89 Stat. 1111 (1975) ....................3
Pub. L. No. 100-408, 102 Stat. 1066 (1988) ................3
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.067 (2005) .................................19
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 644.006 et seq. (Missouri
Clean Water Law) (1973) ..................................8, 15
Regulations
10 C.F.R. § 20.105 (1970) ...........................................14
vi
10 C.F.R. § 20.106(a) (1970) .......................................14
10 C.F.R. § 20.201(b) (1970) .......................................18
10 C.F.R. § 20.1001(a) ..................................................4
10 C.F.R. § 20.1001(b) ............................................4, 24
10 C.F.R. § 20.1002 .....................................................14
10 C.F.R. § 20.1101(b) ..................................................4
10 C.F.R. § 20.1501 .....................................................18
Legislative Materials
H.R. Rep. No. 100-104 (1987) .....................................23
S. Rep. No. 85-296 (1957) ...........................................23
S. Rep. No. 89-1605 (1966) ...................................16, 23
S. Rep. No. 94-454 (1975) ...........................................30
S. Rep. No. 100-218 (1987) ...........................................3
Other Authorities
Restatement (Third) of Torts (2005) ..........................16
U.S. Department of Energy, Price-Anderson Act:
Report to Congress (2023),
https://perma.cc/JCS5-8U5X ................................24
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, The Price-
Anderson Act: 2021 Report to Congress
(Dec. 2021), https://perma.cc/BN82-HULN ...29, 30
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Enforcement Process Diagram (July 7, 2020),
https://perma.cc/NDA5-XCJY ........................18, 30
INTRODUCTION
Respondents Nikki Steiner Mazzocchio and
Angela Steiner Kraus are sisters who developed blood
cancer as a result of their exposure to radioactive
waste material mishandled by petitioners and other
defendants. They filed suit, raising, as relevant here,
a claim under the Price-Anderson Act (PAA), which
creates a federal cause of action for litigation over
harms arising from radioactive material. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2014(ii), (w). By default, the “substantive rules for
decision” in a PAA case are “derived from the law of
the State” where the injury occurred. Id. By this point
in the litigation, petitioners appear to acknowledge
that this default rule applies here: This case should be
governed by the “substantive” law “of the State” (here,
Missouri law). See Pet. 8.
Petitioners nonetheless ask this Court to grant
review and hold that respondents must prove a
violation of a federal regulation, not just of state law.
Their logic? “[F]ederal law is the ‘law of the State.’”
Pet. 24.
This Court should deny the petition. No circuit
has ever considered—let alone accepted—petitioners’
up-is-down reading of the PAA. Indeed, petitioners’
reading of the statute was not even raised in the court
below, where petitioners floated an entirely different
textual analysis.
A grant of certiorari would be particularly
mistaken at this juncture. This case comes to the
Court on the appeal of a question certified for
interlocutory review. This Court does not need to
consider weighing in on the question presented until
the courts below have had the chance to assess
2
petitioners’ reading. And this Court should not credit
petitioners’ alarmist claims that the opinion below
threatens the entire nuclear industry in the
meantime: Thanks to a federal indemnification and
insurance scheme, the potential defendants Congress
cared most about know they are not on the hook for
any damages.
The petition should be denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Legal background
1. The Price-Anderson Act (PAA), codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2210, with relevant definitions in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2014, was enacted in 1957 with two goals. First,
Congress sought to protect the public by ensuring
adequate funds would be available to compensate
victims in the event of a nuclear incident. Second, the
PAA sought to encourage the development of the
atomic energy industry. Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 1, 71
Stat. 576 (1957).
To accomplish those goals, Congress mandated
that key players in the nuclear industry, such as
nuclear power plant operators, be required to
purchase financial protection in the form of the
maximum available commercial liability insurance.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210(a), (b), 2014(k). In addition, the
United States government would execute indemnity
agreements with those players to ensure the
companies wouldn’t have to pay even if private
insurance limits were exceeded. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210(c). Eventually, Congress also mandated that
those players participate in a pooled insurance
scheme, whereby liability above a threshold results in
3
an equal premium adjustment for all participants in
the scheme. Pub. L. No. 94-197, §§ 2-3, 89 Stat. 1111,
1111-12 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2014). Finally, the PAA capped the amount of
liability for each nuclear incident. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210(e).
The end result is that today, through a
combination of commercial insurance, pooled
insurance, federal government indemnification, and a
cap on the amount of liability, those key players in the
nuclear industry will not pay a dime of damages.
2. In addition to ensuring the financial stability of
the nuclear industry, the PAA creates a channeling
provision allowing for the consolidation of litigation
over nuclear incidents. Prior to 1988, liability for the
vast majority of nuclear incidents (all but so-called
“extraordinary nuclear occurrences”) was governed
entirely by state tort law. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 254-56 (1984). Following the
Three Mile Island accident, a slew of state tort cases
was filed in both federal and state court. Congress
wanted a mechanism to consolidate those claims in
federal court. S. Rep. No. 100-218, at 13 (1987).
The result was an amendment to the PAA in 1988
creating a “public liability action,” a federal cause of
action for injuries arising out of radioactive material.
Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-408, 102 Stat. 1066 (1988); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2014(ii), (q), (w). The “public liability action” retains
state law as the governing substantive law: A “public
liability action shall be deemed to be an action arising
under [42 U.S.C. §] 2210,” and “the substantive rules
for decision in such action shall be derived from the
law of the State in which the nuclear incident involved
4
occurs, unless such law is inconsistent with the
provisions of such section.” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(ii).1
Section 2210, in turn, contains provisions that, for
instance, limit punitive damages awards or require
defendants to waive state-law defenses in some
circumstances.
The amended PAA thus creates a scheme in which
state torts, with state-law elements, are restyled as
federal claims for purposes of Article III jurisdiction.
3. The PAA built on the Atomic Energy Act, which
created an agency to govern civilian use of nuclear
material. Known today as the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC),2 that agency issues licenses to
entities that handle radioactive material. Some
licenses authorize operating a nuclear power plant;
others authorize taking title to or transporting
radioactive material.
In addition, the NRC issues regulations governing
the handling of radioactive material. As relevant here,
some of those regulations set out dosage limits—levels
of radiation to which workers and members of the
public can be exposed. Those limits apply to “activities
conducted under licenses issued by the [NRC].” 10
C.F.R. § 20.1001(a). The regulations provide that
“nothing” in them “shall be construed as limiting
actions that may be necessary to protect health and
safety.” 10 C.F.R. § 20.1001(b). In 1991, the NRC
1
At the time of the lower court decision in this case, this section
was codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh). It has since been recodified
as 42 U.S.C. § 2014(ii), but the text of the provision has not
changed.
2
Prior to 1974, this agency was known as the Atomic Energy
Commission.
5
added mandatory language requiring that licensees
must ensure that radiation emissions are “as low as
reasonably achievable.” 10 C.F.R. § 20.1101(b).
B. Factual background
Because this case comes to the Court at the
pleading stage, all facts alleged in respondents’
complaint are taken as true.
1. Between 1942 and 1957, uranium was
processed in downtown St. Louis, Missouri, as part of
the Manhattan Project. First Am. Comp. ¶ 34, ECF
No. 44. Radioactive waste material from that
processing was transported and stored at a site near
the St. Louis Lambert International Airport. Id. ¶ 36.
Defendant St. Louis Airport Authority later purchased
that land. Id. ¶ 37. The St. Louis Airport Authority
was never licensed by the NRC (or its predecessor) and
is not a petitioner here.
In the late 1960s, private companies purchased
the radioactive waste stored at the airport site. FAC
¶ 41. The waste was then transported to a site on
Latty Avenue which abuts Coldwater Creek. Id. ¶ 42.
In 1969, petitioner Cotter Corporation, the second
defendant in this case, received a license from the
Atomic Energy Commission (the NRC’s predecessor)
to purchase and assume responsibility for the
radioactive waste material stockpiled at the Latty
Avenue site. Id. ¶ 42. Cotter was not required to obtain
financial protection or an indemnification agreement
with the federal government and did not do so. Id.
¶ 46.
After purchasing the radioactive waste, Cotter
began drying it (to make it lighter and easier to
transport) and loading it on railcars next to Coldwater
6
Creek. FAC ¶ 47. From the start, Cotter failed to fulfill
its licensee obligations. The Atomic Energy
Commission cited Cotter for its “totally inadequate”
sample surveys, which failed to “determine [the]
concentrations of radioactive materials” the public
was exposed to. Id. ¶ 48. The settling ponds and
equipment used in Cotter’s drying operation were in a
state of disrepair. Id. The Atomic Energy Commission
and the local health department also expressed
concern about a “dust problem” and visible air
contaminants. Id. In addition, health and
environmental experts expressed concerns and noted
violations of federal regulations. Id.
Eventually, Cotter’s drying equipment entirely
broke down, and Cotter appeared to abandon the site.
FAC ¶ 49. Cotter eventually returned to dispose of the
radioactive waste material that remained at the site
by simply mixing it with soil and dumping it into a
landfill in the St. Louis area. Id. ¶ 50.
In 1974, Cotter certified that there was no longer
any radioactive contamination at the Latty Avenue
site, despite knowing of radiation surveys that
indicated otherwise. FAC ¶¶ 13, 57, 58. Based on
Cotter’s representations, the Atomic Energy
Commission agreed to terminate its license. Id. ¶ 59.
Around that time, Cotter was purchased by petitioner
Commonwealth Edison, the third defendant in this
case. Id. ¶¶ 13, 55. Commonwealth Edison was never
licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission or the
NRC. Id. ¶ 89.
Two years later, surveys conducted by the NRC
revealed persistent radioactive contamination at the
Latty Avenue site. FAC ¶ 61. The NRC informed
Cotter that the survey “raised a serious question” as to
7
the accuracy of Cotter’s statements made in support of
its application for termination of its license. Id.
In 1978, the fourth defendant, DJR Holdings,
purchased the Latty Avenue site. DJR was never
licensed by the NRC or its predecessor and is not a
petitioner here. DJR conducted decontamination
operations on the site, moving radioactive material
from the soil closest to Coldwater Creek to another
part of the property. FAC ¶¶ 65, 70-71.
By the 1980s, because of defendants’ actions, the
radioactive waste material left over from the
Manhattan Project had contaminated both Coldwater
Creek and the Latty Avenue site. Both contained high
levels of radioactive isotopes, some of “the most toxic
materials known to man.” FAC ¶¶ 24-25. When
radioactive isotopes pass through human cells, they
can cause genetic mutations leading to cancer. Id.
¶ 27.
2. From 1984 to 2014, respondent Nikki Steiner
Mazzocchio lived in an apartment building abutting
Coldwater Creek near the Latty Avenue site. FAC
¶ 10. Respondent Angela Steiner Kraus, Ms.
Mazzocchio’s sister, lived in the same apartment
building from 1998 to 2002. Id. ¶ 11. Both plaintiffs’
apartments flooded multiple times with waters from
the creek. Id. ¶ 10-11. Ms. Kraus regularly spent time
in and around Coldwater Creek, gardening, trail
running, and splashing her face with the creek water.
Id. ¶ 11. And both sisters consumed produce grown in
Ms. Kraus’s garden, right by Coldwater Creek. Id.
As a result of their exposure to radioactive
isotopes, both Ms. Mazzocchio and Ms. Kraus—like
many other people living in the vicinity of the creek—
developed cancer. Within weeks of each other, Ms.
8
Mazzocchio and Ms. Kraus, who have no family
history of cancer, were diagnosed with an incurable
blood cancer called multiple myeloma. FAC ¶¶ 10-11,
81-82.
C. Procedural background
1. Ms. Mazzocchio and Ms. Kraus initially filed a
complaint against defendants in Missouri state court.
After removal and several years of litigation,
respondents filed their first amended complaint.
The operative complaint raises Price-Anderson
Act claims against four defendants: The St. Louis
Airport
Authority,
Cotter
Corporation,
Commonwealth Edison, and DJR Holdings.
Petitioners’ question presented centers on just one
of the claims raised by Ms. Mazzocchio and Ms.
Kraus—their common-law negligence claim. But
respondents in fact raised four sets of claims:
•
Negligence per se: Respondents allege that
defendants violated the Missouri Clean Water Law
and that this violation constituted negligence per
se. Respondents also allege that defendants
violated various federal regulations, including
radiation dosage limits and rules about sampling
and testing.
•
Civil conspiracy: Respondents allege that
defendants conspired to wrongfully release
radioactive waste material and to obtain
termination of Cotter’s license based on inaccurate
information.
•
Strict liability: Respondents allege that because
radioactive waste material is ultrahazardous,
9
defendants are liable for any harms resulting from
that material.
•
Common-law negligence: Respondents allege that
defendants were negligent when they mishandled
radioactive waste material. They also alleged that
defendants negligently failed to warn the public of
the risks of radiation at the Latty Avenue site.
2. Defendants moved to dismiss. They argued that
the standard of care element of plaintiffs’ common-law
negligence claim must be based on federal dosage
regulations, not state law. The district court denied
the motion. First, it pointed out that the standard of
care argument could not be dispositive as to “the other
three Defendants” or as to “some claims” against
Cotter. Pet. App. 22a. Second, even as to the commonlaw negligence claim against Cotter, the district court
found that federal dose regulations did not “provide
the exclusive standard of care.” Id. 21a. Cotter’s
argument to the contrary was “not based on any
provisions in the PAA” and “conflicts with the plain
language of the PAA, Atomic Energy Act, and federal
regulations and causes consequences seemingly
contrary to Congressional intent.” Id.
The district court noted that defendants only
“allude[d] to” and “never develop[ed]” the issues of
field and conflict preemption. Pet. App. 44a. n.29.
Accordingly, the court held that defendants had not
established a “per se rule” that federal regulations
governed their claim. Id. 45a. Instead, it determined
that “the applicable standard of care depends on the
facts of each case and the claims against each
defendant.” Id. 45a.
The district court certified the following question
for interlocutory appeal: “Whether federal dosage
10
regulations should be exclusively utilized as the
standard of care in a Price-Anderson Act public
liability action.” Pet. App. 18a.
3. The appeal turned on the construction of 42
U.S.C. § 2014(ii). That section provides that “[a] public
liability action shall be deemed to be an action arising
under section 2210 of this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(ii).
It then declares that “the substantive rules for
decision in such action shall be derived from the law of
the State . . . unless such law is inconsistent with the
provisions of such section.” Id.
The defendants argued that the phrase “such
section” incorporated the whole federal scheme of
nuclear safety regulation. Pet. App. 9a. Ms.
Mazzocchio and Ms. Kraus responded that the phrase
“such section” referred solely to Section 2210, and that
Missouri substantive law governing standards of care
was in no way “inconsistent” with Section 2210, which
contains rules about, for instance, punitive damages,
indemnification, and liability caps. Id.
The Eighth Circuit agreed with Ms. Mazzocchio
and Ms. Kraus and rejected defendants’ argument.
The Eighth Circuit held that “such section” in the
public liability action provision refers only to Section
2210. Pet. App. 9a. Because nothing in Section 2210
mentioned dosage requirements, much less indicated
that such dosage requirements would trump
Missouri’s standard of care, the Eighth Circuit held
that Missouri state law should govern. Id.
The Eighth Circuit explained that this Court has
“spoke[n] about the role of state tort law in broad
terms” and “was clear that state law standards of
negligence and strict liability would continue to play a
role in compensating those injured in a nuclear
11
accident.” Pet. App. 8a. And while “evidence of
compliance with federal safety standards” might be
“relevant to a negligence claim,” it was not
“dispositive.” Id. 10a n.2 (citations omitted). Moreover,
the Eighth Circuit explained that in the 1988 PAA
amendments, “Congress did not repudiate the Court’s
understanding of the role that state tort law plays in
a public liability action” but in fact “approved it.” Id.
8a.
3. Two of the four defendants—Cotter and
Commonwealth
Edison—have
petitioned
for
certiorari. Petitioners no longer argue that “such
section” in 42 U.S.C. § 2014(ii) refers to the whole
federal regulatory code. Pet. 8. Petitioners thus appear
to agree that the “substantive rules for decision” in
this case must be derived from the “law of the State.”
Petitioners instead now argue that the “law of the
State” in this case is actually federal law. Id. 24.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
I.
This case is a poor vehicle for addressing the
question presented.
This case’s “interlocutory posture is a factor
counseling against this Court’s review at this time.”
Nat’l Football League v. Ninth Inning, Inc., 141 S. Ct.
56, 57 (mem.) (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., statement
respecting denial of certiorari). The case comes to this
Court on an appeal of a certified question, after the
courts below denied defendants’ motion to dismiss.
This Court should wait for the case to play out before
considering whether to intervene.
1. First, petitioners are asking this Court to
consider an argument they never made below. As the
12
Court has instructed time and again, this Court is “a
court of final review and not first view.” Zivotofsky v.
Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012) (citation omitted). It
should wait for the courts below to pass upon
petitioners’ new legal theory before considering
wading into this case.
Petitioners argued in the district court that
Respondents “can only have a federal claim” because
42 U.S.C. § 2014(ii) states that “[a] public liability
action shall be deemed to be an action arising under
section 2210 of this title.” D. Mot. to Dismiss Reply Br.
2, ECF No. 59 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2014(ii)). Per the
district court, petitioners only “allude[d]” to field
preemption and “never develop[ed] the issue.” Pet.
App. 44a.
In the Eighth Circuit, petitioners tried a different
approach, arguing that the phrase “such section”
“refer[s] to the whole Act,” not just to 42 U.S.C. § 2210.
Petr. C.A. Reply Br. 11. They argued that Missouri
standards of care were inconsistent with the “whole
Act.” Id. 12.
Before this Court, petitioners shift gears yet
again. They now abandon any argument that “such
section” is broader than 42 U.S.C. § 2210, that the
Missouri standards of care are “inconsistent with” that
section, or that the “law of the State” does not govern
this case. Pet. 8, 24. Instead, they argue for the first
time in this litigation that the PAA preempts the
entire field here—that “federal law is the ‘law of the
State,” because federal regulations preempt any state
standards of care. Pet. 24. That reading of the statute
bears no resemblance to what petitioners urged below,
and this Court should wait for a lower court to consider
the reading before it considers weighing in.
13
2. Second, this Court should not grant certiorari
in this interlocutory posture because an opinion from
this Court may wind up being largely advisory. The
courts below rejected only a “per se rule that federal
regulations preempt state law standards of care in
every public liability action.” Pet. App. 45a. They left
open the possibility that petitioners might be able to
invoke “specific statutory provisions that conflict with
state standards of care.” Id. 9a. But at this point,
petitioners had invoked at most only “some brooding
federal interest.” Id. (citation omitted). The courts
below simply thought that making such a “factintensive” determination at the pleading stage would
be “premature.” Id. 45a. This Court should not
consider granting certiorari before the district court
has examined those “specific statutory provisions.” Id.
9a.
Indeed, this Court’s opinion might be largely
advisory even if, after examining those “specific
statutory provisions,” the district court concludes that
state law governs. The Eighth Circuit has now
emphasized that “evidence of compliance with federal
safety standards” can be “relevant” to state standards
of care. Id. 10a n.2 (citations omitted).
3. Finally, this Court should not grant certiorari
in this interlocutory posture because the answer to the
question presented is not determinative for the
outcome of this litigation and may turn out not to
matter much at all. Recall that respondents have
brought suit against four different defendants on four
different theories of liability. This Court’s intervention
not only will not end the litigation; it will not even
affect the majority of claims and defendants, and it
certainly will not affect the damages at stake. At most,
14
if this Court were to grant certiorari and reverse, the
decision would affect how plaintiffs prove one theory
of liability against one defendant.
a. The petition does not dispute that, at the very
least, state standards of care will govern claims
against two of the four defendants—St. Louis Airport
Authority and DJR Holdings. The federal regulations
petitioners cite apply, by their terms, only to “persons
licensed by the Commission.” 10 C.F.R. § 20.1002; see
also 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.105, 20.106(a) (1970). These two
defendants were never licensed by the NRC to handle
the radioactive waste material at issue. Thus, the
provision that petitioners claim supplies the standard
of care does not apply to those defendants.
As the district court explained, there can be no
doubt that state law supplies the standard of care
against those defendants. “Surely,” the district court
explained, it would be absurd to “hold that nonlicensees owe a duty of care that is solely imposed on
NRC licensees.” Pet. App. 40a. It would be equally
absurd to hold that they “owe no duty of care and thus,
escape liability completely.” Id.
The petition raises no argument to the contrary.
Indeed, the non-licensee defendants do not bother to
join the petition.
b. That leaves defendant Cotter Corporation.3
Cotter was licensed by the NRC between 1969 and
1974. FAC ¶¶ 45, 57. Even as to Cotter, there can be
no doubt that three of the four claims—negligence per
3
The fourth defendant, Commonwealth Edison, was not
licensed by the NRC but is Cotter’s parent company.
15
se, civil conspiracy, and strict liability—do not require
proof that a federal regulation was violated.
Start with respondents’ negligence per se claim
(where statutes, rather than common law, determine
the standard of care). The negligence per se claim
alleges that petitioners violated the Missouri Clean
Water Law. FAC ¶ 117. Petitioners argue only that
“nuclear safety statutes” are preempted. Pet. 3. They
do not dispute that respondents can raise a negligence
per se claim under a statute like the Missouri Clean
Water Law, which is not a “nuclear safety statute.” Id.
Respondents thus can proceed on their negligence per
se claim without proving a violation of federal
regulations.
Similarly, the petition does not dispute that
respondents can establish civil conspiracy without
reference to federal regulations. Civil conspiracy is an
intentional tort, and petitioners do not contest that
“federal safety standards have no bearing on a
defendant’s liability for its intentional acts.”
Bohrmann v. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co., 926 F.
Supp. 211, 221 (D. Me. 1996). Here, respondents allege
that Cotter and ComEd knew that the Latty Avenue
site was contaminated and “jointly conspired to
perpetrate the fraud that there was no radioactive
contamination remaining with respect to Cotter’s
abandoned operations.” FAC ¶ 14.
Finally, it’s not even clear that petitioners intend
to argue that respondents cannot raise a strict liability
claim. The petition’s question presented is limited to
the correct “standard of care”—an element of a
negligence claim, but not of a strict liability claim. Pet.
i. In a “negligence case,” “[t]ort law imposes ‘a duty to
exercise reasonable care” on those whose conduct
16
presents a risk of harm to others. Air & Liquid Sys.
Corp. v. DeVries, 586 U.S. 446, 452 (2019) (quoting
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. and Emot. Harm
§ 7 (2005)). By contrast, an argument that a defendant
should be strictly liable “begin[s] with the premise
that the accident has happened even though the
defendant has fully exercised reasonable care while
engaging in the activity.” Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 20. Because “strict
liability signifies liability without fault, or at least
without any proof of fault,” strict liability claims
contain no standard of care element. Id. ch. 4 Scope
Note.
Nor do petitioners make any argument that
clarifies their position on strict liability. They do not
address, for instance, the strong evidence that
Congress intended to preserve strict liability claims.
See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,
244-45, 258 (1984) (allowing state-law strict liability
claim); S. Rep. 89-1605, at 12 (explaining that
claimants will have the “benefit of a rule of strict
liability if applicable State law so provides”).
Petitioners have good reason to remain
ambiguous about their position regarding strict
liability. After all, if petitioners argued that personal
injury torts with no standard-of-care element are
abrogated altogether, they would have to concede that
other claims with no standard-of-care element are
similarly abrogated, including property claims like
trespass and nuisance. That petitioners’ question
presented is unclear regarding whether petitioners
intend to challenge respondents’ strict liability claim
is another reason to deny certiorari.
17
c. What is left is respondents’ common-law
negligence claim against Cotter. But it’s not even clear
that the question presented makes a difference as to
that claim. The factual record on which federal
regulations apply is as yet undeveloped. The district
court “doubt[ed] whether the specific [] regulation
Defendants seeks to require here” was “even
applicable (even as to Defendant Cotter).” Pet. App.
40a n.25. And to the extent that Cotter’s negligence lay
in its failing to warn the public about excessive
radiation, that breach took place after its NRC license
was terminated—that is, after NRC regulations no
longer applied. FAC ¶ 105. At that point, Cotter was
in the same position as the other unlicensed
defendants. For the reasons explained supra, at 14, a
state-law standard of care thus must govern
respondents’ duty-to-warn claim.
d. Finally, assume for a moment petitioners turn
out to be right, and there’s at least one theory of
common-law negligence respondents can’t pursue
without proving a violation of a federal regulation.
Certiorari still wouldn’t be warranted, because that
theory of liability will go forward even under
petitioners’ theory. Respondents have at this stage
sufficiently alleged a violation of federal regulations.
First, respondents pleaded a violation of the
federal dosage limits. Respondents alleged that
“Cotter released radiation into unrestricted areas in
the environment in excess of the levels permitted by
federal regulations in effect at the time” and cited
surveys showing radiation levels that could support
their claim. FAC ¶¶ 52, 71. At the pleading stage,
that’s more than enough.
18
Petitioners argue that respondents “do not allege
that federal regulators ever cited Cotter for violating
the applicable radiation limits.” Pet. 10 (emphasis
added). But of course, there is no rule saying that a
defendant is immune from liability just because the
federal government did not catch them violating
federal regulations at the time. The NRC itself
acknowledges that it does not issue citations for many
violations of federal regulations. NRC, Enforcement
Process
Diagram
(July 7,
2020),
https://perma.cc/NDA5-XCJY.
Moreover, recall that Cotter was cited for “totally
inadequate” surveys to test for radiation. FAC ¶ 48. It
is hard to see how the Government could cite Cotter
for exceeding radiation limits when Cotter refused to
collect the very data that would show that it was
exceeding those limits.
Second, the dosage limits are not the only federal
regulations at issue. The district court was “not
convinced” that the dosage regulations petitioners cite
“would provide the exclusive standard of care against
Defendant Cotter based on Plaintiffs’ allegations.” Pet.
App. 45a n.30. The district court pointed out that
“there are other possible sources of federal law.” Id.
For example, respondents alleged violations of a
regulation governing testing and sampling. See 10
C.F.R. § 20.201(b) (1970) (now codified at 10 C.F.R.
§ 20.1501); FAC ¶ 48.
e. Not only would any of these theories of liability
render the question presented immaterial as to
Cotter’s liability, but the amount of damages Cotter is
on the hook for will not change either, regardless of the
answer to the question presented. Cotter has conceded
that Missouri law determines its share of damages.
19
Cotter Corp.’s Third-Party Comp. Cross-cls., ¶ 71.
Missouri law allows joint and several liability and
contribution. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.067 (2005). So under
Missouri law, the question is not which counts
respondents prove against Cotter, but instead what
percentage of the damage is Cotter’s fault. Id.
And of course, if the question presented turns out
to be outcome-determinative in spite of all that, this
Court will have another chance to address it at the
case’s conclusion.
II. Petitioners’ novel reading of the statute is
incorrect.
1. Start with the text of the statute. A “public
liability action” is a suit “resulting from a nuclear
incident.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(ii), (w). Under the PriceAnderson Act, a “public liability action shall be
deemed to be an action arising under section 2210 of
this title, and the substantive rules for decision in such
action shall be derived from the law of the State in
which the nuclear incident involved occurs, unless
such law is inconsistent with the provisions of such
section.” 42 U.S.C. § 2014(ii). Because the standard of
care for a negligence claim is a “substantive rule[] for
decision” and is not “inconsistent with the provisions”
of Section 2210, it must be “derived from the law of the
State.” Id.
No one disputes that the standard of care is a
“substantive rule[] for decision.” A substantive rule of
decision is a “legal rule[]” that “determine[s] the
outcome of a litigation,” not just its procedural
“manner and [] means.” Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York,
326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). The standard of care is the
classic “substantive rule for decision.” Think Erie
20
itself: The Erie Railroad’s standard of care was
determined “under the law of Pennsylvania” because
it was substantive and not procedural. Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 70 (1938).
Nor do petitioners contend any longer that the
state-law standards of care respondents cite are
“inconsistent with the provisions of such section.” As
the Eighth Circuit recognized—and petitioners, at this
point, do not dispute—“such section” “quite clearly
refer[s] to § 2210.” Pet. App. 9a. Section 2210 says
nothing about the standard of care, and it certainly
does not mention federal dosage regulations.
Therefore, they cannot conflict.
Contrast that with substantive state laws that
may well be “inconsistent with” provisions of Section
2210. For instance, a state law about punitive
damages could be inconsistent with Section 2210(s),
which forecloses punitive damages against parties on
whose behalf the United States is obliged to make
payments pursuant to a contract. State law tort
defenses might be inconsistent with Section
2210(n)(1), which allows an indemnification
agreement to foreclose defenses in the case of certain
extraordinary nuclear occurrences. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2210(s), (n)(1).
As such, the standard of care in a public liability
action for negligence must be “derived from the law of
the State in which the nuclear incident involved
occur[ed]”—in this case, the laws of Missouri. See 42
U.S.C. § 2014(ii).
2. Petitioners appear to agree that the standard of
care in this case must be “derived from the law of the
State.” Pet. 24. But rather than give this phrase its
21
natural meaning, they argue that “federal law is ‘the
law of the State.’” Pet. 24.
Petitioners’ explanation appears to go as follows:
All state common law that relates to radioactive waste
material is automatically preempted by federal law.
Therefore, there is no “law of the State” to supply a
standard of care. So the only “law of the State” left to
apply is federal law.
But Congress certainly thought there was a “law
of the State”—it wrote that mandate into the statute.
Requiring the substantive law of the State to govern
public liability actions would be a passing strange way
to express petitioners’ rule: That public liability
actions be litigated according to federal law, with state
law only used to “fill gaps” (Pet. 25).
Moreover, on petitioners’ reading, the final clause
of the public liability action provision would be
entirely superfluous. That final clause states that the
“law of the State” does not apply if it “is inconsistent
with the provisions of” Section 2210. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2014(ii). If petitioners are right that the whole field
of state tort law is field preempted, there would be no
need for that clause, which provides only what thenJudge Gorsuch described as a “modest form of conflict
preemption.” Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 790 F.3d
1088, 1095 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J.).
Even if the statute were “susceptible to more than
one reading,” this Court would “have the duty to
accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.” Id.
(Gorsuch, J.). And of course, nothing in the text of the
PAA renders it susceptible to petitioners’ reading, “let
alone favors it so clearly that we might overcome the
presumption against preemption.” Id. What’s more,
“[t]he case for federal pre-emption is particularly weak
22
where Congress has indicated its awareness of the
operation of state law in a field of federal interest, and
has nonetheless decided to stand by both concepts and
to tolerate whatever tension there [is] between them.”
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 167 (1989) (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984)).
3. Petitioners’ novel argument is also inconsistent
with this Court’s precedent. Petitioners cite Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation &
Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983), for the premise
that “the federal government has occupied the entire
field of nuclear safety concerns.” Id. at 212; see Pet. 22.
But as then-Judge Gorsuch explained, Pacific Gas was
about preemption of “before-the-fact nuclear safety
regulations.” Cook, 790 F.3d at 1098. It did not affect
“traditional after-the-fact tort remedies.” Id.
Were there any doubt, this Court’s opinion the
very next year in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U.S. 238 (1984), made clear that federal regulation
does not preempt those after-the-fact tort remedies. In
Silkwood, this Court held that “persons injured by
nuclear accidents were free to utilize existing state
tort law remedies.” Id. at 252. This Court allowed that
“the award of damages based on the state law of
negligence or strict liability is regulatory in the sense
that a nuclear plant will be threatened with damages
liability if it does not conform to state standards.” Id.
But “that regulatory consequence was something that
Congress was quite willing to accept.” Id.
Even the dissenting justices in Silkwood, who
objected to the award of punitive damages in nuclear
incident cases, recognized that Congress intended
such cases to be governed by state tort law, including
23
a “jury-imposed negligence standard.” See id. at 268
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). As this Court later wrote,
Silkwood made clear that state tort law “fell beyond
any fair understanding of the NRC’s reach.” Virginia
Uranium, Inc., v. Warren, 587 U.S. 761, 773-74 (2019).
In 1988, Congress partially abrogated Silkwood’s
holding that state punitive damages rules govern
nuclear incident cases, forbidding punitive damages
against parties on whose behalf the United States
must make payments pursuant to an indemnification
agreement. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(s). But it did not suggest
any disagreement with the other portion of Silkwood,
explaining that state tort law elements govern
underlying liability. To the contrary: The 1988
amendments to the PAA codified that piece of
Silkwood, making clear that the “law of the State”
would supply any “substantive rules for decision.” See
42 U.S.C. § 2014(ii).
4. Legislative history confirms that, from the
start, the PAA evinced a “policy of only interfering
with state tort law to the minimum extent necessary.”
H.R. Rep. No. 100-104, pt. 1, at 20 (1987); see also S.
Rep. No. 85-296, at 9 (1957) (emphasizing that bill will
result in “no interference with the State law”); S. Rep.
No. 89-1605, at 12 (1966) (“[A] claimant would have
exactly the same rights . . . under [then-]existing
law—including, perhaps, benefit of a rule of strict
liability if applicable State law so provides.”).
And the relevant expert agencies have agreed that
the PAA does not preempt the field of state tort law.
The U.S. Department of Energy acknowledges that the
PAA preserves “the existing tort law of the State.” U.S.
Dep’t of Energy, Price-Anderson Act: Report to
Congress 5 (2023), https://perma.cc/JCS5-8U5X. The
24
NRC’s regulations explain that they should not be
“construed as limiting actions that may be necessary
to protect health and safety.” 10 C.F.R. § 20.1001(b).
In addition, the NRC rejected an argument “that full
compliance with the Commission’s regulations . . . is
evidence acceptable in a court of law that the licensee
was not negligent.” In the Matter of A.N. Tschaede, 23
N.R.C. 461, 461 (1986). The NRC explained that it “did
not intend the standards to establish absolute safe
levels of exposure below which no injury could occur.”
Id. at 464.
Text, structure, precedent, and other interpretive
tools thus all line up against petitioners’ argument.
III. There is no split worthy of this Court’s
attention.
No circuit has considered petitioners’ novel
reading of the text of the PAA, that “federal law is ‘the
law of the State.’” Indeed, no circuit before the Eighth
seems to have considered the statute’s text much at
all.
In any case, petitioners vastly overstate any
division among the circuits as to whether federal
regulations provide the exclusive standard of care:
Most of the language they cite is dicta, and it’s not
clear this case would turn out differently even in the
one circuit (the Eleventh) where it’s not.
1. Per petitioners, the rule that “states are
preempted from imposing a non-federal duty in tort”
stems from a 1991 Third Circuit case. Petitioners cite
In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832, 859
(3d Cir. 1991), for the proposition that “the plaintiffs’
25
rights will necessarily be determined . . . by reference
to federal law.” Pet. 13.4
But that case was not about the standard of care
at all. Recall that the PAA transforms state causes of
action into federal claims. The question in the Third
Circuit case was whether the PAA’s unique
structure—in which the claim is modeled on state
substantive law—nevertheless grants courts federal
question jurisdiction for Article III purposes. TMI II,
940 F.2d at 835-36, 854-55. The Third Circuit
answered in the affirmative. It explained that
although a PAA claim “may have had its origins in
state law,” Congress had “expressed its intention that
state law provides the content of and operates as
federal law.” Id.
In addition, the Third Circuit rattled off several
federal questions that would likely have to be
answered in the course of analyzing a public liability
action: Whether licensees would be required to waive
defenses, whether punitive damages awards were
precluded, and, yes, whether plaintiffs’ rights would
be determined “in part” (a phrase petitioners omit
from their quotation, see Pet. 13) “by reference to
federal law.” TMI II, 940 F.2d at 858-60. All the Third
Circuit said about the standard of care in a public
liability action, then, is that it might involve a federal
question at some point in the litigation, and that
federal courts thus had jurisdiction.
The other Third Circuit case petitioners cite for
their purported split is McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox
Power Gen. Grp., 869 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2017). But
4
Petitioners refer to this case as TMI I. The Third Circuit refers
to this case as TMI II.
26
neither party in McMunn was arguing for a state
standard of care. Instead, the plaintiffs there took the
position that terms in defendants’ federal license
should set the standard of care. Id. at 260. The Third
Circuit rejected that argument. Id. at 260-67.
Were there any doubt, the Third Circuit has
recently confirmed (in a case the petition omits) that
federal regulations do not supply the exclusive
standard of care in public liability actions. See Est. of
Ware v. Hosp. of the Univ. of Pa., 871 F.3d 273, 278
n.3, 285 (3d Cir. 2017) (there is no “legal source that
would limit liability under the [PAA] to cases where
exposure exceeds” federal dosage limits).
2. Petitioners are wrong about what the Sixth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits say, too. The cases
petitioners cite hold that state, not federal law,
governs. Thus, the language petitioners reference is,
at best, dicta.
Petitioners cite a Sixth Circuit case about the
statute of limitations in a Price Anderson Act public
liability action. Pet. 14 (citing Nieman v. NLO, Inc.,
108 F.3d 1546, 1553 (6th Cir. 1997)). Nieman made
two points, neither relevant to the question presented
here. First, it held that there were no “separate causes
of action” under state law—all claims arising from
nuclear incidents were public liability claims under
the PAA. Nieman, 108 F.3d at 1553. That holding isn’t
at issue here; respondents accept that all their claims
arise under the PAA, rather than directly under state
law. Second, the Sixth Circuit held that state tort law
determined the statute of limitations. Id. at 1547-48,
1554-59. Needless to say, anything the Sixth Circuit
said about federal regulations en route to choosing
state law is dicta.
27
In the Seventh Circuit case, the court again looked
to state law to determine the standard of care
applicable in public liability actions. O’Conner v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1105 (7th
Cir. 1994). Reviewing cases from the Illinois Supreme
Court, the Seventh Circuit concluded that, as a matter
of Illinois law, the state standard of care was set by
reference to federal regulations. Petitioners never
argue here that Missouri law chooses federal
regulation to set the state standard of care.
Petitioners cite the Seventh Circuit’s language
that, “[e]ven if” Illinois law did not explicitly require
consulting federal regulations, such “regulations must
provide the sole measure of defendants’ duty.” Pet 14.
But that language was dicta. The Seventh Circuit
speculated as much only after resolving the case on
state-law grounds. The Seventh Circuit has neither
repeated nor relied on that language in the 30 years
since.
The Ninth Circuit case petitioners cite likewise
held that federal courts must base the standard of care
on “what the Washington Supreme Court would likely
do,” not on federal regulations. In re Hanford Nuclear
Rsrv. Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1004 (9th Cir. 2008).
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit held that defendants were
“subject to strict liability” under Washington state
law. Id. at 1007. To be sure, the Ninth Circuit
speculated that there might be other circumstances
where federal regulations “would preempt” state
standards of care, but that speculation had nothing to
do with the outcome there. Id. at 1003.
3. That leaves Roberts v. Fla. Power & Light Co.,
146 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 1998), as the only case
petitioners cite to have actually held that a federal,
28
rather than state, standard of care must apply to a
negligence action under the PAA. But as the district
court explained, Roberts is factually distinguishable.
Roberts was a case about a worker at a nuclear power
plant—the context in which the argument for
“exclusive use of federal dosage regulations is
strongest based on ordinary preemption principles.”
Pet. App. 44a. Respondents’ case does not involve a
nuclear plant (indeed, most of the defendants were not
licensed at all), making the case for exclusive use of
federal regulations far weaker.
In any event, Roberts’ one paragraph of analysis
relied heavily on its reading of the Third Circuit’s
caselaw. In the years since Roberts, the Third Circuit
itself has made clear Roberts’ reading was incorrect.
See supra, at 26 (discussing Ware). The Eleventh
Circuit thus may reconsider even its holding as to
federally licensed facilities. See, e.g., Finestone v. Fla.
Power & Light Co., 272 Fed. Appx. 761, 765 (11th Cir.
2008) (noting that plaintiffs would need to petition for
rehearing en banc to reconsider Roberts; plaintiffs did
not do so).
4. Finally, this case wouldn’t be worthy of this
Court’s attention even if petitioners could show that
the Eleventh Circuit (or any other) would apply
federal, rather than state, law to the standard of care
in this case. Petitioners’ argument is that “the law of
the State” under the PAA is federal law. Not one of the
circuits cited in the petition has considered—let alone
adopted—that argument. Indeed, not one of the
circuits even engaged with the language of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2014(ii). Instead, the cases petitioner points to relied
on policy considerations about “the carefully crafted
balance between private involvement and safety that
29
Congress has achieved.” See Roberts, 146 F.3d at 1308
(quoting O’Conner, 13 F.3d at 1105).
That sort of sense-of-the-statute analysis is “a
relic from a bygone era of statutory construction.” Food
Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 588 U.S. 427, 437
(2019) (citation omitted). Petitioners appear to
recognize as much, which is presumably why they do
not defend the reasoning of those lower court
decisions. This Court should not grant review based on
a purported split where even petitioners do not
endorse their side of that split.
IV. Petitioners’ claims about the importance of the
question presented are vastly overblown.
With no plausible textual argument and no court
of appeals that has adopted its proffered reading,
petitioners resort to consequentialism, fearmongering
that the nuclear industry will go belly-up should the
Eighth Circuit’s opinion stand. But petitioners’
doomsday scenario turns out to be implausible on
closer inspection.
1. Petitioners predict that the Eighth Circuit’s
rule will result in so much liability that companies will
be “forced to abandon the nuclear energy and defense
industries altogether.” Pet. 12; see also Pet. 4. But
remember, key players in the nuclear industry are
protected from catastrophic liability: Congress
implemented a system of insurance, self-insurance,
and indemnification, combined with liability caps that
ensure that none of them will pay a dime in damages.
Supra, at 3-4.
The petition notes that liability for nuclear
incidents between 1957 and 2018 has totaled $522
million in insured losses. Pet. 20 (citing NRC, The
30
Price-Anderson Act: 2021 Report to Congress xx, 1-2 &
n.4 (Dec. 2021), https://perma.cc/BN82-HULN). Put
that number in perspective: Congress has mandated
that important players in the nuclear industry
maintain commercial liability insurance that will
cover $500 million per nuclear incident. NRC Report,
supra, at xvii. That means that even counting lawsuits
prior to 1988—when plaintiffs were suing entirely
under state causes of action—the aggregate liability
for all nuclear incidents barely exceeded the
commercial liability coverage for just one nuclear
incident.
To be sure, Cotter isn’t fully part of that scheme.
It was not one of the nuclear industry players required
to maintain financial protection or secure an
indemnification agreement. (Though Cotter may still
avoid paying damages: The Federal Circuit recently
ruled that Cotter may be indemnified. Cotter Corp.,
N.S.L. v. United States, 127 F.4th 1353, 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 2025).) But that was Congress’s considered
decision. Congress was primarily concerned with
entities like nuclear power plants, whose facilities
generated critical electricity and who faced the
greatest exposure in the event of a nuclear disaster. As
to those entities, Congress created an extensive
financial backstop. Congress simply was not
concerned about players like Cotter, which it believed
could use ordinary insurance strategies to manage
risk. S. Rep. 94-454, at 14 (1975).
2. Petitioners’ second sky-is-falling claim—that
using state-law negligence standards in public
liability actions “effects a startling expansion of
liability” (Pet. 16)—fares no better.
31
In the mine run of cases, the difference between
liability predicated on violations of federal regulations
and liability predicated on state-law negligence
standards will be no difference at all. See, e.g., Taylor
v. Interstate Nuclear Servs., Inc., 1999 WL 35809694,
at *11 (D.N.M. Apr. 7, 1999) (state standard of care
turned out to be “exactly the same” as federal
regulations); Corcoran v. New York Power Auth., 935
F. Supp. 376, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (to prove violation
of state law, plaintiffs had to prove violation of federal
dose limits). And even where state law does not
automatically track federal law, federal regulations
are often still relevant to identifying the state-law
standard of care in a negligence action. See, e.g.,
Bohrmann v. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co., 926 F.
Supp. 211, 221 (D. Me. 1996) (violation of state law
“may be difficult to establish in the absence of proving
a violation of the federal safety standards”). The
Eighth Circuit noted as much in this very case. Pet.
App. 10a n.2.
For claims arising after 1991, the delta between
federal regulations and state-law negligence
standards is smaller still, for two reasons. First, in
1991, the NRC issued new regulations reducing the
annual permissible exposure rate fivefold from the
rates that governed in the 1960s and 1970s. See In re
TMI, 67 F.3d 1103, 1111 n.18 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted). Almost by definition, then, a modern-day
operator who has complied with federal regulations
will have taken the kind of due care that would satisfy
a state-law standard of care, too.
Second, also in 1991, the NRC mandated that the
nuclear industry was required to keep radiation
releases “as low as reasonably achievable”—even if
32
that required them to maintain an exposure rate even
lower than the stringent federal regulations. See
Finestone v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 272 Fed. Appx.
761, 765-66 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted) (“as low
as is reasonably achievable” standard governs post1991 claims); McCafferty v. Centerior Serv. Co., 983 F.
Supp. 715, 720 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (same). As the Third
Circuit put it, an “as low as is reasonably achievable”
standard is “essentially” the same as a common-law
negligence standard. In re TMI, 67 F.3d at 1115
(citation omitted). At this point, then, state and federal
standards of care have more or less converged, and the
question presented does not particularly matter.
Petitioners protest that the problem isn’t the
state-law negligence standard itself, but “lay juries”
who will “Monday morning quarterback” defendants’
decisions. Pet. 4, 20. But of course, if Congress was
worried about lay juries, it could have required a
bench trial for Price Anderson Act claims. It has done
so for other kinds of cases. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2402
(bench trial for Federal Tort Claims Act cases). It
didn’t, presumably because juries occupy “so firm a
place in our history and jurisprudence.” Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109, 121 (2024) (citation
omitted). We trust juries to make all sorts of important
decisions, including in highly complex areas of the law
governed by comprehensive federal regulations. See,
e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 559-63, 581 (2009)
(allowing jury to decide, in a state tort suit, whether
intra-arterial injection warning on antihistamine drug
label constituted a failure to warn under FDA
regulations). Petitioners offer no reason this case
would be any different.
33
3. One final note: The question presented is
relevant to a dwindling category of lawsuits. Resolving
the question presented requires this Court to wade
into petitioners’ interpretation of 50-year-old
regulations, which have changed a dozen times since.
See Pet. 26 (citing federal regulations from 1970 as
governing). And the egregiously careless conduct at
issue in this case—mixing nuclear waste into soil
without taking any precautions—is similarly an
artifact of the 1960s and 1970s; no modern-day
nuclear operator or handler of radioactive waste
material would do the same.
To be sure, as petitioners note, cases may continue
to arise from decades-old conduct, governed by
decades-old regulations. But their numbers will
dwindle. Arguments over the details of that era are not
worth this Court’s time.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ
of certiorari should be denied.
34
Respectfully submitted,
Ryan Keane
Tanner A. Kirksey
KEANE LAW, LLC
7711 Bonhomme Ave.
Suite 600
St. Louis, MO 63105
Kevin Thompson
David R Barney, Jr.
THOMPSON BARNEY
2030 Kanawha Blvd.
E. Charleston, WV 25311
June 26, 2025
Barry J. Cooper, Jr.
Counsel of Record
Victor Cobb
COOPER LAW FIRM
834 Elmwood Park Blvd.
Suite 130
Harahan, LA 70123
barryjcooperjr@gmail.com
(504) 291-1347
Anthony D. Gray
JOHNSON GRAY, LLC
2705 Dougherty Ferry Rd.
Suite 100
St. Louis, MO 63122
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