Emergency Application — Donald J. Trump, Applicant v. United States

Supreme Court briefFeb 12, 2024

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No. _____

In the Supreme Court of the United States

PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP,

Applicant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Application for Stay of the Mandate To Be Issued by the

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

APPLICATION FOR A STAY OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S MANDATE PENDING

THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

LAURO & SINGER

John F. Lauro

Gregory M. Singer

400 N. Tampa St., 15th Fl.

Tampa, FL 33602

(813) 222-8990

jlauro@laurosinger.com

BLANCHE LAW

Todd Blanche

Emil Bove

99 Wall St., Suite 4460

New York, NY 10005

(212) 716-1250

toddblanche@blanchelaw.com

JAMES OTIS LAW GROUP, LLC

D. John Sauer

Counsel of Record

William O. Scharf

Michael E. Talent

Kenneth C. Capps

13321 N. Outer Forty Rd.

Suite 300

St. Louis, Missouri 63017

(314) 562-0031

John.Sauer@james-otis.com

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The questions presented are:

I.

Whether the doctrine of absolute presidential immunity includes immunity from

criminal prosecution for a President’s official acts, i.e., those performed within the “‘outer

perimeter’ of his official responsibility.”

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982)

(quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959)).

II. Whether the Impeachment Judgment Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7, and principles

of double jeopardy foreclose the criminal prosecution of a President who has been impeached

and acquitted by the U.S. Senate for the same and/or closely related conduct that underlies

the criminal charges.

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The applicant is President Donald J. Trump (“President Trump”).

The respondent is the United States of America (“Special Counsel” or “government”).

ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (D.D.C.):

•

United States v. Trump, No. 23-cr-257 (Dec. 1, 2023)

United States Court of Appeals (D.C. Cir.):

•

United States v. Trump, No. 23-3190 (opinion issued Dec. 8, 2023)

•

United States v. Trump, No. 23-3228 (opinion issued Feb. 6, 2024)

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...................................................................................................... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ......................................................................................... ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS.................................................................................................... iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS...........................................................................................................iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... v

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT ............................................................................................................................ 4

I. President Trump Was Indicted for His Official Acts as President. .............................. 4

II. The Lower Courts Incorrectly Deny President Trump’s Immunity Claims. ................ 6

ARGUMENT.............................................................................................................................. 8

I. There Is a Reasonable Probability That This Court Will Grant Certiorari. ................. 9

A. The Case Raises Important Questions of Federal Law. .......................................... 9

B. The D.C. Circuit’s Opinion Conflicts With Decisions of This Court. .................... 11

II. There Is a Significant Possibility of Reversal. ............................................................ 11

A. The Executive Vesting Clause and Marbury v. Madison. ..................................... 12

B. “The Presuppositions of Our Political History.” .................................................... 21

C. The Likelihood of Chilling Presidential Action. .................................................... 26

III. There Is a Likelihood of Irreparable Harm Absent the Stay. .................................... 31

A. Absent a Stay, President Trump Will Immediately Be Required to Bear the

Burdens of Prosecution and Trial. ......................................................................... 32

B. Conducting the Criminal Trial of President Trump Will Inflict Grave First

Amendment Injuries on Millions of American Voters. .......................................... 33

IV. The Balancing of Equities Strongly Favors a Stay. .................................................... 35

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 39

APPENDIX

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Pages(s)

Abney v. United States,

431 U.S. 651 (1977) ............................................................................................................ 32

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009) ............................................................................................................ 32

Barr v. Matteo,

360 U.S. 564 (1959) .............................................................................................................. i

Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico,

457 U.S. 853 (1982) ............................................................................................................ 35

Behrens v. Pelletier,

516 U.S. 299 (1996) ............................................................................................................ 32

Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,

211 F.3d 853 (4th Cir. 2000) .............................................................................................. 39

Blassingame v. Trump,

87 F.4th 1 (D.C. Cir. 2023) ...............................................................................................6-7

Butz v. Economou,

438 U.S. 478 (1978) ............................................................................................................ 21

Certain Named and Unnamed Non-Citizen Children and Their Parents v. Texas,

448 U.S. 1327 (1980) ...................................................................................................... 9, 12

Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,

333 U.S. 103 (1948) ............................................................................................................ 13

Clark v. United States,

289 U.S. 1 (1933)................................................................................................................ 27

Clinton v. Jones,

520 U.S. 681 (1997) ............................................................................................................ 15

Dep’t of Com. v. New York,

139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) ........................................................................................................ 37

Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.,

511 U.S. 863 (1994) ............................................................................................................ 32

Elrod v. Burns,

427 U.S. 347 (1976) ............................................................................................................ 34

v

Ferri v. Ackerman,

444 U.S. 193 (1979) ............................................................................................................ 26

Franklin v. Massachusetts,

505 U.S. 788 (1992) ........................................................................................... 13-15, 17, 28

Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,

561 U.S. 477 (2010) ............................................................................................................ 21

Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800 (1982) ............................................................................................................ 32

Helstoski v. Meanor,

442 U.S. 500 (1979) ............................................................................................................ 32

In re Trump,

958 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2020) ............................................................................. 14-15, 18, 21

Karcher v. Daggett,

455 U.S. 1303 (1982) ....................................................................................... 8-9, 11, 31, 35

Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes,

37 U.S. 524 (1838) .............................................................................................................. 19

Kusay v. United States,

62 F.3d 192 (7th Cir. 1995) ................................................................................................ 38

Landis v. N. Am. Co.,

299 U.S. 248 (1936) ............................................................................................................ 36

Little v. Barreme,

6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) ............................................................................................. 19

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) ................................................................... 3, 11-13, 16-22, 29

Martin v. Mott,

25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827) ...................................................................................... 16, 29

McCulloch v. Maryland,

17 U.S. 316 (1819) .............................................................................................................. 22

McIntyre v. Ohio Elec. Comm’n,

514 U.S. 334 (1995) ............................................................................................................ 34

McLeod v. Gen. Elec. Co.,

87 S. Ct. 5 (1966)............................................................................................................ 9, 12

vi

Meyer v. Grant,

486 U.S. 414 (1988) ............................................................................................................ 34

Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States,

489 U.S. 794 (1989) ............................................................................................................ 33

Mississippi v. Johnson,

71 U.S. 475 (1866) .................................................................................. 11, 13-15, 17-18, 20

Mistretta v. United States,

488 U.S. 361 (1989) ............................................................................................................ 22

Mitchell v. Forsyth,

472 U.S. 511 (1985) ............................................................................................................ 32

Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,

401 U.S. 265 (1971) ............................................................................................................ 34

Morrison v. Olson,

487 U.S. 654 (1988) ................................................................................................ 11, 25, 31

Newdow v. Roberts,

603 F.3d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2010) .............................................................................. 14, 16, 20

NFIB v. OSHA,

595 U.S. 109 (2022) ............................................................................................................ 21

Nixon v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 731 (1982) ................................................................. i, 1-2, 6, 11, 15, 20, 22, 26-28

Nixon v. Sirica,

487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ............................................................................................ 38

N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning,

573 U.S. 513 (2014) ............................................................................................................ 22

Packingham v. North Carolina,

582 U.S. 98 (2017) .............................................................................................................. 35

Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223 (2009) ............................................................................................................ 32

P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,

506 U.S. 139 (1993) ............................................................................................................ 32

Printz v. United States,

521 U.S. 898 (1997) ............................................................................................................ 22

vii

Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

491 U.S. 440 (1989) ............................................................................................................ 17

Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C.,

395 U.S. 367 (1969) ............................................................................................................ 35

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,

536 U.S. 765 (2002) ............................................................................................................ 35

Seila Law, LLC v. CFPB,

140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) ........................................................................................................ 21

Shiffman v. Selective Serv. Bd. No.5,

88 S. Ct. 1831 (1968) ............................................................................................................ 9

Snyder v. Phelps,

562 U.S. 443 (2011) ............................................................................................................ 34

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,

573 U.S. 149 (2014) ............................................................................................................ 34

Swan v. Clinton,

100 F.3d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ................................................................................. 14, 19-20

Times-Picayune Publ’g Corp. v. Schulingkamp,

419 U.S. 1301 (1974) ...................................................................................................... 8, 12

Trump v. Vance,

140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) ........................................................................................................ 30

United States v. Burr,

25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D.Va. 1807) .......................................................................................... 21

United States v. Johnson,

383 U.S. 169 (1966) ............................................................................................................ 21

United States v. Lee,

106 U.S. 196 (1882) ............................................................................................................ 20

United States v. Nixon,

418 U.S. 683 (1974) .......................................................................................... 10, 28, 33, 38

United States v. Philip Morris, Inc.,

314 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ............................................................................................ 36

Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,

425 U.S. 748 (1976) ............................................................................................................ 35

viii

Whalen v. Roe,

423 U.S. 1313 (1975) ............................................................................................................ 8

White v. Florida,

458 U.S. 1301 (1982) ...................................................................................................... 8, 11

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,

343 U.S. 579 (1952) ...................................................................................................... 14, 19

U.S. Constitution, Statutes, Rules

18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) .......................................................................................................... 4, 18

28 U.S.C. § 1291 ...................................................................................................................... 33

D.C. Cir. R. 41(a)(1) ................................................................................................................... 8

H. Res.24, 117th Cong. (2021) ................................................................................................... 4

Sup. Ct. R. 10(c) ................................................................................................................ 2, 9-11

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 ................................................................................. i, 16, 20, 28-29

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 .................................................................................................... 12

Other Authorities

3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ch. 37, § 1563

(1833), https://lonang.com/library/reference/story-commentaries-us-constitution/sto-337/

............................................................................................................................................ 13

Andrew C. McCarthy, The Wages of Prosecuting Presidents for their Official Acts, Nat’l

Review (Dec. 9, 2023), https://www.nationalreview.com/2023/12/the-wages-ofprosecuting-presidents-over-their-official-acts/ ................................................................ 23

Andrew McCarthy, Thoughts on Biden’s Funding of Terror-Sponsoring UNRWA and D.C.

Circuit’s Delay on Trump Immunity, Nat’l Review (Jan. 31, 2024),

https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/thoughts-on-bidens-funding-of-terrorsponsoring-unrwa-and-d-c-circuits-delay-on-trump-immunity/ ....................................... 23

Byron York (@ByronYork), X (Dec. 11, 2023),

https://twitter.com/ByronYork/status/1734305076582244850?s=20 ................................ 37

Editorial Board, Jack Smith and the Supreme Court, Wall St. J. (Dec. 16, 2023) ................ 37

ix

Elie Honig, Why Jack Smith Will Never Say the ‘E’ Word, CNN (Dec. 16, 2023),

https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2023/12/16/smr-honig-on-smith-vs-electioncalendar.cnn ....................................................................................................................... 37

Francis X. Clines and Steven Lee Myers, Attack on Iraq; The Overview; Impeachment Vote

in House Delayed As Clinton Launches Iraq Air Strike, Citing Military Need to Move

Swiftly, N.Y. Times (Dec. 17, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/17/world/attackiraq-overview-impeachment-vote-house-delayed-clinton-launches-iraq-air.html ........... 23

Gary L. Gregg II, George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs, UVA Miller Center,

https://millercenter.org/president/-gwbush/foreign-affairs ............................................... 22

Jason Willick, Politics Are Now Clearly Shaping Jack Smith’s Trump Prosecution, Wash.

Post (Dec. 12, 2023), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/12/12/specialcounsel-jack-smith-politicized-prosecution/ ...................................................................... 37

Jason Willick, The Eyebrow-Raising Line in the Trump Immunity Opinion, Wash. Post

(Feb. 7, 2024), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/02/07/trump-immunitydecision-disclaimer/ ........................................................................................................... 23

Jessie Kratz, The 1824 Presidential Election and the “Corrupt Bargain”, National Archives

(Oct. 22, 2020), https://prologue.blogs.archives.gov/2020/10/22/the-1824-presidentialelection-and-the-corrupt-bargain/ ..................................................................................... 22

Spencer Ackerman, US Cited Controversial Law in Decision to Kill American Citizen by

Drone, The Guardian (June 23, 2014),

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/23/us-justification-drone-killing-americancitizen-awlaki ..................................................................................................................... 23

The Editors, Alien and Sedition Acts, History (June 21, 2023),

https://www.history.com/topics/early-us/alien-and-sedition-acts ..................................... 24

The Editors, Hamas Was Right Under Unrwa’s Nose, Wall St. J. (Feb. 11, 2024),

https://www.wsj.com/articles/hamas-was-right-under-unrwas-nose-tunnels-gaza-israelwar-f715d219?mod=opinion_lead_pos2 ............................................................................. 24

The Editors, Indian Treaties and the Removal Act of 1830, Office of the Historian, U.S.

Department of State, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/indian-treaties .... 24

The Editors, Iran-Contra Scandal Begins with Shredded Documents, History (Nov. 13,

2009), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/oliver-north-starts-feedingdocuments-into-the-shredding-machine............................................................................ 23

The Editors, Mexican-American War, Encyclopaedia Britannica (Jan. 2, 2024),

https://www.britannica.com/event/Mexican-American-War/Invasion-and-war ............... 24

THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 .......................................................................................................... 29

x

THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 .......................................................................................................... 30

THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 .......................................................................................................... 30

THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 .......................................................................................................... 30

Tim Arango, Ex-Prosecutor’s Book Accuses Bush of Murder, N.Y. Times (July 7, 2008),

https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/07/business/media/07bugliosi.html ........................... 22

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-27.260 (2018) ........................................................ 37

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-85.500 (2018) ........................................................ 37

U.S. Dep’t of Justice Memorandum, Doc. 28 in Missouri v. Biden, No. 4:21-cv-00287-AGF

(E.D. Mo. filed June 4, 2021) ............................................................................................. 14

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Reply Brief for Pet’r, In re Trump, No. 18-2486 (4th Cir. filed Feb. 21,

2019) ............................................................................................................................. 14, 18

World Media Troubled by Clinton’s Timing in Airstrikes, CNN (Dec. 18, 1998),

http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/meast/9812/18/iraq.press/ ............................................... 23

Yogi Berra Museum & Learning Center, “Yogi-isms,” https://yogiberramuseum.org/aboutyogi/yogisms/ ........................................................................................................................ 1

xi

INTRODUCTION

This application is “déjà vu all over again.” Yogi Berra Museum & Learning Center,

“Yogi-isms,” https://yogiberramuseum.org/about-yogi/yogisms/. Two months ago, after the

district court denied President Trump’s claim of Presidential immunity in this criminal case,

the Special Counsel filed a petition for certiorari before judgment asking this Court to

undertake an extraordinary departure from ordinary appellate procedures and decide the

vital and historic question of Presidential immunity on a hyper-accelerated basis. This Court

correctly chose to follow standard judicial process and declined to do so. Now, at the Special

Counsel’s urging, a panel of the D.C. Circuit has, in an extraordinarily fast manner, issued a

decision on President Trump’s claim of immunity and ordered the mandate returned to the

district court to proceed with President Trump’s criminal trial in four business days, unless

this Court intervenes (as it should). App’x 58A. This Court should stay the D.C. Circuit’s

mandate to forestall, once again, an unprecedented and unacceptable departure from

ordinary appellate procedures and allow President Trump’s claim of immunity to be decided

in the ordinary course of justice.

The reasons to do so are compelling. President Trump’s claim that Presidents have

absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for their official acts presents a novel, complex,

and momentous question that warrants careful consideration on appeal. The panel opinion

below, like the district court, concludes that Presidential immunity from prosecution for

official acts does not exist at all. This is a stunning breach of precedent and historical norms.

In 234 years of American history, no President was ever prosecuted for his official acts. Nor

should they be.

Presidents “must make the most sensitive and far-reaching decisions

entrusted to any official under our constitutional system.” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 752. Their

decisions are the most politically controversial of any official, and they draw the most

national attention and political ire, making “the President … an easily identifiable target”

1

for politically motivated prosecution. Id. at 753. If the prosecution of a President is upheld,

such prosecutions will recur and become increasingly common, ushering in destructive cycles

of recrimination. Criminal prosecution, with its greater stigma and more severe penalties,

imposes a far greater “personal vulnerability” on the President than any civil penalty. Id.

The threat of future criminal prosecution by a politically opposed Administration will

overshadow every future President’s official acts—especially the most politically

controversial decisions. The President’s political opponents will seek to influence and control

his or her decisions via effective extortion or blackmail with the threat, explicit or implicit, of

indictment by a future, hostile Administration, for acts that do not warrant any such

prosecution. This threat will hang like a millstone around every future President’s neck,

distorting Presidential decisionmaking, undermining the President’s independence, and

clouding the President’s ability “‘to deal fearlessly and impartially with’ the duties of his

office.” Id. at 752. Without immunity from criminal prosecution, the Presidency as we know

it will cease to exist.

President Trump’s application easily satisfies this Court’s traditional factors for

granting a stay of the mandate pending en banc review and review on certiorari by this Court.

First, the likelihood that this Court will grant certiorari in the future is extremely

strong. As the Special Counsel emphatically stated in December, “[i]t is of imperative public

importance that [President Trump’s] claims of immunity be resolved by this Court,” and “only

this Court can definitively resolve them.” Pet. for Cert. Before Judgment, United States v.

Trump, No. 23-624 (U.S. filed Dec. 11, 2023), at 2, 3 (“Pet. in No. 23-624”). President Trump’s

claim presents “a quintessential example of ‘an important question of federal law that has

not been, but should be, settled by this Court.’” Id. at 12 (quoting Sup. Ct. R. 10(c)).

2

Second, there is far more than a “fair prospect” that this Court will reverse the

decision below. The panel opinion misapprehends and contradicts the original understanding

of the Executive Vesting Clause and the separation of powers, as interpreted in an unbroken

line of legal and historical precedent going back to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)

137 (1803). Chief Justice Marshall thought it self-evident that Article III courts cannot sit

in judgment directly over the President’s official acts, which “can never be examinable by the

courts.” Id. at 166. Because “the courts” cannot “examin[e],” id., the President’s official acts,

they cannot enter a criminal judgment against him and imprison him on the basis of those

official acts. Yet the D.C. Circuit’s judgment seemingly authorizes the district court to

conduct a criminal trial of President Trump based on his official acts before this Court

concludes its review of this momentous question—thus subjecting the Presidency to the most

intrusive possible “examin[ation] by the courts,” id., and inflicting one of the gravest wounds

to the separation of powers in our Nation’s history.

Third, absent a stay from this Court, irreparable injury to President Trump is

inevitable. It is axiomatic that President Trump’s claim of immunity is an entitlement not

to stand trial at all, and to avoid the burdens of litigation pending review of his claim. Yet

the D.C. Circuit’s judgment appears to authorize the district court to resume criminal

proceedings immediately, and to conduct President Trump’s criminal trial while his claim is

pending before this Court—and there is strong indication that the district court will do so.

In addition, President Trump is the leading candidate for President in the 2024 election.

Conducting a months-long criminal trial of President Trump at the height of election season

will radically disrupt President Trump’s ability to campaign against President Biden—which

appears to be the whole point of the Special Counsel’s persistent demands for expedition. The

D.C. Circuit’s order thus threatens immediate irreparable injury to the First Amendment

3

interests of President Trump and tens of millions of American voters, who are entitled to

hear President Trump’s campaign message as they decide how to cast their ballots in

November.

This Court should stay the D.C. Circuit’s mandate pending resolution of President

Trump’s petition for certiorari in this Court and subsequent proceedings on the merits. As

additional relief, President Trump also requests that this Court stay the D.C. Circuit’s

mandate pending the resolution of a petition for en banc consideration in that court, before

the filing (if necessary) of his petition for certiorari in this Court.

STATEMENT

I.

President Trump Was Indicted for His Official Acts as President.

On August 1, 2023, President Trump was indicted on four counts—including two

counts alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2)1—for his alleged conduct following the

outcome of the 2020 Presidential election. D. Ct. Doc. 1. All the conduct alleged in the

indictment occurred between November 2020 and early January 2021, while President

Trump was still President. D. Ct. Doc. 1. President Trump was impeached for much of the

same conduct charged in the indictment on January 11, 2021, and acquitted by the U.S.

Senate on February 13, 2021. See H. Res.24, 117th Cong. (2021). The indictment charges

President Trump with five types of conduct, all constituting official acts of the President.

First, it alleges that President Trump, using official channels of communication, made

a series of tweets and other public statements on matters of paramount federal concern,

contending that the 2020 federal election was tainted by fraud and irregularities that should

be addressed by government officials. D. Ct. Doc. 1, ¶¶ 2, 11-12, 19, 32-34, 37, 41-42, 46, 52,

1 This is the same statutory section whose interpretation is at issue in Fischer v. United

States, No. 23-5572 (cert. granted Dec. 13, 2023), which is pending before this Court and may

bear directly upon the validity of those charges against President Trump.

4

99, 102, 104 (alleging public statements regarding the federal election and state and federal

officials’ exercise of their official responsibilities with respect to the election); id. ¶¶ 22, 28,

44, 50, 87-88, 90(c), 96(a)-(c), 100(a)-(b), 111, 114 (alleging tweets about the same topics).

Second, the indictment alleges that President Trump communicated with the Acting

Attorney General and officials at the U.S. Department of Justice—which he oversaw as an

integral part of his official duties as chief executive—about investigating suspected election

crimes and irregularities, and possibly appointing a new Acting Attorney General.

Id.

¶¶ 10(c), 27, 29, 36, 45, 51, 70-85. These include allegations of a series of communications

urging the Acting Attorney General and Acting Deputy Attorney General to investigate

widespread reports of election fraud, id. ¶¶ 29, 36, 45, 51; and allegations of deliberations

during Oval Office meetings about whether to replace the Acting Attorney General, a

Cabinet-level officer constitutionally appointed by the President, id. ¶¶ 74, 77, 84.

Third, the indictment alleges that President Trump communicated with state officials

about the administration of the federal election and urged them to exercise their official

responsibilities in accordance with the conclusion that the 2020 presidential election was

tainted by fraud and irregularities. Id. ¶¶ 10(a), 15-18, 21, 24, 26, 31, 35, 38-39, 43.

Fourth, the indictment alleges that President Trump communicated with the Vice

President in his capacity as President of the Senate, the Vice President’s official staff, and

other members of Congress to urge them to exercise their official duties in the election

certification process in accordance with President Trump’s contention that the election was

tainted by fraud and irregularities. Id. ¶¶ 10(d), 86-95, 97, 101, 122 (Vice President and his

official staff); id. ¶¶ 115, 119(b)-(c) (attempts to communicate with Members of Congress).

Fifth, the indictment alleges that other individuals organized slates of alternate

electors from seven States to ensure that the Vice President would be authorized to exercise

5

his official duties in the manner urged by President Trump. Id. ¶¶ 53-69. According to the

indictment, these alternate slates of electors were designed to validate the Vice President’s

authority to conduct his official duties as President Trump urged. Id. ¶¶ 10(b), 53.

II.

The Lower Courts Incorrectly Deny President Trump’s Immunity Claims.

President Trump filed motions to dismiss the indictment on multiple grounds. As

relevant here, President Trump contended that (1) the indictment must be dismissed because

it brings criminal charges against him based on his official acts as President, and is thus

barred by absolute Presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for official acts, D. Ct.

Doc. 74; and (2) the indictment must be dismissed under the Impeachment Judgment Clause

and principles of double jeopardy because it charges President Trump with conduct for which

he was impeached and acquitted by the U.S. Senate, D. Ct. Doc. 113.

On December 7, 2023, the district court ruled against President Trump’s claims. Pet.

App’x in No. 23-624, at 1a-59a. The district court held that Presidential immunity from

criminal prosecution for official acts does not exist in any circumstance. Id. at 7a. It held

that a federal prosecutor may bring criminal charges against a former President based on

conduct for which he was acquitted during an impeachment proceeding. Id. at 46a.

The district court did not assess whether President Trump’s alleged actions fell within

the “outer perimeter of his official responsibility,” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 755 (quotation

marks omitted), or were official acts on any basis. D. Ct. Doc. 171, at 30. Instead, the district

court held that Presidential immunity from prosecution for official acts does not exist at all.

Id. For the same reason, the district court did not conduct factfinding on this subject or give

President Trump an opportunity to present facts regarding the official nature of his conduct

prior to a potential trial. See Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F.4th 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

6

President Trump timely appealed the district court’s judgment to the D.C. Circuit.

The district court stayed proceedings in the district court pending the outcome of the appeal.

D. Ct. Doc. 186, at 2 (quoting Blassingame, 87 F.4th at 29).

On December 11, 2023, the Special Counsel filed a petition for certiorari before

judgment and a motion to expedite in this Court, seeking this Court’s immediate review of

President Trump’s claims on an extraordinarily expedited basis. Pet. in No. 23-624, at 2. On

December 22, 2023, this Court denied the request. Dec. 22, 2023, Order in No. 23-624.

The Special Counsel was, however, able to convince a panel of the D.C. Circuit to hear

President Trump’s claims on an extremely accelerated basis, giving President Trump just ten

days to draft and file his opening brief, only three days to file his reply brief, and setting the

case for oral argument one week later, on January 9, 2024. C.A. Doc. 2031419, 2032082. In

his brief to the D.C. Circuit, President Trump requested, “[i]f the Court affirms the district

court in any respect, … that the Court stay the issuance of its mandate pending further

review, including possible en banc proceedings and/or Supreme Court review.” C.A. App. Br.

55. The Special Counsel, by contrast, “request[ed] the Court to issue the mandate five days

after the entry of judgment,” citing (as it had done to this Court) the supposed, but

nonexistent, “imperative public importance of a prompt resolution of this case.” C.A. Resp.

Br. 65-66.

On February 6, 2024, the D.C. Circuit panel issued a per curiam opinion ruling against

President Trump’s immunity claims, providing an analysis that

overlooks and

mischaracterizes many of President Trump’s major arguments. App’x 1A-57A. On the same

day, the D.C. Circuit entered a judgment directing the clerk to issue the mandate to the

district court in four business days if President Trump did not file an application in this Court

to stay the mandate in that time. Id. at 58A. The D.C. Circuit’s judgment directs the Clerk

to issue the mandate after February 12, 2024, unless President Trump “notifies the Clerk in

7

writing that he has filed an application with the Supreme Court for a stay of the mandate

pending the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari,” in which case “the Clerk is directed to

withhold issuance of the mandate pending the Supreme Court’s final disposition of the

application.” Id. The D.C. Circuit further directed that “[t]he filing of a petition for rehearing

or rehearing en banc will not result in any withholding of the mandate.” Id.

This order departs from the D.C. Circuit’s ordinary procedures, which provide,

consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(b), that “the court ordinarily will

include as part of its disposition an instruction that the clerk withhold issuance of the

mandate until 7 days after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for rehearing or a

petition for rehearing en banc and, if such petition is timely filed, until 7 days after

disposition thereof.” D.C. Cir. R. 41(a)(1).

On February 12, 2024, as required by the D.C. Circuit’s judgment, President Trump

filed this application to stay the D.C. Circuit’s mandate pending disposition of his petition for

certiorari. President Trump also asks this Court to stay the D.C. Circuit’s mandate pending

resolution of his planned petition for en banc consideration in that court.

ARGUMENT

“The standards for granting a stay of mandate pending disposition of a petition for

certiorari are well established.” White v. Florida, 458 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1982) (Powell, J., in

chambers). “[1] There must be a reasonable probability that four members of the Court would

consider the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari or the

notation of probable jurisdiction; [2] there must be a significant possibility of reversal of the

lower court’s decision; and [3] there must be a likelihood that irreparable harm will result if

that decision is not stayed.” Id. (quoting Times-Picayune Publ’g Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419

U.S. 1301, 1305 (1974) (Powell, J., in chambers)); accord Karcher v. Daggett, 455 U.S. 1303

(1982) (Brennan, J., in chambers); Whalen v. Roe, 423 U.S. 1313, 1316-17 (1975) (Marshall,

8

J., in chambers). In addition, “in a close case it may be appropriate to ‘balance the equities’—

to explore the relative harms to applicant and respondent, as well as the interests of the

public at large.” Karcher, 455 U.S. at 1305–06.

Further, a stay is more likely warranted where, as here, “[t]he underlying issue in

th[e] case … has not heretofore been passed upon by this Court and is of continuing

importance.” McLeod v. Gen. Elec. Co., 87 S. Ct. 5, 6 (1966) (Harlan, J.). Thus, “the existence

of an important question not previously passed on by this Court” is a factor that weighs in

favor of a stay. Shiffman v. Selective Serv. Bd. No.5, 88 S. Ct. 1831, 1832 n.3 (1968) (Douglas,

J., dissenting); Certain Named and Unnamed Non-Citizen Children and Their Parents v.

Texas, 448 U.S. 1327, 1332 (1980) (Powell, J., in chambers) (holding that a case that “presents

novel and important issues” warrants a stay). Where the appeal “raises a difficult question

of constitutional significance” that “also involves a pressing national problem,” a stay is

warranted. Texas, 448 U.S. at 1331.

Here, each of these traditional factors counsels in favor of granting the stay.

I.

There Is a Reasonable Probability That This Court Will Grant Certiorari.

The appeal addresses two issues: whether the President possesses absolute immunity

from criminal prosecution for his official acts, and whether the impeachment and acquittal

of a President forecloses a subsequent criminal prosecution of the President for the same

and/or closely related conduct. The Court is likely to grant a petition for certiorari to review

these questions. Certiorari is warranted when “a United States court of appeals has decided

an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court,

or has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions

of this Court.” Sup. Ct. R. 10(c). Both criteria are satisfied here.

A.

The Case Raises Important Questions of Federal Law.

9

First, this case involves “important question[s] of federal law that ha[ve] not been, but

should be, settled by this Court.” Id. As the Special Counsel advised this Court on December

11, 2023, “[t]his case presents a fundamental question at the heart of our democracy: whether

a former President is absolutely immune from federal prosecution” for his official acts. Pet.

for Cert. Before Judgment, United States v. Trump, No. 23-624 (U.S. filed Dec. 11, 2023), at

2 (“Pet. in No. 23-624”). “This case involves a paradigmatic issue of imperative public

importance: the amenability to criminal prosecution of a former President of the United

States for [official] conduct undertaken during his presidency.” Id. at 10. President Trump’s

claim of absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for a President’s official acts “is a

quintessential example of ‘an important question of federal law that has not been, but should

be, settled by this Court.’” Id. at 12 (quoting Sup. Ct. R. 10(c)).

As the Special Counsel urged, “[i]t is of imperative public importance that [President

Trump’s] claims of immunity be resolved by this Court,” id. at 2, and “only this Court can

definitively resolve them,” id. at 3. “[T]his Court” should “grant review” and “resolve the

important immunity question presented here.” Id. at 10. “It requires no extended discussion

to confirm that this case … is at the apex of public importance.” Id. at 10. “The public

importance of the issues presented” in this case “merit this Court’s intervention.” Id. at 12

(quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 687 (1974)).

On this point, the parties agree. “An erroneous denial of a claim of presidential

immunity from criminal prosecution unquestionably warrants this Court’s review.” Br. in

Opposition in No. 23-624 (U.S. filed Dec. 20, 2023), at 3 (“BIO in No. 23-624”).

The public importance of Presidential immunity cannot be overstated. As stated

above, an absence of criminal immunity for official acts threatens the very ability of the

President to function properly. Any decision by the President on a politically controversial

10

question would face the threat of indictment by the opposing party after a change in

administrations. All presidential decisions would be exposed to undue, wrongful pressure

from opposing political forces, under a threat of indictment after the President has left office.

The D.C. Circuit’s denial of immunity thus threatens every future President with both

attempts of de facto extortion and blackmail while in office, and years of post-office trauma

at the hands of his or her political opponents. The threat of prosecution will become a political

cudgel used to influence the most sensitive and important Presidential decisions with the

menace of personal vulnerability after leaving office. The D.C. Circuit’s categorical denial of

immunity would forever undermine the independence, authority, and decisiveness of the

Presidency. The more consequential the decision, the more likely that political opponents

will use the threat of wrongful criminal prosecution to bully and extort the President, gravely

weakening the independence of the Presidency, and thus our country as a whole. Cycles of

recrimination are inevitable, thrusting the most sensitive and vital Presidential decisions in

the Nation’s future into a “context” that will be “acrid with the smell of threatened” criminal

prosecution. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 702 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). All this

directly contradicts the Founders’ careful design, as discussed below.

B.

The D.C. Circuit’s Opinion Conflicts With Decisions of This Court.

The D.C. Circuit’s decision also warrants review because it decided important federal

questions “in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.” Sup. Ct. R. 10(c). As

discussed below, infra Part II, the D.C. Circuit’s decision conflicts with Marbury v. Madison,

Mississippi v. Johnson, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, and a host of other decisions of this Court.

II.

There Is a Significant Possibility of Reversal.

The second factor considers whether there is “a significant possibility of reversal of

the lower court’s decision.” White, 458 U.S. at 1302. A “fair prospect of reversal” suffices.

Karcher, 455 U.S. at 1306. The factor is satisfied when “[t]he issues underlying this case are

11

important and difficult,” and it does not require “anticipating [the Court’s] views on the

merits.” Times-Picayune Publ’g, 419 U.S. at 1309. A stay is appropriate if “petitioner’s

position … cannot be deemed insubstantial,” McLeod, 87 S. Ct. at 6, and the Court need not

“think it more probable than not that” reversal will occur, Texas, 448 U.S. at 1332.

Here, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion mischaracterizes this Court’s case law and commits a

series of fundamental errors. A full accounting of these errors must await merits briefing,

but President Trump highlights a series of independently sufficient bases for reversal here.

A.

The Executive Vesting Clause and Marbury v. Madison.

First, the panel opinion’s analysis of the Executive Vesting Clause and Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), is profoundly wrong.

The Executive Vesting Clause provides that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in

a President of the United States of America.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. For another

branch to arrogate the “executive Power” to itself, or to purport to dictate how the President

must exercise that authority, is a core violation of the separation of powers. As a direct

corollary, the Clause provides that the Judicial Branch cannot sit in judgment directly over

the President’s official acts, and that any attempt to do so violates the separation of powers.

In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall described this doctrine as foundational

and self-evident. “By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with

certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion,

and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience.”

5 U.S. at 165–66. When it comes to the President’s official acts, “whatever opinion may be

entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and

can exist, no power to control that discretion.” Id. at 166. “[N]othing can be more perfectly

clear than that” the President’s discretionary “acts are only politically examinable.” Id.

12

“Questions … which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never

be made in this court.” Id. at 170. The President’s official acts, therefore, “can never be

examinable by the courts.” Id. at 166 (emphasis added).

Consistent with this opinion, an unbroken tradition from Marbury to the present

holds that Article III courts lack authority to sit in judgment directly over a President’s

official acts. In 1833, citing Marbury, Justice Story wrote that “[i]n the exercise of his political

powers [the President] is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country,

and to his own conscience. His decision, in relation to these powers, is subject to no control;

and his discretion, when exercised, is conclusive.”

CONSTITUTION

OF

THE

UNITED

STATES,

3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE

ch.

37,

§

1563

(1833),

https://lonang.com/library/reference/story-commentaries-us-constitution/sto-337/.

In Mississippi v. Johnson, this Court, citing Marbury, held that Article III courts lack

jurisdiction to enter an injunction directly against the President in the exercise of his official

duties. 71 U.S. 475, 499 (1866). “An attempt on the part of the judicial department of the

government to enforce the performance of such duties by the President might be justly

characterized, in the language of Chief Justice Marshall, as ‘an absurd and excessive

extravagance.’” Id. (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170). “[T]his court has no jurisdiction of a

bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.” Id. at 501.

In 1948, this Court wrote that “whatever of this order emanates from the President is

not susceptible of review by the Judicial Department.” Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S.

Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 112 (1948). The Judicial Branch cannot “require [the President] to

exercise the ‘executive Power’ in a judicially prescribed fashion.” Franklin v. Massachusetts,

505 U.S. 788, 826 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). “It

13

is incompatible with his constitutional position that [the President] be compelled personally

to defend his executive actions before a court.” Id. at 827.

Thus, Article III courts lack jurisdiction to enter an injunction directly against the

President in the exercise of his official responsibility, and no court has ever entered a

declaratory judgment against the President in his official acts. The D.C. Circuit observed

that “in Franklin, … [t]he plurality opinion of the Court concluded that ‘in general, this court

has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties,’

and a majority of the Justices in fact subscribed to this position.” Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d

973, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Franklin, 505 U.S. at 802-03). “With regard to the

President, courts do not have jurisdiction to enjoin him, and have never submitted the

President to declaratory relief.” Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

This is also the consistent litigation position of the U.S. Department of Justice, which

oversees the Special Counsel. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Reply Brief for Pet’r, In re

Trump, No. 18-2486 (4th Cir. filed Feb. 21, 2019), at 4-6 (invoking “the separation-of-powers

principle that ‘courts have no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance

of his official duties’”) (quoting Mississippi, 71 U.S. at 501) (cleaned up); U.S. Dep’t of Justice

Memorandum, Doc. 28 in Missouri v. Biden, No. 4:21-cv-00287-AGF (E.D. Mo. filed June 4,

2021) (same).

“Since Mississippi, the federal courts have continued this practice without exception

and have not sustained a single injunction against the President in his official capacity.” In

re Trump, 958 F.3d 274, 297–98 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom.

Trump v. D.C., 141 S. Ct. 1262 (2021) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (italics in original).

To be sure, Article III courts sometimes review the validity of the official acts of

subordinate executive officials below the President, see, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.

14

Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), and such review may reflect indirectly on the lawfulness of the

President’s own acts or directives. But the authority of judicial review of the official acts of

subordinate officers has never been held to extend to the official acts of the President himself.

Rather, there is an “‘unbroken historical tradition ... implicit in the separation of powers’ that

a President may not be ordered by the Judiciary to perform particular Executive acts.”

Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 719 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Franklin, 505 U.S.

at 827 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).

These two lines of precedent—that courts may not sit in judgment over a President’s

official acts, but they may review the validity of the acts of, and enjoin, subordinate executive

officials—both originate in the decisions of Chief Justice Marshall and have coexisted in

harmony for over two centuries. The distinction they reflect is not one of mere formalism.

“Youngstown … underscores the constitutional necessity of the judiciary separating the

President, as chief executive, from his subordinate officers within the executive branch.” In

re Trump, 958 F.3d at 301 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). “This distinction, in fact, makes all

the difference…. First, more formally, when a federal court enjoins the conduct of a

subordinate executive officer, it may frustrate the President’s will in a specific instance, but

it does not seize the very reins of the executive branch by exercising control over ‘the

executive department’ itself.” Id. (quoting Mississippi, 71 U.S. at 500). “Second, more

functionally, the President is ‘entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of

utmost discretion and sensitivity,’ and how he decides to allocate his energies and attentions

in an official capacity is itself owed constitutional protection.” Id. (quoting Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. at 750). “By contrast, when the judiciary enjoins subordinate executive officers, … the

level of intrusion into the executive branch’s fluid operation is far less severe.” Id.

15

Accordingly, the Executive Vesting Clause and the separation of powers prevent

Article III courts from sitting in judgment directly over the President’s official acts. Under

this principle, no Article III court has jurisdiction to enter an injunction against the

President, and no court has even ventured to enter a declaratory judgment against the

President opining on the validity of his official acts. Newdow, 603 F.3d at 1013. A fortiori,

the authority asserted by the lower courts here—to put a President on trial, enter a criminal

judgment against him, and punish him with imprisonment or other criminal penalties, all

for his official acts—constitutes a core violation of the separation of powers. Cf. Martin v.

Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 32-33 (1827) (Story, J.) (holding that, “[w]hen the President

exercises an authority confided to him by law,” his official conduct cannot “be passed upon by

a jury” or “upon the proofs submitted to a jury”). Accordingly, the Impeachment Judgment

Clause explicitly presupposes that, absent impeachment and conviction by the U.S. Senate,

a President cannot be prosecuted for his official acts. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.7.

The D.C. Circuit’s opinion offers a series of arguments to distinguish Marbury and the

subsequent line of authority. None is convincing.

First, the opinion notes that “Marbury distinguished between two kinds of official acts:

discretionary and ministerial.” App’x 21A. It admits that the President’s “discretionary acts

… ‘can never be examinable by the courts.’” Id. (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 166). But it

likens the President’s alleged duty to comply with each and every federal criminal law—a

duty that no court has ever upheld—to a “ministerial” duty of a subordinate official that

admits of no discretion. Id. at 22A (holding that “Marbury thus makes clear that Article III

courts may review certain kinds of official acts — including those that are legal in nature”);

16

see also id. at 25A (holding that “actions” that “allegedly violated generally applicable

criminal laws2 … were not properly within the scope of his lawful discretion”).

This characterization of a “ministerial” duty under Marbury as any duty that is “legal

in nature,” id., cannot be squared with Marbury itself. What renders a duty “ministerial” is

not whether it is “legal in nature,” id., but whether it admits of any discretion (which is why

“ministerial” duties are distinguished from “discretionary” acts, id.). A “ministerial act” is

one—like the delivery of an already-signed commission—where there is “a precise course

accurately marked out by law, [which] is to be strictly pursued.” Marbury, 5 U.S. at 158. A

ministerial duty arises when the legislature “direct[s]” an official “peremptorily to perform

certain acts.” Id. at 166. By contrast, in any case “in which the executive possesses a

constitutional or legal discretion,” id., the official act is not ministerial. As the Court held in

Mississippi, “[a] ministerial duty” is “a simple, definite duty” in “which nothing is left to

discretion.” 71 U.S. at 498. If there is any “exercise of judgment” involved, the duty is not

ministerial. Id. at 499. Even the panel opinion admits that a “ministerial” duty is one “in

which ‘nothing [i]s left to discretion.’” App’x 23A (quoting Mississippi, 71 U.S. at 498).

2 The D.C. Circuit’s unsupported assumption that all “generally applicable criminal laws”

apply to the President in his official acts cannot be squared with Franklin, which held that

“[w]e would require an express statement by Congress before assuming it intended to subject

the President’s performance of his statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion.”

Franklin, 505 U.S. at 801; see also Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466

(1989) (“[W]e are loath to conclude that Congress intended to press ahead into dangerous

constitutional thickets in the absence of firm evidence that it courted those perils.”). This

Court requires an “express statement” before it will construe even a civil statute to grant

judicial review over the President’s official acts, yet the D.C. Circuit assumes that every

“generally applicable” federal criminal statute must be construed to cover the President in

the exercise of his official responsibilities. Contrary to this assumption, statutes providing

for judicial review of a President’s official acts present, at very least, “dangerous

constitutional thickets” and grave “perils,” requiring an extremely clear statement of

Congress’s intent to cover the President. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 466.

17

Here, even a moment’s reflection demonstrates that avoiding violations of federal

criminal law involves the “exercise of judgment,” Mississippi, 71 U.S. at 499, and of “executive

discretion.” Marbury, 5 U.S. at 166. A statute that imposes a “ministerial” duty is one that

commands a specific, affirmative course of conduct that admits of no discretion in its

execution. Criminal statutes do not command specific, affirmative courses of action; rather,

they prohibit certain specified conduct, leaving those covered with a wide range of discretion

in how to conduct themselves in compliance with such prohibitions. Given a prohibition in a

criminal statute, a covered individual has a virtually infinite array of options on structuring

his or her conduct to avoid violating the statute—thus rendering compliance “discretionary”

within the meaning of Marbury and its progeny.

In fact, the government itself has contended that complying with a constitutional

prohibition, the Emoluments Clause, is obviously not ministerial because it “requires ample

‘exercise of judgment’.” In re Trump, Reply Brief, at 5. This point is indisputable:

[O]nce an official responsibility involves the ‘exercise of judgment,’ it is a nonministerial official duty. That describes compliance with the Emoluments Clauses….

[C]ompliance in practice is not a “simple, definite” endeavor; rather, it involves

seemingly innumerable judgment calls about how a President must organize his

financial interests, sequester his real assets, or restructure his holdings. To put a

finer point on it, compare these sorts of choices with what was required in the

quintessential example of a ministerial duty: the delivery of the commission in

Marbury v. Madison. There, Marbury’s commission had been signed and sealed, but

not delivered. The Secretary of State was required by law to just hand over the

parchment, a function that required no judgment and where nothing was left to

discretion. Such a rote errand is different in kind from the sort of discretionary

conduct at issue here.

In re Trump, 958 F.3d at 299–300 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Likewise, “compliance in

practice” with federal criminal statutes “is not a ‘simple, definite’ endeavor,” id.—especially

the vague, broadly phrased statutes charged in the indictment here, such as 18 U.S.C. §

1512(c)(2).

18

Moreover, the government contends that these statutes purport to impose duties on

the President as he exercises his official responsibilities in overseeing the affairs of the

Department of Justice, deliberating about Cabinet-level appointments, communicating with

members of Congress and state officials about matters of enormous federal concern,

communicating with the public on matters of public concern through official government

channels, etc.—all of which are obviously discretionary, not “ministerial,” responsibilities, for

which the President possesses discretion on how to carry out those duties and

responsibilities. Indeed, virtually all the President’s official responsibilities involve the

exercise of discretion, which is perhaps why the federal courts “have … never attempted to

exercise power to order the President to perform a ministerial duty.” Swan, 100 F.3d at 978.

Second, the panel opinion reasons that “[t]he cases following Marbury confirm that

we may review the President’s actions when he is bound by law, including by federal criminal

statutes.” App’x 22A. But all the cases cited in the opinion do not involve review of “the

President’s actions,” id., but review of the actions of subordinate federal officials or others

implementing federal programs, not the President himself. Id. at 22A-23A. As the opinion

admits, Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-79 (1804), reviewed the acts of a private

ship’s captain, not the President, App’x 22A; Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S.

524, 612-13 (1838), “reviewed the official acts of the Postmaster General, not the President,”

App’x 22A; and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), reviewed the

acts of the Secretary of Commerce, not the President, App’x 23A. None of these cases provides

any authority for Article III courts to sit in judgment directly over the President’s official acts;

and none contradicts the still-binding holding of Marbury that such acts “can never be

examinable by the courts.” 5 U.S. at 166.

19

In fact, the opinion concedes that “Marbury and its progeny exercised jurisdiction only

over subordinate officers, not the President himself,” App’x 24A, and that “[t]he writ in

Marbury was brought against the Secretary of State; in Little against a commander of a ship

of war; in Kendall against the postmaster general; in Youngstown against the Secretary of

Commerce.” Id. But the opinion then pivots—in a dizzying non sequitur—to assert that “the

Supreme Court has unequivocally explained” that “[n]o man in this country is so high that

he is above the law.” Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882)).

The D.C. Circuit’s reliance on the highly generalized maxim that “no man … is above

the law,” id., fails to provide a plausible basis for it to disregard Marbury, Mississippi, or its

own precedents in Swan and Newdow. Those cases, and the separation of powers reflected

in Article II, are part of “the law” that binds the courts. In Fitzgerald, this Court held that

the contention that recognizing absolute Presidential immunity “places the President ‘above

the law’” is “rhetorically chilling but wholly unjustified.” 457 U.S. at 758 n.41. As the panel

opinion overlooks, “[t]he remedy of impeachment demonstrates that the President remains

accountable under law for his misdeeds in office.” Id. This is especially true here, where the

Impeachment Judgment Clause specifically authorizes the criminal prosecution of a

President, but only after the crucial structural check of impeachment and conviction. U.S.

CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. “It is simply error to characterize an official as ‘above the law’ because

a particular remedy is not available against him.” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 758 n.41. Indeed,

the Constitution—including the Executive Vesting Clause—is the most fundamental “law,”

and it dictates that Article III courts lack authority to sit in judgment over a President’s

official acts. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 166. “[T]he federal judiciary, no less than the President, is

subject to the law. And here the federal judiciary has sorely overstepped its proper bounds.”

20

In re Trump, 958 F.3d at 291 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438

U.S. 478, 506 (1978).

Next, the panel opinion notes that “[t]he President does not enjoy absolute immunity

from criminal subpoenas issued by state and federal prosecutors and may be compelled by

the courts to respond.”

App’x 24A (citing United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 33-34

(C.C.D.Va. 1807)). But compelling the President to provide information in response to a

criminal subpoena is a far cry from putting him on trial, entering judgment against him, and

potentially subjecting him to imprisonment for his official acts. Thus, Chief Justice Marshall,

the author of Burr, 25 F. Cas. 33-34, wrote just a few years earlier that the President’s official

acts “can never be examinable by the courts.” Marbury, 5 U.S. at 166.3

B.

“The Presuppositions of Our Political History.”

Below, President Trump argued that “‘[p]erhaps the most telling indication of a severe

constitutional problem’ with this ‘wholly unprecedented’ prosecution ‘is a lack of historical

precedent to support it.’” C.A. App.Br. 7 (quoting Seila Law, LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183,

2201 (2020)); see also id. at 17-18. “The unbroken tradition of not exercising the supposed

formidable power of criminally prosecuting a President for official acts—despite ample

motive and opportunity to do so, over centuries—implies that the power does not exist.” Id.

at 18 (citing, inter alia, NFIB v. OSHA, 595 U.S. 109, 119 (2022) (per curiam); Free Enter.

Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010)). “[T]he longstanding

The panel opinion’s discussion of legislative and judicial immunity, App’x 25A-30A,

misapprehends this Court’s case law, but also overlooks a fundamental point. At common

law, immunity from criminal prosecution was more fundamental to the doctrine of official

immunity than immunity from civil liability. As this Court has recognized, “the privilege” of

legislative immunity “was not born primarily of a desire to avoid private suits …, but rather

to prevent intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile

judiciary.” United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180–81 (1966). Preventing “the

instigation of criminal charges against critical or disfavored legislators” was the “chief fear”

that led to the recognition of legislative immunity. Id. at 182 (emphasis added).

3

21

‘practice of the government,’ can inform our determination of ‘what the law is.’” N.L.R.B. v.

Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401

(1819), and Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177). “That principle is neither new nor controversial,” and

this Court’s “cases have continually confirmed [this] view.” Id. (citing Mistretta v. United

States, 488 U.S. 361, 401 (1989), and eight other cases from 1803 to 1981). Consulting “the

presuppositions of our political history,” C.A. App.Br. 17 (quoting Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 749),

President Trump argued that this 234-year-long, unbroken “constitutional practice ... tends

to negate the existence of the … power asserted here.” Id. at 18 (quoting Printz v. United

States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997)).

The opinion below overlooks this argument. It cites Seila Law only for the proposition

that the President is “elected by the entire Nation,” App’x 39A, and it does not cite or discuss

NFIB, Free Enterprise Fund, Printz, or similar cases.

It also declines to grapple with

President Trump’s long series of real-world, historical examples of former Presidents accused

of criminal behavior through their official acts—none of whom, in 234 years, ever faced

prosecution, despite ample political motive and practical opportunity to charge them.

“American history abounds with examples of Presidents who were accused by political

opponents of committing crimes through their official acts.” C.A. App.Br. 17. “These include,

among many others, John Quincy Adams’ alleged ‘corrupt bargain’ in appointing Henry Clay

as Secretary of State;4 President George W. Bush’s allegedly false claim to Congress that

Saddam Hussein possessed stockpiles of ‘weapons of mass destruction,’ which led to war in

which thousands were killed;5 and President Obama’s alleged authorization of a drone strike

4 See, e.g., Jessie Kratz, The 1824 Presidential Election and the “Corrupt Bargain”, National

Archives

(Oct.

22,

2020),

https://prologue.blogs.archives.gov/2020/10/22/the-1824presidential-election-and-the-corrupt-bargain/.

5 See, e.g., Gary L. Gregg II, George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs, UVA Miller Center,

https://millercenter.org/president/-gwbush/foreign-affairs; Tim Arango, Ex-Prosecutor’s Book

22

that targeted and killed a U.S. citizen abroad (and his teenage son, also a U.S. citizen).6” Id.

They also include, among many other examples, President Reagan’s alleged involvement in

the Iran-Contra scandal,7 President Clinton’s last-minute pardon of fugitive financier Marc

Rich,8 President Clinton’s repeated use of airstrikes in the Middle East in August and

November 1998 in an alleged attempt to distract attention from the Monica Lewinsky

scandal,9 President Biden’s egregious mismanagement of the United States’ border security,

and President Biden’s alleged “material support for terrorism” through the funding of the

UNRWA despite its documented history of direct support for terrorism.10 From the earliest

Accuses

Bush

of

Murder,

N.Y.

Times

(July

7,

2008),

https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/07/business/media/07bugliosi.html.

6 See, e.g., Spencer Ackerman, US Cited Controversial Law in Decision to Kill American

Citizen

by

Drone,

The

Guardian

(June

23,

2014),

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/23/us-justification-drone-killing-americancitizen-awlaki.

7 The Editors, Iran-Contra Scandal Begins with Shredded Documents, History (Nov. 13,

2009), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/oliver-north-starts-feeding-documentsinto-the-shredding-machine.

8 Andrew C. McCarthy, The Wages of Prosecuting Presidents for their Official Acts, Nat’l

Review (Dec. 9, 2023), https://www.nationalreview.com/2023/12/the-wages-of-prosecutingpresidents-over-their-official-acts/ (reporting first-hand that “[i]n 2001 … the Justice

Department considered criminal charges against former president Clinton, and even a theory

that Hillary Clinton may have conspired with him, in connection with his final-day corrupt

pardons,” by which federal prosecutors were “righteously appalled,” but “the Bush Justice

Department would not cross that Rubicon”).

9 See, e.g., World Media Troubled by Clinton’s Timing in Airstrikes, CNN (Dec. 18, 1998),

http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/meast/9812/18/iraq.press/; Francis X. Clines and Steven Lee

Myers, Attack on Iraq; The Overview; Impeachment Vote in House Delayed As Clinton

Launches Iraq Air Strike, Citing Military Need to Move Swiftly, N.Y. Times (Dec. 17, 1998),

https://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/17/world/attack-iraq-overview-impeachment-vote-housedelayed-clinton-launches-iraq-air.html.

10 See, e.g., Jason Willick, The Eyebrow-Raising Line in the Trump Immunity Opinion, Wash.

Post (Feb. 7, 2024), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/02/07/trump-immunitydecision-disclaimer/; Andrew McCarthy, Thoughts on Biden’s Funding of Terror-Sponsoring

UNRWA and D.C. Circuit’s Delay on Trump Immunity, Nat’l Review (Jan. 31, 2024),

https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/thoughts-on-bidens-funding-of-terror-sponsoringunrwa-and-d-c-circuits-delay-on-trump-immunity/ (“When President Biden insisted on

restarting funding for UNRWA, to the tune of over $1 billion since 2021, there was abundant,

well-known evidence, going back decades, that UNRWA provides material support to

terrorism. It was not just a hypothetical possibility that Biden’s funding might end up

23

days of the Republic until today, American history is littered with examples of allegedly

“criminal” behavior by Presidents in their official acts, behavior that was never prosecuted.11

The panel opinion ignores the long history of real-world examples of Presidents

engaging in actual behavior that political opponents viewed as egregious and “criminal.”

Instead, keying on the Special Counsel’s arguments, the panel fretted about lurid

hypotheticals that have never occurred in 234 years of history, almost certainly never will

occur, and would virtually certainly result in impeachment and Senate conviction (thus

authorizing criminal prosecution) if they did occur—such as a hypothetical President

corruptly ordering the assassination of political rivals through “SEAL Team Six.” D.C. Cir.

Oral Arg Tr. 10:19-21. Such hypotheticals provide fodder for histrionic media coverage, but

they are a poor substitute for legal and historical analysis. Confronted with real-world

hypotheticals—such as President Obama’s killing of U.S. citizens by drone strike—the

Special Counsel conceded below that Presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for

official acts likely exists and would apply, directly contradicting the “categorical,” App’x 20A,

holdings to the contrary of both the appellate panel and the trial court. D.C. Cir. Oral Arg.

facilitating Hamas’s operations. There were notorious cases over the years of UNRWA terror

support.”); The Editors, Hamas Was Right Under Unrwa’s Nose, Wall St. J. (Feb. 11, 2024),

https://www.wsj.com/articles/hamas-was-right-under-unrwas-nose-tunnels-gaza-israel-warf715d219?mod=opinion_lead_pos2 (“Israel has provided evidence that 12 Unrwa employees

took part in the Oct. 7 massacre, and that 1,200 are affiliated with or members of Hamas and

Islamic Jihad.”).

11 Similar examples pervade American history—consider, for example, President Adams’

jailing of political opponents under the Alien and Sedition Acts, see The Editors, Alien and

Sedition Acts, History (June 21, 2023), https://www.history.com/topics/early-us/alien-andsedition-acts; President Jackson’s treatment of the Cherokee and other tribes in defiance of

this Court’s rulings, see The Editors, Indian Treaties and the Removal Act of 1830, Office of

the Historian, U.S. Department of State, https://history.state.gov/milestones/18301860/indian-treaties; and President Polk’s allegedly false statement to Congress that Mexico

had “invaded our territory and shed American blood on American soil” at the outbreak of

Mexican-American War, which then-Congressman Abraham Lincoln challenged through the

famous “Spot Resolutions,” The Editors, Mexican-American War, Encyclopaedia Britannica

(Jan. 2, 2024), https://www.britannica.com/event/Mexican-American-War/Invasion-and-war.

24

Tr. 49:18-22 (Special Counsel admitting that a “drone strike” where “civilians were killed …

might be the kind of place in which the Court would properly recognize some kind of

immunity”). Further, the logical presupposition of such speculative hypotheticals—i.e., that

the Founders supposedly must have intended that no alleged Presidential misdeed could ever

escape prosecution—is plainly incorrect and contradicts the basic premises of a system of

separated powers. “While the separation of powers may prevent us from righting every

wrong, it does so in order to ensure that we do not lose liberty.” Morrison, 487 U.S. at 710

(Scalia, J., dissenting).

Thus, when the panel did get around to addressing actual history, App’x 35A-37A, it

drew precisely the wrong conclusions. The panel somehow proposed that there is no reason

to fear “a torrent of politically motivated prosecutions” in the future, because “this is the first

time since the Founding that a former President has been federally indicted,” and so the

prosecution of President Trump is sure to be a historical one-off. App’x 35A. This reasoning

is unpersuasive to followers of recent American political history. For example, “[i]n the 209

years from 1789 to 1998, there was one impeachment of a President—Andrew Johnson in

1868.” BIO in No. 23-624, at 33. “In the last 25 years, there have been three, with a fourth

currently under consideration by the U.S. House of Representatives.” Id. “Presidential

impeachment is changing from virtually unthinkable to a fixture of interbranch politics.” Id.

Moreover, “impeachment faces formidable structural checks—it must be voted by a majority

of the House, with a supermajority of the Senate required to convict. Criminal prosecution,

by contrast, requires only the action of a single enterprising prosecutor and a compliant grand

jury.” Id.

25

For all these reasons, the “presuppositions of our political history” decisively favor the

recognition of Presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for acts within the “outer

perimeter of the President’s official responsibilities.” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 745, 756.

C.

The Likelihood of Chilling Presidential Action.

In Fitzgerald, this Court held that the threat of future civil liability for official acts—

including years after the President left office—could deter the President from the “bold and

unhesitating action” required for his official responsibilities. 457 U.S. at 745. In so holding,

“[t]his Court … weighed concerns of public policy, especially as illuminated by our history

and the structure of our government.” Id. at 747–48. The Court emphasized that “[t]he

President occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme,” id. at 749, and is

“entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity,”

id. at 750. “Because of the singular importance of the President’s duties, diversion of his

energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective

functioning of government.” Id. at 751. “[T]here exists the greatest public interest in

providing” the President with “‘the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with’

the duties of his office.” Id. at 752 (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 203 (1979)).

“This concern is compelling where” the President “must make the most sensitive and farreaching decisions entrusted to any official under our constitutional system.” Id. “Nor can

the sheer prominence of the President’s office be ignored.” Id. at 752–53. “[T]he President

would be an easily identifiable target” for politically motivated litigation.

Id. at 753.

“Cognizance of this personal vulnerability frequently could distract a President from his

public duties, to the detriment of not only the President and his office but also the Nation

that the Presidency was designed to serve.” Id.

26

All the same concerns apply to the threat of criminal prosecution of a President for his

official acts—in fact, those concerns are dramatically enhanced. The President’s “personal

vulnerability,” id., to criminal prosecution, with its greater stigma and far more severe

penalties, provides a much graver deterrent to “bold and unhesitating action” in making “the

most sensitive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under our constitutional

system.”

Id. at 745, 752.

The panel opinion disagrees, dismissing such concerns as

unfounded. App’x 32A-35A. Its analysis is unpersuasive.

First, the panel opinion begins by drawing a comparison between the exercise of the

President’s “unique” responsibilities and the deliberations of ordinary citizens called to serve

as federal jurors. Id. (citing Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 16 (1933)). The opinion

reasons that “[w]e cannot presume that a President will be unduly cowed by the prospect of

post-Presidency criminal liability any more than a juror would be influenced by the prospect

of post-deliberation criminal liability….” App’x 32A-33A. This analogy falls short. Though

undoubtedly exercising an important function, a juror in a federal case does not “occup[y]”

anything like the President’s “unique position in the constitutional scheme,” Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. at 749, and is not “entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost

discretion and sensitivity” on a scale anything like the Presidency, id. at 750. “The singular

importance of [a federal juror’s] duties” does not entail that “diversion of his energies by

concern with [personal liability] would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of

government.” Id. at 751. A federal juror does not “make the most sensitive and far-reaching

decisions entrusted to any official under our constitutional system.” Id. at 752. “Nor” does a

federal juror sit in a position whose “sheer prominence” cannot “be ignored.” Id. at 752–53.

A federal juror would not “be an easily identifiable target” for politically motivated

prosecution. Id. at 753. “Cognizance of this personal vulnerability” is unlikely to “distract a

27

[federal juror] from his public duties, to the detriment of not only the [juror] and his office

but also the Nation that the [juror] was designed to serve.” Id.

The per curiam opinion also relies on an analogy with the executive staffers in United

States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

App’x 32A-33A.

That reasoning is likewise

unconvincing, for at least two reasons. First, Nixon addressed the potential deterrence to

candid advice from the requirement of providing information in response to a criminal

subpoena, see App’x 32A-33A, not the far more chilling threat of “personal vulnerability” to

prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment. Second, Fitzgerald and other cases correctly

reject the analogy between the President, who occupies “a unique position in the

constitutional scheme,” 457 U.S. at 749, and lower-level executive officials such as aides,

staff, and even Cabinet officers. “The President’s unique status under the Constitution

distinguishes him from other executive officials.” Id. at 750. The Court has thus “long

recognized” that “the scope of Presidential immunity from judicial process differs

significantly from that of Cabinet or inferior officers.” Franklin, 505 U.S. at 826 (Scalia, J.,

concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

Next, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion reasons that “past Presidents have understood

themselves to be subject to impeachment and criminal liability, at least under certain

circumstances, so the possibility of chilling executive action is already in effect,” because

“criminal prosecution of a former President is expressly authorized by the Impeachment

Judgment Clause after impeachment and conviction.” App’x 33A. This argument ignores

the enormous significance of the structural check that the Constitution places between a

President and criminal prosecution for his official acts—i.e., the requirement of impeachment

and conviction by the U.S. Senate. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.7.

28

The Founders were steeped in classical history and understood that politically

motivated prosecutions had corroded democratic and republican governments in ancient

Athens and Rome. They were thus explicitly concerned about the destructive effect on the

new Republic of such politically motivated prosecutions—i.e., what James Madison described

as the “new fangled and artificial treasons, [which] have been the great engines, by which

violent factions, the natural offspring of free governments, have usually wreaked their

alternate malignity on each other.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (Madison). Accordingly, the

Founders exercised care when they consciously departed from the British common-law

practice of treating the Chief Executive as absolutely immune in all circumstances. They

crafted a carefully balanced approach that authorizes the criminal prosecution of a President,

but only after both Houses of Congress—reflecting the widespread political consensus

required for a two-thirds majority vote of the Senate—support the President’s removal from

office for high crimes and misdemeanors. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.7.

Contrary to the lower court’s ahistorical analysis, this was the common understanding

of the Founders—that criminal prosecution of a President could only occur if the President

was impeached and convicted by the U.S. Senate. Id. This understanding matches the views

of both Chief Justice Marshall and Attorney General Charles Lee (Attorney General under

Presidents George Washington and John Adams), as expressed in Marbury v. Madison, 5

U.S. at 149, 165-66, and the understanding of Justice Story reflected both in his

Commentaries and in his opinion in Martin, 25 U.S. at 32-33.

This was also the clear and unambiguous understanding of Alexander Hamilton. The

per curiam opinion states that “President Trump turns to one sentence written by Alexander

Hamilton in the Federalist 69,” App’x 46A, but its math is off. Hamilton wrote, not once, but

three times in three different essays, that the President may be subject to criminal

prosecution only after he is impeached and convicted by the Senate, and as a “consequence”

29

of that conviction. “The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried,

and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from

office; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course

of law.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Hamilton). “The punishment which may be the consequence

of conviction upon impeachment, is not to terminate the chastisement of the offender. After

having been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem and confidence, and honors

and emoluments of his country, he will still be liable to prosecution and punishment in the

ordinary course of law.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Hamilton). The President is “at all times

liable to impeachment, trial, dismission from office, incapacity to serve in any other, and to

forfeiture of life and estate by subsequent prosecution in the common course of law.” THE

FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Hamilton) (all emphases added).

As Hamilton explains, criminal

prosecution of a President can arise only “after,” “subsequent” to, “afterwards,” and as a

“consequence” of “conviction upon impeachment.”

Id. (emphasis added).

“The plain

implication” of this Clause “is that criminal prosecution, like removal from the Presidency

and disqualification from other offices, is a consequence that can come about only after the

Senate’s judgment, not during or prior to the Senate trial.” Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412,

2444 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting). “This was how Hamilton explained the impeachment

provisions in the Federalist Papers. He wrote that a President may ‘be impeached, tried,

and, upon conviction ... would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the

ordinary course of law.’” Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 69).

The opinion below errs by disregarding this formidable, carefully crafted structural

check against the criminal prosecution of Presidents for their official acts. Conviction upon

impeachment requires both a majority vote of the House to impeach, and two-thirds majority

vote of the U.S. Senate to convict—which together require a widespread political consensus

of elected representatives across the political spectrum and across the Nation’s geographic

30

regions. Criminal prosecution, by contrast, requires only a single enterprising prosecutor

and a compliant grand jury drawn from a tiny slice of America, which may be—and, if the

prosecutor is clever enough, probably will be—located in an enclave of deep political hostility

to the President. Therefore, criminal prosecution which can only occur after impeachment

and conviction plainly does not present the same “chilling effect,” App’x 33A, as prosecution

unhindered by any structural check—as in this case, where President Trump was acquitted

by the Senate but then wrongfully prosecuted by his political opponent for the same conduct.

Finally, for the reasons discussed above, the D.C. Circuit’s overall assessment that

“the risk of criminal liability chilling Presidential action appears to be low,” App’x 34A,

cannot be squared with our recent political history.

Impeachment of Presidents, once

virtually unheard-of, is becoming a routine feature of interbranch conflict. Once the political

Rubicon is crossed, criminal prosecution of Presidents by their political opponents will

become common, and the threat of such prosecution will become ubiquitous, hanging over

every President like a sword of Damocles. Instead of acting fearlessly, every President will

be forced to ponder, before taking any official act—especially the most politically

controversial decisions—whether the decision may lead to his or her prosecution, conviction,

and imprisonment once the administration changes. Enterprising political opponents, aware

of this, will wield the threat of prosecution as a powerful and menacing tool to influence

Presidents’ official actions. The judgment below thus “deeply wounds the President” by

forever undermining his or her independence.

Morrison, 487 U.S. at 713 (Scalia, J.,

dissenting).

III.

There Is a Likelihood of Irreparable Harm Absent the Stay.

The third factor considers whether the applicant “would … suffer irreparable harm

were the stay not granted.” Karcher, 455 U.S. at 1306. Here, the threat of irreparable injury

if the D.C. Circuit’s mandate is not stayed is clear and manifest.

31

A.

Absent a Stay, President Trump Will Immediately Be Required to Bear

the Burdens of Prosecution and Trial.

Absolute immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of

litigation…. The entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability;

and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to

trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis added). Absolute immunity’s

protection is “not limited to liability for money damages,” but “also include[s] ‘the general

costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial—distraction of officials from their

governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from

public service.’” Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982)). Under absolute

immunity, “even such pretrial matters as discovery are to be avoided if possible, as

‘[i]nquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government.’” Id. (quoting

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009)

(reaffirming that official immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to

liability” that “is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial”); Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009); Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996); P.R. Aqueduct

& Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1993).

The same is true of President Trump’s claim based on principles of double jeopardy

under the Impeachment Judgment Clause. See, e.g., Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 50708 (1979) (double jeopardy protects defendants “not only from the consequences of litigation’s

results but also from the burden of defending themselves”) (quotation omitted); Abney v.

United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 (1977) (double jeopardy “assures an individual that, among

other things, he will not be forced, with certain exceptions, to endure the personal strain,

public embarrassment, and expense of a [second] criminal trial”); accord Digital Equip. Corp.

v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 869-71 (1994) (summarizing cases holding that double32

jeopardy and immunity defenses involve an “entitlement not to stand trial or face the other

burdens of litigation”).

In fact, the opinion below strongly endorses this conclusion. In holding that there is

appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the opinion

emphasizes that “[i]t would be … ‘unseemly’ for us to require that former President Trump

first be tried in order to secure review of his immunity claim after final judgment.” App’x

14A (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 691-92). “[T]he ‘deprivation of the right not to be tried’ would

be ‘effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’” Id. at 15 (quoting Midland

Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 800–01 (1989)). “[T]he right not to stand trial

must be ‘vindicated before trial’ or not at all.” Id. These statements cannot be squared with

the panel’s decision to dramatically accelerate its issuance of the mandate—thus immediately

launching criminal proceedings and trial in the district court—before the completion of

ordinary appellate review, especially this Court’s review. App’x 58A.

B.

Conducting the Criminal Trial of President Trump Will Inflict Grave

First Amendment Injuries on American Voters.

The D.C. Circuit’s extraordinary decision to return the mandate to the district court

to proceed to trial imposes another grave species of irreparable injury—the threat to the First

Amendment rights of President Trump, his supporters and volunteers, and all American

voters, who are entitled to hear from the leading candidate for President at the height of the

Presidential campaign. The Special Counsel seeks urgently to force President Trump into a

months-long criminal trial at the height of campaign season, effectively sidelining him and

preventing him from campaigning against the current President to whom the Special Counsel

ultimately reports, President Biden. This would impose grave First Amendment injuries on

President Trump and all American voters, whether they support him or not, and threatens

to tarnish the federal courts with the appearance of partisanship.

33

“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,

unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).

Here, President Trump is the leading candidate for President of the United States and the

greatest electoral threat to President Biden, whose administration is prosecuting him.

Conducting a months-long criminal trial of the leading opponent of the current regime in the

middle of a Presidential campaign will inevitably disrupt President Trump’s ability to

campaign against President Biden, stifling his voice and preventing American voters from

hearing from the leading candidate.

The speech of a Presidential candidate campaigning for President stands at the

pinnacle of First Amendment protection. “Speech on matters of public concern is at the heart

of the First Amendment’s protection. That is because speech concerning public affairs is

more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.” Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.

443, 451-52 (2011) (cleaned up) (citing numerous cases). “No form of speech is entitled to

greater constitutional protection” than “[c]ore political speech.”

Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).

McIntyre v. Ohio Elec.

Likewise, the First Amendment’s “constitutional

guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns

for political office.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 162 (2014) (quoting

Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)). Campaign speech lies “at the core of

our electoral process of the First Amendment freedoms—an area … where protection of

robust discussion is at its zenith.” Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (citations and

quotations omitted).

This First Amendment protection extends, first and foremost, to the American voters

who would hear and consider President Trump’s campaign speech as they reflect on how to

cast their ballots in November.

The First Amendment’s “protection afforded is to the

34

communication, to its source and to its recipients both.” Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va.

Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (citing many cases); see also

Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 104 (2017) (recognizing the right to “speak and

listen, and then … speak and listen once more,” as a “fundamental principle of the First

Amendment”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). “[T]he right to receive

ideas follows ineluctably from the sender’s First Amendment right to send them.” Bd. of

Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982). A de facto

restriction on President Trump’s campaign speech—such as that caused by a months-long

criminal trial at the height of campaign season—inflicts a “reciprocal” injury on the hundreds

of millions of Americans who listen to him. Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 757.

This Court has “never allowed the government to prohibit candidates from

communicating relevant information to voters during an election.” Republican Party of

Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 781-82 (2002). Permitting the Biden administration to put

its leading political opponent on trial in the middle of the campaign for President would do

just that—effectively stifling President Trump’s campaign speech for months on end with the

election date less than nine months away.

IV.

The Balancing of Equities Strongly Favors a Stay.

Since this is not a “close case,” the Court need not “balance the equities.” Karcher,

455 U.S. at 1305-06. But if it does, the equities strongly favor a stay of the mandate. As

detailed above, the considerations counseling in favor of a stay are overwhelming. They

include preserving this Court’s jurisdiction to hear this appeal in an orderly fashion,

protecting the 234-year tradition against prosecuting Presidents for their official acts,

preventing all Presidents from being effectively blackmailed and extorted by their political

opponents with threat of wrongful prosecution for their official acts, preventing the manifest

35

irreparable injury of forcing President Trump to undergo criminal trial before his claim of

immunity is adjudicated, and violating the First Amendment rights of all American voters to

hear from the leading candidate at the height of a Presidential campaign.

Against these compelling interests, in the court below, the Special Counsel cited only

one consideration supposedly justifying the immediate return of the mandate to the district

court: “the imperative public importance of a prompt resolution of this case.” C.A. Resp.Br.

at 65. The Special Counsel cited the same vaguely defined interest in “prompt resolution” of

this case in its Petition for Certiorari Before Judgment, which this Court denied. As noted

in President Trump’s Brief in Opposition, the Special Counsel conflates the supposed “public”

interest, id., with the manifestly partisan interest of the Special Counsel’s ultimate boss,

President Biden, in conducting President Trump’s criminal trial while he is campaigning

against President Biden himself.

In the Court of Appeals, as here, the Special Counsel never explains why it is so

“imperative” that this case proceed to trial immediately, forestalling ordinary en banc review

and even this Court’s review procedures. The prospect that an interlocutory appeal of an

immunity question might affect a pending trial date is commonplace and routine. “Especially

in cases of extraordinary public moment, the individual may be required to submit to delay

not immoderate in extent and not oppressive in its consequences if the public welfare or

convenience will thereby be promoted.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 256 (1936). “A

mere assertion of delay does not constitute substantial harm.

Some delay would be

occasioned by almost all interlocutory appeals.” United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 314 F.3d

612, 622 (D.C. Cir. 2003), jurisdictional ruling overruled by Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter,

558 U.S. 100 (2009).

“The Special Counsel’s request, therefore, cannot avoid the appearance of

partisanship.” BIO in No. 23-624, at 22. “This Court is ‘not required to exhibit a naiveté

36

from which ordinary citizens are free.’” Id. (quoting Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct.

2551, 2575 (2019)). The Special Counsel’s prior request to circumvent ordinary appellate

review caused “commentators from across the political spectrum [to] observe[] that its evident

motivation is to schedule the trial before the 2024 presidential election—a nakedly political

motive.” Id. (citing Elie Honig, Why Jack Smith Will Never Say the ‘E’ Word, CNN (Dec. 16,

2023),

https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2023/12/16/smr-honig-on-smith-vs-election-

calendar.cnn; Editorial Board, Jack Smith and the Supreme Court, Wall St. J. (Dec. 16, 2023);

Jason Willick, Politics Are Now Clearly Shaping Jack Smith’s Trump Prosecution, Wash. Post

(Dec. 12, 2023), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/12/12/special-counsel-jacksmith-politicized-prosecution/; and Byron York (@ByronYork), X (Dec. 11, 2023),

https://twitter.com/ByronYork/status/1734305076582244850?s=20).

“The Special Counsel thus confuses the public interest with a partisan interest of his

superior, President Biden.” Id. at 22. “The Special Counsel’s politicization of the trial

schedule” also “departs from the best traditions of the U.S. Department of Justice,” which

“call for prosecutors to avoid the appearance of election interference in the prosecution of

political candidates.” Id. at 23 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Manual §§ 9-27.260, 985.500

(2018);

https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution#9-

27.260). “The Special Counsel’s extraordinary petition creates a strong appearance of a

significant departure from those rules and aspirations.” Id. at 24.

“Even worse, the Special Counsel’s request threatens to tarnish” the Court of Appeals’

“procedures with the same appearance of partisanship.” Id. at 24 (citing Editorial Board,

Jack Smith and the Supreme Court, Wall St. J. (Dec. 16, 2023)). “The Special Counsel

urge[d]” the lower court “to jettison venerable principles of prudence, leapfrog the ordinary

process of appellate review, and rush headlong to decide one of the most novel, complex, and

37

momentous legal issues in American history.” Id. at 25. “In doing so, the Special Counsel

seeks to embroil” both the Court of Appeals and “this Court in a partisan rush to judgment

on some of the most historic and sensitive questions that the Court may ever decide.” Id.

The Court should issue a stay of the D.C. Circuit’s mandate to put an end to these illconceived efforts to circumvent the ordinary processes of appellate review.

***

“‘Haste makes waste’ is an old adage. It has survived because it is right so often.”

Kusay v. United States, 62 F.3d 192, 195 (7th Cir. 1995). The Court should stay the D.C.

Circuit’s mandate pending resolution of a petition for certiorari, and if review is granted,

resolution of this case on the merits by this Court.

As additional relief, in issuing its stay, President Trump requests that this Court

direct that the D.C. Circuit’s mandate is stayed pending the resolution, not just of

proceedings in this Court, but also of President Trump’s planned petition for en banc

consideration in the D.C. Circuit, which he intends to file in the D.C. Circuit in the ordinary

course before seeking (if necessary) this Court’s review, if given the opportunity to do so. As

noted in President Trump’s Brief in Opposition in No. 23-624, en banc consideration by the

lower courts provides an important part of the percolation that this Court ordinarily prefers

before reviewing petitions for certiorari. For example, in United States v. Nixon, this Court

had the benefit of the multiple thoughtful opinions produced by the D.C. Circuit’s en banc

consideration of Nixon v. Sirica, which addressed the same executive privilege asserted

against a grand-jury subpoena the year before. 487 F.2d 700, 700-22 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en

banc) (cited in Nixon, 418 U.S. at 689, 708 & n.17); id. at 729 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part); id. at 762 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Allowing President Trump

to pursue en banc review in the D.C. Circuit will provide an opportunity for similar

thoughtful consideration in the lower court before this Court addresses the novel, complex,

38

and momentous issues at stake in this appeal. See Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of

Educ., 211 F.3d 853, 854-55 (4th Cir. 2000) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in the denial of initial

hearing en banc).

CONCLUSION

This Court should stay the D.C. Circuit’s mandate pending resolution of President

Trump’s petition for certiorari in this Court. As additional relief, President Trump requests

that this Court stay the D.C. Circuit’s mandate pending the resolution of a petition for en

banc consideration in that court, before the filing (if necessary) of his petition for certiorari

in this Court.

February 12, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

LAURO & SINGER

John F. Lauro

Gregory M. Singer

400 N. Tampa St., 15th Fl.

Tampa, FL 33602

(813) 222-8990

jlauro@laurosinger.com

JAMES OTIS LAW GROUP, LLC

BLANCHE LAW

Todd Blanche

Emil Bove

99 Wall St., Suite 4460

New York, NY 10005

(212) 716-1250

toddblanche@blanchelaw.com

/s/ D. John Sauer

D. John Sauer

Counsel of Record

William O. Scharf

Michael E. Talent

Kenneth C. Capps

13321 N. Outer Forty Rd., Suite 300

St. Louis, Missouri 63017

(314) 562-0031

John.Sauer@james-otis.com

Attorneys for President Donald J.

Trump

39

APPENDIX

Per Curiam Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit (February 6, 2024) ................................................................................................ 1A

Per Curiam Judgment and Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit (February 6, 2024) ............................................................................. 58A

USCA Case #23-3228

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 9, 2024

Decided February 6, 2024

No. 23-3228

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:23-cr-00257-1)

D. John Sauer argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs were John F. Lauro, Gregory M. Singer, Emil

Bove, William O. Scharf, and Michael E. Talent.

Paul M. Dorsey, pro se, was on the brief for amicus curiae

Paul M. Dorsey in support of appellant.

Victor Williams, pro se, was on the brief for amicus curiae

Law Professor Victor Williams in support of appellant.

James I. Pearce, Assistant Special Counsel, U.S.

Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With him

on the brief were J. P. Cooney, Deputy Special Counsel,

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Michael R. Dreeben and Raymond N. Hulser, Counselors to the

Special Counsel, John M. Pellettieri and Cecil W.

VanDevender, Assistant Special Counsels, and Molly Gaston

and Thomas P. Windom, Senior Assistant Special Counsels.

Richard D. Bernstein was on the brief for amici curiae

Former Officials in Five Republican Administrations, et al. in

support of appellee.

Fred Wertheimer, Matthew A. Seligman, Seth P. Waxman,

Colleen M. Campbell, Nathaniel W. Reisinger, David M.

Levine, and Kyle T. Edwards were on the brief for amici curiae

Former Government Officials and Constitutional Lawyers in

support of appellee.

R. Stanton Jones and Andrew T. Tutt were on the brief for

amicus curiae American Oversight in support of dismissal for

lack of jurisdiction.

Gene C. Schaerr and Justin A. Miller were on the brief for

amici curiae Former Attorney General Edwin Meese III and

Law Professors Steven G. Calabresi and Gary S. Lawson in

support of neither party.

Before: HENDERSON, CHILDS and PAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM: Donald J. Trump was elected the 45th

President of the United States on November 8, 2016. He was

sworn into office at noon on January 20, 2017, and served until

his term expired at noon on January 20, 2021. At that moment,

President Trump became former President Trump and his

successor, Joseph R. Biden, became President and began his

own four-year term. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. Although this

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sequence is set by the Constitution, id. amend. XX, it did not

proceed peacefully. Indeed, from election day 2020 forward,

the government alleges that President Trump denied that he had

lost his bid for a second term and challenged the election results

through litigation, pressure on state and federal officers, the

organization of an alternate slate of electors and other means.

His alleged interference in the constitutionally prescribed

sequence culminated with a Washington, D.C., rally held on

January 6, 2021, the day set by the Electoral Count Act, 3

U.S.C. § 15(a), for the Congress to meet in joint session to

certify the election results. The rally headlined by President

Trump resulted in a march of thousands to the Capitol and the

violent breach of the Capitol Building. The breach delayed the

congressional proceedings for several hours and it was not until

the early morning of January 7th that the 2020 presidential

election results were certified, naming Joseph R. Biden as the

soon-to-be 46th President.

Since then, hundreds of people who breached the Capitol

on January 6, 2021, have been prosecuted and imprisoned.

And on August 1, 2023, in Washington, D.C., former President

Trump was charged in a four-count Indictment as a result of his

actions challenging the election results and interfering with the

sequence set forth in the Constitution for the transfer of power

from one President to the next. Former President Trump

moved to dismiss the Indictment and the district court denied

his motion. Today, we affirm the denial. For the purpose of

this criminal case, former President Trump has become citizen

Trump, with all of the defenses of any other criminal defendant.

But any executive immunity that may have protected him while

he served as President no longer protects him against this

prosecution.

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I. BACKGROUND

Former President Trump did not concede the 2020 election

and, in the ensuing months, he and his supporters made

numerous attempts to challenge the results. Many of their

attempts were allegedly criminal.1 A District of Columbia

federal grand jury indicted former President Trump on four

criminal counts arising from the steps he allegedly took to

change the outcome of the election: (1) conspiracy to defraud

the United States by overturning the election results, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (2) conspiracy to obstruct an

official proceeding — i.e., the Congress’s certification of the

electoral vote — in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k); (3)

obstruction of, and attempt to obstruct, the certification of the

electoral vote, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(2), 2; and

(4) conspiracy against the rights of one or more persons to vote

and to have their votes counted, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241.

At this stage of the prosecution, we assume that the allegations

set forth in the Indictment are true. United States v. Ballestas,

795 F.3d 138, 149 (D.C. Cir. 2015). We emphasize that

whether the Indictment’s allegations are supported by evidence

sufficient to sustain convictions must be determined at a later

stage of the prosecution.

The Indictment alleges that former President Trump

understood that he had lost the election and that the election

results were legitimate but that he nevertheless was

“determined to remain in power.” Indictment ¶ 2. He then

conspired with others to cast doubt on the election’s outcome

and contrived to have himself declared the winner. The

Former President Trump’s campaign and his supporters also

unsuccessfully challenged the election results in several state and

federal courts.

1

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Indictment charges that he and his co-conspirators allegedly

advanced their goal through five primary means:

First, they “used knowingly false claims of election fraud”

to attempt to persuade state legislators and election officials to

change each state’s electoral votes in former President Trump’s

favor. Indictment ¶ 10(a). For example, he and his allies

falsely declared “that more than ten thousand dead voters had

voted in Georgia”; “that there had been 205,000 more votes

than voters in Pennsylvania”; “that more than 30,000 noncitizens had voted in Arizona”; and “that voting machines . . .

had switched votes from [Trump] to Biden.” Id. at ¶ 12.

Second, then-President Trump and his co-conspirators

“organized fraudulent slates of electors in seven targeted

states . . . attempting to mimic the procedures that the

legitimate electors were supposed to follow.” Indictment

¶ 10(b). They “then caused these fraudulent electors to

transmit their false certificates to the Vice President and other

government officials to be counted at the certification

proceeding on January 6.” Id.

Third, then-President Trump and his co-conspirators

pressed officials at the Department of Justice “to conduct sham

election crime investigations and to send a letter to the targeted

states that falsely claimed that the Justice Department had

identified significant concerns that may have impacted the

election outcome.” Indictment ¶ 10(c).

Fourth, then-President Trump and his co-conspirators

attempted to convince then-Vice President Mike Pence to “use

his ceremonial role at the January 6 certification proceeding to

fraudulently alter the election results.” Indictment

¶ 10(d). When the Vice President rebuffed them, he stirred his

base of supporters to increase pressure on the Vice President.

See id. at ¶¶ 10(d), 96, 100. Ultimately, on the morning of

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January 6, 2021, he held a rally in Washington D.C. where he

“repeated knowingly false claims of election fraud to gathered

supporters” and “directed them to the Capitol to obstruct the

certification proceeding and exert pressure on the Vice

President to take the fraudulent actions he had previously

refused.” Id. at ¶¶ 10(d), 90(c).

Fifth, and finally, from the January 6 rally, thousands of

his supporters — “including individuals who had traveled to

Washington and to the Capitol at [his] direction” — swarmed

the United States Capitol, causing “violence and chaos” that

required the Congress to temporarily halt the electioncertification proceeding. Indictment ¶¶ 107, 119, 121. At that

point, he and his co-conspirators “exploited the disruption by

redoubling efforts to levy false claims of election fraud and

convince Members of Congress to further delay the

certification.” Id. at ¶ 10(e).

Then-President Trump’s efforts to overturn the election

results were unsuccessful and the Congress certified the

Electoral College vote in favor of President-Elect Biden.

Indictment ¶ 123. On January 11, 2021, nine days before

President-Elect Biden’s inauguration, the House of

Representatives adopted an impeachment resolution charging

then-President Trump with “Incitement of Insurrection.” H.R.

Res. 24, 117th Cong. (2021).

The single article of

impeachment alleged that he had violated “his constitutional

oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United

States . . . [and] his constitutional duty to take care that the laws

be faithfully executed . . . by inciting violence against the

Government of the United States.” Id. at 2. The impeachment

resolution asserted that “President Trump repeatedly issued

false statements asserting that the Presidential election results

were the product of widespread fraud and should not be

accepted by the American people or certified by State or

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Federal officials,” id. at 2–3; that his statements on the morning

of January 6 “encouraged — and foreseeably resulted in —

lawless action at the Capitol,” id. at 3; and that he attempted to

“subvert and obstruct the certification of the results of the 2020

Presidential election” by other means, including by threatening

a Georgia state official into manipulating the results, id. at 3–

4.

Importantly, by the time the United States Senate

conducted a trial on the article of impeachment, he had become

former President Trump. At the close of the trial, on February

13, 2021, fifty-seven Senators voted to convict him and fortythree voted to acquit him. See 167 CONG. REC. S733 (daily ed.

Feb. 13, 2021). Because two-thirds of the Senate did not vote

for conviction, he was acquitted on the article of

impeachment. See id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.

On November 18, 2022, the U.S. Attorney General

appointed John L. Smith as Special Counsel to investigate

“efforts to interfere with the lawful transition of power

following the 2020 presidential election or the certification of

the Electoral College vote.”2 A Washington, D.C., grand jury

returned the instant four-count Indictment against former

President Trump on August 1, 2023, and on August 28, 2023,

the district court set a trial date of March 4, 2024.

Former President Trump filed four motions to dismiss the

Indictment, relying on: (1) presidential immunity; (2)

constitutional provisions, including the Impeachment

Judgment Clause and principles stemming from the Double

Off. of the Att’y Gen., “Appointment of John L. Smith as

Special Counsel,” Order No. 5559-2022 (Nov. 18, 2022).

2

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Jeopardy Clause; (3) statutory grounds; and (4) allegations of

selective and vindictive prosecution.

On December 1, 2023, the district court issued a written

opinion denying the two motions that are based on presidential

immunity and the two constitutional provisions. In relevant

part, the district court rejected Trump’s claim of executive

immunity from criminal prosecution, holding that “[f]ormer

Presidents enjoy no special conditions on their federal criminal

liability.” United States v. Trump, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2023 WL

8359833, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2023). It concluded that “[t]he

Constitution’s text, structure, and history do not support” the

existence of such an immunity, id., and that it “would betray

the public interest” to grant a former President “a categorical

exemption from criminal liability” for allegedly “attempting to

usurp the reins of government.” Id. at *12. It also held that

“neither traditional double jeopardy principles nor the

Impeachment Judgment Clause provide that a prosecution

following impeachment acquittal violates double jeopardy.”

Id. at *18.3

Former President Trump filed an interlocutory appeal of

the district court’s presidential immunity and double-jeopardy

holdings.

On December 13, 2023, we granted the

Former President Trump does not challenge the district court’s

other holdings at this stage: (1) that “the First Amendment does not

protect speech that is used as an instrument of a crime, and

consequently the indictment — which charges [Trump] with, among

other things, making statements in furtherance of a crime — does not

violate [Trump]’s First Amendment rights,” Trump, --- F. Supp. 3d

---, 2023 WL 8359833, at *15, and (2) that the Indictment does not

violate Due Process because Trump “had fair notice that his conduct

might be unlawful,” id. at *22.

3

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government’s motion to expedite the appeal, and oral argument

was held on January 9, 2024.

II. JURISDICTION

Although both parties agree that the Court has jurisdiction

over former President Trump’s appeal, amicus curiae

American Oversight raises a threshold question about our

collateral-order jurisdiction. In every case, “we must assure

ourselves of our jurisdiction.” In re Brewer, 863 F.3d 861, 868

(D.C. Cir. 2017). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which grants us

jurisdiction over “final decisions of the district courts,” id., “we

ordinarily do not have jurisdiction to hear a defendant’s appeal

in a criminal case prior to conviction and sentencing,” United

States v. Andrews, 146 F.3d 933, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The

collateral-order doctrine, however, treats as final and thus

allows us to exercise appellate jurisdiction over “a small class

of [interlocutory] decisions that conclusively determine the

disputed question, resolve an important issue completely

separate from the merits of the action, and are effectively

unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Citizens for

Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 532 F.3d

860, 864 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). The district court’s

denial of former President Trump’s immunity defense

unquestionably satisfies the first two requirements and thus we

focus our analysis on the third: whether the denial of immunity

is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.

District court orders rejecting claims of civil immunity are

quintessential examples of collateral orders. See, e.g., Nixon v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 741–43 (1982) (executive immunity

from civil liability); Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F.4th 1, 12

(D.C. Cir. 2023) (same). But in Midland Asphalt Corp. v.

United States, the Supreme Court counseled that the collateral-

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order doctrine is interpreted “with the utmost strictness in

criminal cases.” 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (cleaned up).

The Midland Asphalt Court emphasized that criminal

collateral orders that are based on “[a] right not to be tried”

must “rest[] upon an explicit statutory or constitutional

guarantee that trial will not occur” — singling out the Double

Jeopardy Clause and the Speech or Debate Clause. 489 U.S. at

801 (emphasis added). Former President Trump does not raise

a straightforward claim under the Double Jeopardy Clause but

instead relies on the Impeachment Judgment Clause and what

he calls “double jeopardy principles.” Appellant’s Br. 54 n.7.

The double-jeopardy “principle[]” he relies on is a negative

implication drawn from the Impeachment Judgment Clause.

See id. at 8, 12, 46–47. Thus, he does not invoke our

jurisdiction based on the explicit grant of immunity found in

the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Nevertheless, we can exercise jurisdiction for two reasons.

First, Midland Asphalt is distinguishable and does not require

immunity to derive from an explicit textual source. Second,

the theories of immunity former President Trump asserts are

sufficient to satisfy Midland Asphalt under Circuit precedent.

A. DISTINGUISHING MIDLAND ASPHALT

Midland Asphalt dealt with the third prong of the

collateral-order test in the context of criminal defendants who

argued they were entitled to immediately appeal the denial of

their motion to dismiss an indictment because the government

had violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2)’s

requirement of grand jury secrecy. 489 U.S. at 796. The

Supreme Court held that an order is “effectively unreviewable”

on appeal “only where the order at issue involves ‘an asserted

right the legal and practical value of which would be destroyed

if it were not vindicated before trial.’” Id. at 799 (quoting

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United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978)). The

Court rejected the defendants’ argument that the denial of the

motion satisfied the third prong. It explained that “[i]t is true

that deprivation of the right not to be tried satisfies the Coopers

& Lybrand requirement of being ‘effectively unreviewable on

appeal from a final judgment,’” but held that the defendants

had not asserted a right against trial in “the sense relevant for

purposes of the exception to the final judgment rule.” Id. at

801–02 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,

468 (1978) (“To come within the [collateral-order doctrine],

the order must conclusively determine the disputed question,

resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits

of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from

a final judgment.”)).

The reason the defendants’ argument failed, the Midland

Asphalt Court held, was that it overlooked the “crucial

distinction between a right not to be tried and a right whose

remedy requires the dismissal of charges.” 489 U.S. at 801

(quotation omitted). “A right not to be tried in the sense

relevant to the [collateral-order doctrine] rests upon an explicit

statutory or constitutional guarantee that trial will not occur —

as in the Double Jeopardy Clause . . . or the Speech or Debate

Clause.” Id. By contrast, Rule 6(e)(2) did not “give[] rise to a

right not to stand trial” but instead merely created a right to

secret grand jury proceedings, the violation of which could be

remedied through the indictment’s dismissal. Id. at 802.

American Oversight’s argument hinges on the Court’s use

of the adjective “explicit” — a word that appears only once in

the Midland Asphalt opinion. The Court has repeatedly (and

recently) cautioned against “read[ing] too much into too little,”

reminding us that “‘[t]he language of an opinion is not always

to be parsed as though we were dealing with language of a

statute.’” Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 598 U.S. 356,

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373 (2023) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,

341 (1979)). Instead, opinions “must be read with a careful eye

to context” and the “particular work” that quoted language

performs within an opinion. Id. at 374; see also Goldman

Sachs Grp., Inc. v. Ark. Tchr. Ret. Sys., 141 S. Ct. 1951, 1968

(2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (“[T]his Court [has]

often said it is a mistake to parse terms in a judicial opinion

with the kind of punctilious exactitude due statutory

language.”).

The Supreme Court itself has hinted, although not squarely

held, that Midland Asphalt’s language should not be read

literally. In Digital Equipment, the Court quoted the relevant

sentence from Midland Asphalt and characterized it as a

“suggest[ion].” Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.,

511 U.S. 863, 874 (1994) (“Only such an ‘explicit statutory or

constitutional guarantee that trial will not occur,’ we suggested,

could be grounds for an immediate appeal of right under

§ 1291.” (internal citation to Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 801,

omitted)). The Court then weighed the argument that Midland

Asphalt’s comment is dictum because the Court allows

interlocutory review of other implied immunities, including

qualified immunity. Id. at 875 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472

U.S. 511 (1985)). The Court did not concede the point,

however, as it pointed out that Midland Asphalt is a criminal

case and Mitchell is a civil case, but it allowed that “even if

Mitchell could not be squared fully with the literal words of the

Midland Asphalt sentence . . . that would be only because the

qualified immunity right is inexplicit, not because it lacks a

good pedigree in public law.” Id. It then noted “the insight

that explicitness may not be needed for jurisdiction consistent

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with § 1291.”4 Id. The Court ultimately chose to reject the

petitioner’s argument on a different basis, see id. at 877, so it

did not squarely resolve how to interpret Midland Asphalt. But

a fair reading contemplates that there are exceptions to Midland

Asphalt’s broad statement. See id. at 875. Other courts have

held to that effect. See Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 679 F.3d

205, 217 n.9 (4th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (reading Digital

Equipment to hold that qualified immunity’s “good pedigree in

public law . . . more than makes up for its implicitness”

(cleaned up)); McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, 630 F.3d

1288, 1296 n.2 (10th Cir. 2011) (interpreting Digital

Equipment’s “good pedigree in public law” comment as a

“binding” reconciliation of Midland Asphalt with the

immediate appealability of some implicit immunities).

There is good reason not to read Midland Asphalt literally

here. Read in context, the Court’s use of “explicit” was simply

to contrast a right against trial and a right that entitles the

defendant to the dismissal of charges. The latter can be

vindicated through appeal after a final judgment, but the former

cannot. The Court was not addressing an issue as to which it

was necessary to distinguish between explicit and implied

rights against trial; instead, it addressed the defendants’

assertion that the violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure entitled them to immediate review. See Midland

Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 802 (Rule 6(e) contained “no hint” of a

right against trial). Thus, “explicit” did not perform any

“particular work” within the opinion, see Nat’l Pork

Producers, 598 U.S. at 374, meaning it would be a mistake to

make a doctrinal mountain out of a verbal molehill. See Al

Elsewhere, Digital Equipment refers to rights “originating in

the Constitution or statutes.” 511 U.S. at 879. Its broader

formulation comfortably encompasses implicit as well as explicit

immunities.

4

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Shimari, 679 F.3d at 246 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (calling

Midland Asphalt’s sentence “dictum” and a “lonely line”).

Nor was the question presented in Midland Asphalt

anything like the one before us. Procedural rules are worlds

different from a former President’s asserted immunity from

federal criminal liability. The Supreme Court has repeatedly

emphasized that the President is sui generis. In the civil

context, the Court has held that the denial of the President’s

assertion of absolute immunity is immediately appealable “[i]n

light of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a

threatened breach of essential Presidential prerogatives under

the separation of powers.” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 743. And

in United States v. Nixon, the Court waived the typical

requirement that the President risk contempt before appealing

because it would be “unseemly” to require the President to do

so “merely to trigger the procedural mechanism for review of

the ruling.” 418 U.S. 683, 691–92 (1974). It would be equally

“unseemly” for us to require that former President Trump first

be tried in order to secure review of his immunity claim after

final judgment. When the Court instructs us to read its opinions

“with a careful eye to context,” see Nat’l Pork Producers, 598

U.S. at 374, it authorizes us to consider the “special solicitude”

due a former President, Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 743.

One final reason not to overread a single adjective in

Midland Asphalt is that there is no apparent reason to treat an

implicit constitutional immunity from trial differently from an

explicit one for interlocutory review.5 Midland Asphalt

5

By contrast, the Supreme Court has explained why a right

against trial must ordinarily be “statutory or constitutional” in nature

to fall within the collateral-order doctrine. Midland Asphalt, 489

U.S. at 801. Whether a right can be effectively reviewed after final

judgment “simply cannot be answered without a judgment about the

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certainly did not provide one. The ultimate source of our

appellate jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which extends to the

“final decision[]” of the district court. There is no basis in the

statutory text to treat the denial of an explicit immunity as final

but the denial of an implicit immunity as non-final. In both

cases, the “deprivation of the right not to be tried” would be

“effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”

Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 800–01 (quotation omitted).

Whether explicit or implicit in the Constitution, the right not to

stand trial must be “vindicated before trial” or not at all. Id. at

799 (quotation omitted).

B. CIRCUIT PRECEDENT

Our Circuit precedent has taken a broad view of Midland

Asphalt, consistently holding that the denial of a right not to

stand trial is immediately appealable if the right is similar or

analogous to one provided in the Constitution. Both of former

President Trump’s asserted sources of immunity — separation

of powers and double jeopardy principles — fit within this

window of appealability. See Appellant’s Br. 2–3 (listing

“Statement of the Issues”).

Our caselaw includes United States v. Rose, a civil case in

which we held that Congressman Rose’s standalone separation

of powers immunity was reviewable under § 1291 because it

served the same function as a claim of Speech or Debate Clause

immunity. 28 F.3d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Congressman Rose

value of the interests that would be lost through rigorous application

of a final judgment requirement.” Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 878–

79. But there is no need for courts to make that judgment call

“[w]hen a policy is embodied in a constitutional or statutory

provision,” thus leaving “little room for the judiciary to gainsay its

importance.” Id. at 879 (cleaned up).

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argued that he had immunity from the DOJ’s suit against him

because “the action was barred by the Speech or Debate

Clause” and, separately, because “the separation of powers

doctrine barred the DOJ from suing him” when a congressional

committee had already investigated him. Id. at 185. We held

that the latter claim falls within the collateral-order doctrine,

“recogniz[ing] claims of immunity based on the separation of

powers doctrine as an additional exception to the general rule

against interlocutory appeals.” Id. Granted, we acknowledged

that the separation of powers doctrine “does not provide as

precise a protection as the Speech or Debate Clause,” but we

focused on the “equivalent reasons for vindicating in advance

of trial whatever protection it affords.” Id. at 186 (quotation

omitted).

We confirmed Rose’s applicability in the criminal context

in United States v. Durenberger, 48 F.3d 1239 (D.C. Cir.

1995). There, former Senator Durenberger sought to dismiss

an indictment, arguing based on separation of powers that the

district court was powerless to decide whether he had violated

the Senate’s rules, a prerequisite of its assessment of the

criminal charges against him. See id. at 1241; U.S. CONST. art.

I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its

Proceedings . . . .”). He thus “claim[ed] that, as a former

member of the Senate, he cannot be held to answer criminal

charges when his liability depends on judicial usurpation of the

Senate’s exclusive right to formulate its internal rules.”

Durenberger, 48 F.3d at 1242. We held that this “colorable”

argument was sufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction under

Rose. Id. Notably, the constitutional text invoked in

Durenberger can hardly be said to create an “explicit” right not

to stand trial. As we explained in a subsequent case, both Rose

and Durenberger rest on the rationale that the “separation-ofpowers doctrine conferred . . . an analogous and comparable

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privilege” to the Speech or Debate Clause. United States v.

Cisneros, 169 F.3d 763, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

Following the Supreme Court’s lead, see Abney v. United

States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977) (denial of motion to dismiss

indictment on double jeopardy grounds is immediately

appealable), we have also allowed interlocutory review by

analogizing to the explicit constitutional immunity in the

Double Jeopardy Clause. In United States v. Trabelsi, we

exercised interlocutory appellate jurisdiction of the defendant’s

invocation of a treaty’s non bis in idem provision, which

“mirror[ed] the Constitution’s prohibition of double jeopardy.”

28 F.4th 1291, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct.

345 (2022).

The treaty provision’s similarity to the

constitutional guarantee, we held, was enough to bring the

appeal within the scope of Abney.

Former President Trump’s two arguments can be

analogized to explicit constitutional immunities, which is all

that Durenberger and Trabelsi require. His separation of

powers argument does not explicitly draw on the Speech or

Debate Clause but neither did the argument in Durenberger.

The immunity for official acts former President Trump asserts

is “closely akin to a claim of Speech or Debate Clause

immunity,” Cisneros, 169 F.3d at 770, making it immediately

appealable because “there are equivalent reasons for

vindicating [it] in advance of trial,” Rose, 28 F.3d at 186

(quotation omitted). Likewise, the defense argues that the

Impeachment Judgment Clause “incorporates a Double

Jeopardy principle.” Appellant’s Br. 46. We found a similar

line of reasoning convincing in Trabelsi. If a treaty provision

that “mirrors” the Double Jeopardy Clause falls within the

collateral-order doctrine, so does a constitutional clause that

(purportedly) attaches jeopardy to a Senate’s impeachment

acquittal. Both of former President Trump’s arguments are at

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least analogous enough to the Speech or Debate Clause or the

Double Jeopardy Clause to fit within our precedent.

Nor will exercising jurisdiction here put us in conflict with

other circuits, as American Oversight suggests. See Am.

Oversight Br. 9. The chief cases on which American Oversight

relies are readily distinguishable because in each the asserted

right against trial was not grounded solely in either the

Constitution or a statute. See United States v. Joseph, 26 F.4th

528, 534 (1st Cir. 2022) (a state judge’s immunity depended

“solely on the common law”); United States v. Macchia, 41

F.3d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1994) (addressing “an alleged agreement

with the United States Attorney” to provide the defendant with

immunity); United States v. Wampler, 624 F.3d 1330, 1337 &

n.3 (10th Cir. 2010) (involving “an executory plea agreement

between a company and the government” that excluded the

defendants).

Accordingly, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to

reach the merits of former President Trump’s appeal.

III. EXECUTIVE IMMUNITY

For all immunity doctrines, “the burden is on the official

claiming immunity to demonstrate his entitlement.” Dennis v.

Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980). Former President Trump

claims absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for all

“official acts” undertaken as President, a category, he contends,

that includes all of the conduct alleged in the Indictment.

The question of whether a former President enjoys

absolute immunity from federal criminal liability is one of first

impression. See Blassingame, 87 F.4th at 5 (noting the

unresolved question of “whether or when a President might be

immune from criminal prosecution”). The Supreme Court has

consistently held that even a sitting President is not immune

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from responding to criminal subpoenas issued by state and

federal prosecutors. See Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2431

(2020); Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706; United States v. Burr, 25 F.

Cas. 30, 33–34 (C.C. Va. 1807) (Marshall, C.J.). In the civil

context, the Supreme Court has explained that a former

President is absolutely immune from civil liability for his

official acts, defined to include any conduct falling within the

“‘outer perimeter’ of his official responsibility.” Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. at 756. Both sitting and former Presidents remain

civilly liable for private conduct. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S.

681, 686, 694–95 (1997); Blassingame, 87 F.4th at 12–14.

When considering the issue of Presidential immunity, the

Supreme Court has been careful to note that its holdings on

civil liability do not carry over to criminal prosecutions. See

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 754 n.37 (explaining the “lesser public

interest in actions for civil damages than, for example, in

criminal prosecutions”); cf. Clinton, 520 U.S. at 704 n.39

(noting special considerations at issue in criminal cases).

Former President Trump’s claimed immunity would have

us extend the framework for Presidential civil immunity to

criminal cases and decide for the first time that a former

President is categorically immune from federal criminal

prosecution for any act conceivably within the outer perimeter

of his executive responsibility. He advances three grounds for

establishing this expansive immunity for former Presidents:

(1) Article III courts lack the power to review the President’s

official acts under the separation of powers doctrine; (2)

functional policy considerations rooted in the separation of

powers require immunity to avoid intruding on Executive

Branch functions; and (3) the Impeachment Judgment Clause

does not permit the criminal prosecution of a former President

in the absence of the Congress impeaching and convicting him.

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Our analysis is “guided by the Constitution, federal

statutes, and history,” as well as “concerns of public policy.”

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 747. Relying on these sources, we

reject all three potential bases for immunity both as a

categorical defense to federal criminal prosecutions of former

Presidents and as applied to this case in particular.

A. SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE

The President of the United States “occupies a unique

position in the constitutional scheme.” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at

749; see Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2034

(2020) (“The President is the only person who alone composes

a branch of government.”). Under the separation of powers

established in the Constitution, the President is vested with

“executive Power,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.1, which entails

the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” id.

§ 3, and “supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost

discretion and sensitivity,” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 750. The

President’s constitutional role exists alongside the Congress’s

duty to make the laws, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, and the

Judiciary’s duty to “say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

“It is settled law that the separation-of-powers doctrine

does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of

the United States.” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 753–54; see also

Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706 (separation of powers doctrine cannot

“sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of

immunity from judicial process under all circumstances”).

Nevertheless, former President Trump argues that the

constitutional structure of separated powers means that

“neither a federal nor a state prosecutor, nor a state or federal

court, may sit in judgment over a President’s official acts,

which are vested in the Presidency alone.” Appellant’s Br. 10.

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He relies on Marbury’s oft-quoted statement that a President’s

official acts “can never be examinable by the courts.” Id.

(quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166); see also Reply

Br. 6.

Former President Trump misreads Marbury and its

progeny. Properly understood, the separation of powers

doctrine may immunize lawful discretionary acts but does not

bar the federal criminal prosecution of a former President for

every official act.

Marbury distinguished between two kinds of official acts:

discretionary and ministerial. As to the first category, Chief

Justice Marshall recognized that “the President is invested with

certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he

is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his

country in his political character, and to his own conscience.”

Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165–66. When the President or

his appointed officers exercise discretionary authority, “[t]he

subjects are political” and “the decision of the executive is

conclusive.” Id. at 166. Their discretionary acts, therefore,

“can never be examinable by the courts.” Id. “But,” Chief

Justice Marshall continued, “when the legislature proceeds to

impose on that officer other duties; when he is directed

peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the rights of

individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts; he

is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his

conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested

rights of others.” Id. (emphases added). Under these

circumstances, an executive officer acts as a “ministerial

officer . . . compellable to do his duty, and if he refuses, is

liable to indictment.” Id. at 150; see id. at 149–50 (“It is not

consistent with the policy of our political institutions, or the

manners of the citizens of the United States, that any

ministerial officer having public duties to perform, should be

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above the compulsion of law in the exercise of those duties.”).

Based on these principles, Chief Justice Marshall concluded

that, although discretionary acts are “only politically

examinable,” the judiciary has the power to hear cases “where

a specific duty is assigned by law.” Id. at 166. Marbury thus

makes clear that Article III courts may review certain kinds of

official acts — including those that are legal in nature.

The cases following Marbury confirm that we may review

the President’s actions when he is bound by law, including by

federal criminal statutes. In Little v. Barreme, the Supreme

Court concluded that the President’s order to a subordinate

officer to seize American ships traveling to or from French

ports violated the Nonintercourse Act precisely because the

Congress had acted to constrain the Executive’s discretion. 6

U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177–79 (1804). Chief Justice Marshall

observed that the President may have had the discretionary

authority to order the seizure absent legislation but had no

discretion to violate the Act. Id. at 177–78. Similarly, in

Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, the Supreme Court

reviewed the official acts of the postmaster general, the

President’s subordinate officer who derived his authority from

the Executive Branch, because the civil case involved the

violation of a statutory requirement. 37 U.S. 524, 612–13

(1838). To find a statutory violation unreviewable, the Court

held, “would be clothing the President with a power entirely to

control the legislation of congress, and paralyze the

administration of justice.” Id. at 613.

Then, in Mississippi v. Johnson, the Supreme Court

considered whether the State of Mississippi could sue President

Andrew Johnson to enjoin him from enforcing the

Reconstruction Acts, which the State alleged were

unconstitutional. 71 U.S. 475, 497–98 (1866). The Court

concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to issue an injunction,

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relying on Marbury, Kendall and the distinction between “mere

ministerial dut[ies]” in which “nothing was left to discretion”

and “purely executive and political” duties involving the

President’s discretion. Id. at 498–99; see also Martin v. Mott,

25 U.S. 19, 31–32 (1827) (no judicial power to review

President exercising his “discretionary power” conferred by

statute). In holding that it could not enjoin the President from

using his discretion, the Court nevertheless affirmed the role of

the Judiciary in checking the other two branches of

government: “The Congress is the legislative department of

the government; the President is the executive department.

Neither can be restrained in its action by the judicial

department; though the acts of both, when performed, are, in

proper cases, subject to its cognizance.” Mississippi, 71 U.S.

at 500.

The Supreme Court exercised its cognizance over

Presidential action to dramatic effect in 1952, when it held that

President Harry Truman’s executive order seizing control of

most of the country’s steel mills exceeded his constitutional

and statutory authority and was therefore invalid. Youngstown

Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587–89 (1952). The

Congress had not legislated to authorize President Truman’s

seizure and in fact had “refused to adopt th[e seizure] method

of settling labor disputes.” Id. at 586. President Truman could

lawfully act only to execute the Congress’s laws or to carry out

his constitutional duties as the Executive; and he lacked

authority from either source to seize the steel mills. Id. at 587–

89. As Justice Jackson explained, the Court’s holding

invalidating the executive order was proper because “[w]hen

the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed

or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.” Id.

at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). Based on Youngstown and

Marbury, the Supreme Court in Clinton easily concluded that

“when the President takes official action, the Court has the

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authority to determine whether he has acted within the law.”

Clinton, 520 U.S. at 703.

Objection may be made that Marbury and its progeny

exercised jurisdiction only over subordinate officers, not the

President himself. The writ in Marbury was brought against

the Secretary of State; in Little against a commander of a ship

of war; in Kendall against the postmaster general; in

Youngstown against the Secretary of Commerce. But as the

Supreme Court has unequivocally explained:

No man in this country is so high that he is

above the law. No officer of the law may set

that law at defiance with impunity. All the

officers of the government, from the highest to

the lowest, are creatures of the law and are

bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power

in our system of government, and every man

who by accepting office participates in its

functions is only the more strongly bound to

submit to that supremacy, and to observe the

limitations which it imposes upon the exercise

of the authority which it gives.

United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882). “That principle

applies, of course, to a President.” Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2432

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

Further, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the

judiciary’s power to “direct appropriate process to the

President himself.” Clinton, 520 U.S. at 705. The President

does not enjoy absolute immunity from criminal subpoenas

issued by state and federal prosecutors and may be compelled

by the courts to respond. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 33–34; Nixon, 418

U.S. at 713–14; Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2431. We have “200 years

of precedent establishing that Presidents, and their official

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communications, are subject to judicial process, even when the

President is under investigation.” Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2427

(citations omitted); see also Clinton, 520 U.S. at 703–05

(recounting history of sitting Presidents complying with court

orders to provide testimony and other evidence).

The separation of powers doctrine, as expounded in

Marbury and its progeny, necessarily permits the Judiciary to

oversee the federal criminal prosecution of a former President

for his official acts because the fact of the prosecution means

that the former President has allegedly acted in defiance of the

Congress’s laws. Although certain discretionary actions may

be insulated from judicial review, the structure of the

Constitution mandates that the President is “amenable to the

laws for his conduct” and “cannot at his discretion” violate

them. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166. Here, former

President Trump’s actions allegedly violated generally

applicable criminal laws, meaning those acts were not properly

within the scope of his lawful discretion; accordingly, Marbury

and its progeny provide him no structural immunity from the

charges in the Indictment.

Our conclusion that the separation of powers doctrine does

not immunize former Presidents from federal criminal liability

is reinforced by the analogous immunity doctrines for

legislators and judges. Legislators and judges are absolutely

immune from civil suits for any official conduct, and legislators

have an explicit constitutional immunity from criminal

prosecution arising from the Speech or Debate Clause.

Nevertheless, legislators and judges can be criminally

prosecuted under generally applicable laws for their official

acts consistent with the separation of powers doctrine.

Legislators have explicit constitutional immunity from

criminal or civil liability “for what they do or say in legislative

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proceedings” under the Speech or Debate Clause. Tenney v.

Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951); see U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 6, cl. 1. But outside of constitutionally protected legislative

conduct, members of the Congress perform a wide range of

“acts in their official capacity” that are not “legislative in

nature” and so can subject them to criminal liability. Gravel v.

United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972); see id. at 626 (Speech

or Debate Clause “does not privilege either Senator or aide to

violate an otherwise valid criminal law in preparing for or

implementing legislative acts”). In United States v. Johnson, a

Congressman was criminally charged with conspiring to

pressure the Department of Justice to dismiss pending

indictments of a loan company and its officers on mail fraud

charges. 383 U.S. 169, 171 (1966). The Supreme Court held

that the prosecution could not include evidence related to a

speech made by Johnson on the House floor because of his

constitutional immunity but, the Court made clear, Johnson

could be retried on the same count “wholly purged of elements

offensive to the Speech or Debate Clause.” Id. at 185.

Although his unprotected conduct constituted an official act

under Fitzgerald (communicating with the Executive Branch),

see id. at 172, it was constrained by and subject to “criminal

statute[s] of general application.” Id. at 185.

Judges are similarly liable to the criminal laws for their

official acts. A notable example is Ex parte Commonwealth of

Virginia, in which the Supreme Court applied Marbury’s

discretionary/ministerial distinction to affirm the criminal

indictment of a judge based on an official act. 100 U.S. 339

(1879). A county judge was indicted in federal court for

violating a federal statute that prohibited discriminating on the

basis of race in jury selection. Id. at 340, 344. The Supreme

Court began by observing the principle that officers are bound

to follow the law: “We do not perceive how holding an office

under a State, and claiming to act for the State, can relieve the

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holder from obligation to obey the Constitution of the United

States, or take away the power of Congress to punish his

disobedience.” Id. at 348. The Court then addressed the

judge’s argument that the Court lacked the authority to punish

a state judge for “his official acts.” Id. Its response was

twofold. First, the Court described juror selection as “merely

a ministerial act, as much so as the act of a sheriff holding an

execution, in determining upon what piece of property he will

make a levy, or the act of a roadmaster in selecting laborers to

work upon the roads.” Id. The Court then explained that even

if juror selection is considered a “judicial act,” the judge had a

legal duty to obey the criminal laws:

But if the selection of jurors could be considered

in any case a judicial act, can the act charged

against the petitioner be considered such when

he acted outside of his authority and in direct

violation of the spirit of the State statute? That

statute gave him no authority, when selecting

jurors, from whom a panel might be drawn for

a circuit court, to exclude all colored men

merely because they were colored. Such an

exclusion was not left within the limits of his

discretion. It is idle, therefore, to say that the

act of Congress is unconstitutional because it

inflicts penalties upon State judges for their

judicial action. It does no such thing.

Id. at 348–49 (emphasis added).6

The Court’s reference to “the State statute” is to the Virginia

law charging the county judge with the duty to select jurors in the

circuit and county courts. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 340.

6

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More recent case law on the judicial immunity doctrine

affirms that judges are not immune from criminal liability for

their official acts. O’Shea v. Littleton confirmed the holding of

Ex parte Virginia in dismissing a civil rights action for

equitable relief brought against a county magistrate and

associate judge of a county circuit. 414 U.S. 488, 490–91, 503

(1974). The Supreme Court concluded that the requested

injunction was not the only available remedy because both

judges remained answerable to the federal criminal laws:

[W]e have never held that the performance of

the duties of judicial, legislative, or executive

officers, requires or contemplates the

immunization of otherwise criminal deprivation

of constitutional rights. On the contrary, the

judicially fashioned doctrine of official

immunity does not reach ‘so far as to immunize

criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of

Congress . . . .’

Id. at 503 (citation to Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, omitted;

quoting Gravel, 408 U.S. at 627). Similarly, in Dennis v.

Sparks, the Court affirmed judicial immunity from civil money

damages in the context of bribery allegations but explained that

judges “are subject to criminal prosecutions as are other

citizens.” 449 U.S. at 31. Crucially, the judge in Dennis

retained civil immunity because “the challenged conduct” —

allegedly issuing an injunction corruptly after accepting bribes

as part of a conspiracy — was “an official judicial act within

his statutory jurisdiction, broadly construed.” Id. at 29. The

scope of civil judicial immunity thus aligns with civil

Presidential immunity under Fitzgerald, but a judge has no

criminal immunity for the same “official act.” See also Imbler

v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) (“Even judges, cloaked

with absolute civil immunity for centuries, could be punished

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criminally for willful deprivations of constitutional

rights . . . .”); United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 372

(1980) (“[T]he cases in this Court which have recognized an

immunity from civil suit for state officials have presumed the

existence of federal criminal liability as a restraining factor on

the conduct of state officials.”).7

When considering the criminal prosecutions of judges,

other circuits have repeatedly rejected judicial criminal

immunity for official acts, largely in the context of bribery

prosecutions. See United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842,

845 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984);

United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 709–11 (11th Cir.

1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); United States v.

Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1143–44 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.

denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974), overruled on other grounds by

United States v. Gimbel, 830 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1987). Former

President Trump argues that bribery allegations were not

con

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