Emergency Application — Mike Moyle, Speaker of the Idaho House of Representatives, et al., Applicants v. United States
Supreme Court briefNov 20, 2023
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No. 23-____
In the Supreme Court of the United States
_____________
MIKE MOYLE, Speaker of the Idaho House of Representatives of the
State of Idaho, et al.,
Applicants,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
_____________
APPLICATION FOR STAY OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ISSUED BY
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
_____________
Daniel W. Bower
MORRIS BOWER & HAWS PLLC
1305 12th Ave. Rd.
Nampa, ID 83686
(208) 345-3333
dbower@morrisbowerhaws.com
William C. Duncan
Counsel of Record
1868 N. 800 E.
Lehi, UT 84043
(801) 367-4570
billduncan56@gmail.com
Counsel for Applicants
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Applicants are Mike Moyle, Speaker of the Idaho House of Representatives;
and Chuck Winder, President Pro Tempore of the Idaho State Senate; and the SixtySeventh Idaho Legislature. They are Intervenors-Appellants in the consolidated
appeal before the Ninth Circuit.
Respondent is the United States of America, which is Plaintiff-Appellee in the
Ninth Circuit.
The State of Idaho is a Defendant-Appellant in the consolidated appeal before
the Ninth Circuit but is not involved in the proceedings to obtain a stay.
ii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
United States District Court (Idaho):
United States of America v. The State of Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW (Aug.
24, 2022) (preliminary injunction)
United States of America v. The State of Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW (May
4, 2023) (preliminary injunction)
United States of America v. The State of Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW (Aug.
13, 2022) (intervention)
United States of America v. The State of Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW
(February 3, 2023) (intervention)
United States Court of Appeals (9th Cir.):
United States of America v. The State of Idaho, No. 23-35440; United States of
America v. The State of Idaho v. Mike Moyle, et al, No. 23-35450 (preliminary
injunction, consolidated)
United States of America v. The State of Idaho, No. 23-35153 (9th Cir.)
(intervention)
United States of America v. The State of Idaho, No. 23-35440; United States of
America v. The State of Idaho v. Mike Moyle, et al, No. 23-35450 (Sept. 28, 2023)
(motion for stay)
iii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6, applicants consist of the Idaho
Legislature and its elected leaders. As such, none of the applicants is a corporation
with a parent corporation and none issues stock.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ............................................................................... i
RELATED PROCEEDINGS.......................................................................................... ii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .............................................................. iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... vi
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT ................................................................................................................. 5
A. Statutory Background ........................................................................ 5
1. EMTALA ........................................................................................ 5
2. Idaho Abortion Law ....................................................................... 5
B. Procedural History .............................................................................. 7
1. The Complaint ............................................................................... 7
2. Opinion Below ................................................................................ 8
3. Motions to Reconsider .................................................................... 9
4. Reconsideration Order ................................................................. 11
5. Appeal and Motions to Stay ........................................................ 12
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................ 14
I.
THE IDAHO LEGISLATURE WILL BE IRREPARABLY INJURED
WITHOUT A STAY ................................................................................... 14
II.
THE IDAHO LEGISLATURE HAS A STRONG LIKELIHOOD OF
SUCCESS ON THE MERITS ................................................................... 15
A. EMTALA Cannot Preempt Section 622 ........................................... 15
1. Settled principles shape the issue of preemption ........................ 15
v
2. Section 622 does not “directly conflict” with EMTALA .............. 16
3. EMTALA cannot preempt Idaho law under the Medicare Act ... 18
4. The District Court misjudged EMTALA’s preemptive scope ...... 19
B. EMTALA Does Not Mandate Abortion ............................................ 20
1. The District Court badly misread EMTALA............................... 20
2. The District Court violated the major questions doctrine—or at
least the ordinary rules of statutory construction ....................... 23
C. The District Court Likewise Misconstrued Section 622 .................. 26
D. Enjoining Section 622 Because of EMTALA is Unconstitutional ... 28
1. The preliminary injunction violates the Tenth Amendment ...... 28
2. The decision below violates the Spending Clause ....................... 30
III. THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE EQUITIES FAVOR A STAY ...... 31
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 35
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Page(s)
Abbott v. Perez,
138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) ................................................................................... 2, 14
Ala. Assoc. of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs.,
141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) ....................................................................................... 24
Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc. v. Sullivan,
998 F.2d 377 (6th Cir. 1993) ............................................................................. 19
Baker v. Adventist Health, Inc.,
260 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2001) ....................................................................... 16, 17
Barnes v. E-Systems, Inc. Group Hosp. Med. & Surg. Ins. Plan,
501 U.S. 1301 (1991) ......................................................................................... 31
Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP,
142 S. Ct. 2191 (2022) ........................................................................................ 7
Bernhardt v. L.A. Cnty.,
339 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................................................. 33
Biden v. Nebraska,
143 S. Ct. 2355 (2023) ........................................................................... 23, 24, 25
Bryan v. Rectors and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
95 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 1996) ......................................................................... 17–18
Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./West,
289 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2002) ........................................................................... 16
BST Holdings, LLC v. OSHA,
17 F.4th 604 (5th Cir. 2021) ............................................................................. 32
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
505 U.S. 504 (1992). .............................................................................. 16, 19, 20
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood,
507 U.S. 658 (1993) ........................................................................................... 16
vii
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,
142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022) ............................................2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 14, 28, 29, 32, 35
Draper v. Chiapuzio,
9 F.3d 1391 (9th Cir. 1993) ........................................................................... 8, 19
Eberhardt v. Los Angeles,
62 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1995) ............................................................................. 16
Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Acct. Oversight Bd.,
561 U.S. 477 (2010) ........................................................................................... 24
Garcia v. Google, Inc.,
786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) ............................................................................. 34
Golden v. Washington,
138 S. Ct. 448 (2017) ......................................................................................... 32
Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243 (2006) ........................................................................................... 25
Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991) ........................................................................................... 29
Hardy v. New York City Health Hosp. Corp.,
164 F.3d 789 (2d Cir. 1999) .............................................................................. 17
Keams v. Tempe Tech. Inst., Inc.,
39 F.3d 222 (9th Cir. 1994) ............................................................................... 16
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Com’n v. FCC,
476 U.S. 355 (1986) ........................................................................................... 26
Maryland v. King,
567 U.S. 1301 (2012) ......................................................................... 2, 14, 31, 33
McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc.,
21 P.3d 1189 (Cal. 2001) ................................................................................... 19
Medtronic v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470 (1996) ........................................................................................... 16
New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,
434 U.S. 1345 (1977) ......................................................................................... 14
viii
NFIB v. OSHA,
142 S. Ct. 661 (2022) ................................................................................... 23, 24
NFIB v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519 (2012) ........................................................................................... 30
Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418 (2009) ................................................................. 2, 4, 12, 13, 31, 34
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1 (1981) ............................................................................................... 31
Pennsylvania Med. Soc’y v. Marconis,
942 F.2d 842 (3d Cir. 1991) ........................................................................ 18–19
In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Lit.,
582 F.3d 156 (1st Cir. 2009) ............................................................................. 19
Planned Parenthood Great Nw. v. State,
522 P.3d 1132 (Idaho 2023) ........................................................... 11, 27, 28, 34
Planned Parenthood Great Nw. v. State,
532 P.3d 801 (Idaho 2022) ............................................................................ 6, 28
Raich v. Gonzales,
500 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2007) ............................................................................. 29
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
442 U.S. 330 (1979)............................................................................................ 22
Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) ................................................................................. 6, 14, 28
Root v. New Liberty Hospital Dist.,
209 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 2000) ..................................................................... 18, 19
Sierra Club v. Trump,
929 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2019) ............................................................................. 32
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.,
545 U.S. 119 (2005) ........................................................................................... 24
ix
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Proj.,
138 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) ....................................................................................... 31
United States v. Arizona,
641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) ............................................................................. 32
United States v. Arizona,
567 U.S. 387 (2012) ........................................................................................... 32
United States v. California,
921 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2019) ....................................................................... 32, 34
U.S Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Preserv. Assn.,
140 S. Ct. 1837 (2020) ................................................................................. 23, 30
Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA,
573 U.S. 302 (2014) ........................................................................................... 23
Washington v. Trump,
847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) ........................................................................... 32
West Virginia v. EPA,
142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022) ........................................................................... 23, 24, 25
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7 (2008) ............................................................................................... 15
Constitutional Provisions:
U.S. CONST. art. III ...................................................................................................... 10
U.S. CONST. art. VI ............................................................................ 7, 9, 10, 29, 32–34
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 .................................................................................. 4, 10, 30, 31
U.S. CONST. amend. X.................................................................................. 4, 10, 28, 29
Statutes and Rules:
28 U.S.C. § 1651 ............................................................................................................. 1
42 U.S.C. § 1395 ................................................................................. 1, 3, 15, 18–20, 33
x
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd..................................................................................................... 1, 5
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) .................................................................................................... 5
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) .................................................................... 2, 3, 5, 21, 22, 26, 30
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1) ...................................................................................... 3, 5, 22
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2) .......................................................................................... 3, 22
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1) ................................................................................................ 5
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2) .............................................................................................. 18
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1) ........................................................................ 3, 10, 21, 22, 33
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3) .............................................................................................. 21
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f) ................................................................1, 3, 8, 15, 16, 18, 19, 33
H.B. 374, 67th Leg., 1st Sess. (Idaho 2023) ........................................................... 7, 27
H.R. 8296, 117th Cong. (2022) .................................................................................... 25
S. 4132, 117th Cong. (2022)......................................................................................... 25
IDAHO CODE § 18-604(1) ........................................................................................... 6, 27
IDAHO CODE § 18-622 ................................. 1, 5–9, 11, 12, 14–16, 18–20, 23, 26–32, 34
IDAHO CODE § 18-622(1)(a) (repealed) ........................................................................... 6
IDAHO CODE § 18-622(2) ................................................................................. 7, 9, 27, 28
IDAHO CODE § 18-622(3) (repealed) ............................................................................... 9
IDAHO CODE § 18-622(4) ........................................................................................... 6, 27
IDAHO CODE § 18-622(5) ........................................................................................... 6, 27
IDAHO CODE § 67-465 ..................................................................................................... 7
xi
Other Authorities:
CMS Center for Clinical Standards and Quality, QSO-22-22-Hospitals
(“Reinforcement of EMTALA Obligations Specific to Patients who are Pregnant or
are Experiencing Pregnancy Loss”) (July 11, 2022) ................................................. 7–8
Exec. Order No. 14,076, 87 Fed. Reg. 42053 (Jul. 8, 2022) .......................................... 8
Letter from Secretary Becerra to Health Care Providers (July 11, 2022) ................ 31
TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICE ELENA KAGAN,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT AND
CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT:
INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of this Court and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651, the Idaho Legislature respectfully applies for a stay of the preliminary
injunction issued on August 24, 2022, by the United States District Court for the
District of Idaho, pending disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if
such a writ is timely sought.
This application concerns a preliminary injunction with extraordinary
consequences.
The District Court has enjoined the enforcement of Idaho Code § 18-622
(section 622), which prohibits abortions unless authorized, on the sole ground that
the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd,
preempts it. By accepting that reading of EMTALA, the District Court announced a
federal abortion mandate that the statutory text does not support and stretched
EMTALA’s preemptive reach beyond the boundaries set by overlapping express
preemption provisions. See id. §§ 1395dd(f), 1395.
Construing EMTALA as a federal abortion mandate raises grave questions
under the major questions doctrine that affect both Congress and this Court.
EMTALA’s spare directive to provide “stabilizing treatment” for a patient with an
emergency medical condition does not convey clear congressional authorization to
2
regulate abortion in all 50 States. Id. § 1395dd(b) (heading). If that weren’t enough,
the statutory construction advanced by the United States challenges the Court’s
authority by illicitly undermining Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization,
142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022). Concentrating power in the Executive Branch distorts the
federal system as well. Dobbs held that States may regulate abortion, id. at 2279, but
the preliminary injunction reimposes federal control. That result prevents the State
of Idaho and its people from charting their own course regarding abortion, based on
a federal mandate that Congress never adopted. Letting the decision below stand
would be a sad day for our country. Americans understandably disagree when a
woman should be free to end her pregnancy, but we should agree that the United
States is a government of laws.
A stay from this Court would allow the Idaho Legislature to defend its law
without continuing to suffer irreparable injury. This application for stay satisfies the
controlling standard under Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).
1. The Legislature suffers an ongoing irreparable injury from the preliminary
injunction issued by the District Court. Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012)
(Roberts, C.J., in chambers); accord Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2323–24 and
n.17 (2018). Judicial interference with the ordinary operation of state law is an
independent injury. Here, that injury is heightened by the intense controversy
surrounding a federal injunction halting Idaho’s primary abortion law.
2. The Legislature has a strong likelihood of success.
3
First, EMTALA is bound by overlapping express preemption clauses that the
District Court misapplied and overlooked. EMTALA denies preemption unless a state
law “directly conflicts.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f). The government’s implied duty of
abortion access does not conflict with a state law “directly.” Id. A separate clause
governing EMTALA prohibits a federal “officer or employee” from construing the
statute to exercise “supervision or control” over the “practice of medicine.” Id. § 1395.
Yet federal control is exactly what the District Court’s reading of EMTALA achieves.
Second, the lower court’s statutory construction rests on an insupportable
inference. The court accepted the government’s claim that EMTALA’s requirement of
delivering “stabilizing treatment” to a patient with an emergency medical condition
includes a duty to perform an abortion as solely dictated by the physician’s medical
judgment. Id. § 1395dd(b). But EMTALA says nothing about abortion. Construing
the spare phrase “stabilizing treatment” as a blank slate to be filled with the
Executive Branch’s preferred abortion policy collides with multiple statutory
provisions guaranteeing emergency medical care for a pregnant woman and her
unborn child. See id. §§ 1395dd(e)(1)(A)(i); 1395dd(e)(1)(B)(ii); 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii); and
1395dd(c)(2)(A). EMTALA does not address the hard questions that arise when a
pregnant woman has an emergency medical condition for which some physicians
would perform an abortion. Silence may confer consent in other settings but not when
examining a statute for congressional authority. Construing EMTALA as the District
Court did is deeply mistaken because it departs from settled rules of statutory
construction and breaches the major questions doctrine.
4
Third, preempting Idaho law based on a doubtful reading of EMTALA raises
serious constitutional questions. Idaho’s independent sovereignty guaranteed by the
Tenth Amendment is denied if the government’s contrived federal mandate succeeds
in overriding the State’s duly enacted law. The preliminary injunction thwarts the
State’s sovereign authority to regulate abortion despite Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2228.
The Spending Clause is likewise violated by the United States’ threat to strip Idaho
of Medicare funding to leverage the State’s compliance with a mandate that EMTALA
does not contain.
3. Other Nken factors also favor a stay. The balance of equities tips toward
the Legislature since its ongoing irreparable harm from the preliminary injunction
outweighs any harm to the United States from a doubtful preemption claim. The
public interest lies in preserving the integrity of federal law and the Constitution’s
structural guarantees. While the District Court focused on the harm of regulating
abortion for pregnant women with emergency complications, the issue is not whether
women in medical crisis deserve decent medical care. They emphatically do. Instead,
the pressing question is, who decides when abortion is lawful? Under Dobbs, the
answer is clear: “the authority to regulate abortion [is] returned to the people and
their elected representatives”—not granted to unelected federal officials acting at the
President’s behest. Id. at 2279.
For these reasons, the applicants meet the traditional criteria for a stay.
5
STATEMENT
A.
Statutory Background
1. EMTALA
EMTALA obligates Medicare-funded hospitals to provide medical treatment
for emergency medical conditions, regardless of a patient’s ability to pay. See 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd. EMTALA obligates a Medicare-participating hospital to (1) perform
“an appropriate medical screening examination” to see whether the patient has an
emergency medical condition, id. § 1395dd(a); (2) conduct a further medical exam
along with “such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition” or
send the patient “to another medical facility,” id. § 1395dd(b)(1); and (3) transfer a
patient with an emergency medical condition that has not been stabilized only as
provided and where “appropriate,” id. § 1395dd(c)(1).
Noncompliance can carry severe consequences. A hospital or physician “that
negligently violates” EMTALA “is subject to a civil money penalty of” up to $50,000
per violation. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A), (B). A provider or facility whose violations
are “gross and flagrant or [are] repeated” may be excluded “from participation in
[Medicare] and State health care programs.” Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B).
2. Idaho Abortion Law
The Idaho statute challenged here is Idaho Code § 18-622 (section 622). 1
Entitled “Defense of Life Act,” section 622 makes it a crime for anyone to perform an
1 All citations to section 622 refer to the amended version currently in effect, unless otherwise
indicated.
6
abortion unless a physician acts within exceptions that the statute enumerates. See
id. § 622(1). That proscription restores long-held Idaho policy. See Planned
Parenthood Great Nw. v. State, 532 P.3d 801, 807 (Idaho Aug. 12, 2022) (describing
how Idaho law treated abortion as a crime, with exceptions, from territorial days until
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). It also reflects pre-Roe consensus. See Dobbs, 142
S. Ct. at 2253–54 (“[A]n unbroken tradition of prohibiting abortion on pain of criminal
punishment persisted from the earliest days of the common law until 1973.”).
Idaho law defines abortion as “the use of any means to intentionally terminate
the clinically diagnosable pregnancy of a woman with knowledge that the termination
by those means will, with reasonable likelihood, cause the death of the unborn child.”
IDAHO CODE § 18-604(1). Section 622 prohibits a physician from performing an
abortion, with enumerated exceptions. Id. § 622(1). A physician may perform an
abortion when “necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman,” based on
“good faith medical judgment and based on the facts known to the physician at the
time.” Id. § 622(2)(a). Another exception permits an abortion (during the first
trimester) to terminate a pregnancy resulting from rape or incest. Id. § 622(2)(b). No
liability attaches when a doctor causes “the accidental death of, or unintentional
injury to, the unborn child” while treating a pregnant woman. Id. § 622(4). No woman
is liable under section 622 for having an abortion. Id. § 622(5).
A trigger provision in the original version of section 622 provided that the law
would become effective 30 days after a decision by this Court “that restores to the
states their authority to prohibit abortion.” Id. § 622(1)(a) (repealed). Dobbs, 142 S.
7
Ct. at 2284, was that decision. The Dobbs judgment issued on July 26, 2022, making
section 622 presumptively effective on August 25. See Docket Statement, Dobbs v.
Jackson Women’s Health Org., No. 19-1392, at https://www.supremecourt.gov/
search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/19-1392.html.
Section 622 was amended during the 2023 legislative session. See H.B. 374,
67th Leg., 1st Sess. (Idaho 2023) (eff. July 1, 2023). Among those amendments were
provisions replacing affirmative defenses with exceptions. See IDAHO CODE § 18622(2).
B.
Procedural History
1. The Complaint
On August 2, 2022, the United States filed suit against the State of Idaho 2
claiming that section 622 violates the Supremacy Clause. Compl., United States v.
Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW (D. Idaho Aug. 2, 2022), ECF No. 1 (“Complaint”). The
government’s theory is that EMTALA requires Medicare-participating hospitals to
provide an abortion as “stabilizing care” when a pregnant woman suffers an
“emergency medical condition” supposedly demanding it. Id. at 2. This theory reflects
a guidance document issued by an HHS component, CMS Center for Clinical
Standards and Quality, QSO-22-22-Hospitals at 1 (“Reinforcement of EMTALA
2 Days after the complaint, applicants sought to intervene as of right, citing their authority under
Idaho Code § 67-465 and this Court’s decision in Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the
NAACP, 142 S. Ct. 2191 (2022). The District Court denied intervention as of right but granted
permissive intervention. Mem. Decision and Order, United States v. Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW
(D. Idaho Aug. 13, 2022), ECF No. 27. A later order denied the Legislature’s renewed motion to
intervene, id. at ECF No. 125 (Feb. 6, 2023), and that order is on appeal in the Ninth Circuit No. 2335153.
8
Obligations Specific to Patients who are Pregnant or are Experiencing Pregnancy
Loss”) (July 11, 2022), which followed shortly after a presidential directive instructing
federal agencies to “protect and expand access to abortion.” Exec. Order No. 14,076,
87 Fed. Reg. 42053 (Jul. 8, 2022). On this understanding, preemption occurs because
“medical care that a state may characterize as an ‘abortion’ is necessary emergency
stabilizing care that hospitals are required to provide under EMTALA.” Complaint at
2. The complaint seeks a declaratory judgment, as well as preliminary and permanent
injunctive relief. Id. at 16.
2. Opinion Below
The United States moved for a preliminary injunction, which the District Court
granted the day before section 622 was due to become effective. App. 38a. The Court
ruled that the United States would “likely succeed on the merits” because “state law
must yield to federal law when it’s impossible to comply with both,” and section 622
“conflicts with” EMTALA. App. 41a. Central to that analysis was EMTALA’s clause
authorizing preemption when a state law “directly conflicts.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f).
Construing that phrase in terms of impossibility and obstacle preemption, see App.
57a (citing Draper v. Chiapuzio, 9 F.3d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1993)), the Court
concluded that EMTALA preempts section 622.
Impossibility preemption applies, the Court said, because “EMTALA obligates
the treating physician to provide stabilizing treatment, including abortion care” and
“Idaho statutory law makes that treatment a crime.” Id. Provisions offering an
affirmative “defense to prosecution” for a physician who performs an abortion as
9
authorized by statute, IDAHO CODE § 18-622(3) (repealed), “cure the impossibility.”
App. 58a. The Court pointed to “an ectopic pregnancy” as a “straightforward example”
of a medical condition requiring treatment that section 622 supposedly disallows.
App. 45a. Other pregnancy complications mentioned by the Court were preeclampsia,
the possibility of sepsis, a blood clot, or a placental abruption. See App. 46a. The Court
accepted the government’s position that since section 622 does not allow an abortion
for these conditions, a physician cannot “comply with both statutes.” App. 57a.
Obstacle preemption applied because, according to the District Court, section
622 obstructs EMTALA’s aims of “establish[ing] a bare minimum of emergency care
that would be available to all people in Medicare-funded hospitals.” App. 63a. State
law impedes that goal by “deter[ring] physicians from providing abortions in some
emergency situations.” App. 64a. Section 622 “compounds the deterrent effect,” the
Court wrote, by offering “an affirmative defense rather than an exception.” Id.
On this logic, the District Court concluded that EMTALA preempts section
622. App. 76a. The Court denied that Dobbs had any relevance. “Dobbs did not
overrule the Supremacy Clause. Thus, even when it comes to regulating abortion,
state law must yield to federal law.” Id. Therefore, the Court issued an order that
“restrains and enjoins the State of Idaho, including all of its officers, employees, and
agents, from enforcing Idaho Code § 18-622(2)-(3) as applied to medical care required
by [EMTALA].” Id.
10
3. Motions to Reconsider
Fourteen days later, the Legislature filed a motion for reconsideration. Mot.
for Recons., United States v. Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW (D. Idaho Sept. 7, 2022),
ECF No. 95. It explained that the District Court’s order overlooked a contradiction
between the government’s preemption claim and EMTALA’s text. Id. EMTALA
obligates a physician to protect “the health of the woman or her unborn child.” Id. at
2 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added)). Given that language, it is
unreasonable to read EMTALA as an abortion mandate. Id. at 3–4. The Legislature
also identified precedents rejecting “the government’s attempt to use EMTALA as a
wedge to leverage federal control over state abortion laws.” Id. at 5. And the
Legislature added that imposing a flawed theory of preemption raises serious issues
under the major questions doctrine, the Supremacy Clause, Article III, the Spending
Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 9–16.
The Legislature sought reconsideration rather than filing an appeal and
seeking a stay, out of a belief that motions practice would continue to move swiftly,
as it had done under an expedited briefing schedule requested by the United States.
See Docket Entry Order, United States v. Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW (D. Idaho
Aug. 8, 2022), ECF No. 17. There was no reason to anticipate that the District Court
would take eight months to decide the motion.
With the preliminary injunction in place, the District Court throttled down
from its breakneck pace and returned to regular order. When several weeks passed
after the close of briefing without a decision, the Legislature submitted a written
11
request for a ruling. See id. at ECF No. 115 (Nov. 17, 2022). The District Court did
not respond.
In January 2023, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the validity of section 622
against challenges under Idaho law. Planned Parenthood Great Nw. v. State, 522 P.3d
1132 (Idaho 2023). The Legislature and the State requested a stay to file
supplemental briefs addressing the implications of the Idaho decision for the validity
of the preliminary injunction. Docket Entry Order, United States v. Idaho, No. 1:22cv-00329-BLW (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2023), ECF No. 122. That stay elapsed on February
21, 2022. Id.
4. Reconsideration Order
On May 4, 2023, the District Court denied reconsideration. App. 25a. Despite
the Idaho decision, the Court found “no reason to reconsider its decision … and the
injunction stands.” App. 36a. Even though the Idaho Supreme Court sustained
section 622 under the Idaho Constitution, Planned Parenthood, 522 P.3d 1132, the
District Court ruled that the decision “confirms each of the fundamental principles
that underpinned this Court’s decision.” App. 32a. The District Court ruled that the
Idaho decision did not “fundamentally alter” EMTALA’s preemptive effect, id., even
though the Idaho court clarified that section 622 does not cover ectopic or nonviable
pregnancies and that the statute’s exceptions turn on a physician’s subjective
judgment. The District Court did not acknowledge amendments replacing section
622’s affirmative defenses with exceptions or address the Legislature’s constitutional
objections to the preliminary injunction. App. 25a–36a.
12
5. Appeal and Motions to Stay
The Legislature filed a timely notice of appeal with the Ninth Circuit on July
3, 2023. Notice of Appeal, United States v. Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW (D. Idaho
Jul. 3, 2023), ECF No. 138. 3 That same day, the Legislature moved for a stay pending
appeal with the District Court. Id. at ECF No. 140 (Jul. 3, 2023). Weeks passed
without a response, so the Legislature sought a stay from the Ninth Circuit. Mot. to
Stay, United States v. Idaho, No. 23-35450 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2023), ECF No. 29. A
unanimous three-judge panel granted a stay. App 6a. 4 The panel’s 18-page opinion
explained why the Legislature’s motion satisfies the controlling standard:
Each of the four Nken [v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009)] factors favors
issuing a stay here. The Legislature has made a strong showing that
EMTALA does not preempt section 622. EMTALA does not require
abortions, and even if it did in some circumstances, that requirement
would not directly conflict with section 622. The federal government will
not be injured by the stay of an order preliminarily enjoining
enforcement of a state law that does not conflict with its own. Idaho, on
the other hand, will be irreparably injured absent a stay because the
preliminary injunction directly harms its sovereignty. And the balance
of the equities and the public interest also favor judicial action ensuring
Idaho’s right to enforce its legitimately enacted laws during the
pendency of the State’s appeal.
App. 12a.
Within two days of this decision, the United States sought reconsideration en
banc, Mot. for Recons., United States v. Idaho, No. 23-35450 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 2023),
3 ECF citations concerning the pending appeal in the Ninth Circuit refer to the docket in case No. 23-
35450 rather than No. 23-35440, the State’s appeal.
4 The original order was issued at United States v. Idaho, No. 23-35450 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2023), ECF
No. 47. A reformatted version was released a few days later. ECF No. 57 (Oct. 10, 2023). The
reformatted version is included in the Appendix at App. 6a and all references are thereto.
13
ECF No. 51, which the Ninth Circuit granted on October 10. Id. at ECF No. 67 (Oct.
10, 2023). That order also vacated the panel decision: Vacatur reinvigorated the
preliminary injunction, freshly exposing the State to irreparable injury. Id.
On November 1, the Legislature filed an emergency motion requesting an
expedited decision on the stay by November 15. Id. at ECF No. 69 (Nov. 1, 2023). The
Ninth Circuit responded on November 13 with a two-page order denying a stay. App.
1a. Other than the reference to Nken, the order contains no citation or analysis
explaining the court’s reasoning. The same order denied the Legislature’s emergency
motion as moot. See id. (In fairness, the order reflected an expedited decision as
requested.) The order then explained that “[t]he en banc court will proceed to consider
the merits of this preliminary injunction appeal.” Id. at 2. En banc panel members
consisted of Chief Judge Murguia and Judges Gould, Callahan, M. Smith, Owens,
Miller, Bress, Forrest, VanDyke, Koh, and Mendoza. Of these, Judges Callahan,
Miller, Bress and VanDyke dissented. They “would have granted the stay for
substantially the same reasons set forth in the original three-judge motions panel
order.” Id. (citation omitted).
This application follows. Having sought a stay pending appeal from the District
Court and the Ninth Circuit, the Idaho Legislature has shown “with particularity”
why only this Court can grant relief. Sup. Ct. R. 23.3. Without a stay, the Legislature
faces irreparable injury from an erroneous federal injunction, and that injury that
will persist until the Ninth Circuit elects to issue a final judgment.
14
ARGUMENT
The Idaho Legislature is entitled to a stay pending appeal because (1) the
Legislature is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) the Legislature will be irreparably
injured absent a stay; (3) a balance of the equities favors a stay; and (4) a stay serves
the public interest. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. Factors one and two “are the most critical.”
Id. Factors three and four “merge” because the United States is the opposing party.
Id. at 435.
I.
THE IDAHO LEGISLATURE WILL BE IRREPARABLY INJURED
WITHOUT A STAY.
The Idaho Legislature has established that it “suffer[s] irreparable harm”
without a stay. Id. at 434. A State suffers “ongoing irreparable harm” whenever it is
“enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its
people.” King, 567 U.S. at 1303 (Roberts, C.J., in chambers); accord New Motor
Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1351 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in
chambers) (same); Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2324 n.17 (“[The inability to enforce its duly
enacted plans clearly inflicts irreparable harm on the State.”). Interference with the
operation of state law is the injury.
The Idaho Legislature enacted section 622 in anticipation of a decision by this
Court abandoning Roe. Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. 2228, is that decision. It held that “[t]he
Constitution does not prohibit the citizens of each State from regulating or
prohibiting abortion,” and, accordingly, “return[ed] that authority to the people and
their elected representatives.” Id. at 2284. The preliminary injunction blocks Idaho’s
exercise of democratic self-government.
15
Maintaining the preliminary injunction against section 622 is anything but
harmless even if the injunction issued last year. Federal injunctions are the
exception, not the norm. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24
(2008) (“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of
right.”). Every day that passes with an injunction in place inflicts irreparable harm
on the Legislature.
II.
THE IDAHO LEGISLATURE HAS A STRONG LIKELIHOOD OF
SUCCESS ON THE MERITS.
A.
EMTALA Cannot Preempt Section 622.
On the merits, the Legislature has put forward a powerful case. The
preliminary injunction stands on the sole ground of preemption—that, in the District
Court’s opinion, “there will always be a conflict between EMTALA and Idaho Code §
18-622” because “EMTALA obligates the treating physician to provide stabilizing
treatment, including abortion care.” App 57a. But EMTALA is governed by two nonpreemption clauses that should have steered the District Court away from a
preliminary injunction. Since EMTALA does not preempt section 622, the decision
below is incorrect.
1.
Settled principles shape the issue of preemption.
EMTALA is governed by two express preemption clauses, 42 U.S.C. §§
1395dd(f) and 1395. When a statute contains an express preemption clause, courts
“focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence
of Congress’s pre-emptive intent.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664
(1993). Marking the precise boundaries of federal law is critical. The task is to
16
“identify the domain expressly pre-empted by that language.” Medtronic v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 484 (1996) (cleaned up). And it is evident that “Congress’ enactment of a
provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond
that reach are not pre-empted.” Cipollone v. Ligett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517
(1992). That is why “express provisions for preemption of some state laws imply that
Congress intentionally did not preempt state law generally, or in respects other than
those it addressed.” Keams v. Tempe Tech. Inst., Inc., 39 F.3d 222, 225 (9th Cir. 1994).
The question, then, is whether the express preemption clauses governing
EMTALA support “the pre-emptive reach” justifying the preliminary injunction.
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517. They don’t.
2.
Section 622 does not “directly conflict” with EMTALA.
EMTALA contains an express “non-preemption provision.” Baker v. Adventist
Health, Inc., 260 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 2001), which says, “[t]he provisions of this
section do not preempt any State or local law requirement, except to the extent that
the requirement directly conflicts with a requirement of this section.” 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd(f). Non-preemption is the baseline: EMTALA generally “do[es] not preempt
any State or local law requirement.” Id. (emphasis added). Preemption occurs only
where state law “directly conflicts with a requirement of this section,” Id. (emphasis
added). The adverb matters. To justify preemption, a state law must conflict with
EMTALA “directly.” Id.
Ninth Circuit precedent affirms that EMTALA does not dictate particular
standards of medical care. Eberhardt v. Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1995),
17
rejected an EMTALA claim against a physician for not “conduct[ing] a psychiatric
evaluation or a mental status evaluation” for a man later killed by the police following
a violent psychiatric episode. Id. at 1255. “EMTALA clearly declines to impose on
hospitals a national standard of care in screening patients.” Id. at 1258. The Court
explained that “Congress enacted the EMTALA not to improve the overall standard
of medical care, but to ensure that hospitals do not refuse essential emergency care
because of a patient’s inability to pay.” Id.
Other Ninth Circuit decisions are equally insistent that EMTALA does not
prescribe standards of medical care beyond the statute’s overt requirements. See
Baker, 260 F.3d at 993 (“The statute is not intended to create a national standard of
care for hospitals or to provide a federal cause of action akin to a state law claim for
medical malpractice.”); Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1166
(9th Cir. 2002) (“EMTALA, however, was not enacted to establish a federal medical
malpractice cause of action nor to establish a national standard of care.”).
Other circuits agree that EMTALA does not preempt state standards of
medical care. Hardy v. New York City Health Hosp. Corp., 164 F.3d 789, 795 (2d Cir.
1999) (EMTALA’s non-preemption clause suggests “that one of Congress’s objectives
was that EMTALA would peacefully coexist with applicable state ‘requirements’”);
Bryan v. Rectors and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he
legal adequacy of that [stabilizing] care is then governed not by EMTALA but by the
state malpractice law that everyone agrees EMTALA was not intended to preempt.”).
18
EMTALA preempts state law only when it contradicts the statute’s express
requirements. Root v. New Liberty Hospital District, 209 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 2000),
illustrates. There, the Eighth Circuit held that EMTALA preempted a Missouri
statute immunizing state political subdivisions like hospital districts, from tort suits.
Because that law directly conflicts with EMTALA’s guarantee of a personal damage
suit, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A), the Court of Appeals concluded that “Missouri’s
sovereign immunity statute must yield.” Id. at 1070. Root teaches that EMTALA
preempts state law only when a state law conflicts with its express terms. See id. at
1069. Unlike Root, the District Court’s preemption analysis rests on an implied duty
under EMTALA. App. 56a. Since EMTALA has no express requirement requiring
abortion, it does not preempt section 622. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f).
3.
EMTALA cannot preempt Idaho law under the Medicare Act.
EMTALA’s preemptive reach is further shortened by the Medicare Act. Its
express preemption clause says this:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer
or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the practice of medicine
or the manner in which medical services are provided … or to exercise any
supervision or control over the administration or operation of any such
institution, agency, or person.
42 U.S.C. § 1395.
This clause establishes that “the practice of medicine is, in general, a subject
of state regulation.” Pennsylvania Med. Soc’y v. Marconis, 942 F.2d 842, 846 n.4 (3d
Cir. 1991); accord In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Lit., 582 F.3d 156,
175 (1st Cir. 2009) (construing section 1395 to mean that the Medicare Act “reserves
a regulatory role to the states” and “demonstrates Congress’s intent to minimize
19
federal intrusion into the area.”). Courts have interpreted section 1395 as a bar to
preempting state consumer protection laws, see id., and state standards of medical
care, see McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc., 21 P.3d 1189, 1197 (Cal. 2001) (the
Medicare Act does not displace state tort law). So too, here. Because EMTALA is
bound by section 1395 it cannot be construed as “a mechanism to supervise or control
the practice of medicine.” American Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc. v. Sullivan, 998
F.2d 377, 387 (6th Cir. 1993). By overriding Idaho’s regulation of abortion, the
preliminary injunction does exactly that.
4.
The District Court misjudged EMTALA’s preemptive scope.
The District Court miscalculated EMTALA’s limited “pre-emptive reach.”
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
First, it was mistaken to rule that section 622 “directly conflicts” with
EMTALA. See App. 57a (citing Draper, 9 F.3d at 1393). The District Court analyzed
the government’s preemption claim under impossibility and obstacle preemption
without considering that an implied duty under EMTALA cannot conflict with Idaho
law “directly,” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f). App. 57a. Only state laws like the one challenged
in Root, which contradict an express provision of EMTALA, 209 F.3d at 1070, are
subject to EMTALA’s preemption clause.
Even if impossibility and obstacle preemption were relevant—which we deny—
the District Court unfairly moved the goal posts. Its preliminary injunction order
cites section 622’s supposed disallowance of pregnancy termination for ectopic
pregnancies to illustrate the impossibility of complying with both EMTALA and
Idaho law, App. 60a–61a, while its reconsideration order says that the inapplicability
20
of section 622 to the removal of an ectopic or other nonviable pregnancy (as declared
by the Idaho Supreme Court) does not “fundamentally alter” the preemption analysis.
App 32a. A similar turnabout tainted the Court’s discussion of obstacle preemption.
The preliminary injunction order singled out the supposed “deterrent effect” of section
622’s use of affirmative defenses rather than outright exceptions, App. 64a–65a, but
the reconsideration order failed to mention that the amended section 622 replaced
affirmative defenses with exceptions. App. 34a.
Second, neither of the District Court’s orders mention the Medicare Act’s nonpreemption clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1395. That clause forecloses EMTALA as a basis for
preempting section 622, which embodies a state standard of medical care (proscribing
abortion under particular circumstances) and a regulation of the medical profession
(prescribing the suspension or loss of a medical license for violating the statute.) See
IDAHO CODE § 18-622(1). As such, section 622 is the kind of state law that Congress
intended to operate free from federal “supervision or control.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395.
Because the District Court’s orders exaggerate EMTALA’s “pre-emptive
reach,” Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517, the Legislature has a strong likelihood of success.
B.
EMTALA Does Not Mandate Abortion.
1.
The District Court badly misread EMTALA.
Even without a defective preemption analysis, the District Court’s preliminary
injunction is flawed because it rests on a misconstruction of EMTALA.
Accepting the government’s claim, the District Court ruled that “EMTALA
obligates the treating physician to provide stabilizing treatment, including abortion
21
care.” App. 57a. Without that obligation, EMTALA does not require what Idaho law
forbids. A close reading of the statute denies any support for such an obligation.
It is undisputed that EMTALA requires a Medicare-participating hospital to
provide “stabilizing treatment” when a screening exam concludes that a patient has
an emergency medical condition. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (heading); accord id. §
1395dd(b)(1)(A) (requiring “such treatment as may be required to stabilize the
[emergency] medical condition”). But neither of those provisions—nor anywhere else
in EMTALA—mention the word abortion. The only form of stabilizing treatment
expressly endorsed by the statute is delivering a child when a pregnant woman with
contractions has an emergency medical condition. Id. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A). That
Congress expressly endorsed delivery as a stabilizing treatment surely counts against
the government’s contention that EMTALA demands access to abortion.
So do other textual clues. Under EMTALA, “stabilized” means that “no
material deterioration of the [emergency medical] condition is likely, within
reasonable medical probability, to result from or occur during the transfer of the
individual from a facility.” Id. at § 1395dd(e)(3)(B). The corresponding definition of
“emergency medical condition” requires medical care when a pregnant woman has a
condition placing “the health of the woman or her unborn child in serious jeopardy.”
Id. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Since abortion exposes the unborn child to
“serious jeopardy,” it cannot be a legitimate “stabilizing treatment” under the statute.
Id. § 1395dd(b).
22
Still other textual clues point away from the District Court’s construction.
EMTALA contains four provisions expressly requiring emergency care for both a
pregnant woman and her unborn child. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395dd(e)(1)(A)(i);
1395dd(e)(1)(B)(ii);
1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii);
and
1395dd(c)(2)(A).
The
preliminary
injunction order casts aside half the pivotal definition of “emergency medical
condition” as it addresses “a pregnant woman who is having contractions.” Id. §
1395dd(e)(1)(B). The proffered explanation for ignoring that language is that the
Court regarded subsection (B) as “not relevant.” App. 42a n.1. But that explanation
is implausible. Relevance is self-evident, considering that the United States invokes
EMTALA as the source of a federal mandate concerning medical treatment for
pregnant women. That the District Court disregarded EMTALA’s text heightens the
sense that the preliminary injunction rests on quicksand. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (“In construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if
possible, to every word Congress used.”) (citation omitted).
Worse, the District Court deliberately excised EMTALA’s remaining reference
to the medical needs of an unborn child in the operative language of the preliminary
injunction. EMTALA says that an “emergency medical condition” exists when the
absence of “immediate medical attention” probably will result in “placing the health
of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the health of the woman or her
unborn child) in serious jeopardy.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Yet
the lower court selectively quoted from the statute, thereby effectively removing the
phrase “or her unborn child” from its injunction. See App. 77a (prohibiting the
23
enforcement of section 622 insofar as an abortion is “necessary to avoid (i) ‘placing
the health of’ a pregnant patient ‘in serious jeopardy’”).
Through these two errors—disregarding relevant statutory language about the
medical treatment of pregnant women and removing the phrase “or unborn child”
from its injunction—the District Court effectively rewrote EMTALA. Where
EMTALA guarantees emergency medical care for a pregnant woman and her unborn
child, the District Court read the statute as protecting the woman alone.
2.
The District Court violated the major questions doctrine—or at
least the ordinary rules of statutory construction.
A troubling implication of the District Court’s decision is ceding to the
Executive Branch authority that Congress did not delegate. Courts presume that
Congress will “speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast
economic and political significance.” Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324
(2014). When that occurs, “something more than a merely plausible textual basis” is
necessary, West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2609 (2022): only “clear
congressional authorization” will do. Util. Air, 573 U.S. at 324. Indeed, “exceedingly
clear language” is necessary if Congress “wishes to significantly alter the balance
between federal and state power.” U.S Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Preserv.
Assn., 140 S. Ct. 1837, 1850 (2020). Requiring “a clear statement,” Biden v. Nebraska,
143 S. Ct. 2355, 2375 (2023), of congressional authority to justify the consequential
exercise of executive power rests on “both separation of powers principles and a
practical understanding of legislative intent.” West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2609. Like
other clear-statement rules, the major questions doctrine “ensure[s] Congress does
24
not, by broad or general language, legislate on a sensitive topic inadvertently or
without due deliberation.” Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 139
(2005).
The major questions doctrine has figured prominently in recent terms. See
West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2616 (voiding an EPA rule because “[a] decision of such
magnitude and consequence rests with Congress itself, or an agency acting pursuant
to a clear delegation from that representative body”); NFIB v. OSHA, 142 S. Ct. 661,
666 (2022) (setting aside an OSHA standard requiring large employers to ensure that
their employees were vaccinated against COVID-19); Ala. Assoc. of Realtors v. Dep’t
of Health and Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) (voiding a nationwide eviction
moratorium imposed by the Centers for Disease Control). Only months ago, Biden
held that the Department of Education exceeded its authority by instituting a loanforgiveness program in reliance on the HEROES Act. 143 S. Ct. at 2372–73.
The legal theory underlying the preliminary injunction here fits the pattern of
such decisions. Like the OSHA vaccination mandate, an EMTALA abortion mandate
combines a “lack of historical precedent” with a startling “breadth of authority.”
NFIB, 142 S. Ct. at 666 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acc’t Oversight Bd.,
561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010)) (cleaned up). Like the CDC’s eviction moratorium, the
United States leans on “a wafer-thin reed”—EMTALA’s generic obligation to provide
stabilizing treatment—to justify “such sweeping power.” Ala. Assoc., 141 S. Ct. at
2489. Like the EPA’s electricity generation rule, the United States has interpreted
EMTALA as a national abortion mandate that “Congress had conspicuously and
25
repeatedly declined to enact itself,” West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2610. See Women’s
Health Protection Act of 2023, H.R. 8296, 117th Cong. §§ 4(a)(1), 5(a)(1) (2022)
(proposed legislation prescribing a federal right to “abortion services” that would
“supersede” contrary state law); S. 4132, 117th Cong. §§ 3(a)(1), 4(a)(1) (2022) (same).
And like the Attorney General’s interpretive rule concerning assisted suicide, the
government’s claim to authority is “incongruous with [EMTALA’s] statutory purposes
and design.” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006). Gonzales rightly concluded
that an “oblique form” of statutory authority is insufficient when the assertion of
executive power concerns a matter of “earnest and profound debate across the
country.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, it is just as objectionable to read EMTALA as
an “implicit delegation” of authority to compel physicians to perform abortions
prohibited by state law based on the statute’s “oblique” language. Id.
Because EMTALA does not confer clear congressional authority for the
abortion mandate the United States asserts, the major questions doctrine applies.
The District Court’s handling of EMTALA raises additional concerns. Unlike
the HEROES Act, EMTALA is not a statute enacted to address unpredictable
national emergencies, Biden, 143 S. Ct. at 2399 (Kagan, J., dissenting), and the
provision relied on by the United States directs hospitals to provide “stabilizing care”
for patients. It does not confer on HHS “broad emergency powers.” Id. The District
Court’s statutory analysis distorts the text. A statute that endorses delivery as
stabilizing treatment and mentions unborn children four times is (to say the least)
an unpromising candidate for a national abortion mandate. That the lower court
26
disregarded or excised those references suggests that the preliminary injunction rests
not so much on the EMTALA that Congress enacted but on the EMTALA the
government and the District Court preferred. That approach flouts the principle that
a federal agency “literally has no power to act, let alone pre-empt the validly enacted
legislation of a sovereign State, unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Com’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986).
Sanctioning the government’s new-found power under EMTALA would have
profoundly troubling consequences. Allowing the United States to treat EMTALA’s
duty of stabilizing treatment as a blank page to fill with the Executive Branch’s
preferred medical policy would empower the government to impose federal mandates
compelling hospitals to provide any sort of medical procedures—so long as the
purported mandate can be framed as “necessary stabilizing treatment.” 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd(b). Such an approach would displace Congress’s role as the Nation’s
lawmaker and the States’ historic police power to regulate medical care.
C.
The District Court Likewise Misconstrued Section 622.
Although EMTALA contains no abortion mandate with which the State of
Idaho must comply, we want to correct the record about how section 622 actually
operates because the District Court got the state side of its federal-state conflict
wrong too. In the Court’s opinion, “EMTALA obligates the treating physician to
provide stabilizing treatment, including abortion care. But regardless of the pregnant
patient’s condition, Idaho statutory law makes that treatment a crime.” App. 57a.
Going further, the Court characterized section 622 as an impediment to decent
medical care for a pregnant woman in distress. See App. 74a–75a (describing “the
27
pregnant patient, laying on a gurney in an emergency room facing the terrifying
prospect of a pregnancy complication that may claim her life” but where “her doctors
feel hobbled by an Idaho law that does not allow them to provide the medical care
necessary to save her health and life”). Not so. Section 622 does not discourage a
doctor from protecting a pregnant woman’s life and health.
First, the statute wholly exempts a woman who obtains an abortion. IDAHO
CODE § 18-622(5). She faces no liability at all. Full stop.
Second, Idaho law does not treat all medical procedures terminating a
pregnancy as an abortion. The Idaho Supreme Court has clarified that section 622
does not cover ectopic or other non-viable pregnancies. See Planned Parenthood, 522
P.3d at 1202–03. Further, section 622 does not apply when necessary medical
treatment accidentally results in the death of an unborn child. See IDAHO CODE §§ 18622(4) (statutory exemption); 18-604(1) (defining abortion as using some means “to
intentionally terminate” a pregnancy).
Third, recent amendments clarify that section 622 contains straightforward
exceptions. See H.B. 374, 67th Leg., 1st Sess. (Idaho 2023). An abortion performed to
save a woman’s life or (during the first trimester) to address a pregnancy from rape
or incest “shall not be considered criminal abortions.” IDAHO CODE §§ 18-622(2); 18622(2)(b). Nor does a physician face prosecution for an abortion performed in the
belief that a woman’s life was at risk. Mistakes of fact are no basis for prosecution.
These exceptions form a safe harbor for a physician who acts “in his good faith medical
judgment and based on the facts known to the physician at the time.” Id. §§ 18-
28
622(2)(a)(i), (ii). Within that zone, section 622 should no longer “deter physicians from
providing abortions in some emergency situations.” App. 31a.
Far from posing an arbitrary obstacle to medical care, section 622 simply
restores Idaho law to its pre-Roe condition. See Planned Parenthood, 532 P.3d at 807
(Abortion was a crime under Idaho law from territorial days until Roe). By prohibiting
abortion unless necessary to save a woman’s life or end a pregnancy resulting from
rape or incest, section 622 fairly reflects Idaho’s “history and traditions” under which
a nontherapeutic “abortion was viewed as an immoral act and treated as a crime.”
Planned Parenthood, 522 P.3d at 1148.
In short, the federal-state conflict for which the District Court issued a
preliminary injunction is false at both ends. Reading EMTALA as an abortion
mandate defeats Congress’s evident intent to secure emergency medical care for both
a pregnant woman and her unborn child, and Idaho’s section 622 is not the draconian
measure depicted by the District Court. Without a conflict between EMTALA and
section 622, the preliminary injunction lacks any foundation in law.
D.
Enjoining Section 622 Because of EMTALA is Unconstitutional.
1.
The preliminary injunction violates the Tenth Amendment.
Dobbs held that “the authority to regulate abortion must be returned to the
people and their elected representatives.” Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2279. By enjoining
section 622 based on a misreading of EMTALA, the District Court denies Idaho’s
authority to regulate abortion.
29
Structural implications follow from reserving legislative power to states. Dobbs
contemplates that abortion will be regulated in a way that “will be more sensitive to
the diverse needs of a heterogenous society,” that “increases opportunity for citizen
involvement in democratic process,” that “allows for more innovation and
experimentation in government,” and that “makes government more responsive by
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 458 (1991) (citation omitted). All these virtues of a federal system guarded by
the Tenth Amendment naturally follow from Dobbs’s determination that states hold
the power to regulate abortion.
The preliminary injunction generates the contrary implications. It rests on the
Supremacy Clause, which the court described as a rule that “state law must yield to
federal law when it’s impossible to comply with both.” App. 41a. Waving aside
concerns about Idaho’s sovereignty, the Court added that “Dobbs did not overrule the
Supremacy Clause … even when it comes to regulating abortion, state law must yield
to conflicting federal law.” App. 76a. This misconceives the nature of the Supremacy
Clause. True, “if Congress acts under one of its enumerated powers, there can be no
violation of the Tenth Amendment.” Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 867 (9th Cir.
2007). But “[t]his is an extraordinary power in a federalist system … that we must
assume Congress does not exercise lightly.” Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460. A federal agency
can distort our federal system, no less than the separation of powers, by exercising
authority that Congress does not confer. That is why this Court insists on
“exceedingly clear language” if federal law is to “alter the balance between federal
30
and state power,” Cowpasture River, 140 S. Ct. at 1849–50. But such “exceedingly
clear” delegation of authority to HHS, id. at 1849, is hardly satisfied by EMTALA’s
requirement to provide “necessary stabilizing treatment.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b).
2.
The decision below violates the Spending Clause.
The construction of EMTALA adopted by the District Court also transgresses
the Spending Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
First, that Clause forbids the United States from coercing an unwilling state
into complying with a regulatory command. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 582
(2012) (holding that a provision of the ACA amounted to “economic dragooning that
leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion”).
Here, the United States says that section 622 denies it “the benefit of its bargain …
by affirmatively prohibiting Idaho hospitals from complying with certain obligations
under EMTALA.” Complaint at 13. The government adds that section 622
“undermines the overall Medicare program and the funds that the United States
provides in connection with that program.” Id. at 13–14. This suggests that Idaho
hospitals must perform abortions when the United States says that EMTALA
requires it or risk the loss of billions in Medicare funding. The scale of that risk is
eye-popping. Idaho received “approximately $3.4 billion in federal Medicare funds”
between 2018 and 2020. U.S.A. Mem. ISO Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 6, United States v.
Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW (D. Idaho Aug. 8, 2022), ECF No. 17-1. HHS Secretary
Becerra made the threat crystal clear by warning Medicare-funded hospitals that
adherence to State law rather than complying with the government’s conception of
31
EMTALA risks “termination of its Medicare provider agreement.” Letter from
Secretary Becerra to Health Care Providers, July 11, 2022, at 2, available at
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/emergency-medical-care-letter-to-healthcare-providers.pdf. The State of Idaho thus faces the loss of billions in Medicare
funding unless it obeys the government’s abortion mandate, for which EMTALA is
little more than window dressing.
Second, the abortion mandate requirement pressed by the United States is
retroactive. It comes long after Idaho agreed to the conditions of participating in
Medicare. Imposing a novel mandate retroactively is another way that the
government violates the Spending Clause. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981).
III.
THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE EQUITIES FAVOR A STAY.
Nken holds that the remaining factors—harm to the opposing party and the
public interest—“merge when the Government is the opposing party.” 556 U.S. at
435. These too favor a stay.
What matters are “the relative harms to applicant and respondent, as well as
the interests of the public at large.” Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Proj., 138 S. Ct.
2080, 2087 (2017) (quoting Barnes v. E-Systems, Inc. Group Hosp. Med. & Surg. Ins.
Plan, 501 U.S. 1301, 1305 (1991) (Scalia, J., in chambers (cleaned up)). Start with the
harm to the Legislature. Enjoining section 622 inflicts an irreparable harm on the
State of Idaho and its institutions, including the Legislature, King, 567 U.S. at 1303.
Judicial interference with state law is an independent injury.
32
By contrast, the United States will not suffer an irreparable injury from a stay.
Ninth Circuit precedent has rebuffed “general pronouncements that a Supremacy
Clause violation alone constitutes sufficient harm to warrant an injunction.” United
States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 894 (9th Cir. 2019). But “[g]eneral
pronouncements” are all the United States has to offer. Id. Letting a preempted state
law operate could impose irreparable harm on the United States—but only if its claim
of preemption is valid. See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 366 (9th Cir. 2011),
rev’d in part on other grounds, 567 U.S. 387 (2012). And that seems highly doubtful
considering the flaws in the government’s preemption claim. Any harm from waiting
to persuade an appellate panel that EMTALA preempts section 622 before enjoining
Idaho law is hardly “irreparable” since the government “may yet pursue and vindicate
its interests in the full course of this litigation.” Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151,
1168 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Golden v. Washington, 138 S.
Ct. 448 (2017).
The public interest lies in preserving the integrity of EMTALA as adopted by
Congress and by “maintaining our constitutional structure” of powers divided among
the three branches of the national government and between the federal government
and the states. BST Holdings, LLC v. OSHA, 17 F.4th 604, 618 (5th Cir. 2021). See
also Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 677 (9th Cir. 2019) (public interest would
be served by “respecting the Constitution’s assignment of the power of the purse to
Congress, and by deferring to Congress’s understanding of the public interest”).
Dobbs reserves to States like Idaho the authority to regulate abortion. Beyond that,
33
EMTALA’s text expresses Congress’s sense of the public interest—that the life and
health of both a pregnant woman and her unborn child deserve federal protection.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1). At the same time, EMTALA embodies a legislative
determination to respect a State’s traditional authority over public health, which is
why EMTALA is governed by express non-preemption clauses limiting the statute’s
preemptive reach. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f), 42 U.S.C. § 1395.
The District Court saw the public interest in starkly different terms. The
preliminary injunction order accepted as a “key consideration … what impact an
injunction would have on non-parties and the public at large.” App. 74a (citing
Bernhardt v. L.A. Cnty., 339 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 2003)). Public interest would be
best served, in the Court’s view, by vindicating the government’s claim under the
Supremacy Clause. See id. Added to that, “allowing the Idaho law to go into effect
would threaten severe, irreparable harm to pregnant patients in Idaho.” Id. Hospital
capacity in neighboring states “would be pressured as patients may choose to cross
state lines to get the emergency care they are entitled to receive under federal law.”
App. 75a. Compared with these interests, the opinion concluded that “the State of
Idaho will not suffer any real harm if the Court issues the modest preliminary
injunction the United States is requesting.” App. 76a.
This analysis goes astray in several respects.
First, the District Court overlooked the irreparable harm that the preliminary
injunction inflicts on the State. King, 567 U.S. at 1303.
34
Second, a concern with the Supremacy Clause is overblown when the United
States produces only “general pronouncements that a Supremacy Clause violation
alone constitutes sufficient harm to warrant an injunction.” California, 921 F.3d at
894. Nor, to be clear, can third-party harm relieve the United States of the duty to
show injury to itself. Nken, 556 U.S. at 426.
Third, concern with third-party harm cannot overshadow irreparable injury
and the likelihood of success when evaluating equitable relief. Id. at 434 (the “first
two factors of the traditional standard are the most critical”). Concern with nonparties should not distract from the government’s failure to demonstrate a likelihood
of success—“the most important” factor in considering interim equitable relief. Garcia
v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015).
Fourth, the District Court misstates Idaho law. The lower court relied on
declarations prepared within a three-week period that have never been tested at trial,
to portray section 622 as a brutal threat to Idaho women. It isn’t so. The complaint
says that “ectopic pregnancy, severe preeclampsia, or a pregnancy complication
threatening septic infections or hemorrhage … could be deemed an ‘abortion’ under
Idaho law.” Complaint at 7. The Idaho Supreme Court has conclusively held
otherwise—that section 622 does not cover ectopic or other non-viable pregnancies
and that it authorizes an abortion to save a woman’s life. See Planned Parenthood,
522 P.3d at 1202–03. Even if other emergency medical conditions pose serious risks
to women, the legal analysis remains unchanged. Under EMTALA, what matters is
whether a pregnant woman with an emergency medical condition can get emergency
35
treatment to preserve her health and life; whether an abortion is available in every
such instance is beside the point. The difficult questions that arise in deciding when
abortion should be legal belong to the people of Idaho and their elected
representatives—not to federal agencies wielding a contrived mandate.
CONCLUSION
Dobbs assured the country that the American people and their elected
representatives have the authority to regulate abortion. 142 S. Ct. at 2279. The
District Court’s preliminary injunction, founded on an unprecedented construction of
federal law, thwarts Idaho’s sovereign authority to regulate abortion as it has done
through most of its history. To avoid irreparable harm to the State while the
Legislature defends Idaho law on the merits, the Legislature respectfully requests an
administrative stay, if necessary, and a stay of the preliminary injunction pending
disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such a writ is timely sought.
Respectfully submitted,
Daniel W. Bower
MORRIS BOWER & HAWS PLLC
1305 12th Ave. Rd.
Nampa, ID 83686
(208) 345-3333
dbower@morrisbowerhaws.com
/s/ William C. Duncan
William C. Duncan
Counsel of Record
1868 N. 800 E.
Lehi, UT 84043
(801) 367-4570
billduncan56@gmail.com
Counsel for Applicants
November 20, 2023
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.