Amicus Curiae Brief — Seven County Infrastructure Coalition, et al., Petitioners v. Eagle County, Colorado, et al.
Supreme Court briefSep 4, 2024
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 23-975
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
____________________________________
SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION and
UINTA BASIN RAILWAY, LLC,
Petitioners,
v.
EAGLE COUNTY, COLORADO, et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________________
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
____________________________________
BRIEF OF THE INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, THE ELECTRIC
POWER SUPPLY ASSOCIATION, THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY
UTILITY COMMISSIONERS, THE
MIDCONTINENT INDEPENDENT SYSTEM
OPERATOR, INC., THE LIQUID ENERGY
PIPELINE ASSOCIATION, ET AL. AS AMICI
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
____________________________________
DONALD P. SALZMAN
Counsel of Record
JAMES P. DANLY
KYRSTIN M. WALLACH
SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,
MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
1440 New York Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20005
202-371-7000
donald.salzman@skadden.com
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................ ii
INTEREST OF THE AMICI ....................................... 2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................ 5
ARGUMENT................................................................ 7
I.
Expanded NEPA Review Causes Profound
Litigation Risk. ................................................. 7
II.
Permitting Delays Have Impeded Energy
Infrastructure Development. ......................... 11
III.
Sabal Trail has Undermined Public Citizen
and Undermined Agencies’ Organic
Statutes…. ...................................................... 21
A.
NEPA is a Procedural Statute. ............ 21
B.
Sabal Trail has Encouraged the
Unlawful Expansion of Agency
Jurisdiction and Threatens Agencies’
Organic Statutes. ................................. 23
C.
Federal Respondents Argue—
Unconvincingly—for Judicial
Inaction….. ........................................... 26
D.
The Court Should Adopt—and Impose—
the Holding in Sierra Club. ................. 29
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 32
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Co. v.
S.C.R.A.P.,
422 U.S. 289 (1975)...................................... 22
Alabama Municipal Distributors Group v.
FERC,
100 F.4th 207 (D.C. Cir. 2024) .................... 31
American Gas Ass’n v. FERC,
912 F.2d 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1990).................... 25
Andrus v. Sierra Club,
442 U.S. 347 (1979)...................................... 22
Birckhead v. FERC,
925 F.3d 510 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ........................ 9
Center for Biological Diversity v. FERC,
67 F.4th 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2023) .................... 30
City of Port Isabel v. FERC,
No. 23-1174 et al., 2024 WL 3659344
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 2024) ........................... 9, 10
Department of Transportation v. Public
Citizen,
541 U.S. 752 (2004)................. 4, 6, 21, 22, 23,
.................................. 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32
iii
Eagle County, Colorado v. STB (Eagle
County),
82 F.4th 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2023) ........... 5, 6, 17,
.............................................. 21, 25, 26, 29, 32
EarthReports, Inc. v. FERC,
828 F.3d 949 (D.C. Cir. 2016)...................... 30
Food & Water Watch v. FERC (Food & Water
Watch),
28 F.4th 277 (D.C. Cir. 2022) ............ 7, 24, 29
Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC,
578 U.S. 150 (2016)...................................... 23
Karst Environmental Education &
Protection, Inc. v. EPA,
475 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ...................... 7
Kleppe v. Sierra Club,
427 U.S. 390 (1976)...................................... 22
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against
Nuclear Energy (Metropolitan),
460 U.S. 766 (1983).................... 21, 22, 27, 28
Moskal v. United States,
498 U.S. 103 (1990)...................................... 28
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the
United States, Inc. v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983) ....................................... 26
iv
NAACP v. Federal Power Commission
(NAACP),
425 U.S. 662 (1976)................................ 25, 26
National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC,
909 F.2d 1519 (D.C. Cir. 1990).................... 25
Richmond Power & Light v. FERC,
574 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ...................... 25
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
490 U.S. 332 (1989)...................................... 21
Sierra Club v. FERC (Sabal Trail),
867 F.3d 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ....... 3, 5, 6, 17,
................................................... 21, 23, 24, 25,
.............................................. 27, 29, 30, 31, 32
Sierra Club v. FERC,
827 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2016)........................ 30
Sierra Club v. FERC,
827 F.3d 59 (D.C. Cir. 2016)........................ 30
Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support,
No. 2:20-cv-00396-LEW (D. Me. Mar.
29, 2024), ECF No. 177 ................................ 16
v
Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Federal Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, with Incorporated
Memorandum of Law, No. 2:20-cv00396-LEW (D. Me. June 4, 2024),
ECF No. 180 ................................................. 17
Stone v. I.N.S.,
514 U.S. 386 (1995)...................................... 27
Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.
Karlen,
444 U.S. 223 (1980)...................................... 22
Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC,
364 U.S. 137 (1960)...................................... 25
Vecinos para el Bienestar de la Comunidad
Costera v. FERC,
6 F.4th 1321 (D.C. Cir. 2021) ........................ 9
Statutes
15 U.S.C. § 717(b) ............................................ 13, 24
16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) ....................................... 23, 31
42 U.S.C. § 4332 ..................................................... 26
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) ............................................ 7, 10
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) ............................................. 27
vi
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) (1970) ................................. 27
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) (2023) ................................. 27
42 U.S.C. § 4335 ..................................................... 22
49 U.S.C. § 11101(a) ............................................... 25
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023,
Pub. L. No. 118-5, Div. C, Tit. III,
§ 321(a)(3)(B), 137 Stat. 10, 38
(Builder Act)............................................. 7, 27
National Environmental Policy Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 ................................. 3
Other Authorities
169 Cong. Rec. H2681, H2704
(daily ed. May 31, 2023) .............................. 28
Alyson C. Flournoy et al., Harnessing the
Power of Information to Protect Our
Public Natural Resource Legacy, 86
Tex. L. Rev. 1575 (2008) ................................ 8
Caroline Nakhle, Geopolitical Intelligence
Services AG, Energy Prices and Inflation: Politics Trump the Economics
Dec. 7, 2022), https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/energy-prices/ ................. 18
vii
CEQ, A Citizen’s Guide to the NEPA (Dec.
2007), https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/get-involved/Citizens_Guide_Dec07.pdf ................. 7
CEQ, Environmental Impact Statement
Timelines (2010–2018) (June 12, 2020) ........ 8
CEQ, Length of Environmental Impact Statements (2013–2018) (June 12, 2020) .............. 8
Daniel A. Dreyfus, NEPA: The Original Intent of the Law, 109 J. Prof. Issues in
Eng’g Educ. & Prac. 249 (1983)..................... 8
Duke Energy, Dominion Energy and Duke
Energy Cancel the Atlantic Coast Pipeline (July 5, 2020), https://news.dukeenergy.com/releases/dominion-energyand-duke-energy-cancel-the-atlanticcoast-pipeline ............................................... 12
Erick Garcia Luna, Fed. Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, Rising Household Energy
Costs Affect Lower-Income and NonWhite Residents Most (Mar. 1, 2023),
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2023/rising-household-energycosts-affect-lower-income-and-nonwhite-residents-most ................................... 18
FERC, Electric Power Markets (May 16,
2023), https://www.ferc.gov/electricpower-markets ............................................. 18
viii
FERC, Final Environmental Impact Statement – Rio Grande LNG Project and
Rio Bravo Pipeline Project (Apr. 26,
2019) ............................................................. 10
FERC, Final Environmental Impact Statement – Texas LNG Project (Mar. 15,
2019) ............................................................. 10
H.R. Rep. No. 91-765 (1969) (Conf. Rep.) ........ 22, 26
H.R. Rep. No. 118-28, pt. 1 (2023) ......................... 28
Industrial Energy Consumers of America,
Comments for the Record on the “American Energy Expansion: Strengthening
Economic, Environmental, and National Security” Hearing (Jan. 20,
2023), https://www.ieca-us.com/wpcontent/uploads/01.30.23_Commentsfor-the-Record_American-Energy-Expansion-Hearing.pdf .................................... 20
Industrial Energy Consumers of America,
Letter to Governors re: Manufacturing
Companies Face Growing Natural Gas
Scarcity Along the Entire Eastern Seaboard (Dec. 13, 2022),
https://www.ieca-us.com/wp-content/uploads/12.13.22_Transco-Governors-Letter.pdf ............................................. 20
ISO New England Inc., 2022 Annual Markets
Report (June 5, 2023)................................... 19
ix
ISO New England Inc., Draft ISO/EDC/
LDC Problem Statement and Call to
Action on LNG and Energy Adequacy
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission New England Winter Gas-Electric
Forum, Sept. 8, 2022 (Aug. 29, 2022),
https://isonewswire.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/DraftFERCTechConferenceEverettandEnergyAdequacyProblemStatement-8.29-final.pdf ............ 19
Joint Comments of Electric Reliability
Council of Texas, Inc.; Midcontinent
Independent System Operator, Inc.;
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.; and
Southwest Power Pool, Inc., Docket No.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0072 (Dec.
20, 2023) ................................................... 2, 15
Kristen Hite, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF11932,
National Environmental Policy Act:
Judicial Review and Remedies (Sept.
22, 2021) ..................................................... 5, 7
MISO, MISO Board Approves $9 Billion
Transmission Portfolio (Dec. 8, 2023),
https://www.misoenergy.org/meetmiso/media-center/miso-matters/misoboard-approves-$9-billion-transmission-portfolio/ ............................................... 15
x
MISO, MISO’s Response to the Reliability Imperative (Feb. 2024),
https://www.misoenergy.org/meetmiso/MISO_Strategy/reliabilityimperative/ ................................................... 15
Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC,
185 FERC ¶ 61,193 (2023) .......................... 11
National Grid LNG, LLC,
179 FERC ¶ 61,205 (2022) .......................... 12
NERC, 2023 Long-Term Reliability Assessment (Dec. 2023) .................................... 15, 17
NextDecade Corp., Quarterly Report (Form
10-Q) (Aug. 14, 2024) ................................... 11
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., PJM Capacity
Auction Procures Sufficient Resources
to Meet RTO Reliability Requirement
(July 30, 2024) ....................................... 14, 15
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Transmission
Congestion Can Increase Costs (2024),
https://www.pjm.com/-/media/aboutpjm/newsroom/fact-sheets/congestionfact-sheet.ashx ............................................ 16
Roanoke Gas, Comments in Support of Mountain Valley Pipeline Project, FERC
Docket Nos. CP16-10-000, et al.,
(July 8, 2022) ............................................... 13
xi
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q)
(Aug. 5, 2024) ............................................... 13
Trunkline Gas Company, LLC, Costs Comparison Statement re the Pipeline Modifications Project, FERC Docket No.
CP14-119-000 (July 23, 2024) ..................... 11
U.S. Energy Information Administration,
Natural Gas Intrastate Pipeline Capacity Additions Outpaced Interstate
Additions in 2023 (Mar. 20, 2024),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?%20id=61623 ............................. 2, 13
U.S. Energy Information Administration,
New England Utility Closes Import-Dependent Gas-Fired Power Plant, Keeps
LNG Import Option
(June 24, 2024), https://www.eia.gov/to
dayinenergy/detail.php?id=62404 ............... 19
BRIEF OF THE INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, THE ELECTRIC
POWER SUPPLY ASSOCIATION, THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY
UTILITY COMMISSIONERS, THE
MIDCONTINENT INDEPENDENT SYSTEM
OPERATOR, INC., THE LIQUID ENERGY
PIPELINE ASSOCIATION, ET AL.
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
The Interstate Natural Gas Association of
America (INGAA), the Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA), the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners (NARUC), the Midcontinent
Independent System Operator, INC. (MISO), the Liquid Energy Pipeline Association (LEPA), the Industrial Energy Consumers of America (IECA), the Natural Gas Supply Association (NGSA), the Center for
LNG (CLNG), the American Public Gas Association
(APGA), and the Consumer Energy Alliance (CEA)
(collectively, “Amici”) respectfully submit this brief as
amici curiae in support of petitioners Seven County
Infrastructure Coalition and Uinta Basin Railway,
LLC.1
1 Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.6, counsel for amici curiae
states that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or
in part, and no party or counsel for a party made a monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of
this brief. No person or entity other than amici curiae or its counsel has made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
2
INTEREST OF THE AMICI
America’s energy system is in peril. Critical energy infrastructure has become increasingly difficult
to permit, site, and construct. Even as America witnesses unprecedented growth in the demand for energy, desperately-needed energy infrastructure—projects which would have been built as a matter of routine mere decades ago—are now being delayed, abandoned mid-development, or never proposed in the first
place.
This infrastructure is critical. It includes the
high voltage transmission lines necessary for electric
reliability, the oil pipelines that supply fuel for transportation, the electric generators that produce power,
the pipelines that supply fuel to electric generators
and fuel and feedstock to the manufacturing industry,
the local gas distribution networks that provide fuel
to heat houses in the winter, the LNG terminals that
provide needed energy to our allies overseas, and the
pipelines that fuel manufacturing, providing millions
of jobs and contributing trillions of dollars to our economy.
More infrastructure is needed or the country
could face energy scarcity, rising prices, and, ultimately, reliability failures. And yet the rate of energy
infrastructure development has been slowing down
precipitously. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (EIA),
Natural Gas Intrastate Pipeline Capacity Additions
Outpaced Interstate Additions in 2023 (Mar. 20, 2024)
[hereinafter EIA Report], https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?%20id=61623. This, at a time
when the electric markets are sounding the alarm
over impending reliability shortfalls. See, e.g., Joint
Comments of Electric Reliability Council of Texas,
3
Inc.; Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.;
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.; and Southwest Power
Pool, Inc., Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0072, at 9
(Dec. 20, 2023) [hereinafter Joint Comments],
(“[S]hortfalls in resource adequacy . . . cannot simply
be addressed overnight and would require the development of new resources that can take considerable
time to permit and build.”).
So what has changed? Among the greatest contributors is environmental review. In the past several
years, starting with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit’s (D.C. Circuit) issuance
of Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(Sabal Trail), judicial fiat has expanded the scope of
environmental review conducted under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–
4347. This has caused delays, reduced regulatory certainty, increased costs, and impeded development of
desperately needed infrastructure.
INGAA is a trade association that represents
the majority of interstate natural gas pipeline companies operating in North America; EPSA is a trade association that represents the nation’s competitive
electric power generators; NARUC represents energy
regulators in all 50 States and most US Territories
who oversee industry—some of whom are included in
this brief—to ensure the reliability and affordability
of the utility services that provide the backbone for
their respective state economies; MISO is an independent, non-profit, electric Regional Transmission
Operator, facilitating one of the world’s largest energy
markets and coordinating regional transmission planning across its 15 U.S. states and the Canadian province of Manitoba; LEPA is a trade association that
4
represents the liquid energy pipeline owners shipping
nearly 97 percent of the crude oil and petroleum products moved by pipeline in the United States; IECA is
an association that represents the interests of a diverse array of industrial energy consumers including
those that produce chemicals, plastics, steel, aluminum, food processing, fertilizer, insulation, glass,
pharmaceuticals, building products, and cement;
NGSA is a trade association that represents integrated and independent energy companies that produce, transport, and market billions of cubic feet of
natural gas per day; CLNG, a committee of NGSA, advocates for the advancement of the use of LNG in the
United States and its international export; APGA represents the nation’s not-for-profit, community-owned
natural gas local distribution systems; and CEA is an
association of energy consumers and producers that
advocates for energy and environmental policies to ensure all Americans benefit from access to affordable,
reliable, and environmentally responsible energy.
Representing diverse components of the energy
supply chains and markets, the Amici are united in
their desire to see clear, rational, predictable environmental reviews under NEPA that support the ongoing
development of reliable, affordable energy systems
throughout the country. To avoid unnecessarily expansive environmental reviews that throw federal infrastructure permits into doubt, they urge the Court
to reverse the D.C. Circuit’s decision and reaffirm the
core holding in Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004) (Public Citizen), that
NEPA does not require review of environmental effects for which the agency is not the legally relevant
cause.
5
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
NEPA is the most heavily litigated federal environmental statute. Kristen Hite, Cong. Rsch. Serv.,
IF11932, National Environmental Policy Act: Judicial
Review and Remedies 1 (Sept. 22, 2021) (Judicial Review and Remedies). Though wholly procedural and
informational, NEPA provides a liberally-employed
backdoor by which litigants can challenge agencies’
substantive decisions.
Agencies, in an attempt to bulletproof their
NEPA issuances from reversal on appeal, gold-plate
their environmental reviews, producing ever longer
NEPA documents in the course of ever longer environmental reviews. The result is delay.
Because of the regulatory uncertainty caused
by the delays from the threat of litigation and from
the litigation itself, every type of infrastructure vital
to the energy sector (generation, transmission, LNG
terminals, and pipelines) has become more difficult
and more expensive to permit and construct. This infrastructure is critical to the United States. Insufficient infrastructure means rising costs and, in cases
of truly acute scarcity, the possibility of blackouts and
reliability failures.
Eagle County, Colorado v. STB, 82 F.4th 1152
(D.C. Cir. 2023) (Eagle County), represents the culmination of a seven-year long, court-mandated expansion of the scope of NEPA review. This series of cases,
which began with Sabal Trail, has ignored Congressionally-imposed jurisdictional limitations placed on
agencies’ substantive powers by requiring agencies to
consider subjects in their substantive decision making
that are either explicitly exempted in their enabling
statutes or contrary to their statutes’ purpose. Sabal
6
Trail’s abandonment of the sensible proximate causation requirement established in Public Citizen has resulted in the treatment of agencies as the legally relevant cause of every effect for which their permits are
a but-for cause—even when considering those effects,
undermines the fundamental purpose of the statute
(like requiring discrimination against particular categories of customer on common carrier railways).
The regime established by Sabal Trail is unworkable. Predictability is impossible when the scope
of NEPA review is determined, as the Federal Respondents advocate, on an agency-by-agency, projectby-project basis. In order to restore the regulatory
certainty necessary for investment in the energy infrastructure America desperately needs, the Court
should reject the Federal Respondents’ request for
narrow relief, and instead reverse Eagle County, reaffirm Public Citizen, and instruct the lower courts that
agencies cannot be required to conduct NEPA review
on effects for which they are not the legally relevant
cause.
7
ARGUMENT
I.
Expanded NEPA Review Causes Profound
Litigation Risk.
NEPA is the most heavily litigated federal environmental statute—the federal courts hear over one
hundred NEPA challenges annually. See Judicial Review and Remedies at 1.
NEPA is everywhere. Every agency contemplating a “major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” must prepare a “detailed statement” describing the environmental effects of that action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
Federal agencies publish thousands of environmental
assessments and hundreds of environmental impact
statements each year. See CEQ, A Citizen’s Guide to
the NEPA, at 7 (Dec. 2007).
NEPA itself does not provide a private right of
action,2 but challenges can “be brought under the
APA,” Karst Env’t Educ. & Protection, Inc. v. EPA, 475
F.3d 1291, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2007), and are reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard. See Food
& Water Watch v. FERC, 28 F.4th 277, 285 (D.C. Cir.
2022) (Food & Water Watch). As that standard has
come to be applied in NEPA litigation, any alleged deficiency in reasoning, any perceived oversight, any
claimed failure to provide a sufficiently thorough examination of a potential effect, can serve as the
2 Historically, NEPA provided no cause of action.
As of the passage of the Builder Act, there is now a cause of action to enforce
deadlines against agencies. Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023,
Pub. L. No. 118-5, Div. C, Tit. III, § 321(a)(3)(B), 137 Stat. 10, 38
(Builder Act). Challenges to the substance of a NEPA document
must still be brought through the Administrative Procedure Act.
8
predicate for a judicial challenge, no matter how trivial. NEPA challenges have become the means by
which to challenge agencies’ substantive decisions.
Agencies have responded to this litigation risk
by expanding the scope of their environmental reviews in an effort to bullet-proof their issuances on appeal. See Alyson C. Flournoy, et al., Harnessing the
Power of Information to Protect Our Public Natural
Resource Legacy, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1575, 1582–83 (2008)
(noting that critics of NEPA procedure state that concerns over omissions “encourage agencies to gold-plate
their [environmental impact statements (EIS)] by including every conceivably relevant piece of information to avoid reversal”) (citation omitted).
As a result, NEPA documents have ballooned
into encyclopedic reviews covering every imaginable
potentially relevant subject. When NEPA was first
enacted, EISs were short and concise. See Daniel A.
Dreyfus, NEPA: The Original Intent of the Law, 109
J. Prof. Issues in Eng’g Educ. & Prac. 249, 253 (1983).
Now, the average length of an EIS has swelled to 661
pages, with an average of over 1,000 pages of appendices. See CEQ, Length of Environmental Impact
Statements (2013–2018), at 1, 3 (June 12, 2020).
Longer documents take longer to prepare. As
of 2018, it took agencies an average of four and a half
years of fact finding, analysis, drafting, and review to
publish an EIS. CEQ, Environmental Impact Statement Timelines (2010-2018), 1 (June 12, 2020). Some
take far longer.
Even relatively routine permit applications,
like, for example, an application to build an 88-mile
rail line in rural Utah, are subject to protracted and
9
exhaustive NEPA reviews. The permit at issue in this
case was accompanied by an exhaustive 3,600-page
EIS. Yet the fate of this rail line now hangs in the
balance due to a challenge based, in part, upon the alleged insufficiency of the agency’s examination of unpredictable and incalculable effects hundreds of miles
away from the actual rail line.
The courts describe their role in reviewing
NEPA as “not to ‘flyspeck’ an agency’s environmental
analysis, looking for any deficiency no matter how minor.” Birckhead v. FERC, 925 F.3d 510, 515 (D.C. Cir.
2019) (citation omitted). Instead, the courts’ role is
purported to be limited to ensuring “that the agency
has adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact of its actions.” Id. (citation omitted).
Experience with NEPA litigation has instructed the Amici otherwise. By way of recent example, a NEPA challenge was brought against Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authorizations for two LNG export terminals and an associated
natural gas pipeline. See City of Port Isabel v. FERC,
No. 23-1174, et al., 2024 WL 3659344 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
6, 2024). Together, these projects represent billions of
dollars of geo-strategically critical infrastructure.
LNG terminals provide allies with desperately needed
natural gas at a time of growing demand, scarce supply, rising costs, and energy insecurity. Having identified deficiencies in the initial authorization order,
the D.C. Circuit remanded to FERC. See Vecinos para
el Bienestar de la Comunidad Costera v. FERC, 6
F.4th 1321, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
On a second appeal, the D.C. Circuit again remanded, this time with vacatur, despite acknowledging that FERC’s subsequent order on remand
10
incorporated “significantly expanded” analysis for
each project and that the analysis was based, in part,
on “several information requests to the developers,”
and that FERC “solicit[ed] public comment as to some
of the data underlying” its new analysis. City of Port
Isabel, 2024 WL 3659344, at *4, *7. The reason for
remand? In part because, despite the remedied analysis, FERC failed to issue a supplemental EIS,
thereby reopening the process for further comment.
See id. at *8.
This, after FERC’s initial EISs (including attachments) for the projects, which were prepared over
the course of several years, together spanned over
3,000 pages, canvassing every conceivable topic including geological conditions, effects on soil, water,
wetlands, vegetation, wildlife, endangered species,
recreation, cultural resources, air quality, noise pollution, and safety. See FERC, Final Environmental Impact Statement – Rio Grande LNG Project and Rio
Bravo Pipeline Project (Apr. 26, 2019); FERC, Final
Environmental Impact Statement – Texas LNG Project
(Mar. 15, 2019). FERC consulted and worked alongside numerous other federal agencies, took and responded to public comments on its draft documents,
conducted scoping and public outreach, and reviewed
the EIS before publication.
By anyone’s estimation, this effort exceeds
NEPA’s modest requirement that agencies produce a
“detailed statement” on a proposed action’s environmental effects. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
The lesson learned: almost no quantity of review is enough.
11
The court’s remand and vacatur of these facilities’ permits imperils the viability of all future projects. Regulatory uncertainty causes costs to rise, including the cost of capital, and sows doubt in the
minds of potential investors. See NextDecade Corp.,
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 26 (Aug. 14, 2024)
(explaining that “the D.C. Circuit[’s] . . . [vacatur decision] could impact Rio Grande’s ability to complete
Phase 1 on the expected time frame or at all”).
Boundless NEPA review has created grave legal vulnerabilities and it has directly harmed energy
infrastructure development in the United States.
II.
Permitting Delays Have Impeded Energy
Infrastructure Development.
Energy infrastructure is capital intensive and
permitting delays (and litigation risk) undermine the
certainty necessary for private investment.
Time is money. The delays caused by regulatory review and litigation can drastically alter the assumptions upon which a project’s finances were based.
While agencies conduct years-long NEPA reviews in
an effort to survive appeal, costs such as labor, construction materials, and commodity prices will
change. See, e.g., Trunkline Gas Co., LLC, Costs Comparison Statement re the Pipeline Modifications Project, FERC Docket No. CP14-119-000, at 1, Attach.
(July 23, 2024) (explaining that with “the passage of
time between the original estimates in 2015 and the
actual dates of construction [of pipeline modifications], costs have risen substantially,” with the original estimate of $53,956,745 increasing $107,155,160);
Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 185 FERC ¶ 61,193,
at PP 5–6 (2023) (estimating a cost increase from
12
$3,707,568,813 to $6,648,000,000 due to “permitting
delays caused by ongoing legal challenges to the project”); Nat’l Grid LNG, LLC, 179 FERC ¶ 61,205, at
PP 5–7 (2022) (explaining that, due to the delay in obtaining a permit, costs increased from $180,256,679 to
$390,829,000).
Delay kills projects. In some cases, the costs
caused by permitting and litigation delay prove insurmountable. Needed, otherwise viable infrastructure
projects are not infrequently withdrawn as a result of
delay. The Atlantic Coast Pipeline, which had already
received its FERC permit, was withdrawn due to “ongoing delays and increasing cost uncertainty which
threaten[ed] the economic viability of the project.” See
Duke Energy, Dominion Energy and Duke Energy
Cancel the Atlantic Coast Pipeline (July 5, 2020),
https://news.duke-energy.com/releases/dominion-energy-and-duke-energy-cancel-the-atlantic-coast-pipeline. The project sponsors specifically cited the threeand-a-half-year delay caused by “legal challenges to
the project’s federal and state permits” which caused
the costs of the project to almost double from about
$4.5 billion to $8 billion. Id.
Every project delayed, every project subject to
cost overruns, every project cancelled, increases the
cost of financing for other projects. As the evidence of
regulatory uncertainty accumulates, the risk premium added to any infrastructure project grows as the
capital markets price delay and regulatory failure into
their risk models. This makes financing over the life
of the project more expensive, the investment less attractive, and the pool of available capital smaller—
and at higher rates. This results in fewer projects developed. In the past five years, from 2017 to 2023, the
13
additional interstate natural gas pipeline capacity
added annually has dropped from approximately 11
Bcf per day to under 0.9—a startling reduction. See
EIA Report.
So great is the burden posed by NEPA review,
its delays and attendant litigation risk, that pipeline
investment has fled interstate pipelines and sought
safe harbor with intrastate pipelines because federal
jurisdiction only extends to transportation in interstate commerce, so intrastate pipelines are not subject
to NEPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 717(b). The last five years
have shown a marked increase in the proportion of intrastate pipelines as a share of added capacity, reaching 86 percent in 2023. See EIA Report. Though the
NGA was passed to encourage development of interstate pipelines, the regulatory burden of NEPA has
driven capital to state-jurisdictional investments.
In addition to increasing project costs and sending risk signals to the broader market, delays caused
by unnecessary process and litigation deprive the consumer and ratepayer of the energy services they need.
If a project cannot enter into service, ratepayers will
not get the benefit of diversified sources of supply
(needed now, more than ever, given growing demand)
and the lower associated costs. See, e.g., Roanoke Gas,
Comments in Support of Mountain Valley Pipeline
Project, FERC Docket Nos. CP16-10-000, et al., at 3
(July 8, 2022) (explaining “that access to the Appalachian Basin via Mountain Valley Pipeline would lower
the average Roanoke Gas customer’s gas cost by at
least 20%”). Cf. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co.,
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 16 (Aug. 5, 2024)
(explaining that the D.C. Circuit recently vacated the
FERC authorization for a project where “half of the
14
project [was placed] into service in the fourth quarter
of 2023” and stating that it “will take the necessary
legal and regulatory actions to ensure that the project
capacity continues to be available to serve the needs
of [its] customers without interruption”).
Permitting Delays also threaten electric reliability and drive up electricity ratepayers’ costs. Electric utilities depend upon energy infrastructure to
maintain system reliability and to ensure diversity of
supply. Without natural gas and oil pipelines to provide fuel, and without transmission to move power,
utilities cannot ensure that they will have adequate
supplies of electric power when they need it and will
be unable to keep prices low by dispatching the lowest
cost power from among the generators across a large
footprint. Failure to build needed energy infrastructure results in scarcity—and that, at a minimum,
means higher prices. Cf. PJM Interconnection L.L.C.
(PJM), PJM Capacity Auction Procures Sufficient Resources to Meet RTO Reliability Requirement, at 1
(July 30, 2024) [hereinafter PJM Auction Results] (explaining that for the 2025/2026 delivery year in PJM,
“[a]uction prices were significantly higher across the
RTO due to decreased electricity supply caused primarily by a large number of generator retirements,
combined with increased electricity demand and implementation of FERC-approved market reforms”).
Should the scarcity be acute, it could mean reliability
failures.
Both generation and transmission are desperately needed. The demand for electricity in many regions is growing more quickly than at any time in the
past decade due to economic growth, rise in manufacturing, the deployment of data centers, and the
15
retirement of large quantities of dispatchable generation. See NERC, 2023 Long-Term Reliability Assessment, at 10 (Dec. 2023); MISO, MISO’s Response to the
Reliability Imperative, at 9 (Feb. 2024) [hereinafter
MISO’s Response], https://www.misoenergy.org/meetmiso/MISO_Strategy/reliability-imperative/.
Even in the face of rapid load growth, it is extremely difficult to build sufficient generation to meet
demand. As a group of electric market operators explained in a recent Environmental Protection Agency
proceeding, “shortfalls in resource adequacy as a result of retirements cannot simply be addressed overnight and would require the development of new resources that can take considerable time to permit and
build.” Joint Comments at 9; cf. MISO’s Response at
10 (“As of late 2023, about 25 GW . . . had missed their
in-service deadlines by an average of 650 days, with
developers citing supply chain and permitting issues
as the two biggest reasons for the delays.”); PJM Auction Results at 2 (“PJM remains concerned with the
slow pace of new generation construction. Approximately 38,000 MW of resources . . . have not been built
due to external challenges, including financing, supply chain and siting/permitting issues.”).
It is similarly difficult to build transmission.
MISO warned that “the real risk is in a scenario where
we have underbuilt the [transmission] system.”
MISO’s Response at 18. A sobering comment in light
of MISO’s recent approval of 700 miles of transmission
development at a cost $9 billion to “address[] aging infrastructure, new load and added generation due to
retiring traditional resources.” MISO, MISO Board
Approves $9 Billion Transmission Portfolio (Dec. 8,
2023), https://www.misoenergy.org/meet-miso/media-
16
center/miso-matters/miso-board-approves-$9-billiontransmission-portfolio/.
Delays are costly. In the face of delayed infrastructure development, prices rise and reliability is
threatened. If generation development is delayed,
prices rise due to scarcity; if transmission development is delayed, prices rise because of congestion. See
PJM, Transmission Congestion Can Increase Costs, at
1 (Jan. 3, 2024), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/aboutpjm/newsroom/fact-sheets/congestion-fact-sheet.ashx
(“Heavy use of the electricity grid can result in congestion—a condition where the lowest-priced electricity
can’t flow freely to a specific area—and higher-priced
power is needed to keep the lights on”).
This threat to transmission development is not
speculative. The Clean Energy Connect project, designed to bring 1.2 GW of hydroelectric power from
Quebec to New England, a region that is suffering debilitating fuel scarcity, is currently being challenged
under NEPA, in part, on a procedural argument that
the authorizing agencies improperly segmented their
environmental reviews and a challenge to the treatment of upstream combustion emissions based on the
plaintiff’s concern that backup fossil fuel generation
might be required in the event of a shortfall of hydroelectric power. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment and Memorandum in Support at 15–17, 2125, Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No.
2:20-cv-00396-LEW (D. Me. Mar. 29, 2024), ECF No.
177.
There can be absolutely no doubt that this project is needed. “[A] persistent concern [in New England] is whether there will be sufficient fuel available
to satisfy electrical energy and operating reserve
17
demands during an extended cold spell.” NERC, 2023
Long-Term Reliability Assessment, supra, at 8. Blackouts in New England in the winter threaten not just
high electric costs due to scarcity, but the lives of New
Englanders. Needed though it is, this project hangs
in the balance based upon alleged deficiencies in the
NEPA review of, at most, a minimal portion of the entire project. The Federal Defendants in that case
stated that “[o]nly 1.9% of the 8,600 acres of total land
associated with the Project would impact federally
regulated wetlands”; the remaining 98 percent of the
project’s land would not be subject to the Corps’ jurisdiction. See Federal Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment and Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment, with Incorporated
Memorandum of Law at 12, Sierra Club v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, No. 2:20-cv-00396-LEW (D. Me.
June 4, 2024), ECF No. 180.
Eagle County is particularly threatening to
transmission development. The D.C. Circuit, quoting
Sabal Trail, held that the STB must “either quantify
and consider the project’s upstream impacts or explain in more detail why it cannot do so.” Eagle
County, 82 F.4th at 1179 (cleaned up) (citation omitted). This holding expands the scope of NEPA review
to potentially encompass every conceivable activity induced by a federal action. Read for all it is worth, the
NEPA analysis for a proposed transmission line would
have to account, one way or another, for all of the development and economic activity caused by the lower
electric rates and higher reliability afforded by the
project as well as the effects of the new generation
that will be able to connect to the transmission system
due to lower congestion. Such effects are simply impossible to predict—let alone quantify. Such analysis
18
would impute to the transmission project the negative
environmental consequences of everything from new
industry being developed to increased population as a
result of general economic prosperity caused by the
transmission line. NEPA reviews under this holding
will create profound risk to the projects.
Rising prices hurt ratepayers because demand
for domestic fuel and electricity use are relatively inelastic. People will heat their houses in the winter
and will use lights at night. When energy prices rise,
ratepayers feel the impact directly. See Erick Garcia
Luna, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Rising
Household Energy Costs Affect Lower-Income and
Non-White Residents Most (Mar. 1, 2023),
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2023/risinghousehold-energy-costs-affect-lower-income-and-nonwhite-residents-most; FERC, Energy Markets Primer,
at 5 (Dec. 2023) (“In the short term, residential and
commercial natural gas use tends to be inelastic—consumers use what they need, regardless of the price.”).
Rising energy costs due to infrastructure delays
also harm the economy more broadly because energy,
both fuel and electricity, are primary inputs to all
manner of industry and commerce. The economic
harm comes in two waves. First, people are required
to spend a larger proportion of their income on higher
energy costs, consequently reducing their spending on
other goods and services. Second, as higher energy
prices are absorbed by manufacturing and industry,
those costs are passed through to consumers, and the
price of goods and services rise. See Caroline Nakhle,
Geopolitical Intelligence Services AG, Energy Prices
and Inflation: Politics Trump the Economics (Dec. 7,
2022), https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/energy-
19
prices/. The result is a dampened economy, lower employment, and economic distress.
New England is a case study in infrastructure
scarcity’s effects on the price of energy and its consequences for the economy. New England routinely suffers idiosyncratically high fuel and electricity prices
because of insufficient infrastructure. See EIA, New
England Utility Closes Import-Dependent Gas-Fired
Power Plant, Keeps LNG Import Option (June 24,
2024), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?
id=62404. This phenomenon is well known and
widely recognized. ISO New England, Inc., the region’s wholesale electric market operator, cites infrastructure constraints as the primary driver of both
higher fuel and electricity costs: in 2022, “periods of
sustained cold weather led to increased demand on a
constrained pipeline system . . . result[ing] in very
high gas and electricity prices.” ISO New England
Inc., 2022 Annual Markets Report, at 6 (June 5, 2023).
In 2022, day-ahead electricity prices were “$86 per
MWh . . . almost 90% higher than [the previous] year.”
Id. Unless more transmission and pipeline capacity is
built, high prices will continue in New England. See ISO New England Inc., Draft ISO/EDC/
LDC Problem Statement and Call to Action on LNG
and Energy Adequacy Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission New England Winter Gas-Electric Forum, Sept. 8, 2022, at 1 (Aug. 29, 2022), https://isone
wswire.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/DraftFERCTechConferenceEverettandEnergyAdequacyProblemStatement-8.29-final.pdf (“The natural gas
pipelines that serve New England operate at maximum capacity during the winter.”).
20
Industry and manufacturing are directly exposed to higher prices and insufficient supply which
forces industry to reduce production or shut down operations at great cost. On the East Coast, the winter
can see fuel prices that are up to 500 percent higher
than in unconstrained areas. See Indus. Energy Consumers of Am. (IECA), Letter to Governors re: Manufacturing Companies Face Growing Natural Gas Scarcity Along the Entire Eastern Seaboard, at 2 (Dec. 13,
2022), https://www.ieca-us.com/wp-content/uploads/
12.13.22_Transco-Governors-Letter.pdf (stating that
in 2021 “manufacturers paid over $20 per MMBtu” for
natural gas compared to “$3.84 per MMBtu” at Henry
Hub). It is difficult for a business to remain competitive when its primary input’s costs are five times those
of its competitors.
Industry is a critical component of the economy.
On the Eastern seaboard, it accounted for almost
three and a half million jobs and $638 billion in GDP.
See IECA, Comments for the Record on the “American
Energy Expansion: Strengthening Economic, Environmental, and National Security” Hearing, at 1–2 (Jan.
30, 2023), https://www.ieca-us.com/wp-content/uploads/01.30.23_Comments-for-the-Record_AmericanEnergy-Expansion-Hearing.pdf. High energy prices
and curtailments due to insufficient infrastructure
threaten the long-term viability of manufacturing
throughout infrastructure-constrained regions.
Ordinarily, the cure for high prices is high
prices. In a permitting regime that was not beset by
delay and legal risk, the profit motive of infrastructure developers would induce them to develop the
transmission and pipeline projects that could satisfy
the urgent demand for electricity and fuel. But
21
confronted with an obstructive permitting regime,
driven in large measure by the delay and litigation
caused by NEPA, uncertainty will continue to drive up
risk premiums, increase the cost of capital, and impede infrastructure development.
III.
Sabal Trail has Undermined Public Citizen and Undermined Agencies’ Organic
Statutes.
Although the instant case arose from an order
of the STB, the following discussion concentrates on
the cases upon which Eagle County was based, a series of appeals arising from FERC orders. Beginning
with Sabal Trail, the court issued a number of opinions which expanded the scope of NEPA review, undermined agencies’ enabling statutes and impeded the
development of energy infrastructure.
A. NEPA is a Procedural Statute.
NEPA “imposes only procedural requirements
. . . requiring agencies to undertake analyses of the
environmental impact of their proposals and actions.”
Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 756–57. Accordingly,
“NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but
simply prescribes the necessary process.” Robertson
v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350
(1989) (citations omitted). “NEPA was designed” to
create processes that would “alert[] governmental actors to the effect of their proposed actions on the physical environment.” Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People
Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 772 (1983)
(Metropolitan). Because its purpose is to inform decision makers, NEPA’s “rule of reason” allows agencies
to determine “whether and to what extent to prepare
an EIS based on the usefulness of any new potential
22
information on the decisionmaking process.” Public
Citizen, 541 U.S. at 754.
As a procedural statute, NEPA cannot add to
an agency’s jurisdiction beyond that conferred by Congress in its organic statute, nor does NEPA “repeal by
implication any other statute.” Aberdeen & Rockfish
R.R. Co. v. S.C.R.A.P., 422 U.S. 289, 319 (1975); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (“The policies and goals set forth
in this chapter are supplementary to those set forth in
existing authorizations of Federal agencies”); H.R.
Rep. No. 91-765, at 10 (1969) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining
that NEPA “does not repeal existing law,” but instead
requires compliance “unless to do so would clearly violate their existing statutory authorizations”).
Agencies are still bound by their statutes and
are not required to “elevate environmental concerns
over other appropriate considerations,” Strycker’s Bay
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,
227 (1980), and when courts sit in review of an
agency’s NEPA analysis, their only role “is to insure
that the agency has [considered the] environmental
consequences; [a reviewing court] cannot ‘interject itself within the area of discretion . . . as to the choice of
the action to be taken.’” Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427
U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (citation omitted).
In light of NEPA’s role as an “action-forcing”
statute, Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350
(1979), this court held in Metropolitan and again in
Public Citizen, that agencies are not responsible for
effects based on strict “‘but for’ causation” especially
“when the agency has no authority to prevent the effect.” Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 754 (citing Metropolitan, 460 U.S. at 774). Instead, there must be a “reasonably close causal relationship” between the
23
agency’s action and the effect, “akin to proximate
cause in tort law,” in order to find an agency to be the
legally relevant cause of an effect. Id.
B. Sabal Trail has Encouraged the Unlawful Expansion of Agency Jurisdiction and Threatens Agencies’ Organic Statutes.
Public Citizen was the prevailing framework
for determining whether an agency was the legally
relevant cause of an environmental effect until Sabal
Trail.3 In Sabal Trail, the court found FERC the “legally relevant cause” of the effects of natural gas combustion from power plants “[b]ecause FERC could
deny a pipeline certificate on the ground that the pipeline would be too harmful to the environment.” Sabal
Trail, 867 F.3d at 1373 (citation omitted).
The court’s assignment of responsibility to
FERC for the emissions of electric generators rests
upon a false predicate. FERC has no jurisdiction over
electric generators. The Federal Power Act (FPA) explicitly reserves that authority to the states alone. See
16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (“The Commission . . . shall not
have jurisdiction . . . over facilities used for the generation of electric energy . . . .”); Hughes v. Talen Energy
Mktg., LLC, 578 U.S. 150, 154 (2016) (“The States’ reserved authority includes control over in-state ‘facilities used for the generation of electric energy.’” (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1)). In a word, FERC does not
3 Although Sabal Trail was decided in the D.C. Circuit and
does not apply in every circuit, because so many agencies’ enabling statutes provide venue in the D.C. Circuit, agencies frequently conduct their NEPA review in anticipation of a challenge
there, thus Sabal Trail’s broad influence.
24
have the power to stop power plant emissions. Even
were it to deny an application for a pipeline intended
to deliver natural gas to an electric generator, the generator can still operate with fuel obtained elsewhere,
for example, from non-FERC jurisdictional intrastate
pipelines. Whether it operates is a decision left entirely to the states.
The court repeated its error in Food and Water
Watch when it required FERC to review the environmental effects caused by local distribution companies
that supply commercial and residential customers because they were to receive their natural gas from the
FERC-jurisdictional pipeline under review. See Food
& Water Watch, 28 F.4th at 288. But FERC cannot be
the legally relevant cause of those effects under Public
Citizen because, like generators under the FPA, the
NGA specifically exempts local distribution from
FERC’s jurisdiction. See 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (stating
that the NGA “shall not apply to . . . the local distribution of natural gas”).
The instant case is the culmination of the case
law that began with Sabal Trail and, given its holding, it was perhaps inevitable that the STB’s decision
to forego review of upstream and downstream effects
would have resulted in the reversal of its order. As
long as an agency has the ability to deny a permit, so
the logic of Sabal Trail goes, it is the legally relevant
cause of the permitted activities’ effects. This, of
course, amounts to the very but-for causation that was
specifically eschewed in Metropolitan and Public Citizen.
Worse than flouting Supreme Court precedent,
the holding in Sabal Trail all but requires agencies to
violate their own statutes. Railroads, as common
25
carriers, must provide “service on reasonable request”
and cannot refuse service merely because they dislike
the effects of the commodity being transported. 49
U.S.C. § 11101(a). Congress has commanded the STB
to indifference as to the cargo shipped on the rail lines
it authorizes, yet Eagle County, by declaring the STB
the legally relevant cause of downstream emissions,
encourages the STB to violate its statute in favor of
discrimination.
This was the original sin of Sabal Trail. Declaring FERC the legally relevant cause of the effects
of generator combustion encouraged FERC to violate
its statute by considering matters that its enabling
statute explicitly placed outside its jurisdiction.
FERC is prohibited from regulating indirectly what it
cannot regulate directly. See, e.g., Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 909 F.2d 1519, 1522 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (citing Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC,
364 U.S. 137, 152 (1960); Richmond Power & Light v.
FERC, 574 F.2d 610, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1978)); see also
Am. Gas Ass’n v. FERC, 912 F.2d 1496, 1510 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (“[T]he Commission may not use its § 7 conditioning power to do indirectly . . . things that it cannot do at all.”).
Having placed these subjects outside FERC’s
jurisdiction, FERC should not include them in its substantive considerations under its authorizing statute.
These limits on agency power are necessary.
“[T]he . . . words ‘public interest’ in a regulatory statute is not a broad license to promote the general public
welfare.” NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S.
662, 669 (1976) (NAACP). Instead, the inquiry must
be conducted in accordance with the “purposes of the
regulatory legislation.” Id. The purpose of the NGA,
26
for example, is to “encourage the orderly development
of plentiful supplies of . . . natural gas at reasonable
prices.” Id. at 669-70. When Congress exempts a subject from FERC’s jurisdiction, that subject is no longer
a legitimate consideration in FERC’s deliberations.
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(“[A]n agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious
if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has
not intended it to consider . . . .”).
The Federal Respondents’ brief argues for a
broad reading of NEPA’s requirement that “all agencies of the Federal Government” comply to “the fullest
extent possible,” 42 U.S.C. § 4332, hinting in the direction of the “broad license to promote the general
public welfare” rejected in NAACP. 425 U.S. at 669.
The most cursory inspection of the legislative history
demonstrates that, far from expanding agencies’ jurisdiction, that language was include in clear-eyed recognition that agencies will have limits imposed by their
enabling statutes, and that those limits were to be observed. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-765, at 9 (stating that
compliance is required unless “existing law . . . expressly prohibits or makes full compliance . . . impossible”).
C. Federal Respondents Argue—Unconvincingly—for Judicial Inaction.
Federal Respondents argue demurely for judicial restraint. It is the place of Congress, not the
courts, they argue, to make policy decisions. This
Court, they say, cannot “impose new limits on NEPA’s
established framework.” Fed. Resp’ts Br. 38. But Sabal Trail and its successor cases, culminating with
Eagle County, abandoned the framework that this
27
Court established in Metropolitan and subsequently
reaffirmed in Public Citizen. The Federal Respondents’ clever entreaty to judicial circumspection
amounts to an invitation to forbear disturbing the
lower court’s obstruction of long-standing precedent.
They ask this Court to leave in place Sabal Trail’s new
regime imposing an expansive, unpredictable, and atextual implementation of NEPA. Fed. Resp’ts Br. 29.
This Court should decline the Federal Respondents’
invitation to inaction.
As to the Federal Respondents’ statement that
Congress is the institution that should rearrange
NEPA, the Amici could not agree more. And Congress
has done just that.
The Federal Respondents, in arguing that Congress is perfectly capable of amending NEPA when
and should it choose to, offer a list of various new provisions passed as part of the Builder Act. See Fed.
Resp’ts Br. 38. The Federal Respondents should have
dwelt more upon the most important amendment to
the sole operative provision in the statute, section 102.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i). There, Congress took pains not
just to codify reasonable foreseeability into the scope
of NEPA analysis, but also to surgically amend the
cause of the effects that were to be considered, changing the requirement from reviewing the “environmental impact of the proposed action,” id. § 4332(C)(i)
(1970), to the “reasonably foreseeable environmental
effects of the proposed agency action.” Id. § 4332(C)(i)
(2023) (emphasis added); Builder Act § 321(a)(3)(B)
(emphasis added).
As this court has said, “[w]hen Congress acts to
amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.” Stone v.
28
INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995) (citations omitted).
When interpreting that language, “a court should give
effect, if possible, to every clause or word of a statute.”
Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 104 (1990).
This language of these amendments is best read as a
limitation. Agencies are not to review all of the environmental impacts, just the reasonably foreseeable
ones. They are not to consider all of the consequences
of the proposed action, just those caused by the action
of the agency. Agencies are not required to review effects that are so speculative as to be unforeseeable,
nor must they review effects for which they are not
properly considered the legally relevant cause. In
other words, the amendments codified the very limitations articulated in Metropolitan and Public Citizen.
The legislative history, if needed given the obvious intent, supports no other conclusion. A House
Report accompanying an earlier version of what became this provision of the Builder Act stated that its
purpose was to “clarify[] the scope of [NEPA] reviews.”
H.R. Rep. No. 118-28, pt 1, at 33 (2023). A proponent
of the bill that was later to become the Builder Act,
Congressman Westerman, stated that the “intent” of
this section was “to narrow the scope” “from ‘any environmental impact’ . . . to only those ‘environmental
effects’ that would be a ‘reasonably foreseeable’ result
of ‘the proposed agency action.” 169 Cong. Rec.
H2681, H2704 (daily ed. May 31, 2023).
Federal Respondents assertion that “Congress
did not choose to make any changes that would dramatically limit NEPA’s reach,” Fed. Resp’ts Br. 38,
flies in the face of these narrow and purposeful
amendments plainly intended to circumscribe NEPA
review.
29
The Federal Respondents are arguing that the
scheme established by the D.C. Circuit under Sabal
Trail, which gave rise to the absurd result in this case
should remain in place. There is no problem with the
Sabal Trail regime, they effectively argue, there is
merely a problem with the application of that regime
in this particular instance.
The Federal Respondents advocate for the narrowest possible relief—maintain the status quo, just
reverse this one case. What they argue for is unworkable. Federal Respondents rest their faith in the prerogative of agencies to draw reasonable, “context-specific” lines to bound their NEPA inquiries that depend
upon “the nature of the decision before the agency and
its assessment of the facts on the ground. Fed. Resp’ts
Br. 29. In other words, as much discretion to the
agency as possible.
This is an invitation to chaos.
Worse, under the Federal Respondents’ regime
that provides no “bright-line limits,” Fed. Resp’ts Br.
18, the scope of NEPA review would vary among agencies and even among projects reviewed under the
same statute, as agencies labor to establish some principled limits to their obligations based on “the nature
of the decision” they are called to make and their “assessment of the facts on the ground.” Id. at 29.
D. The Court Should Adopt—and Impose—the Holding in Sierra Club.
In order to limit the damage caused by Sabal
Trail, Food & Water Watch, and Eagle County, the
Court should, at a minimum, reaffirm Public Citizen.
The D.C. Circuit has repeatedly, and correctly,
held that because FERC does not have jurisdiction
30
over the export of natural gas, it could not be the legally relevant cause of the effects caused by export
and therefore it need not consider those effects because it has no statutory authority to prohibit them.
See Sierra Club v. FERC, 827 F.3d 36, 47 (D.C. Cir.
2016); see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. FERC,
67 F.4th 1176, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (explaining that
“FERC is forbidden to rely on the effects of gas exports
as a justification for denying” a permit and that
“FERC’s lack of jurisdiction over export approvals also
means it has no NEPA obligation stemming from the
effects of export-bound gas”) (cleaned up) (citations
omitted); Sierra Club v. FERC, 827 F.3d 59, 68 (D.C.
Cir. 2016); EarthReports, Inc. v. FERC, 828 F.3d 949,
951–52 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Sabal Trail itself, however, sets forth a confused justification for FERC’s designation as the legally relevant cause for the generators’ effects, citing
Public Citizen as it did so. The court reasoned that,
because FERC reviews LNG terminal applications
pursuant to a narrow delegation of authority from the
Department of Energy (DOE), it was not authorized
by the DOE to consider the effects of exports, the approval of which was a power the DOE reserved to itself. See Sabal Trail, 867 F.3d at 1373. The court
found that, in contrast, FERC reviews pipeline applications under section 7 of the NGA which requires
FERC to make a broader inquiry—whether the project is in “the public convenience and necessity.” Id.
Accordingly, the court went on, FERC can deny an application for environmental reasons and is therefore
the legally relevant cause of the effects. See id.
This reasoning must be in error. If a narrow
delegation from the DOE that excludes export
31
licensing authority is a sufficient basis to prohibit
FERC from considering export effects, then the complete exemption of electric generation from FERC’s jurisdiction in the plain text of its organic statute must
present an even greater obstacle. See 16 U.S.C. §
824(b)(1). If the argument is that DOE exclusively
regulates exports and so FERC cannot consider those
effects, then it logically follows that, since States exclusively regulate generation, FERC cannot consider
the effects attributable to the generators.
The court’s distinction in Sabal Trail between
the review under delegated authority and the broader
considerations under the public convenience and necessity inquiry cannot overcome these jurisdictional
limitations. See Sabal Trail, 867 F.3d at 1373. In reviewing a FERC order that found a natural gas pipeline project serving an LNG export facility to be in the
public convenience and necessity, the D.C. Circuit itself recently said (notwithstanding the broader public
convenience and necessity inquiry under NGA section
7) that because “Congress gave export authorization
to the [DOE]—not FERC,” “FERC did not err when it
declined to consider the environmental effects of exported gas.” Ala. Mun. Distribs. Grp. v. FERC, 100
F.4th 207, 214 (D.C. Cir. 2024).
When an agency cannot deny a permit based
upon an effect because the agency’s enabling statute
exempts the source of that effect from the agency’s jurisdiction, then the agency cannot be the legally relevant cause of that effect. The Court should clarify the
scope of Public Citizen’s limitation on agencies’ obligation to examine effects statutorily exempted from the
agency’s jurisdiction, and thereby obviate Sabal Trail.
32
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Amici respectfully request that the Court vacate the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Eagle County, reaffirm its precedent
in Public Citizen, and hold that when an agency’s enabling statute places the cause of an effect outside the
agency’s jurisdiction, the agency’s action cannot be the
legally relevant cause of that effect and further, that
only when an agency’s action is the legally relevant
cause of an effect does the agency have an obligation
to review that effect under NEPA.
September 4, 2024
Respectfully submitted,
DONALD P. SALZMAN
Counsel of Record
JAMES P. DANLY
KYRSTIN M. WALLACH
SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,
MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
1440 New York Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20005
202-371-7000
donald.salzman@skadden.com
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.