Amicus Curiae Brief — Seven County Infrastructure Coalition, et al., Petitioners v. Eagle County, Colorado, et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 4, 2024

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Text

No. 23-975

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

EAGLE COUNTY, COLORADO, et al.,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF A PPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF ANSCHUTZ EXPLORATION

CORPORATION AS AMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

A NDREW C. LILLIE

TINA R. VAN BOCKERN

Counsel of Record

MARK D. GIBSON

UTSARGA BHATTARAI

HOLLAND & HART LLP

555 Seventeenth Street,

Suite 3200

Denver, CO 80202

(303) 295-8000

trvanbockern@hollandhart.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

117003

A

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

I N T RODUC T ION A N D SU M M A RY OF

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

I.

Reaffirming Public Citizen is Vital to

En s u r e T h a t N EPA A n a ly s e s for

Federal Oil-and-Gas Approvals Remain

Consistent with Interior’s Regulatory

Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

A. Fe der a l Law L i m it s I nt er ior ’s

Aut hor it y t o Consider Cer t a i n

“Effects” in its Decision-Making

Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

B. Despite Public Citizen’s Instruction

t h a t a n A g e n c y ’s R e g u l a t o r y

Authority Matters, Some Courts

Have Improperly Expanded Interior’s

NEPA-Review Requirements . . . . . . . . . . .11

ii

Table of Contents

Page

II. E x p a n d e d N E P A R e v i e w s —

Unb ou nde d by Pu bli c Ci ti z e n —

Fail to Ser ve NEPA’s Fundamental

Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

III. Reaffirming Public Citizen’s Limits

Wi ll Lessen Many Ha r ms T hat

E x p a n d e d N E PA R e v i e w s C a u s e

Agencies, Project Developers, and the

Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

iii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

350 Mont. v. Bernhardt,

443 F. Supp. 3d 1185 (D. Mont. 2020). . . . . . . . . . . . .24

350 Mont. v. Haaland,

50 F.4th 1254 (9th Cir. 2022). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 17, 24

Audubon Naturalist Soc’y of the Cent. Atl.

States, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.,

524 F. Supp. 2d 642 (D. Md. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren,

698 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth,

420 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Conner v. Burford,

848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8, 10

Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. Bernhardt,

982 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. U.S. Army Corps of

Eng’rs,

941 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,

2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195761

(D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

iv

Cited Authorities

Page

Dep’t of Transp. v. Public Citizen,

541 U.S. 752 (2004). . . 1-7, 9-11, 13-17, 19, 21-22, 26, 29, 34

Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v.

Haaland,

59 F.4th 1016 (10th Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v.

Jewell,

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109986

(D.N.M. Aug. 14, 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

Eagle Cty. v. Surface Transp. Bd.,

82 F.4th 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2023) . . . . 2, 4-6, 19-20, 29, 34

Friends of the Earth v. Haaland,

583 F. Supp. 3d 113 (D.D.C. 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 29

Geosearch, Inc. v. Andrus,

508 F. Supp. 839 (D. Wyo. 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

High Country Conservation Advocs. v.

U.S. Forest Serv.,

52 F. Supp. 3d 1174 (D. Colo. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Haaland,

2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128280

(D. Mont. Feb. 11, 2022). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v.

862IÀFHRI6XUIDFH0LQLQJ

274 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (D. Mont. 2017) . . . . . . . . . .13, 24

v

Cited Authorities

Page

Mont. Wildlife Fed’n v. Bernhardt,

2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44080

(D. Mont. Mar. 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v.

U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,

725 F. App’x 527 (9th Cir. 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Kempthorne,

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110152

(D. Alaska Sept. 25, 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co.,

556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Or.-Cal. Trails Ass’n v. Walsh,

467 F. Supp. 3d 1007 (D. Colo. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,

490 U.S. 332 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2, 3, 19, 20

San Juan Citizens All. v.

U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,

326 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D.N.M. 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons,

871 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n,

867 F.3d 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2017). . . . . . . . . .13, 14, 15, 22

vi

Cited Authorities

Page

Signal Peak Energy, LLC v. Haaland,

2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149325 (Aug. 21, 2024) . . . .23, 24

Sovereign Iñupiat for a Living Arctic v.

U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,

555 F. Supp. 3d 739 (D. Alaska 2021). . . . . . . . . .16, 29

Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.

Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

435 U.S. 519 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

W. Watersheds Project v. Haaland,

22 F.4th 828 (9th Cir. 2022). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

W. Watersheds Project v. Zinke,

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85203

(D. Idaho May 12, 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

W. Watersheds Project v. Zinke,

441 F. Supp. 3d 1042 (D. Idaho 2020). . . . . . . . . . . . .30

WildEarth Guardians v. Bernhardt,

502 F. Supp. 3d 237 (D.D.C. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell,

738 F.3d 298 (D.C. Cir. 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

WildEarth Guardians v.

U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,

457 F. Supp. 3d 880 (D. Mont. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

vii

Cited Authorities

Page

WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke,

368 F. Supp. 3d 41 (D.D.C. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15

Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,

2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51011

(D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

30 U.S.C. § 21a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3, 7, 15

30 U.S.C. § 181 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3, 7, 9

30 U.S.C. § 187 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

30 U.S.C. § 191(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

30 U.S.C. § 191(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

30 U.S.C. § 201 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)(A)(i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)(C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

30 U.S.C. § 207(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

30 U.S.C. § 226. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

viii

Cited Authorities

Page

30 U.S.C. § 226(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

30 U.S.C. § 226(b)(1)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

42 U.S.C. § 4321. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1, 19

42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

42 U.S.C. § 4336a(e). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4, 21

42 U.S.C. § 4336a(g) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

42 U.S.C. § 7407(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

43 U.S.C. § 1701 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

43 U.S.C. § 1712(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Pub. L. No. 109-58, pmbl., 119 Stat. 594 (2005) . . . . . . .33

ix

Cited Authorities

Page

Regulations

30 C.F.R. § 746.13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

40 C.F.R. § 1501.11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

40 C.F.R. § 1508.1(i). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(n) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8, 9

43 C.F.R. § 1610.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

43 C.F.R. § 3161.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

43 C.F.R. § 3171.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

43 C.F.R. § 3171.17(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

43 C.F.R. § 3171.12(b)(2)(i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

43 C.F.R. § 3420.1-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

43 C.F.R. § 3425.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

43 C.F.R. § 3425.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

43 C.F.R. § 3425.3(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

x

Cited Authorities

Page

Federal Register

Actions To Expedite Energy-Related Projects,

66 Fed. Reg. 28,357 (May 22, 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

Promoting Energy Independence and Economic

Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017) . . . . . .33

Update to the Regulations Implementing

the Procedural Provisions of the

Na ti o n a l Env ir o nm e n t a l Poli c y Ac t ,

85 Fed. Reg. 43,304 (July 16, 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Waste Prevention , Production Subject to

Royalties, and Resource Conser vation,

89 Fed. Reg. 25,378 (Apr. 10, 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Other Authorities

Aidan Mackenzie & Santi Ruiz, No, NEPA Really

Is a Problem for Clean Energy, Institute for

Progress (Aug. 17, 2023), https://ifp.org/nonepa-really-is-a-problem-for-clean-energy/ . . . .21, 25

Bl o c k i n g D i r t y O i l In f r a s t r u c t u r e,

Sierra Club, https://w w w. sierraclub .org /

dirty-fuels/stopping-build- out- dir ty- oilinfrastructure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

xi

Cited Authorities

Page

C OU NCIL ON E N V T L . Q UA LI T Y, E X EC . O FFICE

OF THE P RESIDENT, Environmental Impact

Statement Timelines (2010-2018) (2020),

https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/nepa-practice/CEQ_

EIS_Timeline_Report_2020-6-12.pdf . . . . . . . . . . .22

COUNCIL ON ENVTL . QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF

THE PRESIDENT, Fact Sheet: CEQ’s Proposal to

Modernize its NEPA Implementing Regulations

  KWWSVZZZGRLJRYVLWHVGRLJRYÀOHV

uploads/8-nepa-ceq-factsheet-508.pdf. . . . . . . . . . . .27

COUNCIL ON ENVTL . QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF

THE PRESIDENT, The National Environmental

Policy Act: A Study of Its Effectiveness After

7ZHQW\ÀYH <HDUV (1997), https://ceq.doe.gov/

docs/ceq-publications/nepa25fn.pdf . . . . . . . . . . .21, 22

D a v i d K r e ut z e r & Pa i g e L a m b e r mont ,

T h e E n v i r o n m e n t a l Q u a l i t y In d e x :

Environmental Quality Weighted Oil and

Gas Production (Feb. 2023), https://www.

instituteforenergyresearch.org/wp-content/

uploads/2023/02/IER-EQI-2023.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

H.R. Rep. No. 91-765 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

Keep It in the Ground, WildEarth Guardians,

https://w ildearthguardians.org / climateenergy/keep-it-in-the-ground/ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

xii

Cited Authorities

Page

M ichael Bennon & Devon Wi lson, NEPA

Litigation Over Large Energy an d

Transport Infrastructure Projects, 53 Envtl.

L. Rep. 10836 (Oct. 2, 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25, 29

Michael J. Mortimer et al., Environmental and

Social Risks: Defensive National Environmental

Policy Act in the US Forest Service, J. of Forestry

(Jan./Feb. 2011), www.fs.usda.gov/pnw/pubs/

journals/pnw_2011_mortimer001.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . .29

Philip Rossetti, R Street Policy Study No. 234,

Addressing NEPA-Related Infrastructure

D e l a y s ( 2 0 2 1) , h t t p s : // w w w. r s t r e e t .

org/ wp-content/uploads/2021/07/FINAL_

RSTREET234.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Rystad Energy, API’s “10 in 2022” Policy

Plan , Quantification of Policy Impacts

(2022), https://w w w.api.org/-/media/files/

misc / 2 0 2 2 / 11 / r yst ad- energ y-apis-10 -i n2022-policy-plan-quantification-of-policyimpacts.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Staff of S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs

and H. Comm. on Science and Astronautics,

90th Cong., Congressional White Paper

on a National Policy for the Environment

(Comm. Print 1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

xiii

Cited Authorities

Page

Timothy J. Considine, The Fiscal and Economic

Impacts of Federal Onshore Oil and Gas

Lea se Mo r a t o r ium an d D r illin g Ban

Policies (2020), https://www.eoriwyoming.

org /projects-resources/ publications/307the-fiscal-and-economic-impacts-of-federalonshore-oil-and-gas-lease-moratorium-anddrilling-ban-policies/viewdocument/307 . . . . . . . . . .32

U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, National Environmental

Policy Act Lessons Learned: Quar terly

Repor t (Dec. 2013), https://w w w.energy.

gov/sites/default /files/ 2013/12 /f5/ LLQR2013-Q4.pdf. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26, 27

U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, National Environmental

Policy Act Lessons Learned: Quarterly Report

(Dec. 2014), https://www.energy.gov/sites/

default/files/ 2014/12/f19/DecemberLLQR_

2014.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, National Environmental

Policy Act Lessons Learned: Quarterly Report

(Dec. 2015), https://www.energy.gov/sites/

default/files/ 2015/12/f27/LLQR_Dec2015_

12-1-15_FINALr2.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, National Environmental

Policy Act Lessons Learned: Quar terly

Repor t (Dec. 2016), https://w w w.energy.

gov/sites/default/files/ 2016/12/f34/LLQR_

2016_Q4.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

xiv

Cited Authorities

Page

U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,

Bald Mountain Mine Plan of Operations

A m e n d m e n t Ju n i p e r P r o j e c t F i n a l

Environmental Impact Statement (2024),

https://eplanning.blm.gov/public_ projects/

2011567/200507677/20111331/251011322/App_

K_FRA_Conformance.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,

Rock Springs Field Office Draft Resource

Management Plan Revision and Draf t

Environmental Impact Statement (2023),

https://eplanning.blm.gov/ public_projects/

1385 3/2 0 0 0 30 619/ 2 0 0 8 4073/250 09 0255/

Volume%201_Rock%20 Springs%20RMP%20

Revision% 20Draft%20EIS_v2.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,

Supplemental Environmental Assessment

Analysis for Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Related to Oil and Gas Leasing (2022),

https://eplanning.blm.gov/public_ projects/

2022218/200537447/ 20069931/250076113/

WEG%20EA.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15, 16, 23, 32

U.S. E N ERGY I N FOR M AT ION A DM INIST R AT ION ,

Frequently Asked Questions (2024), https://www.

eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=709&t=6 . . . . . . . . . .32

xv

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U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-369,

National Environmental Policy Act, Little

Information Exists on NEPA Analyses (2014),

https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-369.pdf . . . . . . .27

1

INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE1

Anschutz Exploration Corporation is an independent

oil-and-gas company focused on responsible production of

oil-and-gas resources in three Western States: Colorado,

Utah, and Wyoming. Since its founding decades ago,

Anschutz has developed federal oil and gas managed

by the Department of the Interior (“Interior”) through

the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”). Each time

BLM proposes to sell new leases or issue Anschutz a

new permit to develop a well on an existing lease, the

agency must undertake an environmental review under

the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321

et seq. (“NEPA”).

Because NEPA applies to every major federal action—

including the authorizations Anschutz needs to develop

federal oil-and-gas reserves—far more is at stake in this

case than the 88-mile rail line in rural Utah.

Instead, this case presents a question that recurs in

virtually every case brought by special-interest groups

that oppose oil-and-gas and other mineral development

on public lands: Must an agency “study environmental

impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action

over which the agency has regulatory authority?” The

Court said the answer is “no” under Department of

Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004). But,

1. Under Supreme Court Rule 37.6, no counsel for a party

authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party

made a monetary contribution to fund the preparation or

submission of this brief. No person or entity other than amicus

curiae made a monetary contribution to fund the preparation and

submission of the brief.

2

as the D.C. Circuit’s decision demonstrates, see Eagle Cty.

v. Surface Transp. Bd., 82 F.4th 1152, 1177–80 (D.C. Cir.

2023), the D.C. Circuit and other courts still demand that

agencies evaluate effects that are outside the agencies’

authority.

Anschutz presents this brief to: (1) explain the statutes

and regulations that authorize Interior to manage oiland-gas and mineral development on public lands; (2)

demonstrate how recent judicial decisions—sidestepping

Public Citizen—have expanded NEPA reviews for

mineral-development projects to require Interior to

consider effects far outside its regulatory purview, leading

to absurd requirements imposed on remand and causing

significant harms to the project developers and the

economy; and (3) impress upon the Court the importance

RIUHDIÀUPLQJPublic Citizen and upholding appropriate

limits on the scope of NEPA’s “effects” analysis.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In Public Citizen, the Court established reasonable

guardrails on the scope of an agency’s required NEPA

analysis. The Court held that “where an agency has no

ability to prevent [an environmental effect] due to its

limited statutory authority over the relevant actions, the

agency cannot be considered a legally relevant ‘cause’ of

the effect,” and thus NEPA does not require the agency

to study that effect. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 770. This

sensible approach focuses an agency’s NEPA analysis on

only those effects that will serve NEPA’s fundamental

purpose: informed agency decision-making. See Robertson

v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349

3

(1989). In other words, Public Citizen instructed that if

information analyzed during the NEPA process cannot

LQÁXHQFHRUFKDQJHWKHRXWFRPHRIWKHDJHQF\·VGHFLVLRQ

because the agency “simply lacks the power to act on

whatever information might be contained in the [NEPA

document],” then it serves “no purpose” in the NEPA

process, and a court cannot fault an agency for omitting

it. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 767–68.

Unfortunately, the D.C. Circuit and other courts have

not heeded Public Citizen’s instruction. In supporting

Petitioners before this Court, the Surface Transportation

%RDUG MXVWLÀDEO\ DUJXHV WKDW ´1(3$ GLG QRW UHTXLUHµ

it to consider the upstream and downstream effects at

issue—“based on the scope of the proposed action and

the nature and reach of the agency’s organic statutes”—

because the effects were “so attenuated, speculative,

FRQWLQJHQW RU RWKHUZLVH LQVXIÀFLHQWO\ PDWHULDO WR WKH

agency’s decisionmaking.” See Resp’ts’ Br. in Supp. of

Pet’rs 16–17 (citing Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 767).

Likewise, in challenges to oil-and-gas lease sales and

development permits (known as applications for permits to

drill), and contests of mining-plan approvals, courts have

faulted agencies for not adequately evaluating indirect

effects that the agencies cannot control, prevent, or “act

on” under their governing statutes—the Mineral Leasing

Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq., the Mining and Minerals

Policy Act, 30 U.S.C. § 21a, and the Federal Land Policy

and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701, et seq. Courts

have required agencies responsible for permitting oiland-gas and mining operations to evaluate effects such

as global climate change, foreign countries’ energy

consumption and greenhouse-gas emissions, and impacts

4

to air and water—not from the mineral development itself

but from the ultimate end-use of the mineral—much like

the indirect upstream and downstream effects at issue in

this case. See Eagle Cty., 82 F.4th at 1177–80.

The repercussions are legion.

First, after achieving some success about a decade

ago in convincing a court to disregard Public Citizen

and expand the scope of NEPA to include effects outside

the agency’s regulatory authority, anti-fossil-fuel groups

have gained momentum. There is seemingly no limit to

the number of cases they can bring and the types of farÁXQJHIIHFWVWKH\FDQFODLPWKHDJHQF\IDLOHGWRFRQVLGHU

In other words, the groups have been gifted a powerful

tool—NEPA litigation unbounded by Public Citizen or

the rule of reason—to challenge, slow, and sometimes halt

projects they oppose based on speculative impacts often

far removed from the challenged project.

Second, to insulate their NEPA analyses from

attack, agencies are forced to prepare oversized NEPA

documents—covering every “effect” imaginable—that

take years and sometimes millions of dollars to prepare.

This problem became so dire that President Biden signed

into law Section 321 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023,

which amended NEPA to set reasonable page limits and

deadlines. See 42 U.S.C. § 4336a(e). But agencies struggle

to meet the new requirements, opponents continue to

DVVDXOWDJHQFLHV·1(3$DQDO\VHVDQGFRXUWVVWLOOÀQGIDXOW

in the agencies’ evaluations. In the end, the developers

whose projects are delayed and later challenged are

KDUPHGWKHHFRQRPLFEHQHÀWVRIWKHSURMHFWVDUHGHWDLQHG

or never realized, and America’s energy independence and

5

national security are compromised.

Clarity and certainty in the NEPA process is critical

for industries that depend on federal approvals or

funding—not limited to developing oil-and-gas but also

mining for critical minerals, developing wind facilities,

and growing solar arrays. Anschutz urges the Court to

FRQÀUPWKDWPublic Citizen limits the scope of an agency’s

NEPA analysis—consistent with NEPA’s purpose to

foster informed agency decision-making—such that an

agency need only study those environmental effects over

which the agency has regulatory authority.

ARGUMENT

The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Eagle County is a prime

example of courts ignoring the sensible limits this Court

established in Public Citizen, faulting an agency for failing

to consider “effects” of a proposed action over which the

agency has no regulatory authority. See Pet’rs’ Br. 13–19,

30–49. Predictably, the 88-mile rail line was challenged

in this case, in part, because the Surface Transportation

Board allegedly failed to consider the upstream and

downstream effects of transporting crude oil, Eagle Cty.,

82 F.4th at 1177—a product that anti-fossil-fuel groups

have unabashedly assailed.

The Court need only examine the cases involving

challenges to Interior’s oil-and-gas and mineral approvals

highlighted in this brief to understand how sidestepping

the bounds of Public Citizen have run roughshod over

NEPA’s fundamental purpose to foster informed decisionmaking. These cases also highlight the real-world

repercussions: increased litigation weaponizing NEPA

6

to further an anti-fossil-fuel agenda;2 agencies’ attempts

to fortify NEPA documents—inevitably delaying and

increasing the costs of projects; and the harms that follow

when courts grant disruptive remedies upending existing

projects. Like the Eagle County decision, these cases

XQGHUVFRUH WKH XUJHQW QHHG IRU WKH &RXUW WR UHDIÀUP

Public Citizen.

, 5HDIÀUPLQJPublic Citizen is Vital to Ensure That

NEPA Analyses for Federal Oil-and-Gas Approvals

5HPDLQ &RQVLVWHQW ZLWK ,QWHULRU·V 5HJXODWRU\

Authority.

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Consider Certain “Effects” in its DecisionMaking Processes.

Statutes intended to promote and maximize mineral

development on public lands govern Interior’s decisionmaking authority for proposed oil-and-gas projects. The

Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 was adopted in the aftermath

of World War I “to promote the orderly development of

oil and gas deposits in publicly owned lands of the United

States through private enterprise.” Geosearch, Inc. v.

Andrus, 508 F. Supp. 839, 842 (D. Wyo. 1981). The Act

2. WildEarth Guardians, a group responsible for many

NEPA-based challenges to energy projects, wants to “stop fossil

fuel production in its tracks,” Keep It in the Ground, WildEarth

Guardians, https://wildearthguardians.org /climate-energy/keepit-in-the-ground/. Sierra Club similarly boasts how it is using the

“same tools”—which includes NEPA-based litigation—to “stop

the industry from building any new oil infrastructure.” Blocking

Dirty Oil Infrastructure, Sierra Club, https://www.sierraclub.org /

dirty-fuels/stopping-build-out-dirty-oil-infrastructure.

7

thus mandates leasing certain federal lands for oil-andgas, coal, and other mineral development. See 30 U.S.C.

§§ 181, 226.

Similarly, in the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of

1970, “Congress declare[d] that it is the continuing policy

of the Federal Government in the national interest to

foster and encourage private enterprise in ... the orderly

and economic development of domestic mineral resources

... to help assure satisfaction of industrial, security and

HQYLURQPHQWDOQHHGVµ86&†D7KLVSROLF\GHÀQHV

“minerals” as “oil, gas, coal, oil shale and uranium.” Id.

The Federal Land Policy and Management Act

(“FLPMA”) directs BLM to manage public lands

“on the basis of multiple use and sustained yield.” 43

U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7). “The term ‘multiple use’ means ‘the

management of the public lands and their various resource

values so that they are utilized in the combination that will

best meet the present and future needs of the American

people.’” Id. § 1702(c). The development of “minerals” is one

of the multiple uses Congress contemplated. Id.

Interior, through BLM, carries out these congressional

mandates to foster oil-and-gas development in a threestage process of (1) region-wide resource planning, (2)

leasing, and (3) permitting development operations—

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FLPMA requires local BLM offices to prepare a

resource-management plan for its assigned planning

area, identifying lands within the planning area open to

oil-and-gas leasing. Id. § 1712(a); 43 C.F.R. §§ 1601.0-5(n),

1610.1. BLM prepares an environmental impact statement

under NEPA to consider the plan’s direct, indirect,

8

and cumulative effects. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); 40 C.F.R.

§ 1508.1(i); 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-6.

At the second stage, the Mineral Leasing Act

requires, for lands “known or believed to contain oil or

gas deposits,” that “[l]ease sales shall be held ... at least

quarterly.” 30 U.S.C. § 226(a)–(b)(1)(A). Thus, BLM

conducts quarterly lease sales in approved areas consistent

with each resource-management plan. Id. BLM prepares

additional NEPA analysis for each sale, which can tier to

or incorporate by reference the previous NEPA analysis

done at the resource-planning stage, if appropriate. See

40 C.F.R. § 1501.11.

Once issued, a federal oil-and-gas lease represents

the government’s “point of commitment” or the “go/no go”

decision for mineral development. See Conner v. Burford,

848 F.2d 1441, 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1988). An oil-andgas lease is a vested property right. See W. Watersheds

Project v. Haaland, 22 F.4th 828, 842 (9th Cir. 2022)

(an oil-and-gas lease is a “legally protected interest in

[a] contract right[ ] with the federal government”). The

lease imposes obligations on the lessee to develop the

oil-and-gas reserves with “reasonable diligence.” 30

U.S.C. § 187. BLM’s implementing regulations require

the agency to ensure that “all operations be conducted

in a manner which ... results in the maximum ultimate

recovery of oil and gas with minimum waste.” 43 C.F.R.

§ 3161.2. To that end, at the third stage, BLM reviews and

approves an application for a permit to drill, setting out

geological data, drilling plans, plans of operations, plans

for reclamation, and other pertinent data. See id. § 3171.6.

Before approving development operations, BLM must

again comply with NEPA. Id. § 3171.12(b)(2)(i).

9

Interior’s approval of coal mining on federal lands

follows a similar three-stage process—each stage being

subject to NEPA: (1) region-wide resource planning, see

30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)(A)(i); 43 C.F.R. §§ 1601.0-6, 3420.1-4;

(2) leasing, see 30 U.S.C. §§ 181, 201; 43 C.F.R. §§ 3425.2,

3425.3; and (3) mining-plan approval, see 30 U.S.C.

§ 207(c); 43 C.F.R. § 3425.3(b); 30 C.F.R. § 746.13. The

Mineral Leasing Act instructs that “no mining operating

plan shall be approved which is not found to achieve the

maximum economic recovery of the coal.” 30 U.S.C.

† D  & %/0·VVLVWHUDJHQF\WKH2IÀFHRI6XUIDFH

Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, reviews and

recommends mining-plan approvals. 30 C.F.R. § 746.13.

Interior’s NEPA analyses cannot be divorced from

this statutory framework or Congress’s clear directives.

Consistent with Public Citizen, the information the

agencies consider and the analyses they perform at these

three stages must inform the decision before the agency,

otherwise their efforts fail to serve NEPA’s fundamental

purpose. See 541 U.S. at 768.

For instance, after BLM has already completed

stage one for authorizing oil-and-gas development (by

determining that certain lands are available for oil-andJDV OHDVLQJ  DQG ÀQLVKHG VWDJH WZR E\ LVVXLQJ D YDOLG

oil-and-gas lease, deciding mineral development is a “go,”

and triggering the lessee’s legal obligation to diligently

develop the minerals to maximize recovery), the agency

“has no authority to prevent,” id. at 767, or base a permit

denial decision on, any variable related to the downstream

end-use of the oil and gas at stage three when the agency

is analyzing whether to approve a development permit.

See 43 C.F.R. § 3171.17(c) (when approving a permit, BLM

may require an operator to comply with permit provisions

10

addressing “issues” covered by “applicable laws, regulations,”

and related to cultural resources, endangered species, surface

protection, safety, and completion of oil-and-gas wells). Nor

could BLM decide at stage three that the validly issued lease

should not be developed at all. See Conner, 848 F.2d at 1451

(the sale of an oil-and-gas lease “constitutes the ‘point of

commitment;’ after the lease is sold the government no

ORQJHU KDV WKH DELOLW\ WR SURKLELW SRWHQWLDOO\ VLJQLÀFDQW

inroads on the environment” because the “no action,” noleasing alternative is foreclosed).

Thus, even assuming BLM could predict how much of

or where the produced oil or gas would be later combusted,

the agency lacks authority to regulate or reduce emissions,

such that analyzing the air-quality impacts from oil or

gas combustion could inform BLM’s decision on which

lands are available to lease at stage one, which leases

to sell at stage two, and which conditions are necessary

in a permit to drill at stage three under the controlling

statutory scheme. 3 But, as discussed next, some courts

have required this level of speculation and analysis,

notwithstanding Public Citizen’s limitations.

3. Under the Clean Air Act, Congress expressly delegated

the authority to regulate air quality to the States and the

Environmental Protection Agency, not BLM. See 42 U.S.C.

§§ 7407(a), 7410(a)(1), 7410(c)(1). That is why, in a recent rulemaking

aimed at disincentivizing the loss of gas during oil-and-gas

production, BLM disclaimed authority to regulate air pollution

and human health. See Waste Prevention, Production Subject

to Royalties, and Resource Conservation, 89 Fed. Reg. 25,378,

25,394 (Apr. 10, 2024) (“BLM is not regulating air quality in this

rule.... [A]ir pollution and its connection to human health and

welfare ... is the primary responsibility of the [Environmental

Protection Agency], States, and local governments.”).

11

B. Despite Public Citizen·V Instruction that an

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&RXUWV+DYH,PSURSHUO\([SDQGHG,QWHULRU·V

1(3$5HYLHZ5HTXLUHPHQWV

In early NEPA cases, the Court emphasized the

need to consider “the scope of the agency’s statutory

responsibility” when determining whether the agency

complied with NEPA. E.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power

Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 550–53

(1978) (agency’s selection of alternatives in NEPA analysis

was “judged in ... light ... of its statutory authority”); see

also Pet’rs’ Br. 24–25. And in the years following Public

Citizen, courts generally acknowledged that agencies were

required to consider only those effects that fell within the

agency’s regulatory jurisdiction or that were proximately

caused by—not merely within the “but for” causal chain

of—the acting agency’s decision. See Pet’rs’ Br. 5–6; see

also, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co.,

556 F.3d 177, 197 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[agency] reasonably

determined that a scope of NEPA analysis extending

beyond [its] limited jurisdiction ... would encroach on

the regulatory authority of [another agency]”); City of

Shoreacres v. Waterworth, 420 F.3d 440, 453 (5th Cir.

2005) (“[I]t is doubtful that an environmental effect may

be considered as proximately caused by the action of a

particular federal regulator if that effect is directly caused

by the action of another government entity over which the

regulator has no control.”).

However, as the effects of greenhouse-gas emissions

and climate change have been increasingly debated,

and the Circuit Courts have diverged on how they

interpret Public Citizen, see Pet’rs’ Br. 5–6, agencies

and courts alike have been “forced to confront this global

12

environmental issue” with “little direction,” 350 Mont. v.

Haaland, 50 F.4th 1254, 1281 (9th Cir. 2022) (Nelson, J.,

dissenting), leading to “mixed messaging” on what NEPA

requires of agencies, Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our

Env’t v. Haaland, 59 F.4th 1016, 1040 (10th Cir. 2023).

$WÀUVWFRXUWVPDGHQRDWWHPSWWRZDGHLQWRWKHLVVXH

See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp.

1291, 1324 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (summarily rejecting

climate-change challenge); Audubon Naturalist Soc’y

of the Cent. Atl. States, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.,

)6XSSG '0G  DIÀUPLQJZKHUH

agency explained it “believed it was not useful to consider

greenhouse gas emissions” (internal quotations omitted)).

By the mid-2000s, Interior began analyzing, to a

limited degree, climate-change impacts in its oil-andgas and coal-related NEPA documents. These analyses

were record-based and avoided speculations—and they

were uniformly upheld. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v.

Kempthorne, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110152, at *28–31 (D.

Alaska Sept. 25, 2006) (in upholding analysis for oil-andgas leases, observing that “[a]ny attempted delineation

RUTXDQWLÀFDWLRQRIWKHHIIHFWVRIJOREDOFOLPDWHFKDQJH

would be highly speculative” and noting plaintiffs agreed

that “BLM was not required to develop information about

global climate change other than what was in the record”);

WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, 308–11

'&&LU  DIÀUPLQJ%/0·VDQDO\VLVRIJUHHQKRXVH

gas emissions for coal lease where BLM determined that

projecting future emissions was too speculative).

A shift began in 2014, as anti-fossil-fuel groups

achieved several judicial wins requiring expanded NEPA

13

analyses on remand, forcing agencies to consider globalclimate-change impacts, utilize tools to monetize the

social cost of carbon emissions (or explain why those tools

were not used), quantify projected future greenhouse-gas

emissions, evaluate greenhouse-gas effects of downstream

transportation and combustion of oil-and-gas, and much

more. See, e.g., High Country Conservation Advocs. v.

U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1193 (D. Colo. 2014)

(holding Interior failed to adequately explain “reasons for

not using ... the social cost of carbon protocol to quantify

the cost of [greenhouse-gas] emissions”); Mont. Envtl.

,QIR&WUY862IÀFHRI6XUIDFH0LQLQJ, 274 F. Supp.

3d 1074, 1090–94 (D. Mont. 2017) (holding Interior failed

to adequately consider downstream rail transportation

and coal-combustion impacts—ignoring Interior’s Public

Citizen argument that these effects “fall[ ] outside the

scope of the Secretary’s authority” and such analyses

“would be speculative” given uncertainty as to ultimate

“combustion locations ... and emissions controls” in place).

After these early successes, the anti-oil groups

increasingly deployed NEPA to challenge nearly every

significant mineral-development project approved

by Interior, and they continued to succeed—in large

part because courts were ignoring Public Citizen—by

following the example set by Sierra Club v. Federal

Energy Regulatory Commission, 867 F.3d 1357 (D.C.

Cir. 2017) (“Sabal Trail”). In Sabal Trail, the D.C. Circuit

required consideration of downstream effects regulated

by other State and federal agencies because (a) the effects

were “reasonably foreseeable,” and (b) even if outside the

action agency’s regulatory authority, the action agency

could “consider” the effects under NEPA because it

could “deny” the action if it “would be too harmful to the

14

environment.” Id. at 1372–73. Unfortunately, the court

provided no guidance on how an agency could accomplish

this impossible task.

The first oil-and-gas decision applying the Sabal

Trail sidestep was WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368

F. Supp. 3d 41, 55, 67–77 (D.D.C. 2019). In that case,

plaintiffs challenged BLM’s issuance of oil-and-gas leases

covering 460,000 acres across several Western States for

the agency’s alleged failure to adequately quantify and

analyze greenhouse-gas emissions from future, yet-to-beproposed oil-and-gas drilling operations and future enduse consumption of the petroleum that might be produced.

Id. Interior argued that under Public Citizen, end-use

greenhouse-gas emissions are not an indirect effect of

oil-and-gas leasing and, even if they are, BLM’s analysis

RIWKHHPLVVLRQVVDWLVÀHG1(3$Id. at 72. Relying on the

D.C. Circuit’s skewed reading of Public Citizen in Sabal

Trail, the court determined that NEPA required Interior

to analyze the “[d]ownstream use of oil and gas, and the

resulting [greenhouse-gas] emissions” as an indirect effect

of leasing. Id. at 73–75 (citing Sabal Trail, 867 F.3d at

1373). Ultimately, the court held that the agency’s analysis

ZDVGHÀFLHQWDQGUHPDQGHGIRUIXUWKHUDQDO\VLVId. at 85.4

4. BLM prepared supplemental NEPA, but plaintiffs

brought another challenge repeating many of the same claims.

See WildEarth Guardians v. Bernhardt, 502 F. Supp. 3d 237,

245 – 47 (D.D.C. 2020). After the court again found NEPA

GHÀFLHQFLHV DIWHU LW LJQRUHG Public Citizen), see id. at 244–59,

and ordered another remand, id. at 259, plaintiffs and BLM

eventually executed a settlement agreement by which the

agency agreed to conduct additional NEPA analysis for the

challenged (as well as several other) leasing decisions. BLM

issued a draft supplemental NEPA analysis in November 2022,

15

But as the Eleventh Circuit explains, the Sabal Trail

“test” runs afoul of Public Citizen and turns an agency

into a “de facto environmental-policy czar” that can kill

a project after considering distant and often speculative

effects over which the agency has no statutory or

regulatory authority, if the agency somehow determines

certain environmental harms are too great. See Ctr. for

Biological Diversity v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 941

F.3d 1288, 1298–1300 (11th Cir. 2019).

This is the unspoken result of the WildEar th

Guardians decision. 368 F. Supp. 3d at 73. The court gave

BLM an environmental-policy-based power to disregard

Congress’s clear instruction that the agency must manage

public lands to “foster ... development of ” federal oil-andgas reserves to support the nation’s “industrial, security

and environmental needs.” 30 U.S.C. § 21a; see Argument

Section I.A, supra. By sidestepping Public Citizen, the

court cleared the way for BLM to shirk its statutory

GXW\WRLVVXHRUDIÀUPRLODQGJDVOHDVHVLIEDVHGRQLWV

expanded NEPA analysis alone, the agency determines

that the end-use of the oil and gas is too environmentally

harmful. See WildEarth Guardians, 368 F. Supp. 3d at 73.

The Congresses that passed NEPA, the Mineral Leasing

Act, the Mining and Minerals Policy Act, and FLPMA

never intended this result. Indeed, BLM is considering

cancelling 3,600 leases covering 3,433,615 acres across

DOWKRXJK LW KDV \HW WR LVVXH D ÀQDO DQDO\VLV See U.S. DEP ’T OF

INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., Supplemental Environmental

Assessment Analysis for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Related to

Oil and Gas Leasing (2022), https://eplanning.blm.gov/public_

projects/ 2022218/200537447/20069931/250076113/WEG%20EA.

pdf (“WildEarth Guardians Supplemental Environmental

Assessment”).

16

seven States in the supplemental NEPA analysis it

prepared to evaluate the sole issue of greenhouse-gas

emissions over whose effects it has no authority to control.5

Such a reading of NEPA is beyond the pale. NEPA

“does not expand the jurisdiction of an agency beyond that

set forth in its organic statute.” Cape May Greene, Inc. v.

Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 188 (3d Cir. 1983). As much as some

advocates and courts wish to re-write Public Citizen and

turn agencies into environmental-policy czars, Congress

simply did not intend for NEPA to “confer unlimited

power on the agencies.” Id. NEPA does not “support ...

an agency taking substantive action beyond that set forth

in its enabling act.” Id.

Unfortunately, the WildEarth Guardians decision is

only one of numerous recent decisions requiring an agency

to consider downstream, far-removed, and speculative

“effects” beyond the proximate effects of the action over

which the agency has regulatory authority. Courts have

lately required, for example:

• BLM to predict and consider foreig n oil

consumption and emissions in calculating the

greenhouse-gas emissions of a proposed oil-andgas development project in Alaska. Sovereign

Iñupiat for a Living Arctic v. U.S. Bureau of

Land Mgmt., 555 F. Supp. 3d 739, 762–67 (D.

Alaska 2021) (rejecting Public Citizen argument).

While the court did not provide instruction on

the “foreign” consumption information that

5. See WildEarth Guardians Supplemental Environmental

Assessment, supra note 4, at 10.

17

BLM should consider, another judge aptly

obser ved that such global climate-change

analyses would presumably require agencies

to make assumptions based on “the behavior

of 200 other sovereign nations, the supply and

demand projections of global energy models, or

the personal energy usage decisions of 7 billion

people worldwide.” 350 Mont., 50 F.4th at 1281

(Nelson, J., dissenting).

• BLM to expressly “factor into its decisionmaking” for an oil-and-gas lease sale in Wyoming

the “social cost” of greenhouse-gas emissions.

Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 2024

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51011, at *84–92 (D.D.C. Mar.

22, 2024).

• The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management to

predict and consider foreign oil consumption in

calculating greenhouse-gas emissions for the sale

of leases in the Gulf of Mexico. Friends of the

Earth v. Haaland, 583 F. Supp. 3d 113, 136–44

(D.D.C. 2022), rev’d on other grounds, 2023 U.S.

App. LEXIS 10554 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 28, 2023).

‡ 7KH2IÀFHRI6XUIDFH0LQLQJ5HFODPDWLRQDQG

Enforcement to evaluate the impacts of a power

SODQW·VZLWKGUDZDORIZDWHUIURPDULYHURQÀVK

miles away from the plant (and even further away

from the permitted coal mine) when evaluating

the effects of combusting coal from the proposed

mining plan area. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v.

Haaland, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128280, at

*29–30 (D. Mont. Feb. 11, 2022) (rejecting Public

18

Citizen argument that agency lacks authority

over plant’s water withdrawals).

• The Fish and Wildlife Services to consider

how a third-party wind-power project, whose

development was rendered “more probable” by

a proposed and evaluated 225-mile electrical

transmission line, might impact the beetles and

cranes found at the wind-project site. Or.-Cal.

Trails Ass’n v. Walsh, 467 F. Supp. 3d 1007,

1050–51, 1068 (D. Colo. 2020).

Seeking to stretch NEPA reviews to the breaking

point, plaintiffs opposed to oil and gas want even more.

Most recently, in Center for Biological Diversity v.

U.S. Department of Interior, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

195761, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2023), plaintiffs brought

an unprecedented omnibus challenge to BLM’s more

than 4,000 separate agency actions approving individual

permits to develop existing oil-and-gas leases across

New Mexico and Wyoming. Among their plethora of

claims is the argument that in approving the permits,

BLM was required but failed to consider the impacts of

greenhouse-gas emissions on “climate-imperiled species”

across the world, including Hawaiian songbirds that could

DOOHJHGO\ ´EH H[WLQFW LQ WKH ZLOG LQ WKUHH WR ÀYH \HDUV

due to the uphill spread of mosquitos and avian malaria

caused by climate change.” See Ctr. for Bio. Diversity,

No. 22-cv-01716-TSC, Am. Compl., ECF No. 57 at ¶¶ 1,

4, 7, 9, 191–97 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2022). The district court

rightly dismissed the case because plaintiffs could not

establish standing. See Ctr. for Bio. Diversity, 2023 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 195761, at *15. Undeterred, the plaintiffs

appealed to the D.C. Circuit. See Ctr. for Bio. Diversity

19

v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 23-5308 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22,

2023).

Because courts have ignored Public Citizen’s limits

on the scope of NEPA, the analyses that courts have

required Interior to undertake on remand have and will

continue to spiral out of control. Regardless of whether

BLM can “act on” information gathered about the oilor gas-consumption trends in 200 other countries, or

mosquitos in Hawaii, or some other downstream “effect”

not yet imagined by anti-fossil-fuel groups, some court will

nonetheless fault the agency for not analyzing that effect

LQVXIÀFLHQWGHWDLOWR´LQIRUPµLWVGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSURFHVV

$GHFLVLRQIURPWKLV&RXUWDIÀUPLQJEagle County

would further expand NEPA and, ultimately, thwart

NEPA’s fundamental goals.

,, ([SDQGHG1(3$5HYLHZV³8QERXQGHGE\Public

Citizen³)DLOWR6HUYH1(3$·V)XQGDPHQWDO*RDOV

The Court in Public Citizen wisely limited the scope

of NEPA based on “the underlying policies behind NEPA

and Congress’ intent, as informed by the ‘rule of reason.’”

541 U.S. at 768.

NEPA is intended to promote “the understanding of

the ecological systems and natural resources important

to” the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 4321. Environmental

analyses that comply with NEPA serve two fundamental

purposes: (1) ensuring that agencies make informed

decisions after considering the environmental impacts of

the proposed action; and (2) guaranteeing that relevant

information is made available to the public. Robertson,

20

490 U.S. at 349. Critically, NEPA is a procedural statute;

it “does not mandate particular results.” Id. at 350.

In directing agencies to consider “objectives of

environmental management,” Congress did not intend for

environmental considerations to override federal agencies’

other priorities and project goals. Staff of S. Comm. on

Interior and Insular Affairs and H. Comm. on Science and

Astronautics, 90th Cong., Congressional White Paper on a

National Policy for the Environment, at 15 (Comm. Print

1968). Nor did Congress intend for NEPA’s procedures to

“unreasonably delay the processing of Federal proposals.”

H.R. Rep. No. 91-765, at 8 (1969).

Expanded NEPA reviews—like that required by

Eagle County—GHIHDW&RQJUHVV·VLQWHQWLQWZRVLJQLÀFDQW

ways. First, they require agencies to amass voluminous

information that have no bearing on the agencies’ decisionmaking authority. Second, they serve as a tool, for agencies

and project opponents alike, to delay—and potentially

kill—projects.

1. Expanded reviews require agencies to wastefully

evaluate “effects” that fail to inform their decisionmaking processes. As discussed above, successful NEPA

challenges often require agencies on remand to consider

additional effects, or certain effects in more detail—even

if the agency took the position that it had no statutory

DXWKRULW\ WR DFW RQ RU SUHYHQW WKH LGHQWLÀHG HIIHFW See

Argument Section I.B, supra. Nonetheless, “[w]hen

lawsuits successfully kill a project, the rulings explicitly

state that a NEPA document failed to account for some

environmental impact, forcing future agency reviews to

21

analyze that impact.”6 One lawsuit, therefore, can create

a one-way ratchet affecting numerous federal decisions

and have a reverberating effect. Id.

In response, agencies seek to “litigation-proof ” their

NEPA documents, “increasing costs and time but not

necessarily quality” of their analyses.7$VDUHVXOWÀQDO

environmental impact statements have bloated from a

handful of pages in the early 1970s to an average of about

661 pages. 8

But NEPA’s purpose was never “ to generate

paperwork—even excellent paperwork,” 40 C.F.R.

§ 1500.1(c), just for the sake of insulating a review from

legal challenge. Its purpose is to promote informed

GHFLVLRQPDNLQJE\JRYHUQPHQWRIÀFLDOVPublic Citizen,

541 U.S. at 768–69. That is why President Biden attempted

to limit the size of agencies’ NEPA documents through the

Fiscal Responsibility Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 4336a(e). Now,

environmental impact statements are generally limited

to 150 pages and environmental assessments are limited

to 75 pages, not counting appendices. Id. Yet agencies,

apparently, view the statutory page limits as optional—

6. Aidan Mackenzie & Santi Ruiz, No, NEPA Really Is a

Problem for Clean Energy, Institute for Progress (Aug. 17, 2023),

https://ifp.org/no-nepa-really-is-a-problem-for-clean-energy/.

7. C OU NCIL ON E N V T L . Q UA LI T Y, E X EC . O FFICE OF T H E

PRESIDENT, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Study of

,WV(IIHFWLYHQHVV$IWHU7ZHQW\ÀYH<HDUV, at iii (1997), https://ceq.

doe.gov/docs/ceq-publications/nepa25fn.pdf.

8. See Update to the Regulations Implementing the

Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy

Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43,304, 43,309 (July 16, 2020).

22

following the “more is better” approach.9 Understandably

so. If courts require agencies to evaluate all “reasonably

foreseeable effects” no matter the statutory limits in play,

see Sabal Trail, 867 F.3d at 1373, an agency cannot do so

in 150 pages.

5HDIÀUPLQJPublic Citizen will further NEPA’s goal

of focusing NEPA documents on the information that truly

matters to an agency’s decision-making, and further the

Fiscal Responsibility Act’s streamlining goal.

2. NEPA reviews and ensuing litigation have become

potent tools—for agencies and opponents—to delay

projects. Agencies drive the NEPA process and, therefore,

can dictate how fast or slow the process proceeds.10

Between 2010 and 2018, the average environmental impact

statement took 4.5 years to complete, and 25% of them

took more than 6 years.11

9 . Se e, e .g ., U. S . D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R , B U R E A U O F

L A N D M GM T ., Bald Mountain Mine Plan of Operations

Amendment Juniper Project Final Environmental Impact

Statement (2024), App. K, https://eplanning.blm.gov/public_

projects/2011567/200507677/20111331/251011322/App_K_FRA_

Conformance.pdf (claiming compliance with page limits despite

publishing 502-page environmental impact statement plus over

630 pages in appendices).

10. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE

PRESIDENT, supra note 7, at 22 (“agencies often have different

VRPHWLPHVFRQÁLFWLQJ WLPHWDEOHV>DQG@UHTXLUHPHQWVµ 

11. See C OUNCIL ON E N V TL . Q UA LIT Y, E X EC . O FFICE OF

THE P RESIDENT, Environmental Impact Statement Timelines

(2010-2018) (2020), at 1, https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/nepa-practice/

CEQ_EIS_Timeline_Report_2020-6-12.pdf.

23

Trying to rein in ever-expanding NEPA timelines,

the Fiscal Responsibility Act set reasonable deadlines.

See 42 U.S.C. § 4336a(g) (two years for environmental

impact statements and one year for environmental

assessments). Like the page limits, however, the deadlines

have also been ignored. For example, a Montana coal mine

UHFHQWO\VXHGWKH2IÀFHRI6XUIDFH0LQLQJ5HFODPDWLRQ

and Enforcement to enforce the two-year deadline for

preparing an environmental impact statement for a mining

plan because the agency’s current NEPA schedule exceeds

two years by 19 months. See Signal Peak Energy, LLC v.

Haaland, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149325, at *5 (Aug. 21,

2024); see also The Falkirk Mining Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of

Interior, No. 24-cv-00040-DLH-CRH, First Am. Compl.,

(&)1Rˆ '1'$SU  ÀOLQJVXLWEHFDXVH

BLM failed to complete an environmental assessment for

a coal lease in over four years).

Lawsuits brought by project opponents also affect the

timeline of NEPA analyses. Often, successive lawsuits

repeatedly challenging the NEPA work for the same

agency approval can mean that an approval granted over a

decade ago remains at risk of reversal. For example, based

on the WildEarth Guardians settlement, BLM issued

a draft supplemental NEPA analysis for the challenged

leases over a year-and-a-half ago, in November 2022.12

,WKDVQRW\HWUHOHDVHGWKHÀQDODQDO\VLV0HDQZKLOHWKH

leases involved in that case—some issued close to ten

12. See generally WildEarth Guardians Supplemental

Environmental Assessment, supra note 4.

24

years ago13 —are still at risk of cancellation. And some of

those same leases are now the subject of a new challenge

ÀOHG LQ 8WDK³SURORQJLQJ WKH XQFHUWDLQW\ See S. Utah

Wilderness All. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 2:23-cv-804,

Compl., ECF No. 1 (D. Utah Nov. 3, 2023).

A lengthy saga also is playing out for a Montana coal

PLQH0LQLQJFRPSDQ\6LJQDO3HDNÀOHGLWVDSSOLFDWLRQ

to lease an area of federal coal at its existing mine in

2008. 0RQW (QYWO ,QIR &WU Y 86 2IÀFH RI 6XUIDFH

Mining, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1083 (D. Mont. 2017). BLM’s

NEPA work for the leasing decision was challenged and

XOWLPDWHO\DIÀUPHGLQN. Plains Res. Council, Inc.

v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 725 F. App’x 527, 529–31

(9th Cir. 2018). In 2012, Signal Peak applied for a miningplan approval; it too was challenged—repeatedly. Mont.

Envtl. Info. Ctr., 274 F. Supp. 3d at 1083–84; 350 Mont.

v. Bernhardt, 443 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1190 (D. Mont. 2020).

Almost sixteen years later, Signal Peak is still precluded

from mining the area. See 350 Mont., 50 F.4th at 1273.

$QGWKHDJHQF\KDVVLJQLÀFDQWO\GHOD\HGFRPSOHWLQJWKH

required NEPA on remand, despite the two-year deadline.

See Signal Peak Energy, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149325,

at *5 (deadline expires in December 2024 but agency’s

schedule projects NEPA will be completed in May 2026).

What is worse, under a recent court ruling, Signal Peak

cannot do anything about the delay until the agency misses

the deadline because, until then, the mine’s claim under

the Fiscal Responsibility Act is prudentially unripe. Id.

at *25–28.

13. See id., App. D (listing leases sold as far back as February

2015).

25

The mine’s story is not uncommon. Ten major

LQIUDVWUXFWXUH SURMHFWV UHÁHFWLQJ  ELOOLRQ LQ FDSLWDO

expenditures, were cancelled, stalled, or were at risk of

cancellation due to permitting and judicial-review delays

in recent years.14

Oil-and-gas and mining projects are not the only ones

to suffer because of long NEPA reviews. Extended NEPA

disrupt “clean” energy projects too, including onshore

and offshore wind facilities, solar farms, geothermal

power plants, transmission lines, and mining permits

for copper and lithium—critical minerals for “clean”

energy.15 According to 2021 data, 42% of the Department

of Energy’s active NEPA reviews were for clean-energy,

transmission, or conservation projects, while only 15%

were for fossil-fuel projects.16

Regardless of the kind of project, these enormous

and costly delays frustrate NEPA’s purpose. More

significantly, these delays in federal permitting and

approvals of oil-and-gas, critical-mineral, renewable14. See Rystad Energy, API’s “10 in 2022” Policy Plan,

4XDQWLÀFDWLRQRI3ROLF\,PSDFWV, at 26–27 (2022), https://www.

DSLRUJPHGLDÀOHVPLVF2022/11/rystad-energy-apis-10-in-2022SROLF\SODQTXDQWLÀFDWLRQRISROLF\LPSDFWVSGI

15. Mackenzie & Ruiz, supra note 6; see also Michael

Bennon & Devon Wilson, NEPA Litigation Over Large Energy

and Transport Infrastructure Projects, 53 Envtl. L. Rep. 10836

(Oct. 2, 2023).

16. See Philip Rossetti, R Street Policy Study No. 234,

Addressing NEPA-Related Infrastructure Delays, at 1, 4

(2021), https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/

FINAL_RSTREET234.pdf.

26

energy, infrastructure, and other projects cause numerous

VLJQLÀFDQWKDUPV³DQGQRWMXVWWRWKRVHVXSSRUWLQJWKH

projects, as discussed next.

,,,5HDIÀUPLQJ Public Citizen·V /LPLWV :LOO /HVVHQ

0DQ\+DUPV7KDW([SDQGHG1(3$5HYLHZV&DXVH

$JHQFLHV3URMHFW'HYHORSHUVDQGWKH(FRQRP\

Expanded, wasteful NEPA analyses, and permitting

and litigation delays have serious repercussions, including

increased project costs, litigation risks, waterfalls of

SHUPLWWLQJKROGXSVDQGVLJQLÀFDQWUHJXODWRU\XQFHUWDLQW\

These hurt developers, the thousands of employees and

contractors they employ, and the economies they and their

projects support and energize. Further, as applied to

the oil-and-gas and energy industries, expansive, costly,

and languishing NEPA reviews also threaten America’s

energy independence and national security.

Direct and Indirect Costs. To begin, agencies and

project developers must spend millions of dollars to

prepare “litigation-proof ” NEPA documents to analyze

effects that have no bearing on their decision-making

process—then they must repeat that effort in preparing

supplemental NEPA analyses when courts inevitably hold

that their original analyses are not enough.

NEPA is not cheap—and requiring expanded reviews

only exacerbates the cost. The Department of Energy

VSHQW RYHU  PLOOLRQ WR SUHSDUH  HQYLURQPHQWDO

assessments between 2013 and 2016.17 Just last year, BLM

17. See U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, National Environmental

Policy Act Lessons Learned: Quarterly Report, at 16 (Dec.

27

VSHQW  PLOOLRQ WR SUHSDUH D draft³QRW HYHQ ÀQDO³

environmental impact statement.18 Even assuming, as

estimated in 2020, that the federal government prepares

10,000 environmental assessments every year at a

FRQVHUYDWLYHSULFHWDJRIHDFKWKHWRWDOGLUHFW

FRVWV ZRXOG EH D VWDJJHULQJ  ELOOLRQ19 And those are

just the direct costs. There are also billions of dollars

allocated to indirect costs. NEPA reviews also demand

the full-time efforts of hundreds or thousands of federal

employees and contractors in every federal agency.

Developers and project sponsors seeking federal funds or

2013), https://w w w.energ y.gov /sites/default /files/2013/12 /

f 5/ LLQR-2 013 - Q4.pdf; U.S. D EP ’ T OF E N ER G Y , National

Environmental Policy Act Lessons Learned: Quarterly Report, at

 'HF KWWSVZZZHQHUJ\JRYVLWHVGHIDXOWÀOHV

f19/ DecemberLLQR_2014.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, National

Environmental Policy Act Lessons Learned: Quarterly Report, at

 'HF KWWSVZZZHQHUJ\JRYVLWHVGHIDXOWÀOHV12/

f 27/LLQR_Dec2015_12-1-15_FINALr2.pdf; U.S. D EP ’ T OF

ENERGY, National Environmental Policy Act Lessons Learned:

Quarterly Report, at 23 (Dec. 2016), https://www.energy.gov/sites/

GHIDXOWÀOHVI//45B2016_Q4.pdf.

18. See U.S. DEP ’T OF INTERIOR , BUREAU OF L AND MGMT.,

5RFN 6SULQJV )LHOG 2IÀFH 'UDIW 5HVRXUFH 0DQDJHPHQW 3ODQ

Revision and Draft Environmental Impact Statement, at 1 (2023),

https://eplanning.blm.gov/public_projects/13853/2000 30619/200

84073/ 250090255/ Volume% 201_Rock%20Springs%20RMP%20

Revision% 20Draft%20EIS_v2.pdf.

19. C OUNCIL ON E N V TL . Q UA LIT Y, E X EC . O FFICE OF THE

PRESIDENT, Fact Sheet: CEQ’s Proposal to Modernize its NEPA

Implementing Regulations (2020), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.

gov/ files/ uploads / 8-nepa-ceq-factsheet-508.pdf; U.S. G OV ’ T

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-369, National Environmental

Policy Act, Little Information Exists on NEPA Analyses (2014),

https://www.gao.gov/assets /gao-14-369.pdf.

28

DSSURYDOVVLPLODUO\LQFXUPDVVLYHH[SHQGLWXUHVWRIXOÀOO

NEPA’s requirements.

When NEPA documents are challenged (and few are

not), the same parties must then spend additional, often

vast sums on litigation. No one disputes that litigation is

massively expensive—not only for the government but

also for the project developer if it elects to intervene and

defend approval of its project.

It bears consideration that the Equal Access to

Justice Act allows certain categories of plaintiffs who

successfully challenge a government decision to recover

legal costs and attorney fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).

Anti-fossil-fuel plaintiffs often take advantage of this.

Following their success in the WildEarth Guardians

cases, plaintiffs sought to recover their fees and costs from

the government. See WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, No.

1:16-cv-01724-RC, Interim Mot. for Att’y Fees, ECF No.

199 (D.D.C. July 9, 2021).

While the federal government—and thus American

taxpayers—foots the bill for government attorneys and

Equal Access to Justice fees, the project developer incurs

its own fees and costs and has no way to recover them if

plaintiffs’ NEPA claims ultimately fail. The overwhelming

costs of defending federal approvals have unfortunately

become part of doing business on federal lands. These

litigation costs, incurred to defend all manner of oiland-gas, mineral, renewable-energy, and infrastructure

projects in federal court are, like other regulatory

expenses, ultimately passed on to the consumer.

3HUPLWWLQJ'HOD\V Businesses, investors, and project

developers, including oil-and-gas companies like amicus

29

curiae Anschutz, depend on predictable permitting

processes to make informed investments and undertake

business decisions. Uncertainty injected into the NEPA

process by the Eagle County decision, and the other

cases discussed in this brief that uniformly sidestep

Public Citizen, jeopardizes Interior’s ability to timely

review and approve new lease sales or permits. 20 In other

words, expanded NEPA makes the process of developing

federal oil and gas expensive and unpredictable. That

unpredictability impedes project development and

increases costs to producers and consumers. 21

Litigation Risks and Disruptive Vacaturs. NEPA

litigation has the potential to severely hamper domestic

oil-and-gas production, renewable-energy development,

critical-mineral extraction, and other infrastructure

projects. That is because, if successful, courts often vacate

pre-existing project approvals pending additional NEPA

DQDO\VLV DQG YDFDWXU FDQ EH GLIÀFXOW³ERWK ORJLVWLFDOO\

DQG ÀQDQFLDOO\³IRU DJHQFLHV DQG SURMHFW GHYHORSHUV WR

implement.

In just the last few years, courts have vacated or

VXVSHQGHGVHYHUDOIHGHUDOHQHUJ\SURMHFWVDIWHUÀQGLQJ

GHÀFLHQFLHV LQ WKH DJHQFLHV· 1(3$ DQDO\VHV See, e.g.,

Friends of the Earth, 583 F. Supp. 3d 113 (vacating 80.8

million-acre Gulf of Mexico lease sale); Sovereign Iñupiat.,

555 F. Supp. 3d 739 (vacating oil-and-gas development

20. Cf., Michael J. Mortimer et al., Environmental and Social

Risks: Defensive National Environmental Policy Act in the US

Forest Service, J. of Forestry (Jan./Feb. 2011), www.fs.usda. gov/

pnw/pubs/journals/pnw_2011_mortimer001.pdf.

21. Cf. Bennon & Wilson, supra note 15, at 10849.

30

project approval); Mont. Wildlife Fed’n v. Bernhardt, 2022

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44080 (D. Mont. Mar. 11, 2022) (vacating

multi-state oil-and-gas lease sale); W. Watersheds Project

v. Zinke, 441 F. Supp. 3d 1042 (D. Idaho 2020) (same); 22

Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. Bernhardt, 982 F.3d 723 (9th Cir.

2020) (vacating approval of offshore oil-and-gas production

facility); WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land

Mgmt., 457 F. Supp. 3d 880 (D. Mont. 2020) (vacating

oil-and-gas leases in Montana); San Juan Citizens All. v.

U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D.N.M.

2018) (vacating oil-and-gas leases in New Mexico).

Remedies like these—upending oil-and-gas and other

SURMHFWV³FUHDWHVDODQGVFDSHRIVLJQLÀFDQWXQFHUWDLQW\

and instability that hampers investment in projects that

depend on federal minerals and federal approvals.

%XVLQHVVDQG(FRQRPLF+DUPVWhen courts upend

projects, they often derail companies’ lease-development

and mineral-production operations that are already well in

motion. That can slam the door on companies’ logistically

complex and economically vulnerable business models.

In the oil-and-gas industry, lease-development is

generally a multi-year endeavor that requires overlapping

resources devoted to numerous wells, as opposed to

discretely developing one well. This type of interconnected

program requires companies to mobilize large and diverse

teams of contractors that include drill-rig operators,

22. The court later stayed vacatur of the leases pending

appeal but suspended operations and production on those leases.

W. Watersheds Project v. Zinke, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85203,

at *16 (D. Idaho May 12, 2020).

31

engineers, construction companies, water, and other

service providers. When a court vacates oil-and-gas

leases or drilling permits, that decision not only wreaks

havoc on a large and interconnected lease-development

operation, but also leaves the vendors and contractors

without meaningful jobs. See, e.g., Diné Citizens Against

Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

109986, at *161 (D.N.M. Aug. 14, 2015) (“The oil-and-gas

industry is an enormous job creator and economic engine

... and shutting down portions of it based on speculation

about unproven environmental harms is against the public

interest.”), aff ’d, 839 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2016).

Halting oil-and-gas and mineral production on federal

lands also robs the government of federal royalties on

production, 50% of which is funneled back to the States

where the minerals are produced. See 30 U.S.C. § 191(c)

(“50 percent ... shall be paid by the Secretary of the

Treasury to the State ... within the boundaries of which the

leased land is located or the deposits were derived.”). Most

of this royalty money goes to “those subdivisions of the

State socially or economically impacted by development

of minerals” for “(i) planning, (ii) construction and

maintenance of public facilities, and (iii) provision of public

service.” Id. § 191(a).

Energy Independence and National Security.

Responsible development of energy resources on federal

lands is critical to meet the growing demand for affordable,

reliable energy while reducing greenhouse-gas emissions.

Due in large part to energy produced on federal lands, the

United States has become the leading petroleum supplier

32

in the world. 23 It has thereby deterred the Organization of

the Petroleum Exporting Countries from cutting its own

production to increase prices. 24

Discouraging domestic production inevitably results

in America’s greater dependence on foreign sources

of oil and gas, produced in jurisdictions with fewer

and less-protective environmental laws. 25 The courts’

increasingly drastic remedies, ostensibly designed to

FXUH RQO\ SURFHGXUDO 1(3$ GHÀFLHQFLHV ULVN HURGLQJ

the country’s competitive advantage in the global

marketplace for energy, and can alter global geopolitics:

reducing the energy security of the U.S. and its allies by

forcing dependence on foreign—and often politically and

economically unfavorable—sources.

P reventing domestic energ y production also

contravenes congressional intent and the public interest.

23. See U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION A DMINISTRATION, Frequently

Asked Questions (2024), https:// www.eia.gov/ tools/faqs/faq.

php?id=709&t=6.

24. See Timothy J. Considine, The Fiscal and Economic

Impacts of Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Lease Moratorium

and Drilling Ban Policies xi (2020), https://www.eoriwyoming.

org/projects-resources/publications/WKHÀVFDODQGHFRQRPLF

impacts-of-federal-onshore-oil-and-gas-lease-moratorium-anddrilling-ban-policies/ viewdocument/307.

25. See WildEarth Guardians Supplemental Environmental

Assessment, supra note 4, at 26 (citing U.S. Energy Information

Administration 2021 Annual Energy Outlook); David Kreutzer

& Paige Lambermont, The Environmental Quality Index:

Environmental Quality Weighted Oil and Gas Production, at

6–8 (Feb. 2023), https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/

wp-content/uploads/2023/02/IER-EQI-2023.pdf.

33

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provides that it is the intent

of Congress to “ensure jobs for our future with secure,

affordable, and reliable energy.” Pub. L. No. 109-58, pmbl.,

119 Stat. 594 (2005). Exploration and development of oiland-gas on public lands is also consistent with executive

orders from presidents on both sides of the political aisle.

See Actions To Expedite Energy-Related Projects, 66 Fed.

Reg. 28,357 (May 22, 2001) (“The increased production

and transmission of energy in a safe and environmentally

sound manner is essential to the well-being of the

American people.”); Promoting Energy Independence

and Economic Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017)

(“It is in the national interest to promote clean and safe

development of our Nation’s vast energy resources” and

“the prudent development of these natural resources is

essential to ensuring the Nation’s geopolitical security.”).

34

CONCLUSION

Amicus curiae Anschutz Exploration Corporation

respectfully requests that the Court reverse Eagle County

DQGUHDIÀUPPublic Citizen’s appropriate limits on NEPA.

Respectfully submitted,

A NDREW C. LILLIE

TINA R. VAN BOCKERN

Counsel of Record

MARK D. GIBSON

UTSARGA BHATTARAI

HOLLAND & HART LLP

555 Seventeenth Street,

Suite 3200

Denver, CO 80202

(303) 295-8000

trvanbockern@hollandhart.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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