Amicus Curiae Brief — Seven County Infrastructure Coalition, et al., Petitioners v. Eagle County, Colorado, et al.
Supreme Court briefSep 4, 2024
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No. 23-975
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
EAGLE COUNTY, COLORADO, et al.,
Respondents.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF A PPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF ANSCHUTZ EXPLORATION
CORPORATION AS AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
A NDREW C. LILLIE
TINA R. VAN BOCKERN
Counsel of Record
MARK D. GIBSON
UTSARGA BHATTARAI
HOLLAND & HART LLP
555 Seventeenth Street,
Suite 3200
Denver, CO 80202
(303) 295-8000
trvanbockern@hollandhart.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
117003
A
(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
I N T RODUC T ION A N D SU M M A RY OF
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
I.
Reaffirming Public Citizen is Vital to
En s u r e T h a t N EPA A n a ly s e s for
Federal Oil-and-Gas Approvals Remain
Consistent with Interior’s Regulatory
Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
A. Fe der a l Law L i m it s I nt er ior ’s
Aut hor it y t o Consider Cer t a i n
“Effects” in its Decision-Making
Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
B. Despite Public Citizen’s Instruction
t h a t a n A g e n c y ’s R e g u l a t o r y
Authority Matters, Some Courts
Have Improperly Expanded Interior’s
NEPA-Review Requirements . . . . . . . . . . .11
ii
Table of Contents
Page
II. E x p a n d e d N E P A R e v i e w s —
Unb ou nde d by Pu bli c Ci ti z e n —
Fail to Ser ve NEPA’s Fundamental
Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
III. Reaffirming Public Citizen’s Limits
Wi ll Lessen Many Ha r ms T hat
E x p a n d e d N E PA R e v i e w s C a u s e
Agencies, Project Developers, and the
Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
iii
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
350 Mont. v. Bernhardt,
443 F. Supp. 3d 1185 (D. Mont. 2020). . . . . . . . . . . . .24
350 Mont. v. Haaland,
50 F.4th 1254 (9th Cir. 2022). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 17, 24
Audubon Naturalist Soc’y of the Cent. Atl.
States, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.,
524 F. Supp. 2d 642 (D. Md. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren,
698 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth,
420 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Conner v. Burford,
848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8, 10
Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. Bernhardt,
982 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs,
941 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,
2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195761
(D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
iv
Cited Authorities
Page
Dep’t of Transp. v. Public Citizen,
541 U.S. 752 (2004). . . 1-7, 9-11, 13-17, 19, 21-22, 26, 29, 34
Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v.
Haaland,
59 F.4th 1016 (10th Cir. 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v.
Jewell,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109986
(D.N.M. Aug. 14, 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
Eagle Cty. v. Surface Transp. Bd.,
82 F.4th 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2023) . . . . 2, 4-6, 19-20, 29, 34
Friends of the Earth v. Haaland,
583 F. Supp. 3d 113 (D.D.C. 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 29
Geosearch, Inc. v. Andrus,
508 F. Supp. 839 (D. Wyo. 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
High Country Conservation Advocs. v.
U.S. Forest Serv.,
52 F. Supp. 3d 1174 (D. Colo. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Haaland,
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128280
(D. Mont. Feb. 11, 2022). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v.
862IÀFHRI6XUIDFH0LQLQJ
274 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (D. Mont. 2017) . . . . . . . . . .13, 24
v
Cited Authorities
Page
Mont. Wildlife Fed’n v. Bernhardt,
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44080
(D. Mont. Mar. 11, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v.
U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
725 F. App’x 527 (9th Cir. 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Kempthorne,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110152
(D. Alaska Sept. 25, 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co.,
556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Or.-Cal. Trails Ass’n v. Walsh,
467 F. Supp. 3d 1007 (D. Colo. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
490 U.S. 332 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2, 3, 19, 20
San Juan Citizens All. v.
U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
326 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D.N.M. 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons,
871 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n,
867 F.3d 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2017). . . . . . . . . .13, 14, 15, 22
vi
Cited Authorities
Page
Signal Peak Energy, LLC v. Haaland,
2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149325 (Aug. 21, 2024) . . . .23, 24
Sovereign Iñupiat for a Living Arctic v.
U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
555 F. Supp. 3d 739 (D. Alaska 2021). . . . . . . . . .16, 29
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
W. Watersheds Project v. Haaland,
22 F.4th 828 (9th Cir. 2022). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
W. Watersheds Project v. Zinke,
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85203
(D. Idaho May 12, 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
W. Watersheds Project v. Zinke,
441 F. Supp. 3d 1042 (D. Idaho 2020). . . . . . . . . . . . .30
WildEarth Guardians v. Bernhardt,
502 F. Supp. 3d 237 (D.D.C. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell,
738 F.3d 298 (D.C. Cir. 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
WildEarth Guardians v.
U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
457 F. Supp. 3d 880 (D. Mont. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
vii
Cited Authorities
Page
WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke,
368 F. Supp. 3d 41 (D.D.C. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15
Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,
2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51011
(D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28
30 U.S.C. § 21a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3, 7, 15
30 U.S.C. § 181 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3, 7, 9
30 U.S.C. § 187 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
30 U.S.C. § 191(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
30 U.S.C. § 191(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
30 U.S.C. § 201 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)(A)(i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)(C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
30 U.S.C. § 207(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
30 U.S.C. § 226. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
viii
Cited Authorities
Page
30 U.S.C. § 226(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
30 U.S.C. § 226(b)(1)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
42 U.S.C. § 4321. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1, 19
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
42 U.S.C. § 4336a(e). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4, 21
42 U.S.C. § 4336a(g) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
42 U.S.C. § 7407(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
43 U.S.C. § 1701 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
43 U.S.C. § 1712(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Pub. L. No. 109-58, pmbl., 119 Stat. 594 (2005) . . . . . . .33
ix
Cited Authorities
Page
Regulations
30 C.F.R. § 746.13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
40 C.F.R. § 1501.11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
40 C.F.R. § 1508.1(i). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(n) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8, 9
43 C.F.R. § 1610.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
43 C.F.R. § 3161.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
43 C.F.R. § 3171.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
43 C.F.R. § 3171.17(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
43 C.F.R. § 3171.12(b)(2)(i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
43 C.F.R. § 3420.1-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
43 C.F.R. § 3425.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
43 C.F.R. § 3425.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
43 C.F.R. § 3425.3(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
x
Cited Authorities
Page
Federal Register
Actions To Expedite Energy-Related Projects,
66 Fed. Reg. 28,357 (May 22, 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33
Promoting Energy Independence and Economic
Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017) . . . . . .33
Update to the Regulations Implementing
the Procedural Provisions of the
Na ti o n a l Env ir o nm e n t a l Poli c y Ac t ,
85 Fed. Reg. 43,304 (July 16, 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
Waste Prevention , Production Subject to
Royalties, and Resource Conser vation,
89 Fed. Reg. 25,378 (Apr. 10, 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
Other Authorities
Aidan Mackenzie & Santi Ruiz, No, NEPA Really
Is a Problem for Clean Energy, Institute for
Progress (Aug. 17, 2023), https://ifp.org/nonepa-really-is-a-problem-for-clean-energy/ . . . .21, 25
Bl o c k i n g D i r t y O i l In f r a s t r u c t u r e,
Sierra Club, https://w w w. sierraclub .org /
dirty-fuels/stopping-build- out- dir ty- oilinfrastructure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
xi
Cited Authorities
Page
C OU NCIL ON E N V T L . Q UA LI T Y, E X EC . O FFICE
OF THE P RESIDENT, Environmental Impact
Statement Timelines (2010-2018) (2020),
https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/nepa-practice/CEQ_
EIS_Timeline_Report_2020-6-12.pdf . . . . . . . . . . .22
COUNCIL ON ENVTL . QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, Fact Sheet: CEQ’s Proposal to
Modernize its NEPA Implementing Regulations
KWWSVZZZGRLJRYVLWHVGRLJRYÀOHV
uploads/8-nepa-ceq-factsheet-508.pdf. . . . . . . . . . . .27
COUNCIL ON ENVTL . QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, The National Environmental
Policy Act: A Study of Its Effectiveness After
7ZHQW\ÀYH <HDUV (1997), https://ceq.doe.gov/
docs/ceq-publications/nepa25fn.pdf . . . . . . . . . . .21, 22
D a v i d K r e ut z e r & Pa i g e L a m b e r mont ,
T h e E n v i r o n m e n t a l Q u a l i t y In d e x :
Environmental Quality Weighted Oil and
Gas Production (Feb. 2023), https://www.
instituteforenergyresearch.org/wp-content/
uploads/2023/02/IER-EQI-2023.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
H.R. Rep. No. 91-765 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
Keep It in the Ground, WildEarth Guardians,
https://w ildearthguardians.org / climateenergy/keep-it-in-the-ground/ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
xii
Cited Authorities
Page
M ichael Bennon & Devon Wi lson, NEPA
Litigation Over Large Energy an d
Transport Infrastructure Projects, 53 Envtl.
L. Rep. 10836 (Oct. 2, 2023) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25, 29
Michael J. Mortimer et al., Environmental and
Social Risks: Defensive National Environmental
Policy Act in the US Forest Service, J. of Forestry
(Jan./Feb. 2011), www.fs.usda.gov/pnw/pubs/
journals/pnw_2011_mortimer001.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . .29
Philip Rossetti, R Street Policy Study No. 234,
Addressing NEPA-Related Infrastructure
D e l a y s ( 2 0 2 1) , h t t p s : // w w w. r s t r e e t .
org/ wp-content/uploads/2021/07/FINAL_
RSTREET234.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
Rystad Energy, API’s “10 in 2022” Policy
Plan , Quantification of Policy Impacts
(2022), https://w w w.api.org/-/media/files/
misc / 2 0 2 2 / 11 / r yst ad- energ y-apis-10 -i n2022-policy-plan-quantification-of-policyimpacts.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
Staff of S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs
and H. Comm. on Science and Astronautics,
90th Cong., Congressional White Paper
on a National Policy for the Environment
(Comm. Print 1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
xiii
Cited Authorities
Page
Timothy J. Considine, The Fiscal and Economic
Impacts of Federal Onshore Oil and Gas
Lea se Mo r a t o r ium an d D r illin g Ban
Policies (2020), https://www.eoriwyoming.
org /projects-resources/ publications/307the-fiscal-and-economic-impacts-of-federalonshore-oil-and-gas-lease-moratorium-anddrilling-ban-policies/viewdocument/307 . . . . . . . . . .32
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, National Environmental
Policy Act Lessons Learned: Quar terly
Repor t (Dec. 2013), https://w w w.energy.
gov/sites/default /files/ 2013/12 /f5/ LLQR2013-Q4.pdf. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26, 27
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, National Environmental
Policy Act Lessons Learned: Quarterly Report
(Dec. 2014), https://www.energy.gov/sites/
default/files/ 2014/12/f19/DecemberLLQR_
2014.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, National Environmental
Policy Act Lessons Learned: Quarterly Report
(Dec. 2015), https://www.energy.gov/sites/
default/files/ 2015/12/f27/LLQR_Dec2015_
12-1-15_FINALr2.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, National Environmental
Policy Act Lessons Learned: Quar terly
Repor t (Dec. 2016), https://w w w.energy.
gov/sites/default/files/ 2016/12/f34/LLQR_
2016_Q4.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
xiv
Cited Authorities
Page
U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,
Bald Mountain Mine Plan of Operations
A m e n d m e n t Ju n i p e r P r o j e c t F i n a l
Environmental Impact Statement (2024),
https://eplanning.blm.gov/public_ projects/
2011567/200507677/20111331/251011322/App_
K_FRA_Conformance.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,
Rock Springs Field Office Draft Resource
Management Plan Revision and Draf t
Environmental Impact Statement (2023),
https://eplanning.blm.gov/ public_projects/
1385 3/2 0 0 0 30 619/ 2 0 0 8 4073/250 09 0255/
Volume%201_Rock%20 Springs%20RMP%20
Revision% 20Draft%20EIS_v2.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT.,
Supplemental Environmental Assessment
Analysis for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Related to Oil and Gas Leasing (2022),
https://eplanning.blm.gov/public_ projects/
2022218/200537447/ 20069931/250076113/
WEG%20EA.pdf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15, 16, 23, 32
U.S. E N ERGY I N FOR M AT ION A DM INIST R AT ION ,
Frequently Asked Questions (2024), https://www.
eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=709&t=6 . . . . . . . . . .32
xv
Cited Authorities
Page
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-369,
National Environmental Policy Act, Little
Information Exists on NEPA Analyses (2014),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-369.pdf . . . . . . .27
1
INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE1
Anschutz Exploration Corporation is an independent
oil-and-gas company focused on responsible production of
oil-and-gas resources in three Western States: Colorado,
Utah, and Wyoming. Since its founding decades ago,
Anschutz has developed federal oil and gas managed
by the Department of the Interior (“Interior”) through
the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”). Each time
BLM proposes to sell new leases or issue Anschutz a
new permit to develop a well on an existing lease, the
agency must undertake an environmental review under
the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321
et seq. (“NEPA”).
Because NEPA applies to every major federal action—
including the authorizations Anschutz needs to develop
federal oil-and-gas reserves—far more is at stake in this
case than the 88-mile rail line in rural Utah.
Instead, this case presents a question that recurs in
virtually every case brought by special-interest groups
that oppose oil-and-gas and other mineral development
on public lands: Must an agency “study environmental
impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action
over which the agency has regulatory authority?” The
Court said the answer is “no” under Department of
Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004). But,
1. Under Supreme Court Rule 37.6, no counsel for a party
authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party
made a monetary contribution to fund the preparation or
submission of this brief. No person or entity other than amicus
curiae made a monetary contribution to fund the preparation and
submission of the brief.
2
as the D.C. Circuit’s decision demonstrates, see Eagle Cty.
v. Surface Transp. Bd., 82 F.4th 1152, 1177–80 (D.C. Cir.
2023), the D.C. Circuit and other courts still demand that
agencies evaluate effects that are outside the agencies’
authority.
Anschutz presents this brief to: (1) explain the statutes
and regulations that authorize Interior to manage oiland-gas and mineral development on public lands; (2)
demonstrate how recent judicial decisions—sidestepping
Public Citizen—have expanded NEPA reviews for
mineral-development projects to require Interior to
consider effects far outside its regulatory purview, leading
to absurd requirements imposed on remand and causing
significant harms to the project developers and the
economy; and (3) impress upon the Court the importance
RIUHDIÀUPLQJPublic Citizen and upholding appropriate
limits on the scope of NEPA’s “effects” analysis.
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In Public Citizen, the Court established reasonable
guardrails on the scope of an agency’s required NEPA
analysis. The Court held that “where an agency has no
ability to prevent [an environmental effect] due to its
limited statutory authority over the relevant actions, the
agency cannot be considered a legally relevant ‘cause’ of
the effect,” and thus NEPA does not require the agency
to study that effect. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 770. This
sensible approach focuses an agency’s NEPA analysis on
only those effects that will serve NEPA’s fundamental
purpose: informed agency decision-making. See Robertson
v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349
3
(1989). In other words, Public Citizen instructed that if
information analyzed during the NEPA process cannot
LQÁXHQFHRUFKDQJHWKHRXWFRPHRIWKHDJHQF\·VGHFLVLRQ
because the agency “simply lacks the power to act on
whatever information might be contained in the [NEPA
document],” then it serves “no purpose” in the NEPA
process, and a court cannot fault an agency for omitting
it. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 767–68.
Unfortunately, the D.C. Circuit and other courts have
not heeded Public Citizen’s instruction. In supporting
Petitioners before this Court, the Surface Transportation
%RDUG MXVWLÀDEO\ DUJXHV WKDW ´1(3$ GLG QRW UHTXLUHµ
it to consider the upstream and downstream effects at
issue—“based on the scope of the proposed action and
the nature and reach of the agency’s organic statutes”—
because the effects were “so attenuated, speculative,
FRQWLQJHQW RU RWKHUZLVH LQVXIÀFLHQWO\ PDWHULDO WR WKH
agency’s decisionmaking.” See Resp’ts’ Br. in Supp. of
Pet’rs 16–17 (citing Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 767).
Likewise, in challenges to oil-and-gas lease sales and
development permits (known as applications for permits to
drill), and contests of mining-plan approvals, courts have
faulted agencies for not adequately evaluating indirect
effects that the agencies cannot control, prevent, or “act
on” under their governing statutes—the Mineral Leasing
Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq., the Mining and Minerals
Policy Act, 30 U.S.C. § 21a, and the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701, et seq. Courts
have required agencies responsible for permitting oiland-gas and mining operations to evaluate effects such
as global climate change, foreign countries’ energy
consumption and greenhouse-gas emissions, and impacts
4
to air and water—not from the mineral development itself
but from the ultimate end-use of the mineral—much like
the indirect upstream and downstream effects at issue in
this case. See Eagle Cty., 82 F.4th at 1177–80.
The repercussions are legion.
First, after achieving some success about a decade
ago in convincing a court to disregard Public Citizen
and expand the scope of NEPA to include effects outside
the agency’s regulatory authority, anti-fossil-fuel groups
have gained momentum. There is seemingly no limit to
the number of cases they can bring and the types of farÁXQJHIIHFWVWKH\FDQFODLPWKHDJHQF\IDLOHGWRFRQVLGHU
In other words, the groups have been gifted a powerful
tool—NEPA litigation unbounded by Public Citizen or
the rule of reason—to challenge, slow, and sometimes halt
projects they oppose based on speculative impacts often
far removed from the challenged project.
Second, to insulate their NEPA analyses from
attack, agencies are forced to prepare oversized NEPA
documents—covering every “effect” imaginable—that
take years and sometimes millions of dollars to prepare.
This problem became so dire that President Biden signed
into law Section 321 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023,
which amended NEPA to set reasonable page limits and
deadlines. See 42 U.S.C. § 4336a(e). But agencies struggle
to meet the new requirements, opponents continue to
DVVDXOWDJHQFLHV·1(3$DQDO\VHVDQGFRXUWVVWLOOÀQGIDXOW
in the agencies’ evaluations. In the end, the developers
whose projects are delayed and later challenged are
KDUPHGWKHHFRQRPLFEHQHÀWVRIWKHSURMHFWVDUHGHWDLQHG
or never realized, and America’s energy independence and
5
national security are compromised.
Clarity and certainty in the NEPA process is critical
for industries that depend on federal approvals or
funding—not limited to developing oil-and-gas but also
mining for critical minerals, developing wind facilities,
and growing solar arrays. Anschutz urges the Court to
FRQÀUPWKDWPublic Citizen limits the scope of an agency’s
NEPA analysis—consistent with NEPA’s purpose to
foster informed agency decision-making—such that an
agency need only study those environmental effects over
which the agency has regulatory authority.
ARGUMENT
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Eagle County is a prime
example of courts ignoring the sensible limits this Court
established in Public Citizen, faulting an agency for failing
to consider “effects” of a proposed action over which the
agency has no regulatory authority. See Pet’rs’ Br. 13–19,
30–49. Predictably, the 88-mile rail line was challenged
in this case, in part, because the Surface Transportation
Board allegedly failed to consider the upstream and
downstream effects of transporting crude oil, Eagle Cty.,
82 F.4th at 1177—a product that anti-fossil-fuel groups
have unabashedly assailed.
The Court need only examine the cases involving
challenges to Interior’s oil-and-gas and mineral approvals
highlighted in this brief to understand how sidestepping
the bounds of Public Citizen have run roughshod over
NEPA’s fundamental purpose to foster informed decisionmaking. These cases also highlight the real-world
repercussions: increased litigation weaponizing NEPA
6
to further an anti-fossil-fuel agenda;2 agencies’ attempts
to fortify NEPA documents—inevitably delaying and
increasing the costs of projects; and the harms that follow
when courts grant disruptive remedies upending existing
projects. Like the Eagle County decision, these cases
XQGHUVFRUH WKH XUJHQW QHHG IRU WKH &RXUW WR UHDIÀUP
Public Citizen.
, 5HDIÀUPLQJPublic Citizen is Vital to Ensure That
NEPA Analyses for Federal Oil-and-Gas Approvals
5HPDLQ &RQVLVWHQW ZLWK ,QWHULRU·V 5HJXODWRU\
Authority.
$ )HGHUDO /DZ /LPLWV ,QWHULRU·V $XWKRULW\ WR
Consider Certain “Effects” in its DecisionMaking Processes.
Statutes intended to promote and maximize mineral
development on public lands govern Interior’s decisionmaking authority for proposed oil-and-gas projects. The
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 was adopted in the aftermath
of World War I “to promote the orderly development of
oil and gas deposits in publicly owned lands of the United
States through private enterprise.” Geosearch, Inc. v.
Andrus, 508 F. Supp. 839, 842 (D. Wyo. 1981). The Act
2. WildEarth Guardians, a group responsible for many
NEPA-based challenges to energy projects, wants to “stop fossil
fuel production in its tracks,” Keep It in the Ground, WildEarth
Guardians, https://wildearthguardians.org /climate-energy/keepit-in-the-ground/. Sierra Club similarly boasts how it is using the
“same tools”—which includes NEPA-based litigation—to “stop
the industry from building any new oil infrastructure.” Blocking
Dirty Oil Infrastructure, Sierra Club, https://www.sierraclub.org /
dirty-fuels/stopping-build-out-dirty-oil-infrastructure.
7
thus mandates leasing certain federal lands for oil-andgas, coal, and other mineral development. See 30 U.S.C.
§§ 181, 226.
Similarly, in the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of
1970, “Congress declare[d] that it is the continuing policy
of the Federal Government in the national interest to
foster and encourage private enterprise in ... the orderly
and economic development of domestic mineral resources
... to help assure satisfaction of industrial, security and
HQYLURQPHQWDOQHHGVµ86&D7KLVSROLF\GHÀQHV
“minerals” as “oil, gas, coal, oil shale and uranium.” Id.
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(“FLPMA”) directs BLM to manage public lands
“on the basis of multiple use and sustained yield.” 43
U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7). “The term ‘multiple use’ means ‘the
management of the public lands and their various resource
values so that they are utilized in the combination that will
best meet the present and future needs of the American
people.’” Id. § 1702(c). The development of “minerals” is one
of the multiple uses Congress contemplated. Id.
Interior, through BLM, carries out these congressional
mandates to foster oil-and-gas development in a threestage process of (1) region-wide resource planning, (2)
leasing, and (3) permitting development operations—
DQG HDFK VWDJH LV VXEMHFW WR 1(3$ $W WKH ÀUVW VWDJH
FLPMA requires local BLM offices to prepare a
resource-management plan for its assigned planning
area, identifying lands within the planning area open to
oil-and-gas leasing. Id. § 1712(a); 43 C.F.R. §§ 1601.0-5(n),
1610.1. BLM prepares an environmental impact statement
under NEPA to consider the plan’s direct, indirect,
8
and cumulative effects. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.1(i); 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-6.
At the second stage, the Mineral Leasing Act
requires, for lands “known or believed to contain oil or
gas deposits,” that “[l]ease sales shall be held ... at least
quarterly.” 30 U.S.C. § 226(a)–(b)(1)(A). Thus, BLM
conducts quarterly lease sales in approved areas consistent
with each resource-management plan. Id. BLM prepares
additional NEPA analysis for each sale, which can tier to
or incorporate by reference the previous NEPA analysis
done at the resource-planning stage, if appropriate. See
40 C.F.R. § 1501.11.
Once issued, a federal oil-and-gas lease represents
the government’s “point of commitment” or the “go/no go”
decision for mineral development. See Conner v. Burford,
848 F.2d 1441, 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1988). An oil-andgas lease is a vested property right. See W. Watersheds
Project v. Haaland, 22 F.4th 828, 842 (9th Cir. 2022)
(an oil-and-gas lease is a “legally protected interest in
[a] contract right[ ] with the federal government”). The
lease imposes obligations on the lessee to develop the
oil-and-gas reserves with “reasonable diligence.” 30
U.S.C. § 187. BLM’s implementing regulations require
the agency to ensure that “all operations be conducted
in a manner which ... results in the maximum ultimate
recovery of oil and gas with minimum waste.” 43 C.F.R.
§ 3161.2. To that end, at the third stage, BLM reviews and
approves an application for a permit to drill, setting out
geological data, drilling plans, plans of operations, plans
for reclamation, and other pertinent data. See id. § 3171.6.
Before approving development operations, BLM must
again comply with NEPA. Id. § 3171.12(b)(2)(i).
9
Interior’s approval of coal mining on federal lands
follows a similar three-stage process—each stage being
subject to NEPA: (1) region-wide resource planning, see
30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)(A)(i); 43 C.F.R. §§ 1601.0-6, 3420.1-4;
(2) leasing, see 30 U.S.C. §§ 181, 201; 43 C.F.R. §§ 3425.2,
3425.3; and (3) mining-plan approval, see 30 U.S.C.
§ 207(c); 43 C.F.R. § 3425.3(b); 30 C.F.R. § 746.13. The
Mineral Leasing Act instructs that “no mining operating
plan shall be approved which is not found to achieve the
maximum economic recovery of the coal.” 30 U.S.C.
D & %/0·VVLVWHUDJHQF\WKH2IÀFHRI6XUIDFH
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, reviews and
recommends mining-plan approvals. 30 C.F.R. § 746.13.
Interior’s NEPA analyses cannot be divorced from
this statutory framework or Congress’s clear directives.
Consistent with Public Citizen, the information the
agencies consider and the analyses they perform at these
three stages must inform the decision before the agency,
otherwise their efforts fail to serve NEPA’s fundamental
purpose. See 541 U.S. at 768.
For instance, after BLM has already completed
stage one for authorizing oil-and-gas development (by
determining that certain lands are available for oil-andJDV OHDVLQJ DQG ÀQLVKHG VWDJH WZR E\ LVVXLQJ D YDOLG
oil-and-gas lease, deciding mineral development is a “go,”
and triggering the lessee’s legal obligation to diligently
develop the minerals to maximize recovery), the agency
“has no authority to prevent,” id. at 767, or base a permit
denial decision on, any variable related to the downstream
end-use of the oil and gas at stage three when the agency
is analyzing whether to approve a development permit.
See 43 C.F.R. § 3171.17(c) (when approving a permit, BLM
may require an operator to comply with permit provisions
10
addressing “issues” covered by “applicable laws, regulations,”
and related to cultural resources, endangered species, surface
protection, safety, and completion of oil-and-gas wells). Nor
could BLM decide at stage three that the validly issued lease
should not be developed at all. See Conner, 848 F.2d at 1451
(the sale of an oil-and-gas lease “constitutes the ‘point of
commitment;’ after the lease is sold the government no
ORQJHU KDV WKH DELOLW\ WR SURKLELW SRWHQWLDOO\ VLJQLÀFDQW
inroads on the environment” because the “no action,” noleasing alternative is foreclosed).
Thus, even assuming BLM could predict how much of
or where the produced oil or gas would be later combusted,
the agency lacks authority to regulate or reduce emissions,
such that analyzing the air-quality impacts from oil or
gas combustion could inform BLM’s decision on which
lands are available to lease at stage one, which leases
to sell at stage two, and which conditions are necessary
in a permit to drill at stage three under the controlling
statutory scheme. 3 But, as discussed next, some courts
have required this level of speculation and analysis,
notwithstanding Public Citizen’s limitations.
3. Under the Clean Air Act, Congress expressly delegated
the authority to regulate air quality to the States and the
Environmental Protection Agency, not BLM. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7407(a), 7410(a)(1), 7410(c)(1). That is why, in a recent rulemaking
aimed at disincentivizing the loss of gas during oil-and-gas
production, BLM disclaimed authority to regulate air pollution
and human health. See Waste Prevention, Production Subject
to Royalties, and Resource Conservation, 89 Fed. Reg. 25,378,
25,394 (Apr. 10, 2024) (“BLM is not regulating air quality in this
rule.... [A]ir pollution and its connection to human health and
welfare ... is the primary responsibility of the [Environmental
Protection Agency], States, and local governments.”).
11
B. Despite Public Citizen·V Instruction that an
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&RXUWV+DYH,PSURSHUO\([SDQGHG,QWHULRU·V
1(3$5HYLHZ5HTXLUHPHQWV
In early NEPA cases, the Court emphasized the
need to consider “the scope of the agency’s statutory
responsibility” when determining whether the agency
complied with NEPA. E.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 550–53
(1978) (agency’s selection of alternatives in NEPA analysis
was “judged in ... light ... of its statutory authority”); see
also Pet’rs’ Br. 24–25. And in the years following Public
Citizen, courts generally acknowledged that agencies were
required to consider only those effects that fell within the
agency’s regulatory jurisdiction or that were proximately
caused by—not merely within the “but for” causal chain
of—the acting agency’s decision. See Pet’rs’ Br. 5–6; see
also, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co.,
556 F.3d 177, 197 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[agency] reasonably
determined that a scope of NEPA analysis extending
beyond [its] limited jurisdiction ... would encroach on
the regulatory authority of [another agency]”); City of
Shoreacres v. Waterworth, 420 F.3d 440, 453 (5th Cir.
2005) (“[I]t is doubtful that an environmental effect may
be considered as proximately caused by the action of a
particular federal regulator if that effect is directly caused
by the action of another government entity over which the
regulator has no control.”).
However, as the effects of greenhouse-gas emissions
and climate change have been increasingly debated,
and the Circuit Courts have diverged on how they
interpret Public Citizen, see Pet’rs’ Br. 5–6, agencies
and courts alike have been “forced to confront this global
12
environmental issue” with “little direction,” 350 Mont. v.
Haaland, 50 F.4th 1254, 1281 (9th Cir. 2022) (Nelson, J.,
dissenting), leading to “mixed messaging” on what NEPA
requires of agencies, Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our
Env’t v. Haaland, 59 F.4th 1016, 1040 (10th Cir. 2023).
$WÀUVWFRXUWVPDGHQRDWWHPSWWRZDGHLQWRWKHLVVXH
See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp.
1291, 1324 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (summarily rejecting
climate-change challenge); Audubon Naturalist Soc’y
of the Cent. Atl. States, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.,
)6XSSG '0G DIÀUPLQJZKHUH
agency explained it “believed it was not useful to consider
greenhouse gas emissions” (internal quotations omitted)).
By the mid-2000s, Interior began analyzing, to a
limited degree, climate-change impacts in its oil-andgas and coal-related NEPA documents. These analyses
were record-based and avoided speculations—and they
were uniformly upheld. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v.
Kempthorne, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110152, at *28–31 (D.
Alaska Sept. 25, 2006) (in upholding analysis for oil-andgas leases, observing that “[a]ny attempted delineation
RUTXDQWLÀFDWLRQRIWKHHIIHFWVRIJOREDOFOLPDWHFKDQJH
would be highly speculative” and noting plaintiffs agreed
that “BLM was not required to develop information about
global climate change other than what was in the record”);
WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, 308–11
'&&LU DIÀUPLQJ%/0·VDQDO\VLVRIJUHHQKRXVH
gas emissions for coal lease where BLM determined that
projecting future emissions was too speculative).
A shift began in 2014, as anti-fossil-fuel groups
achieved several judicial wins requiring expanded NEPA
13
analyses on remand, forcing agencies to consider globalclimate-change impacts, utilize tools to monetize the
social cost of carbon emissions (or explain why those tools
were not used), quantify projected future greenhouse-gas
emissions, evaluate greenhouse-gas effects of downstream
transportation and combustion of oil-and-gas, and much
more. See, e.g., High Country Conservation Advocs. v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1193 (D. Colo. 2014)
(holding Interior failed to adequately explain “reasons for
not using ... the social cost of carbon protocol to quantify
the cost of [greenhouse-gas] emissions”); Mont. Envtl.
,QIR&WUY862IÀFHRI6XUIDFH0LQLQJ, 274 F. Supp.
3d 1074, 1090–94 (D. Mont. 2017) (holding Interior failed
to adequately consider downstream rail transportation
and coal-combustion impacts—ignoring Interior’s Public
Citizen argument that these effects “fall[ ] outside the
scope of the Secretary’s authority” and such analyses
“would be speculative” given uncertainty as to ultimate
“combustion locations ... and emissions controls” in place).
After these early successes, the anti-oil groups
increasingly deployed NEPA to challenge nearly every
significant mineral-development project approved
by Interior, and they continued to succeed—in large
part because courts were ignoring Public Citizen—by
following the example set by Sierra Club v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 867 F.3d 1357 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (“Sabal Trail”). In Sabal Trail, the D.C. Circuit
required consideration of downstream effects regulated
by other State and federal agencies because (a) the effects
were “reasonably foreseeable,” and (b) even if outside the
action agency’s regulatory authority, the action agency
could “consider” the effects under NEPA because it
could “deny” the action if it “would be too harmful to the
14
environment.” Id. at 1372–73. Unfortunately, the court
provided no guidance on how an agency could accomplish
this impossible task.
The first oil-and-gas decision applying the Sabal
Trail sidestep was WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke, 368
F. Supp. 3d 41, 55, 67–77 (D.D.C. 2019). In that case,
plaintiffs challenged BLM’s issuance of oil-and-gas leases
covering 460,000 acres across several Western States for
the agency’s alleged failure to adequately quantify and
analyze greenhouse-gas emissions from future, yet-to-beproposed oil-and-gas drilling operations and future enduse consumption of the petroleum that might be produced.
Id. Interior argued that under Public Citizen, end-use
greenhouse-gas emissions are not an indirect effect of
oil-and-gas leasing and, even if they are, BLM’s analysis
RIWKHHPLVVLRQVVDWLVÀHG1(3$Id. at 72. Relying on the
D.C. Circuit’s skewed reading of Public Citizen in Sabal
Trail, the court determined that NEPA required Interior
to analyze the “[d]ownstream use of oil and gas, and the
resulting [greenhouse-gas] emissions” as an indirect effect
of leasing. Id. at 73–75 (citing Sabal Trail, 867 F.3d at
1373). Ultimately, the court held that the agency’s analysis
ZDVGHÀFLHQWDQGUHPDQGHGIRUIXUWKHUDQDO\VLVId. at 85.4
4. BLM prepared supplemental NEPA, but plaintiffs
brought another challenge repeating many of the same claims.
See WildEarth Guardians v. Bernhardt, 502 F. Supp. 3d 237,
245 – 47 (D.D.C. 2020). After the court again found NEPA
GHÀFLHQFLHV DIWHU LW LJQRUHG Public Citizen), see id. at 244–59,
and ordered another remand, id. at 259, plaintiffs and BLM
eventually executed a settlement agreement by which the
agency agreed to conduct additional NEPA analysis for the
challenged (as well as several other) leasing decisions. BLM
issued a draft supplemental NEPA analysis in November 2022,
15
But as the Eleventh Circuit explains, the Sabal Trail
“test” runs afoul of Public Citizen and turns an agency
into a “de facto environmental-policy czar” that can kill
a project after considering distant and often speculative
effects over which the agency has no statutory or
regulatory authority, if the agency somehow determines
certain environmental harms are too great. See Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 941
F.3d 1288, 1298–1300 (11th Cir. 2019).
This is the unspoken result of the WildEar th
Guardians decision. 368 F. Supp. 3d at 73. The court gave
BLM an environmental-policy-based power to disregard
Congress’s clear instruction that the agency must manage
public lands to “foster ... development of ” federal oil-andgas reserves to support the nation’s “industrial, security
and environmental needs.” 30 U.S.C. § 21a; see Argument
Section I.A, supra. By sidestepping Public Citizen, the
court cleared the way for BLM to shirk its statutory
GXW\WRLVVXHRUDIÀUPRLODQGJDVOHDVHVLIEDVHGRQLWV
expanded NEPA analysis alone, the agency determines
that the end-use of the oil and gas is too environmentally
harmful. See WildEarth Guardians, 368 F. Supp. 3d at 73.
The Congresses that passed NEPA, the Mineral Leasing
Act, the Mining and Minerals Policy Act, and FLPMA
never intended this result. Indeed, BLM is considering
cancelling 3,600 leases covering 3,433,615 acres across
DOWKRXJK LW KDV \HW WR LVVXH D ÀQDO DQDO\VLV See U.S. DEP ’T OF
INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., Supplemental Environmental
Assessment Analysis for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Related to
Oil and Gas Leasing (2022), https://eplanning.blm.gov/public_
projects/ 2022218/200537447/20069931/250076113/WEG%20EA.
pdf (“WildEarth Guardians Supplemental Environmental
Assessment”).
16
seven States in the supplemental NEPA analysis it
prepared to evaluate the sole issue of greenhouse-gas
emissions over whose effects it has no authority to control.5
Such a reading of NEPA is beyond the pale. NEPA
“does not expand the jurisdiction of an agency beyond that
set forth in its organic statute.” Cape May Greene, Inc. v.
Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 188 (3d Cir. 1983). As much as some
advocates and courts wish to re-write Public Citizen and
turn agencies into environmental-policy czars, Congress
simply did not intend for NEPA to “confer unlimited
power on the agencies.” Id. NEPA does not “support ...
an agency taking substantive action beyond that set forth
in its enabling act.” Id.
Unfortunately, the WildEarth Guardians decision is
only one of numerous recent decisions requiring an agency
to consider downstream, far-removed, and speculative
“effects” beyond the proximate effects of the action over
which the agency has regulatory authority. Courts have
lately required, for example:
• BLM to predict and consider foreig n oil
consumption and emissions in calculating the
greenhouse-gas emissions of a proposed oil-andgas development project in Alaska. Sovereign
Iñupiat for a Living Arctic v. U.S. Bureau of
Land Mgmt., 555 F. Supp. 3d 739, 762–67 (D.
Alaska 2021) (rejecting Public Citizen argument).
While the court did not provide instruction on
the “foreign” consumption information that
5. See WildEarth Guardians Supplemental Environmental
Assessment, supra note 4, at 10.
17
BLM should consider, another judge aptly
obser ved that such global climate-change
analyses would presumably require agencies
to make assumptions based on “the behavior
of 200 other sovereign nations, the supply and
demand projections of global energy models, or
the personal energy usage decisions of 7 billion
people worldwide.” 350 Mont., 50 F.4th at 1281
(Nelson, J., dissenting).
• BLM to expressly “factor into its decisionmaking” for an oil-and-gas lease sale in Wyoming
the “social cost” of greenhouse-gas emissions.
Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 2024
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51011, at *84–92 (D.D.C. Mar.
22, 2024).
• The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management to
predict and consider foreign oil consumption in
calculating greenhouse-gas emissions for the sale
of leases in the Gulf of Mexico. Friends of the
Earth v. Haaland, 583 F. Supp. 3d 113, 136–44
(D.D.C. 2022), rev’d on other grounds, 2023 U.S.
App. LEXIS 10554 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 28, 2023).
7KH2IÀFHRI6XUIDFH0LQLQJ5HFODPDWLRQDQG
Enforcement to evaluate the impacts of a power
SODQW·VZLWKGUDZDORIZDWHUIURPDULYHURQÀVK
miles away from the plant (and even further away
from the permitted coal mine) when evaluating
the effects of combusting coal from the proposed
mining plan area. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v.
Haaland, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128280, at
*29–30 (D. Mont. Feb. 11, 2022) (rejecting Public
18
Citizen argument that agency lacks authority
over plant’s water withdrawals).
• The Fish and Wildlife Services to consider
how a third-party wind-power project, whose
development was rendered “more probable” by
a proposed and evaluated 225-mile electrical
transmission line, might impact the beetles and
cranes found at the wind-project site. Or.-Cal.
Trails Ass’n v. Walsh, 467 F. Supp. 3d 1007,
1050–51, 1068 (D. Colo. 2020).
Seeking to stretch NEPA reviews to the breaking
point, plaintiffs opposed to oil and gas want even more.
Most recently, in Center for Biological Diversity v.
U.S. Department of Interior, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
195761, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2023), plaintiffs brought
an unprecedented omnibus challenge to BLM’s more
than 4,000 separate agency actions approving individual
permits to develop existing oil-and-gas leases across
New Mexico and Wyoming. Among their plethora of
claims is the argument that in approving the permits,
BLM was required but failed to consider the impacts of
greenhouse-gas emissions on “climate-imperiled species”
across the world, including Hawaiian songbirds that could
DOOHJHGO\ ´EH H[WLQFW LQ WKH ZLOG LQ WKUHH WR ÀYH \HDUV
due to the uphill spread of mosquitos and avian malaria
caused by climate change.” See Ctr. for Bio. Diversity,
No. 22-cv-01716-TSC, Am. Compl., ECF No. 57 at ¶¶ 1,
4, 7, 9, 191–97 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2022). The district court
rightly dismissed the case because plaintiffs could not
establish standing. See Ctr. for Bio. Diversity, 2023 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 195761, at *15. Undeterred, the plaintiffs
appealed to the D.C. Circuit. See Ctr. for Bio. Diversity
19
v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 23-5308 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22,
2023).
Because courts have ignored Public Citizen’s limits
on the scope of NEPA, the analyses that courts have
required Interior to undertake on remand have and will
continue to spiral out of control. Regardless of whether
BLM can “act on” information gathered about the oilor gas-consumption trends in 200 other countries, or
mosquitos in Hawaii, or some other downstream “effect”
not yet imagined by anti-fossil-fuel groups, some court will
nonetheless fault the agency for not analyzing that effect
LQVXIÀFLHQWGHWDLOWR´LQIRUPµLWVGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSURFHVV
$GHFLVLRQIURPWKLV&RXUWDIÀUPLQJEagle County
would further expand NEPA and, ultimately, thwart
NEPA’s fundamental goals.
,, ([SDQGHG1(3$5HYLHZV³8QERXQGHGE\Public
Citizen³)DLOWR6HUYH1(3$·V)XQGDPHQWDO*RDOV
The Court in Public Citizen wisely limited the scope
of NEPA based on “the underlying policies behind NEPA
and Congress’ intent, as informed by the ‘rule of reason.’”
541 U.S. at 768.
NEPA is intended to promote “the understanding of
the ecological systems and natural resources important
to” the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 4321. Environmental
analyses that comply with NEPA serve two fundamental
purposes: (1) ensuring that agencies make informed
decisions after considering the environmental impacts of
the proposed action; and (2) guaranteeing that relevant
information is made available to the public. Robertson,
20
490 U.S. at 349. Critically, NEPA is a procedural statute;
it “does not mandate particular results.” Id. at 350.
In directing agencies to consider “objectives of
environmental management,” Congress did not intend for
environmental considerations to override federal agencies’
other priorities and project goals. Staff of S. Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs and H. Comm. on Science and
Astronautics, 90th Cong., Congressional White Paper on a
National Policy for the Environment, at 15 (Comm. Print
1968). Nor did Congress intend for NEPA’s procedures to
“unreasonably delay the processing of Federal proposals.”
H.R. Rep. No. 91-765, at 8 (1969).
Expanded NEPA reviews—like that required by
Eagle County—GHIHDW&RQJUHVV·VLQWHQWLQWZRVLJQLÀFDQW
ways. First, they require agencies to amass voluminous
information that have no bearing on the agencies’ decisionmaking authority. Second, they serve as a tool, for agencies
and project opponents alike, to delay—and potentially
kill—projects.
1. Expanded reviews require agencies to wastefully
evaluate “effects” that fail to inform their decisionmaking processes. As discussed above, successful NEPA
challenges often require agencies on remand to consider
additional effects, or certain effects in more detail—even
if the agency took the position that it had no statutory
DXWKRULW\ WR DFW RQ RU SUHYHQW WKH LGHQWLÀHG HIIHFW See
Argument Section I.B, supra. Nonetheless, “[w]hen
lawsuits successfully kill a project, the rulings explicitly
state that a NEPA document failed to account for some
environmental impact, forcing future agency reviews to
21
analyze that impact.”6 One lawsuit, therefore, can create
a one-way ratchet affecting numerous federal decisions
and have a reverberating effect. Id.
In response, agencies seek to “litigation-proof ” their
NEPA documents, “increasing costs and time but not
necessarily quality” of their analyses.7$VDUHVXOWÀQDO
environmental impact statements have bloated from a
handful of pages in the early 1970s to an average of about
661 pages. 8
But NEPA’s purpose was never “ to generate
paperwork—even excellent paperwork,” 40 C.F.R.
§ 1500.1(c), just for the sake of insulating a review from
legal challenge. Its purpose is to promote informed
GHFLVLRQPDNLQJE\JRYHUQPHQWRIÀFLDOVPublic Citizen,
541 U.S. at 768–69. That is why President Biden attempted
to limit the size of agencies’ NEPA documents through the
Fiscal Responsibility Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 4336a(e). Now,
environmental impact statements are generally limited
to 150 pages and environmental assessments are limited
to 75 pages, not counting appendices. Id. Yet agencies,
apparently, view the statutory page limits as optional—
6. Aidan Mackenzie & Santi Ruiz, No, NEPA Really Is a
Problem for Clean Energy, Institute for Progress (Aug. 17, 2023),
https://ifp.org/no-nepa-really-is-a-problem-for-clean-energy/.
7. C OU NCIL ON E N V T L . Q UA LI T Y, E X EC . O FFICE OF T H E
PRESIDENT, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Study of
,WV(IIHFWLYHQHVV$IWHU7ZHQW\ÀYH<HDUV, at iii (1997), https://ceq.
doe.gov/docs/ceq-publications/nepa25fn.pdf.
8. See Update to the Regulations Implementing the
Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy
Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43,304, 43,309 (July 16, 2020).
22
following the “more is better” approach.9 Understandably
so. If courts require agencies to evaluate all “reasonably
foreseeable effects” no matter the statutory limits in play,
see Sabal Trail, 867 F.3d at 1373, an agency cannot do so
in 150 pages.
5HDIÀUPLQJPublic Citizen will further NEPA’s goal
of focusing NEPA documents on the information that truly
matters to an agency’s decision-making, and further the
Fiscal Responsibility Act’s streamlining goal.
2. NEPA reviews and ensuing litigation have become
potent tools—for agencies and opponents—to delay
projects. Agencies drive the NEPA process and, therefore,
can dictate how fast or slow the process proceeds.10
Between 2010 and 2018, the average environmental impact
statement took 4.5 years to complete, and 25% of them
took more than 6 years.11
9 . Se e, e .g ., U. S . D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R , B U R E A U O F
L A N D M GM T ., Bald Mountain Mine Plan of Operations
Amendment Juniper Project Final Environmental Impact
Statement (2024), App. K, https://eplanning.blm.gov/public_
projects/2011567/200507677/20111331/251011322/App_K_FRA_
Conformance.pdf (claiming compliance with page limits despite
publishing 502-page environmental impact statement plus over
630 pages in appendices).
10. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, supra note 7, at 22 (“agencies often have different
VRPHWLPHVFRQÁLFWLQJ WLPHWDEOHV>DQG@UHTXLUHPHQWVµ
11. See C OUNCIL ON E N V TL . Q UA LIT Y, E X EC . O FFICE OF
THE P RESIDENT, Environmental Impact Statement Timelines
(2010-2018) (2020), at 1, https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/nepa-practice/
CEQ_EIS_Timeline_Report_2020-6-12.pdf.
23
Trying to rein in ever-expanding NEPA timelines,
the Fiscal Responsibility Act set reasonable deadlines.
See 42 U.S.C. § 4336a(g) (two years for environmental
impact statements and one year for environmental
assessments). Like the page limits, however, the deadlines
have also been ignored. For example, a Montana coal mine
UHFHQWO\VXHGWKH2IÀFHRI6XUIDFH0LQLQJ5HFODPDWLRQ
and Enforcement to enforce the two-year deadline for
preparing an environmental impact statement for a mining
plan because the agency’s current NEPA schedule exceeds
two years by 19 months. See Signal Peak Energy, LLC v.
Haaland, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149325, at *5 (Aug. 21,
2024); see also The Falkirk Mining Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Interior, No. 24-cv-00040-DLH-CRH, First Am. Compl.,
(&)1R '1'$SU ÀOLQJVXLWEHFDXVH
BLM failed to complete an environmental assessment for
a coal lease in over four years).
Lawsuits brought by project opponents also affect the
timeline of NEPA analyses. Often, successive lawsuits
repeatedly challenging the NEPA work for the same
agency approval can mean that an approval granted over a
decade ago remains at risk of reversal. For example, based
on the WildEarth Guardians settlement, BLM issued
a draft supplemental NEPA analysis for the challenged
leases over a year-and-a-half ago, in November 2022.12
,WKDVQRW\HWUHOHDVHGWKHÀQDODQDO\VLV0HDQZKLOHWKH
leases involved in that case—some issued close to ten
12. See generally WildEarth Guardians Supplemental
Environmental Assessment, supra note 4.
24
years ago13 —are still at risk of cancellation. And some of
those same leases are now the subject of a new challenge
ÀOHG LQ 8WDK³SURORQJLQJ WKH XQFHUWDLQW\ See S. Utah
Wilderness All. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 2:23-cv-804,
Compl., ECF No. 1 (D. Utah Nov. 3, 2023).
A lengthy saga also is playing out for a Montana coal
PLQH0LQLQJFRPSDQ\6LJQDO3HDNÀOHGLWVDSSOLFDWLRQ
to lease an area of federal coal at its existing mine in
2008. 0RQW (QYWO ,QIR &WU Y 86 2IÀFH RI 6XUIDFH
Mining, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1083 (D. Mont. 2017). BLM’s
NEPA work for the leasing decision was challenged and
XOWLPDWHO\DIÀUPHGLQN. Plains Res. Council, Inc.
v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 725 F. App’x 527, 529–31
(9th Cir. 2018). In 2012, Signal Peak applied for a miningplan approval; it too was challenged—repeatedly. Mont.
Envtl. Info. Ctr., 274 F. Supp. 3d at 1083–84; 350 Mont.
v. Bernhardt, 443 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1190 (D. Mont. 2020).
Almost sixteen years later, Signal Peak is still precluded
from mining the area. See 350 Mont., 50 F.4th at 1273.
$QGWKHDJHQF\KDVVLJQLÀFDQWO\GHOD\HGFRPSOHWLQJWKH
required NEPA on remand, despite the two-year deadline.
See Signal Peak Energy, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149325,
at *5 (deadline expires in December 2024 but agency’s
schedule projects NEPA will be completed in May 2026).
What is worse, under a recent court ruling, Signal Peak
cannot do anything about the delay until the agency misses
the deadline because, until then, the mine’s claim under
the Fiscal Responsibility Act is prudentially unripe. Id.
at *25–28.
13. See id., App. D (listing leases sold as far back as February
2015).
25
The mine’s story is not uncommon. Ten major
LQIUDVWUXFWXUH SURMHFWV UHÁHFWLQJ ELOOLRQ LQ FDSLWDO
expenditures, were cancelled, stalled, or were at risk of
cancellation due to permitting and judicial-review delays
in recent years.14
Oil-and-gas and mining projects are not the only ones
to suffer because of long NEPA reviews. Extended NEPA
disrupt “clean” energy projects too, including onshore
and offshore wind facilities, solar farms, geothermal
power plants, transmission lines, and mining permits
for copper and lithium—critical minerals for “clean”
energy.15 According to 2021 data, 42% of the Department
of Energy’s active NEPA reviews were for clean-energy,
transmission, or conservation projects, while only 15%
were for fossil-fuel projects.16
Regardless of the kind of project, these enormous
and costly delays frustrate NEPA’s purpose. More
significantly, these delays in federal permitting and
approvals of oil-and-gas, critical-mineral, renewable14. See Rystad Energy, API’s “10 in 2022” Policy Plan,
4XDQWLÀFDWLRQRI3ROLF\,PSDFWV, at 26–27 (2022), https://www.
DSLRUJPHGLDÀOHVPLVF2022/11/rystad-energy-apis-10-in-2022SROLF\SODQTXDQWLÀFDWLRQRISROLF\LPSDFWVSGI
15. Mackenzie & Ruiz, supra note 6; see also Michael
Bennon & Devon Wilson, NEPA Litigation Over Large Energy
and Transport Infrastructure Projects, 53 Envtl. L. Rep. 10836
(Oct. 2, 2023).
16. See Philip Rossetti, R Street Policy Study No. 234,
Addressing NEPA-Related Infrastructure Delays, at 1, 4
(2021), https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/
FINAL_RSTREET234.pdf.
26
energy, infrastructure, and other projects cause numerous
VLJQLÀFDQWKDUPV³DQGQRWMXVWWRWKRVHVXSSRUWLQJWKH
projects, as discussed next.
,,,5HDIÀUPLQJ Public Citizen·V /LPLWV :LOO /HVVHQ
0DQ\+DUPV7KDW([SDQGHG1(3$5HYLHZV&DXVH
$JHQFLHV3URMHFW'HYHORSHUVDQGWKH(FRQRP\
Expanded, wasteful NEPA analyses, and permitting
and litigation delays have serious repercussions, including
increased project costs, litigation risks, waterfalls of
SHUPLWWLQJKROGXSVDQGVLJQLÀFDQWUHJXODWRU\XQFHUWDLQW\
These hurt developers, the thousands of employees and
contractors they employ, and the economies they and their
projects support and energize. Further, as applied to
the oil-and-gas and energy industries, expansive, costly,
and languishing NEPA reviews also threaten America’s
energy independence and national security.
Direct and Indirect Costs. To begin, agencies and
project developers must spend millions of dollars to
prepare “litigation-proof ” NEPA documents to analyze
effects that have no bearing on their decision-making
process—then they must repeat that effort in preparing
supplemental NEPA analyses when courts inevitably hold
that their original analyses are not enough.
NEPA is not cheap—and requiring expanded reviews
only exacerbates the cost. The Department of Energy
VSHQW RYHU PLOOLRQ WR SUHSDUH HQYLURQPHQWDO
assessments between 2013 and 2016.17 Just last year, BLM
17. See U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, National Environmental
Policy Act Lessons Learned: Quarterly Report, at 16 (Dec.
27
VSHQW PLOOLRQ WR SUHSDUH D draft³QRW HYHQ ÀQDO³
environmental impact statement.18 Even assuming, as
estimated in 2020, that the federal government prepares
10,000 environmental assessments every year at a
FRQVHUYDWLYHSULFHWDJRIHDFKWKHWRWDOGLUHFW
FRVWV ZRXOG EH D VWDJJHULQJ ELOOLRQ19 And those are
just the direct costs. There are also billions of dollars
allocated to indirect costs. NEPA reviews also demand
the full-time efforts of hundreds or thousands of federal
employees and contractors in every federal agency.
Developers and project sponsors seeking federal funds or
2013), https://w w w.energ y.gov /sites/default /files/2013/12 /
f 5/ LLQR-2 013 - Q4.pdf; U.S. D EP ’ T OF E N ER G Y , National
Environmental Policy Act Lessons Learned: Quarterly Report, at
'HF KWWSVZZZHQHUJ\JRYVLWHVGHIDXOWÀOHV
f19/ DecemberLLQR_2014.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, National
Environmental Policy Act Lessons Learned: Quarterly Report, at
'HF KWWSVZZZHQHUJ\JRYVLWHVGHIDXOWÀOHV12/
f 27/LLQR_Dec2015_12-1-15_FINALr2.pdf; U.S. D EP ’ T OF
ENERGY, National Environmental Policy Act Lessons Learned:
Quarterly Report, at 23 (Dec. 2016), https://www.energy.gov/sites/
GHIDXOWÀOHVI//45B2016_Q4.pdf.
18. See U.S. DEP ’T OF INTERIOR , BUREAU OF L AND MGMT.,
5RFN 6SULQJV )LHOG 2IÀFH 'UDIW 5HVRXUFH 0DQDJHPHQW 3ODQ
Revision and Draft Environmental Impact Statement, at 1 (2023),
https://eplanning.blm.gov/public_projects/13853/2000 30619/200
84073/ 250090255/ Volume% 201_Rock%20Springs%20RMP%20
Revision% 20Draft%20EIS_v2.pdf.
19. C OUNCIL ON E N V TL . Q UA LIT Y, E X EC . O FFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, Fact Sheet: CEQ’s Proposal to Modernize its NEPA
Implementing Regulations (2020), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.
gov/ files/ uploads / 8-nepa-ceq-factsheet-508.pdf; U.S. G OV ’ T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-369, National Environmental
Policy Act, Little Information Exists on NEPA Analyses (2014),
https://www.gao.gov/assets /gao-14-369.pdf.
28
DSSURYDOVVLPLODUO\LQFXUPDVVLYHH[SHQGLWXUHVWRIXOÀOO
NEPA’s requirements.
When NEPA documents are challenged (and few are
not), the same parties must then spend additional, often
vast sums on litigation. No one disputes that litigation is
massively expensive—not only for the government but
also for the project developer if it elects to intervene and
defend approval of its project.
It bears consideration that the Equal Access to
Justice Act allows certain categories of plaintiffs who
successfully challenge a government decision to recover
legal costs and attorney fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).
Anti-fossil-fuel plaintiffs often take advantage of this.
Following their success in the WildEarth Guardians
cases, plaintiffs sought to recover their fees and costs from
the government. See WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, No.
1:16-cv-01724-RC, Interim Mot. for Att’y Fees, ECF No.
199 (D.D.C. July 9, 2021).
While the federal government—and thus American
taxpayers—foots the bill for government attorneys and
Equal Access to Justice fees, the project developer incurs
its own fees and costs and has no way to recover them if
plaintiffs’ NEPA claims ultimately fail. The overwhelming
costs of defending federal approvals have unfortunately
become part of doing business on federal lands. These
litigation costs, incurred to defend all manner of oiland-gas, mineral, renewable-energy, and infrastructure
projects in federal court are, like other regulatory
expenses, ultimately passed on to the consumer.
3HUPLWWLQJ'HOD\V Businesses, investors, and project
developers, including oil-and-gas companies like amicus
29
curiae Anschutz, depend on predictable permitting
processes to make informed investments and undertake
business decisions. Uncertainty injected into the NEPA
process by the Eagle County decision, and the other
cases discussed in this brief that uniformly sidestep
Public Citizen, jeopardizes Interior’s ability to timely
review and approve new lease sales or permits. 20 In other
words, expanded NEPA makes the process of developing
federal oil and gas expensive and unpredictable. That
unpredictability impedes project development and
increases costs to producers and consumers. 21
Litigation Risks and Disruptive Vacaturs. NEPA
litigation has the potential to severely hamper domestic
oil-and-gas production, renewable-energy development,
critical-mineral extraction, and other infrastructure
projects. That is because, if successful, courts often vacate
pre-existing project approvals pending additional NEPA
DQDO\VLV DQG YDFDWXU FDQ EH GLIÀFXOW³ERWK ORJLVWLFDOO\
DQG ÀQDQFLDOO\³IRU DJHQFLHV DQG SURMHFW GHYHORSHUV WR
implement.
In just the last few years, courts have vacated or
VXVSHQGHGVHYHUDOIHGHUDOHQHUJ\SURMHFWVDIWHUÀQGLQJ
GHÀFLHQFLHV LQ WKH DJHQFLHV· 1(3$ DQDO\VHV See, e.g.,
Friends of the Earth, 583 F. Supp. 3d 113 (vacating 80.8
million-acre Gulf of Mexico lease sale); Sovereign Iñupiat.,
555 F. Supp. 3d 739 (vacating oil-and-gas development
20. Cf., Michael J. Mortimer et al., Environmental and Social
Risks: Defensive National Environmental Policy Act in the US
Forest Service, J. of Forestry (Jan./Feb. 2011), www.fs.usda. gov/
pnw/pubs/journals/pnw_2011_mortimer001.pdf.
21. Cf. Bennon & Wilson, supra note 15, at 10849.
30
project approval); Mont. Wildlife Fed’n v. Bernhardt, 2022
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44080 (D. Mont. Mar. 11, 2022) (vacating
multi-state oil-and-gas lease sale); W. Watersheds Project
v. Zinke, 441 F. Supp. 3d 1042 (D. Idaho 2020) (same); 22
Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. Bernhardt, 982 F.3d 723 (9th Cir.
2020) (vacating approval of offshore oil-and-gas production
facility); WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land
Mgmt., 457 F. Supp. 3d 880 (D. Mont. 2020) (vacating
oil-and-gas leases in Montana); San Juan Citizens All. v.
U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 326 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D.N.M.
2018) (vacating oil-and-gas leases in New Mexico).
Remedies like these—upending oil-and-gas and other
SURMHFWV³FUHDWHVDODQGVFDSHRIVLJQLÀFDQWXQFHUWDLQW\
and instability that hampers investment in projects that
depend on federal minerals and federal approvals.
%XVLQHVVDQG(FRQRPLF+DUPVWhen courts upend
projects, they often derail companies’ lease-development
and mineral-production operations that are already well in
motion. That can slam the door on companies’ logistically
complex and economically vulnerable business models.
In the oil-and-gas industry, lease-development is
generally a multi-year endeavor that requires overlapping
resources devoted to numerous wells, as opposed to
discretely developing one well. This type of interconnected
program requires companies to mobilize large and diverse
teams of contractors that include drill-rig operators,
22. The court later stayed vacatur of the leases pending
appeal but suspended operations and production on those leases.
W. Watersheds Project v. Zinke, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85203,
at *16 (D. Idaho May 12, 2020).
31
engineers, construction companies, water, and other
service providers. When a court vacates oil-and-gas
leases or drilling permits, that decision not only wreaks
havoc on a large and interconnected lease-development
operation, but also leaves the vendors and contractors
without meaningful jobs. See, e.g., Diné Citizens Against
Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
109986, at *161 (D.N.M. Aug. 14, 2015) (“The oil-and-gas
industry is an enormous job creator and economic engine
... and shutting down portions of it based on speculation
about unproven environmental harms is against the public
interest.”), aff ’d, 839 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2016).
Halting oil-and-gas and mineral production on federal
lands also robs the government of federal royalties on
production, 50% of which is funneled back to the States
where the minerals are produced. See 30 U.S.C. § 191(c)
(“50 percent ... shall be paid by the Secretary of the
Treasury to the State ... within the boundaries of which the
leased land is located or the deposits were derived.”). Most
of this royalty money goes to “those subdivisions of the
State socially or economically impacted by development
of minerals” for “(i) planning, (ii) construction and
maintenance of public facilities, and (iii) provision of public
service.” Id. § 191(a).
Energy Independence and National Security.
Responsible development of energy resources on federal
lands is critical to meet the growing demand for affordable,
reliable energy while reducing greenhouse-gas emissions.
Due in large part to energy produced on federal lands, the
United States has become the leading petroleum supplier
32
in the world. 23 It has thereby deterred the Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries from cutting its own
production to increase prices. 24
Discouraging domestic production inevitably results
in America’s greater dependence on foreign sources
of oil and gas, produced in jurisdictions with fewer
and less-protective environmental laws. 25 The courts’
increasingly drastic remedies, ostensibly designed to
FXUH RQO\ SURFHGXUDO 1(3$ GHÀFLHQFLHV ULVN HURGLQJ
the country’s competitive advantage in the global
marketplace for energy, and can alter global geopolitics:
reducing the energy security of the U.S. and its allies by
forcing dependence on foreign—and often politically and
economically unfavorable—sources.
P reventing domestic energ y production also
contravenes congressional intent and the public interest.
23. See U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION A DMINISTRATION, Frequently
Asked Questions (2024), https:// www.eia.gov/ tools/faqs/faq.
php?id=709&t=6.
24. See Timothy J. Considine, The Fiscal and Economic
Impacts of Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Lease Moratorium
and Drilling Ban Policies xi (2020), https://www.eoriwyoming.
org/projects-resources/publications/WKHÀVFDODQGHFRQRPLF
impacts-of-federal-onshore-oil-and-gas-lease-moratorium-anddrilling-ban-policies/ viewdocument/307.
25. See WildEarth Guardians Supplemental Environmental
Assessment, supra note 4, at 26 (citing U.S. Energy Information
Administration 2021 Annual Energy Outlook); David Kreutzer
& Paige Lambermont, The Environmental Quality Index:
Environmental Quality Weighted Oil and Gas Production, at
6–8 (Feb. 2023), https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/
wp-content/uploads/2023/02/IER-EQI-2023.pdf.
33
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provides that it is the intent
of Congress to “ensure jobs for our future with secure,
affordable, and reliable energy.” Pub. L. No. 109-58, pmbl.,
119 Stat. 594 (2005). Exploration and development of oiland-gas on public lands is also consistent with executive
orders from presidents on both sides of the political aisle.
See Actions To Expedite Energy-Related Projects, 66 Fed.
Reg. 28,357 (May 22, 2001) (“The increased production
and transmission of energy in a safe and environmentally
sound manner is essential to the well-being of the
American people.”); Promoting Energy Independence
and Economic Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017)
(“It is in the national interest to promote clean and safe
development of our Nation’s vast energy resources” and
“the prudent development of these natural resources is
essential to ensuring the Nation’s geopolitical security.”).
34
CONCLUSION
Amicus curiae Anschutz Exploration Corporation
respectfully requests that the Court reverse Eagle County
DQGUHDIÀUPPublic Citizen’s appropriate limits on NEPA.
Respectfully submitted,
A NDREW C. LILLIE
TINA R. VAN BOCKERN
Counsel of Record
MARK D. GIBSON
UTSARGA BHATTARAI
HOLLAND & HART LLP
555 Seventeenth Street,
Suite 3200
Denver, CO 80202
(303) 295-8000
trvanbockern@hollandhart.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.