Amicus Curiae Brief — Shell PLC, fka Royal Dutch Shell PLC, et al., Petitioners v. City and County of Honolulu, Hawaii, et al.
Supreme Court briefMar 26, 2024
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Nos. 23-947 & 23-952
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In The
Supreme Court of the United States
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------SUNOCO LP, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, HAWAII, ET AL.,
Respondents.
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------SHELL PLC, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, HAWAII, ET AL.,
Respondents.
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------On Petitions For Writ Of Certiorari
To The Supreme Court Of Hawaii
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------BRIEF OF ATLANTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION
AS AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------LAWRENCE S. EBNER
Counsel of Record
ATLANTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION
1701 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 729-6337
lawrence.ebner@atlanticlegal.org
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i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................ii
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE ................. 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT…………………………..3
ARGUMENT………………………………………………4
The Court Should Grant Review To Decide Whether
State & Local Governments’ Damages Suits Seeking
To Hold The Fossil Fuel Industry Liable For Global
Climate Change Are Precluded By Federal Law…….4
A. Global climate change is beyond the bounds of
traditional state tort litigation...............................4
B. Petitioners’ alleged liability for causing global
climate change cannot be fragmented into myriad
state and local pieces………………………………...9
C. Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions through
state tort litigation would undermine the
comprehensive federal-state regulatory scheme..14
CONCLUSION…………………………………………..22
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut,
564 U.S. 410 (2011) .......................... 9-11, 14-16, 18
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.,
547 U.S. 451 (2006) .............................................. 13
Chic. & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.,
450 U.S. 311 (1981) ................................................ 6
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
505 U.S. 504 (1992) .............................................. 17
City of New York v. Chevron Corp.,
993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021).......... .5, 8, 11, 14-17, 19
North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. TVA,
615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010) ................................ 18
Fry ex rel. E.F. v. Napoleon Cmty. Schools,
137 S. Ct. 743 (2017) .............................................. 6
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481 (1987) .............................................. 20
Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497 (2007) ........................................ 10, 14
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,
696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012) ................................ 16
iii
Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA,
573 U.S. 302 (2011) .............................................. 15
West Virginia v. EPA,
142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022) ................................ 9, 11, 13
Statutes
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (Clean Air Act) .................... 2
42 U.S.C.] § 7401(a), (b). ........................................... 16
42 U.S.C. § 7411(c)(1), (d)(1)-(2). ............................... 16
42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) .................................................... 14
Other Authorities
Amy Smaldone & Mark L.J. Wright, Local
Governments in the U.S.: A Breakdown by
Number and Type, Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis
(March 14, 2024) ................................................... .3
Climate Watch, Historical GHG Emissions. ....... 11-13
Cong. Rsch. Serv., Clean Air Act: A Summary of the
Act and Its Major Requirements (updated Sept.
13, 2022). .............................................................. 15
Daniel E. Walters, Animal Agriculture Liability for
Climatic Nuisance: A Path Forward for Climate
Change Litigation? 44 Colum. J. Env. L. 300
(2019) .................................................................... 12
iv
Kate Larsen et al., China’s Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Exceeded the Developed World for the
First Time in 2019
(Rhodium Group Mar. 6, 2021) ............................ 11
S. A. Montzka et al., Non-CO2 greenhouse gases and
climate change, Nature 476 (2011) (Abstract). ... 12
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Basics of
Climate Change (Nov. 1, 2023) ..................... .10, 12
1
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE 1
Established in 1977, the Atlantic Legal
Foundation (“ALF”) is a national, nonprofit,
nonpartisan, public interest law firm. ALF’s mission
is to advance the rule of law and civil justice by
advocating for individual liberty, free enterprise,
property rights, limited and responsible government,
sound science in judicial and regulatory proceedings,
and effective education, including parental rights and
school choice. With the benefit of guidance from the
distinguished legal scholars, corporate legal officers,
private practitioners, business executives, and
prominent scientists who serve on its Board of
Directors and Advisory Council, ALF pursues its
mission by participating as amicus curiae in carefully
selected appeals before the Supreme Court, federal
courts of appeals, and state supreme courts. See
atlanticlegal.org.
***
The question presented by these appeals is
whether federal law precludes the dozens of global
climate change damages suits that state and local
governments, with the assistance of the plaintiffs’
bar, have been filing against the fossil fuel industry.
The potentially disastrous national and international
1 This amicus brief supports the Petitioners in Nos. 23-947 & 23-
952. Petitioners’ and Respondents’ counsel were provided
timely notice in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 37.2. No
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or part, and no
party or counsel other than the amicus curiae and its counsel
made a monetary contribution intended to fund preparation or
submission of this brief.
2
ramifications of allowing these proliferating statecourt suits to proceed are enormously important—not
only for the defendant fossil fuel energy companies,
but also for the nation’s economy, critical
infrastructure, and national defense. The everyday
lives of virtually every American will be adversely
affected in numerous ways if these suits succeed in
crippling the fossil fuel industry.
Climate change tort suits pending in state courts
around the United States collectively seek billions of
dollars in compensatory and punitive damages from
fossil fuel producers for the alleged local effects of
global warming and climate change—a politically
charged, multi-source, scientific phenomenon that is
both borderless and indivisible. The urgent question
of whether these state-law suits are precluded by
federal law due to the inherently interstate (indeed
global) nature of greenhouse gas air pollution and/or
by the preemptive effect of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”),
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq., aligns with two of ALF’s
most prominent advocacy missions: defending free
enterprise and advancing sound science in the
nation’s courtrooms.
The Court should grant
certiorari and hold that federal law precludes the
efforts of state and local governments to shut down
the fossil fuel industry and cash-in on the so-called
“climate crisis.”
3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In addition to the 50 States, there are
approximately 40,000 county and sub-county
general-purpose local governments in the United
States. 2 If each and every State, county, city, or town
were free to pursue, in the friendly surroundings of
its own courts, multi-million dollar damages and
abatement litigation against the fossil fuel industry
for the novel and opportunistic tort of “causing global
climate change and dire effects on the planet,” Am.
Compl. at 60, there would be judicial chaos. At the
very least, there would be an enormous potential for
inconsistent or conflicting findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and imposition of astronomical
damages awards and onerous abatement measures
against the same “major corporate members of the
fossil fuel industry,” id. at 1, for engaging in heavily
regulated commercial activities that are vital to the
survival of our nation.
Although this suit, like many others around the
United States, masquerades as a traditional tort suit
for nuisance, trespass, and failure to warn, its unique
subject—atmospheric greenhouse gas pollution that
Respondents contend causes global warming and
climate change—is indisputably interstate—and
certainly not local—in nature. The advent of these
2 Amy Smaldone & Mark L.J. Wright, Local Governments in the
U.S.: A Breakdown by Number and Type, Fed. Res. Bank of St.
Louis (March 14, 2024), https://tinyurl.com/cv4yhzpc.
4
suits begs for a uniform rule of decision, which only
federal law can supply.
The Clean Air Act
accomplishes this by establishing, for greenhouse gas
emissions, a comprehensive federal-state regulatory
scheme that impliedly preempts state tort suits
seeking to impose liability for causing or contributing
to global warming and climate change. If successful,
these state-law suits would seriously undermine
national uniformity of regulation by imposing their
own conflicting or inconsistent requirements for
avoiding liability. The Hawaii Supreme Court’s
opinion errs by failing to recognize the true nature of
Respondents’ claims, and instead, pretends that this
is just a traditional tort suit that would have no effect
on the manner in which greenhouse gas emissions
are regulated.
ARGUMENT
The Court Should Grant Review To Decide
Whether State & Local Governments’ Damages
Suits Seeking To Hold The Fossil Fuel Industry
Liable For Global Climate Change Are
Precluded By Federal Law
A.
Global climate change is beyond the
bounds of traditional state tort
litigation
According to the Hawaii Supreme Court, “this is a
traditional tort case alleging Defendants misled
5
consumers and should have warned them about the
dangers of using their products.” App. 19a. Based on
the erroneous premise that “Plaintiffs’ claims do not
seek to regulate emissions,” but instead “challenge
the promotion and sale of fossil-fuel products without
warning,” id. 38a, the court held that the Clean Air
Act does not preempt Respondents’ claims.
Despite the complaint’s mundanely labeled causes
of action for nuisance, trespass, and failure to warn,
this extraordinary litigation bears no resemblance to
a garden-variety product liability suit. In its effort to
circumvent the Clean Air Act’s preemptive sweep,
the Hawaii Supreme Court has elevated artful
pleading over the true nature of Respondents’
allegations that Petitioners should be held liable for
their alleged alteration of the global climate.
As the Second Circuit explained in City of New
York v. Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2021),
a climate-change damages suit with substantively
identical allegations,
[a]rtful pleading cannot transform the
City’s complaint into anything other than
a suit over global greenhouse gas
emissions. It is precisely because fossil
fuels emit greenhouse gases – which
collectively “exacerbate global warming”
– that the City is seeking damages.
6
See generally Fry ex rel. E.F. v. Napoleon Cmty.
Schools, 137 S. Ct. 743, 755 (2017) (“What matters is
the crux—or, in legal speak, the gravamen—of the
plaintiff’s complaint, setting aside any attempts at
artful pleading.”); Chic. & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo
Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 324 (1981)
(“[C]ompliance with the intent of Congress cannot be
avoided by mere artful pleading.”).
According to the Hawaii Supreme Court,
“Plaintiffs’ references to emissions in [their]
Complaint only serve to tell a broader story about
how the unrestrained production and use of
Defendants’ fossil-fuel products contribute to
greenhouse gas pollution.”
App. 38a (internal
quotation marks omitted). In reality, Respondents’
“broader story” is the gravamen of their complaint.
Even a cursory review makes it clear that
Respondents’ causes of action for nuisance, trespass,
and failure-to-warn are a thinly disguised attempt to
hold Petitioners liable for nothing less than global
climate change—for the “greenhouse gas pollution
that warms the planet and changes climate”; for
“exacerbation of global warming” and “climate
disruption.” Am. Compl. at 1, 30, 34.
Although Respondents’ alleged harms are locally
focused, they are expressly predicated on “a wide
range of dire climate-related effects” allegedly
resulting from “anthropogenic global warming”—
“global greenhouse gas pollution” that Respondents
7
contend is primarily attributable to the fossil fuel
industry’s “contributions to the buildup of
greenhouse gases via their fossil fuel products in the
Earth’s environment.” Id. at 1, 4, 34; see also App. 7a
(“Plaintiffs allege that human activity is causing the
atmosphere and oceans to warm, sea levels to rise,
snow cover to diminish, oceans to acidify, and
hydrologic systems to change.”).
Respondents’ 115-page complaint—which refers
to “global warming” more than 80 times—reads like
a climate activist’s handbook. Its 70-page “Factual
Background” section asserts, for example;
• that “[h]uman-caused warming of the Earth is
unequivocal”;
• that “ocean and atmospheric warming is
overwhelmingly
caused
by
anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions”;
• that “[g]reenhouse gases are largely byproducts
of humans combusting fossil fuels to produce energy
and using fossil fuels to create petrochemical
products”;
• that “[b]ecause of the increased burning of fossil
fuel products, concentrations of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere are now at a level unprecedented in
at least 3 million years”;
8
• that “[t]his accumulation and associated
disruption of the Earth’s energy balance have
myriad environmental and physical consequences,
including but not limited to . . . [c]hanges to the
global climate”;
• that Petitioners’ “conduct caused a substantial
portion of global atmospheric greenhouse gas
concentrations, and the attendant . . . disruptions to
the environment”; and
• that “[w]ithout [Petitioners’] exacerbation of
global warming . . . the current physical and
environmental changes caused by global warming
would have been far less than those observed to date.”
Am. Compl. at 30, 31, 32, 34, 35.
These and similar allegations demonstrate that
this litigation is “a clash over regulating worldwide
greenhouse gas emissions and slowing global climate
change,” not “a more modest litigation akin to a
product liability suit.” City of New York, 993 F.3d at
91.
[T]he City intends to hold the Producers
liable, under [Hawaiian] law, for the
effects of emissions made around the globe
over the past several hundred years. In
other words, the City requests damages
for the cumulative impact of conduct
9
occurring simultaneously across just
about every jurisdiction on the planet.
Id. at 92.
Respondents’ attempt through this
litigation to hold virtually the entire fossil fuel
industry liable under Hawaiian law for “causing
global climate change and dire effects on the planet,”
Am. Compl. at 60, is reason enough for this Court to
grant review.
B.
Petitioners’ alleged liability for causing
global climate change cannot be
fragmented into myriad state and local
pieces
Damages suits that target fossil fuel producers for
causing global climate change—and that attempt to
fragment their alleged liability into countless state
and/or local pieces—ignore the scientific facts that
global warming and climate change have no
geographic or political boundaries, and that there are
a multitude of sources of carbon dioxide (CO2) and
other greenhouse gas emissions (including non-fossil
fuel sources) both in the United States and abroad.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
“serves as the Nation’s ‘primary regulator of
greenhouse gas emissions.’” West Virginia v. EPA,
142 S. Ct. 2587, 2627 (2022) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(quoting American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut
(“AEP”), 564 U.S. 410, 428 (2011)). EPA’s website
10
emphasizes that climate change is a borderless,
whole-earth phenomenon:
The earth’s climate is changing. Multiple
lines of evidence show changes in our
weather,
oceans,
and
ecosystems
. . . . These changes are due to a buildup
of greenhouse gases in our atmosphere
and the warming of the planet due to the
greenhouse effect.
***
“[G]reenhouse gases”. . . act like a
blanket, making the earth warmer than
it otherwise would be. This process,
commonly known as the “greenhouse
effect,” is natural and necessary to
support life. However, the recent buildup
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
from human activities has changed the
earth’s climate and resulted in dangerous
effects to human health and welfare and
to ecosystems.
EPA, Basics of Climate Change (Nov. 1, 2023); 3 see
also AEP, 564 U.S. at 416 (describing the greenhouse
effect); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504-05
(2007) (same).
3 https://tinyurl.com/mwpwznx9.
11
“Since ‘[g]reenhouse gases once emitted become
well mixed in the atmosphere’ . . . [g]reenhouse gas
molecules cannot be traced to their source, and
greenhouse gases quickly diffuse and comingle in the
atmosphere.” City of New York, 993 F.3d at 92
(quoting AEP, 564 U.S. at 422) (cleaned up). Thus,
regardless of any local harm that Respondents
contend global warming and climate change have
caused, Petitioners’ alleged contribution to what
Respondents call “climate disruption,” see Am.
Compl. at 30-35, is necessarily global in scope.
In other words, “global warming — as the name
suggests — is a global problem.” City of New York,
993 F.3d at 88; see West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 262627 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing the potential
worldwide effects of global warming). For example,
“[i]n 2019, China’s emissions not only eclipsed that of
the US—the world’s second-largest emitter at 11% of
the global total—but also, for the first time,
surpassed the emissions of all developed countries
combined.” Kate Larsen et al., China’s Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Exceeded the Developed World for the
First Time in 2019 (Rhodium Group Mar. 6, 2021); 4
see also Climate Watch, Historical GHG Emissions
(chart indicating that since 2005 China has far
4 https://tinyurl.com/59923sz6.
12
surpassed the United States in greenhouse gas
emissions). 5
EPA’s website also explains that greenhouse gas
emissions are not limited to fossil fuels: “Greenhouse
gases come from a variety of human activities,
including burning fossil fuels for heat and energy,
clearing forests, fertilizing crops, storing waste in
landfills, raising livestock, and producing some kinds
of industrial products.” EPA, Basics of Climate
Change, supra; see also Climate Watch, supra (listing
energy and heat generation, transportation,
manufacturing, agriculture, and other sources of
global greenhouse gas emissions). 6
“Anthropogenic emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse
gases, such as methane, nitrous oxide and ozonedepleting substances (largely from sources other than
fossil fuels), also contribute significantly to
warming.” S. A. Montzka et al., Non-CO2 greenhouse
gases and climate change, Nature 476, 43-50 (2011)
(Abstract) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Daniel E.
Walters, Animal Agriculture Liability for Climatic
Nuisance: A Path Forward for Climate Change
Litigation?, 44 Colum. J. Env. L. 300, 303 (2019)
(“The agriculture industry is responsible for a
surprising amount of greenhouse gas emissions. . . .
5 https://tinyurl.com/5eh9jnb7 (last visited Mar. 17, 2024).
6 https://tinyurl.com/yrdp2x85 (last visited Mar. 17, 2024).
13
In the United States, the numbers are . . .
stunning.”).
Further, since 2004, coal—not oil or gas—has
been the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide.
Climate Watch, supra (chart); see also West Virginia,
142 S. Ct. at 2627 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[F]ossilfuel-fired (mainly coal - and natural-gas-fired) power
plants . . . are responsible for about one quarter of the
Nation’s greenhouse gas emissions. . . .”).
Given the borderless, multi-source nature of
greenhouse gas emissions, global warming, and
climate change, Petitioners’ alleged liability for
“climate disruption”—for “causing global climate
change and dire effects on the planet”— Am. Compl.
at 30, 60, cannot be divided into potentially tens of
thousands of local bits and pieces of liability, each
subject to the vagaries of one of 50 States’ differing
judicial systems and tort law standards.
The
interstate, in fact worldwide, scope of atmospheric
greenhouse gas pollution cannot be transformed into
a parochial dispute merely by pointing to the
damages that a local government claims it has
suffered due to global climate change. “Proximate
cause and certainty of damages . . . are distinct
requirements for recovery in tort.” Anza v. Ideal
Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 466 (2006)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
14
The utter impracticality of climate change
damages litigation is underscored by the multiplicity
of industrial, agricultural, and other human and
natural sources of greenhouse gas emissions
throughout the nation and world. Liability for the
impacts of global climate change in Honolulu or any
other locale cannot be attributed to any particular
industry, corporation, individual, or other source of
greenhouse emissions. Insofar as any greenhouse
gas emitter can be held liable for causing global
climate change, then every greenhouse gas emitter
must be held liable. “Such a sprawling case is simply
beyond the limits of state law.” City of New York, 993
F.3d at 92.
C.
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions
through state tort regulation would
undermine the comprehensive federalstate regulatory scheme
1. EPA has been regulating greenhouse gas
emissions under the Clean Air Act ever since the
Court held in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 532,
that “greenhouse gases fit well within the Clean Air
Act’s capacious definition of ‘air pollutant.’”
(referring to 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g)); see AEP, 564 U.S.
at 424 (“Massachusetts made plain that emissions of
carbon dioxide qualify as air pollution subject to
regulation under the Act.”). “Responding to [the
Court’s] decision in Massachusetts, EPA undertook
greenhouse gas regulation.” Id. at 415. More
15
specifically, EPA initiated rulemakings to control
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles and
stationary sources. See id. at 417; Util. Air Regul.
Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 310-13 (2011) (discussing
“EPA’s Greenhouse-Gas Regulations”); City of New
York, 993 F.3d at 87-88; see generally Cong. Rsch.
Serv., Clean Air Act: A Summary of the Act and Its
Major Requirements 10, 13 n.13, 19 (updated Sept.
13, 2022) (summarizing or citing certain greenhouse
gas-related provisions and programs). 7
The Court explained in AEP “[i]t is altogether
fitting that Congress designated an expert agency,
here, EPA, as best suited to serve as primary
regulator of greenhouse gas emissions.” 564 U.S. at
428. “The expert agency is surely better equipped to
do the job than individual . . . judges [who] lack the
scientific, economic, and technological resources an
agency can utilize in coping with issues of this order.”
Id.
Although “[t]he Clean Air Act is a comprehensive
statutory scheme that anoints EPA as the ‘primary
regulator’ of [domestic] greenhouse gas emissions . . .
[t]his does not mean that states are excluded from
the process.” City of New York, 993 F.3d at 99.
Instead, the Clean Air Act embodies a “cooperative
federalist approach” which vests state and local
governments with “primary responsibility for
enforcement.”
Id. (internal quotation marks
7 https://tinyurl.com/46dcmpba.
16
omitted). “The Act envisions extensive cooperation
between federal and state authorities, see [42 U.S.C.]
§ 7401(a), (b), generally permitting each State to take
the first cut at determining how best to achieve EPA
emissions standards within its domain, see
§ 7411(c)(1), (d)(1)-(2).” AEP, 564 U.S. at 428.
2. The Court held in AEP that “the Clean Air Act
and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any
federal common law right to seek abatement of
carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power
plants.” 564 U.S. at 424; see City of New York, 993
F.3d at 95-96 (“In the wake of AEP, it is beyond cavil
that the Clean Air Act displaced federal common law
nuisance suits seeking to abate domestic
transboundary emissions of greenhouse gases.”).
“That Congress chose to preempt the federal common
law of nuisance with a well-defined and robust
statutory and regulatory scheme of environmental
law is by no means surprising.” Id. at 97. Nor is it
surprising that the Second Circuit, building upon
AEP and agreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696
F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), held in City of New York
that “the City’s claims are clearly barred by the Clean
Air Act,” and “if successful, would act as a de facto
regulation on greenhouse gases.” 993 F.3d at 96.
“Congress has already spoken directly to th[at] issue
by empower[ing] the EPA to regulate [those very]
emissions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
17
This Court long has recognized that “[state]
regulation can be . . . effectively asserted through an
award of damages . . . . The obligation to pay
compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a
potent method of governing conduct and controlling
policy.” Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 521 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As the Second Circuit recognized in City of New York,
if state-law climate change damages suits are
allowed to proceed, substantial damages awards
against fossil fuel producers “would effectively
regulate [their] behavior.” 993 F.3d at 92.
Rather than supplementing federal regulation
and state enforcement of greenhouse gas emissions
in a beneficial manner, multiple locally imposed
damages awards (and abatement measures) against
the same group of major fossil fuel companies would
compete with, indeed seriously undermine, the
federal-state regulatory scheme, especially as
climate change damages suits continue to proliferate.
Such suits would reflect the vagaries of individual
States’ tort regimes and the whims of local courts and
individual juries.
They likely would impose
conflicting or inconsistent tort duties, damages
awards, and remedial measures that would destroy
the national uniformity the Clean Air Act is intended
to achieve.
18
The Court explained in AEP that
[t]he appropriate amount of regulation in
any particular greenhouse gas-producing
sector cannot be prescribed in a vacuum:
as with other questions of national or
international
policy,
informed
assessment of competing interests is
required. Along with the environmental
benefit potentially achievable, our
Nation’s energy needs and the possibility
of economic disruption must weigh in the
balance.
The Clean Air Act entrusts such complex
balancing to EPA in the first instance, in
combination with state regulators.
AEP, 564 U.S. at 427 (emphasis added); cf. North
Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. TVA, 615 F.3d 291, 298 (4th
Cir. 2010) (“To say [the Clean Air Act’s] regulatory
and permitting regime is comprehensive would be an
understatement.
To say it embodies carefully
wrought compromises states the obvious.”).
Thus, “[t]o permit this suit to proceed under state
law would further risk upsetting the careful balance
that has been struck between the prevention of global
warming, a project that necessarily requires national
standards and global participation, on the one hand,
and energy production, economic growth, foreign
19
policy, and national security, on the other.” City of
New York, 993 F.3d at 93.
3. The Hawaii Supreme Court’s conclusion that
Respondents’ state common-law damages claims are
not impliedly preempted or otherwise precluded by
federal law is predicated upon the fiction that
Petitioners’ “alleged tortious conduct is not
production of emissions.”
App. 63a.
Taking
Respondents’ artfully pleaded complaint at face
value, the court’s preemption analysis is based on the
mantra (repeated throughout the court’s opinion)
that Respondents’ “claims do not seek to regulate
emissions,” id. 38a, but instead, are for Petitioners’
“alleged deceptive marketing and failure to warn
about the dangers of using their products.” Id. 63a.
According to the court, “the City’s claims do not seek
to regulate emissions, and so a claim of field
preemption in the field of emissions regulation is
inapposite.” Id. 58a. The court similarly asserted
that Petitioners’ “state tort law claims do not seek to
regulate emissions, and there is thus no ‘actual
conflict’ between Hawai‘i tort law and the CAA.” Id.
61a. For essentially the same reason, the court
rejected Petitioners’ contention that due to the
inherently interstate nature of atmospheric
greenhouse gas pollution, federal law precludes the
application of state tort law. See id. 50a-52a.
The court’s opinion concedes that the Clean Air
Act does preempt state-law tort claims that seek to
regulate out-of-state greenhouse gas emissions. For
20
example, the court acknowledged that in
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481
(1987), involving the analogous Clean Water Act
(“CWA”) regulatory scheme, the Supreme Court held
that “affected-state common law claims arising from
polluting activity located outside the affected-state
are preempted by the CWA because ‘[t]he application
of affected-state laws would be incompatible with the
[CWA’s]
delegation
of
authority
and
its
comprehensive regulation of water pollution.’”
App. 62a (quoting Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 500); see also
id. 61a (acknowledging Petitioners are correct that
“the CAA does not permit States to use their state
tort law to address harms caused by emissions
occurring in other States”). “Applying affected-state
common law could potentially subject a defendantpolluter to ‘an indeterminate number of potential
regulations’ depending on how far the emission
traveled.” Id. (quoting Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 499).
The state supreme court asserted, however, that
“the rationale motivating the Ouellette court in
preempting affected-state common law claims does
not apply to [Respondents’] state tort claims
[because] the source of [their] alleged injury is not
emissions but the additional alleged torts” of
deceptive marketing and failure to warn. Id. 63a.
This analysis is wrong because it fails to recognize
the true nature and regulatory effect of Respondents’
claims. As discussed above, this suit, like many
21
others pending in state courts around the United
States, is a blatant attempt to hold Petitioners liable
for causing, or at least contributing to, global
warming and worldwide climate change.
The
“affected-state
common-law
claims,”
i.e.,
Respondents’ Hawaiian common-law claims, are
preempted because they necessarily “aris[e] from
polluting activity located outside the affected-state.”
App. 62a.
Indeed, Respondents’ complaint
repeatedly alleges that Petitioners’ alleged
“polluting activity” is global. See, e.g., Am. Compl. at
34 (referring to Petitioners’ “exacerbation of global
warming caused by their conduct as alleged herein”);
id. (alleging that Petitioners’ “contributions to the
buildup of greenhouse gases via their fossil fuel
products in the Earth’s environment are quantifiable
both individually and in the aggregate”); id. at 35
(alleging that Petitioners’ “conduct caused a
substantial
portion
of
global
atmospheric
greenhouse gas concentrations . . . and consequent
injuries to [Respondents]”); id. at 89 (alleging that
Petitioners’ “individual and collective conduct . . . is
[a] substantial factor causing global warming”).
Respondents’ additional allegations concerning
the fossil fuel industry’s supposedly deceptive
promotion and marketing do not change the fact that
this litigation is about local environmental harm
allegedly caused by global greenhouse gas pollution,
global warming, and global climate change. Nor does
Respondents’ attempt to frame their claims as run-
22
of-the-mill causes of action alter their indisputably
global nature. At the very least, this case presents
federal preclusion-of-state-law questions whose
immediate resolution is vital to the fossil fuel
industry, and in turn, to the entire nation.
CONCLUSION
The petitions for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted,
LAWRENCE S. EBNER
Counsel of Record
ATLANTIC LEGAL FOUNDATION
1701 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 729-6337
lawrence.ebner@atlanticlegal.org
March 2024
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.