Supplemental Brief — Sunoco LP, et al., Petitioners v. City and County of Honolulu, Hawaii, et al.

Supreme Court briefDec 24, 2024

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No. 23-947

In the Supreme Court of the United States

SUNOCO LP, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF HAWAII

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

THEODORE J. BOUTROUS, JR.

GIBSON, DUNN

& CRUTCHER LLP

333 South Grand Street

Los Angeles, CA 90071

THOMAS G. HUNGAR

GIBSON, DUNN

& CRUTCHER LLP

1050 Connecticut

Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20036

KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

Counsel of Record

WILLIAM T. MARKS

JAKE L. KRAMER

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

2001 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 223-7300

kshanmugam@paulweiss.com

THEODORE V. WELLS, JR.

DANIEL J. TOAL

YAHONNES CLEARY

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

1285 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019

(additional counsel on signature page)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A. The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1257(a)........... 3

B. The decision below creates a conflict

on the question presented ..................................................... 5

C. The decision below is incorrect

under this Court’s precedents .............................................. 7

D. The question presented is important

and warrants the Court’s review in this case .................... 11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,

564 U.S. 410 (2011) .................................................. 8, 9, 11

Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee,

531 U.S. 341 (2001) ............................................................ 9

City of New York v. Chevron Corp.,

993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021) .......................................... 2, 5-7

Connecticut v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

83 F.4th 122 (2d Cir. 2023) ............................................... 6

Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc. v. Nevils,

581 U.S. 87 (2017) .............................................................. 4

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,

420 U.S. 469 (1975) ........................................................ 3, 5

Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey,

569 U.S. 251 (2013) ............................................................ 4

Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619 (1981) ........................................ 4

Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,

489 U.S. 46 (1989) .......................................................... 3, 4

Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller,

486 U.S. 174 (1988) ............................................................ 4

International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,

479 U.S. 481 (1987) ............................................................ 9

Illinois v. Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984) ........... 7

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,

569 U.S. 108 (2013) .......................................................... 11

(I)

II

Page

Cases—continued:

Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. BP p.l.c.,

No. 24-C-18-4219, 2024 WL 3678699

(Md. Cir. Ct. July 10, 2024) .............................................. 7

Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi

ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988) ................................... 5

North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. TVA,

615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010) ............................................. 7

Puerto Rico Department of Consumer Affairs

v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495 (1988) ................. 9

United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) .......................... 9

Statutes:

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. ............................... 8-10

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. .............................. 9

28 U.S.C. 1257(a) .................................................................... 3

Miscellaneous:

Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change,

Written Statement of the United States

(Mar. 22, 2024) <tinyurl.com/ICJ-US-Climate> ........ 10

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 23-947

SUNOCO LP, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF HAWAII

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

Respondents’ suit is one of dozens across the Nation

seeking to hold multinational energy companies liable for

climate change. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that respondents’ state-law claims could proceed despite seeking

relief for injuries allegedly caused by the effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions—a field

traditionally governed by federal law. The question presented implicates vital federal interests in the regulation

of greenhouse-gas emissions, the preservation of the

American energy industry, the resolution of interstate

conflict, and delicate questions of international diplomacy.

The consistent position of the United States, as expressed to this Court and lower courts in previous cases,

has been that federal law precludes the application of

state law to transboundary pollution claims. In its brief

here, the government does not walk back that position; in

(1)

2

fact, it admits that petitioners “may ultimately prevail.”

Br. 12.

But rather than taking a definitive position on the

question, the outgoing Administration attempts to throw

a wrench in the works, raising a series of purported obstacles to review. Tellingly, the government sees obstacles

even where respondents do not. But none is valid. As to

jurisdiction: the decision below finally resolved the question presented, and its reversal would terminate further

litigation. As to preservation: petitioners’ constitutional

claims were directly presented to the Hawaii Supreme

Court. And as to the conflict: the allegations of deceptive

marketing here do not eliminate the conflict between the

decision below and the Second Circuit’s decision in City of

New York v. Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81 (2021).

Despite the government’s best efforts, the case for this

Court’s review is compelling. There are now dozens of

similar cases pending in state courts nationwide. The arguments on both sides of the question presented have

been fully ventilated in the lower courts, and there is a

clear conflict on that question. The question is of substantial importance to one of the country’s most critical industries, and it raises profound questions of constitutional

structure.

Additional years of complex and costly litigation may

ensue before another case presenting this question works

its way through a state appellate system to this Court—

particularly if (as the government erroneously suggests)

the case must first proceed to final judgment. The Court

should decide now whether state-law climate claims may

go forward, instead of allowing uncertainty about the viability of these claims to linger. The petition for a writ of

certiorari should be granted.

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A. The Court Has Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. 1257(a)

As previously explained, this Court has jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. 1257(a). See Pet. 2; Reply Br. 3-4. The

question presented has been finally decided by the Hawaii

Supreme Court; this Court’s review of the question would

be prevented if petitioners prevail on the merits on nonfederal grounds; reversal of the decision below would terminate the litigation; and declining review now would seriously erode significant federal policies. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 482-483 (1975).

Although the government expands on respondents’

cursory jurisdictional arguments, its arguments equally

lack merit.

1. The government first contends (Br. 8-9) that jurisdiction is lacking because petitioners raised additional

federal defenses in their answer below. But this Court has

not treated the possibility of additional federal defenses

as a jurisdictional bar. See Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 54-57 (1989); id. at 69 (O’Connor, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part). Rather, the

Court requires that the petitioner “might prevail on the

merits on nonfederal grounds,” such that future review of

the federal issue by the Court would be “render[ed] unnecessary.” Cox, 420 U.S. at 482. That condition is satisfied here.

2. The government next contends that reversal would

not prevent future litigation, because “respondents would

not be precluded from pursuing claims involving in-state

deceptive practices or in-state pollution.” Br. 9. But respondents do not advance that argument here: they have

never asserted that petitioners’ in-state conduct alone

caused their alleged injuries, see Haw. Cir. Ct. Dkt. 45, at

1-4, and they admitted below that reversal would likely

terminate this litigation, see Haw. Cir. Ct. Dkt. 649, at 5.

Reversal would thus preclude respondents’ sole theory of

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liability and end the case. Cf. Wilson v. Hawaii, No. 237517, slip op. 6-7 (Dec. 9, 2024) (Thomas, J., respecting the

denial of certiorari).

3. The government further contends (Br. 9-10) that

denying review would not erode federal policy. As the

government sees it, this Court’s jurisdiction is proper only

when “continuation of the litigation” would undermine

“identifiable federal statutory or constitutional policies.”

Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619, 622 (1981). But jurisdiction

also exists where the “unreviewed decision” itself “might

seriously erode federal policy.” Goodyear Atomic Corp.

v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 179 (1988). And however the

standard is formulated, it is plainly met here: the threat

of untold liability hanging over one of this Nation’s most

critical industries implicates identifiable federal policies,

see, e.g., API Br. 18-24, and hampers the United States’

international diplomacy, see pp. 10-11, infra. The proper

allocation of authority between the federal and state governments over the regulation of greenhouse-gas emissions “should not remain in doubt.” Fort Wayne Books,

489 U.S. at 56.

As petitioners have noted (Reply Br. 3), this Court has

routinely granted review over interlocutory state-court

decisions on questions of federal preemption. See, e.g.,

Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc. v. Nevils, 581

U.S. 87 (2017); Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569

U.S. 251 (2013). The government speculates that jurisdiction in those cases was proper only because they concerned the scope of an express preemption provision. But

that is a distinction without a difference. There is ample

evidence of the federal interests at stake here, see Reply

Br. 3, and this Court has reviewed interlocutory statecourt decisions on questions of federal preemption in the

absence, as well as presence, of express preemption pro-

5

visions. See, e.g., Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 370 n.11 (1988).

4. There is nothing to the government’s suggestion

(Br. 11-13)—conspicuously not made by respondents—

that petitioners’ constitutional argument was not properly

presented. Petitioners’ brief to the Hawaii Supreme

Court unambiguously stated that “our federal constitutional structure does not allow varying state laws to govern claims arising out of interstate pollution.” Br. 26.

That is exactly petitioners’ argument here. And although

the relevant question is whether the argument was adequately presented to the court immediately below, the

same argument was presented to the trial court as well.

See Mot. to Dismiss, Haw. Cir. Ct. Dkt. 348, at 11-12; Mot.

to Dismiss Hearing Tr. 99, 101, 104.

5. Perhaps recognizing that its jurisdictional argument is a loser, the government ultimately retreats to the

position that this Court should decline certiorari whenever a jurisdictional question would “complicate” review.

See Br. 11. Perhaps so if the jurisdictional inquiry would

depend on yet-to-be-developed facts. Cf. Br. in Opp. at 18,

Gordon College v. DeWeese-Boyd, 142 S. Ct. 952 (2022)

(No. 21-145). But there is no such complication here. It

would destroy the Cox doctrine if the Court denied review

whenever a respondent could simply raise a colorable but

meritless objection to jurisdiction. Here, there is no need

even to add an additional question concerning jurisdiction; this Court plainly has it.

B. The Decision Below Creates A Conflict On The Question Presented

Like respondents, the government does not dispute

that the Hawaii Supreme Court expressly rejected the

Second Circuit’s reasoning in City of New York that state

tort law cannot govern claims alleging injury caused by

6

global greenhouse-gas emissions. See Br. 21. The government contends only that the Second Circuit reached its

conflicting conclusion “because it understood [the plaintiff ’s] claims to regulate cross-border emissions.” Ibid.

(citation omitted). That argument is invalid.

1. As petitioners have explained (Reply Br. 4-5), it is

incorrect that the claims in City of New York targeted

only “fossil-fuel products themselves,” U.S. Br. 20, and

not the marketing of those products. As the government

acknowledges (ibid.), the claims in City of New York targeted defendants’ actions in “producing, marketing, and

selling fossil fuels.” J.A. at 51, City of New York, supra

(No. 18-2188). The City of New York alleged that the defendants had “orchestrated a campaign of deception and

denial” while “knowing of the harm that was substantially

certain to result.” Id. at 47, 51. Both this case and City of

New York involved the same allegedly wrongful conduct,

yet they reached conflicting conclusions about the viability of state-law claims.

Contrary to the government’s contention (Br. 21), the

Second Circuit’s subsequent decision in Connecticut v.

Exxon Mobil Corp., 83 F.4th 122 (2023), does not suggest

otherwise. There, the question was whether federal law

was a “necessary element” of a statutory consumer-deception claim for purposes of establishing federal subjectmatter jurisdiction. Id. at 140. The court reasoned that

federal law was “irrelevant” for that purpose, but explained that it may “give rise to an affirmative federal

preemption defense.” Id. at 140 n.6. Connecticut thus

sheds no light on whether such claims can go forward on

the merits under state law.

And even if City of New York had not involved a claim

for deceptive marketing, the conflict would remain because the theory of harm was the same as respondents’.

See Reply Br. 5; U.S. Br. at 11, 26, City of New York,

7

supra; Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C.,

No. 24-C-18-4219, 2024 WL 3678699, at *6-*7 (Md. Cir. Ct.

July 10, 2024). Neither case targets defendants for their

own emissions; instead, the theory in each case is that defendants engaged in conduct that caused other people to

use fossil-fuel products and thus release greenhouse

gases. The Second Circuit reasoned that the City could

not, through “artful pleading,” “disavow[] any intent to

address emissions” while “identifying such emissions as

the singular source of [its] harm.” 993 F.3d at 91. The

Hawaii Supreme Court reached the opposite result, yet

acknowledged that respondents’ “theory of liability” is

that petitioners’ global conduct “caus[ed] increased fossil

fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions” that produced respondents’ “damage.” Pet. App. 2a. The government’s attempt to downplay the conflict merely underscores it.

2. The government similarly seeks to distinguish

North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. TVA, 615 F.3d 291 (4th

Cir. 2010), and Illinois v. Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th

Cir. 1984), on the ground that those cases involved suits

brought for redress of direct emissions, rather than alleged deception that causes direct emissions. See Br. 2122. But the key point is that both cases rejected attempts

to use state law to redress injuries allegedly caused by

pollution from other States. See Reply Br. 6. The resulting conflict with the decision below as to the viability of

state-law claims for transboundary emissions warrants

this Court’s review.

C. The Decision Below Is Incorrect Under This Court’s

Precedents

1. The government concedes that petitioners “may

ultimately prevail” on the argument that the Constitution

precludes respondents’ state-law claims seeking redress

8

for interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions. U.S. Br. 12. That is unsurprising in light of the

government’s consistent position on the question. The

government has told this Court that nearly identical

claims were “inherently federal in nature.” Oral Arg. Tr.

at 31, BP p.l.c. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 141

S. Ct. 1532 (2021). And it similarly argued to the Ninth

Circuit that such claims were “irreconcilable with the constitutional commitment of such matters to the national

government and the relative rights and obligations of the

national government and States under the structure of

the Constitution.” U.S. Rehearing Br. at 12, City of Oakland v. B.P. p.l.c., 969 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 1816663).

The government now seeks to head off this Court’s endorsement of that view by rewriting the question presented and attacking a strawman. Remember that the

question presented here is whether federal law precludes

respondents’ state-law claims. See Pet. i. Throughout

this litigation, petitioners have argued that the Constitution and the Clean Air Act are the sources of that preclusion. See p. 5, supra. Yet the government avoids reiterating its consistent agreement with petitioners’ constitutional-structure argument by reframing the question presented as whether “federal common law” governs respondents’ claims. Br. i (emphasis added). Its arguments

concerning the scope and displacement of federal common

law (Br. 14-17) are not directly responsive to the actual

question presented.

2. This Court’s decisions support the conclusion that

federal law precludes respondents’ claims, and the government mischaracterizes those decisions in several respects.

As to American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564

U.S. 410 (2011): the government is correct that the Court

9

remanded with instructions to assess the availability of

the remaining state-law claims in light of “the preemptive

effect of the federal [Clean Air] Act.” Br. 15 (quoting 564

U.S. at 429). The government fails to mention, however,

that the Court immediately cited International Paper Co.

v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), for the proposition that

“the Clean Water Act does not preclude aggrieved individuals from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the law

of the source state.” 564 U.S. at 429 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Respondents’ claims, by contrast, are not limited to source-state emissions.

As to Ouellette: the government is simply wrong that

“the Court did not suggest that the prior federal-commonlaw regime had any bearing on the extent to which statelaw claims could go forward.” Br. 15. The Court’s reasoning was expressly based on “the fact that the control of

interstate pollution is primarily a matter of federal law.”

479 U.S. at 492. That directly affected the Court’s analysis, because, in areas in which “there has been a history of

significant federal presence,” there is “no beginning assumption that concurrent regulation by the State is a valid

exercise of its police powers.” United States v. Locke, 529

U.S. 89, 108 (2000); see Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal

Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 347-348 (2001).

And as to Puerto Rico Department of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495 (1988): that

case stands only for the unremarkable proposition that

state law in an area historically governed by the State is

not preempted by a repealed federal statute. See id. at

499-504. That is distinct from the question here: whether

the Constitution continues to preclude state law in an inherently federal area after Congress displaces federal

common law without affirmatively authorizing resort to

state law in its place.

10

3. In addition, the Clean Air Act preempts claims for

transboundary pollution under a traditional preemption

analysis. * The government acknowledges that the Act

may “limit the scope of respondents’ claims or the relief

that could be granted,” but it ultimately takes the position

(without elaboration) that the Act does not “categorically

preempt respondents’ claims.” Br. 17-18 (emphasis

added). That position, the government acknowledges, is a

reversal from its earlier position that analogous suits were

preempted by the Clean Air Act. See Br. 18 n.3. The government’s only explanation for its about-face is the implausible assertion that it did not previously consider that

some of the claims were based, in part, on alleged deception.

4. The government is completely silent on respondents’ claims based on international greenhouse-gas emissions. That is also unsurprising. Earlier this year, the

government told the International Court of Justice that

“climate change has been the subject of continuous international negotiations for more than 30 years,” culminating

thus far in the Paris Agreement, which “represents a significant diplomatic achievement” through “carefully calibrated provisions.” Obligations of States in Respect of

Climate Change, Written Statement of the United States

¶¶ 2.29, 2.51 (Mar. 22, 2024) <tinyurl.com/ICJ-US-Climate>. The government took the position that “these ongoing diplomatic efforts” offer “the best means for achieving the international community’s shared climate goals.”

Id. ¶ 1.14. But the unilateral imposition of liability by Hawaii, or any other State, for climate-change-related harms

caused by international emissions would take a wrecking

Whether the Clean Air Act preempts respondents’ state-law

claims is within the scope of the single question presented here. See

Reply Br. 2.

*

11

ball to those efforts. There can be no serious doubt that

respondents’ claims reach international emissions and

thus threaten “serious foreign policy consequences.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124

(2013).

D. The Question Presented Is Important And Warrants

The Court’s Review In This Case

Like respondents, the government does not question

the importance of the question presented. Dozens of

States and municipalities are seeking billions of dollars in

damages from multinational energy companies for the alleged effects of climate change. Those cases are pending

in state courts nationwide, and more continue to be filed.

See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. SJ202424CV0652 (P.R. Super. Ct. filed July 15, 2024); Maine v.

BP p.l.c., No. PORSC-CV-2024-442 (Me. Super. Ct. filed

Nov. 26, 2024). In the similar circumstances presented in

American Electric Power, the government urged interlocutory review because “action by this Court would

meaningfully affect an emerging category of litigation

over greenhouse-gas emissions that implicate myriad

plaintiffs and defendants.” TVA Cert. Br. at 9-10 (No. 10174). The Court granted review there, and it should do so

again here.

In light of the enormous legal and practical importance of this case, now is the time to resolve the question presented. Respondents’ claims are representative

of the claims brought in other similar climate suits; petitioners’ federal preclusion defense is cleanly presented;

arguments on both sides have been fully ventilated; and

the lower courts are in clear conflict. And while there are

many cases currently pending in trial courts, it is uncertain when another case will make its way through a state

appellate system in order to present this Court with

12

another opportunity for review. The Court’s intervention

is urgently needed to dispel the cloud of uncertainty hanging over one of this Nation’s most critical industries, to

protect important federal interests in national and economic security, and to prevent wasting untold resources

in litigating and adjudicating cases that should be dismissed at the outset.

13

*

*

*

*

*

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

THEODORE J. BOUTROUS, JR.

WILLIAM E. THOMSON

GIBSON, DUNN

& CRUTCHER LLP

333 South Grand Street

Los Angeles, CA 90071

THOMAS G. HUNGAR

LOCHLAN F. SHELFER

GIBSON, DUNN

& CRUTCHER LLP

1050 Connecticut

Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20036

ANDREA E. NEUMANN

GIBSON, DUNN

& CRUTCHER LLP

200 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10166

JOSHUA D. DICK

GIBSON, DUNN

& CRUTCHER LLP

One Embarcadero Center,

Suite 2600

San Francisco, CA 94111

Counsel for Petitioners

Chevron Corporation and

Chevron U.S.A., Inc.

DECEMBER 2024

KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

WILLIAM T. MARKS

JAKE L. KRAMER

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

2001 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 223-7300

kshanmugam@paulweiss.com

THEODORE V. WELLS, JR.

DANIEL J. TOAL

YAHONNES CLEARY

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

1285 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019

Counsel for Petitioners

Exxon Mobil Corporation

and ExxonMobil Oil

Corporation

JOHN D. LOMBARDO

LAURA E. WATSON

ARNOLD & PORTER

KAYE SCHOLER LLP

777 South Figueroa Street,

44th Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90017

JONATHAN W. HUGHES

ARNOLD & PORTER

KAYE SCHOLER LLP

Three Embarcadero Center,

10th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94111

ETHAN G. SHENKMAN

ELISABETH S. THEODORE

ARNOLD & PORTER

KAYE SCHOLER LLP

601 Massachusetts Avenue,

N.W.

Washington, DC 20001

Counsel for Petitioners

BP p.l.c. and BP America Inc.

J. SCOTT JANOE

BAKER BOTTS LLP

910 Louisiana Street

Houston, TX 77002

MEGAN BERGE

STERLING MARCHAND

BAKER BOTTS LLP

700 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20001

Counsel for Petitioners

Sunoco LP; Aloha Petroleum,

Ltd.; and Aloha Petroleum

LLC

HALLIE B. LEVIN

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE & DORR LLP

7 World Trade Center

250 Greenwich Street

New York, NY 10007

ERICKA AIKEN

ALLISON SCHULTZ

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE & DORR LLP

2100 Pennsylvania

Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20037

Counsel for Petitioners

ConocoPhillips and

ConocoPhillips Company

NICOLE C. VALCO

KATHERINE A. ROUSE

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

505 Montgomery Street,

Suite 2000

San Francisco, CA 94111

Counsel for Petitioners

Phillips66 and

Phillips66 Company

LAYNE E. KRUSE

EDWARD C. LEWIS

ELIOT F. TURNER

RACHEL GROGAN ROOSTH

NORTON ROSE

FULBRIGHT US LLP

1550 Lamar Street,

Suite 2000

Houston, TX 77010

Counsel for Petitioner

Woodside Energy Hawaii Inc.

SHANNON S. BROOME

HUNTON ANDREWS

KURTH LLP

50 California Street

San Francisco, CA 94111

SHAWN PATRICK REGAN

HUNTON ANDREWS

KURTH LLP

200 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10166

ANN MARIE MORTIMER

HUNTON ANDREWS

KURTH LLP

550 South Hope Street,

Suite 2000

Los Angeles, CA 90071

Counsel for Petitioners

Marathon Petroleum Corp.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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