Supplemental Brief — Sunoco LP, et al., Petitioners v. City and County of Honolulu, Hawaii, et al.
Supreme Court briefDec 24, 2024
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No. 23-947
In the Supreme Court of the United States
SUNOCO LP, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF HAWAII
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
THEODORE J. BOUTROUS, JR.
GIBSON, DUNN
& CRUTCHER LLP
333 South Grand Street
Los Angeles, CA 90071
THOMAS G. HUNGAR
GIBSON, DUNN
& CRUTCHER LLP
1050 Connecticut
Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
KANNON K. SHANMUGAM
Counsel of Record
WILLIAM T. MARKS
JAKE L. KRAMER
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
2001 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 223-7300
kshanmugam@paulweiss.com
THEODORE V. WELLS, JR.
DANIEL J. TOAL
YAHONNES CLEARY
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
(additional counsel on signature page)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
A. The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1257(a)........... 3
B. The decision below creates a conflict
on the question presented ..................................................... 5
C. The decision below is incorrect
under this Court’s precedents .............................................. 7
D. The question presented is important
and warrants the Court’s review in this case .................... 11
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,
564 U.S. 410 (2011) .................................................. 8, 9, 11
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee,
531 U.S. 341 (2001) ............................................................ 9
City of New York v. Chevron Corp.,
993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021) .......................................... 2, 5-7
Connecticut v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
83 F.4th 122 (2d Cir. 2023) ............................................... 6
Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc. v. Nevils,
581 U.S. 87 (2017) .............................................................. 4
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469 (1975) ........................................................ 3, 5
Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey,
569 U.S. 251 (2013) ............................................................ 4
Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619 (1981) ........................................ 4
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,
489 U.S. 46 (1989) .......................................................... 3, 4
Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller,
486 U.S. 174 (1988) ............................................................ 4
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481 (1987) ............................................................ 9
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984) ........... 7
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
569 U.S. 108 (2013) .......................................................... 11
(I)
II
Page
Cases—continued:
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. BP p.l.c.,
No. 24-C-18-4219, 2024 WL 3678699
(Md. Cir. Ct. July 10, 2024) .............................................. 7
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi
ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988) ................................... 5
North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. TVA,
615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010) ............................................. 7
Puerto Rico Department of Consumer Affairs
v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495 (1988) ................. 9
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) .......................... 9
Statutes:
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. ............................... 8-10
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. .............................. 9
28 U.S.C. 1257(a) .................................................................... 3
Miscellaneous:
Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change,
Written Statement of the United States
(Mar. 22, 2024) <tinyurl.com/ICJ-US-Climate> ........ 10
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 23-947
SUNOCO LP, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF HAWAII
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
Respondents’ suit is one of dozens across the Nation
seeking to hold multinational energy companies liable for
climate change. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that respondents’ state-law claims could proceed despite seeking
relief for injuries allegedly caused by the effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions—a field
traditionally governed by federal law. The question presented implicates vital federal interests in the regulation
of greenhouse-gas emissions, the preservation of the
American energy industry, the resolution of interstate
conflict, and delicate questions of international diplomacy.
The consistent position of the United States, as expressed to this Court and lower courts in previous cases,
has been that federal law precludes the application of
state law to transboundary pollution claims. In its brief
here, the government does not walk back that position; in
(1)
2
fact, it admits that petitioners “may ultimately prevail.”
Br. 12.
But rather than taking a definitive position on the
question, the outgoing Administration attempts to throw
a wrench in the works, raising a series of purported obstacles to review. Tellingly, the government sees obstacles
even where respondents do not. But none is valid. As to
jurisdiction: the decision below finally resolved the question presented, and its reversal would terminate further
litigation. As to preservation: petitioners’ constitutional
claims were directly presented to the Hawaii Supreme
Court. And as to the conflict: the allegations of deceptive
marketing here do not eliminate the conflict between the
decision below and the Second Circuit’s decision in City of
New York v. Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81 (2021).
Despite the government’s best efforts, the case for this
Court’s review is compelling. There are now dozens of
similar cases pending in state courts nationwide. The arguments on both sides of the question presented have
been fully ventilated in the lower courts, and there is a
clear conflict on that question. The question is of substantial importance to one of the country’s most critical industries, and it raises profound questions of constitutional
structure.
Additional years of complex and costly litigation may
ensue before another case presenting this question works
its way through a state appellate system to this Court—
particularly if (as the government erroneously suggests)
the case must first proceed to final judgment. The Court
should decide now whether state-law climate claims may
go forward, instead of allowing uncertainty about the viability of these claims to linger. The petition for a writ of
certiorari should be granted.
3
A. The Court Has Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. 1257(a)
As previously explained, this Court has jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. 1257(a). See Pet. 2; Reply Br. 3-4. The
question presented has been finally decided by the Hawaii
Supreme Court; this Court’s review of the question would
be prevented if petitioners prevail on the merits on nonfederal grounds; reversal of the decision below would terminate the litigation; and declining review now would seriously erode significant federal policies. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 482-483 (1975).
Although the government expands on respondents’
cursory jurisdictional arguments, its arguments equally
lack merit.
1. The government first contends (Br. 8-9) that jurisdiction is lacking because petitioners raised additional
federal defenses in their answer below. But this Court has
not treated the possibility of additional federal defenses
as a jurisdictional bar. See Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 54-57 (1989); id. at 69 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Rather, the
Court requires that the petitioner “might prevail on the
merits on nonfederal grounds,” such that future review of
the federal issue by the Court would be “render[ed] unnecessary.” Cox, 420 U.S. at 482. That condition is satisfied here.
2. The government next contends that reversal would
not prevent future litigation, because “respondents would
not be precluded from pursuing claims involving in-state
deceptive practices or in-state pollution.” Br. 9. But respondents do not advance that argument here: they have
never asserted that petitioners’ in-state conduct alone
caused their alleged injuries, see Haw. Cir. Ct. Dkt. 45, at
1-4, and they admitted below that reversal would likely
terminate this litigation, see Haw. Cir. Ct. Dkt. 649, at 5.
Reversal would thus preclude respondents’ sole theory of
4
liability and end the case. Cf. Wilson v. Hawaii, No. 237517, slip op. 6-7 (Dec. 9, 2024) (Thomas, J., respecting the
denial of certiorari).
3. The government further contends (Br. 9-10) that
denying review would not erode federal policy. As the
government sees it, this Court’s jurisdiction is proper only
when “continuation of the litigation” would undermine
“identifiable federal statutory or constitutional policies.”
Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619, 622 (1981). But jurisdiction
also exists where the “unreviewed decision” itself “might
seriously erode federal policy.” Goodyear Atomic Corp.
v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 179 (1988). And however the
standard is formulated, it is plainly met here: the threat
of untold liability hanging over one of this Nation’s most
critical industries implicates identifiable federal policies,
see, e.g., API Br. 18-24, and hampers the United States’
international diplomacy, see pp. 10-11, infra. The proper
allocation of authority between the federal and state governments over the regulation of greenhouse-gas emissions “should not remain in doubt.” Fort Wayne Books,
489 U.S. at 56.
As petitioners have noted (Reply Br. 3), this Court has
routinely granted review over interlocutory state-court
decisions on questions of federal preemption. See, e.g.,
Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc. v. Nevils, 581
U.S. 87 (2017); Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569
U.S. 251 (2013). The government speculates that jurisdiction in those cases was proper only because they concerned the scope of an express preemption provision. But
that is a distinction without a difference. There is ample
evidence of the federal interests at stake here, see Reply
Br. 3, and this Court has reviewed interlocutory statecourt decisions on questions of federal preemption in the
absence, as well as presence, of express preemption pro-
5
visions. See, e.g., Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 370 n.11 (1988).
4. There is nothing to the government’s suggestion
(Br. 11-13)—conspicuously not made by respondents—
that petitioners’ constitutional argument was not properly
presented. Petitioners’ brief to the Hawaii Supreme
Court unambiguously stated that “our federal constitutional structure does not allow varying state laws to govern claims arising out of interstate pollution.” Br. 26.
That is exactly petitioners’ argument here. And although
the relevant question is whether the argument was adequately presented to the court immediately below, the
same argument was presented to the trial court as well.
See Mot. to Dismiss, Haw. Cir. Ct. Dkt. 348, at 11-12; Mot.
to Dismiss Hearing Tr. 99, 101, 104.
5. Perhaps recognizing that its jurisdictional argument is a loser, the government ultimately retreats to the
position that this Court should decline certiorari whenever a jurisdictional question would “complicate” review.
See Br. 11. Perhaps so if the jurisdictional inquiry would
depend on yet-to-be-developed facts. Cf. Br. in Opp. at 18,
Gordon College v. DeWeese-Boyd, 142 S. Ct. 952 (2022)
(No. 21-145). But there is no such complication here. It
would destroy the Cox doctrine if the Court denied review
whenever a respondent could simply raise a colorable but
meritless objection to jurisdiction. Here, there is no need
even to add an additional question concerning jurisdiction; this Court plainly has it.
B. The Decision Below Creates A Conflict On The Question Presented
Like respondents, the government does not dispute
that the Hawaii Supreme Court expressly rejected the
Second Circuit’s reasoning in City of New York that state
tort law cannot govern claims alleging injury caused by
6
global greenhouse-gas emissions. See Br. 21. The government contends only that the Second Circuit reached its
conflicting conclusion “because it understood [the plaintiff ’s] claims to regulate cross-border emissions.” Ibid.
(citation omitted). That argument is invalid.
1. As petitioners have explained (Reply Br. 4-5), it is
incorrect that the claims in City of New York targeted
only “fossil-fuel products themselves,” U.S. Br. 20, and
not the marketing of those products. As the government
acknowledges (ibid.), the claims in City of New York targeted defendants’ actions in “producing, marketing, and
selling fossil fuels.” J.A. at 51, City of New York, supra
(No. 18-2188). The City of New York alleged that the defendants had “orchestrated a campaign of deception and
denial” while “knowing of the harm that was substantially
certain to result.” Id. at 47, 51. Both this case and City of
New York involved the same allegedly wrongful conduct,
yet they reached conflicting conclusions about the viability of state-law claims.
Contrary to the government’s contention (Br. 21), the
Second Circuit’s subsequent decision in Connecticut v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 83 F.4th 122 (2023), does not suggest
otherwise. There, the question was whether federal law
was a “necessary element” of a statutory consumer-deception claim for purposes of establishing federal subjectmatter jurisdiction. Id. at 140. The court reasoned that
federal law was “irrelevant” for that purpose, but explained that it may “give rise to an affirmative federal
preemption defense.” Id. at 140 n.6. Connecticut thus
sheds no light on whether such claims can go forward on
the merits under state law.
And even if City of New York had not involved a claim
for deceptive marketing, the conflict would remain because the theory of harm was the same as respondents’.
See Reply Br. 5; U.S. Br. at 11, 26, City of New York,
7
supra; Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C.,
No. 24-C-18-4219, 2024 WL 3678699, at *6-*7 (Md. Cir. Ct.
July 10, 2024). Neither case targets defendants for their
own emissions; instead, the theory in each case is that defendants engaged in conduct that caused other people to
use fossil-fuel products and thus release greenhouse
gases. The Second Circuit reasoned that the City could
not, through “artful pleading,” “disavow[] any intent to
address emissions” while “identifying such emissions as
the singular source of [its] harm.” 993 F.3d at 91. The
Hawaii Supreme Court reached the opposite result, yet
acknowledged that respondents’ “theory of liability” is
that petitioners’ global conduct “caus[ed] increased fossil
fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions” that produced respondents’ “damage.” Pet. App. 2a. The government’s attempt to downplay the conflict merely underscores it.
2. The government similarly seeks to distinguish
North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. TVA, 615 F.3d 291 (4th
Cir. 2010), and Illinois v. Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th
Cir. 1984), on the ground that those cases involved suits
brought for redress of direct emissions, rather than alleged deception that causes direct emissions. See Br. 2122. But the key point is that both cases rejected attempts
to use state law to redress injuries allegedly caused by
pollution from other States. See Reply Br. 6. The resulting conflict with the decision below as to the viability of
state-law claims for transboundary emissions warrants
this Court’s review.
C. The Decision Below Is Incorrect Under This Court’s
Precedents
1. The government concedes that petitioners “may
ultimately prevail” on the argument that the Constitution
precludes respondents’ state-law claims seeking redress
8
for interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions. U.S. Br. 12. That is unsurprising in light of the
government’s consistent position on the question. The
government has told this Court that nearly identical
claims were “inherently federal in nature.” Oral Arg. Tr.
at 31, BP p.l.c. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 141
S. Ct. 1532 (2021). And it similarly argued to the Ninth
Circuit that such claims were “irreconcilable with the constitutional commitment of such matters to the national
government and the relative rights and obligations of the
national government and States under the structure of
the Constitution.” U.S. Rehearing Br. at 12, City of Oakland v. B.P. p.l.c., 969 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 1816663).
The government now seeks to head off this Court’s endorsement of that view by rewriting the question presented and attacking a strawman. Remember that the
question presented here is whether federal law precludes
respondents’ state-law claims. See Pet. i. Throughout
this litigation, petitioners have argued that the Constitution and the Clean Air Act are the sources of that preclusion. See p. 5, supra. Yet the government avoids reiterating its consistent agreement with petitioners’ constitutional-structure argument by reframing the question presented as whether “federal common law” governs respondents’ claims. Br. i (emphasis added). Its arguments
concerning the scope and displacement of federal common
law (Br. 14-17) are not directly responsive to the actual
question presented.
2. This Court’s decisions support the conclusion that
federal law precludes respondents’ claims, and the government mischaracterizes those decisions in several respects.
As to American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564
U.S. 410 (2011): the government is correct that the Court
9
remanded with instructions to assess the availability of
the remaining state-law claims in light of “the preemptive
effect of the federal [Clean Air] Act.” Br. 15 (quoting 564
U.S. at 429). The government fails to mention, however,
that the Court immediately cited International Paper Co.
v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), for the proposition that
“the Clean Water Act does not preclude aggrieved individuals from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the law
of the source state.” 564 U.S. at 429 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Respondents’ claims, by contrast, are not limited to source-state emissions.
As to Ouellette: the government is simply wrong that
“the Court did not suggest that the prior federal-commonlaw regime had any bearing on the extent to which statelaw claims could go forward.” Br. 15. The Court’s reasoning was expressly based on “the fact that the control of
interstate pollution is primarily a matter of federal law.”
479 U.S. at 492. That directly affected the Court’s analysis, because, in areas in which “there has been a history of
significant federal presence,” there is “no beginning assumption that concurrent regulation by the State is a valid
exercise of its police powers.” United States v. Locke, 529
U.S. 89, 108 (2000); see Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal
Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 347-348 (2001).
And as to Puerto Rico Department of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495 (1988): that
case stands only for the unremarkable proposition that
state law in an area historically governed by the State is
not preempted by a repealed federal statute. See id. at
499-504. That is distinct from the question here: whether
the Constitution continues to preclude state law in an inherently federal area after Congress displaces federal
common law without affirmatively authorizing resort to
state law in its place.
10
3. In addition, the Clean Air Act preempts claims for
transboundary pollution under a traditional preemption
analysis. * The government acknowledges that the Act
may “limit the scope of respondents’ claims or the relief
that could be granted,” but it ultimately takes the position
(without elaboration) that the Act does not “categorically
preempt respondents’ claims.” Br. 17-18 (emphasis
added). That position, the government acknowledges, is a
reversal from its earlier position that analogous suits were
preempted by the Clean Air Act. See Br. 18 n.3. The government’s only explanation for its about-face is the implausible assertion that it did not previously consider that
some of the claims were based, in part, on alleged deception.
4. The government is completely silent on respondents’ claims based on international greenhouse-gas emissions. That is also unsurprising. Earlier this year, the
government told the International Court of Justice that
“climate change has been the subject of continuous international negotiations for more than 30 years,” culminating
thus far in the Paris Agreement, which “represents a significant diplomatic achievement” through “carefully calibrated provisions.” Obligations of States in Respect of
Climate Change, Written Statement of the United States
¶¶ 2.29, 2.51 (Mar. 22, 2024) <tinyurl.com/ICJ-US-Climate>. The government took the position that “these ongoing diplomatic efforts” offer “the best means for achieving the international community’s shared climate goals.”
Id. ¶ 1.14. But the unilateral imposition of liability by Hawaii, or any other State, for climate-change-related harms
caused by international emissions would take a wrecking
Whether the Clean Air Act preempts respondents’ state-law
claims is within the scope of the single question presented here. See
Reply Br. 2.
*
11
ball to those efforts. There can be no serious doubt that
respondents’ claims reach international emissions and
thus threaten “serious foreign policy consequences.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124
(2013).
D. The Question Presented Is Important And Warrants
The Court’s Review In This Case
Like respondents, the government does not question
the importance of the question presented. Dozens of
States and municipalities are seeking billions of dollars in
damages from multinational energy companies for the alleged effects of climate change. Those cases are pending
in state courts nationwide, and more continue to be filed.
See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. SJ202424CV0652 (P.R. Super. Ct. filed July 15, 2024); Maine v.
BP p.l.c., No. PORSC-CV-2024-442 (Me. Super. Ct. filed
Nov. 26, 2024). In the similar circumstances presented in
American Electric Power, the government urged interlocutory review because “action by this Court would
meaningfully affect an emerging category of litigation
over greenhouse-gas emissions that implicate myriad
plaintiffs and defendants.” TVA Cert. Br. at 9-10 (No. 10174). The Court granted review there, and it should do so
again here.
In light of the enormous legal and practical importance of this case, now is the time to resolve the question presented. Respondents’ claims are representative
of the claims brought in other similar climate suits; petitioners’ federal preclusion defense is cleanly presented;
arguments on both sides have been fully ventilated; and
the lower courts are in clear conflict. And while there are
many cases currently pending in trial courts, it is uncertain when another case will make its way through a state
appellate system in order to present this Court with
12
another opportunity for review. The Court’s intervention
is urgently needed to dispel the cloud of uncertainty hanging over one of this Nation’s most critical industries, to
protect important federal interests in national and economic security, and to prevent wasting untold resources
in litigating and adjudicating cases that should be dismissed at the outset.
13
*
*
*
*
*
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
THEODORE J. BOUTROUS, JR.
WILLIAM E. THOMSON
GIBSON, DUNN
& CRUTCHER LLP
333 South Grand Street
Los Angeles, CA 90071
THOMAS G. HUNGAR
LOCHLAN F. SHELFER
GIBSON, DUNN
& CRUTCHER LLP
1050 Connecticut
Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
ANDREA E. NEUMANN
GIBSON, DUNN
& CRUTCHER LLP
200 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10166
JOSHUA D. DICK
GIBSON, DUNN
& CRUTCHER LLP
One Embarcadero Center,
Suite 2600
San Francisco, CA 94111
Counsel for Petitioners
Chevron Corporation and
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
DECEMBER 2024
KANNON K. SHANMUGAM
WILLIAM T. MARKS
JAKE L. KRAMER
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
2001 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 223-7300
kshanmugam@paulweiss.com
THEODORE V. WELLS, JR.
DANIEL J. TOAL
YAHONNES CLEARY
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
Counsel for Petitioners
Exxon Mobil Corporation
and ExxonMobil Oil
Corporation
JOHN D. LOMBARDO
LAURA E. WATSON
ARNOLD & PORTER
KAYE SCHOLER LLP
777 South Figueroa Street,
44th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90017
JONATHAN W. HUGHES
ARNOLD & PORTER
KAYE SCHOLER LLP
Three Embarcadero Center,
10th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
ETHAN G. SHENKMAN
ELISABETH S. THEODORE
ARNOLD & PORTER
KAYE SCHOLER LLP
601 Massachusetts Avenue,
N.W.
Washington, DC 20001
Counsel for Petitioners
BP p.l.c. and BP America Inc.
J. SCOTT JANOE
BAKER BOTTS LLP
910 Louisiana Street
Houston, TX 77002
MEGAN BERGE
STERLING MARCHAND
BAKER BOTTS LLP
700 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20001
Counsel for Petitioners
Sunoco LP; Aloha Petroleum,
Ltd.; and Aloha Petroleum
LLC
HALLIE B. LEVIN
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE & DORR LLP
7 World Trade Center
250 Greenwich Street
New York, NY 10007
ERICKA AIKEN
ALLISON SCHULTZ
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE & DORR LLP
2100 Pennsylvania
Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037
Counsel for Petitioners
ConocoPhillips and
ConocoPhillips Company
NICOLE C. VALCO
KATHERINE A. ROUSE
LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
505 Montgomery Street,
Suite 2000
San Francisco, CA 94111
Counsel for Petitioners
Phillips66 and
Phillips66 Company
LAYNE E. KRUSE
EDWARD C. LEWIS
ELIOT F. TURNER
RACHEL GROGAN ROOSTH
NORTON ROSE
FULBRIGHT US LLP
1550 Lamar Street,
Suite 2000
Houston, TX 77010
Counsel for Petitioner
Woodside Energy Hawaii Inc.
SHANNON S. BROOME
HUNTON ANDREWS
KURTH LLP
50 California Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
SHAWN PATRICK REGAN
HUNTON ANDREWS
KURTH LLP
200 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10166
ANN MARIE MORTIMER
HUNTON ANDREWS
KURTH LLP
550 South Hope Street,
Suite 2000
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Counsel for Petitioners
Marathon Petroleum Corp.
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