Reply Brief — Sunoco LP, et al., Petitioners v. City and County of Honolulu, Hawaii, et al.
Supreme Court briefMay 21, 2024
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No. 23-947
In the Supreme Court of the United States
SUNOCO LP, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF HAWAII
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
THEODORE J. BOUTROUS, JR.
GIBSON, DUNN
& CRUTCHER LLP
333 South Grand Street
Los Angeles, CA 90071
THOMAS G. HUNGAR
GIBSON, DUNN
& CRUTCHER LLP
1050 Connecticut
Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
KANNON K. SHANMUGAM
Counsel of Record
WILLIAM T. MARKS
JAKE L. KRAMER
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
2001 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 223-7300
kshanmugam@paulweiss.com
THEODORE V. WELLS, JR.
DANIEL J. TOAL
YAHONNES CLEARY
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
(additional counsel on signature page)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
A. The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1257 ............... 3
B. The decision below creates a conflict on
the question presented .......................................................... 4
C. The decision below is incorrect under
this Court’s precedents .......................................................... 6
D. The question presented is important
and warrants the Court’s review in this case .................... 10
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Al Shimari v. CACI International, Inc.,
679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012) ........................................... 10
American Broadcast Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.,
573 U.S. 431 (2014) .......................................................... 11
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,
564 U.S. 410 (2011) ............................................................ 7
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee,
531 U.S. 341 (2001) ............................................................ 9
City of New York v. Chevron Corp.,
993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021)......................................... 4, 5, 6
Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc. v. Nevils,
581 U.S. 87 (2017) .............................................................. 3
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) ....... 3
Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey,
569 U.S. 251 (2013) ............................................................ 3
Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 587 U.S. 230 (2019) .......... 7
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907)....... 7
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984) ............................................. 6
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481 (1987) ........................................................ 7, 9
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
569 U.S. 108 (2013) ...................................................... 9, 11
(I)
II
Page
Cases—continued:
Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp.,
565 U.S. 625 (2012) ............................................................ 8
Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U.S. 480 (2015) ........... 11
Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.,
600 U.S. 122 (2023) ............................................................ 7
National Institute of Family & Life Advocates
v. Becerra, 585 U.S. 755 (2018) ...................................... 11
North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010) .......................... 6
Statutes:
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. ......................... 2, 5-7, 9
28 U.S.C. 1257(a) ................................................................ 3, 4
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 23-947
SUNOCO LP, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF HAWAII
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
The Hawaii Supreme Court held that state law can impose liability for injuries allegedly caused by the effect of
interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions on
the global climate. The Second Circuit, considering materially identical claims, rejected such a breathtaking, extraterritorial application of state law. Other courts, too,
have declined to apply state law extraterritorially to regulate transboundary pollution. The question whether the
unique phenomenon of global climate change licenses
States to ignore the structure of our constitutional system
and extend state law beyond their borders is at the heart
of the climate-change litigation currently ongoing nationwide. This Court’s intervention is urgently needed.
After a passing attempt to contest the Court’s jurisdiction, respondents build their brief in opposition around
one argument: that this case is about deceptive market(1)
2
ing, not the release of greenhouse-gas emissions. That argument neither eliminates the conflict nor is correct on
the merits. As to the conflict: the Second Circuit considered and rejected the same theory of liability for deceptive marketing as alleged here. And in rejecting that theory, the Second Circuit declined to hold—as the Hawaii
Supreme Court held here—that state law could apply
merely because the claims focus on an earlier point in the
causal chain than the injury-causing emissions.
As to the merits: respondents’ theory of causation is
that, absent the allegedly deceptive marketing, greenhouse-gas emissions would have been lower, thereby alleviating the alleged climate-change injuries. Respondents
are thus seeking to impose liability for transboundary
emissions under state tort law. But both the Constitution
and the Clean Air Act prohibit the extraterritorial application of state law to out-of-state and international emissions.
At a time when the Court is working to fill out its calendar for next Term, this is exactly the sort of case the
Court should be hearing. It presents a fundamental and
substantial question concerning the interplay between
federal and state law. And as the avalanche of amicus
briefs indicates, that question is of exceptional importance, and it arises in the context of litigation that presents a critical threat to one of the Nation’s most vital industries. This is the perfect time to resolve the question
presented, because the arguments on both sides have
been fully ventilated in the lower courts. Further delay
would simply enable the proliferation of litigation in handpicked state courts when these cases should be dismissed
at the outset. The case for certiorari here is compelling,
and the petition should be granted.
3
A. The Court Has Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. 1257(a)
Respondents challenge this Court’s jurisdiction (Br. in
Opp. 7-11), but their arguments are insubstantial. As petitioners have noted (Pet. 2), this Court has jurisdiction
under Section 1257(a). The Hawaii Supreme Court finally
decided the question of federal preclusion; reversal of that
decision would terminate this litigation; and declining review now would erode significant federal policies. See Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 482-483 (1975).
The Court has routinely granted certiorari in a similar
posture in cases presenting questions of federal preemption. See, e.g., Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc. v.
Nevils, 581 U.S. 87, 92-94 (2017); Dan’s City Used Cars,
Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 259 (2013).
Respondents contend that reversal would not terminate the litigation, because it would “remain open on remand” whether their claims could go forward “based on
source-state law.” Br. in Opp. 8. That is false. Respondents’ entire theory of causation and injury depends on the
cumulative impact of greenhouse-gas emissions released
from every jurisdiction on the planet—which they concede cannot be traced to any particular source. See Am.
Compl. 107. And respondents have always purported to
proceed only “under Hawai‘i common law.” See, e.g., No.
22-523 Br. in Opp. at 1. Accordingly, as the trial court determined, reversal would “likely speedily terminate the
case,” Pet. App. 87a, because it would preclude respondents’ sole theory of liability.
Respondents contend (Br. in Opp. 9) that denying review would not erode federal policy. That is also incorrect.
This case implicates vital federal interests in the regulation of fossil fuels and greenhouse-gas emissions. See Pet.
31-33; Myers & Mullen Br. 11-22; Chamber Br. 19-22; API
Br. 18-24; AmFree Br. 18-21. In addition, 20 States are
vehemently protesting the projection of Hawaii law
4
beyond its borders as a serious affront to their constitutional sovereignty. See States Br. 3-15. Jurisdiction is
plainly present under Section 1257(a).
B. The Decision Below Creates A Conflict On The Question Presented
The decision below conflicts with City of New York v.
Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021), and other decisions holding that state law cannot govern claims alleging
injury from pollution emanating from a different State.
See Pet. 14-21. Respondents’ efforts to deny the conflict
are unpersuasive.
1. Respondents admit that the Hawaii Supreme
Court “expressly disagree[d]” with the Second Circuit’s
reasoning in City of New York that state tort law cannot
govern claims alleging injury caused by global greenhouse-gas emissions. Br. in Opp. 13. Respondents argue
only that the claims in City of New York were an attempt
to regulate emissions, whereas the claims here, focused on
deceptive marketing, purportedly are not. See id. at 1213. That argument fails for two reasons.
First, respondents’ description of City of New York is
simply incorrect: the plaintiff there presented the same
theory of deceptive marketing as respondents do here.
The plaintiff asserted that the defendants “ha[d] known
for decades that their fossil fuel products pose a severe
risk to the planet’s climate” yet “downplayed the risks and
continued to sell massive quantities of fossil fuels.” 993
F.3d at 86-87. The complaint alleged that the defendants
had “orchestrated a campaign of deception and denial regarding climate change,” the goal of which was to “portray fossil fuels as environmentally responsible.” J.A. at
48 (No. 18-2188). That alleged “sophisticated advertising
campaign[]” served as part of the basis for the plaintiff ’s
theory of liability, which was that the defendants’ actions
5
in “producing, marketing, and selling fossil fuels[,]
* * * while knowing of the harm that was substantially
certain to result[,] constitute[d] an unlawful public and
private nuisance and an illegal trespass.” Id. at 47, 51; see
id. at 87-106 (allegations about the defendants’ deceptive
statements and knowledge). On appeal, the plaintiff identified, as the “primary fault” it was alleging, that the defendants “contributed to serious environmental harm that
they knew their highly profitable production and marketing activities would cause.” Br. at 16. City of New York
thus involved the same allegedly wrongful conduct at issue here.
Second, even if the allegedly wrongful conduct differed, it would not eliminate the conflict, because the theory of harm is identical. In both cases, the plaintiffs
sought damages on the ground that the defendants’ actions allegedly resulted in increased emissions and
thereby injured the plaintiffs. In City of New York, the
plaintiff “disavow[ed] any intent to address emissions” in
its complaint, but it “identif[ied] such emissions as the singular source of [its] harm”; the Second Circuit held that
the suit thus could not proceed under state law. 993 F.3d
at 91. Respondents likewise acknowledge that their alleged injury results from “increased fossil fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions,” Pet. App. 2a, yet the
Hawaii Supreme Court allowed the suit to proceed under
state law. The decision below thus conflicts with City of
New York even under respondents’ characterization of
the allegedly wrongful conduct.
The two decisions conflict further with respect to international emissions. The Second Circuit held that the
Clean Air Act did not displace federal common law with
respect to those emissions, yet the Hawaii Supreme Court
drew no distinction between interstate and international
emissions in its displacement analysis. Compare City of
6
New York, 993 F.3d at 100-101, with Pet. App. 39a-45a.
Respondents entirely ignore that additional conflict.
2. Respondents attempt to distinguish North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 615
F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010), and Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984), on the similar ground that
the claims alleged in those cases sought to impose liability
for the defendants’ release of “pollutants from a point
source” rather than for “failure to warn and deceptive
promotion.” Br. in Opp. 14. But just as here, both cases
involved claims under the law of one State seeking redress
for injuries allegedly caused by emissions from a different
State. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits held that state
law could not govern such claims. The Hawaii Supreme
Court reached the opposite conclusion and expressly rejected the Seventh Circuit’s decision. The resulting conflict warrants this Court’s review.
C. The Decision Below Is Incorrect Under This Court’s
Precedents
Tellingly, respondents primarily focus not on the certworthiness of this case, but on the merits. See Br. in Opp.
16-29. While it is ultimately a matter for another day, respondents’ merits arguments are unpersuasive.
1. Respondents do not dispute that, for over a century, this Court has held that interstate pollution is one of
the few inherently federal areas necessarily governed by
federal law. See Pet. 22. Instead, respondents contend
that, after the Clean Air Act’s enactment, the viability of
state law depends solely on the Act and not on “a defunct
body of judge-made federal law.” Br. in Opp. 17.
That fundamentally mischaracterizes petitioners’ argument. Displaced federal common law is not what precludes respondents’ claims. The reason why federal common law ever existed in this area is because the structure
7
of the Constitution precludes the extraterritorial application of state law here. See Pet. 21-23, 28-29. It is thus the
Constitution, not displaced federal common law, that is
doing the relevant work. See Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 587 U.S. 230, 246 (2019); Mallory v. Norfolk Southern
Railway Co., 600 U.S. 122, 154 (2023) (Alito, J., concurring).
Respondents contend that “federal common law existed in areas of environmental protection” to “fill in statutory interstices,” not because of any “constitutional
rules.” Br. in Opp. 21 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But long before the enactment of federal
environmental statutes, this Court applied federal common law to claims seeking redress for interstate pollution.
See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230,
237 (1907).
Turning to the case law, respondents argue (Br. in
Opp. 18) that International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479
U.S. 481 (1987), and American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011), undermine petitioners’ position. That is exactly backwards. In Ouellette, the Court
held that, in light of the Clean Water Act’s “pervasive regulation” and “the fact that the control of interstate pollution is primarily a matter of federal law,” the Act “precludes a court from applying the law of an affected State
against an out-of-state source” of pollution. 479 U.S. at
492, 494 (citation omitted). That is petitioners’ position
here with respect to the Clean Air Act. See Pet. 23-24, 2627. As for American Electric Power, in remanding the
case for consideration of the remaining state-law claims,
the Court cited Ouellette for the proposition that “the
Clean Water Act does not preclude aggrieved individuals
from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the law of the
source State.” 564 U.S. at 429 (internal quotation marks
8
and citation omitted). That is also consistent with petitioners’ position. See Pet. 29.
2. In a now-familiar argument, respondents contend
that this case “falls outside” the inherently federal area of
interstate emissions because it concerns only deceptive
marketing. Br. in Opp. 19. But that theory is merely the
most recent one that plaintiffs in these cases are attempting to use to recover for injuries allegedly caused by interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions. See
NAM Br. 6-15. Regardless of the tort theory being invoked, the “gravamen” of these cases has always been injury allegedly caused by interstate and international
emissions. See Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products
Corp., 565 U.S. 625, 635 (2012) (citation omitted); API Br.
7-10. Respondents allege injury in the form of physical
harms allegedly caused by global climate change. See
Pet. 24-25. And to demonstrate causation, they must show
that, absent the allegedly deceptive marketing, fewer fossil fuels would have been used, which would have resulted
in decreased greenhouse-gas emissions, which would have
alleviated the alleged injuries.
So understood, respondents’ claims are simply an indirect method of regulating interstate and international
emissions. See, e.g., Kurns, 565 U.S. at 637. The imposition of liability is designed to incentivize petitioners to
take actions to reduce the sale of fossil fuels and thereby
limit greenhouse-gas emissions.
3. Respondents fault petitioners for failing to provide
a sufficiently “searching and rigorous analysis of the Constitution’s text and history.” Br. in Opp. 22. Setting aside
that this case is only at the certiorari stage, petitioners
cited both well-established constitutional principles and
numerous decisions from this Court in support of their position. See Pet. 21-24. Respondents also argue that claims
by “non-sovereign plaintiffs seek[ing] to hold private
9
companies liable under tort law for in-state injuries” do
not implicate issues of state sovereignty. Br. in Opp. 23.
At least 20 States beg to differ, arguing that respondents’
theory of liability “would trample over every State’s sovereignty” by projecting one State’s law across the Nation.
States Br. 7.
4. Contrary to respondents’ contention (Br. in Opp.
24-26), the Clean Air Act also preempts their claims under
a traditional preemption analysis. No “presumption
against pre-emption obtains” in “inherently federal” areas like transboundary emissions. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 347-348 (2001). And
the Clean Air Act makes the Environmental Protection
Agency, not state courts and juries, the Nation’s regulator
of interstate greenhouse-gas emissions. See Pet. 26. The
use of state law indirectly to regulate those emissions
would interfere with the Clean Air Act’s comprehensive
scheme, which assigns responsibility for setting emissions
standards to EPA and the source States. See ALF Br. 1419. Indeed, even if a presumption against preemption applied, respondents’ state-law claims could not survive.
See Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 494. Respondents’ rejoinder
that they are not seeking to hold petitioners liable for injuries caused by interstate emissions fails for reasons already explained. See p. 8, supra.
5. With respect to international greenhouse-gas
emissions (the vast majority of those at issue), the extension of state tort law beyond the Nation’s borders inherently raises foreign-policy concerns. Contra Br. in Opp.
26-29. After all, the presumption against the extraterritorial application of federal law exists to “guard[] against
our courts triggering * * * serious foreign policy consequences.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569
U.S. 108, 124 (2013). There is an “even stronger” reason
to question the extraterritorial application of state law,
10
“given that the Constitution entrusts foreign affairs to the
federal political branches, limits state power over foreign
affairs, and establishes the supremacy of federal enactments over state law.” Al Shimari v. CACI International, Inc., 679 F.3d 205, 231 (4th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
D. The Question Presented Is Important And Warrants
The Court’s Review In This Case
There is no disputing the importance of the question
presented; respondents do not even try. Numerous climate-change cases seeking billions in damages for the alleged localized effects of global climate change are now
pending in state courts nationwide. More have been filed
even since this petition, see City of Chicago v. BP p.l.c.,
No. 2024CH1024 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Feb. 20, 2024); Bucks
County v. BP p.l.c., No. 2024-1836 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas
filed Mar. 25, 2024), and still more have been promised.
These cases represent a critical threat to one of the Nation’s most vital industries. See Myers & Mullen Br. 1122; AmFree Br. 20-21.
The decision below also presents a serious challenge
to our constitutional system. The Hawaii Supreme Court
held that state law can impose liability for injuries allegedly caused by the effect of interstate and international
greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate. Numerous States have objected to that sweeping, extraterritorial
application of state law. See States Br. 3-15. And allowing
the States to apply tort law in such an extraterritorial
fashion will disrupt efforts to address global climate
change at the national and international level. See Chamber Br. 19-22; Epstein & Yoo Br. 11-13.
Given the stakes, the time for review is now. There is
a clear conflict on the question presented, and it is uncertain when another case will make its way through a state-
11
court system (especially in States with multiple layers of
appellate review). If petitioners are correct that these
“unprecedented” cases should fail at the outset, the “enormous” resources necessary to litigate and adjudicate
them would be wasted. Pet. App. 87a. Because the complaint in this case is representative of the complaints filed
in other climate-change cases, a decision in petitioners’ favor here would affect all of the cases in this nationwide
litigation.
Respondents offer only two additional reasons to deny
review. In a reprise of their meritless jurisdictional argument, respondents note (Br. in Opp. 29-30) that this case
arises in an interlocutory posture. But the Court routinely grants review to decide important questions of federal law in cases that have not been fully resolved below.
See, e.g., National Institute of Family & Life Advocates
v. Becerra, 585 U.S. 755, 765 (2018); Mach Mining, LLC
v. EEOC, 575 U.S. 480, 485-486 (2015); American Broadcast Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 438
(2014); Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 114.
Respondents also argue (Br. in Opp. 30-33) that further percolation is warranted. But to what end? Both the
Second Circuit and the Hawaii Supreme Court issued
lengthy precedential opinions addressing the question
presented in conflicting ways. And any percolation in the
foreseeable future will come not from federal courts but
from hand-picked state courts, which have comparatively
little experience addressing the interaction of the Constitution, a federal statute, partially displaced federal common law, and state law. It is thus implausible that further
percolation would aid the Court, and there are compelling
reasons not to delay review of the question presented.
The time for that review, we respectfully submit, is now.
12
*
*
*
*
*
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
THEODORE J. BOUTROUS, JR.
WILLIAM E. THOMSON
GIBSON, DUNN
& CRUTCHER LLP
333 South Grand Street
Los Angeles, CA 90071
THOMAS G. HUNGAR
LOCHLAN F. SHELFER
GIBSON, DUNN
& CRUTCHER LLP
1050 Connecticut
Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
ANDREA E. NEUMANN
GIBSON, DUNN
& CRUTCHER LLP
200 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10166
JOSHUA D. DICK
GIBSON, DUNN
& CRUTCHER LLP
One Embarcadero Center,
Suite 2600
San Francisco, CA 94111
Counsel for Petitioners
Chevron Corporation and
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
MAY 2024
KANNON K. SHANMUGAM
WILLIAM T. MARKS
JAKE L. KRAMER
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
2001 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 223-7300
kshanmugam@paulweiss.com
THEODORE V. WELLS, JR.
DANIEL J. TOAL
YAHONNES CLEARY
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
Counsel for Petitioners
Exxon Mobil Corporation
and ExxonMobil Oil
Corporation
JOHN D. LOMBARDO
LAURA E. WATSON
ARNOLD & PORTER
KAYE SCHOLER LLP
777 South Figueroa Street,
44th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90017
HALLIE B. LEVIN
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE & DORR LLP
7 World Trade Center
250 Greenwich Street
New York, NY 10007
JONATHAN W. HUGHES
ARNOLD & PORTER
KAYE SCHOLER LLP
Three Embarcadero Center,
10th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
ERICKA AIKEN
ALLISON SCHULTZ
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE & DORR LLP
2100 Pennsylvania
Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037
ETHAN G. SHENKMAN
ELISABETH S. THEODORE
ARNOLD & PORTER
KAYE SCHOLER LLP
601 Massachusetts Avenue,
N.W.
Washington, DC 20001
STEVEN M. BAUER
NICOLE C. VALCO
KATHERINE A. ROUSE
LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
505 Montgomery Street,
Suite 2000
San Francisco, CA 94111
Counsel for Petitioners
BP p.l.c. and BP America Inc.
Counsel for Petitioners
ConocoPhillips and
ConocoPhillips Company
J. SCOTT JANOE
BAKER BOTTS LLP
910 Louisiana Street
Houston, TX 77002
MEGAN BERGE
STERLING MARCHAND
BAKER BOTTS LLP
700 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20001
Counsel for Petitioners
Sunoco LP; Aloha Petroleum,
Ltd.; and Aloha Petroleum
LLC
STEVEN M. BAUER
NICOLE C. VALCO
KATHERINE A. ROUSE
LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
505 Montgomery Street,
Suite 2000
San Francisco, CA 94111
Counsel for Petitioners
Phillips66 and
Phillips66 Company
LAYNE E. KRUSE
EDDIE LEWIS
ELIOT F. TURNER
RACHEL GROGAN ROOSTH
NORTON ROSE
FULBRIGHT US LLP
1550 Lamar, Suite 2000
Houston, TX 77010
Counsel for Petitioner
Woodside Energy Hawaii Inc.
SHANNON S. BROOME
HUNTON ANDREWS
KURTH LLP
50 California Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
SHAWN PATRICK REGAN
HUNTON ANDREWS
KURTH LLP
200 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10166
ANN MARIE MORTIMER
HUNTON ANDREWS
KURTH LLP
550 South Hope Street,
Suite 2000
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Counsel for Petitioner
Marathon Petroleum Corp.
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