Reply Brief — Sunoco LP, et al., Petitioners v. City and County of Honolulu, Hawaii, et al.

Supreme Court briefMay 21, 2024

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No. 23-947

In the Supreme Court of the United States

SUNOCO LP, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF HAWAII

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

THEODORE J. BOUTROUS, JR.

GIBSON, DUNN

& CRUTCHER LLP

333 South Grand Street

Los Angeles, CA 90071

THOMAS G. HUNGAR

GIBSON, DUNN

& CRUTCHER LLP

1050 Connecticut

Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20036

KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

Counsel of Record

WILLIAM T. MARKS

JAKE L. KRAMER

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

2001 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 223-7300

kshanmugam@paulweiss.com

THEODORE V. WELLS, JR.

DANIEL J. TOAL

YAHONNES CLEARY

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

1285 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019

(additional counsel on signature page)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A. The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1257 ............... 3

B. The decision below creates a conflict on

the question presented .......................................................... 4

C. The decision below is incorrect under

this Court’s precedents .......................................................... 6

D. The question presented is important

and warrants the Court’s review in this case .................... 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Al Shimari v. CACI International, Inc.,

679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012) ........................................... 10

American Broadcast Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.,

573 U.S. 431 (2014) .......................................................... 11

American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,

564 U.S. 410 (2011) ............................................................ 7

Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee,

531 U.S. 341 (2001) ............................................................ 9

City of New York v. Chevron Corp.,

993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021)......................................... 4, 5, 6

Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc. v. Nevils,

581 U.S. 87 (2017) .............................................................. 3

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) ....... 3

Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey,

569 U.S. 251 (2013) ............................................................ 3

Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 587 U.S. 230 (2019) .......... 7

Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907)....... 7

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,

731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984) ............................................. 6

International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,

479 U.S. 481 (1987) ........................................................ 7, 9

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,

569 U.S. 108 (2013) ...................................................... 9, 11

(I)

II

Page

Cases—continued:

Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp.,

565 U.S. 625 (2012) ............................................................ 8

Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U.S. 480 (2015) ........... 11

Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.,

600 U.S. 122 (2023) ............................................................ 7

National Institute of Family & Life Advocates

v. Becerra, 585 U.S. 755 (2018) ...................................... 11

North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley

Authority, 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010) .......................... 6

Statutes:

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. ......................... 2, 5-7, 9

28 U.S.C. 1257(a) ................................................................ 3, 4

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 23-947

SUNOCO LP, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF HAWAII

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

The Hawaii Supreme Court held that state law can impose liability for injuries allegedly caused by the effect of

interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions on

the global climate. The Second Circuit, considering materially identical claims, rejected such a breathtaking, extraterritorial application of state law. Other courts, too,

have declined to apply state law extraterritorially to regulate transboundary pollution. The question whether the

unique phenomenon of global climate change licenses

States to ignore the structure of our constitutional system

and extend state law beyond their borders is at the heart

of the climate-change litigation currently ongoing nationwide. This Court’s intervention is urgently needed.

After a passing attempt to contest the Court’s jurisdiction, respondents build their brief in opposition around

one argument: that this case is about deceptive market(1)

2

ing, not the release of greenhouse-gas emissions. That argument neither eliminates the conflict nor is correct on

the merits. As to the conflict: the Second Circuit considered and rejected the same theory of liability for deceptive marketing as alleged here. And in rejecting that theory, the Second Circuit declined to hold—as the Hawaii

Supreme Court held here—that state law could apply

merely because the claims focus on an earlier point in the

causal chain than the injury-causing emissions.

As to the merits: respondents’ theory of causation is

that, absent the allegedly deceptive marketing, greenhouse-gas emissions would have been lower, thereby alleviating the alleged climate-change injuries. Respondents

are thus seeking to impose liability for transboundary

emissions under state tort law. But both the Constitution

and the Clean Air Act prohibit the extraterritorial application of state law to out-of-state and international emissions.

At a time when the Court is working to fill out its calendar for next Term, this is exactly the sort of case the

Court should be hearing. It presents a fundamental and

substantial question concerning the interplay between

federal and state law. And as the avalanche of amicus

briefs indicates, that question is of exceptional importance, and it arises in the context of litigation that presents a critical threat to one of the Nation’s most vital industries. This is the perfect time to resolve the question

presented, because the arguments on both sides have

been fully ventilated in the lower courts. Further delay

would simply enable the proliferation of litigation in handpicked state courts when these cases should be dismissed

at the outset. The case for certiorari here is compelling,

and the petition should be granted.

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A. The Court Has Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. 1257(a)

Respondents challenge this Court’s jurisdiction (Br. in

Opp. 7-11), but their arguments are insubstantial. As petitioners have noted (Pet. 2), this Court has jurisdiction

under Section 1257(a). The Hawaii Supreme Court finally

decided the question of federal preclusion; reversal of that

decision would terminate this litigation; and declining review now would erode significant federal policies. See Cox

Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 482-483 (1975).

The Court has routinely granted certiorari in a similar

posture in cases presenting questions of federal preemption. See, e.g., Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc. v.

Nevils, 581 U.S. 87, 92-94 (2017); Dan’s City Used Cars,

Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 259 (2013).

Respondents contend that reversal would not terminate the litigation, because it would “remain open on remand” whether their claims could go forward “based on

source-state law.” Br. in Opp. 8. That is false. Respondents’ entire theory of causation and injury depends on the

cumulative impact of greenhouse-gas emissions released

from every jurisdiction on the planet—which they concede cannot be traced to any particular source. See Am.

Compl. 107. And respondents have always purported to

proceed only “under Hawai‘i common law.” See, e.g., No.

22-523 Br. in Opp. at 1. Accordingly, as the trial court determined, reversal would “likely speedily terminate the

case,” Pet. App. 87a, because it would preclude respondents’ sole theory of liability.

Respondents contend (Br. in Opp. 9) that denying review would not erode federal policy. That is also incorrect.

This case implicates vital federal interests in the regulation of fossil fuels and greenhouse-gas emissions. See Pet.

31-33; Myers & Mullen Br. 11-22; Chamber Br. 19-22; API

Br. 18-24; AmFree Br. 18-21. In addition, 20 States are

vehemently protesting the projection of Hawaii law

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beyond its borders as a serious affront to their constitutional sovereignty. See States Br. 3-15. Jurisdiction is

plainly present under Section 1257(a).

B. The Decision Below Creates A Conflict On The Question Presented

The decision below conflicts with City of New York v.

Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021), and other decisions holding that state law cannot govern claims alleging

injury from pollution emanating from a different State.

See Pet. 14-21. Respondents’ efforts to deny the conflict

are unpersuasive.

1. Respondents admit that the Hawaii Supreme

Court “expressly disagree[d]” with the Second Circuit’s

reasoning in City of New York that state tort law cannot

govern claims alleging injury caused by global greenhouse-gas emissions. Br. in Opp. 13. Respondents argue

only that the claims in City of New York were an attempt

to regulate emissions, whereas the claims here, focused on

deceptive marketing, purportedly are not. See id. at 1213. That argument fails for two reasons.

First, respondents’ description of City of New York is

simply incorrect: the plaintiff there presented the same

theory of deceptive marketing as respondents do here.

The plaintiff asserted that the defendants “ha[d] known

for decades that their fossil fuel products pose a severe

risk to the planet’s climate” yet “downplayed the risks and

continued to sell massive quantities of fossil fuels.” 993

F.3d at 86-87. The complaint alleged that the defendants

had “orchestrated a campaign of deception and denial regarding climate change,” the goal of which was to “portray fossil fuels as environmentally responsible.” J.A. at

48 (No. 18-2188). That alleged “sophisticated advertising

campaign[]” served as part of the basis for the plaintiff ’s

theory of liability, which was that the defendants’ actions

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in “producing, marketing, and selling fossil fuels[,]

* * * while knowing of the harm that was substantially

certain to result[,] constitute[d] an unlawful public and

private nuisance and an illegal trespass.” Id. at 47, 51; see

id. at 87-106 (allegations about the defendants’ deceptive

statements and knowledge). On appeal, the plaintiff identified, as the “primary fault” it was alleging, that the defendants “contributed to serious environmental harm that

they knew their highly profitable production and marketing activities would cause.” Br. at 16. City of New York

thus involved the same allegedly wrongful conduct at issue here.

Second, even if the allegedly wrongful conduct differed, it would not eliminate the conflict, because the theory of harm is identical. In both cases, the plaintiffs

sought damages on the ground that the defendants’ actions allegedly resulted in increased emissions and

thereby injured the plaintiffs. In City of New York, the

plaintiff “disavow[ed] any intent to address emissions” in

its complaint, but it “identif[ied] such emissions as the singular source of [its] harm”; the Second Circuit held that

the suit thus could not proceed under state law. 993 F.3d

at 91. Respondents likewise acknowledge that their alleged injury results from “increased fossil fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions,” Pet. App. 2a, yet the

Hawaii Supreme Court allowed the suit to proceed under

state law. The decision below thus conflicts with City of

New York even under respondents’ characterization of

the allegedly wrongful conduct.

The two decisions conflict further with respect to international emissions. The Second Circuit held that the

Clean Air Act did not displace federal common law with

respect to those emissions, yet the Hawaii Supreme Court

drew no distinction between interstate and international

emissions in its displacement analysis. Compare City of

6

New York, 993 F.3d at 100-101, with Pet. App. 39a-45a.

Respondents entirely ignore that additional conflict.

2. Respondents attempt to distinguish North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 615

F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010), and Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,

731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984), on the similar ground that

the claims alleged in those cases sought to impose liability

for the defendants’ release of “pollutants from a point

source” rather than for “failure to warn and deceptive

promotion.” Br. in Opp. 14. But just as here, both cases

involved claims under the law of one State seeking redress

for injuries allegedly caused by emissions from a different

State. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits held that state

law could not govern such claims. The Hawaii Supreme

Court reached the opposite conclusion and expressly rejected the Seventh Circuit’s decision. The resulting conflict warrants this Court’s review.

C. The Decision Below Is Incorrect Under This Court’s

Precedents

Tellingly, respondents primarily focus not on the certworthiness of this case, but on the merits. See Br. in Opp.

16-29. While it is ultimately a matter for another day, respondents’ merits arguments are unpersuasive.

1. Respondents do not dispute that, for over a century, this Court has held that interstate pollution is one of

the few inherently federal areas necessarily governed by

federal law. See Pet. 22. Instead, respondents contend

that, after the Clean Air Act’s enactment, the viability of

state law depends solely on the Act and not on “a defunct

body of judge-made federal law.” Br. in Opp. 17.

That fundamentally mischaracterizes petitioners’ argument. Displaced federal common law is not what precludes respondents’ claims. The reason why federal common law ever existed in this area is because the structure

7

of the Constitution precludes the extraterritorial application of state law here. See Pet. 21-23, 28-29. It is thus the

Constitution, not displaced federal common law, that is

doing the relevant work. See Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 587 U.S. 230, 246 (2019); Mallory v. Norfolk Southern

Railway Co., 600 U.S. 122, 154 (2023) (Alito, J., concurring).

Respondents contend that “federal common law existed in areas of environmental protection” to “fill in statutory interstices,” not because of any “constitutional

rules.” Br. in Opp. 21 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But long before the enactment of federal

environmental statutes, this Court applied federal common law to claims seeking redress for interstate pollution.

See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230,

237 (1907).

Turning to the case law, respondents argue (Br. in

Opp. 18) that International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479

U.S. 481 (1987), and American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011), undermine petitioners’ position. That is exactly backwards. In Ouellette, the Court

held that, in light of the Clean Water Act’s “pervasive regulation” and “the fact that the control of interstate pollution is primarily a matter of federal law,” the Act “precludes a court from applying the law of an affected State

against an out-of-state source” of pollution. 479 U.S. at

492, 494 (citation omitted). That is petitioners’ position

here with respect to the Clean Air Act. See Pet. 23-24, 2627. As for American Electric Power, in remanding the

case for consideration of the remaining state-law claims,

the Court cited Ouellette for the proposition that “the

Clean Water Act does not preclude aggrieved individuals

from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the law of the

source State.” 564 U.S. at 429 (internal quotation marks

8

and citation omitted). That is also consistent with petitioners’ position. See Pet. 29.

2. In a now-familiar argument, respondents contend

that this case “falls outside” the inherently federal area of

interstate emissions because it concerns only deceptive

marketing. Br. in Opp. 19. But that theory is merely the

most recent one that plaintiffs in these cases are attempting to use to recover for injuries allegedly caused by interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions. See

NAM Br. 6-15. Regardless of the tort theory being invoked, the “gravamen” of these cases has always been injury allegedly caused by interstate and international

emissions. See Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products

Corp., 565 U.S. 625, 635 (2012) (citation omitted); API Br.

7-10. Respondents allege injury in the form of physical

harms allegedly caused by global climate change. See

Pet. 24-25. And to demonstrate causation, they must show

that, absent the allegedly deceptive marketing, fewer fossil fuels would have been used, which would have resulted

in decreased greenhouse-gas emissions, which would have

alleviated the alleged injuries.

So understood, respondents’ claims are simply an indirect method of regulating interstate and international

emissions. See, e.g., Kurns, 565 U.S. at 637. The imposition of liability is designed to incentivize petitioners to

take actions to reduce the sale of fossil fuels and thereby

limit greenhouse-gas emissions.

3. Respondents fault petitioners for failing to provide

a sufficiently “searching and rigorous analysis of the Constitution’s text and history.” Br. in Opp. 22. Setting aside

that this case is only at the certiorari stage, petitioners

cited both well-established constitutional principles and

numerous decisions from this Court in support of their position. See Pet. 21-24. Respondents also argue that claims

by “non-sovereign plaintiffs seek[ing] to hold private

9

companies liable under tort law for in-state injuries” do

not implicate issues of state sovereignty. Br. in Opp. 23.

At least 20 States beg to differ, arguing that respondents’

theory of liability “would trample over every State’s sovereignty” by projecting one State’s law across the Nation.

States Br. 7.

4. Contrary to respondents’ contention (Br. in Opp.

24-26), the Clean Air Act also preempts their claims under

a traditional preemption analysis. No “presumption

against pre-emption obtains” in “inherently federal” areas like transboundary emissions. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 347-348 (2001). And

the Clean Air Act makes the Environmental Protection

Agency, not state courts and juries, the Nation’s regulator

of interstate greenhouse-gas emissions. See Pet. 26. The

use of state law indirectly to regulate those emissions

would interfere with the Clean Air Act’s comprehensive

scheme, which assigns responsibility for setting emissions

standards to EPA and the source States. See ALF Br. 1419. Indeed, even if a presumption against preemption applied, respondents’ state-law claims could not survive.

See Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 494. Respondents’ rejoinder

that they are not seeking to hold petitioners liable for injuries caused by interstate emissions fails for reasons already explained. See p. 8, supra.

5. With respect to international greenhouse-gas

emissions (the vast majority of those at issue), the extension of state tort law beyond the Nation’s borders inherently raises foreign-policy concerns. Contra Br. in Opp.

26-29. After all, the presumption against the extraterritorial application of federal law exists to “guard[] against

our courts triggering * * * serious foreign policy consequences.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569

U.S. 108, 124 (2013). There is an “even stronger” reason

to question the extraterritorial application of state law,

10

“given that the Constitution entrusts foreign affairs to the

federal political branches, limits state power over foreign

affairs, and establishes the supremacy of federal enactments over state law.” Al Shimari v. CACI International, Inc., 679 F.3d 205, 231 (4th Cir. 2012) (en banc)

(Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

D. The Question Presented Is Important And Warrants

The Court’s Review In This Case

There is no disputing the importance of the question

presented; respondents do not even try. Numerous climate-change cases seeking billions in damages for the alleged localized effects of global climate change are now

pending in state courts nationwide. More have been filed

even since this petition, see City of Chicago v. BP p.l.c.,

No. 2024CH1024 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Feb. 20, 2024); Bucks

County v. BP p.l.c., No. 2024-1836 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas

filed Mar. 25, 2024), and still more have been promised.

These cases represent a critical threat to one of the Nation’s most vital industries. See Myers & Mullen Br. 1122; AmFree Br. 20-21.

The decision below also presents a serious challenge

to our constitutional system. The Hawaii Supreme Court

held that state law can impose liability for injuries allegedly caused by the effect of interstate and international

greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate. Numerous States have objected to that sweeping, extraterritorial

application of state law. See States Br. 3-15. And allowing

the States to apply tort law in such an extraterritorial

fashion will disrupt efforts to address global climate

change at the national and international level. See Chamber Br. 19-22; Epstein & Yoo Br. 11-13.

Given the stakes, the time for review is now. There is

a clear conflict on the question presented, and it is uncertain when another case will make its way through a state-

11

court system (especially in States with multiple layers of

appellate review). If petitioners are correct that these

“unprecedented” cases should fail at the outset, the “enormous” resources necessary to litigate and adjudicate

them would be wasted. Pet. App. 87a. Because the complaint in this case is representative of the complaints filed

in other climate-change cases, a decision in petitioners’ favor here would affect all of the cases in this nationwide

litigation.

Respondents offer only two additional reasons to deny

review. In a reprise of their meritless jurisdictional argument, respondents note (Br. in Opp. 29-30) that this case

arises in an interlocutory posture. But the Court routinely grants review to decide important questions of federal law in cases that have not been fully resolved below.

See, e.g., National Institute of Family & Life Advocates

v. Becerra, 585 U.S. 755, 765 (2018); Mach Mining, LLC

v. EEOC, 575 U.S. 480, 485-486 (2015); American Broadcast Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 438

(2014); Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 114.

Respondents also argue (Br. in Opp. 30-33) that further percolation is warranted. But to what end? Both the

Second Circuit and the Hawaii Supreme Court issued

lengthy precedential opinions addressing the question

presented in conflicting ways. And any percolation in the

foreseeable future will come not from federal courts but

from hand-picked state courts, which have comparatively

little experience addressing the interaction of the Constitution, a federal statute, partially displaced federal common law, and state law. It is thus implausible that further

percolation would aid the Court, and there are compelling

reasons not to delay review of the question presented.

The time for that review, we respectfully submit, is now.

12

*

*

*

*

*

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

THEODORE J. BOUTROUS, JR.

WILLIAM E. THOMSON

GIBSON, DUNN

& CRUTCHER LLP

333 South Grand Street

Los Angeles, CA 90071

THOMAS G. HUNGAR

LOCHLAN F. SHELFER

GIBSON, DUNN

& CRUTCHER LLP

1050 Connecticut

Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20036

ANDREA E. NEUMANN

GIBSON, DUNN

& CRUTCHER LLP

200 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10166

JOSHUA D. DICK

GIBSON, DUNN

& CRUTCHER LLP

One Embarcadero Center,

Suite 2600

San Francisco, CA 94111

Counsel for Petitioners

Chevron Corporation and

Chevron U.S.A., Inc.

MAY 2024

KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

WILLIAM T. MARKS

JAKE L. KRAMER

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

2001 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 223-7300

kshanmugam@paulweiss.com

THEODORE V. WELLS, JR.

DANIEL J. TOAL

YAHONNES CLEARY

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

1285 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019

Counsel for Petitioners

Exxon Mobil Corporation

and ExxonMobil Oil

Corporation

JOHN D. LOMBARDO

LAURA E. WATSON

ARNOLD & PORTER

KAYE SCHOLER LLP

777 South Figueroa Street,

44th Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90017

HALLIE B. LEVIN

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE & DORR LLP

7 World Trade Center

250 Greenwich Street

New York, NY 10007

JONATHAN W. HUGHES

ARNOLD & PORTER

KAYE SCHOLER LLP

Three Embarcadero Center,

10th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94111

ERICKA AIKEN

ALLISON SCHULTZ

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

HALE & DORR LLP

2100 Pennsylvania

Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20037

ETHAN G. SHENKMAN

ELISABETH S. THEODORE

ARNOLD & PORTER

KAYE SCHOLER LLP

601 Massachusetts Avenue,

N.W.

Washington, DC 20001

STEVEN M. BAUER

NICOLE C. VALCO

KATHERINE A. ROUSE

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

505 Montgomery Street,

Suite 2000

San Francisco, CA 94111

Counsel for Petitioners

BP p.l.c. and BP America Inc.

Counsel for Petitioners

ConocoPhillips and

ConocoPhillips Company

J. SCOTT JANOE

BAKER BOTTS LLP

910 Louisiana Street

Houston, TX 77002

MEGAN BERGE

STERLING MARCHAND

BAKER BOTTS LLP

700 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20001

Counsel for Petitioners

Sunoco LP; Aloha Petroleum,

Ltd.; and Aloha Petroleum

LLC

STEVEN M. BAUER

NICOLE C. VALCO

KATHERINE A. ROUSE

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

505 Montgomery Street,

Suite 2000

San Francisco, CA 94111

Counsel for Petitioners

Phillips66 and

Phillips66 Company

LAYNE E. KRUSE

EDDIE LEWIS

ELIOT F. TURNER

RACHEL GROGAN ROOSTH

NORTON ROSE

FULBRIGHT US LLP

1550 Lamar, Suite 2000

Houston, TX 77010

Counsel for Petitioner

Woodside Energy Hawaii Inc.

SHANNON S. BROOME

HUNTON ANDREWS

KURTH LLP

50 California Street

San Francisco, CA 94111

SHAWN PATRICK REGAN

HUNTON ANDREWS

KURTH LLP

200 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10166

ANN MARIE MORTIMER

HUNTON ANDREWS

KURTH LLP

550 South Hope Street,

Suite 2000

Los Angeles, CA 90071

Counsel for Petitioner

Marathon Petroleum Corp.

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