Amicus Curiae Brief — Pamela Bondi, Attorney General, et al., Petitioners v. Jennifer VanDerStok, et al.
Supreme Court briefAug 20, 2024
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No. 23-852
In the Supreme Court of the United States
MERRICK B. GARLAND, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
V.
JENNIFER VANDERSTOK, ET AL.,
Respondents.
——————
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE STATES OF
WEST VIRGINIA, MONTANA,
AND 25 OTHER STATES
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
AUSTIN KNUDSEN
Attorney General
CHRISTIAN B. CORRIGAN
Solicitor General
PETER M. TORSTENSEN, JR.
Deputy Solicitor General
PATRICK MORRISEY
Attorney General
MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
MONTANA DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
215 North Sanders
P.O. Box 201401
Helena, MT 59620-1401
(406) 444-2026
peter.torstensen@mt.gov
OFFICE OF THE
WEST VIRGINIA
ATTORNEY GENERAL
State Capitol Complex
Building 1, Room E-26
Charleston, WV 25305
(304) 558-2021
mwilliams@wvago.gov
Counsel for State of
Montana
Counsel for State of
West Virginia
[additional counsel listed after signature page]
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether “a weapon parts kit that is designed to or
may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or
otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of
an explosive,” 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, is a “firearm” regulated
by the Gun Control Act of 1968.
2. Whether “a partially complete, disassembled, or
nonfunctional frame or receiver” that is “designed to or
may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or
otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver,” 27
C.F.R. 478.12(c), is a “frame or receiver” regulated by the
Act.
II
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Questions Presented ............................................................ I
Introduction and Interests of Amici Curiae ..................... 1
Summary of Argument ........................................................ 2
Argument .............................................................................. 3
I.
ATF Has A History Of Pushing The Limits,
And It’s Doing So Again ............................................... 3
A. Bump Stocks ........................................................... 4
B. Stabilizing Braces .................................................. 5
C. Firearms Dealing ................................................. 10
D. This Rule ............................................................... 16
II. Policy Concerns Can’t Trump Statutory Text ......... 19
Conclusion ........................................................................... 23
III
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health &
Hum. Servs.,
594 U.S. 758 (2021) ....................................................... 21
Bartenwerfer v. Buckley,
598 U.S. 69 (2023) ......................................................... 21
Bittner v. United States,
598 U.S. 85 (2023) ......................................................... 15
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,
590 U.S. 644 (2020) ........................................... 21, 22, 23
Cargill v. Barr,
502 F. Supp. 3d 1163 (W.D. Tex. 2020)....................... 16
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd.,
584 F.3d 1076 (D.C. Cir. 2009) .................................... 18
District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008) ................................................. 14, 21
Firearms Regulatory Accountability
Coalition, Inc. (FRAC), v. Garland,
No. 23-3230, 2024 WL 3737366
(8th Cir. Aug. 9, 2024) ................................................ 5, 9
Garland v. Cargill,
602 U.S. 406 (2024) ......................................... 4, 5, 16, 23
Guedes v. ATF,
140 S. Ct. 789 (2020) ..................................................... 17
Intel Corp. Inv. Pol’y Comm. v. Sulyma,
589 U.S. 178 (2020) ....................................................... 23
IV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Kansas v. Garland,
No. 24-CV-01086, 2024 WL 3360533
(D. Kan. July 10, 2024) ................................................. 16
Kisor v. Wilke,
588 U.S. 558 ................................................................... 22
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,
551 U.S. 158 (2007) ....................................................... 18
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,
144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024) ....................................... 19, 21, 22
Luis v. United States,
578 U.S. 5 (2016) ........................................................... 19
Mock v. Garland,
75 F.4th 563 (5th Cir. 2023) ......................... 6, 7, 8, 9, 18
Mock v. Garland,
No. 4:23-CV-00095-O, 2024 WL 2982056
(N.D. Tex. June 13, 2024) .............................................. 9
Murphy v. NCAA,
584 U.S. 453 (2018) ....................................................... 23
Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Brady,
914 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1990) ......................................... 16
Ohio v. EPA,
144 S. Ct. 2040 (2024) ................................................... 18
Patel v. Garland,
596 U.S. 328 (2022) ....................................................... 21
V
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Texas v. ATF,
No. 2:24-CV-89-Z, 2024 WL 2277848
(N.D. Tex. May 19, 2024) ....................................... 14, 16
Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside,
Hoffman Ests., Inc.,
455 U.S. 489 (1982) ......................................................... 8
West Virginia v. EPA,
597 U.S. 697 (2022) ....................................................... 15
Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of
Educ.,
550 U.S. 81 (2007) ( ....................................................... 22
Statutes
5 U.S.C. § 553 ...................................................................... 18
18 U.S.C. § 921 ...............................................3, 11, 12, 13, 14
18 U.S.C. § 922 .............................................................. 15, 19
18 U.S.C. § 923 .................................................................... 15
18 U.S.C. § 924 ................................................................ 3, 19
18 U.S.C. § 926 .......................................................... 3, 14, 15
18 U.S.C. § 929 ...................................................................... 3
26 U.S.C. § 5845 ........................................................ 3, 6, 7, 8
34 U.S.C. § 40901 .................................................................. 3
VI
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Bipartisan Safer Communities Act,
Pub. L. No. 117-159, 136 Stat. 1313
(2022) .......................................................................... 3, 11
Firearms Owners’ Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) .......... 3, 10, 11
Gun Control Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1213
(Oct. 22, 1968) .......................................................... 10, 11
Other Authorities
27 C.F.R. § 478.11 ......................................................... 12, 14
27 C.F.R. § 478.13 ......................................................... 12, 13
86 Fed. Reg. 27720 (May 21, 2021) ................................... 17
86 Fed. Reg. 30826-01 (June 10, 2021) ....................... 5, 6, 7
87 Fed. Reg. 24652-01 (Apr. 26, 2022) ...................... 1, 4, 17
88 Fed. Reg. 6478-01 (Jan. 31, 2023) ...................... 5, 7 ,8, 9
88 Fed. Reg. 61993-01 (Sept. 8, 2023) ......................... 10, 12
89 Fed. Reg. 28968-01 (Apr. 19, 2024) .......12, 13, 14, 15, 16
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms &
Explosives,
Factoring Criteria for Firearms with
Attached “Stabilizing Braces”: Final
Regulatory Impact Analysis and Final
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (2023) ........................ 7
VII
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78
(J. Cooke ed. 1961)........................................................ 22
Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson,
Reprocessing Vermont Yankee,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856 (2007) .............................. 19
Michael D. Faucette & Boyd Garriott,
“Happiness Is A Warm Gun”,
50 LITIGATION 53 (2024) ................................................ 1
Reuben Dass,
The Assassination of Shinzo Abe in
Japan and the Threat from Primitive
Homemade Weapons,
JAMESTOWN FOUND. TERRORISM
MONITOR (Oct. 7, 2022) ................................................ 20
The Right to Keep and Bear Arms,
Rep. of the Subcomm. on the Const.,
Sen. Jud. Comm.,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) .......................................... 10
Tristan Silva II, Almost Heaven, West
Virginia?: The Country Road to Take
Firearm Regulation Back Home to
Congress and the States, 18 J.L. ECON.
& POL’Y 404, 405 (2023) .................................................. 1
INTRODUCTION AND
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives “is a political briar patch because of its
rulemaking authority.” Tristan Silva II, Almost Heaven,
West Virginia?: The Country Road to Take Firearm
Regulation Back Home to Congress and the States, 18
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 404, 405 (2023). Among other things,
the agency is responsible for administering and enforcing
important but controversial federal gun laws like the Gun
Control Act of 1968 and the National Firearms Act of
1934. Its actions often go directly to the heart of
Americans’ Second Amendment rights. And “the criminal
consequences of the ATF’s regulations,” as well as the
informal “method of regulation” it often uses, “can render
the agency’s decision-making vulnerable” to challenges
under the Administrative Procedure Act. Michael D.
Faucette & Boyd Garriott, “Happiness Is A Warm Gun”,
50 LITIGATION 53, 55 (2024).
Given the sensitivity of this work, one might at least
expect ATF to tread carefully before purporting to
regulate in unexpected and aggressive new ways. But
recently, it hasn’t. ATF has instead seemed determined
to stretch the words found in statutes like the GCA and
NFA to reach conduct never anticipated by the lawmakers
who passed them. This case, concerning ATF’s efforts to
regulate gun kits and other forms of private firearms
assembly under the guise of calling them “frames or
receivers” subject to the GCA, is just the latest example
of that effort. See Definition of “Frame or Receiver” and
Identification of Firearms (“Frame Final Rule”), 87 Fed.
Reg. 24652-01, 24662 (Apr. 26, 2022). Other examples
abound. Indeed, many of the Amici States here have been
compelled to step in and sue ATF multiple times over the
2
past few years just to return the agency to its actual area
of authority.
All this leads to a simple conclusion: when the Court
encounters another ATF regulation offering a
purportedly creative solution to a long-standing problem,
it should be wary. And in this brief, Amici States describe
some of the specific machinations ATF has used in the
past to get to its desired results—erasing ordinary
meaning, stripping words from context, ignoring
comments, short-circuiting APA requirements, and
blinding itself to the real-world consequences of its own
actions. Armed with that understanding, the Court can
approach the rule at issue here with eyes wide open. And
though some might try to excuse a bit of administrative
corner-cutting because of the purported interests at stake,
that kind of policy-first approach won’t work, either. The
Court must remain firmly focused on what Congress
commanded, not what certain political interest groups
might prefer or what ATF might wish for.
The rule here overreaches. But the Court need not
follow ATF into the briar patch. It should instead affirm.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. ATF has not shown great respect for either the
limits of its own authority or the requirements set out in
the APA. Time and again, it has pushed rules that offend
both. Just a few months ago, the Court told ATF that it
had overstepped when it tried to transform bump stocks
into machine guns. But ATF has likewise tried to make
stabilizing braces into short-barreled shotguns and
private owners and traders into commercial firearms
dealers. And here, ATF has done more than just ignore
the statute’s text—it’s also played games with the noticeand-comment process, depriving commenters like the
3
States from having the chance to speak up about the flaws
in ATF’s thinking. All these issues confirm that the Court
should be careful about trusting ATF’s work; if anything,
the agency’s recent history suggests that the Court should
approach this case with a skeptical eye.
II. Some might suggest that ATF’s limits-testing
approach is justified because of the stakes. And certainly,
in the wrong hands, firearms can be dangerous. But short
of constitutional constraints, Congress is the body that
gets to decide how to address any risks that might arise
from a particular product. Neither the ATF nor this
Court can impose naked policy preferences, especially so
on hot-button issues like these.
ARGUMENT
I.
ATF Has A History Of Pushing The Limits, And
It’s Doing So Again.
ATF has limited statutory authority. The GCA, for
example, permits ATF to “prescribe only such rules and
regulations as are necessary to carry out [its] provisions.”
18 U.S.C. § 926 (emphasis added). The NFA likewise
gives ATF circumscribed authority because it regulates a
narrow set of firearms. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845. And over
the years, Congress has made only minor changes to this
statutory scheme. See Firearms Owners’ Protection Act
(FOPA), Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-926, 929, 26 U.S.C. § 5845);
see also Bipartisan Safer Communities Act (BSCA), Pub.
L. No. 117-159, 136 Stat. 1313 (2022) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-924, 34 U.S.C. § 40901).
Even though these statutes have remained essentially
static for decades, ATF’s role in executing them has
somehow grown larger day by day. In ATF’s view, it must
4
create “new definitions” that are “general enough to
account for changes” in society. Frame Final Rule, 87
Fed. Reg. at 24668. Not so. ATF misunderstands its own
job—and this misconception is statutorily unjustified and
constitutionally impermissible. Time and time again, ATF
has ventured off into the regulatory wilderness,
abandoning the only statutes that give it life in the first
instance. In other instances, it has ignored its obligations
under the APA to bypass legitimate objections to its
regulatory misadventures.
ATF’s Frame Final Rule is more of the same. But to
understand just why ATF’s regulatory work can’t really
be trusted, it helps to travel through the rabbit hole of its
fickle regulatory scheme. It’s a dizzying ride.
A. Bump Stocks
Start where the Court needs little reminder—with
bump stocks. “For many years, [ATF] took the position
that semiautomatic rifles equipped with bump stocks were
not machineguns.” Garland v. Cargill, 602 U.S. 406, 412
(2024). In response to a shooting, though, the agency
“abruptly reversed course.” Id. Although Congress’s
attempts to outlaw bump stocks had stalled, ATF
remained undeterred. See id. at 412-13. Under the guise
of redefining “machinegun,” ATF’s new rule accomplished
what Congress could not—banning bump stocks and
ordering owners of bump stocks to “destroy” or
“surrender them”—all under threat of criminal
prosecution. Id. at 414.
Many of the States here warned years ago that ATF’s
new rule did “not flow from the governing statute’s clear
and unambiguous language.” See Br. of Amici Curiae
States of West Virginia, Montana, et al. at 6, Aposhian v.
Garland, No. 19-4036 (U.S. filed Sept. 3, 2021), 2021 WL
5
4080669, at *6. Fortunately, this Court took up the
question and showed more concern for the statutory text
than ATF had. Text is always the starting point. Cargill,
602 U.S. at 415. And when “the statutory text is clear,”
it’s also the ending point. Id. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring).
Ultimately, ATF had impermissibly “abandon[ed] the
text” of the statute it claimed to execute. Id. at 427.
B. Stabilizing Braces
Fast forward to June 2021. ATF issued another
proposed rulemaking, this one addressing stabilizing
braces. Factoring Criteria for Firearms With Attached
“Stabilizing Braces” (“Brace Proposed Rule”), 86 Fed.
Reg. 30826-01 (June 10, 2021). Stabilizing braces are
“orthotic devices that attach to the rear of a firearm” that
allow someone “to secure [a] pistol against their forearm.”
Br. for Plaintiffs at 5, Firearms Regulatory
Accountability Coalition, Inc. (FRAC), v. Garland, No.
23-3230, , 2024 WL 3737366 (8th Cir. Aug. 9, 2024). These
braces were “designed” to help “people with disabilities or
limited strength or mobility” fire pistols “safely and
comfortably.”
Factoring Criteria for Firearms With
Attached “Stabilizing Braces” (“Brace Final Rule”), 88
Fed. Reg. 6478-01, 6482 (Jan. 31, 2023). And though they
are particularly helpful for people with physical
disabilities, stabilizing braces promote safety and
accuracy for any user. See Br. for Plaintiffs at 7, FRAC,
No. 23-3230.
For a great long while, ATF approved of these assistive
devices. Indeed, between 2012 and 2018, “ATF issued
[seventeen] classifications of ‘stabilizing braces.’” 88 Fed.
Reg. at 6502 n.84. In every instance, the agency concluded
that the brace was not a “firearm” covered by the NFA.
Id.
6
ATF’s (previously) long-standing approach to
stabilizing braces was consistent with the statute. The
NFA regulates “firearms,” but “‘firearms’ is a term of
art.” Mock v. Garland, 75 F.4th 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2023).
As relevant here, “firearms” under the NFA includes two
types of long guns: shotguns and rifles. 26 U.S.C.
§ 5845(a). The definitions for shotguns and rifles have this
common thread: they are weapons that are “designed,”
“made,” “and intended to be fired from the shoulder.” Id.
at § 5845(c),(d). The broader “firearm” definition targets
shotguns and rifles in two ways each—as produced and as
modified. See id. at § 5845(a). As to shotguns, the NFA
covers shotguns with “[(1)] barrels of less than 18 inches
in length” and “[(2)] weapon[s] made from a shotgun” if
they have “barrels of less than 18 inches in length” or an
“overall length of less than 26 inches.” Id. The clauses
governing rifles follow the same structure: they cover
rifles with “[(3)] barrels of less than 16 inches in length”
and “[(4)] weapon[s] made from a rifle” if they have
“barrels of less than 16 inches in length” or “an overall
length of less than 26 inches.” Id. And “make” (and its
derivatives) means “manufacturing” “other than by one
qualified to engage in such business.” 26 U.S.C. § 5845(i).
So “made from” a shotgun or rifle in (a)(2) and (4) means
someone, after initial production, shortened or modified a
rifle or shotgun. Id. § 5845(a). That leaves (a)(1) and (3)
to cover shotguns and rifles as produced. Id.
But ATF’s Brace Proposed Rule abandoned all that.
The rule’s ostensible purpose was to evaluate whether
pistols with stabilizing braces were “shotguns” or “rifles”
covered by the NFA. But to do that, the agency created a
worksheet out of thin air that purportedly helped
determine if a stabilizing brace is a firearm “designed and
intended to be fired from the shoulder.” Brace Proposed
Rule, 86 Fed. Reg. at 30829. The Worksheet established
7
“a point system assigning a weighted value to various
characteristics.” Id.
A year and half later, ATF released the Brace Final
Rule. Considering the two-hundred thousand negative
comments, “the Department agree[d] that the proposed
Worksheet … and point system did not achieve [its]
intended purposes.” Brace Final Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at
6510. So, ATF scratched the Worksheet and adopted
something shorter—a six-factor balancing test “based on
almost entirely subjective criteria.” Mock, 75 F.4th at 583.
But “nowhere in the Proposed Rule did the ATF give
notice that it was considering getting rid of the Worksheet
for a vaguer test.” Id. at 584. And the Rule was predicted
to have a gargantuan impact—affecting 99% of all
stabilizing braces on the market. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, Factoring Criteria for
Firearms with Attached “Stabilizing Braces”: Final
Regulatory Impact Analysis and Final Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis 21 (2023).
Yet the Brace Final Rule was a building with no
foundation, as the statutory text rejects ATF’s
interpretation. To start, a pistol with a stabilizing brace is
not a firearm covered by the NFA. As laid out above, the
NFA covers only a narrow subset of firearms. See 26
U.S.C. § 5845. A pistol is not one of them. See id. A pistol
with an accessory could not be covered by (a)(1) or (3),
because those definitions reach only shotguns and rifles,
as produced. Id. Neither could a pistol with an accessory
be covered by (a)(2) or (4) because those reach only
“weapon[s] made” from a shotgun or rifle. Id. Subsection
(e) confirms that pistols are not covered because it
explicitly excludes pistols from the broader “firearm”
definition. See id. At bottom, a pistol with an accessory is
8
not a rifle or shotgun. ATF’s interpretation is precluded
by the plain text of the NFA.
ATF’s Brace Final Rule also disfigures the statutory
definitions of “rifle” and “shotgun.” Remember that both
rifles and shotguns are defined, in relevant part, as
weapons that are “designed,” “made,” “and intended to be
fired from the shoulder.” 26 U.S.C. § 5845(c),(d). The
Brace Final Rule conflicts with these definitions.
Stabilizing braces were designed to assist people with
disabilities or limited strength to stabilize non-shouldered
fire. And statutorily, that matters. Designed “refers to
the design of the manufacturer, not the intent of the
retailer or customer.” Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside,
Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 501 (1982).
The Brace Final Rule likewise reinterprets “intended.”
26 U.S.C. § 5845(c),(d). To be a rifle or shotgun covered
by the NFA, the weapon must be “intended to be fired
from the shoulder.” Id. According to ATF, though, a
manufacturer’s “stated intent” is not “dispositive” of
whether the weapon is “intended” to be used in shouldered
fire. Brace Final Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 6479. So, under
the Final Rule, whenever “stated intent” apparently falls
short, ATF will look to the “likely use of the weapon in the
general community.” Id. at 6480. But analyzing “third
parties’ actions” to determine a manufacturer’s intent is
wrong. Mock, 75 F.4th at 585. The subjective intent of a
purchaser does not change the objective intent of a
manufacturer. See Vill. of Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 501. By
basing its “intent” analysis on the “likely use of the
weapon in the general community,” Brace Final Rule, 88
Fed. Reg.at 6480, ATF threatens to “hold citizens
criminally liable for the actions of others, who are likely
unknown, unaffiliated, and uncontrollable by the person
being regulated,” Mock, 75 F.4th at 586.
9
Yet with the wave of a hand, ATF dismissed every
counterargument raised. It described its seventeen
previous interpretations that found that a stabilizing
brace was not covered by the NFA as “past inconsistences
and misapplication[s] of the statutory definition,” claiming
to now “rectify its past classifications.” Brace Final Rule,
88 Fed. Reg. at 6503. For the factors in its newly invented
test that are ambiguous, ATF “does not believe it is
appropriate or necessary to specify a quantifiable metric”
to provide clarity. Id. at 6529. To the concern that there’s
no statutory basis for the rule, the agency simply “does
not agree.” Id. at 6500. And oddly, ATF claims “this rule
does not impose any new legal obligations on owners of
‘stabilizing braces’ at all.” Id. at 6506. “Instead, this rule
merely conveys more clearly to the public” what is covered
by the statute. Id.
It didn’t take long for courts to respond to how ATF’s
Brace Final Rule mangled the NFA. The Fifth Circuit
quickly recognized that the rule should be set aside as
unlawful and remanded, flagging many of the issues
above. Mock, 75 F.4th at 586; see also Mock v. Garland,
No. 4:23-CV-00095-O, 2024 WL 2982056, at *6 (N.D. Tex.
June 13, 2024) (vacating the rule). And at the behest of
many of the States here, the Eighth Circuit just recently
reversed the denial of a preliminary injunction, too. See
Firearms Regulatory Accountability Coalition, Inc.
(FRAC), v. Garland, No. 23-3230, 2024 WL 3737366 at *13
(8th Cir. Aug. 9, 2024). In finding that the Brace Final
Rule and certain related actions likely did not comply with
the APA, the court sharply condemned “[t]he ATF’s actnow-and-justify-later decisionmaking.” Id. at *12 n.15.
And it agreed with the Fifth Circuit that the rule made it
“nigh
impossible
for
a
regular
citizen
to
determine … whether a specified braced pistol required
NFA registration.” Id. at 11 (cleaned up). So once more,
10
ATF showed itself an untrustworthy steward of the
statutes.
C. Firearms Dealing
Fast forward once more, this time to September 2023.
ATF proposed a rule defining who might qualify as a
“dealer” under the GCA. “Definition of “Engaged in the
Business” as a Dealer in Firearms (“Dealer Proposed
Rule”), 88 Fed. Reg. 61993-01, 61993 (Sept. 8, 2023).
Defining “dealer” has long been a fraught exercise—
but one in which Congress has been directly engaged.
Initially, the GCA defined “dealer” as “any person
engaged in the business of selling firearms or ammunition
at wholesale or retail.” Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat.
1213, 1216 (Oct. 22, 1968). But about fifteen years after
GCA’s passage, Congress worried about the agency’s
abusive enforcement of the statute. ATF “[a]gents [were]
anxious to generate an impressive arrest and gun
confiscation quota,” so they “repeatedly enticed gun
collectors into making a small number of sales.” See The
Right to Keep and Bear Arms, Rep. of the Subcomm. on
the Const., Sen. Jud. Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at 25
(1982). Then, the agents would “charge[] the collector
with having ‘engaged in the business’” of dealing firearms
under the GCA, even though “each of the sales was
completely legal under state and federal law.” Id. To stop
this kind of abuse, Congress passed FOPA. See 100 Stat.
at 449. The Act clarified that GCA’s purpose was not to
“place any undue or unnecessary” burdens on law-abiding
citizens who wanted to own firearms. Id. To that end,
FOPA narrowed the definition of “dealer” by defining
what it meant to be “engaged in business.” Id.
Instead of capturing “any person engaged in the
business of selling firearms or ammunition at wholesale or
11
retail,” 82 Stat. at 1216 (emphasis added), FOPA clarified
that someone was “engaged in business” only if they: “[1]
devote[d] time, attention, and labor to dealing in firearms
[2] as a regular course of trade or business [3] with
the principal objective of livelihood and profit through [4]
the repetitive purchase and resale of firearms,” 100 Stat.
at 450. Note that this narrowed “dealer” in four distinct
ways. FOPA also specified that “with the principal
objective of livelihood and profit” was to mean “that the
intent underlying the sale or disposition of firearms is
predominantly one of obtaining livelihood and pecuniary
gain.” Id. And Congress provided some express
exclusions for hobbyists or collectors. Id. Altogether,
Congress could hardly have been clearer: “dealer” is a
high bar.
In 2022, Congress made a minor change to this
definition. In the BSCA, it modified “engaged in
business,” by replacing “the principal objective of
livelihood and profit” with “to predominantly earn a
profit.”
136 Stat. at 1324 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(21)(C)). And it defined “predominantly earn a
profit” to mean “that the intent underlying the sale . . . is
predominantly one of obtaining pecuniary gain.” 136 Stat.
at 1325 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(22)). These BSCA
amendments thus made two small tweaks: swapping
“predominantly” for “principal objective,” and eliminating
“livelihood” from both definitions. See id. As with the
earlier definition, BSCA maintained that someone
purchasing or selling guns for a “personal firearms
collection” was not “engaged in business.” Id. And it
added that “proof of profit” was not required when
persons are selling “firearms for criminal purposes or
terrorism.” Id.
12
ATF took BSCA as an invitation to turn the system
upside down.
Galvanized by this minor statutory
adjustment, it proposed a new rule to “clarify” the
meaning of terms Congress just defined. Dealer Proposed
Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at 61993. And in April of this year, it
finalized that rule. Definition of “Engaged in the
Business” as a Dealer in Firearms (“Dealer Final Rule”),
89 Fed. Reg. 28968-01 (Apr. 19, 2024). In it, ATF pledges
its allegiance to the “overall sentiment” animating its
actions: “we must do what we can to stop gun violence.”
Id. at 28984.
ATF’s legislative aspirations are the star of Dealer
Final Rule. To be “engaged in the business” of firearms
dealing, the Rule says “there is no minimum number of
transactions” needed. 89 Fed. Reg. at 29091; 27 C.F.R.
§ 478.13(b). In fact, “even a single firearm transaction or
offer to engage in a transaction” may be enough. Id.
(emphasis added). The Rule also creates out of the void
five presumptions, three with multiple subparts, that
could be used to show someone is “engaging in the
business” of firearms dealing. 27 C.F.R. § 478.13(c). The
Rule further declares that one’s intent can be
“predominantly [to] earn a profit” even if the seller doesn’t
“actually obtain … pecuniary gain.” Id. at § 478.13(d)(1).
And the Rule excludes firearms obtained for “personal
protection” from the definition of “personal collection.”
Id. at § 478.11.
But once more, ATF’s rule has a problem: namely, its
inconsistency with the statute meant to justify it.
First, the Rule’s “engaged in business” definition is
incompatible with the statutory one.
The GCA
emphasizes one must sell multiple—and usually many—
firearms to be “engaged in business.” 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(21)(C).
The statute refers to a “dealer in
13
firearms”—plural; it requires someone “deal[] in
firearms” (again plural) “as a regular course of trade or
business”; and it demands someone engage in “the
repetitive purchase and resale of firearms” to be
considered a dealer. Id. (emphasis added). And as a
matter of commonsense, it’s logical that someone must sell
at least two guns to be a firearms dealer.
Yet the ATF insists “there is no minimum number of
transactions” needed to be considered a “dealer.” 89 Fed.
Reg. at 29091; 27 C.F.R. § 478.13(b). “[E]ven a single
firearm transaction or offer to engage in a transaction”
may be enough. Id. (emphasis added). Worse still are the
presumptions. The first one shows it best: someone can
be presumed to be “engaged in the business” of firearm
dealing if they “(1) [r]esell[] or offer[] for resale firearms,
and also represent[] to potential buyers or otherwise
demonstrate[] a willingness and ability to purchase and
resell additional firearms.” 27 C.F.R. § 478.13(c)(1)
(emphasis added). In other words, if someone offers guns
for resale once and gives off the sense that they might
resell other guns, they are “engaged in the business” of
firearms dealing—all while selling zero firearms. See id.
Second, the Rule is incompatible with the GCA’s intent
requirement. The GCA says that “predominantly to earn
a profit” means that one’s intent is “predominantly one of
obtaining pecuniary gain.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(22). But
ATF’s Rule guts that. In its view, “predominantly [to]
earn a profit” doesn’t mean someone “actually [must]
obtain pecuniary gain.” 89 Fed. Reg. at 29090; 27 C.F.R.
§ 478.13(d)(1). This definition is at odds with the one in the
GCA. And for all ATF’s talk of how BSCA changed things,
there is one relevant addition—but it cuts against ATF’s
claims. The BSCA specified that for those selling
“firearms for criminal purposes or terrorism,” no “proof
14
of profit” was needed to prove intent. 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(22). “[T]he negative corollary is obvious: while
proof of profit is not required ‘for criminal purposes or
terrorism,’ it is required for all other cases.” Texas v.
ATF, No. 2:24-CV-89-Z, 2024 WL 2277848, at *6 (N.D.
Tex. May 19, 2024).
Third, the Dealer Final Rule improperly subverts
GCA’s safe-harbor provision. Under the GCA, one who
sells or purchases firearms for a “personal collection or for
a hobby” is not a “dealer.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C). The
Final Rule, though, excludes “firearms accumulated
primarily for personal protection” from the definition of
“personal collection.” 89 Fed. Reg. at 29090; 27 C.F.R.
§ 478.11. That exclusion has no statutory basis, and it
strips the “personal collection” exception of its force. See
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C). A natural reading of “personal
collection” includes guns owned for personal protection.
After all, self-protection is “central to the Second
Amendment right.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
Aside from the textual conflicts between the GCA and
the Dealer Final Rule, there’s one more foundational
issue: the GCA does not give ATF authority to define
terms in the first instance.
Remember ATF’s
circumscribed authority under the GCA: it may
“prescribe” only those “rules and regulations [that] are
necessary to carry out [the GCA’s] provisions.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 926(a) (emphasis added). Then, look to the GCA’s
definition of “collector.” Id. § 921(a)(13). That definition
mentions “curios or relics,” and instructs that “the
Attorney General shall by regulation define” the term. Id.
Thus, Congress instructed ATF to create a definition only
for one minor phrase in the GCA. An express grant of
authority to define one term strongly implies a lack of
15
authority to define the thirty-six others. See Bittner v.
United States, 598 U.S. 85, 94 (2023) (“[D]ifference[s] in
language” “convey a difference in meaning.”). That’s
especially true when you remember ATF has limited
authority under the statute to begin with. See 18 U.S.C. §
926. And even if ATF could define a minor term here or
there, there is no world in which it is “necessary” for ATF
to redefine the statute’s most crucial terms, thereby
eviscerating the definitions Congress created. 18 U.S.C.
§ 926.
The impact is enormous. Anyone who qualifies as a
“dealer” under the GCA must obtain a federal firearms
license. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1), 923(a). And obtaining
a license requires undergoing a background check. See id.
So by making almost everyone a “dealer” under the GCA,
ATF sneaks universal background checks in the back
door. But universal background checks are a hotly
contested political issue.
And an agency claiming
newfound “sweeping and consequential authority” needs
more than delegation “lurking” in the shadows of some
statutory corner. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 721,
723 (2022). Thus, ATF’s Dealer Final Rule raises serious
questions under the major-questions doctrine. See id.
But as it did with the Brace Final Rule, ATF insists
that all is well. ATF asserts people will “be no more
exposed to criminal liability” than they were before the
Rule. Dealer Final Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. at 28985. Instead—
says ATF—“they will just have much clearer sense of
what conduct does and does not fall” in GCA’s reach. Id.
As to universal background checks, ATF seemingly
agrees with one of its commenters that “no one is being
inconvenienced by doing a background check” anyway.
Id. And what does ATF say to the tens of thousands of
commentors who thought the regulation was vague, overly
16
complex, or beyond statutory authority? Here, too, they
just “disagree.” Id. at 28991, 29010.
As for statutory authority, ATF leans on a cut-andpaste from the enabling statute and this quote from an
older Fourth Circuit case: “Because [the GCA] authorizes
the Secretary to promulgate those regulations which are
‘necessary,’ it almost inevitably confers some measure of
discretion to determine what regulations are in fact
‘necessary.’” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Brady, 914 F.2d 475, 479
(4th Cir. 1990). Nothing screams “lacking statutory
authority” like necessary doesn’t really mean necessary.
Only one case has ever been fooled into relying on that
faulty proposition—the district court’s now-repudiated
decision in Cargill. See Cargill v. Barr, 502 F. Supp. 3d
1163, 1186 (W.D. Tex. 2020). And even NRA recognized
that ATF was not to “stray from the directives of the
statute.” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 914 F.2d at 479. No wonder,
then, that courts have already recognized the serious
flaws in this rule, too. See, e.g., Kansas v. Garland, No.
24-CV-01086, 2024 WL 3360533, at *7 (D. Kan. July 10,
2024) (“Plaintiffs identified instances where the Final
Rule may have effectively attempted to rewrite the
statute, which the agency may not do.”); Texas, 2024 WL
2277848, at *5 (“[T]he Final Rule clashes with the text of
the BSCA in at least three ways.”).
So the Dealer Rule was a third recent example of ATF
endeavoring to evade the limits of the very statutes it was
purporting to construe.
D. This Rule
All that brings us to the dispute before the Court now.
In trying to squeeze “weapons parts kits” within the
meaning of GCA’s definition of “firearm,” ATF is once
more trying to stretch its enabling statutes too far. In
17
every instance outlined above, “[t]he law hasn’t changed,
only [the] agency’s interpretation of it.” Guedes v. ATF,
140 S. Ct. 789, 790 (2020) (statement of Gorsuch, J.). And
with each broad-brush expansion of liability, a host of
constitutional and other issues arise—be it inconsistency
with the major questions doctrine, violations of Second
Amendment rights, or new Due Process concerns. So too
here. ATF’s rule just isn’t grounded in the statute, as
Respondents well explain. See VanDerStok Br. 18-33;
Defense Distributed Br. 13-22.
But here, ATF is also playing fast and loose with its
responsibilities under the APA, which only further
compounds the problem. The rule at issue turns on the
definition of “frame or receiver” in the GCA. And under
the proposed rule, a “frame or receiver” embraced any
part that could “hold” or “integrate” “one or more fire
control components,” which was in turn defined as “a
component necessary for the firearm to initiate, complete,
or continue the firing sequence.” Definition of “Frame or
Receiver” and Identification of Firearms (“Frame
Proposed Rule”), 86 Fed. Reg. 27720, 27741 (May 21,
2021). But that definition would have covered all sorts of
firearms parts, which meant modern firearms would then
have many different “frames” or “receivers.” When
commenters flagged that reality, ATF at least agreed its
proposed definition was unworkable. Frame Final Rule,
87 Fed. Reg. at 24692. But ATF didn’t propose a new
definition and invite comment (which might’ve allowed
commenters to flag the problems lurking in any new
definition, too). Id. Instead, ATF just did its work on the
fly; the final rule adopts “new distinct definitions
describing a specific housing or structure for one specific
type of fire control component.” Id. at 24693. Specifically,
the new definition focused on the “primary energized
component designed to hold back the hammer, striker,
18
bolt, or similar component.” Id. at 24735. Put differently,
ATF shifted from focusing on every discernible
component of a firing sequence (and any housing or
structure for it) to fixing on just one specific piece. ATF
plucked this new formulation from a comment. Id. at
24693.
So this case presents a “logical outgrowth” problem—
a situation in which the agency “significantly amended the
rule between the proposed rule and final versions, making
it impossible for people to comment on the rule during the
comment period.” Ohio v. EPA, 144 S. Ct. 2040, 2056
(2024) (cleaned up). The APA forecloses that approach.
See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158,
174 (2007) (describing how the courts of appeals have
construed 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)). In other words, the APA
won’t countenance a rulemaking process in which
“interested parties would have had to divine the agency’s
unspoken thoughts, because the final rule was
surprisingly distant from the proposed rule.” CSX
Transp., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 584 F.3d 1076, 1080
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). And “[a]n agency ... does not
have carte blanche to establish a rule contrary to its
original proposal simply because it receives suggestions to
alter it during the comment period.” Mock, 75 F.4th at
584.
It’s hard not to draw troubling conclusions from these
moves. ATF’s approach could well give off the sense that
it did not want to be told again why it was employing extrastatutory understandings. Instead, the agency preferred
to skip to the end and reach its desired result. This baitand-switch is yet another reason not to countenance this
rule. “Otherwise, agencies could hide their true proposal
from public scrutiny by proposing something completely
unrelated to what they intend to promulgate as a final
19
rule.” Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing
Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 895 (2007).
And as should be obvious to this point, ATF’s efforts
warrant plenty of scrutiny.
* * *
Congress has not outlawed weapons parts kits,
stabilizing braces, or bump stocks. Nor has it dubbed
every person handling a gun a firearms dealer. ATF can’t
take these actions in Congress’s place. The agency’s
error, here, provides another peek behind the curtains.
And looking backstage, it’s clear that ATF is a legislative
body poorly disguising itself as an executive one—even
going so far as to use procedural maneuvers to avoid
scrutiny.
ATF has a history of ignoring statutory text and APA
mandates. The Court should keep that history in mind
when providing ATF with course correction here. Cf.
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2258
(2024) (explaining how “respect” for administrative
determinations was only warranted under early cases
when agencies had shown themselves “masters of the
subject” who had consistently implemented the statute).
Especially when key constitutional rights, Luis v. United
States, 578 U.S. 5, 26-27 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring),
and potential criminal liability, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924, are
in play (as they are here), the Court should not blind itself
to the ATF’s pattern of conduct.
II.
Policy Concerns Can’t Trump Statutory Text.
Left with little in the way of textual support, many of
ATF’s amici argue that this Court should depart from the
statute’s plain meaning because excluding “ghost guns”
from the GCA’s scope would purportedly have dire
20
consequences. See, e.g., Br. of Amicus Curiae Global
Action on Gun Violence, at 3-4; Br. of Dist. Att’y N.Y.
Cnty. et al., as Amici Curiae, at 17 (“home-assembled
firearms’ … functional equivalence to pre-assembled guns
confirms the need for the regulatory oversight provided
by the Final Rule”); Br. of Amici Curiae 20 Major Cities
et al., at 12 (arguing that vacating ATF’s final rule will
likely lead to a surge in the use of ghost guns in criminal
activity); Br. of Major Cities Chiefs Ass’n et al., as Amici
Curiae, at 13-14 (commending ATF’s final rule and
arguing that it shouldn’t be set aside because it helps
“keep [ghost guns] out of the hands of criminals” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). By focusing less on the law
and more on the policy, the amici seem to be pursuing the
same ends-justify-the-means approach that ATF has
pushed in its prior rulemaking efforts. And some of the
“ends” seem speculative, as when Petitioners ominously
warn about a world in which “juveniles”—that is,
children—will start manufacturing their own firearms “in
a few minutes.” Pets.’ Br. 43.
But to resolve this case, the Court need not resolve
whether it’s likely children will start building their own
pistols or whether kits that have been legal for years will
suddenly come into vogue, sparking a crime wave. Nor
need the Court wrestle with how to draw the line between
kits and ordinary “hardware store components,” both of
which can be fashioned into weapons. See Reuben Dass,
The Assassination of Shinzo Abe in Japan and the Threat
from Primitive Homemade Weapons, JAMESTOWN
FOUND. TERRORISM MONITOR (Oct. 7, 2022),
https://bit.ly/3WE4krc. In the end, no matter how wise
ATF’s final rule or how “weighty” Petitioners’ policy
concerns may be, the final rule exceeds ATF’s statutory
authority. And that should be the end of the matter. Even
more so when the new administrative effort purports to
21
tackle a closely contested issue by putting an
“unprecedented” new spin on a long-existing statute. Ala.
Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 594
U.S. 758, 765 (2021).
Even if ATF’s final rule rested on a so-called
“permissible” construction of the GCA that may have
warranted deference under Chevron, this Court just shut
that door. “It … makes no sense,” the Court just
recognized, “to speak of a ‘permissible’ interpretation that
is not the one the court, after applying all relevant
interpretive tools, concludes is best.” Loper Bright, 144 S.
Ct. at 2266. In the business of statutory interpretation, if
it is not the best, it is not permissible.” Id.
And setting Loper Bright aside for the moment, our
core constitutional commitments foreclose ATF’s attempt
to bend the GCA to achieve policy goals that Congress has
yet to embrace. “[P]olicy concerns cannot trump the best
interpretation of the statutory text.” Patel v. Garland,
596 U.S. 328, 346 (2022). “In the face of … unsuccessful
legislative efforts … judges may not rewrite the law
simply because of their policy views[,] … update the law
merely because they think that Congress does not have
the votes or fortitude[,] … [or] predictively amend the
law[.]” Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 782 (2020)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). “No statute pursues a single
policy at all costs, and we are not free to rewrite this
statute (or any other) as if it did.” Bartenwerfer v.
Buckley, 598 U.S. 69, 81 (2023). And in much the same
way that firearms violence cannot justify ignoring the
Constitution, Heller, 554 U.S. at 636, the same problem
cannot justify ignoring congressional statutes, either.
As a practical matter, “executive officials are not, nor
are they supposed to be ‘wholly impartial’” on policy
choices like those reflected in ATF’s final rule—indeed,
22
ATF has “[its] own interests, [its] own constituencies, and
[its] own policy goals” that are reflected in the final rule.
Kisor v. Wilke, 588 U.S. 558, 615 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
That bias makes it only more important that this Court
not cede its obligation to adopt the fairest and best reading
of the statute, even if it differs from ATF’s preferred
reading. For “[u]nder the Constitution’s separation of
powers, [the Court’s] role as judges is to interpret and
follow the law as written, regardless of whether [the
judges] like the result.” Bostock, 590 U.S. at 780-81
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Texas v. Johnson,
491 U. S. 397, 420-21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)); see
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, p. 523 (J. Cooke ed. 1961)
(federal judges exercise “neither Force nor Will, but
merely judgment”).
Careful adherence by this Court to the text is not a
matter of blind obedience. Rather, it is what it means to
be a “[g]overnment of laws, not of men.” Zuni Pub. Sch.
Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 119 (2007)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). It is, after all, legislated or
promulgated text that allows citizens to predictably order
their affairs and avoid the “eternal fog of uncertainty” that
deference to agency reinterpretations allows. Loper
Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2272. And it is what safeguards our
right of self-government—the separation of legislative,
executive, and judicial powers, enforced not by mere
“parchment barriers” but by a judicial branch faithful to
say what the law is, not what it should be (or would be if
only the legislators knew better). See Zuni, 550 U.S. at
118 (“Why should we suppose that in matters more likely
to arouse the judicial libido … a judge in the School of
Textual Subversion would not find it convenient (yea,
righteous!) to assume that Congress must have meant, not
what it said, but what he knows to be best?”). In contrast,
“[i]f judges could … rewrite or update … gun laws based
23
on their own policy views, the Judiciary would become a
democratically illegitimate super-legislature—unelected
and hijacking the important policy decisions reserved by
the Constitution to the people’s elected representatives.”
Bostock, 590 U.S. at 782-83 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
The answer to the concerns raised by Petitioners’
amici—weighty as they may be—is not to abandon our
core constitutional commitments but to reaffirm them.
The regulation of parts kits, like sports gambling and
many other controversial subjects, requires important
policy choices—but the choice is not for agencies or courts
to make. Cf. Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453, 486 (2018).
The solution to those concerns lies in the halls of Congress,
not in the chambers of the Supreme Court. See Intel
Corp. Inv. Pol’y Comm. v. Sulyma, 589 U.S. 178, 188
(2020) (“If policy considerations suggest that the current
scheme should be altered, Congress must be the one to do
it.”); Cargill, 602 U.S. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[A]n
event that highlights the need to amend a law does not
change its meaning,” but there is a “simple
remedy”: “Congress can amend the law[.]”). So the Fifth
Circuit correctly recognized below that “lawmaking
power—the ability to transform policy into real world
obligations—lies solely with the legislative branch.”
Pet.App.2a.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm.
24
Respectfully submitted.
AUSTIN KNUDSEN
Attorney General
CHRISTIAN B. CORRIGAN
Solicitor General
PETER M. TORSTENSEN,
JR.
Deputy Solicitor General
MONTANA DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
215 North Sanders
P.O. Box 201401
Helena, MT 59620-1401
(406) 444-2026
peter.torstensen@mt.gov
Counsel for State of
Montana
PATRICK MORRISEY
Attorney General
MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
OFFICE OF THE
WEST VIRGINIA
ATTORNEY GENERAL
State Capitol Complex
Building 1, Room E-26
Charleston, WV 25305
(304) 558-2021
mwilliams@wvago.gov
Counsel for State of
West Virginia
25
ADDITIONAL COUNSEL
STEVE MARSHALL
Attorney General
State of Alabama
KRIS KOBACH
Attorney General
State of Kansas
TREG TAYLOR
Attorney General
State of Alaska
RUSSELL COLEMAN
Attorney General
State of Kentucky
TIM GRIFFIN
Attorney General
State of Arkansas
LIZ MURRILL
Attorney General
State of Louisiana
ASHLEY MOODY
Attorney General
State of Florida
LYNN FITCH
Attorney General
State of Mississippi
CHRIS CARR
Attorney General
State of Georgia
ANDREW BAILEY
Attorney General
State of Missouri
RAÚL LABRADOR
Attorney General
State of Idaho
MICHAEL T. HILGERS
Attorney General
State of Nebraska
THEODORE E. ROKITA
Attorney General
State of Indiana
JOHN FORMELLA
Attorney General
State of New Hampshire
BRENNA BIRD
Attorney General
State of Iowa
DREW WRIGLEY
Attorney General
State of North Dakota
26
DAVE YOST
Attorney General
State of Ohio
GENTNER DRUMMOND
Attorney General
State of Oklahoma
ALAN WILSON
Attorney General
State of South Carolina
MARTY JACKLEY
Attorney General
State of South Dakota
JONATHAN SKRMETTI
Attorney General and
Reporter
State of Tennessee
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General
State of Texas
SEAN REYES
Attorney General
State of Utah
JASON MIYARES
Attorney General
State of Virginia
BRIDGET HILL
Attorney General
State of Wyoming
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.