Opposition Brief — United States, Petitioner v. David L. Miller

Supreme Court briefMay 13, 2024

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No. 23-824

In the Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PETITIONER,

v.

DAVID L. MILLER,

RESPONDENT.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

REID W. LAMBERT

STRONG & HANNI

102 South 200 East

Suite 800

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

LISA S. BLATT

Counsel of Record

AARON Z. ROPER

ERIN M. SIELAFF

AYOUB OUEDERNI

WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP

680 Maine Avenue SW

Washington, DC 20024

(202) 434-5000

lblatt@wc.com

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The Bankruptcy Code broadly waives federal sovereign immunity “with respect to” 59 sections of the Code,

including sections 544 and 550. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a). Section 544 empowers bankruptcy trustees to avoid prebankruptcy transfers of debtors’ property that are “voidable under applicable law,” including state law, “by a

creditor holding an unsecured claim.” Id. § 544(b)(1).

Section 550 then empowers trustees to “recover” such

fraudulent transfers “for the benefit of the estate.” Id.

§ 550(a).

The questions presented are:

1. Whether bankruptcy trustees may avoid fraudulent transfers to the United States under section 544(b),

notwithstanding federal sovereign immunity.

2. Whether the United States may invoke federal-law

preemption and Appropriations Clause defenses to a section 544(b) avoidance action.

(I)

II

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION ................................................................ 1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..................... 3

STATEMENT ....................................................................... 4

Statutory Background .............................................. 4

Factual and Procedural Background ..................... 6

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ............ 10

I. Further Percolation Is Warranted ............................ 11

II. This Case Does Not Warrant the Court’s

Review ............................................................................ 15

III. The Decision Below Is Correct .................................. 20

CONCLUSION ................................................................... 25

III

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Acequia, Inc. v. Clinton (In re Acequia, Inc.),

34 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1994) ........................................... 22

Affiliated Physicians & Emps. Master Tr. v.

Dep’t of Treasury (In re Affiliated Physicians

& Emps. Master Tr.), 2022 WL 16953555

(Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. 15, 2022) ...................................... 17

Bauer v. United States (In re Oncology Assocs. of

Ocean Cnty. LLC), 510 B.R. 463

(Bankr. D.N.J. 2014) ..................................................... 17

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.

Bureau of Narcotics,

403 U.S. 388 (1971) ........................................................ 12

CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985) ........................... 5

Cook v. United States (In re Yahweh Ctr., Inc.),

27 F.4th 960 (4th Cir. 2022) .................................... 12, 14

Dep’t of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v.

Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42 (2024) .................... 2, 10, 12-14, 20-21

FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) ......................10, 12-13

In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc. (EAR),

742 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2014) ..... 2, 9-10, 12-17, 21-22, 24

Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior

Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin,

599 U.S. 382 (2023) .................................................4-5, 21

Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling,

584 U.S. 709 (2018) .................................................... 9, 20

Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415 (2014) ....................................... 5

McClarty v. Hatchett (In re Hatchett),

588 B.R. 472 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2018)....................... 17

IV

Page

Cases—continued:

Menotte v. United States (In re Custom

Contractors, LLC), 439 B.R. 544

(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010) ................................................. 18

Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc.,

583 U.S. 366 (2018) ........................................................ 22

Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology,

LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019) ............................................ 5

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis,

143 S. Ct. 2686 (2023) .................................................... 20

Pyfer v. Katzman (In re Nat’l Pool Constr., Inc.),

2015 WL 394507 (Bankr. D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2015) ....17-18

United States v. Nordic Vill. Inc.,

503 U.S. 30 (1992) .......................................................... 18

VMI Liquidating Tr. v. United States

(In re Valley Mortg., Inc.), 2013 WL 5314369

(Bankr. D. Colo. Sept. 18, 2013) .................................. 18

Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy,

144 S. Ct. 478 (2023) ...................................................... 19

Zazzali v. United States (In re DBSI, Inc.),

869 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2017) ............... 12, 14-15, 19, 24

Constitution and Statutes:

U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 7

(Appropriations Clause) ............. 3, 11-12, 14-15, 19, 24

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

§ 101 ............................................................................. 5, 20

§ 106 ................................................................................. 17

§ 106(a) ................................ 1-2, 5, 8-11, 13, 20-21, 23-24

§ 106(a)(1) ..................................................................... 6, 9

§ 106(a)(2)-(5) ................................................................. 23

§ 544 ................................................. 1, 3, 6, 8-9, 11, 20, 22

§ 544(b) ...................................................... 2-3, 7-15, 18-24

§ 544(b)(1) ............................................ 1, 5, 7, 9-11, 22-23

V

Page

Constitution and Statutes—continued:

11 U.S.C.

§ 545 ................................................................................. 22

§ 547 ................................................................................. 22

§ 548 .................................................... 2, 5-8, 11, 15, 22-23

§ 549 ................................................................................. 22

§ 550 ............................................................................. 6, 22

§ 553 ................................................................................. 22

§ 704 ................................................................................... 5

§ 724 ................................................................................. 22

28 U.S.C. § 1408 ................................................................... 16

Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (1984)

§ 5 ....................................................................................... 6

§ 9 ....................................................................................... 6

Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (2014)

§ 5 ....................................................................................... 6

§ 9 ....................................................................................... 6

Ala. Code § 8-9B-10(c)......................................................... 16

Alaska Stat. § 34.40.010 ...................................................... 16

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1009(2) ..................................... 16

Ark. Code Ann. § 4-59-209(b) ............................................. 16

Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.09(b)................................................. 16

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-110(1)(b) ........................................ 16

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552j(2) ............................................. 16

D.C. Code § 28-3109(2)........................................................ 16

Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 1309(2) .......................................... 16

Fla. Stat. § 726.110(2).......................................................... 16

Ga. Code Ann. § 18-2-79(2) ................................................. 16

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 651C-9(2) ............................................... 16

Idaho Code § 55-918(2) ....................................................... 16

Ill. Comp. Stat. 160/10(b) .................................................... 16

Ind. Code § 32-18-2-19(2).................................................... 16

VI

Page

Constitution and Statutes—continued:

2016 Iowa Acts ch. 1040 ...................................................... 16

Iowa Code § 684.9(2) ........................................................... 16

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 33-209(b) ................................................ 16

2015 Ky. Acts ch. 37 ............................................................ 16

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 378A.090(2) ..................................... 16

La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2041 .............................................. 16

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 109A, § 10(b) .................................... 16

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101 ........................ 16

Me. Stat. tit. 14, § 3580(2) ................................................... 16

Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5813 ............................................ 16

Minn. Stat. § 541.05(1)(2).................................................... 16

Miss. Code Ann. § 15-3-115(b) ........................................... 16

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 428.049(2) ................................................. 16

Mont. Code Ann. § 31-2-341(2) .......................................... 16

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.9(2) ................................................ 16

N.D. Cent. Code § 13-02.1-09(2) ........................................ 16

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 545-A:9(II).................................... 16

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 25:2-31(b) ................................................ 16

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 56-10-23(B)............................................ 16

N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law § 278(b) ...................................... 16

2019 N.Y. Laws ch. 580 ....................................................... 16

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 36-810(2) ................................................. 16

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 112.230(1)(b) .......................................... 16

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1336.09(B) .................................... 16

Okla. Stat. tit. 24, § 121(2) .................................................. 16

Or. Rev. Stat. § 95.280(2) .................................................... 16

12 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5109(2) ................................................ 16

6 R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-16-9(2) ............................................... 16

S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530 .................................................. 16

S.D. Codified Laws § 54-8A-9(b) ....................................... 16

Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-3-310(2) ........................................... 16

Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 24.010(a)(2) ..................... 16

Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-305(2) ............................................ 16

VII

Page

Constitution and Statutes—continued:

Utah’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,

Utah Code §§ 25-6-1 et seq. (2014) ................ 2, 7, 20, 23

§ 25-6-5 ........................................................................... 22

§ 25-6-6 ...................................................................7, 22-23

§ 25-6-8 .................................................................. 7, 22, 24

§ 25-6-9 ...................................................................8, 22-23

§ 25-6-10 ............................................................................ 8

Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-253 .................................................... 16

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2293(2) ............................................. 16

W. Va. Code § 40-1A-9(b) ................................................... 16

Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.091(2) ......................................... 16

Wis. Stat. § 893.425(2) ......................................................... 16

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-14-210(a)(ii)...................................... 16

Other Authorities:

Collier on Bankruptcy (16th ed.)

¶ 544.01............................................................................ 20

¶ 544.06.............................................................................. 6

¶ 550.01............................................................................ 22

Complaint, Cook v. Roberts (In re Yahweh Ctr.,

Inc.), 2019 WL 1325032

(Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 22, 2019) ................................. 18

Complaint, Furr v. IRS (In re Pharmacy Distrib.

Servs.), 455 B.R. 817 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) ............ 18

Complaint, McClarty v. Hatchett (In re Hatchett),

588 B.R. 472 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2018)....................... 18

Complaint, Bauer v. United States (In re

Oncology Assocs. of Ocean Cnty. LLC),

510 B.R. 463 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014) .............................. 18

U.S. Courts, Bankruptcies Rise 16 Percent Over

Previous Year (Apr. 25, 2024),

https://tinyurl.com/2cvurbt3 ........................................ 17

VIII

Page

Other Authorities—continued:

U.S. Courts, Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics,

https://tinyurl.com/5fhad2x4 .......................................... 5

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

(1993) ............................................................................... 20

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 23-824

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PETITIONER,

v.

DAVID L. MILLER,

RESPONDENT.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

INTRODUCTION

The government asks this Court to decide how Congress’ waiver of sovereign immunity in bankruptcy cases

applies to a specific type of fraudulent-transfer action.

The shallow disagreement on that infrequently arising

question does not warrant this Court’s review.

Section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

§ 106(a), broadly and unambiguously waives federal sovereign immunity “with respect to” 59 sections of the Code,

including section 544. Section 544(b)(1), in turn, permits

bankruptcy trustees to “avoid any transfer … by the

debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor

(1)

2

holding an unsecured claim.” Here, an insolvent company

fraudulently paid its officers’ personal tax debts to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The bankruptcy trustee

used section 544(b) to avoid those transfers, relying on

Utah’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act as the “applicable law.”

As the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits recognize,

sovereign immunity is no barrier to such avoidance actions against the United States. Section 106(a)’s broad

waiver takes sovereign immunity out of the picture. If a

transfer is voidable under state law, the federal government cannot invoke sovereign immunity. Only the

Seventh Circuit disagrees. That court has held that because sovereign immunity would bar recovery from the

IRS outside of bankruptcy, a trustee cannot sue the IRS

inside of bankruptcy. In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc.

(EAR), 742 F.3d 743, 747 (7th Cir. 2014).

That outlier decision has been overtaken by events.

This Court in Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42 (2024),

recently rejected a similar argument that would have effectively required two waivers of sovereign immunity—

one general and one specific to the cause of action. And

since the Seventh Circuit’s decision, every other circuit to

consider the question has rejected the Seventh Circuit’s

approach. Rather than wading in now, this Court should

permit the Seventh Circuit to reconsider its holding in

light of those subsequent decisions.

Even were the question fully aired, this case would

not warrant the Court’s intervention. Trustees may undisputedly avoid fraudulent transfers to the United States

made within two years of bankruptcy under a different

provision, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a). The question presented

thus arises only when the transfer occurs more than two

3

years before bankruptcy, but within the look-back period

allowed under state law—four years or less in 46 States

and the District of Columbia. Given that narrow window,

the government identifies only six reported cases in the

last decade presenting this issue. The median amount involved is around $200,000—0.000003% of the federal

budget. An issue arising less than once a year that implicates relatively modest sums does not warrant this

Court’s review.

Moreover, the government’s expansive question presented smuggles in extraneous issues on which there is no

split. The government (at 17-18) asks the Court to decide

the availability of two other federal-law defenses in section 544(b) cases:

field preemption and the

Appropriations Clause. But the two circuits to rule on either question side with trustees; the Seventh Circuit’s

discussion favoring the government is dicta. The government’s preemption argument would inject complicated,

disputed issues that have little to do with bankruptcy law.

And the government forfeited its Appropriations Clause

argument below.

Moreover, the Tenth Circuit’s decision is correct.

Congress’ waiver of immunity “with respect to” section

544 covers all aspects of section 544(b) claims, including

the underlying state-law cause of action. Whether or not

a creditor could recover from the IRS outside of bankruptcy, the transfers here are “voidable” under Utah law.

That is all section 544(b) requires. This Court should deny

the petition.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(1) provides:

(a) Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a

4

governmental unit to the extent set forth in this section

with respect to the following:

(1) Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 303, 346, 362, 363, 364,

365, 366, 502, 503, 505, 506, 510, 522, 523, 524, 525, 542,

543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 722,

724, 726, 744, 749, 764, 901, 922, 926, 928, 929, 944,

1107, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1146, 1201, 1203, 1205, 1206,

1227, 1231, 1301, 1303, 1305, and 1327 of this title.

11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) provides:

Except as provided in paragraph (2), the trustee may

avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property

or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable

under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured

claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title or

that is not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title.

11 U.S.C. § 550(a) provides:

Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the

extent that a transfer is avoided under section 544, 545,

547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the trustee may

recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such

property, from—

(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity

for whose benefit such transfer was made; or

(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.

STATEMENT

Statutory Background

In order to protect bankruptcy’s “orderly and centralized debt-resolution process,” the Bankruptcy Code

contains an expansive waiver of sovereign immunity. Lac

5

du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians

v. Coughlin, 599 U.S. 382, 391 (2023) (citation omitted).

Congress expressly abrogated the sovereign immunity of

“governmental unit[s],” including the United States,

“with respect to” 59 enumerated sections of the Code. 11

U.S.C. §§ 101(27), 106(a). Accordingly, the Code’s “basic

requirements generally apply to all creditors,” including

the United States. See Lac du Flambeau, 599 U.S. at 391.

This case involves a liquidation bankruptcy under

chapter 7 of the Code. In chapter 7 bankruptcies, a disinterested, private individual called a trustee collects the

debtor’s assets, liquidates them, and distributes the proceeds to creditors. Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 417 (2014);

11 U.S.C. § 704(a); see U.S. Courts, Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics, https://tinyurl.com/5fhad2x4.

Trustees enjoy “extensive” powers to fulfill their

“duty to maximize the value of the estate.” CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 352 (1985). One of those powers is

avoiding fraudulent transfers, i.e., “something-for-nothing transfers that deplete the estate (and so cheat

creditors).” Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology,

LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1663 (2019). Several provisions of

the Code empower trustees to avoid fraudulent transfers,

including two relevant here.

First, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1), in relevant part, permits

trustees to “avoid any transfer” for which the debtor “received less than a reasonably equivalent value” at a time

when the debtor “was insolvent.” That section applies to

transfers made within two years of bankruptcy.

Second, 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) permits trustees to

“avoid any transfer” that “is voidable under applicable law

by a creditor holding an unsecured claim.” The trustee

must identify “an actual creditor with an allowable claim

6

against the debtor”—a requirement that does not apply

to section 548(a). Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 544.06[1] (16th

ed.). And the trustee must identify an “applicable law”—

usually the relevant State’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer

Act or Uniform Voidable Transactions Act.

Id.

¶ 544.06[2]. Those uniform acts, like section 548(a), permit creditors to avoid transfers made “without receiving

a reasonably equivalent value” at a time when “the debtor

was insolvent.” Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 5(a)

(1984); Unif. Voidable Transactions Act § 5(a) (2014). The

uniform acts generally give creditors four years to avoid

fraudulent transfers instead of the two years available under section 548(a). Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 9;

Unif. Voidable Transactions Act § 9; see infra p. 16 nn.1-2

(cataloging state look-back periods).

Only once a trustee has avoided a transfer under section 544, 548, or some other provision of the Code can the

trustee “recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred” or the value thereof. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a).

Sections 544, 548, and 550 are among the 59 sections of the

Code for which Congress has waived the United States’

sovereign immunity. Id. § 106(a)(1).

Factual and Procedural Background

1. This case arises from the bankruptcy of All Resort

Group, Inc.—a transportation and destination-management company based in Park City, Utah. See Insolvency

Analysis 2-6, Bankr. Ct. Dkt. 14-1. All Resort and its subsidiaries offered limousine, car, and bus services in Utah

and Las Vegas, Nevada. Id.

In December 2013, All Resort fell into insolvency. Id.

at 8-9. All Resort had mounting debts, including a $55,000

employment-discrimination settlement owed to a former

employee, Robin Salazar. Pet.App.20a-21a. And, despite

7

“decreasing revenues,” All Resort paid “substantial dividends” to its shareholders and suffered from “poor

management” that made worsening financial decisions.

Insolvency Analysis 10-13.

All Resort’s managers also used the company for personal financial benefit. In June 2014, All Resort paid the

IRS $145,138.78 to satisfy the personal tax debts of two

corporate officers. Pet.App.20a; Compl. ¶¶ 10-13, Bankr.

Ct. Dkt. 1. All Resort paid those personal tax debts using

corporate checks drawn on the company’s corporate bank

account. Compl. Exs. 1-2. All Resort received nothing

reasonably equivalent in exchange. Pet.App.26a.

2. In April 2017, All Resort filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Utah. Pet.App.19a. In

September 2017, All Resort petitioned the bankruptcy

court to convert the case to a chapter 7 liquidation.

Pet.App.19a. The court granted the petition, and respondent was appointed as trustee. Pet.App.19a-20a.

In July 2018, the trustee filed this adversary proceeding to avoid All Resort’s fraudulent tax payments to the

United States. See Pet.App.20a. The trustee invoked

both sections 544(b) and 548(a). Compl. ¶ 19; Pet.App.20a.

As the “applicable law” for his section 544(b)(1) claim, the

trustee cited Utah’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,

Utah Code §§ 25-6-1 et seq. (2014).

Utah permits creditors to bring “an action for relief

against a transfer” to obtain “avoidance of the transfer.”

Id. § 25-6-8(1). A transfer is fraudulent and thus voidable

when (1) “the debtor made the transfer … without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange,” and

(2) “the debtor was insolvent” at the time. Id. § 25-6-6(1).

If “a transfer is voidable,” “the creditor may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred” against the

8

transferee, any subsequent transferee who did not take in

good faith, or “the person for whose benefit the transfer

was made.” Id. § 25-6-9(2). Like most States, Utah gives

creditors four years to avoid fraudulent transfers. Id.

§ 25-6-10(2).

3.a. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment,

and the bankruptcy court granted the trustee’s motion.

Pet.App.50a-51a. The court rejected the trustee’s claim

under section 548(a) because the transfers fell outside the

statute’s two-year look-back period. Pet.App.24a n.26.

But, the court held, the trustee could avoid the fraudulent

transfers under section 544(b). Pet.App.48a.

The government “concede[d] that the Trustee has

proved all the elements” required by Utah law: “All Resort did not receive reasonably equivalent value” for the

transfers and “was insolvent at the time.” Pet.App.26a.

The government also conceded the existence of an unsecured creditor: Salazar, the former employee with the

employment-discrimination settlement.

Pet.App.26a.

But, the government argued that Salazar could not serve

as the “creditor” under section 544(b) because, outside of

bankruptcy, “sovereign immunity … would bar her suit

against the United States” and the Internal Revenue

Code would field preempt her cause of action.

Pet.App.26a, 43a.

The bankruptcy court rejected the government’s sovereign-immunity defense, holding that section 106(a)

“eliminates sovereign immunity with respect to the underlying state law causes of action incorporated through

§ 544(b).” Pet.App.37a (cleaned up). By its “plain text,”

section 106(a) waives sovereign immunity “with respect

to” section 544, signaling Congress’ “intent that the

waiver would cover matters related to that Code section,”

9

including “the state law causes of action incorporated

through § 544(b).” Pet.App.33a-34a.

Thus, the court held, “the trustee need only identify

an unsecured creditor who, but for sovereign immunity,

could have brought the claim at issue.” Pet.App.39a (citation omitted). The government cannot assert sovereign

immunity—“the very defense that is abrogated by

§ 106(a)(1)”—against the trustee. Pet.App.39a (citation

omitted).

The court also held that field preemption does not bar

section 544(b) claims against the IRS. The court explained that section 544(b) “is a federal cause of action and

therefore cannot be preempted.” Pet.App.46a (cleaned

up). Moreover, the court continued, fraudulent-transfer

claims do not fall “within the field of federal tax collection”

and are therefore not preempted even outside bankruptcy. Pet.App.46a-47a.

b. The district court affirmed, adopting the bankruptcy court’s decision. Pet.App.15a-17a.

4. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. Pet.App.14a. As the

court noted, section 106(a) waives sovereign immunity

“with respect to” section 544. Pet.App.6a-7a. That “critical,” “broadening” language reaches “any subject that has

‘a connection with’” section 544 and “clearly expresses

Congress’s intent to abolish the Government’s sovereign

immunity in an avoidance proceeding arising under

§ 544(b)(1).” Pet.App.7a-8a (quoting Lamar, Archer &

Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 584 U.S. 709, 717-18 (2018)) (emphasis omitted). Section 106(a) thus waives sovereign

immunity from both section 544(b) itself and “the Utah

state law the Trustee invokes.” Pet.App.8a.

The Tenth Circuit considered and rejected the Seventh Circuit’s decision in EAR, 742 F.3d 743. Pet.App.9a-

10

11a. The Tenth Circuit explained that the Seventh Circuit

erroneously demands “a second waiver of sovereign immunity … as to the underlying state law cause of action”

based on a faulty analogy to FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471

(1994). Pet.App.9a-10a. But the Seventh Circuit “never

meaningfully addressed the scope of § 106(a) as reflected

in its text,” which broadly waives immunity “with respect

to” section 544(b) claims. Pet.App.9a.

The Tenth Circuit also rejected the government’s

field-preemption argument. Pet.App.12a-14a. The court

explained that section 544(b)(1) “is a federal statute” that

expressly incorporates state law. Pet.App.13a. Had Congress wanted to preempt the application of state law

under section 544(b), the court added, “Congress surely

would have added an express preemption provision.”

Pet.App.13a.

The Tenth Circuit denied rehearing en banc without

noted dissent. Pet.App.52a-53a.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

The circuits’ narrow disagreement over how federal

sovereign immunity applies to section 544(b) fraudulenttransfer actions does not warrant this Court’s review.

To start, the government’s 3-1 split warrants further

percolation. Only the Seventh Circuit has adopted the

government’s position that sovereign immunity bars section 544(b) actions against the United States. EAR, 742

F.3d at 747. But just this Term, the Court rejected a similar sovereign-immunity argument in Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42.

And in the decade since the Seventh Circuit’s decision,

every circuit to consider the question has rejected the

Seventh Circuit’s approach. The Court should deny certiorari to permit the Seventh Circuit to consider these

developments.

11

Regardless, sovereign immunity’s application to section 544(b) actions is not an issue warranting this Court’s

review. Trustees can undisputedly sue the United States

for fraudulent transfers made within two years of bankruptcy under section 548(a). The question presented thus

matters only when the United States accepts a fraudulent

transfer more than two years before bankruptcy, but less

than the (usually) four years allowed under section 544(b).

In the last decade, that narrow delta has apparently produced only six bankruptcy-court decisions nationwide.

The amounts at stake are typically in the low six figures.

Deciding a case that might save the federal government a

few hundred thousand dollars a year would be a poor use

of this Court’s limited resources. That is especially true

here where the government’s overly broad question presented sweeps in field-preemption and Appropriations

Clause arguments on which there is no split and which the

government forfeited in part below.

Finally, the decision below is correct. Section 106(a)

unambiguously waives sovereign immunity “with respect

to” section 544. That sweeping text reaches all aspects of

section 544(b) claims, including the underlying state law

cause of action. Even if it did not, nothing in section 544(b)

requires that an actual creditor could recover from the

IRS outside of bankruptcy, as the government insists.

Section 544(b)(1) instead asks whether the transfer “is

voidable under applicable law” (emphasis added). Here,

all Utah-law requirements for voidability are undisputedly met, permitting the trustee to avoid the transfers.

I.

Further Percolation Is Warranted

The government’s petition blends two questions:

(1) whether sovereign immunity precludes section 544(b)

actions against the United States, and (2) whether the

12

government may invoke other federal-law defenses in section 544(b) cases—namely, field preemption and the

Appropriations Clause. Further percolation on the first

question is appropriate given this Court’s recent decision

in Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42, and the unanimous trend in the

courts of appeals. There is no split on the second question.

1. As the government (at 18-21) catalogs, the Fourth,

Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all rejected the government’s sovereign-immunity argument. Cook v. United

States (In re Yahweh Ctr., Inc.), 27 F.4th 960, 966 (4th Cir.

2022); Zazzali v. United States (In re DBSI, Inc.), 869

F.3d 1004, 1009-13 (9th Cir. 2017); Pet.App.5a-9a. The

government’s 3-1 split (at 19) thus hinges on the Seventh

Circuit’s decision in EAR, 742 F.3d 743. But shortly after

the government filed its petition for certiorari, this Court

in Kirtz, 601 U.S. at 53, rejected a sovereign-immunity argument similar to the one the Seventh Circuit adopted in

EAR. The Court should deny certiorari to permit the Seventh Circuit to reconsider its position in light of Kirtz.

The Seventh Circuit understood this Court’s decision

in Meyer to require “two analytically distinct inquiries”

“when it comes to questions of a federal agency’s liability.” EAR, 742 F.3d at 746 (quoting 510 U.S. at 484).

First, the plaintiff needs “a waiver of sovereign immunity.” Id. (quoting 510 U.S. at 484). And second, the

plaintiff needs a “source of substantive law” providing “an

avenue for relief.” Id. at 747(quoting 510 U.S. at 484). In

Meyer, the second requirement was not met because the

plaintiffs had no cause of action, and this Court declined

to imply one under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388

(1971). 510 U.S. at 483-86.

13

The Seventh Circuit, though, read the “substantive

law” requirement to demand not just a generally applicable cause of action, but “an avenue for relief against the

IRS.” EAR, 742 F.3d at 747 (emphasis added). In other

words, the Seventh Circuit thought that Congress must

both waive sovereign immunity generally and create a

cause of action that expressly runs against the government. In the section 544(b) context, the Seventh Circuit

held, that second requirement is not met because sovereign immunity would bar state-law claims against the

government outside of bankruptcy. Id.

Kirtz rejected a similar misreading of Meyer. In

Kirtz, this Court held that the Fair Credit Reporting Act

licenses suit against the United States for supplying false

information to consumer reporting agencies. 601 U.S. at

50-51. By creating a cause of action against “[a]ny person” defined to include the government, Congress

“explicitly permitted … claims for damages against the

government.” Id.

The government countered with reasoning that mirrored EAR’s: A cause of action was not enough because

“a plaintiff must identify both a ‘source of substantive law’

that ‘provide[d] an avenue for relief’ and ‘a waiver of sovereign immunity.’” Id. at 53 (quoting U.S. Br. 14 (quoting

Meyer, 510 U.S. at 484)). In the government’s view, the

plaintiff needed both “a cause of action explicitly against

the government” and “a separate provision addressing

sovereign immunity.” Id. This Court disagreed. Either

“a separate waiver provision” or “a cause of action authorizing suit against the government may waive sovereign

immunity.” Id. Nothing in Meyer, which involved “an implied cause of action, say[s] anything to the contrary.” Id.

Here, Congress authorized suit against the United

States by coupling a cross-cutting waiver (in section

14

106(a)) with a generally applicable cause of action (in section 544(b)). Congress did not need to also create a

government-specific cause of action. Given the similarity

between the Seventh Circuit’s two-step framework and

the reasoning rejected in Kirtz, this Court should permit

the Seventh Circuit to reconsider its position.

Moreover, the Seventh Circuit’s 2014 decision in EAR

predates every other court-of-appeals case addressing

this issue. In 2017, the Ninth Circuit rejected EAR’s analysis, DBSI, 869 F.3d at 1013-14, followed by the Fourth

Circuit in 2022, Yahweh, 27 F.4th at 966 n.5, and the Tenth

Circuit below, Pet.App.9a-12a. Yet the Seventh Circuit

has never had the opportunity to respond to other circuits’

criticisms. The government cites no Seventh Circuit case

applying EAR, and respondent is aware of none.

Further percolation is therefore appropriate, even

setting aside Kirtz. The Seventh Circuit could resolve the

split by adopting the majority position, obviating any reason for this Court’s review. Or the Seventh Circuit could

reaffirm its position and address other circuits’ counterarguments, providing a fuller airing of the issue. Either

way, this Court’s consideration of the sovereign-immunity

question would be premature.

2. The government (at 19-20) suggests that the circuits are also divided over whether the government can

invoke field preemption and the Appropriations Clause in

section 544(b) cases. That is incorrect. While the Ninth

Circuit has rejected both arguments, DBSI, 869 F.3d at

1014-15, and the Tenth Circuit rejected a preemption argument below, Pet.App.12a-14a, no circuit has held that

the government may invoke these defenses in section

544(b) cases.

15

The government (at 19) again points to EAR, where

the Seventh Circuit “note[d] that there may be other reasons why § 544(b)’s actual-creditor requirement is not

satisfied” and spent a sentence each discussing preemption and the Appropriations Clause. 742 F.3d at 747-48.

As the Ninth Circuit has observed, that discussion is dicta.

DBSI, 869 F.3d at 1015. The Seventh Circuit had already

held that sovereign immunity barred the suit, making the

brief discussion of other issues unnecessary to the disposition. There is no circuit split on the government’s

alternative arguments.

II. This Case Does Not Warrant the Court’s Review

Even were the split entrenched, this case would not

warrant review. The sovereign-immunity question has

produced less than one bankruptcy-court decision per

year and implicates trivial amounts within the $6.1 trillion

federal budget. And the government’s overly broad question presented muddies this case as a vehicle for review.

1. The sovereign-immunity question has limited practical importance. As the government (at 2, 22) recognizes,

section 548(a) permits bankruptcy trustees to avoid

fraudulent transfers to the United States within two years

of the bankruptcy petition. At bottom then, this case is

not about whether bankruptcy trustees can avoid fraudulent transfers to the government but when they can do so.

The timing difference between the two years available under section 548(a) and the state-law look-back

periods incorporated by section 544(b) is narrow. Fortysix States plus the District of Columbia provide a fouryear window or less to avoid constructively fraudulent

16

transfers.1 Only four States offer additional time—with

six years as the outer bound.2 Given that bankruptcy

cases must almost always be filed in the debtor’s home

district, 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1), there is virtually no risk of

Forty States and the District of Columbia provide four years. Ala.

Code § 8-9B-10(c); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1009(2); Ark. Code Ann.

§ 4-59-209(b); Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.09(b); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8110(1)(b); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552j(2); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6,

§ 1309(2); D.C. Code § 28-3109(2); Fla. Stat. § 726.110(2); Ga. Code

Ann. § 18-2-79(2); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 651C-9(2); Idaho Code § 55918(2); 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 160/10(b); Ind. Code § 32-18-2-19(2); Iowa

Code § 684.9(2); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 33-209(b); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 378A.090(2); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 109A, § 10(b); Mo. Rev. Stat.

§ 428.049(2); Mont. Code Ann. § 31-2-341(2); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 36810(2); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 112.230(1)(b); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 545A:9(II); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 25:2-31(b); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 56-10-23(B);

N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law § 278(b); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.9(2); N.D.

Cent. Code § 13-02.1-09(2); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1336.09(B); Okla.

Stat. tit. 24, § 121(2); Or. Rev. Stat. § 95.280(2); 12 Pa. Cons. Stat.

§ 5109(2); 6 R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-16-9(2); S.D. Codified Laws § 54-8A9(b); Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-3-310(2); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann.

§ 24.010(a)(2); Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-305(2); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9,

§ 2293(2); Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.091(2); W. Va. Code § 40-1A-9(b);

Wis. Stat. § 893.425(2). Four States provide three years. La. Civ.

Code Ann. art. 2041; Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101; Miss.

Code Ann. § 15-3-115(b); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530. Wyoming provides two years. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-14-210(a)(ii). Alaska does not

permit avoidance of constructively fraudulent transfers at all. See

Alaska Stat. § 34.40.010 (actual fraud only).

1

Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-253 (five years); Me. Stat. tit. 14, § 3580(2) (six

years); Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5813 (six years); Minn. Stat.

§ 541.05(1)(2) (six years). The government (at 22) cites EAR, 742 F.3d

at 750 & n.5, which identifies Iowa, Kentucky, and New York as also

having longer look-back windows. Those States have since shortened

their windows to four years. 2016 Iowa Acts ch. 1040; 2015 Ky. Acts

ch. 37; 2019 N.Y. Laws ch. 580.

2

17

forum-shopping to take advantage of slightly longer lookback periods.

Accordingly, the question presented appears to arise

infrequently. There are over 460,000 new bankruptcy

cases filed annually. U.S. Courts, Bankruptcies Rise 16

Percent Over Previous Year (Apr. 25, 2024), https://

tinyurl.com/2cvurbt3. Yet it took almost two decades between Congress’ enactment of section 106’s operative text

in 1994 and the first court of appeals decision addressing

this issue. EAR, 742 F.3d 743. Bankruptcy courts in the

Seventh Circuit have never applied EAR’s holding. And

bankruptcy courts in the circuits adopting respondent’s

rule have never applied their circuit’s holding either. To

respondent’s knowledge, this issue has arisen in only six

bankruptcy-court decisions nationwide in the last decade.3

That lack of cases makes sense given the narrow circumstances in which this issue arises: (1) A debtor must

fraudulently transfer money to the federal government.

(2) The transfer must occur between two and (usually)

four years before the bankruptcy petition is filed.

(3) There must be some actual creditor with a claim

against the debtor at the time of the transfer. And (4) all

state-law conditions for avoidance must be met (typically,

The three cases underlying the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit

decisions plus McClarty v. Hatchett (In re Hatchett), 588 B.R. 472

(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2018), vacated as moot, 2021 WL 5882076 (Bankr.

E.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2021); Pyfer v. Katzman (In re Nat’l Pool Constr.,

Inc.), 2015 WL 394507 (Bankr. D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2015); and Bauer v.

United States (In re Oncology Assocs. of Ocean Cnty. LLC), 510 B.R.

463 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014). One other case notes the issue but concludes that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Affiliated

Physicians & Emps. Master Tr. v. Dep’t of Treasury (In re Affiliated

Physicians & Emps. Master Tr.), 2022 WL 16953555, at *6 (Bankr.

D.N.J. Nov. 15, 2022).

3

18

the debtor’s insolvency and the lack of reasonably equivalent value for the transfer). That lack of recurrence

significantly diminishes any need for certiorari.

Moreover, the amounts at stake are relatively modest. While the government (at 23) cherry-picks three

cases involving over $1 million, typical section 544(b)

cases, like this one, involve smaller amounts.4 In the six

reported cases raising the issue over the last decade, the

median amount at stake has been around $200,000—

hardly an unmanageable “risk[] to the federal fisc” (Pet.

23) within the $6.1 trillion federal budget.

The government (at 22 n.4) identifies three older section 544(b) cases where States raised sovereign immunity.

But federal and state sovereign immunity can present distinct questions. See United States v. Nordic Vill. Inc., 503

U.S. 30, 33 (1992). No circuit has addressed section

544(b)’s application to States, and that issue falls outside

the government’s question presented (at I). Any potential

effect on cases involving other sovereigns does not

strengthen the case for review.

E.g., Nat’l Pool, 2015 WL 394507, at *1 ($47,700); Compl. ¶ 38,

Hatchett, 588 B.R. 472 (No. 17-ap-4700) ($104,096.14); Pet.App.20a

($145,138.78); VMI Liquidating Tr. v. United States (In re Valley

Mortg., Inc.), 2013 WL 5314369, at *1 (Bankr. D. Colo. Sept. 18, 2013)

($161,131.40); Menotte v. United States (In re Custom Contractors,

LLC), 439 B.R. 544, 545-46 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010) ($199,956.25);

Compl. ¶ 343, Cook v. Roberts (In re Yahweh Ctr., Inc.), 2019 WL

1325032 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 22, 2019) (No. 18-ap-82) (“over

$260,000”); Compl. ¶ 9, Furr v. IRS (In re Pharmacy Distrib. Servs.),

455 B.R. 817 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 11-ap-1844) ($264,026);

Compl. ¶ 26, Oncology Assocs., 510 B.R. 463 (No. 14-ap-1094)

($471,938.02).

4

19

2. Moreover, the government’s overly broad question

presented risks muddying this case as a vehicle for reviewing the sovereign-immunity question. As noted, the

government’s petition blends two issues: (1) whether sovereign immunity precludes section 544(b) claims against

the United States, and (2) whether the government may

invoke other federal-law defenses, namely field preemption and the Appropriations Clause. There is no split on

the second question, which invites tangential briefing on

distinct questions. See Pet. 18 (describing preemption as

“independent[]” of sovereign immunity).

The government (at 8, 10-11) claims “it is undisputed”

that field preemption would bar the actual creditor’s recovery outside of bankruptcy. That is incorrect. The

bankruptcy court rejected the government’s fieldpreemption argument, holding that fraudulent-transfer

actions “do[] not implicate” “the field of federal tax collection” and therefore are not preempted—even setting

aside the Bankruptcy Code. Pet.App.46a-47a. The government’s attempt to inject field preemption into this case

thus risks wide-ranging briefing that has little to do with

bankruptcy law.

As for the Appropriations Clause, the government did

not press this argument below and the court of appeals

did not address it, as the government’s statement (at 7)

implicitly recognizes. This Court should not grant certiorari on a question that encompasses a forfeited issue.

To the extent the Court wants to address these additional arguments, it should await a case where the

government preserved both. E.g., DBSI, 869 F.3d at

1014-15. In the alternative, the Court might rephrase the

question presented to limit briefing to the sovereign-immunity issue. Cf. Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy,

20

144 S. Ct. 478 (2023) (narrowing question presented to issue implicating split); Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 143 S.

Ct. 2686 (2023) (similar). Respondent’s first question presented, supra p. I, offers one proposed framing. But given

the need for percolation and the issue’s limited impact, the

better course is to deny certiorari outright.

III. The Decision Below Is Correct

1. The Tenth Circuit correctly concluded that section

106(a) waives the United States’ sovereign immunity from

avoidance actions under section 544(b). The leading bankruptcy treatise agrees. Collier ¶ 544.01.

a. Section 106(a) is a paradigmatic “clear waiver of

sovereign immunity.” Kirtz, 601 U.S. at 49. Congress

“abrogated” “sovereign immunity … as to a governmental

unit” (including “the United States”) “with respect to”

section 544. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(27), 106(a). By waiving immunity “with respect to” section 544, Congress waived

immunity “insofar as [a claim] concerns” section 544. See

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1934

(1993). “With respect to” thus “has a broadening effect,”

reaching not only the listed subject but also “matters relating to that subject.” Pet.App.7a (quoting Appling, 584

U.S. at 717).

Section 106(a)’s waiver covers all aspects of section

544(b) claims, including the underlying state-law cause of

action. Section 544(b) allows a trustee to avoid any transfer “voidable under applicable law”—here, Utah’s

Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Section 544(b) therefore incorporates the actual creditor’s Utah-law claim,

which “concern[s]” or “relat[es] to” that section.

Pet.App.7a (quoting Appling, 584 U.S. at 716-18). The

waiver thus covers the underlying state-law claim.

21

Applying that waiver here “facilitate[s] the Code’s orderly and centralized debt-resolution process” by

subjecting “all creditors (including governmental units)”

to the same “overarching requirements.” Lac du Flambeau, 599 U.S. at 391 (citation omitted). Under the

government’s interpretation, it alone could keep fraudulent transfers received two to four years before

bankruptcy. Yet when Congress wanted to give the government a “limited exception[]” from ordinary

bankruptcy rules, Congress said so expressly. Id. Congress, for example, exempted government fines from

discharge and permitted the government to assess taxes

notwithstanding bankruptcy’s usual automatic stay. Id.

Implying an additional, unwritten exception for fraudulent transfers would undermine Congress’ “meticulous

and carefully calibrated scheme.” See id. at 392 (citation

omitted).

b. The government (at 9) accepts that section 106(a)

“unambiguously waives” immunity. But, the government

(at 9, 12) asserts, that admittedly “broad” waiver does not

apply because section 544(b) “has a two-step structure”—

the trustee must show both a waiver and “that a creditor

exists who could use a state’s ‘applicable law’ to recover

the payment from the IRS.” Pet. 9-10 (quoting EAR, 742

F.3d at 747). Here, the government (at 10-11) says, that

second requirement is not met because sovereign immunity would preclude recovery outside bankruptcy.

That reasoning rests on the same false dichotomy rejected in Kirtz between waivers of sovereign immunity

and express causes of action against the government. 601

U.S. at 53; supra pp. 12-14. Parties suing the United

States do not need a waiver and an express cause of action

against the United States. A waiver plus a generally applicable cause of action suffices. Here, section 106(a)’s

22

unequivocal waiver applies to all aspects of section 544(b)

actions. Trustees do not need a second waiver specific to

the underlying state law.

Even spotting the government its two-step framework, the government misreads section 544(b). The

government demands an actual creditor who could “recover the payment from the IRS.” Pet. 10 (quoting EAR,

742 F.3d at 747). But section 544(b) asks only whether the

transfer “is voidable under applicable law” (emphasis

added). That passive-voice phrasing focuses on the transfer’s voidability, not whether the creditor could actually

recover from this defendant. Section 544(b)(1) never uses

the word “recovery.”

Avoidance and recovery are distinct concepts under

both federal bankruptcy law and state fraudulent-transfer law. Collier ¶ 550.01; see Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI

Consulting, Inc., 583 U.S. 366, 370-72 (2018); Acequia,

Inc. v. Clinton (In re Acequia, Inc.), 34 F.3d 800, 809 (9th

Cir. 1994). In the Bankruptcy Code, Congress gave trustees various powers to avoid transfers. See 11 U.S.C.

§§ 544, 545, 547–549, 553(b), 724(a). Section 550(a) then

identifies when the trustee can recover for “a transfer

[that] is avoided”—at which point the basis for avoidance

is, “for all intents and purposes, irrelevant.” Collier

¶ 550.01. Congress thus understood avoidance and recovery as distinct and, in section 544(b), asked only whether

the transfer was “voidable.”

Utah draws that same avoidance/recovery distinction.

Utah law identifies “fraudulent” transfers and permits

“avoidance of [such] transfer[s].” Utah Code §§ 25-6-5,

25-6-6, 25-6-8(1) (2014). Only after the “transfer is voidable” may the creditor “recover judgment for” its “value.”

Id. § 25-6-9(2). Notably, recovery is not limited to the initial transferee. “[T]he person for whose benefit the

23

transfer was made” and secondary transferees who did

not take in good faith are also fair game. Id.

Thus, even setting aside section 106(a), section

544(b)’s “substantive requirements” (Pet. 12) are met.

Section 544(b)(1) asks only whether the “transfer … is

voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim.” The government (at I, 2, 9-10, 12) agrees

that the “applicable law” here is “applicable state law,”

i.e., Utah’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Under that

Act, a transfer “is fraudulent” and voidable when the

debtor (1) did not receive “reasonably equivalent value,”

and (2) “was insolvent.” Utah Code § 25-6-6(1) (2014).

The government agrees those requirements are met.

Pet.App.3a. The transfers are thus voidable under applicable Utah law.

The government is incorrect that the decision below

impermissibly creates a “substantive claim for relief or

cause of action” or “alter[s] the substantive requirements

of” bankruptcy. Pet. 13-14 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(2)(5)). Section 544(b) creates a cause of action, which incorporates state law on what transfers are “voidable.”

Nothing in the decision below alters those requirements.

To the extent the government (at 13) suggests that waivers of sovereign immunity cannot “create[] new liability”

against the United States, that is plainly incorrect. The

entire point of waiving sovereign immunity is to make the

United States liable where it would otherwise be immune.

The government (at 22) accepts that it must return fraudulent transfers under section 548(a)—even though the

United States would not be liable without a waiver of sovereign immunity. The same is true here.

The government (at 16-17) urges that courts should

narrowly construe ambiguities in sovereign-immunity

waivers. But the government identifies no ambiguity in

24

section 106(a), instead insisting (at 10) that “Section

106(a) has no bearing on” this case’s outcome.

2. The Tenth Circuit correctly rejected the government’s alternative argument (at 17-18) that field

preemption bars the trustee’s claim. Pet.App.12a-14a.

Section 544(b) is a federal law creating a “federal cause of

action in bankruptcy court.” DBSI, 869 F.3d at 1015. One

federal law cannot preempt another.

Further, the government’s preemption argument

again conflates avoidance with recovery. The government

asserts that States cannot “enabl[e] their residents to recover tax payments directly from the United States.” Pet.

17 (quoting EAR, 742 F.3d at 748). But regardless of

whether an actual creditor could recover from the United

States, the transfer is still voidable under Utah law. Plus,

as the bankruptcy court recognized, the government’s

field-preemption argument is dubious even outside of

bankruptcy. Nothing suggests Congress would want to

preempt state fraudulent-transfer laws when a debtor

fraudulently pays someone else’s taxes. Pet.App.46a-47a.

Finally, the government fleetingly suggests that the

Appropriations Clause bars the trustee’s claim because a

state-law creditor could not “recover from the IRS outside

of bankruptcy” absent a congressional appropriation.

Pet. 18 (quoting EAR, 742 F.3d at 748). Putting aside forfeiture, supra p. 19, that argument is meritless. Again,

the question under section 544(b) is whether the transfer

“is voidable,” not whether a creditor could actually recover from the IRS. Utah provides various remedies for

voidable transfers, many of which would not require the

IRS to pay a dime. Utah Code § 25-6-8 (2014). The Appropriations Clause poses no barrier here.

25

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

REID W. LAMBERT

STRONG & HANNI

102 South 200 East

Suite 800

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

MAY 13, 2024

LISA S. BLATT

Counsel of Record

AARON Z. ROPER

ERIN M. SIELAFF

AYOUB OUEDERNI

WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP

680 Maine Avenue SW

Washington, DC 20024

(202) 434-5000

lblatt@wc.com

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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