Opposition Brief — United States, Petitioner v. David L. Miller
Supreme Court briefMay 13, 2024
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No. 23-824
In the Supreme Court of the United States
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PETITIONER,
v.
DAVID L. MILLER,
RESPONDENT.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
REID W. LAMBERT
STRONG & HANNI
102 South 200 East
Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
LISA S. BLATT
Counsel of Record
AARON Z. ROPER
ERIN M. SIELAFF
AYOUB OUEDERNI
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP
680 Maine Avenue SW
Washington, DC 20024
(202) 434-5000
lblatt@wc.com
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The Bankruptcy Code broadly waives federal sovereign immunity “with respect to” 59 sections of the Code,
including sections 544 and 550. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a). Section 544 empowers bankruptcy trustees to avoid prebankruptcy transfers of debtors’ property that are “voidable under applicable law,” including state law, “by a
creditor holding an unsecured claim.” Id. § 544(b)(1).
Section 550 then empowers trustees to “recover” such
fraudulent transfers “for the benefit of the estate.” Id.
§ 550(a).
The questions presented are:
1. Whether bankruptcy trustees may avoid fraudulent transfers to the United States under section 544(b),
notwithstanding federal sovereign immunity.
2. Whether the United States may invoke federal-law
preemption and Appropriations Clause defenses to a section 544(b) avoidance action.
(I)
II
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION ................................................................ 1
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..................... 3
STATEMENT ....................................................................... 4
Statutory Background .............................................. 4
Factual and Procedural Background ..................... 6
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ............ 10
I. Further Percolation Is Warranted ............................ 11
II. This Case Does Not Warrant the Court’s
Review ............................................................................ 15
III. The Decision Below Is Correct .................................. 20
CONCLUSION ................................................................... 25
III
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases:
Acequia, Inc. v. Clinton (In re Acequia, Inc.),
34 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1994) ........................................... 22
Affiliated Physicians & Emps. Master Tr. v.
Dep’t of Treasury (In re Affiliated Physicians
& Emps. Master Tr.), 2022 WL 16953555
(Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. 15, 2022) ...................................... 17
Bauer v. United States (In re Oncology Assocs. of
Ocean Cnty. LLC), 510 B.R. 463
(Bankr. D.N.J. 2014) ..................................................... 17
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) ........................................................ 12
CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985) ........................... 5
Cook v. United States (In re Yahweh Ctr., Inc.),
27 F.4th 960 (4th Cir. 2022) .................................... 12, 14
Dep’t of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v.
Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42 (2024) .................... 2, 10, 12-14, 20-21
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) ......................10, 12-13
In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc. (EAR),
742 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2014) ..... 2, 9-10, 12-17, 21-22, 24
Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin,
599 U.S. 382 (2023) .................................................4-5, 21
Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling,
584 U.S. 709 (2018) .................................................... 9, 20
Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415 (2014) ....................................... 5
McClarty v. Hatchett (In re Hatchett),
588 B.R. 472 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2018)....................... 17
IV
Page
Cases—continued:
Menotte v. United States (In re Custom
Contractors, LLC), 439 B.R. 544
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010) ................................................. 18
Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc.,
583 U.S. 366 (2018) ........................................................ 22
Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology,
LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019) ............................................ 5
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis,
143 S. Ct. 2686 (2023) .................................................... 20
Pyfer v. Katzman (In re Nat’l Pool Constr., Inc.),
2015 WL 394507 (Bankr. D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2015) ....17-18
United States v. Nordic Vill. Inc.,
503 U.S. 30 (1992) .......................................................... 18
VMI Liquidating Tr. v. United States
(In re Valley Mortg., Inc.), 2013 WL 5314369
(Bankr. D. Colo. Sept. 18, 2013) .................................. 18
Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy,
144 S. Ct. 478 (2023) ...................................................... 19
Zazzali v. United States (In re DBSI, Inc.),
869 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2017) ............... 12, 14-15, 19, 24
Constitution and Statutes:
U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 7
(Appropriations Clause) ............. 3, 11-12, 14-15, 19, 24
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§ 101 ............................................................................. 5, 20
§ 106 ................................................................................. 17
§ 106(a) ................................ 1-2, 5, 8-11, 13, 20-21, 23-24
§ 106(a)(1) ..................................................................... 6, 9
§ 106(a)(2)-(5) ................................................................. 23
§ 544 ................................................. 1, 3, 6, 8-9, 11, 20, 22
§ 544(b) ...................................................... 2-3, 7-15, 18-24
§ 544(b)(1) ............................................ 1, 5, 7, 9-11, 22-23
V
Page
Constitution and Statutes—continued:
11 U.S.C.
§ 545 ................................................................................. 22
§ 547 ................................................................................. 22
§ 548 .................................................... 2, 5-8, 11, 15, 22-23
§ 549 ................................................................................. 22
§ 550 ............................................................................. 6, 22
§ 553 ................................................................................. 22
§ 704 ................................................................................... 5
§ 724 ................................................................................. 22
28 U.S.C. § 1408 ................................................................... 16
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (1984)
§ 5 ....................................................................................... 6
§ 9 ....................................................................................... 6
Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (2014)
§ 5 ....................................................................................... 6
§ 9 ....................................................................................... 6
Ala. Code § 8-9B-10(c)......................................................... 16
Alaska Stat. § 34.40.010 ...................................................... 16
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1009(2) ..................................... 16
Ark. Code Ann. § 4-59-209(b) ............................................. 16
Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.09(b)................................................. 16
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-110(1)(b) ........................................ 16
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552j(2) ............................................. 16
D.C. Code § 28-3109(2)........................................................ 16
Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 1309(2) .......................................... 16
Fla. Stat. § 726.110(2).......................................................... 16
Ga. Code Ann. § 18-2-79(2) ................................................. 16
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 651C-9(2) ............................................... 16
Idaho Code § 55-918(2) ....................................................... 16
Ill. Comp. Stat. 160/10(b) .................................................... 16
Ind. Code § 32-18-2-19(2).................................................... 16
VI
Page
Constitution and Statutes—continued:
2016 Iowa Acts ch. 1040 ...................................................... 16
Iowa Code § 684.9(2) ........................................................... 16
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 33-209(b) ................................................ 16
2015 Ky. Acts ch. 37 ............................................................ 16
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 378A.090(2) ..................................... 16
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2041 .............................................. 16
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 109A, § 10(b) .................................... 16
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101 ........................ 16
Me. Stat. tit. 14, § 3580(2) ................................................... 16
Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5813 ............................................ 16
Minn. Stat. § 541.05(1)(2).................................................... 16
Miss. Code Ann. § 15-3-115(b) ........................................... 16
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 428.049(2) ................................................. 16
Mont. Code Ann. § 31-2-341(2) .......................................... 16
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.9(2) ................................................ 16
N.D. Cent. Code § 13-02.1-09(2) ........................................ 16
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 545-A:9(II).................................... 16
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 25:2-31(b) ................................................ 16
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 56-10-23(B)............................................ 16
N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law § 278(b) ...................................... 16
2019 N.Y. Laws ch. 580 ....................................................... 16
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 36-810(2) ................................................. 16
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 112.230(1)(b) .......................................... 16
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1336.09(B) .................................... 16
Okla. Stat. tit. 24, § 121(2) .................................................. 16
Or. Rev. Stat. § 95.280(2) .................................................... 16
12 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5109(2) ................................................ 16
6 R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-16-9(2) ............................................... 16
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530 .................................................. 16
S.D. Codified Laws § 54-8A-9(b) ....................................... 16
Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-3-310(2) ........................................... 16
Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 24.010(a)(2) ..................... 16
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-305(2) ............................................ 16
VII
Page
Constitution and Statutes—continued:
Utah’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,
Utah Code §§ 25-6-1 et seq. (2014) ................ 2, 7, 20, 23
§ 25-6-5 ........................................................................... 22
§ 25-6-6 ...................................................................7, 22-23
§ 25-6-8 .................................................................. 7, 22, 24
§ 25-6-9 ...................................................................8, 22-23
§ 25-6-10 ............................................................................ 8
Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-253 .................................................... 16
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2293(2) ............................................. 16
W. Va. Code § 40-1A-9(b) ................................................... 16
Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.091(2) ......................................... 16
Wis. Stat. § 893.425(2) ......................................................... 16
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-14-210(a)(ii)...................................... 16
Other Authorities:
Collier on Bankruptcy (16th ed.)
¶ 544.01............................................................................ 20
¶ 544.06.............................................................................. 6
¶ 550.01............................................................................ 22
Complaint, Cook v. Roberts (In re Yahweh Ctr.,
Inc.), 2019 WL 1325032
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 22, 2019) ................................. 18
Complaint, Furr v. IRS (In re Pharmacy Distrib.
Servs.), 455 B.R. 817 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) ............ 18
Complaint, McClarty v. Hatchett (In re Hatchett),
588 B.R. 472 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2018)....................... 18
Complaint, Bauer v. United States (In re
Oncology Assocs. of Ocean Cnty. LLC),
510 B.R. 463 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014) .............................. 18
U.S. Courts, Bankruptcies Rise 16 Percent Over
Previous Year (Apr. 25, 2024),
https://tinyurl.com/2cvurbt3 ........................................ 17
VIII
Page
Other Authorities—continued:
U.S. Courts, Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics,
https://tinyurl.com/5fhad2x4 .......................................... 5
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
(1993) ............................................................................... 20
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 23-824
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PETITIONER,
v.
DAVID L. MILLER,
RESPONDENT.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
INTRODUCTION
The government asks this Court to decide how Congress’ waiver of sovereign immunity in bankruptcy cases
applies to a specific type of fraudulent-transfer action.
The shallow disagreement on that infrequently arising
question does not warrant this Court’s review.
Section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§ 106(a), broadly and unambiguously waives federal sovereign immunity “with respect to” 59 sections of the Code,
including section 544. Section 544(b)(1), in turn, permits
bankruptcy trustees to “avoid any transfer … by the
debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor
(1)
2
holding an unsecured claim.” Here, an insolvent company
fraudulently paid its officers’ personal tax debts to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The bankruptcy trustee
used section 544(b) to avoid those transfers, relying on
Utah’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act as the “applicable law.”
As the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits recognize,
sovereign immunity is no barrier to such avoidance actions against the United States. Section 106(a)’s broad
waiver takes sovereign immunity out of the picture. If a
transfer is voidable under state law, the federal government cannot invoke sovereign immunity. Only the
Seventh Circuit disagrees. That court has held that because sovereign immunity would bar recovery from the
IRS outside of bankruptcy, a trustee cannot sue the IRS
inside of bankruptcy. In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc.
(EAR), 742 F.3d 743, 747 (7th Cir. 2014).
That outlier decision has been overtaken by events.
This Court in Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42 (2024),
recently rejected a similar argument that would have effectively required two waivers of sovereign immunity—
one general and one specific to the cause of action. And
since the Seventh Circuit’s decision, every other circuit to
consider the question has rejected the Seventh Circuit’s
approach. Rather than wading in now, this Court should
permit the Seventh Circuit to reconsider its holding in
light of those subsequent decisions.
Even were the question fully aired, this case would
not warrant the Court’s intervention. Trustees may undisputedly avoid fraudulent transfers to the United States
made within two years of bankruptcy under a different
provision, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a). The question presented
thus arises only when the transfer occurs more than two
3
years before bankruptcy, but within the look-back period
allowed under state law—four years or less in 46 States
and the District of Columbia. Given that narrow window,
the government identifies only six reported cases in the
last decade presenting this issue. The median amount involved is around $200,000—0.000003% of the federal
budget. An issue arising less than once a year that implicates relatively modest sums does not warrant this
Court’s review.
Moreover, the government’s expansive question presented smuggles in extraneous issues on which there is no
split. The government (at 17-18) asks the Court to decide
the availability of two other federal-law defenses in section 544(b) cases:
field preemption and the
Appropriations Clause. But the two circuits to rule on either question side with trustees; the Seventh Circuit’s
discussion favoring the government is dicta. The government’s preemption argument would inject complicated,
disputed issues that have little to do with bankruptcy law.
And the government forfeited its Appropriations Clause
argument below.
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit’s decision is correct.
Congress’ waiver of immunity “with respect to” section
544 covers all aspects of section 544(b) claims, including
the underlying state-law cause of action. Whether or not
a creditor could recover from the IRS outside of bankruptcy, the transfers here are “voidable” under Utah law.
That is all section 544(b) requires. This Court should deny
the petition.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(1) provides:
(a) Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a
4
governmental unit to the extent set forth in this section
with respect to the following:
(1) Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 303, 346, 362, 363, 364,
365, 366, 502, 503, 505, 506, 510, 522, 523, 524, 525, 542,
543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 722,
724, 726, 744, 749, 764, 901, 922, 926, 928, 929, 944,
1107, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1146, 1201, 1203, 1205, 1206,
1227, 1231, 1301, 1303, 1305, and 1327 of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) provides:
Except as provided in paragraph (2), the trustee may
avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property
or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable
under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured
claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title or
that is not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 550(a) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the
extent that a transfer is avoided under section 544, 545,
547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the trustee may
recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such
property, from—
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity
for whose benefit such transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.
STATEMENT
Statutory Background
In order to protect bankruptcy’s “orderly and centralized debt-resolution process,” the Bankruptcy Code
contains an expansive waiver of sovereign immunity. Lac
5
du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians
v. Coughlin, 599 U.S. 382, 391 (2023) (citation omitted).
Congress expressly abrogated the sovereign immunity of
“governmental unit[s],” including the United States,
“with respect to” 59 enumerated sections of the Code. 11
U.S.C. §§ 101(27), 106(a). Accordingly, the Code’s “basic
requirements generally apply to all creditors,” including
the United States. See Lac du Flambeau, 599 U.S. at 391.
This case involves a liquidation bankruptcy under
chapter 7 of the Code. In chapter 7 bankruptcies, a disinterested, private individual called a trustee collects the
debtor’s assets, liquidates them, and distributes the proceeds to creditors. Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 417 (2014);
11 U.S.C. § 704(a); see U.S. Courts, Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics, https://tinyurl.com/5fhad2x4.
Trustees enjoy “extensive” powers to fulfill their
“duty to maximize the value of the estate.” CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 352 (1985). One of those powers is
avoiding fraudulent transfers, i.e., “something-for-nothing transfers that deplete the estate (and so cheat
creditors).” Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology,
LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1663 (2019). Several provisions of
the Code empower trustees to avoid fraudulent transfers,
including two relevant here.
First, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1), in relevant part, permits
trustees to “avoid any transfer” for which the debtor “received less than a reasonably equivalent value” at a time
when the debtor “was insolvent.” That section applies to
transfers made within two years of bankruptcy.
Second, 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) permits trustees to
“avoid any transfer” that “is voidable under applicable law
by a creditor holding an unsecured claim.” The trustee
must identify “an actual creditor with an allowable claim
6
against the debtor”—a requirement that does not apply
to section 548(a). Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 544.06[1] (16th
ed.). And the trustee must identify an “applicable law”—
usually the relevant State’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act or Uniform Voidable Transactions Act.
Id.
¶ 544.06[2]. Those uniform acts, like section 548(a), permit creditors to avoid transfers made “without receiving
a reasonably equivalent value” at a time when “the debtor
was insolvent.” Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 5(a)
(1984); Unif. Voidable Transactions Act § 5(a) (2014). The
uniform acts generally give creditors four years to avoid
fraudulent transfers instead of the two years available under section 548(a). Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 9;
Unif. Voidable Transactions Act § 9; see infra p. 16 nn.1-2
(cataloging state look-back periods).
Only once a trustee has avoided a transfer under section 544, 548, or some other provision of the Code can the
trustee “recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred” or the value thereof. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a).
Sections 544, 548, and 550 are among the 59 sections of the
Code for which Congress has waived the United States’
sovereign immunity. Id. § 106(a)(1).
Factual and Procedural Background
1. This case arises from the bankruptcy of All Resort
Group, Inc.—a transportation and destination-management company based in Park City, Utah. See Insolvency
Analysis 2-6, Bankr. Ct. Dkt. 14-1. All Resort and its subsidiaries offered limousine, car, and bus services in Utah
and Las Vegas, Nevada. Id.
In December 2013, All Resort fell into insolvency. Id.
at 8-9. All Resort had mounting debts, including a $55,000
employment-discrimination settlement owed to a former
employee, Robin Salazar. Pet.App.20a-21a. And, despite
7
“decreasing revenues,” All Resort paid “substantial dividends” to its shareholders and suffered from “poor
management” that made worsening financial decisions.
Insolvency Analysis 10-13.
All Resort’s managers also used the company for personal financial benefit. In June 2014, All Resort paid the
IRS $145,138.78 to satisfy the personal tax debts of two
corporate officers. Pet.App.20a; Compl. ¶¶ 10-13, Bankr.
Ct. Dkt. 1. All Resort paid those personal tax debts using
corporate checks drawn on the company’s corporate bank
account. Compl. Exs. 1-2. All Resort received nothing
reasonably equivalent in exchange. Pet.App.26a.
2. In April 2017, All Resort filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Utah. Pet.App.19a. In
September 2017, All Resort petitioned the bankruptcy
court to convert the case to a chapter 7 liquidation.
Pet.App.19a. The court granted the petition, and respondent was appointed as trustee. Pet.App.19a-20a.
In July 2018, the trustee filed this adversary proceeding to avoid All Resort’s fraudulent tax payments to the
United States. See Pet.App.20a. The trustee invoked
both sections 544(b) and 548(a). Compl. ¶ 19; Pet.App.20a.
As the “applicable law” for his section 544(b)(1) claim, the
trustee cited Utah’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,
Utah Code §§ 25-6-1 et seq. (2014).
Utah permits creditors to bring “an action for relief
against a transfer” to obtain “avoidance of the transfer.”
Id. § 25-6-8(1). A transfer is fraudulent and thus voidable
when (1) “the debtor made the transfer … without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange,” and
(2) “the debtor was insolvent” at the time. Id. § 25-6-6(1).
If “a transfer is voidable,” “the creditor may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred” against the
8
transferee, any subsequent transferee who did not take in
good faith, or “the person for whose benefit the transfer
was made.” Id. § 25-6-9(2). Like most States, Utah gives
creditors four years to avoid fraudulent transfers. Id.
§ 25-6-10(2).
3.a. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment,
and the bankruptcy court granted the trustee’s motion.
Pet.App.50a-51a. The court rejected the trustee’s claim
under section 548(a) because the transfers fell outside the
statute’s two-year look-back period. Pet.App.24a n.26.
But, the court held, the trustee could avoid the fraudulent
transfers under section 544(b). Pet.App.48a.
The government “concede[d] that the Trustee has
proved all the elements” required by Utah law: “All Resort did not receive reasonably equivalent value” for the
transfers and “was insolvent at the time.” Pet.App.26a.
The government also conceded the existence of an unsecured creditor: Salazar, the former employee with the
employment-discrimination settlement.
Pet.App.26a.
But, the government argued that Salazar could not serve
as the “creditor” under section 544(b) because, outside of
bankruptcy, “sovereign immunity … would bar her suit
against the United States” and the Internal Revenue
Code would field preempt her cause of action.
Pet.App.26a, 43a.
The bankruptcy court rejected the government’s sovereign-immunity defense, holding that section 106(a)
“eliminates sovereign immunity with respect to the underlying state law causes of action incorporated through
§ 544(b).” Pet.App.37a (cleaned up). By its “plain text,”
section 106(a) waives sovereign immunity “with respect
to” section 544, signaling Congress’ “intent that the
waiver would cover matters related to that Code section,”
9
including “the state law causes of action incorporated
through § 544(b).” Pet.App.33a-34a.
Thus, the court held, “the trustee need only identify
an unsecured creditor who, but for sovereign immunity,
could have brought the claim at issue.” Pet.App.39a (citation omitted). The government cannot assert sovereign
immunity—“the very defense that is abrogated by
§ 106(a)(1)”—against the trustee. Pet.App.39a (citation
omitted).
The court also held that field preemption does not bar
section 544(b) claims against the IRS. The court explained that section 544(b) “is a federal cause of action and
therefore cannot be preempted.” Pet.App.46a (cleaned
up). Moreover, the court continued, fraudulent-transfer
claims do not fall “within the field of federal tax collection”
and are therefore not preempted even outside bankruptcy. Pet.App.46a-47a.
b. The district court affirmed, adopting the bankruptcy court’s decision. Pet.App.15a-17a.
4. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. Pet.App.14a. As the
court noted, section 106(a) waives sovereign immunity
“with respect to” section 544. Pet.App.6a-7a. That “critical,” “broadening” language reaches “any subject that has
‘a connection with’” section 544 and “clearly expresses
Congress’s intent to abolish the Government’s sovereign
immunity in an avoidance proceeding arising under
§ 544(b)(1).” Pet.App.7a-8a (quoting Lamar, Archer &
Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 584 U.S. 709, 717-18 (2018)) (emphasis omitted). Section 106(a) thus waives sovereign
immunity from both section 544(b) itself and “the Utah
state law the Trustee invokes.” Pet.App.8a.
The Tenth Circuit considered and rejected the Seventh Circuit’s decision in EAR, 742 F.3d 743. Pet.App.9a-
10
11a. The Tenth Circuit explained that the Seventh Circuit
erroneously demands “a second waiver of sovereign immunity … as to the underlying state law cause of action”
based on a faulty analogy to FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471
(1994). Pet.App.9a-10a. But the Seventh Circuit “never
meaningfully addressed the scope of § 106(a) as reflected
in its text,” which broadly waives immunity “with respect
to” section 544(b) claims. Pet.App.9a.
The Tenth Circuit also rejected the government’s
field-preemption argument. Pet.App.12a-14a. The court
explained that section 544(b)(1) “is a federal statute” that
expressly incorporates state law. Pet.App.13a. Had Congress wanted to preempt the application of state law
under section 544(b), the court added, “Congress surely
would have added an express preemption provision.”
Pet.App.13a.
The Tenth Circuit denied rehearing en banc without
noted dissent. Pet.App.52a-53a.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
The circuits’ narrow disagreement over how federal
sovereign immunity applies to section 544(b) fraudulenttransfer actions does not warrant this Court’s review.
To start, the government’s 3-1 split warrants further
percolation. Only the Seventh Circuit has adopted the
government’s position that sovereign immunity bars section 544(b) actions against the United States. EAR, 742
F.3d at 747. But just this Term, the Court rejected a similar sovereign-immunity argument in Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42.
And in the decade since the Seventh Circuit’s decision,
every circuit to consider the question has rejected the
Seventh Circuit’s approach. The Court should deny certiorari to permit the Seventh Circuit to consider these
developments.
11
Regardless, sovereign immunity’s application to section 544(b) actions is not an issue warranting this Court’s
review. Trustees can undisputedly sue the United States
for fraudulent transfers made within two years of bankruptcy under section 548(a). The question presented thus
matters only when the United States accepts a fraudulent
transfer more than two years before bankruptcy, but less
than the (usually) four years allowed under section 544(b).
In the last decade, that narrow delta has apparently produced only six bankruptcy-court decisions nationwide.
The amounts at stake are typically in the low six figures.
Deciding a case that might save the federal government a
few hundred thousand dollars a year would be a poor use
of this Court’s limited resources. That is especially true
here where the government’s overly broad question presented sweeps in field-preemption and Appropriations
Clause arguments on which there is no split and which the
government forfeited in part below.
Finally, the decision below is correct. Section 106(a)
unambiguously waives sovereign immunity “with respect
to” section 544. That sweeping text reaches all aspects of
section 544(b) claims, including the underlying state law
cause of action. Even if it did not, nothing in section 544(b)
requires that an actual creditor could recover from the
IRS outside of bankruptcy, as the government insists.
Section 544(b)(1) instead asks whether the transfer “is
voidable under applicable law” (emphasis added). Here,
all Utah-law requirements for voidability are undisputedly met, permitting the trustee to avoid the transfers.
I.
Further Percolation Is Warranted
The government’s petition blends two questions:
(1) whether sovereign immunity precludes section 544(b)
actions against the United States, and (2) whether the
12
government may invoke other federal-law defenses in section 544(b) cases—namely, field preemption and the
Appropriations Clause. Further percolation on the first
question is appropriate given this Court’s recent decision
in Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42, and the unanimous trend in the
courts of appeals. There is no split on the second question.
1. As the government (at 18-21) catalogs, the Fourth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all rejected the government’s sovereign-immunity argument. Cook v. United
States (In re Yahweh Ctr., Inc.), 27 F.4th 960, 966 (4th Cir.
2022); Zazzali v. United States (In re DBSI, Inc.), 869
F.3d 1004, 1009-13 (9th Cir. 2017); Pet.App.5a-9a. The
government’s 3-1 split (at 19) thus hinges on the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in EAR, 742 F.3d 743. But shortly after
the government filed its petition for certiorari, this Court
in Kirtz, 601 U.S. at 53, rejected a sovereign-immunity argument similar to the one the Seventh Circuit adopted in
EAR. The Court should deny certiorari to permit the Seventh Circuit to reconsider its position in light of Kirtz.
The Seventh Circuit understood this Court’s decision
in Meyer to require “two analytically distinct inquiries”
“when it comes to questions of a federal agency’s liability.” EAR, 742 F.3d at 746 (quoting 510 U.S. at 484).
First, the plaintiff needs “a waiver of sovereign immunity.” Id. (quoting 510 U.S. at 484). And second, the
plaintiff needs a “source of substantive law” providing “an
avenue for relief.” Id. at 747(quoting 510 U.S. at 484). In
Meyer, the second requirement was not met because the
plaintiffs had no cause of action, and this Court declined
to imply one under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). 510 U.S. at 483-86.
13
The Seventh Circuit, though, read the “substantive
law” requirement to demand not just a generally applicable cause of action, but “an avenue for relief against the
IRS.” EAR, 742 F.3d at 747 (emphasis added). In other
words, the Seventh Circuit thought that Congress must
both waive sovereign immunity generally and create a
cause of action that expressly runs against the government. In the section 544(b) context, the Seventh Circuit
held, that second requirement is not met because sovereign immunity would bar state-law claims against the
government outside of bankruptcy. Id.
Kirtz rejected a similar misreading of Meyer. In
Kirtz, this Court held that the Fair Credit Reporting Act
licenses suit against the United States for supplying false
information to consumer reporting agencies. 601 U.S. at
50-51. By creating a cause of action against “[a]ny person” defined to include the government, Congress
“explicitly permitted … claims for damages against the
government.” Id.
The government countered with reasoning that mirrored EAR’s: A cause of action was not enough because
“a plaintiff must identify both a ‘source of substantive law’
that ‘provide[d] an avenue for relief’ and ‘a waiver of sovereign immunity.’” Id. at 53 (quoting U.S. Br. 14 (quoting
Meyer, 510 U.S. at 484)). In the government’s view, the
plaintiff needed both “a cause of action explicitly against
the government” and “a separate provision addressing
sovereign immunity.” Id. This Court disagreed. Either
“a separate waiver provision” or “a cause of action authorizing suit against the government may waive sovereign
immunity.” Id. Nothing in Meyer, which involved “an implied cause of action, say[s] anything to the contrary.” Id.
Here, Congress authorized suit against the United
States by coupling a cross-cutting waiver (in section
14
106(a)) with a generally applicable cause of action (in section 544(b)). Congress did not need to also create a
government-specific cause of action. Given the similarity
between the Seventh Circuit’s two-step framework and
the reasoning rejected in Kirtz, this Court should permit
the Seventh Circuit to reconsider its position.
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit’s 2014 decision in EAR
predates every other court-of-appeals case addressing
this issue. In 2017, the Ninth Circuit rejected EAR’s analysis, DBSI, 869 F.3d at 1013-14, followed by the Fourth
Circuit in 2022, Yahweh, 27 F.4th at 966 n.5, and the Tenth
Circuit below, Pet.App.9a-12a. Yet the Seventh Circuit
has never had the opportunity to respond to other circuits’
criticisms. The government cites no Seventh Circuit case
applying EAR, and respondent is aware of none.
Further percolation is therefore appropriate, even
setting aside Kirtz. The Seventh Circuit could resolve the
split by adopting the majority position, obviating any reason for this Court’s review. Or the Seventh Circuit could
reaffirm its position and address other circuits’ counterarguments, providing a fuller airing of the issue. Either
way, this Court’s consideration of the sovereign-immunity
question would be premature.
2. The government (at 19-20) suggests that the circuits are also divided over whether the government can
invoke field preemption and the Appropriations Clause in
section 544(b) cases. That is incorrect. While the Ninth
Circuit has rejected both arguments, DBSI, 869 F.3d at
1014-15, and the Tenth Circuit rejected a preemption argument below, Pet.App.12a-14a, no circuit has held that
the government may invoke these defenses in section
544(b) cases.
15
The government (at 19) again points to EAR, where
the Seventh Circuit “note[d] that there may be other reasons why § 544(b)’s actual-creditor requirement is not
satisfied” and spent a sentence each discussing preemption and the Appropriations Clause. 742 F.3d at 747-48.
As the Ninth Circuit has observed, that discussion is dicta.
DBSI, 869 F.3d at 1015. The Seventh Circuit had already
held that sovereign immunity barred the suit, making the
brief discussion of other issues unnecessary to the disposition. There is no circuit split on the government’s
alternative arguments.
II. This Case Does Not Warrant the Court’s Review
Even were the split entrenched, this case would not
warrant review. The sovereign-immunity question has
produced less than one bankruptcy-court decision per
year and implicates trivial amounts within the $6.1 trillion
federal budget. And the government’s overly broad question presented muddies this case as a vehicle for review.
1. The sovereign-immunity question has limited practical importance. As the government (at 2, 22) recognizes,
section 548(a) permits bankruptcy trustees to avoid
fraudulent transfers to the United States within two years
of the bankruptcy petition. At bottom then, this case is
not about whether bankruptcy trustees can avoid fraudulent transfers to the government but when they can do so.
The timing difference between the two years available under section 548(a) and the state-law look-back
periods incorporated by section 544(b) is narrow. Fortysix States plus the District of Columbia provide a fouryear window or less to avoid constructively fraudulent
16
transfers.1 Only four States offer additional time—with
six years as the outer bound.2 Given that bankruptcy
cases must almost always be filed in the debtor’s home
district, 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1), there is virtually no risk of
Forty States and the District of Columbia provide four years. Ala.
Code § 8-9B-10(c); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1009(2); Ark. Code Ann.
§ 4-59-209(b); Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.09(b); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8110(1)(b); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552j(2); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6,
§ 1309(2); D.C. Code § 28-3109(2); Fla. Stat. § 726.110(2); Ga. Code
Ann. § 18-2-79(2); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 651C-9(2); Idaho Code § 55918(2); 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 160/10(b); Ind. Code § 32-18-2-19(2); Iowa
Code § 684.9(2); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 33-209(b); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 378A.090(2); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 109A, § 10(b); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 428.049(2); Mont. Code Ann. § 31-2-341(2); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 36810(2); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 112.230(1)(b); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 545A:9(II); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 25:2-31(b); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 56-10-23(B);
N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law § 278(b); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.9(2); N.D.
Cent. Code § 13-02.1-09(2); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1336.09(B); Okla.
Stat. tit. 24, § 121(2); Or. Rev. Stat. § 95.280(2); 12 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 5109(2); 6 R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-16-9(2); S.D. Codified Laws § 54-8A9(b); Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-3-310(2); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann.
§ 24.010(a)(2); Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-305(2); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9,
§ 2293(2); Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.091(2); W. Va. Code § 40-1A-9(b);
Wis. Stat. § 893.425(2). Four States provide three years. La. Civ.
Code Ann. art. 2041; Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101; Miss.
Code Ann. § 15-3-115(b); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530. Wyoming provides two years. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-14-210(a)(ii). Alaska does not
permit avoidance of constructively fraudulent transfers at all. See
Alaska Stat. § 34.40.010 (actual fraud only).
1
Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-253 (five years); Me. Stat. tit. 14, § 3580(2) (six
years); Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5813 (six years); Minn. Stat.
§ 541.05(1)(2) (six years). The government (at 22) cites EAR, 742 F.3d
at 750 & n.5, which identifies Iowa, Kentucky, and New York as also
having longer look-back windows. Those States have since shortened
their windows to four years. 2016 Iowa Acts ch. 1040; 2015 Ky. Acts
ch. 37; 2019 N.Y. Laws ch. 580.
2
17
forum-shopping to take advantage of slightly longer lookback periods.
Accordingly, the question presented appears to arise
infrequently. There are over 460,000 new bankruptcy
cases filed annually. U.S. Courts, Bankruptcies Rise 16
Percent Over Previous Year (Apr. 25, 2024), https://
tinyurl.com/2cvurbt3. Yet it took almost two decades between Congress’ enactment of section 106’s operative text
in 1994 and the first court of appeals decision addressing
this issue. EAR, 742 F.3d 743. Bankruptcy courts in the
Seventh Circuit have never applied EAR’s holding. And
bankruptcy courts in the circuits adopting respondent’s
rule have never applied their circuit’s holding either. To
respondent’s knowledge, this issue has arisen in only six
bankruptcy-court decisions nationwide in the last decade.3
That lack of cases makes sense given the narrow circumstances in which this issue arises: (1) A debtor must
fraudulently transfer money to the federal government.
(2) The transfer must occur between two and (usually)
four years before the bankruptcy petition is filed.
(3) There must be some actual creditor with a claim
against the debtor at the time of the transfer. And (4) all
state-law conditions for avoidance must be met (typically,
The three cases underlying the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit
decisions plus McClarty v. Hatchett (In re Hatchett), 588 B.R. 472
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2018), vacated as moot, 2021 WL 5882076 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2021); Pyfer v. Katzman (In re Nat’l Pool Constr.,
Inc.), 2015 WL 394507 (Bankr. D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2015); and Bauer v.
United States (In re Oncology Assocs. of Ocean Cnty. LLC), 510 B.R.
463 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014). One other case notes the issue but concludes that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Affiliated
Physicians & Emps. Master Tr. v. Dep’t of Treasury (In re Affiliated
Physicians & Emps. Master Tr.), 2022 WL 16953555, at *6 (Bankr.
D.N.J. Nov. 15, 2022).
3
18
the debtor’s insolvency and the lack of reasonably equivalent value for the transfer). That lack of recurrence
significantly diminishes any need for certiorari.
Moreover, the amounts at stake are relatively modest. While the government (at 23) cherry-picks three
cases involving over $1 million, typical section 544(b)
cases, like this one, involve smaller amounts.4 In the six
reported cases raising the issue over the last decade, the
median amount at stake has been around $200,000—
hardly an unmanageable “risk[] to the federal fisc” (Pet.
23) within the $6.1 trillion federal budget.
The government (at 22 n.4) identifies three older section 544(b) cases where States raised sovereign immunity.
But federal and state sovereign immunity can present distinct questions. See United States v. Nordic Vill. Inc., 503
U.S. 30, 33 (1992). No circuit has addressed section
544(b)’s application to States, and that issue falls outside
the government’s question presented (at I). Any potential
effect on cases involving other sovereigns does not
strengthen the case for review.
E.g., Nat’l Pool, 2015 WL 394507, at *1 ($47,700); Compl. ¶ 38,
Hatchett, 588 B.R. 472 (No. 17-ap-4700) ($104,096.14); Pet.App.20a
($145,138.78); VMI Liquidating Tr. v. United States (In re Valley
Mortg., Inc.), 2013 WL 5314369, at *1 (Bankr. D. Colo. Sept. 18, 2013)
($161,131.40); Menotte v. United States (In re Custom Contractors,
LLC), 439 B.R. 544, 545-46 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010) ($199,956.25);
Compl. ¶ 343, Cook v. Roberts (In re Yahweh Ctr., Inc.), 2019 WL
1325032 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 22, 2019) (No. 18-ap-82) (“over
$260,000”); Compl. ¶ 9, Furr v. IRS (In re Pharmacy Distrib. Servs.),
455 B.R. 817 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 11-ap-1844) ($264,026);
Compl. ¶ 26, Oncology Assocs., 510 B.R. 463 (No. 14-ap-1094)
($471,938.02).
4
19
2. Moreover, the government’s overly broad question
presented risks muddying this case as a vehicle for reviewing the sovereign-immunity question. As noted, the
government’s petition blends two issues: (1) whether sovereign immunity precludes section 544(b) claims against
the United States, and (2) whether the government may
invoke other federal-law defenses, namely field preemption and the Appropriations Clause. There is no split on
the second question, which invites tangential briefing on
distinct questions. See Pet. 18 (describing preemption as
“independent[]” of sovereign immunity).
The government (at 8, 10-11) claims “it is undisputed”
that field preemption would bar the actual creditor’s recovery outside of bankruptcy. That is incorrect. The
bankruptcy court rejected the government’s fieldpreemption argument, holding that fraudulent-transfer
actions “do[] not implicate” “the field of federal tax collection” and therefore are not preempted—even setting
aside the Bankruptcy Code. Pet.App.46a-47a. The government’s attempt to inject field preemption into this case
thus risks wide-ranging briefing that has little to do with
bankruptcy law.
As for the Appropriations Clause, the government did
not press this argument below and the court of appeals
did not address it, as the government’s statement (at 7)
implicitly recognizes. This Court should not grant certiorari on a question that encompasses a forfeited issue.
To the extent the Court wants to address these additional arguments, it should await a case where the
government preserved both. E.g., DBSI, 869 F.3d at
1014-15. In the alternative, the Court might rephrase the
question presented to limit briefing to the sovereign-immunity issue. Cf. Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy,
20
144 S. Ct. 478 (2023) (narrowing question presented to issue implicating split); Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 143 S.
Ct. 2686 (2023) (similar). Respondent’s first question presented, supra p. I, offers one proposed framing. But given
the need for percolation and the issue’s limited impact, the
better course is to deny certiorari outright.
III. The Decision Below Is Correct
1. The Tenth Circuit correctly concluded that section
106(a) waives the United States’ sovereign immunity from
avoidance actions under section 544(b). The leading bankruptcy treatise agrees. Collier ¶ 544.01.
a. Section 106(a) is a paradigmatic “clear waiver of
sovereign immunity.” Kirtz, 601 U.S. at 49. Congress
“abrogated” “sovereign immunity … as to a governmental
unit” (including “the United States”) “with respect to”
section 544. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(27), 106(a). By waiving immunity “with respect to” section 544, Congress waived
immunity “insofar as [a claim] concerns” section 544. See
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1934
(1993). “With respect to” thus “has a broadening effect,”
reaching not only the listed subject but also “matters relating to that subject.” Pet.App.7a (quoting Appling, 584
U.S. at 717).
Section 106(a)’s waiver covers all aspects of section
544(b) claims, including the underlying state-law cause of
action. Section 544(b) allows a trustee to avoid any transfer “voidable under applicable law”—here, Utah’s
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Section 544(b) therefore incorporates the actual creditor’s Utah-law claim,
which “concern[s]” or “relat[es] to” that section.
Pet.App.7a (quoting Appling, 584 U.S. at 716-18). The
waiver thus covers the underlying state-law claim.
21
Applying that waiver here “facilitate[s] the Code’s orderly and centralized debt-resolution process” by
subjecting “all creditors (including governmental units)”
to the same “overarching requirements.” Lac du Flambeau, 599 U.S. at 391 (citation omitted). Under the
government’s interpretation, it alone could keep fraudulent transfers received two to four years before
bankruptcy. Yet when Congress wanted to give the government a “limited exception[]” from ordinary
bankruptcy rules, Congress said so expressly. Id. Congress, for example, exempted government fines from
discharge and permitted the government to assess taxes
notwithstanding bankruptcy’s usual automatic stay. Id.
Implying an additional, unwritten exception for fraudulent transfers would undermine Congress’ “meticulous
and carefully calibrated scheme.” See id. at 392 (citation
omitted).
b. The government (at 9) accepts that section 106(a)
“unambiguously waives” immunity. But, the government
(at 9, 12) asserts, that admittedly “broad” waiver does not
apply because section 544(b) “has a two-step structure”—
the trustee must show both a waiver and “that a creditor
exists who could use a state’s ‘applicable law’ to recover
the payment from the IRS.” Pet. 9-10 (quoting EAR, 742
F.3d at 747). Here, the government (at 10-11) says, that
second requirement is not met because sovereign immunity would preclude recovery outside bankruptcy.
That reasoning rests on the same false dichotomy rejected in Kirtz between waivers of sovereign immunity
and express causes of action against the government. 601
U.S. at 53; supra pp. 12-14. Parties suing the United
States do not need a waiver and an express cause of action
against the United States. A waiver plus a generally applicable cause of action suffices. Here, section 106(a)’s
22
unequivocal waiver applies to all aspects of section 544(b)
actions. Trustees do not need a second waiver specific to
the underlying state law.
Even spotting the government its two-step framework, the government misreads section 544(b). The
government demands an actual creditor who could “recover the payment from the IRS.” Pet. 10 (quoting EAR,
742 F.3d at 747). But section 544(b) asks only whether the
transfer “is voidable under applicable law” (emphasis
added). That passive-voice phrasing focuses on the transfer’s voidability, not whether the creditor could actually
recover from this defendant. Section 544(b)(1) never uses
the word “recovery.”
Avoidance and recovery are distinct concepts under
both federal bankruptcy law and state fraudulent-transfer law. Collier ¶ 550.01; see Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI
Consulting, Inc., 583 U.S. 366, 370-72 (2018); Acequia,
Inc. v. Clinton (In re Acequia, Inc.), 34 F.3d 800, 809 (9th
Cir. 1994). In the Bankruptcy Code, Congress gave trustees various powers to avoid transfers. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 544, 545, 547–549, 553(b), 724(a). Section 550(a) then
identifies when the trustee can recover for “a transfer
[that] is avoided”—at which point the basis for avoidance
is, “for all intents and purposes, irrelevant.” Collier
¶ 550.01. Congress thus understood avoidance and recovery as distinct and, in section 544(b), asked only whether
the transfer was “voidable.”
Utah draws that same avoidance/recovery distinction.
Utah law identifies “fraudulent” transfers and permits
“avoidance of [such] transfer[s].” Utah Code §§ 25-6-5,
25-6-6, 25-6-8(1) (2014). Only after the “transfer is voidable” may the creditor “recover judgment for” its “value.”
Id. § 25-6-9(2). Notably, recovery is not limited to the initial transferee. “[T]he person for whose benefit the
23
transfer was made” and secondary transferees who did
not take in good faith are also fair game. Id.
Thus, even setting aside section 106(a), section
544(b)’s “substantive requirements” (Pet. 12) are met.
Section 544(b)(1) asks only whether the “transfer … is
voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim.” The government (at I, 2, 9-10, 12) agrees
that the “applicable law” here is “applicable state law,”
i.e., Utah’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Under that
Act, a transfer “is fraudulent” and voidable when the
debtor (1) did not receive “reasonably equivalent value,”
and (2) “was insolvent.” Utah Code § 25-6-6(1) (2014).
The government agrees those requirements are met.
Pet.App.3a. The transfers are thus voidable under applicable Utah law.
The government is incorrect that the decision below
impermissibly creates a “substantive claim for relief or
cause of action” or “alter[s] the substantive requirements
of” bankruptcy. Pet. 13-14 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(2)(5)). Section 544(b) creates a cause of action, which incorporates state law on what transfers are “voidable.”
Nothing in the decision below alters those requirements.
To the extent the government (at 13) suggests that waivers of sovereign immunity cannot “create[] new liability”
against the United States, that is plainly incorrect. The
entire point of waiving sovereign immunity is to make the
United States liable where it would otherwise be immune.
The government (at 22) accepts that it must return fraudulent transfers under section 548(a)—even though the
United States would not be liable without a waiver of sovereign immunity. The same is true here.
The government (at 16-17) urges that courts should
narrowly construe ambiguities in sovereign-immunity
waivers. But the government identifies no ambiguity in
24
section 106(a), instead insisting (at 10) that “Section
106(a) has no bearing on” this case’s outcome.
2. The Tenth Circuit correctly rejected the government’s alternative argument (at 17-18) that field
preemption bars the trustee’s claim. Pet.App.12a-14a.
Section 544(b) is a federal law creating a “federal cause of
action in bankruptcy court.” DBSI, 869 F.3d at 1015. One
federal law cannot preempt another.
Further, the government’s preemption argument
again conflates avoidance with recovery. The government
asserts that States cannot “enabl[e] their residents to recover tax payments directly from the United States.” Pet.
17 (quoting EAR, 742 F.3d at 748). But regardless of
whether an actual creditor could recover from the United
States, the transfer is still voidable under Utah law. Plus,
as the bankruptcy court recognized, the government’s
field-preemption argument is dubious even outside of
bankruptcy. Nothing suggests Congress would want to
preempt state fraudulent-transfer laws when a debtor
fraudulently pays someone else’s taxes. Pet.App.46a-47a.
Finally, the government fleetingly suggests that the
Appropriations Clause bars the trustee’s claim because a
state-law creditor could not “recover from the IRS outside
of bankruptcy” absent a congressional appropriation.
Pet. 18 (quoting EAR, 742 F.3d at 748). Putting aside forfeiture, supra p. 19, that argument is meritless. Again,
the question under section 544(b) is whether the transfer
“is voidable,” not whether a creditor could actually recover from the IRS. Utah provides various remedies for
voidable transfers, many of which would not require the
IRS to pay a dime. Utah Code § 25-6-8 (2014). The Appropriations Clause poses no barrier here.
25
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
REID W. LAMBERT
STRONG & HANNI
102 South 200 East
Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
MAY 13, 2024
LISA S. BLATT
Counsel of Record
AARON Z. ROPER
ERIN M. SIELAFF
AYOUB OUEDERNI
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP
680 Maine Avenue SW
Washington, DC 20024
(202) 434-5000
lblatt@wc.com
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.