Opposition Brief — Markeith D. Loyd, Petitioner v. Florida

Supreme Court briefJun 19, 2024

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

NO. 23-7391

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MARKEITH LOYD,

Petitioner,

Vv.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

ASHLEY MOODY

Attorney General

Tallahassee, Florida

CARLA SUZANNE BECHARD*

Associate Deputy Attorney General

Florida Bar No. 147745

*Counsel of Record

DORIS MEACHAM

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Attorney General

3507 East Frontage Road, Suite 200

Tampa, Florida 33607

Telephone: (813) 287-7900

CapApp@myfloridalegal.com

carlasuzanne.bechard@myfloridalegal.com

Doris.Meacham@myfloridalegal.com

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

[Capital Case]

Whether Petitioner’s death sentence violates the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment—specifically, whether the state’s remarks during penalty phase closing

arguments minimized the individualized role of the capital jury in violation of

Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994) and Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320

(1985).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW |... ceecccccssessssssscsatesessesesenesseessessesseneceaes i

TABLE OF CONTENTS nice ecccccscesecseesecsseseeesseeeeeeseeessseeeesseesesaessesseesseesesseseesaaees i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 0.0... cecccceccccssecsesssecseseseceseesesssceseteceesseseeseeeseessesaeteas ili

CITATION TO OPINION BELOW 0... cecececcceneceeeeseeeesesceesseeeseeeeseetaneseesssssesenees I

JURISDICTION oo... cccsccscseccsasscsnssenssescseseseeesaeeeseeeseseeeeceaeenseessaseaaeseesnseasenes 1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED ........cccceccsecseeseeseeeneerseeteeseeanees ]

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1.0... eee eneeeeeeeeeeeeeeaceeteateaeeenee ]

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT uuu. cccescssesecessescsessserseceseeseeeteteeeteeees 5

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT GRANT CERTIORARI TO REVIEW THE

FLORIDA SUPREME COURT’S DENIAL OF RELIEF ON LOYD’S CLAIMS

PURSUANT TO ROMANO V. OKLAHOMA, 512 U.S. 1 (1994) AND

CALDWELL V. MISSISSIPPI, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). ...ccecesesceseeseesrecsneeeneesenetenees 5

CONCLUSION .. o.oo eeeesccseeseccessescceesensessenssesesenssasesneceaueeaseneessaeesaeessaseaesteeesesseees 12

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE(S)

CASES

Allen v. United States,

164 US. 492 (1896) oo... eesccsessscssscesssessecssscssssssssssessssecseecsssesstseseessecetssonssoneas 10

Barrientes v. Johnson,

221 F.3d 741 (Sth Cir. 2000) 0.0... cccecsesccssssecsssesseessneecesseesseeeessecesseeceseseesnuseeuacees 9

Caldwell v. Mississippi,

472 U.S. 320 (1985) .....cccccccccsscccessecsscessescssaeecseensssecsseeeessneeessuecseeseeeessesenseess i, ii, 5

Darden v. Wainwright,

A477 U.S. 168 (1986) .0... ee eeccceessseescsecessecesseceseeeseeeseessneeesseesaeessecsseeesaeseneseateeaesseees 6

Davis v. Singletary,

119 F.3d 1471 (11th Cir. 1997)... ccccccccssssccsssccsssscccesseecsssssecsssaeceeseeseeseareceeeess 6

Dutton v. Brown,

812 F.2d 593 (LOth Cir. 1987) oo. ee ecccseceneseseeceteeseeessceseersneeeesseeeseeseeseesenssetsares 6

Hooks v. Workman,

606 F.3d 715 (10th Cir. 2010) 0. ccecsecsseescessseessecssseesaeessecsssesseeenseeeess 10, 11

Hurst v. State,

202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) .......cecccsscecesseeseesscceseeecesscesecsaeeenecseesaeesaeseneeaeeseesaseessasenses 9

Lowenfield v. Phelps,

A84 U.S. 231 (1988) ...ececceccsscsecsceeeseseeseceseeseeeeeesseescesseesseessesseesaeseaseaeseeesaeeaseasens 10

Loyd v. State,

379 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 2023)... ce csccsscecstsessceesesesseseessaecssseceeesrseesseeeaseeeees passim

Montoya v. Scott,

65 F.3d 405 (Sth Cir, 1995) voc eecscscscccsseeeseesscceseesseeeseceeseceseessseeeseeeeeeeseeseeseneeaes 9

Neill v. Gibson,

278 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2001) oo. eeeccecessccssecsecesccesseseneeseneseneeseeeseeeesasseesaseses 6

Romano v. Oklahoma,

512 U.S. 1 (1994) i eccccsssscseecseceseecesecsseeseceseecseessneeeseeesaeeeaaeeasesasenseeeseentes i, ii, 5

State v. Poole,

297 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2020)... .cccccssccsssesceesseeeeeseeseseneessecsceeseeeseeeseeseseseeseseatareeeesees 9

Waters v. Thomas,

46 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1995) ooo eee cecseesesesseeseceeeseaeeseasseeesesesesaseeeetesseseeeeetaees 6

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1257 w.eccccccscccssccscccssscsscessnestecsseceseeeeseeesaeeaeesaecenseeeeesseseseseseeenaseseseteaeeentes 1

CITATION TO OPINION BELOW

The petition seeks review of a decision of the Florida Supreme Court

affirming the death sentence of Loyd for the first-degree murder of Lieutenant Debra

Clayton; that decision appears as Loyd v. State, 379 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 2023).

JURISDICTION

Petitioner asserts that this Court's jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

Respondent acknowledges that section 1257 sets out the scope of this Court's

certiorari jurisdiction but submits that this case is inappropriate for the exercise of

this Court's discretionary jurisdiction.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Respondent accepts Petitioner's statement regarding the applicable

constitutional and statutory provisions involved.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Early on January 9, 2017, Loyd—on the run for the murders of his girlfriend,

Sade Dixon, and their unborn baby'—entered a Walmart where a witness familiar

with Loyd and his previously committed murders spotted Loyd in the checkout line

wearing a bulletproof vest. This witness immediately exited the store and alerted a

uniformed police officer that Loyd was inside. The officer was Lieutenant Debra

Clayton. Soon after, Lieutenant Clayton confronted Loyd as he exited the store into

1 In 2019, before the trial in this case, Loyd was convicted of these murders and

sentenced to life.

the parking lot. Lieutenant Clayton commanded that he “get on the ground.” Loyd

responded by rushing behind a pillar and then hastily reemerged with his gun drawn.

Loyd fired at Lieutenant Clayton, and she returned fire. Lieutenant Clayton was shot

and fell to the ground. Loyd then moved towards Lieutenant Clayton until he stood

over her and delivered a fatal shot into her neck.

Loyd then fled the Walmart parking lot in his vehicle. After dispatch radioed

the news of Lieutenant Clayton's shooting, Captain Joseph Carter pursued Loyd into

the parking lot of an apartment complex. As Captain Carter emerged from his

vehicle, Loyd shot at him twice, but hit only his hubcap. Captain Carter then

maneuvered his vehicle to block in Loyd's vehicle, and Loyd took off running. Loyd

then approached a resident of the apartment complex, Antwyne Thomas, and pointed

his gun at Thomas's face. Loyd demanded that Thomas hand over his car keys.

Frightened, Thomas threw his keys into the air and ran into his apartment.

Loyd evaded arrest until law enforcement officers found him inside a house

on January 17, 2017. At the scene of the arrest, law enforcement recovered a

bulletproof vest, the gun used to murder Sade Dixon, her unborn child, and

Lieutenant Clayton, and the gun used in the attempted murder of Captain Carter.

The jury found Loyd guilty as charged as to each of the five counts of the

indictment- first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, aggravated assault

with a deadly weapon, carjacking with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon; and was sentenced to death.

After penalty phase deliberations, the jury returned with a unanimous

recommendation for death, finding the state proved the existence of all the proposed

aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court agreed with the jury

recommendation and sentenced Loyd to death? finding three aggravators: (1) the

defendant was previously convicted of a felony and on felony probation when the

first-degree murder was committed (slight weight); (2) the defendant was previously

convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of

violence to the person (great weight); and (3) the capital felony was committed for

the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest/the capital felony was

committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or

enforcement of laws/the victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer

engaged in the performance of her official duties (merged) (great weight).? Loyd v.

2 The court also sentenced Loyd to life in prison for attempted first-degree murder;

five years in prison for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; life in prison for

carjacking with a firearm; and fifteen years in prison for possession of a firearm by

a convicted felon. Id.

3 Regarding the statutory age mitigator, the court found that the defendant did prove

the defendant's age at the time of the crime (forty-one years old) but gave the

mitigator no weight. The court found five nonstatutory mitigators: the defendant’s

psychological and psychiatric mitigators (moderate weight); the defendant's

childhood trauma (moderate weight); the defendant's trauma as an adult (some

weight); the trauma of racism (minimal weight); and circumstances related to

defendant's offer to surrender and his arrest (minimal weight). Jd. at 1087.

3

State, 379 So. 3d 1080,1086-87 (Fla. 2023), reh'g denied, No. SC2022-0378, 2024

WL 472283 (Fla. Feb. 7, 2024).

Direct Appeal

Loyd filed a notice of appeal on March 23, 2022, raising thirteen issues. Id.

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the sentences and convictions on November

16, 2023. Id. at 1098. Loyd filed a motion for rehearing that was denied on February

7, 2024. The mandate was issued on February 23, 2024.

On May 23, 2024, Loyd, represented by the Public Defender of the Seventh

Judicial Circuit of Florida, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

This Court should not grant certiorari to review the Florida

Supreme Court’s denial of relief on Loyd’s claims pursuant to

Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994) and Caldwell v. Mississippi,

472 U.S. 320 (1985).

Loyd requests that this Court review the Florida Supreme Court's opinion

rejecting his claim that he is entitled to relief pursuant to Romano v. Oklahoma, 512

USS. 1, (1994) and Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). Specifically, Loyd

argues that the state minimized the jury’s individualized roles during the state’s

penalty phase closing argument by arguing “that the jurors should, or must, do their

best to achieve unanimity as to the ultimate question before them’”.’ See Pet. at 3.

The Florida Supreme Court ruled otherwise, finding there was nothing improper

about the state's remark; the remark did not misstate the law; nor did the state

minimize the jurors’ individualized roles, especially when considered in the context

of the state's entire closing argument. Loyd v. State, 379 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 2023).

* As Loyd did in his briefing to the Florida Supreme Court, Loyd again misquotes

the record, as the prosecutor never used the word “should” or “must”, but rather that

“they try their best” in reference to a unanimous verdict. As noted in the Florida

Supreme Court opinion, “Loyd asserts that the State improperly remarked in its

penalty phase closing that the jurors “ha[{d] an obligation to ... try [their] best to reach

a unanimous verdict.” But Loyd misstates the record. What the State actually said

is: “I would suggest to you that as the instructions point out, you have an obligation

to give meaningful consideration to everything. And not only that, but that you try

your best to reach a unanimous verdict.” Loyd v. State, 379 So. 3d 1080, 1090 (Fla.

2023).

Petitioner presents no significant issue on an important or unsettled question of

law for this Court to review. The Florida Supreme Court was correct in finding no

error under this Court’s established precedent. This Court described the narrow

scope of Caldwell in Romero v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9 (1994) (cleaned up):

[W]e have since read Caldwell as relevant only to certain types of comment—

those that mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing process in a way that

allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision.

Thus, to establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant necessarily must show that

the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local

law.

See Davis v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 1471, 1482 (11th Cir. 1997) (Finding no

constitutional error under Caldwell because the challenged instructions “accurately

characterize the jury's and judge's sentencing roles under Florida law.”).

In evaluating the challenged statements, it is necessary to examine the context

in which they were made. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179(1986) (finding

it helpful as an initial matter to place the remarks in context); Neill v. Gibson, 278

F.3d 1044, 1053 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding that although the prosecutor did, at one

point, misstate Oklahoma law, his argument as a whole did not mislead the jury);

Davis v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 1471, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that where

remarks made during the course of the trial considered in isolation would cause

concern, our decisions teach that such remarks must be considered in the context of

the entire trial); Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding

that the court’s evaluation must focus not upon the challenged instruction in

6

isolation, but upon the entire sentencing instruction and the entire sentencing

proceeding); Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593, 596-97 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding that

when taken in context, the statement of the prosecutor was not constitutionally

impermissible).

After analyzing the statements made by the prosecutor as a whole, the Florida

Supreme Court determined that the prosecutor did not misstate the law and noted

that the trial court, in accordance with Standard Criminal Jury Instruction 3.10,

instructed the jury, “Whatever verdict you render must be unanimous, that is, each

juror must agree to the same verdict.” Nor did the state court find that the prosecutor

minimized the jurors’ individualized roles, especially when considered in the context

of the prosecutor’s entire closing argument, in which the prosecutor also made the

following remarks:

And while it is true, as you have been told several

times, that your decision as to whether or not a sentence of

death is appropriate is an individualized decision, that is

nothing new to you. That is something you have already

done, because what the instructions and the law tell you is

that each of you reach an individualized decision, and only

if you're unanimous that death is the appropriate

punishment can it be imposed.

So you're going to be — it's going to be emphasized

to you and I will emphasize to you that you're making an

individualized decision.

This is an important decision and all I am

suggesting is that you-all collaborate together

understanding you will make an individualized decision to

7

reach a decision that is commiserate [sic] with the task in

front of you.

In those comments, the State emphasized rather than minimized

the jurors’ individualized roles. The trial court did not abuse its

discretion in allowing the statement.

Loyd vy. State, 379 So. 3d 1080, 1090-91 (Fla. 2023).

The Florida Supreme Court correctly followed this Court's precedent when it

analyzed whether the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to

them. Loyd’s disagreement with the Florida Supreme Court's ultimate decision is

not a sufficient basis to grant certiorari review.

Looking at the single statement alone, there was no legal misstatement of the

law, nor did the statement misrepresent the law regarding the jury's individualized

role in the sentencing process. The prosecutor correctly told the jurors that it was

their duty to deliberate and try to come to a unanimous verdict, but he in no way

implied that the jury was required by law to return one. Even if one would consider

the statement to be problematic, one cannot myopically focus on a single statement

or instruction. Rather, Caldwell claims are properly evaluated by “look[ing] to the

‘total trial scene,’ including jury selection, the guilt phase of the trial, and the

sentencing hearing, examining both the court's instructions and counsel's arguments

to the jury.” Barrientes v. Johnson, 221 F.3d 741, 777 (Sth Cir. 2000) (quoting

Montoya v. Scott, 65 F.3d 405, 420 (Sth Cir. 1995)).

The comment by the prosecutor here was made in the context of his

explanation to the jury of the steps needed to reach a verdict in accordance with the

jury instructions and Florida law. The prosecutor emphasized that the decision as to

whether a sentence of death was appropriate was not only an individualized decision,

but one that was required to be unanimous.’ The prosecutor stressed that the process

itself was important and asked that they not deviate from that process, which

included a duty to deliberate. The prosecutor then asked the jury to give meaningful

consideration to everything and to try their best to reach a unanimous verdict,

knowing that they could just as well unanimously decide that Loyd deserved life in

prison without parole.

Contextually, the comments made by the state repeatedly emphasized the

juror’s individual role in the sentencing process and explained that only if they are

unanimous that death is the appropriate punishment, can it then be imposed. No

obligation to return a unanimous verdict was ever conferred onto them by the state.

The closing argument made by the state conveyed what the jury instructions

5 In 2017 Florida law required a unanimous jury verdict supporting a death sentence

as a precondition to imposition of that sentence. See Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40

(Fla. 2016), receded from in State v. Poole, 297 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2020).

informed the jury; unanimity is required only to impose the death penalty, not to

avoid it.®

Loyd asserts that the Court of Appeals decision in Hooks v. Workman, 606 F.

3d 715, 719 (10" Cir. 2010) conflicts with the Florida Supreme Court decision in

this case. While the Court of Appeals found that the prosecution’s closing argument

improperly described the role assigned to the jury by Oklahoma law, that was not

the basis for their decision. Habeas relief in Hooks was predicated on the

impermissibly coercive Allen’ charge given during penalty phase deliberations, and

the Oklahoma appellate courts’ decision to the contrary as an unreasonable

application of Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988). Id. at 719. Loyd has not

shown any persuasive, much less compelling reasons for this Court to grant

certiorari, other than a general disagreement with the state court’s ruling and

reference to a case that was ultimately decided on an issue not before this Court.

More to the point, the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in this case does not

conflict with Hooks because the comments at issue here are in no way comparable

to those in Hooks. The Hooks majority described the prosecutors’ comments as

® Even assuming for a moment some error could be discerned from the prosecutor’s

comment, it had no impact upon the outcome of this heavily aggravated case. Lloyd

murdered a police officer by standing over her and shooting her in the neck after

wounding and incapacitating her. Lloyd committed the capital murder shortly after

murdering his girlfriend and their unborn child.

7 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).

10

misleading the jury in several respects and amounted to intentional misconduct: “(1)

the jury's work would be wasted if it failed to reach a unanimous verdict, (2) defense

counsel's argument that it took the vote of only one juror to prevent imposition of

the death penalty constituted a request for “jury nullification,” and (3) failure to

deliberate in a manner leading to a unanimous verdict would amount to operating

outside the law.” Hooks, 606 F.3d at 742—43 (footnote omitted).

The comments challenged here pale in comparison to Hooks in both number

and severity. There is no conflict for this Court to resolve. The prosecutor in this

case did not argue that failing to deliberate and reach a unanimous decision would

be operating outside of the law.’ This Court should accord deference to the Florida

Supreme Court’s finding that the jurors were not misled and there was no

prosecutorial misconduct, as an objectively reasonable application of federal law.

Since the Florida Supreme Court's decision does not conflict with any decision

by any court and does not decide any important, unsettled question of federal law,

certiorari review should be denied.

® Aside from the obvious factual distinction, there was also a strong dissent in Hooks

by Circuit Judge O’Brien in which he criticizes the Court of Appeals finding that the

jury was misled by the prosecutors' intentional misstatements of law. Circuit Judge

O’Brien observed that, “[t]o decide whether the OCCA's decision to the contrary is

“objectively unreasonable,” or even wrong, we must take a close look at the events,

especially the prosecutors' arguments, in context. The majority does so selectively,

and thus fails to provide necessary context”. Jd. at 759-60. Hooks v. Workman, 606

F.3d 715, 764-65 (10th Cir. 2010).

1]

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should DENY the petition for certiorari

review of the decision of the Florida Supreme Court entered below.

Respectfully submitted,

ASHLEY MOODY

Attorney General of Florida

(CA i—

C. Suzanne Bechard*

Associate Deputy Attorney General

Florida Bar No. 147745

* Counsel of Record

Doris Meacham

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Attorney General

3507 East Frontage Road, Suite 200

Tampa, Florida 33607

Telephone: (813) 287-7900

CapApp@myfloridalegal.com

carlasuzanne.bechard@myfloridalegal.com

Doris.Meacham@myfloridalegal.com

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

12

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.