Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Sean A. Gray, Petitioner v. Kevin Payne, Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth

Supreme Court briefApr 11, 2024

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

FILED

United States Court of Appeal

Tenth Circuit

December 5, 2023

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court

SEAN A. GRAY,

Petitioner - Appellant,

KEVIN PAYNE, Commandant, United

States Disciplinary Barracks,

No. 23-3079

(D.C. No. 5:23-CV-03006-JWL)

(D. Kan.)

Respondent - Appellee.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before PHILLIPS, KELLY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner-Appellant Sean Gray was an active-duty member of the United

States Army. But after he pled guilty to sexually assaulting his adopted stepdaughter

and related crimes, he was dishonorably discharged and sentenced to 44 years’

confinement. Gray filed for postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,

challenging his court-martial convictions and sentence on ineffective-assistance-of-

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

counsel grounds. The district court denied his petition, so he filed this appeal.

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district court’s

judgment.

Background

In 2018, Gray pled guilty to multiple violations of the Uniform Code of

Military Justice, including sexual assault of a child, sexual assault, sexual assault

consummated by battery, assault, prejudice to good order and discipline, and failure

to obey an order. The victim—his adopted stepdaughter—was between the ages of

13 and 16 when Gray sexually assaulted her. At age 16, she gave birth to Gray’s

biological daughter, as confirmed by DNA testing.

In exchange for Gray’s plea, the Army agreed to dismiss without prejudice the

remaining charges, which included rape of a child, sexual abuse, and additional

sexual-assault and assault charges. Those charges related to another adopted

stepdaughter and the victim’s mother. A military judge sentenced Gray to a

reduction in rank, 44 years’ confinement, and a dishonorable discharge with

forfeiture of all pay and allowances. He is confined in the United States Disciplinary

Barracks (“USDB”) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Gray appealed to the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals

(“ACCA”), arguing his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in violation

of the Sixth Amendment by advising him to plead guilty to offenses he did not

commit, to agree to an incorrect stipulation of facts, and to lie during his providence

inquiry with the military judge. In a shift from his previous statements, he insisted

the sex with the victim was consensual and occurred only after her sixteenth birthday.

The ACCA ordered his defense counsel to respond, and they provided lengthy

affidavits describing their representation. Gray also submitted affidavits, and he

requested a fact-finding hearing to resolve disputed questions of fact relating to his

legal representation. The ACCA deemed a hearing unnecessary, rejected Gray’s

argument, and affirmed his conviction and sentence. See R.1 at 102 (“finding] no

unethical behavior on the part of the defense counsel and concluding] their

representation was not ineffective”).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (“CAAF”) denied

his petition for review of the ACCA’s decision. That denial concluded his direct

appeal and left him with only a “narrowly circumscribed” ability to seek collateral

review, Santucci v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 66 F.4th 844, 853

(10th Cir. 2023).2

In 2023, Gray filed the § 2241 habeas petition underlying this appeal in the

United States District Court for the District of Kansas. His petition was based on the

same ineffective-assistance claim that he raised in his military-court appeal. Before

briefing was complete, he filed an opposed discovery motion seeking a transcript of a

1 The record on appeal contains multiple sets of page numbers. All citations

refer to the blue numbers.

2“Congress ... has largely exempted the court-martial from direct Article III

review.” Santucci, 66 F.4th at 853. Santucci provides a helpful explanation of the

process by which a servicemember can appeal a conviction within the military justice

system, id. at 848 n.3, and the history behind the limited collateral review available

in federal court, id. at 853-59.

phone call between another USDB inmate and the victim. During that call, the victim

supposedly told the inmate that she did not want to testify but her mother made her

do so. The district court denied the § 2241 petition on the ground that Gray failed to

show the military justice system had failed to give full and fair consideration to his

claim. It also denied Gray’s discovery motion. This timely appeal followed.

II.

Analysis

Reviewability and Standard of Review for Military Habeas Petitions

“Federal courts are empowered under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to entertain habeas

petitions from military prisoners. But our review of court-martial proceedings is very

limited.” Santucci, 66 F.4th at 853 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id.

(describing the standard of review as “deferential” and noting that “the deference we

give to military tribunals is even greater than that we owe to state courts” (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

To determine whether merits review of a military habeas corpus petition is

appropriate, we consider four factors as articulated in Dodson v. Zelez, 917 F.2d

1250, 1252-53 (10th Cir. 1990):

1. “The asserted error must be of substantial constitutional dimension.” Id. at

1252 (italics and internal quotation marks omitted).

2. “The issue must be one of law rather than of disputed fact already determined

by the military tribunals.” Id. (italics and internal quotation marks omitted).

3. There must be no “[mjilitary considerations [that] warrant different treatment

of constitutional claims.” Id. at 1252-53 (italics and internal quotation marks

omitted).

4. “The military courts must give adequate consideration to the issues involved

and apply proper legal standards.” Id. at 1253 (italics and internal quotation

marks omitted).

The fourth factor is “the most important.” Santucci, 66 F.4th at 858 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

In Santucci, we clarified that “as a necessary condition for full merits review

of a given claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that the resolution of each of the

Dodson factors weighs in the petitioner’s favor.” Id. at 859 (emphasis added). Only

then can a petitioner “show that the military tribunals have not given full and fair

consideration to [his] claim.” Id.

The district court concluded that Gray had not shown he could satisfy all four

Dodson factors. It focused on the second and fourth factors and, finding them

lacking, declined to reach the merits of his habeas petition. We review the district

court’s denial of habeas relief de novo. Id. at 871.

The Second Dodson Factor

We start by assessing whether Gray’s ineffective-assistance claim presents

only a question of law. The district court concluded it does not—reasoning that the

ACCA reviewed multiple conflicting fact-based affidavits and “applied fact-based

factors in holding that a hearing was not required to resolve those issues of fact.” R.

at 1154. We agree.

Gray’s argument on the second Dodson factor is hard to decipher.3 He seems

to be saying the district court should not even have applied this factor to his claim

because an ineffective-assistance claim presents a mixed question of law and fact

under Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984). But his acknowledgment

that the Strickland standard is “in direct contradiction to the second Dodson factor,”

Aplt. Br. at 7, amounts to a concession that this factor cannot weigh in his favor.

After all, it would be illogical to say that an issue reviewable under a mixed-question

standard is purely “one of law,” Dodson, 917 F.2d at 1252 (italics and internal

quotation marks omitted), unless no issues of disputed fact exist. Although Gray now

insists that is the case, he told both the ACC A and the CAAF that disputed facts exist

and that the factual disparity between his affidavits and his defense counsel’s

affidavits was “outcome determinative.” See R. at 56-57, 60, 165. And he told the

ACCA that a hearing was required because “disputed questions of fact [were]

introduced by conflicting post-trial affidavits.” R. at 110 (capitalization

standardized).

Gray also says that applying the second Dodson factor “to

[ineffective-assistance] cases brought forth in habeas petitions by military prisoners

Because Gray proceeds pro se, we liberally construe his pleadings and his appeal

brief. See Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003). But we

do not act as his advocate. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th

Cir. 1991).

is, in effect, a bar to habeas and thus unconstitutional,” Aplt. Br. at 9. But he

presents no support for this novel argument.

Under these circumstances, Gray has not demonstrated the second Dodson

factor weighs in his favor. Our analysis could begin and end here, given that his

failure to satisfy even one factor is fatal under Santucci. Nevertheless, we will

consider his argument on the fourth, and most important, Dodson factor, to reassure

him that he has received full and fair consideration in this court as well.

The Fourth Dodson Factor

The district court found that the military courts adequately considered Gray’s

ineffective-assistance claim. It highlighted the ACCA’s efforts to supplement the

record by requesting affidavits from Gray’s counsel and concluded that the ACCA’s

opinion shows that it rejected the claim only after a complete record analysis

thus

giving full and fair consideration to his claim. Here, too, we agree.

Gray’s arguments on the fourth Dodson factor rest on two inconsequential

omissions in the district court’s ruling. First, he faults the district court for not

addressing the ACCA’s failure to properly cite the affidavits, “which showed clear

negligence in their analysis of the affidavits and therefore a lack of adequate

consideration,” Aplt. Br. at 5. Second, he faults the district court for not specifically

addressing the CAAF’s rejection of the petition for grant of review, even though it

did speak broadly of “the military courts,” R. at 1155. Gray might be conflating

adequate consideration by the district court with adequate consideration by the

military court. In any event, our independent record review shows the military courts

adequately considered4 Gray’s ineffective-assistance claim and applied proper legal

standards. Gray has not demonstrated the fourth Dodson factor weighs in his favor.

Discovery and Procedural Motions

Last, we turn to Gray’s argument that the district court abused its discretion in

denying his motions for discovery and for an extension of time and in delaying its

ruling on those motions until it resolved his habeas petition. “We review pretrial

discovery rulings for abuse of discretion.” King v. PA Consulting Grp., Inc., 485

F.3d 577, 590 (10th Cir. 2007). “District courts are properly granted broad discretion

over discovery and scheduling matters; otherwise, they would be unable to

effectively manage their caseloads.” Id. at 591. Likewise, we review a district

court’s denial of a motion for an extension of time for abuse of discretion.

Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1242 (10th Cir.

2010).

As Gray recognized in district court, see Suppl. R. at 4, habeas petitioners are

not entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary course. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S.

899, 904 (1997). Instead, a district court has discretion to permit discovery upon a

showing of good cause. See id. Good cause is established where “the petitioner may,

4 The district court used the phrase “full and fair consideration” when

discussing the fourth Dodson factor. See R. at 1155. Gray says the district court

erred by using this phrase because the fourth factor references “adequate

consideration.” See Aplt. Br. at 11. We discern no meaningful error. The district

court clearly assessed the adequacy of the military courts’ consideration. Moreover,

the aim of the Dodson test as a whole is to assess whether the military courts gave

full and fair consideration, so that phrasing is appropriate too.

if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief.”

Id. at 909 (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted).

Gray’s discovery motion sought a transcript of a phone call between another

USDB inmate and the victim, during which the victim supposedly told the inmate

that she did not want to testify but her mother made her do so. The district court

found that he had not shown good cause for discovery because (1) “the alleged

statement by the victim does not suggest that petitioner did not commit the crime,”

and (2) “the facts at issue in the discovery request do not bear on the Dodson factors

that preclude . . . merits review.” R. at 1156.

On appeal, Gray asserts that the transcript would support his ineffectiveassistance claim because his attorneys would not have advised him to plead guilty

had they recognized the victim’s motive to fabricate and done their job effectively.

But even assuming that statement is true, the district court correctly reasoned that the

requested discovery has no relationship to any of the Dodson factors. Gray disagrees

with the notion that a court must base its discovery ruling on whether the facts sought

in discovery “bear on issues barring the court’s review of the merits of the case.”

Aplt. Br. at 15. But whether the district court could review the merits of Gray’s case

was a threshold question, and it is axiomatic that discovery must be relevant or

calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. Therefore, the district court

did not abuse its discretion in denying the discovery motion.

Gray also sought an extension of time to file a traverse (i.e., a reply) in support

of his habeas petition. He had filed a reply, but he wanted an opportunity to alter it

after the district court issued its discovery ruling. Having denied the habeas petition

and the motion for discovery, the district court logically denied the motion for an

extension as moot and thus did not abuse its discretion.

III.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the district court. We grant Gray’s motion for

leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees.

Entered for the Court

Gregory A. Phillips

Circuit Judge

Appellate Case: 23-3079

Document: 010110989256

Date Filed: 01/24/2024

Page: 1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

January 24,2024

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court

SEAN A. GRAY,

Petitioner - Appellant,

No. 23-3079

(D.C. No. 5:23-CV-03006-JWL)

(D. Kan.)

KEVIN PAYNE, Commandant, United

States Disciplinary Barracks,

Respondent - Appellee.

ORDER

Before PHILLIPS, KELLY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.

Appellant's petition for rehearing is denied.

Entered for the Court

CHRISTOPHER M. WOLPERT, Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

SEAN A. GRAY,

Petitioner,

KEVIN PAYNE, Commandant,

United States Disciplinary Barracks,

Respondent.

)

Case No. 23-3006-JWL

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Petitioner, a military prisoner, has filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241, in which he challenges his convictions by court martial. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court denies the petition. In addition, petitioner’s motion for discovery (Doc.

# 6) is hereby denied, and his motion for an extension of time to file his traverse (Doc. #

12) is denied as moot.

Petitioner was convicted after pleading guilty to various offenses related to his

alleged sexual assault of his step-daughter. The United States Army Court of Criminal

Appeals (ACCA) affirmed petitioner’s convictions and sentence, and the Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces (CAAF) denied review of that decision. See United States v. Gray,

2019 WL 5604452 (A.C.C.A. Oct. 28, 2019) (unpub. op.), rev. denied, 80 M.J. 169

(C.A.A.F. 2020). The ACCA addressed and rejected petitioner’s claim on appeal that his

defense counsel had been ineffective, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, because they

advised petitioner to plead guilty to offenses he did not commit and to agree to an incorrect

stipulation of facts as a part of that plea. See id. at *4.

By his present petition, petitioner brings a single claim, as follows: “Petitioner’s

defense team was ineffective leading up to and at trial in that they advised him to lie in the

stipulation of fact and during his providence inquiry in order to receive a plea agreement

from the government.” As supporting facts, petitioner states that defense counsel believed

petitioner was innocent of the charges against him;'’ “planned [with petitioner] on a

contested trial for a year and a half leading up to the trial;

V! »

failed to uncover motive to

fabricate for the main complaining witness;” “knew that petitioner would be lying in the

stipulation of fact and providence inquiry;” and “continued to advice [sfc] petitioner that

he would face steeper sentencing if he contended the trial.”

Only a week ago, the Tenth Circuit clarified the standard for a district court’s

consideration of a habeas petition filed by a military prisoner convicted by a court martial.

See Santucci v. Commandant,_F.4th

, 2023 WL 3070683, at *7-22 (10th Cir. Apr. 25,

2023). Other than questions of jurisdiction, a district court may consider the merits upon

habeas review only if “the military justice system has failed to give full and fair

consideration to the petitioner’s claims.” See id. at 10 (citing Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S.

137, 142 (1953)). A court determines whether such full and fair consideration has been

given by examining the following four factors:

1. The asserted error must be of substantial constitutional dimension. 2. The

issue must be one of law rather than of disputed fact already determined by

the military tribunals. 3. Military consideration may warrant different

treatment of constitutional claims. 4. The military courts must give adequate

consideration to the issues involved and apply proper legal standards.

See id. (quoting Dodson v. Zelez, 917 F.2d 1250, 1252-53 (10th Cir. 1990)). Military

petitioners must establish that all four factors weigh in their favor in order to have the

merits of their claims reviewed. See id. at * 11. “Putting the matter differently, petitioners

failure to show that even one factor weighs in their favor is fatal to their efforts to secure

full merits review.” See id. at *12. “[T]his is especially so, when the factor in question is

one that [the Tenth Circuit has] described as ‘the most important,’ that is, the fourth,

adequate-consideration factor.” See id (quoting Thomas v. U.S. Disciplinary Barracks,

625 F.3d 667, 671 (10th Cir. 2010)).

Petitioner has not shown that he can satisfy this standard with respect to all four

factors. First, the Court disagrees with petitioner that his claim presents only a question of

law concerning whether a trial counsel’s advising a client to lie to plead guilty pursuant to

a plea agreement or coercing the client to do so constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.

Petitioner and his defense counsel submitted affidavits to the ACC A, and petitioner s

allegations concerning statements made to him by counsel were directly contradicted by

counsel. The ACCA then applied fact-based factors in holding that a hearing was not

required to resolve those issues of fact. See Gray, 2019 WL 5604452, at *4-6. The court

reviewed the factual record, found that petitioner’s allegations were improbable based on

that record, and noted that petitioner’s credibility had been damaged by occasions in which

he had made false statements that he was later forced to retract when confronted with

physical evidence. See id at *5. To prove his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

petitioner would be required to show that his counsel’s performance was deficient based

on counsel’s conduct, and the facts concerning that conduct are not undisputed. In his

traverse, petitioner appears to change his claim, arguing that even if counsel did not advise

him to lie, they coerced him by telling him not to lie while also stating that he would be

better off pleading guilty to offenses they knew he did not commit. Such a claim, however,

would turn on factual issues concerning the manner in which counsel made those

statements and their belief concerning petitioner’s guilt. Accordingly, the Court concludes

that petitioner’s claim does not present solely an issue of law, and because the second

Dodson factor weighs against petitioner, the Court may not review the merits of petitionei s

claims.

In addition, petitioner cannot establish the fourth Dodson factor. Petitioner argues

that the ACCA relied only on portions of the affidavits from defense counsel. The ACCA’s

opinion, however demonstrates that it addressed petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel, supplemented the record by soliciting affidavits from petitioner s counsel,

applied the governing Strickland standard, and rejected the claim after an analysis of the

record. Thus the military courts gave full and fair consideration to petitioner’s claim, and

because the fourth Dodson factor does not favor petitioner, the Court does not reach the

merits of petitioner’s claim for that reason as well. The Court therefore denies the petition.

The Court also addresses petitioner’s motion for discovery of a transcript of a

telephone call between a fellow inmate and the victim of his offenses (his step-daughter).

Petitioner has submitted an affidavit by the inmate stating that the victim admitted that she

did not wish to testify but that her mother made her do so. A habeas petitioner is not

entitled to discovery as a matter of course, although a court may in its discretion grant leave

to conduct discovery for good cause shown. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904

(1997) (citing Rule Governing § 2254 cases, Rule 6(a)). Good cause may be shown if

specific allegations provide a reason to believe that if facts are fully developed, the

petitioner may be able to demonstrate an entitlement to relief. See id. at 908-09 (citing

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969)). As respondent points out in opposing the

motion, the alleged statement by the victim does not suggest that petitioner did not commit

the crime. Petitioner insists that the statement (along with other evidence) shows a possible

motive from the victim to have fabricated her story. In the end, however, the facts at issue

in the discovery request do not bear on the Dodson factors that preclude this Court s merits

review, namely whether the ACCA fully considered the claim and whether the claim

involves solely a question of law (indeed, petitioner’s reliance on such evidence tends to

confirm that the claim involves a consideration of facts). Accordingly, good cause has not

been shown, and the Court in its discretion denies the motion for leave to conduct

discovery.

Finally, the Court addresses petitioner’s motion for an extension of time in which

to file a traverse. Petitioner states that he seeks such an extension because the contents of

the traverse will depend on the Court’s ruling on the discovery motion. Petitioner mailed

the motion to the Court on April 17, although it was not filed until April 28, 2023. On

April 25, however, petitioner mailed the Court a traverse, which was filed on April 27,

2023. In that traverse, petitioner addressed the relevant Dodson factors on which the

Court’s decision turns. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion for an extension as moot.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the petition for habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is hereby denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT petitioner’s motion for leave

to conduct discovery (Doc. # 6) is hereby denied.

IT IS FUTHER ORDERED THAT petitioner’s motion for an extension of time

(Doc. # 12) is hereby denied as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 2nd day of May, 2023, in Kansas City, Kansas.

/s/ John W. Lunastrum

Hon. John W. Lungstrum

United States District Judge

4 '

UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before

BURTON, RODRIGUEZ, and FLEMING

Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee

Sergeant First Class SEAN A. GRAY

United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20180353

Headquarters, I Corps

Lanny J. Acosta, Jr., Timothy P. Hayes, Jr., and James P. Arguelles, Military Judges

Colonel Steven C. Henricks, Staff Judge Advocate

For Appellant: Captain Steven J. Dray, JA; Matthew Flynn, Esquire (on brief).

For Appellee: Colonel Steven P. Haight, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Wayne H.

Williams, J A; Major Craig Schapira, JA; Captain Brian Jones, JA (on brief).

28 October'2019

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent.

FLEMING, Judge:

Appellant sexually assaulted his adopted step-daughter, DG, on numerous

occasions when she was between the ages of thirteen and sixteen.1 At sixteen years

old, DG gave birth to appellant’s biological daughter and step-granddaughter.

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, pursuant to

his pleas, of six Specifications of sexual assault of a child, two specifications of

sexual assault, three specifications of assault consummated by a battery, one

specification of adultery, and two specifications of violating a lawful general

regulation, in violation of Articles 120b, 120, 128, 134, and 92, Uniform Code of

Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 920b, 920, 928, 934, and 892. The military

judge found the two specifications alleging Article 92 violations were an

unreasonable multiplication of charges and conditionally dismissed one of the

specifications (Specification 1 of Charge V ) pending final appellate review of the

(continued . . .)

GRAY—ARMY 20180353

scriva ee^i n^faeKACTay^a^dtawldii3j^^»SjaOPegtciaiB»s«fai sati^iid-efcffl^etemm^tttgWTyEp.,

«^r,y. We ordered affidavits from appellant’s trial defense counsel who deny

appellant’s assertions. Appellant requests a post-trial fact finding hearing to resolve

alleged disputed questions of fact from the affidavits.

After a review of the entire record, including the affidavits from the trial

defense counsel, appellant, and appellant’s uncle, we determine a post-trial fact

finding hearing is not necessary. We find no unethical behavior on the part of the

defense counsel and conclude their representation was not ineffective. Accordingly,

we affirm the findings and sentence.

BACKGROUND

Appellant entered DG’s life when she was six years old. He married her

mother and adopted DG as his daughter, along with her three other siblings. The

following discussion highlights appellant’s sexual abuse of DG as admitted to by

appellant in his stipulation of fact and thirty-five pages of providence inquiry with

the military judge.

Appellant’s Sexual Abuse of DG from Thirteen to Sixteen Years Old

When DG turned thirteen years old, appellant “tried to fight the sexual

attraction [he] felt towards [DG].” On multiple occasions when she was thirteen,

appellant would isolate DG from the rest of the family by bringing her to an empty

bedroom in the house. Once in the bedroom, appellant would undress DG. He

would direct her to lay down on a bed and he would digitally penetrate her. After a

few minutes, appellant would proceed to insert his penis in her vagina.

Around DG’s fourteenth birthday, appellant and DG’s mother separated.

Appellant moved from Alaska to Colorado and his wife moved with the children to

Washington State. During his move to Colorado, appellant stopped to visit DG and

her siblings for a month. During the visit, he rented a hotel room. On several

occasions during this one month visit, appellant would isolate DG from her siblings

in the hotel room. He would undress her, direct her to lay down on a bed, and he .

would digitally penetrate her. After a few minutes, appellant would proceed to

(. . . continued)

other specification (Specification 2 of Charge V). The military judge sentenced

appellant to a dishonorable discharge and confinement for forty-four years. The

convening authority approved the sentence as adjudged.

GRAY—ARMY 20180353

insert his penis m her vagina. On several occasions, appellant told DG that “she

better not tell.”

After these events, DG confided in friends at school that she was being

sexually assaulted by her father. A police investigation ensued, and appellant

denied the allegations. During DG’s interview with police, she expressed she was

uncomfortable and scared. During the course of the interview, DG would neither

confirm nor deny that she was being sexually assaulted by appellant. Despite DG’s

outcry, appellant continued to sexually assault her.

Appellant visited DG and her siblings several times in Washington State when

she was fifteen. Again, appellant would rent a hotel room and have DG and her

siblings visit him at the hotel. On multiple occasions, appellant would isolate DG

from her siblings and sexually assault her. On one of these occasions, DG cried

during the assault. Appellant ignored her crying and sexually assaulted DG later,

again, that same day, while the other children were sleeping.

Shortly after DG’s sixteenth birthday, she and her siblings visited appellant

for the summer in Colorado. During this summer visit, appellant continued to

engage in sexual intercourse with DG. When she returned from visiting appellant,

DG became very sick. She was taken to the hospital over the course of the next

several months and treated for a variety of possible illnesses. Around Thanksgiving

doctors determined DG was twenty weeks pregnant with a conception date in the

summer she visited appellant.

DG informed her mother that appellant was the father. Appellant denied he

sexually assaulted his daughter and denied having sexual intercourse with her. At

sixteen years old, DG gave birth. A paternity test confirmed appellant was the

father.

Appellant’s Guilty Plea & Post-Trial Affidavits

Appellant entered into a pretrial agreement to plead guilty to all of the

aforementioned sexual assaults of DG.2 As a result of the pretrial agreement, the

government agreed to dismiss twenty other specifications, including three

specifications of rape of a child against one of his other daughters, in violation of

Article 120b, UCMJ, which each carried a maximum punishment of life without

Appellant also pleaded guilty to three specifications of assaulting a subordinate

soldier, Private E-2 (PV2) KD; one specification of committing adultery with PV2

KD, and two specifications of having an inappropriate relationship with PV2 KD in

violation of Articles 128, 134, and 92, UCMJ.

GRAY—ARMY 20180353

eligibility for parole.3 As part of his pretrial agreement, appellant entered into

seven-page stipulation of fact which was admitted at trial. In this stipulation,

appellant admitted to the underlying facts for each of the charges to which he

pleaded guilty.

Now on appeal, appellant alleges he engaged in only one act of consensual

sexual intercourse with DG, after her sixteen birthday, which resulted in her

pregnancy. He claims, however, in his post-trial affidavit that he never sexually

assaulted DG while she was between the ages of thirteen and sixteen.4

Appellant asserts he pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting DG because his

defense counsel told him he “had to lie” because “a court-martial panel would not

believe that the sex was consensual and [would find appellant] guilty with a lengthy

sentence.” Appellant claims he told his defense counsel, during a recess in the

middle of his providence inquiry, that “[he] was not comfortable lying to the

military judge.” Appellant claims his defense counsel responded that “lying to the

judge in order to get the benefit of the plea was in [his] best interest.” After the

military judge sentenced appellant to confinement for forty-four years, appellant

claims his defense counsel told him, “[w]hen you get your appellate lawyer, you tell

them what I made you do.”5

3 The specifications dismissed as a result of appellant’s guilty plea allege offenses

against appellant’s other children and DG’s mother: three specifications of rape of a

child, two specifications of sexual assault of a child, three specifications of sexual

abuse of a child, nine specifications of assault consummated by a battery upon a

child, one specification of aggravated assault upon a child, one specification of

attempted assault upon a child, and one specification of assault consummated by a

battery upon DG’s mother in violation of Articles 120b and 128, UCMJ.

4 We note appellant’s affidavit to this court was submitted as an “ unsworn

declaration under penalty of perjury in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746.”

(emphasis added). Despite the unsworn nature of appellant’s affidavit, we afford it

the same weight as if it were a sworn affidavit.

5 In support of his claim, appellant’s uncle submitted an affidavit stating “[a]fter the

sentence was announced, I walked into a back room with [appellant] and his lawyers.

I witnessed [appellant’s] lawyers tell [appellant] that the plea was not a good

decision, and that they would tell [appellant’s] appellate lawyers it was a bad

decisionf.]” This affidavit was also submitted as an “unsworn declaration under

penalty of perjury in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746.” Despite the unsworn

nature of appellant’s uncle’s affidavit, we afford it the same weight as if it were a

sworn affidavit.

GRAY—ARMY 20180353

Affidavits from Trial Defense Counsel

Appellant’s trial defense counsel submitted affidavits stating they never

advised appellant to lie. In fact, trial defense counsel state they told appellant

multiple times not to lie. As stated by defense counsel in her affidavit:

[Appellant] initially said the sex with DG was consensual

and that he was not sure of the exact date but thought it

was after her 16th birthday, but before the guilty plea he

changed that and admitted that the sex with DG was

nonconsensual and that some of it was before she was 16

years old. Over the, approximately one year, and a half

that I represented appellant, his version of events changed

multiple times. . . . [I] told [appellant] what the evidence

showed. ... [I] told [appellant] multiple times that I did

not want him to lie.

Appellant’s defense counsel agreed with appellant’s affidavit that they told

him they did not think they would be successful at a contested trial, and if found

guilty, he would likely receive a lengthy sentence. Defense counsel reiterated in

their affidavits, “No one on the defense team advised [appellant] to lie or agree to

factual inaccuracies. [I] did say that I thought a pretrial agreement was in his best

interest.” And, “[I] informed [appellant] that the law did not permit him to lie, that I

advised him not to do so.”

In a recess during the providence inquiry, trial defense counsel recall

appellant expressing a concern that he was admitting to inaccurate facts. Defense

counsel states appellant was again advised:

We believed the [offer to plead guilty] would result in a

more favorable outcome than a contested trial, we could

not advise him to lie, and his two options were to answer

affirmatively to the questions in the providence inquiry or

to proceed to a contested trial. [Appellant] elected to

proceed with the providence inquiry.

Defense counsel deny they told appellant, after the military judge announced

his sentence, to tell his appellate attorney, “what I made you do.” Defense counsel

explains, [I] told [appellant] he should be honest with his appellate attorney

regarding his views of my performance.”6

Assuming appellant s claim is true, we do not find defense counsel ’s assessment

(continued . . .)

GRAY—ARMY 20180353

LAW AND DISCUSSION

To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which we review de

novo an appellant must show: “(1) his counsel’s performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) the counsel’s deficient performance

gives rise to a reasonable probability' that the result of the proceeding would have

counsel’s unprofessional errors.” United States v. Akbar, 74

688; 6944’098i)T(emApha“'£4“ ^

When we evaluate the first Strickland prong, we “must indulge a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.” 466 U.S. at 689. Appellant has the burden to show “that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’

v8USrr 5*62 U.S."86.n'l0b4y(2h0lT)X,h Ame”dment ”

«*

Appellant’s affidavit to this court alleges his defense counsel were ineffective

because they advised him: (1) to sign a pretrial agreement to plead guilty to

offenses he did not commit, and (2) to sign an inaccurate stipulation of fact. The

affidavits from appellant’s defense counsel deny appellant’s allegations.

Pursuant to United States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236, 244-45 (C.A.A.F. 1997) this

court need only order a fact finding hearing to resolve conflicting affidavits when

the case cannot be resolved through one of the five Ginn principles. We find the

tourth and fifth Ginn principles, discussed in-depth below, are present in appellant’

case. Accordingly, a fact finding hearing is not necessary and we determine

appellant s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are meritless.

(. . . continued)

of their own performance relevant to this court’s determination. Whether a counsel

1S^n objectlve ‘nquiry. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104

(2011). Regardless of whether it is favorable or unfavorable, we give little weight

to counsels subjective assessment of their own performance and instead conduct an

objective assessment of their performanee.”

reasonableness of counsel’s performance, not counsel’s subjective state of mind.”

Richter, 562 U.S. at 110 (citations omitted).

GRAY—ARMY 20180353

Fourth Ginn Principle

(St re

Under the fourth Ginn principle, even if an appellant’s post-trial affidavit is

actually adequate on its face, we may “discount those factual assertions and decide

the legal issue if the appellate filings and the record as a whole compellingly

demonstrate the improbability of those facts.” Id. at 248 (quotation omitted). A

review of the record as a whole, particularly appellant’s pretrial agreement

stipulation of fact, and his responses to the military judge at trial, demonstrate the

improbability of his post-trial allegations.

First, in appellant’s offer to plead guilty, submitted to the convening

authority, appellant states in the first paragraph that he recognizes his “moral and

egal right to plead not guilty.” At the end of appellant’s offer to plead guilty he

states this offer to plead guilty originated with me. No person has made any

attempt to force or coerce me into making this offer.” Appellant’s signature

appears at the end of the document. At trial, the military judge addressed these

provisions with appellant and he confirmed his agreement to those statements.

., . - Ne*t> at aPPellan*’s guilty plea, the military judge confirmed with appellant

at he voluntarily signed the stipulation of fact because he believed it was in his

best interest and that the contents were true.7 The military judge explained that if

appellant disagreed with anything in the stipulation of fact, he should inform the

military judge. The military judge gave appellant an eighteen-minute recess to

review the stipulation of fact to ensure its accuracy. Upon returning from the recess

the military judge confirmed with appellant that he voluntarily signed the stipulation

and that it was accurate. Despite these extensive discussions between appellant and

the military judge, appellant did not express any hesitation to the military judge that

the stipulation of fact was inaccurate or that he was coerced into pleading guilty.

Appellant also claims his defense counsel told him to lie in a recess during his

providence inquiry. At the beginning of appellant's guilty plea, the military judge

advised appellant that he should only plead guilty if he, was in fact, guilty. The

military judge advised appellant that if he told the military judge anything untrue

his statements could be used against him for charges of perjury Further the

military judge explained all of the elements of the offenses to which appellant

pleaded guilty and instructed appellant to ask himself whether the element was true

and whether he wanted to admit it was true. Appellant acknowledged all

We Pause to note that three weeks elapsed between appellant signing his stipulation

of fact and his guilty plea. During those three weeks, appellant had ample time to

reconsider his decision to sign the stipulation of fact and his decision to plead

GRAY—ARMY 20180353

advisements, answered affirmatively that he wished

to plead guilty, and stated he

understood all of the elements for each offense.

, .

recess aPPellant describes in his affidavit, his defense counsel

“ h.lm'h?‘

'he Plea deal he was facing a maximum Se“enceofHfe

hout eligibility for parole. His defense counsel evaluated the government’s

w'I ?u C0”V,0''"e appellM1 as beinE Ugh. “Telling an accused that the evidence

c?eJcL*e,£/m'«rfTrand ‘r POt“,tial P“alties for a conviction are great is not

coercion. United States v. Fernandez, 2018 CCA LEXIS 546 *9 lArmv Ct

App. 16 Nov. 2018) (mem. op.). Upon our review of the record of Wa” defend

counsel s evaluation of appellant’s case appears more than reasonable. ’

thl lUl K Kh,h i f

counsel- The record as a whole compelling^ demonstrates

he improbability that appellant’s defense counsel told him to lie.

Fifth Ginn Principle

Under the fifth Ginn principle:

[Wjhen an appellate claim of ineffective representation

contradicts a matter that is within the record of a guilty

plea, an appellate court may decide the issue on the basis

of the appellate file and record (including the admissions

made in the plea inquiry at trial and appellant’s expression

of satisfaction with counsel at trial) unless the appellant

sets forth facts that would rationally explain why he would

have made such statements at trial but not upon appeal.

Ginn, 47 M.J. 248.

,APPellant’saffldavit does not Provide a rational explanation as to whv his

alfcurfcv [orth°e miHt/UI1‘d

.stiFula,ion of fact and affirmations of its

curacy to the military judge, admissions on the record during his providence

ZtoyludgeTe non.''.rueXPreSSi°” °f satisfac,i',a »ith hia

counsel to the

We also note that nothing in appellant’s unsworn statement during sentencing

s tatern em?^urth er ao/ vT F^!?8.f.ro v*dence -quiry. In fact, appellant^ unsworn

statement further solidified his guilt. He described himself as “weak minded ”

Appellant directly addressed DG and stated, “I’m supposed to be your step-father

f^Ky

GRAY—ARMY 20180353

and protector. Instead, I misused your trust in me and my position to have sex with

you. What I did was wrong.”

Appellant’s affidavit requests this court disbelieve all of his statements in his

offer to plead guilty, stipulation of fact, his affirmations to the military judge, his

detailed statements admitting all of the elements of the offenses, and his unsworn

statement. Either appellant is lying to this court in his affidavit, or he committed

perjury when he lied repeatedly to the military judge during his guilty plea.

Appellant’s credibility is further damaged by his original denial that he did

not have sexual intercourse with DG, which he was forced to retract when a DNA

test proved he was the biological father of DG’s child and that he was clearly lying.

Appellant’s defense counsel related a similar experience stating'^1 fappellant’si

version of events changed multiple times.” ~----The objective facts from the record do not support appellant’s assertions.

Appellant has failed to set forth facts that rationally explain why he would make

such statements at trial but not upon appeal. We do not see the need for a hearing on

the matter. Accordingly, we find neither deficient performance nor prejudice

regarding appellant’s representation.

CONCLUSION

The finding as to Specification 1 of Charge V is DISMISSED conditioned

upon Specification 2 of Charge V surviving “final judgment” of the proceedings.

The remaining findings of guilty and the sentence are AFFIRMED.

Senior Judge BURTON and Judge RODRIGUEZ concur.

FOR THE COURT:

Acting Clerk of Court

REPORT CONTROL SYMBOL

ANNUAL CORRECTIONAL REPORT

DD-P&R(A)2067

1. REPORT is due TO: UNITED STATES DISCIPLINARY BARRACKS (USDB), KS

2. BRANCH

3. REPORT DATE (YYYYMMDD)

United States Army

20200101

4. PERIOD COVERED

5. REPORTING YEAR

2019

2019/01/01 -2019/12/31

6. POINT OF CONTACT

a. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)

b. COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include

c. DSN TELEPHONE NUMBER

area code)

COL HORTON, CAROLINE K

7. FACILITIES AND CAPACITIES OF REPORTING SERVICE

TOTAL

DESIGN

CAPACITY

01)

(1) LEVEL 1 CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

(2) LEVEL 2 CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

(3) LEVEL 3 CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

515

460

401

515

460

401

NUMBER OF

FACILITIES

a. CONUS (Including OCONUS)

b. TOTAL

TOTAL

HEAD COUNT ON 31 DEC REPORTING YEAR

OPERATIONAL

CAPACITY

PRE-TRIAL

POST-TRIAL

TOTAL

(Mi)

(y)

(Vi)

0v)

8. TOTAL PRISONER POPULATION IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

AIR FORCE

ARMY

MARINE CORPS

NAVY

COAST GUARD

TOTAL

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENUSTED

a. ON 31 DEC PRIOR YEAR

197

366

b. ON 31 DEC REPORTING YEAR

204

374

9. SEX OF PRISONERS

ON 31 DECEMBER REPORTING YEAR

ARMY

(2)

AIR FORCE

(1)

MARINE CORPS

(3)

NAVY

(4)

COAST GUARD

TOTAL

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENUSTED

a. MALE

204

b. FEMALE

c. TOTAL (a. + b.)

204

374

10. RACE OF PRISONERS

ON 31 DECEMBER REPORTING YEAR

AIR FORCE

ARMY

(2)

(1)

MARINE CORPS

NAVY

(4)

(3)

TOTAL

COASTGUARD

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED

a. AMERICAN INDIAN/ALASKA NATIVE

b. ASIAN

C. BLACK OR AFRICAN AMERICAN

d. NATIVE HAWAIIAN OR

OTHER PACIFIC ISLANDER

e. WHITE

138

266

f. TWO OR MORE RACES

g. UNKNOWN

h. TOTAL (Sum of a. - g.)

204

374

11. ETHNICITY OF PRISONERS

ON 31 DECEMBER REPORTING YEAR

AIR FORCE

(1)

ARMY

(2)

MARINE CORPS

(3)

NAVY

(4)

COASTGUARD

TOTAL

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED

a. HISPANIC OR LATINO

b. NOT HISPANIC OR LATINO

158

309

c. UNKNOWN

d. TOTAL (Sum of a. - c.)

204

374

DD FORM 2720, MAR 2013

PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PRIVACY SENSITIVE

Page 1 of 4 Pages

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12. TOTAL NUMBER OF PRISONERS BY SENTENCE LENGTH

ON 31 DECEMBER REPORTING YEAR

AIR FORCE

ARMY

<2)

MARINE CORPS

(3)

NAVY

COAST GUARD

TOTAL

(4)

(5)

(«)

OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED

a. 1 YEAR OR MORE (>365 days)

204

b. LESS THAN 1 YEAR (<365 days)

c. PRE-TRIAL CONFINEMENT

374

d. UNKNOWN

e. TOTAL (Sum of a. - d.)

204

374

13. CONTROLLING OFFENSE BY BRANCH OF SERVICE

ON 31 DEC REPORTING YEAR

ARMY

(2)

AIR FORCE

NAVY

(4)

MARINE CORPS

(3)

TOTAL

COAST GUARD

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENUSTED

a. VIOLENT OFFENSES

□

(2) VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER

(3) NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER

(1) MURDER

(4) KIDNAPPING

(5) ROBBERY

(6) ASSAULT

(7) OTHER VIOLENT OFFENSES

(1) RAPE W/ADULT

(2) RAPE W/CHILD

108

(3) SEXUAL ASSAULT W/ADULT

(4) SEXUAL ASSAULT W/CHILD

(5) SEXUAL MISCONDUCT W/ADULT

(6) SEXUAL MISCONDUCT W/CHILD

(7) OTHER SEXUAL OFFENSES

(1) BURGLARY

(2) LARCENY/THEFT

b. SEXUAL OFFENSES (See table in Instructions)

c. PROPERTY OFFENSES

(3) AUTO THEFT

(4) ARSON

(5) FRAUD/FORGERY

(6) STOLEN PROPERTY

(7) OTHER PROPERTY OFFENSES

vw.rn***- *****

d. DRUG OFFENSES

riBfr

rnmm

(1) POSSESSION/USE

(2) TRAFFICKING

(3) OTHER/UNSPECIFIED DRUG OFFENSES

(1) WEAPONS

(2) DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED

(3) OTHER PUBLIC ORDER OFFENSES

-.0

e. PUBLIC ORDER OFFENSES

□

■

f. MILITARY OFFENSES

g. ALL OTHER OFFENSES

h. TOTAL

204

374

DD FORM 2720, MAR 2013

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PRIVACY SENSITIVE

Page 2 of 4 Pages

[

14. CONTROLLING OFFENSE BY LENGTH

OF SENTENCE

ON 31 DEC REPORTING YEAR

6 MONTHS

OR LESS

6 MONTHS

+1 OAY

TO 1 YEAR

1 YEAR

+1 DAY

TO 3 YEARS

{■)

iiil

(Hi)

3 YEARS

6 YEARS

♦ 1 DAY

♦1 DAY

TO 6 YEARS TO 10 YEARS

(iv)

(v)

10 YEARS

*1 DAY

LIFE

DEATH

TOTAL

(vt)

(v»)

(vili)

(lx)

a. VIOLENT OFFENSES

(1) MURDER

(2) VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER

(3) NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER

(4) KIDNAPPING

(S) ROBBERY

(6) ASSAULT

(7) OTHER VIOLENT OFFENSES

b. SEXUAL OFFENSES (See table In Instructions)

(1) RAPE W/AOULT

(2) RAPE W/CHILD

109

113

(3) SEXUAL ASSAULT W/ADULT

(4) SEXUAL ASSAULT W/CHILD

(5) SEXUAL MISCONDUCT W/ADULT

(6) SEXUAL MISCONDUCT W/CHILD

(7) OTHER SEXUAL OFFENSES

(1) BURGLARY

(2) LARCENY/THEFT

(3) AUTO THEFT

(4) ARSON

(5) FRAUD/FORGERY

(6) STOLEN PROPERTY

(7) OTHER PROPERTY OFFENSES

(1) POSSESSION/USE

(2) TRAFFICKING

(3) OTHER/UNSPECIFIED DRUG OFFENSES

c. PROPERTY OFFENSES

d. DRUG OFFENSES

e. PUBLIC ORDER OFFENSES

(1) WEAPONS

(2) DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED

(3) OTHER PUBLIC ORDER OFFENSES

f. MILITARY OFFENSES

g. ALL OTHER OFFENSES

h. TOTAL

346

393

15. PRE-TRIAL CONFINEMENTS

AIRFORCE

(1)

(

)

ARMY

(2)

MARINE CORPS

(3)

NAVY

(4)

TOTAL

COAST GUARD

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENUSTED

a. FROM (YYYYMMDDI

01 JAN RY

b. TO (YYYYMMDDI

31 DEC RY

16. ADMISSIONS OF SENTENCED PRISONERS

a. FROM (YYYYMMDDI

01 JAN RY

b. TO (YYYYMMDD)

31 DEC RY

C. NEW COURT COMMITMENTS

AIR FORCE

ARMY

(2)

MARINE CORPS

(3)

NAVY

(4)

TOTAL

COAST GUARD

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTEO OFFICER ENUSTED

(1) FROM SUMMARY COURT

(2) FROM SPECIAL COURT

(3) FROM GENERAL COURT

d. PAROLE/MSR VIOLATORS

e. TRANSFERS

(1) OTHER BRANCH OF SERVICE

(2) SAME BRANCH OF SERVICE

(3) CIVILIAN FACILITY

ESCAPEES RETURNED

g. TOTAL ADMISSIONS

DD FORM 2720, MAR 2013

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PRIVACY SENSITIVE

Page 3 of 4 Pages

17. RELEASES OF SENTENCED PRISONERS

a. FROM (YYYYMMDD) \ b. TO (YYYYMMDD)

31 DEC RY

01 JAN RY

C. UNCONDITIONAL

AIRFORCE

ARMY

MARINE CORPS

NAVY

COAST GUARD

TOTAL

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED

1 •

(2) CLEMENCY

(3) OTHER UNCONDITIONAL

(4) TOTAL UNCONDITIONAL

(Sum (1H3))

(1) EXPIRATION OF SENTENCE

d. CONDITIONAL

(1) PAROLES

(2) MANDATORY SUPERVISED RELEASE

(3) RESTORED TO DUTY

(4) OTHER CONDITIONAL

(5) TOTAL CONDITIONAL (Sum (i)-(4))

e. DEATHS

(1) EXECUTIONS

(2) ILLNESSES/NATURAL CAUSES

(Other than AIDS)

(3) AIDS-RELATED CAUSES

(4) SUICIDES

(5) ACCIDENTS

(6) DEATHS BY ANOTHER PERSON

(7) OTHER DEATHS

(8) TOTAL DEATHS (Sum (1) - (7))

f. OTHER

(1) ESCAPEES FROM CONFINEMENT

(2) TRANSFER TO FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY

(3) TRANSFER TO OTHER BRANCH OF

SERVICE

(4) TRANSFER TO SAME BRANCH OF SERVICE

(5) OTHER RELEASES (Specify)

(6) TOTAL OTHER RELEASES

(Sum of(1)-(4)j

g. TOTAL RELEASES

18. VICTIM/WITNESS NOTIFICATIONS AND ACTIONS

DD FORM 2720, MAR 2013

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PRIVACY SENSITIVE

Page 4 of 4 Pages

REPORT CONTROL SYMBOL

DD-P&R(A}2067

ANNUAL CORRECTIONAL REPORT

1. REPORT IS DUE TO: UNITED STATES DISCIPLINARY BARRACKS (USDB), KS

4. PERIOD COVERED

3. REPORT DATE (YYYYMMDD)

2. BRANCH

United States Army

S. REPORTING YEAR

2020/01/01 -2020/12/31

20210101

2020

6. POINT OF CONTACT

C. DSN TELEPHONE NUMBER

b. COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include

a. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)

area code)

COL JOHNSTON, MICHAEL A

7. FACILITIES AND CAPACITIES OF REPORTING SERVICE

TOTAL

HEAD COUNT ON 31 DEC REPORTING YEAR

OPERATIONAL

CAPACITY

TOTAL

PRE-TRIAL

POST-TRIAL

(ill)

(vl)

(i)

TOTAL

DESIGN

CAPACITY

(M)

(1) LEVEL 1 CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

(2) LEVEL 2 CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

(3) LEVEL 3 CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

515

460

393

515

460

393

■

NUMBER OF

FACILITIES

a. CONUS (Including OCONUS)

b. TOTAL

8. TOTAL PRISONER POPULATION IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

AIR FORCE

ARMY

MARINE CORPS

NAVY

COAST GUARD

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

TOTAL

(6)

OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTEO OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENUSTEO OFFICER ENUSTEO

a. ON 31 DEC PRIOR YEAR

204

374

b. ON 31 DEC REPORTING YEAR

205

367

9. SEX OF PRISONERS

ON 31 DECEMBER REPORTING YEAR

ARMY

(2)

AIRFORCE

MARINE CORPS

NAVY

COAST GUARD

(3)

(5)

TOTAL

<6>

OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENUSTED

205

a. MALE

b. FEMALE

c. TOTAL (a. + b.)

205

367

10. RACE OF PRISONERS

ON 31 DECEMBER REPORTING YEAR

MARINE CORPS

(3)

ARMY

AIR FORCE

(1)

(2)

NAVY

COAST GUARD

(4)

(5)

TOTAL

(6)

OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENUSTED

a. AMERICAN INDIAN/ALASKA NATIVE

b. ASIAN

C. BLACK OR AFRICAN AMERICAN

d. NATIVE HAWAIIAN OR

OTHER PACIFIC ISLANDER

e. WHITE

139

261

f. TWO OR MORE RACES

g. UNKNOWN

h. TOTAL (Sum of a. - g.)

205

367

11. ETHNICITY OF PRISONERS

ON 31 DECEMBER REPORTING YEAR

AIR FORCE

ARMY

(2)

MARINE CORPS

(3)

NAVY

COAST GUARD

TOTAL

(4)

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED

315

367

b. NOT HISPANIC OR LATINO

167

c. UNKNOWN

DD FORM 2720, MAR 2013

205

d. TOTAL (Sum of a. - c.)

a. HISPANIC OR LATINO

PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PRIVACY SENSITIVE

Page 1 of 4 Pages

Adobe Professional X

12. TOTAL NUMBER OF PRISONERS BY SENTENCE LENGTH

ON 31 DECEMBER REPORTING YEAR

AIR FORCE

ARMY

(2)

MARINE CORPS

(3)

NAVY

COAST GUARD

TOTAL

(4)

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED

a. 1 YEAR OR MORE (>365 days)

205

367

b. LESS THAN 1 YEAR (<365 days)

C. PRE-TRIAL CONFINEMENT

d. UNKNOWN

e. TOTAL (Sum of a. - d.)

205

367

13. CONTROLLING OFFENSE BY BRANCH OF SERVICE

ON 31 DEC REPORTING YEAR

AIR FORCE

ARMY

MARINE CORPS

NAVY

COAST GUARD

TOTAL

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENUSTED

a. VIOLENT OFFENSES

(1) MURDER

(2) VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER

(3) NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER

(4) KIDNAPPING

(5) ROBBERY

(6) ASSAULT

(7) OTHER VIOLENT OFFENSES

(1) RAPE W/ADULT

(2) RAPE W/CHILD

(3) SEXUAL ASSAULT W/ADULT

(4) SEXUAL ASSAULT W/CHILD

(5) SEXUAL MISCONDUCT W/ADULT

(6) SEXUAL MISCONDUCT W/CHILD

(7) OTHER SEXUAL OFFENSES

(1) BURGLARY

(2) LARCENY/THEFT

(3) AUTO THEFT

(4) ARSON

(5) FRAUD/FORGERY

(6) STOLEN PROPERTY

(7) OTHER PROPERTY OFFENSES

108

•

b. SEXUAL OFFENSES (See table in Instructions)

C. PROPERTY OFFENSES

d. DRUG OFFENSES

(1) POSSESSION/USE

(2) TRAFFICKING

(3) OTHER/UNSPECIFIED DRUG OFFENSES

(1) WEAPONS

0 •

(2) DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED

(3) OTHER PUBLIC ORDER OFFENSES

e. PUBLIC ORDER OFFENSES

f. MILITARY OFFENSES

g. ALL OTHER OFFENSES

h. TOTAL

205

367

DD FORM 2720, MAR 2013

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PRIVACY SENSITIVE

Page 2 of 4 Pages

/* .

14. CONTROLLING OFFENSE BY LENGTH

OF SENTENCE

ON 31 DEC REPORTING YEAR

6 MONTHS

41 DAY

TO 1 YEAR

6 MONTHS

OR LESS

(I)

1 YEAR

♦ 1 DAY

TO iYEARS

(HI)

6 YEARS

3 YEARS

♦1 DAY

♦ 1 DAY

TO $ YEARS TO 10 YEARS

<iv)

LIFE

DEATH

TOTAL

10 YEARS

♦ 1 DAY

(vi)

(vii)

Mil

(lx)

a. VIOLENT OFFENSES

(1) MURDER

(2) VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER

(3) NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER

(4) KIDNAPPING

(5) ROBBERY

{$) ASSAULT

(7) OTHER VIOLENT OFFENSES

b. SEXUAL OFFENSES (See table In Instructions}

(1) RAPE W/ADULT

(2) RAPEW/CHILD

110

113

(3) SEXUAL ASSAULT W/AOULT

(4) SEXUAL ASSAULT W/CHILD

(5) SEXUAL MISCONDUCT W/ADULT

(6) SEXUAL MISCONDUCT W/CHILD

(7) OTHER SEXUAL OFFENSES

c. PROPERTY OFFENSES

»- —

'■*' -

*san

(1) BURGLARY

(2) LARCENY/THEFT

(3) AUTO THEFT

(4) ARSON

(5) FRAUD/FORGERY

(6) STOLEN PROPERTY

(7) OTHER PROPERTY OFFENSES

•

d. DRUG OFFENSES

(1) POSSESSION/USE

(2) TRAFFICKING

(3) OTHER/UNSPECIFIED DRUG OFFENSES

e. PUBLIC ORDER OFFENSES

(1) WEAPONS

(2) DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED

(3) OTHER PUBLIC ORDER OFFENSES

f. MILITARY OFFENSES

g. ALL OTHER OFFENSES

h. TOTAL

350

401

15. PRE-TRIAL CONFINEMENTS

AIRFORCE

(1)

fife

a. FROM (YYYYMMDD)

01 JAN RY

ARMY

(2)

TOTAL

COAST GUARD

(5)

NAVY

(4)

MARINE CORPS

(3)

(6)

OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED

b. TO (YYYYMMDD)

31 DEC RY

16. ADMISSIONS OF SENTENCED PRISONERS

a. FROM (YYYYMMDD)

01 JAN RY

b. TO (YYYYMMDD)

31 DEC RY

c. NEW COURT COMMITMENTS

AIR FORCE

(1)

ARMY

(2)

MARINE CORPS

NAVY

COAST GUARD

TOTAL

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED

(1) FROM SUMMARY COURT

(2) FROM SPECIAL COURT

(3) FROM GENERAL COURT

d. PAROLE/MSR VIOLATORS

e. TRANSFERS

(1) OTHER BRANCH OF SERVICE

(2) SAME BRANCH OF SERVICE

(3) CIVILIAN FACILITY

ESCAPEES RETURNED

g. TOTAL ADMISSIONS

DD FORM 2720, MAR 2013

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PRIVACY SENSITIVE

Page 3 of 4 Pages

17. RELEASES OF SENTENCED PRISONERS

a. FROM (YYYYMMDD) | b. TO (YYYYMMDD)

01 JAN RY

31 DEC RY

c. UNCONDITIONAL

AIR FORCE

ARMY

MARINE CORPS

NAVY

(2)

(3)

TOTAL

COASTGUARD

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED

(1) EXPIRATION OF SENTENCE

(2) CLEMENCY

(3) OTHER UNCONDITIONAL

(4) TOTAL UNCONDITIONAL

(Sum (1)-(3))

(1) PAROLES

d. CONDITIONAL

(2) MANDATORY SUPERVISED RELEASE

(3) RESTORED TO DUTY

(4) OTHER CONDITIONAL

(5) TOTAL CONDITIONAL (Sum (1)~(4))

e. DEATHS

(1) EXECUTIONS

(2) ILLNESSES/NATURAL CAUSES

(Other than AIDS)

(3) AIDS-RELATED CAUSES

(4) SUICIDES

(5) ACCIDENTS

(6) DEATHS BY ANOTHER PERSON

(7) OTHER DEATHS

(8) TOTAL DEATHS (Sum (1) - (7))

(1) ESCAPEES FROM CONFINEMENT

(2) TRANSFER TO FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY

(3) TRANSFER TO OTHER BRANCH OF

SERVICE

(4) TRANSFER TO SAME BRANCH OF SERVICE

f. OTHER

(5) OTHER RELEASES (Specify)

(S) TOTAL OTHER RELEASES

(Sum of(1)‘(4)j

g. TOTAL RELEASES

DD FORM 2720, MAR 2013

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PRIVACY SENSITIVE

Page 4 of 4 Pages

REPORT CONTROL SYMBOL

DD-P&R(A)2067

ANNUAL CORRECTIONAL REPORT

1. REPORT IS DUE TO: UNITED STATES DISCIPLINARY BARRACKS (USDB), KS

2. BRANCH

3. REPORT DATE (YYYYMMDD)

United States Army

20220101

4. PERIOD COVERED

5. REPORTING YEAR

2021

2021/01/01 -2021/12/31

6. POINT OF CONTACT

a. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)

b. COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include

C. DSN TELEPHONE NUMBER

area code)

COL JOHNSTON, MICHAEL A

7. FACILITIES AND CAPACITIES OF REPORTING SERVICE

TOTAL

DESIGN

CAPACITY

(ii)

(1) LEVEL 1 CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

(2) LEVEL 2 CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

(3) LEVEL 3 CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

515

460

395

515

460

395

NUMBER OF

FACILITIES

a. CONUS (Including OCONUS)

b. TOTAL

TOTAL

HEAD COUNT ON 31 DEC REPORTING YEAR

OPERATIONAL

CAPACITY

PRE-TRIAL

POST-TRIAL

TOTAL

(Mi)

(IV)

(Vl)

(V)

8. TOTAL PRISONER POPULATION IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

AIR FORCE

ARMY

MARINE CORPS

NAVY

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

TOTAL

COASTGUARD

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED

a. ON 31 DEC PRIOR YEAR

205

367

b. ON 31 DEC REPORTING YEAR

213

1 '

371

9. SEX OF PRISONERS

ON 31 DECEMBER REPORTING YEAR

AIR FORCE

ARMY

(2)

MARINE CORPS

(3)

NAVY

COAST GUARD

TOTAL

(4)

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENUSTED

a. MALE

b. FEMALE

c. TOTAL (a. + b.)

213

. 0

371

10. RACE OF PRISONERS

ON 31 DECEMBER REPORTING YEAR

AIR FORCE

NAVY

(4)

MARINE CORPS

ARMY

(2)

(3)

TOTAL

COAST GUARD

(S)

(6)

OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENUSTED

a. AMERICAN INDIAN/ALASKA NATIVE

b. ASIAN

c. BLACK OR AFRICAN AMERICAN

d. NATIVE HAWAIIAN OR

OTHER PACIFIC ISLANDER

e. WHITE

146

261

f. TWO OR MORE RACES

•2

g. UNKNOWN

h. TOTAL (Sum of a. - g.)

213

371

11. ETHNICITY OF PRISONERS

ON 31 DECEMBER REPORTING YEAR

AIR FORCE

ARMY

(2)

MARINE CORPS

(3)

NAVY

(4)

COASTGUARD

TOTAL

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENUSTED

a. HISPANIC OR LATINO

‘

b. NOT HISPANIC OR LATINO

170

312

c. UNKNOWN

d. TOTAL (Sum of a. - c.)

213

371

DD FORM 2720, MAR 2013

PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PRIVACY SENSITIVE

Page 1 of 4 Pages

Adobe Professional X

»•

12. TOTAL NUMBER OF PRISONERS BY SENTENCE LENGTH

ON 31 DECEMBER REPORTING YEAR

AIR FORCE

ARMY

MARINE CORPS

NAVY

COASTGUARD

TOTAL

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED

a. 1 YEAR OR MORE (>365 days)

213

371

b. LESS THAN 1 YEAR (<365 days)

C. PRE-TRIAL CONFINEMENT

d. UNKNOWN

0 '

e. TOTAL (Sum of a. - d.)

213

371

13. CONTROLLING OFFENSE BY BRANCH OF SERVICE

ON 31 DEC REPORTING YEAR

AIR FORCE

ARMY

MARINE CORPS

NAVY

(2)

(3)

(4)

TOTAL

COAST GUARD

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENUSTED

a. VIOLENT OFFENSES

(1) MURDER

(2) VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER

(3) NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER

(4) KIDNAPPING

(5) ROBBERY

(6) ASSAULT

(7) OTHER VIOLENT OFFENSES

(1) RAPE W/ADULT

(2) RAPE W/CHILD

(3) SEXUAL ASSAULT W/ADULT

(4) SEXUAL ASSAULT W/CHILD

(5) SEXUAL MISCONDUCT W/ADULT

112

(6) SEXUAL MISCONDUCT W/CHILD

(7) OTHER SEXUAL OFFENSES

b. SEXUAL OFFENSES (See table in Instructions)

C. PROPERTY OFFENSES

(1) BURGLARY

(2) LARCENY/THEFT

(3) AUTO THEFT

(4) ARSON

(5) FRAUD/FORGERY

(6) STOLEN PROPERTY

(7) OTHER PROPERTY OFFENSES

(1) POSSESSION/USE

(2) TRAFFICKING

. 0

(1) WEAPONS

(2) DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED

(3) OTHER PUBLIC ORDER OFFENSES

d. DRUG OFFENSES

(3) OTHER/UNSPECIFIED DRUG OFFENSES

e. PUBLIC ORDER OFFENSES

f. MILITARY OFFENSES

g. ALL OTHER OFFENSES

h. TOTAL

DD FORM 2720, MAR 2013

•

213

371

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PRIVACY SENSITIVE

Page 2 of 4 Pages

14. CONTROLLING OFFENSE BY LENGTH

OF SENTENCE

ON 31 DEC REPORTING YEAR

6 MONTHS

+1 OAY

TO 1 YEAR

6 MONTHS

OR LESS

iiil

1 YEAR

♦ 1 DAY

TO 3 YEARS

(MO

3 YEARS

♦ 1 DAY

TO SYEARS

(iv)

$ YEARS

♦1 DAY

TO 10 YEARS

10 YEARS

+1 DAY

(vi)

LIFE

DEATH

TOTAL

(vii)

Ml—

(ix)

a. VIOLENT OFFENSES

{1) MURDER

(2) VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER

(3) NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER

(4) KIDNAPPING

(5) ROBBERY

(6) ASSAULT

(7) OTHER VIOLENT OFFENSES

114

118

b. SEXUAL OFFENSES (See table in Instructions)

(1) RAPE W/ADULT

(2) RAPE W/CHILD

(3) SEXUAL ASSAULT W/ADULT

(4) SEXUAL ASSAULT W/CHILD

(5) SEXUAL MISCONDUCT W/ADULT

(6) SEXUAL MISCONDUCT W/CHILD

(7) OTHER SEXUAL OFFENSES

c. PROPERTY OFFENSES

(1) BURGLARY

(2) LARCENY/THEFT

(3) AUTO THEFT

(4) ARSON

(5) FRAUD/FORGERY

{6) STOLEN PROPERTY

(7) OTHER PROPERTY OFFENSES

d. DRUG OFFENSES

(1) POSSESSION/USE

(2) TRAFFICKING

(3) OTHER/UNSPECIFIED DRUG OFFENSES

e. PUBLIC ORDER OFFENSES

(1) WEAPONS

(2) DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED

(3) OTHER PUBLIC ORDER OFFENSES

f. MILITARY OFFENSES

g. ALL OTHER OFFENSES

h. TOTAL

351

395

15. PRE-TRIAL CONFINEMENTS

AIRFORCE

ARMY

(2)

MARINE CORPS

(3)

NAVY

(A)

TOTAL

COAST GUARD

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED

a. FROM (YYYYMMDD)

01 JAN RY

b. TO (YYYYMMDD)

31 DEC RY

16. ADMISSIONS OF SENTENCED PRISONERS

a. FROM (YYYYMMDD)

01 JAN RY

b. TO (YYYYMMDD)

31 DEC RY

C. NEW COURT COMMITMENTS

AIR FORCE

(1)

ARMY

(2)

MARINE CORPS

(3)

NAVY

(A)

TOTAL

COAST GUARD

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED

(1) FROM SUMMARY COURT

(2) FROM SPECIAL COURT

(3) FROM GENERAL COURT

(1) OTHER BRANCH OF SERVICE

(2) SAME BRANCH OF SERVICE

(3) CIVILIAN FACILITY

ESCAPEES RETURNED

g. TOTAL ADMISSIONS

d. PAROLE/MSR VIOLATORS

e. TRANSFERS

DD FORM 2720, MAR 2013

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PRIVACY SENSITIVE

Page 3 of 4 Pages

17. RELEASES OF SENTENCED PRISONERS

a. FROM (YYYYMMDD)

01 JAN RY

b. TO (YYYYMMDD)

31 DEC RY

AIR FORCE

ARMY

(1)

(2)

MARINE CORPS

(3)

NAVY

COASTGUARD

TOTAL

(4)

(5)

(6)

OFFICER ENUSTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED

c. UNCONDITIONAL

(1) EXPIRATION OF SENTENCE

(2) CLEMENCY

0 •

(3) OTHER UNCONDITIONAL

(4) TOTAL UNCOKI'dmbtoAL

(1) PAROLES

(2) MANDATORY SUPERVISED RELEASE

(Sum (1H3))

d. CONDITIONAL

(3) RESTORED TO DUTY

(4) OTHER CONDITIONAL

(5) TOTAL CONDITIONAL (Sum (D-(4))

e. DEATHS

(1) EXECUTIONS

(2) ILLNESSES/NATURAL CAUSES

(Other than AIDS)

(3) AIDS-RELATED CAUSES

(4) SUICIDES

(5) ACCIDENTS

(6) DEATHS BY ANOTHER PERSON

(7) OTHER DEATHS

(8) TOTAL DEATHS (Sum (1) - (7))

f. OTHER

(1) ESCAPEES FROM CONFINEMENT

(2) TRANSFER TO FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY

(3) TRANSFER TO OTHER BRANCH OF

SERVICE

(4) TRANSFER TO SAME BRANCH OF SERVICE

O’

(5) OTHER RELEASES (Specify)

(6) TOTAL OTHER RELEASES

(Sum of(1H4)j

g. TOTAL RELEASES

18. VICTIM/WITNESS NOTIFICATIONS AND ACTIONS

DD FORM 2720, MAR 2013

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PRIVACY SENSITIVE

Page 4 of 4 Pages

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.