Emergency Application — Mike Moyle, Speaker of the Idaho House of Representatives, et al., Petitioners v. United States

Supreme Court briefNov 20, 2023

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No. 23-____

In the Supreme Court of the United States

_____________

MIKE MOYLE, Speaker of the Idaho House of Representatives of the

State of Idaho, et al.,

Applicants,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

_____________

APPLICATION FOR STAY OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ISSUED BY

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

_____________

Daniel W. Bower

MORRIS BOWER & HAWS PLLC

1305 12th Ave. Rd.

Nampa, ID 83686

(208) 345-3333

dbower@morrisbowerhaws.com

William C. Duncan

Counsel of Record

1868 N. 800 E.

Lehi, UT 84043

(801) 367-4570

billduncan56@gmail.com

Counsel for Applicants

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Applicants are Mike Moyle, Speaker of the Idaho House of Representatives;

and Chuck Winder, President Pro Tempore of the Idaho State Senate; and the SixtySeventh Idaho Legislature. They are Intervenors-Appellants in the consolidated

appeal before the Ninth Circuit.

Respondent is the United States of America, which is Plaintiff-Appellee in the

Ninth Circuit.

The State of Idaho is a Defendant-Appellant in the consolidated appeal before

the Ninth Circuit but is not involved in the proceedings to obtain a stay.

ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (Idaho):

United States of America v. The State of Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW (Aug.

24, 2022) (preliminary injunction)

United States of America v. The State of Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW (May

4, 2023) (preliminary injunction)

United States of America v. The State of Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW (Aug.

13, 2022) (intervention)

United States of America v. The State of Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW

(February 3, 2023) (intervention)

United States Court of Appeals (9th Cir.):

United States of America v. The State of Idaho, No. 23-35440; United States of

America v. The State of Idaho v. Mike Moyle, et al, No. 23-35450 (preliminary

injunction, consolidated)

United States of America v. The State of Idaho, No. 23-35153 (9th Cir.)

(intervention)

United States of America v. The State of Idaho, No. 23-35440; United States of

America v. The State of Idaho v. Mike Moyle, et al, No. 23-35450 (Sept. 28, 2023)

(motion for stay)

iii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6, applicants consist of the Idaho

Legislature and its elected leaders. As such, none of the applicants is a corporation

with a parent corporation and none issues stock.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ............................................................................... i

RELATED PROCEEDINGS.......................................................................................... ii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .............................................................. iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... vi

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT ................................................................................................................. 5

A. Statutory Background ........................................................................ 5

1. EMTALA ........................................................................................ 5

2. Idaho Abortion Law ....................................................................... 5

B. Procedural History .............................................................................. 7

1. The Complaint ............................................................................... 7

2. Opinion Below ................................................................................ 8

3. Motions to Reconsider .................................................................... 9

4. Reconsideration Order ................................................................. 11

5. Appeal and Motions to Stay ........................................................ 12

ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................ 14

I.

THE IDAHO LEGISLATURE WILL BE IRREPARABLY INJURED

WITHOUT A STAY ................................................................................... 14

II.

THE IDAHO LEGISLATURE HAS A STRONG LIKELIHOOD OF

SUCCESS ON THE MERITS ................................................................... 15

A. EMTALA Cannot Preempt Section 622 ........................................... 15

1. Settled principles shape the issue of preemption ........................ 15

v

2. Section 622 does not “directly conflict” with EMTALA .............. 16

3. EMTALA cannot preempt Idaho law under the Medicare Act ... 18

4. The District Court misjudged EMTALA’s preemptive scope ...... 19

B. EMTALA Does Not Mandate Abortion ............................................ 20

1. The District Court badly misread EMTALA............................... 20

2. The District Court violated the major questions doctrine—or at

least the ordinary rules of statutory construction ....................... 23

C. The District Court Likewise Misconstrued Section 622 .................. 26

D. Enjoining Section 622 Because of EMTALA is Unconstitutional ... 28

1. The preliminary injunction violates the Tenth Amendment ...... 28

2. The decision below violates the Spending Clause ....................... 30

III. THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE EQUITIES FAVOR A STAY ...... 31

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 35

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Page(s)

Abbott v. Perez,

138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) ................................................................................... 2, 14

Ala. Assoc. of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs.,

141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) ....................................................................................... 24

Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc. v. Sullivan,

998 F.2d 377 (6th Cir. 1993) ............................................................................. 19

Baker v. Adventist Health, Inc.,

260 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2001) ....................................................................... 16, 17

Barnes v. E-Systems, Inc. Group Hosp. Med. & Surg. Ins. Plan,

501 U.S. 1301 (1991) ......................................................................................... 31

Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP,

142 S. Ct. 2191 (2022) ........................................................................................ 7

Bernhardt v. L.A. Cnty.,

339 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................................................. 33

Biden v. Nebraska,

143 S. Ct. 2355 (2023) ........................................................................... 23, 24, 25

Bryan v. Rectors and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,

95 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 1996) ......................................................................... 17–18

Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./West,

289 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2002) ........................................................................... 16

BST Holdings, LLC v. OSHA,

17 F.4th 604 (5th Cir. 2021) ............................................................................. 32

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,

505 U.S. 504 (1992). .............................................................................. 16, 19, 20

CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood,

507 U.S. 658 (1993) ........................................................................................... 16

vii

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,

142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022) ............................................2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 14, 28, 29, 32, 35

Draper v. Chiapuzio,

9 F.3d 1391 (9th Cir. 1993) ........................................................................... 8, 19

Eberhardt v. Los Angeles,

62 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1995) ............................................................................. 16

Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Acct. Oversight Bd.,

561 U.S. 477 (2010) ........................................................................................... 24

Garcia v. Google, Inc.,

786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) ............................................................................. 34

Golden v. Washington,

138 S. Ct. 448 (2017) ......................................................................................... 32

Gonzales v. Oregon,

546 U.S. 243 (2006) ........................................................................................... 25

Gregory v. Ashcroft,

501 U.S. 452 (1991) ........................................................................................... 29

Hardy v. New York City Health Hosp. Corp.,

164 F.3d 789 (2d Cir. 1999) .............................................................................. 17

Keams v. Tempe Tech. Inst., Inc.,

39 F.3d 222 (9th Cir. 1994) ............................................................................... 16

Louisiana Pub. Serv. Com’n v. FCC,

476 U.S. 355 (1986) ........................................................................................... 26

Maryland v. King,

567 U.S. 1301 (2012) ......................................................................... 2, 14, 31, 33

McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc.,

21 P.3d 1189 (Cal. 2001) ................................................................................... 19

Medtronic v. Lohr,

518 U.S. 470 (1996) ........................................................................................... 16

New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,

434 U.S. 1345 (1977) ......................................................................................... 14

viii

NFIB v. OSHA,

142 S. Ct. 661 (2022) ................................................................................... 23, 24

NFIB v. Sebelius,

567 U.S. 519 (2012) ........................................................................................... 30

Nken v. Holder,

556 U.S. 418 (2009) ................................................................. 2, 4, 12, 13, 31, 34

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,

451 U.S. 1 (1981) ............................................................................................... 31

Pennsylvania Med. Soc’y v. Marconis,

942 F.2d 842 (3d Cir. 1991) ........................................................................ 18–19

In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Lit.,

582 F.3d 156 (1st Cir. 2009) ............................................................................. 19

Planned Parenthood Great Nw. v. State,

522 P.3d 1132 (Idaho 2023) ........................................................... 11, 27, 28, 34

Planned Parenthood Great Nw. v. State,

532 P.3d 801 (Idaho 2022) ............................................................................ 6, 28

Raich v. Gonzales,

500 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2007) ............................................................................. 29

Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,

442 U.S. 330 (1979)............................................................................................ 22

Roe v. Wade,

410 U.S. 113 (1973) ................................................................................. 6, 14, 28

Root v. New Liberty Hospital Dist.,

209 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 2000) ..................................................................... 18, 19

Sierra Club v. Trump,

929 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2019) ............................................................................. 32

Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.,

545 U.S. 119 (2005) ........................................................................................... 24

ix

Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Proj.,

138 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) ....................................................................................... 31

United States v. Arizona,

641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) ............................................................................. 32

United States v. Arizona,

567 U.S. 387 (2012) ........................................................................................... 32

United States v. California,

921 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2019) ....................................................................... 32, 34

U.S Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Preserv. Assn.,

140 S. Ct. 1837 (2020) ................................................................................. 23, 30

Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA,

573 U.S. 302 (2014) ........................................................................................... 23

Washington v. Trump,

847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) ........................................................................... 32

West Virginia v. EPA,

142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022) ........................................................................... 23, 24, 25

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

555 U.S. 7 (2008) ............................................................................................... 15

Constitutional Provisions:

U.S. CONST. art. III ...................................................................................................... 10

U.S. CONST. art. VI ............................................................................ 7, 9, 10, 29, 32–34

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 .................................................................................. 4, 10, 30, 31

U.S. CONST. amend. X.................................................................................. 4, 10, 28, 29

Statutes and Rules:

28 U.S.C. § 1651 ............................................................................................................. 1

42 U.S.C. § 1395 ................................................................................. 1, 3, 15, 18–20, 33

x

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd..................................................................................................... 1, 5

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) .................................................................................................... 5

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) .................................................................... 2, 3, 5, 21, 22, 26, 30

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1) ...................................................................................... 3, 5, 22

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2) .......................................................................................... 3, 22

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1) ................................................................................................ 5

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2) .............................................................................................. 18

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1) ........................................................................ 3, 10, 21, 22, 33

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3) .............................................................................................. 21

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f) ................................................................1, 3, 8, 15, 16, 18, 19, 33

H.B. 374, 67th Leg., 1st Sess. (Idaho 2023) ........................................................... 7, 27

H.R. 8296, 117th Cong. (2022) .................................................................................... 25

S. 4132, 117th Cong. (2022)......................................................................................... 25

IDAHO CODE § 18-604(1) ........................................................................................... 6, 27

IDAHO CODE § 18-622 ................................. 1, 5–9, 11, 12, 14–16, 18–20, 23, 26–32, 34

IDAHO CODE § 18-622(1)(a) (repealed) ........................................................................... 6

IDAHO CODE § 18-622(2) ................................................................................. 7, 9, 27, 28

IDAHO CODE § 18-622(3) (repealed) ............................................................................... 9

IDAHO CODE § 18-622(4) ........................................................................................... 6, 27

IDAHO CODE § 18-622(5) ........................................................................................... 6, 27

IDAHO CODE § 67-465 ..................................................................................................... 7

xi

Other Authorities:

CMS Center for Clinical Standards and Quality, QSO-22-22-Hospitals

(“Reinforcement of EMTALA Obligations Specific to Patients who are Pregnant or

are Experiencing Pregnancy Loss”) (July 11, 2022) ................................................. 7–8

Exec. Order No. 14,076, 87 Fed. Reg. 42053 (Jul. 8, 2022) .......................................... 8

Letter from Secretary Becerra to Health Care Providers (July 11, 2022) ................ 31

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICE ELENA KAGAN,

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT AND

CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT:

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of this Court and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1651, the Idaho Legislature respectfully applies for a stay of the preliminary

injunction issued on August 24, 2022, by the United States District Court for the

District of Idaho, pending disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if

such a writ is timely sought.

This application concerns a preliminary injunction with extraordinary

consequences.

The District Court has enjoined the enforcement of Idaho Code § 18-622

(section 622), which prohibits abortions unless authorized, on the sole ground that

the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd,

preempts it. By accepting that reading of EMTALA, the District Court announced a

federal abortion mandate that the statutory text does not support and stretched

EMTALA’s preemptive reach beyond the boundaries set by overlapping express

preemption provisions. See id. §§ 1395dd(f), 1395.

Construing EMTALA as a federal abortion mandate raises grave questions

under the major questions doctrine that affect both Congress and this Court.

EMTALA’s spare directive to provide “stabilizing treatment” for a patient with an

emergency medical condition does not convey clear congressional authorization to

2

regulate abortion in all 50 States. Id. § 1395dd(b) (heading). If that weren’t enough,

the statutory construction advanced by the United States challenges the Court’s

authority by illicitly undermining Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization,

142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022). Concentrating power in the Executive Branch distorts the

federal system as well. Dobbs held that States may regulate abortion, id. at 2279, but

the preliminary injunction reimposes federal control. That result prevents the State

of Idaho and its people from charting their own course regarding abortion, based on

a federal mandate that Congress never adopted. Letting the decision below stand

would be a sad day for our country. Americans understandably disagree when a

woman should be free to end her pregnancy, but we should agree that the United

States is a government of laws.

A stay from this Court would allow the Idaho Legislature to defend its law

without continuing to suffer irreparable injury. This application for stay satisfies the

controlling standard under Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).

1. The Legislature suffers an ongoing irreparable injury from the preliminary

injunction issued by the District Court. Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012)

(Roberts, C.J., in chambers); accord Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2323–24 and

n.17 (2018). Judicial interference with the ordinary operation of state law is an

independent injury. Here, that injury is heightened by the intense controversy

surrounding a federal injunction halting Idaho’s primary abortion law.

2. The Legislature has a strong likelihood of success.

3

First, EMTALA is bound by overlapping express preemption clauses that the

District Court misapplied and overlooked. EMTALA denies preemption unless a state

law “directly conflicts.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f). The government’s implied duty of

abortion access does not conflict with a state law “directly.” Id. A separate clause

governing EMTALA prohibits a federal “officer or employee” from construing the

statute to exercise “supervision or control” over the “practice of medicine.” Id. § 1395.

Yet federal control is exactly what the District Court’s reading of EMTALA achieves.

Second, the lower court’s statutory construction rests on an insupportable

inference. The court accepted the government’s claim that EMTALA’s requirement of

delivering “stabilizing treatment” to a patient with an emergency medical condition

includes a duty to perform an abortion as solely dictated by the physician’s medical

judgment. Id. § 1395dd(b). But EMTALA says nothing about abortion. Construing

the spare phrase “stabilizing treatment” as a blank slate to be filled with the

Executive Branch’s preferred abortion policy collides with multiple statutory

provisions guaranteeing emergency medical care for a pregnant woman and her

unborn child. See id. §§ 1395dd(e)(1)(A)(i); 1395dd(e)(1)(B)(ii); 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii); and

1395dd(c)(2)(A). EMTALA does not address the hard questions that arise when a

pregnant woman has an emergency medical condition for which some physicians

would perform an abortion. Silence may confer consent in other settings but not when

examining a statute for congressional authority. Construing EMTALA as the District

Court did is deeply mistaken because it departs from settled rules of statutory

construction and breaches the major questions doctrine.

4

Third, preempting Idaho law based on a doubtful reading of EMTALA raises

serious constitutional questions. Idaho’s independent sovereignty guaranteed by the

Tenth Amendment is denied if the government’s contrived federal mandate succeeds

in overriding the State’s duly enacted law. The preliminary injunction thwarts the

State’s sovereign authority to regulate abortion despite Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2228.

The Spending Clause is likewise violated by the United States’ threat to strip Idaho

of Medicare funding to leverage the State’s compliance with a mandate that EMTALA

does not contain.

3. Other Nken factors also favor a stay. The balance of equities tips toward

the Legislature since its ongoing irreparable harm from the preliminary injunction

outweighs any harm to the United States from a doubtful preemption claim. The

public interest lies in preserving the integrity of federal law and the Constitution’s

structural guarantees. While the District Court focused on the harm of regulating

abortion for pregnant women with emergency complications, the issue is not whether

women in medical crisis deserve decent medical care. They emphatically do. Instead,

the pressing question is, who decides when abortion is lawful? Under Dobbs, the

answer is clear: “the authority to regulate abortion [is] returned to the people and

their elected representatives”—not granted to unelected federal officials acting at the

President’s behest. Id. at 2279.

For these reasons, the applicants meet the traditional criteria for a stay.

5

STATEMENT

A.

Statutory Background

1. EMTALA

EMTALA obligates Medicare-funded hospitals to provide medical treatment

for emergency medical conditions, regardless of a patient’s ability to pay. See 42

U.S.C. § 1395dd. EMTALA obligates a Medicare-participating hospital to (1) perform

“an appropriate medical screening examination” to see whether the patient has an

emergency medical condition, id. § 1395dd(a); (2) conduct a further medical exam

along with “such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition” or

send the patient “to another medical facility,” id. § 1395dd(b)(1); and (3) transfer a

patient with an emergency medical condition that has not been stabilized only as

provided and where “appropriate,” id. § 1395dd(c)(1).

Noncompliance can carry severe consequences. A hospital or physician “that

negligently violates” EMTALA “is subject to a civil money penalty of” up to $50,000

per violation. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A), (B). A provider or facility whose violations

are “gross and flagrant or [are] repeated” may be excluded “from participation in

[Medicare] and State health care programs.” Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B).

2. Idaho Abortion Law

The Idaho statute challenged here is Idaho Code § 18-622 (section 622). 1

Entitled “Defense of Life Act,” section 622 makes it a crime for anyone to perform an

1 All citations to section 622 refer to the amended version currently in effect, unless otherwise

indicated.

6

abortion unless a physician acts within exceptions that the statute enumerates. See

id. § 622(1). That proscription restores long-held Idaho policy. See Planned

Parenthood Great Nw. v. State, 532 P.3d 801, 807 (Idaho Aug. 12, 2022) (describing

how Idaho law treated abortion as a crime, with exceptions, from territorial days until

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). It also reflects pre-Roe consensus. See Dobbs, 142

S. Ct. at 2253–54 (“[A]n unbroken tradition of prohibiting abortion on pain of criminal

punishment persisted from the earliest days of the common law until 1973.”).

Idaho law defines abortion as “the use of any means to intentionally terminate

the clinically diagnosable pregnancy of a woman with knowledge that the termination

by those means will, with reasonable likelihood, cause the death of the unborn child.”

IDAHO CODE § 18-604(1). Section 622 prohibits a physician from performing an

abortion, with enumerated exceptions. Id. § 622(1). A physician may perform an

abortion when “necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman,” based on

“good faith medical judgment and based on the facts known to the physician at the

time.” Id. § 622(2)(a). Another exception permits an abortion (during the first

trimester) to terminate a pregnancy resulting from rape or incest. Id. § 622(2)(b). No

liability attaches when a doctor causes “the accidental death of, or unintentional

injury to, the unborn child” while treating a pregnant woman. Id. § 622(4). No woman

is liable under section 622 for having an abortion. Id. § 622(5).

A trigger provision in the original version of section 622 provided that the law

would become effective 30 days after a decision by this Court “that restores to the

states their authority to prohibit abortion.” Id. § 622(1)(a) (repealed). Dobbs, 142 S.

7

Ct. at 2284, was that decision. The Dobbs judgment issued on July 26, 2022, making

section 622 presumptively effective on August 25. See Docket Statement, Dobbs v.

Jackson Women’s Health Org., No. 19-1392, at https://www.supremecourt.gov/

search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/19-1392.html.

Section 622 was amended during the 2023 legislative session. See H.B. 374,

67th Leg., 1st Sess. (Idaho 2023) (eff. July 1, 2023). Among those amendments were

provisions replacing affirmative defenses with exceptions. See IDAHO CODE § 18622(2).

B.

Procedural History

1. The Complaint

On August 2, 2022, the United States filed suit against the State of Idaho 2

claiming that section 622 violates the Supremacy Clause. Compl., United States v.

Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW (D. Idaho Aug. 2, 2022), ECF No. 1 (“Complaint”). The

government’s theory is that EMTALA requires Medicare-participating hospitals to

provide an abortion as “stabilizing care” when a pregnant woman suffers an

“emergency medical condition” supposedly demanding it. Id. at 2. This theory reflects

a guidance document issued by an HHS component, CMS Center for Clinical

Standards and Quality, QSO-22-22-Hospitals at 1 (“Reinforcement of EMTALA

2 Days after the complaint, applicants sought to intervene as of right, citing their authority under

Idaho Code § 67-465 and this Court’s decision in Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the

NAACP, 142 S. Ct. 2191 (2022). The District Court denied intervention as of right but granted

permissive intervention. Mem. Decision and Order, United States v. Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW

(D. Idaho Aug. 13, 2022), ECF No. 27. A later order denied the Legislature’s renewed motion to

intervene, id. at ECF No. 125 (Feb. 6, 2023), and that order is on appeal in the Ninth Circuit No. 2335153.

8

Obligations Specific to Patients who are Pregnant or are Experiencing Pregnancy

Loss”) (July 11, 2022), which followed shortly after a presidential directive instructing

federal agencies to “protect and expand access to abortion.” Exec. Order No. 14,076,

87 Fed. Reg. 42053 (Jul. 8, 2022). On this understanding, preemption occurs because

“medical care that a state may characterize as an ‘abortion’ is necessary emergency

stabilizing care that hospitals are required to provide under EMTALA.” Complaint at

2. The complaint seeks a declaratory judgment, as well as preliminary and permanent

injunctive relief. Id. at 16.

2. Opinion Below

The United States moved for a preliminary injunction, which the District Court

granted the day before section 622 was due to become effective. App. 38a. The Court

ruled that the United States would “likely succeed on the merits” because “state law

must yield to federal law when it’s impossible to comply with both,” and section 622

“conflicts with” EMTALA. App. 41a. Central to that analysis was EMTALA’s clause

authorizing preemption when a state law “directly conflicts.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f).

Construing that phrase in terms of impossibility and obstacle preemption, see App.

57a (citing Draper v. Chiapuzio, 9 F.3d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1993)), the Court

concluded that EMTALA preempts section 622.

Impossibility preemption applies, the Court said, because “EMTALA obligates

the treating physician to provide stabilizing treatment, including abortion care” and

“Idaho statutory law makes that treatment a crime.” Id. Provisions offering an

affirmative “defense to prosecution” for a physician who performs an abortion as

9

authorized by statute, IDAHO CODE § 18-622(3) (repealed), “cure the impossibility.”

App. 58a. The Court pointed to “an ectopic pregnancy” as a “straightforward example”

of a medical condition requiring treatment that section 622 supposedly disallows.

App. 45a. Other pregnancy complications mentioned by the Court were preeclampsia,

the possibility of sepsis, a blood clot, or a placental abruption. See App. 46a. The Court

accepted the government’s position that since section 622 does not allow an abortion

for these conditions, a physician cannot “comply with both statutes.” App. 57a.

Obstacle preemption applied because, according to the District Court, section

622 obstructs EMTALA’s aims of “establish[ing] a bare minimum of emergency care

that would be available to all people in Medicare-funded hospitals.” App. 63a. State

law impedes that goal by “deter[ring] physicians from providing abortions in some

emergency situations.” App. 64a. Section 622 “compounds the deterrent effect,” the

Court wrote, by offering “an affirmative defense rather than an exception.” Id.

On this logic, the District Court concluded that EMTALA preempts section

622. App. 76a. The Court denied that Dobbs had any relevance. “Dobbs did not

overrule the Supremacy Clause. Thus, even when it comes to regulating abortion,

state law must yield to federal law.” Id. Therefore, the Court issued an order that

“restrains and enjoins the State of Idaho, including all of its officers, employees, and

agents, from enforcing Idaho Code § 18-622(2)-(3) as applied to medical care required

by [EMTALA].” Id.

10

3. Motions to Reconsider

Fourteen days later, the Legislature filed a motion for reconsideration. Mot.

for Recons., United States v. Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW (D. Idaho Sept. 7, 2022),

ECF No. 95. It explained that the District Court’s order overlooked a contradiction

between the government’s preemption claim and EMTALA’s text. Id. EMTALA

obligates a physician to protect “the health of the woman or her unborn child.” Id. at

2 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added)). Given that language, it is

unreasonable to read EMTALA as an abortion mandate. Id. at 3–4. The Legislature

also identified precedents rejecting “the government’s attempt to use EMTALA as a

wedge to leverage federal control over state abortion laws.” Id. at 5. And the

Legislature added that imposing a flawed theory of preemption raises serious issues

under the major questions doctrine, the Supremacy Clause, Article III, the Spending

Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 9–16.

The Legislature sought reconsideration rather than filing an appeal and

seeking a stay, out of a belief that motions practice would continue to move swiftly,

as it had done under an expedited briefing schedule requested by the United States.

See Docket Entry Order, United States v. Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW (D. Idaho

Aug. 8, 2022), ECF No. 17. There was no reason to anticipate that the District Court

would take eight months to decide the motion.

With the preliminary injunction in place, the District Court throttled down

from its breakneck pace and returned to regular order. When several weeks passed

after the close of briefing without a decision, the Legislature submitted a written

11

request for a ruling. See id. at ECF No. 115 (Nov. 17, 2022). The District Court did

not respond.

In January 2023, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the validity of section 622

against challenges under Idaho law. Planned Parenthood Great Nw. v. State, 522 P.3d

1132 (Idaho 2023). The Legislature and the State requested a stay to file

supplemental briefs addressing the implications of the Idaho decision for the validity

of the preliminary injunction. Docket Entry Order, United States v. Idaho, No. 1:22cv-00329-BLW (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2023), ECF No. 122. That stay elapsed on February

21, 2022. Id.

4. Reconsideration Order

On May 4, 2023, the District Court denied reconsideration. App. 25a. Despite

the Idaho decision, the Court found “no reason to reconsider its decision … and the

injunction stands.” App. 36a. Even though the Idaho Supreme Court sustained

section 622 under the Idaho Constitution, Planned Parenthood, 522 P.3d 1132, the

District Court ruled that the decision “confirms each of the fundamental principles

that underpinned this Court’s decision.” App. 32a. The District Court ruled that the

Idaho decision did not “fundamentally alter” EMTALA’s preemptive effect, id., even

though the Idaho court clarified that section 622 does not cover ectopic or nonviable

pregnancies and that the statute’s exceptions turn on a physician’s subjective

judgment. The District Court did not acknowledge amendments replacing section

622’s affirmative defenses with exceptions or address the Legislature’s constitutional

objections to the preliminary injunction. App. 25a–36a.

12

5. Appeal and Motions to Stay

The Legislature filed a timely notice of appeal with the Ninth Circuit on July

3, 2023. Notice of Appeal, United States v. Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW (D. Idaho

Jul. 3, 2023), ECF No. 138. 3 That same day, the Legislature moved for a stay pending

appeal with the District Court. Id. at ECF No. 140 (Jul. 3, 2023). Weeks passed

without a response, so the Legislature sought a stay from the Ninth Circuit. Mot. to

Stay, United States v. Idaho, No. 23-35450 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2023), ECF No. 29. A

unanimous three-judge panel granted a stay. App 6a. 4 The panel’s 18-page opinion

explained why the Legislature’s motion satisfies the controlling standard:

Each of the four Nken [v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009)] factors favors

issuing a stay here. The Legislature has made a strong showing that

EMTALA does not preempt section 622. EMTALA does not require

abortions, and even if it did in some circumstances, that requirement

would not directly conflict with section 622. The federal government will

not be injured by the stay of an order preliminarily enjoining

enforcement of a state law that does not conflict with its own. Idaho, on

the other hand, will be irreparably injured absent a stay because the

preliminary injunction directly harms its sovereignty. And the balance

of the equities and the public interest also favor judicial action ensuring

Idaho’s right to enforce its legitimately enacted laws during the

pendency of the State’s appeal.

App. 12a.

Within two days of this decision, the United States sought reconsideration en

banc, Mot. for Recons., United States v. Idaho, No. 23-35450 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 2023),

3 ECF citations concerning the pending appeal in the Ninth Circuit refer to the docket in case No. 23-

35450 rather than No. 23-35440, the State’s appeal.

4 The original order was issued at United States v. Idaho, No. 23-35450 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2023), ECF

No. 47. A reformatted version was released a few days later. ECF No. 57 (Oct. 10, 2023). The

reformatted version is included in the Appendix at App. 6a and all references are thereto.

13

ECF No. 51, which the Ninth Circuit granted on October 10. Id. at ECF No. 67 (Oct.

10, 2023). That order also vacated the panel decision: Vacatur reinvigorated the

preliminary injunction, freshly exposing the State to irreparable injury. Id.

On November 1, the Legislature filed an emergency motion requesting an

expedited decision on the stay by November 15. Id. at ECF No. 69 (Nov. 1, 2023). The

Ninth Circuit responded on November 13 with a two-page order denying a stay. App.

1a. Other than the reference to Nken, the order contains no citation or analysis

explaining the court’s reasoning. The same order denied the Legislature’s emergency

motion as moot. See id. (In fairness, the order reflected an expedited decision as

requested.) The order then explained that “[t]he en banc court will proceed to consider

the merits of this preliminary injunction appeal.” Id. at 2. En banc panel members

consisted of Chief Judge Murguia and Judges Gould, Callahan, M. Smith, Owens,

Miller, Bress, Forrest, VanDyke, Koh, and Mendoza. Of these, Judges Callahan,

Miller, Bress and VanDyke dissented. They “would have granted the stay for

substantially the same reasons set forth in the original three-judge motions panel

order.” Id. (citation omitted).

This application follows. Having sought a stay pending appeal from the District

Court and the Ninth Circuit, the Idaho Legislature has shown “with particularity”

why only this Court can grant relief. Sup. Ct. R. 23.3. Without a stay, the Legislature

faces irreparable injury from an erroneous federal injunction, and that injury that

will persist until the Ninth Circuit elects to issue a final judgment.

14

ARGUMENT

The Idaho Legislature is entitled to a stay pending appeal because (1) the

Legislature is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) the Legislature will be irreparably

injured absent a stay; (3) a balance of the equities favors a stay; and (4) a stay serves

the public interest. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. Factors one and two “are the most critical.”

Id. Factors three and four “merge” because the United States is the opposing party.

Id. at 435.

I.

THE IDAHO LEGISLATURE WILL BE IRREPARABLY INJURED

WITHOUT A STAY.

The Idaho Legislature has established that it “suffer[s] irreparable harm”

without a stay. Id. at 434. A State suffers “ongoing irreparable harm” whenever it is

“enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its

people.” King, 567 U.S. at 1303 (Roberts, C.J., in chambers); accord New Motor

Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1351 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in

chambers) (same); Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2324 n.17 (“[The inability to enforce its duly

enacted plans clearly inflicts irreparable harm on the State.”). Interference with the

operation of state law is the injury.

The Idaho Legislature enacted section 622 in anticipation of a decision by this

Court abandoning Roe. Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. 2228, is that decision. It held that “[t]he

Constitution does not prohibit the citizens of each State from regulating or

prohibiting abortion,” and, accordingly, “return[ed] that authority to the people and

their elected representatives.” Id. at 2284. The preliminary injunction blocks Idaho’s

exercise of democratic self-government.

15

Maintaining the preliminary injunction against section 622 is anything but

harmless even if the injunction issued last year. Federal injunctions are the

exception, not the norm. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24

(2008) (“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of

right.”). Every day that passes with an injunction in place inflicts irreparable harm

on the Legislature.

II.

THE IDAHO LEGISLATURE HAS A STRONG LIKELIHOOD OF

SUCCESS ON THE MERITS.

A.

EMTALA Cannot Preempt Section 622.

On the merits, the Legislature has put forward a powerful case. The

preliminary injunction stands on the sole ground of preemption—that, in the District

Court’s opinion, “there will always be a conflict between EMTALA and Idaho Code §

18-622” because “EMTALA obligates the treating physician to provide stabilizing

treatment, including abortion care.” App 57a. But EMTALA is governed by two nonpreemption clauses that should have steered the District Court away from a

preliminary injunction. Since EMTALA does not preempt section 622, the decision

below is incorrect.

1.

Settled principles shape the issue of preemption.

EMTALA is governed by two express preemption clauses, 42 U.S.C. §§

1395dd(f) and 1395. When a statute contains an express preemption clause, courts

“focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence

of Congress’s pre-emptive intent.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664

(1993). Marking the precise boundaries of federal law is critical. The task is to

16

“identify the domain expressly pre-empted by that language.” Medtronic v. Lohr, 518

U.S. 470, 484 (1996) (cleaned up). And it is evident that “Congress’ enactment of a

provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond

that reach are not pre-empted.” Cipollone v. Ligett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517

(1992). That is why “express provisions for preemption of some state laws imply that

Congress intentionally did not preempt state law generally, or in respects other than

those it addressed.” Keams v. Tempe Tech. Inst., Inc., 39 F.3d 222, 225 (9th Cir. 1994).

The question, then, is whether the express preemption clauses governing

EMTALA support “the pre-emptive reach” justifying the preliminary injunction.

Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517. They don’t.

2.

Section 622 does not “directly conflict” with EMTALA.

EMTALA contains an express “non-preemption provision.” Baker v. Adventist

Health, Inc., 260 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 2001), which says, “[t]he provisions of this

section do not preempt any State or local law requirement, except to the extent that

the requirement directly conflicts with a requirement of this section.” 42 U.S.C. §

1395dd(f). Non-preemption is the baseline: EMTALA generally “do[es] not preempt

any State or local law requirement.” Id. (emphasis added). Preemption occurs only

where state law “directly conflicts with a requirement of this section,” Id. (emphasis

added). The adverb matters. To justify preemption, a state law must conflict with

EMTALA “directly.” Id.

Ninth Circuit precedent affirms that EMTALA does not dictate particular

standards of medical care. Eberhardt v. Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1995),

17

rejected an EMTALA claim against a physician for not “conduct[ing] a psychiatric

evaluation or a mental status evaluation” for a man later killed by the police following

a violent psychiatric episode. Id. at 1255. “EMTALA clearly declines to impose on

hospitals a national standard of care in screening patients.” Id. at 1258. The Court

explained that “Congress enacted the EMTALA not to improve the overall standard

of medical care, but to ensure that hospitals do not refuse essential emergency care

because of a patient’s inability to pay.” Id.

Other Ninth Circuit decisions are equally insistent that EMTALA does not

prescribe standards of medical care beyond the statute’s overt requirements. See

Baker, 260 F.3d at 993 (“The statute is not intended to create a national standard of

care for hospitals or to provide a federal cause of action akin to a state law claim for

medical malpractice.”); Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1166

(9th Cir. 2002) (“EMTALA, however, was not enacted to establish a federal medical

malpractice cause of action nor to establish a national standard of care.”).

Other circuits agree that EMTALA does not preempt state standards of

medical care. Hardy v. New York City Health Hosp. Corp., 164 F.3d 789, 795 (2d Cir.

1999) (EMTALA’s non-preemption clause suggests “that one of Congress’s objectives

was that EMTALA would peacefully coexist with applicable state ‘requirements’”);

Bryan v. Rectors and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he

legal adequacy of that [stabilizing] care is then governed not by EMTALA but by the

state malpractice law that everyone agrees EMTALA was not intended to preempt.”).

18

EMTALA preempts state law only when it contradicts the statute’s express

requirements. Root v. New Liberty Hospital District, 209 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 2000),

illustrates. There, the Eighth Circuit held that EMTALA preempted a Missouri

statute immunizing state political subdivisions like hospital districts, from tort suits.

Because that law directly conflicts with EMTALA’s guarantee of a personal damage

suit, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A), the Court of Appeals concluded that “Missouri’s

sovereign immunity statute must yield.” Id. at 1070. Root teaches that EMTALA

preempts state law only when a state law conflicts with its express terms. See id. at

1069. Unlike Root, the District Court’s preemption analysis rests on an implied duty

under EMTALA. App. 56a. Since EMTALA has no express requirement requiring

abortion, it does not preempt section 622. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f).

3.

EMTALA cannot preempt Idaho law under the Medicare Act.

EMTALA’s preemptive reach is further shortened by the Medicare Act. Its

express preemption clause says this:

Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer

or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the practice of medicine

or the manner in which medical services are provided … or to exercise any

supervision or control over the administration or operation of any such

institution, agency, or person.

42 U.S.C. § 1395.

This clause establishes that “the practice of medicine is, in general, a subject

of state regulation.” Pennsylvania Med. Soc’y v. Marconis, 942 F.2d 842, 846 n.4 (3d

Cir. 1991); accord In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Lit., 582 F.3d 156,

175 (1st Cir. 2009) (construing section 1395 to mean that the Medicare Act “reserves

a regulatory role to the states” and “demonstrates Congress’s intent to minimize

19

federal intrusion into the area.”). Courts have interpreted section 1395 as a bar to

preempting state consumer protection laws, see id., and state standards of medical

care, see McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc., 21 P.3d 1189, 1197 (Cal. 2001) (the

Medicare Act does not displace state tort law). So too, here. Because EMTALA is

bound by section 1395 it cannot be construed as “a mechanism to supervise or control

the practice of medicine.” American Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc. v. Sullivan, 998

F.2d 377, 387 (6th Cir. 1993). By overriding Idaho’s regulation of abortion, the

preliminary injunction does exactly that.

4.

The District Court misjudged EMTALA’s preemptive scope.

The District Court miscalculated EMTALA’s limited “pre-emptive reach.”

Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.

First, it was mistaken to rule that section 622 “directly conflicts” with

EMTALA. See App. 57a (citing Draper, 9 F.3d at 1393). The District Court analyzed

the government’s preemption claim under impossibility and obstacle preemption

without considering that an implied duty under EMTALA cannot conflict with Idaho

law “directly,” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f). App. 57a. Only state laws like the one challenged

in Root, which contradict an express provision of EMTALA, 209 F.3d at 1070, are

subject to EMTALA’s preemption clause.

Even if impossibility and obstacle preemption were relevant—which we deny—

the District Court unfairly moved the goal posts. Its preliminary injunction order

cites section 622’s supposed disallowance of pregnancy termination for ectopic

pregnancies to illustrate the impossibility of complying with both EMTALA and

Idaho law, App. 60a–61a, while its reconsideration order says that the inapplicability

20

of section 622 to the removal of an ectopic or other nonviable pregnancy (as declared

by the Idaho Supreme Court) does not “fundamentally alter” the preemption analysis.

App 32a. A similar turnabout tainted the Court’s discussion of obstacle preemption.

The preliminary injunction order singled out the supposed “deterrent effect” of section

622’s use of affirmative defenses rather than outright exceptions, App. 64a–65a, but

the reconsideration order failed to mention that the amended section 622 replaced

affirmative defenses with exceptions. App. 34a.

Second, neither of the District Court’s orders mention the Medicare Act’s nonpreemption clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1395. That clause forecloses EMTALA as a basis for

preempting section 622, which embodies a state standard of medical care (proscribing

abortion under particular circumstances) and a regulation of the medical profession

(prescribing the suspension or loss of a medical license for violating the statute.) See

IDAHO CODE § 18-622(1). As such, section 622 is the kind of state law that Congress

intended to operate free from federal “supervision or control.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395.

Because the District Court’s orders exaggerate EMTALA’s “pre-emptive

reach,” Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517, the Legislature has a strong likelihood of success.

B.

EMTALA Does Not Mandate Abortion.

1.

The District Court badly misread EMTALA.

Even without a defective preemption analysis, the District Court’s preliminary

injunction is flawed because it rests on a misconstruction of EMTALA.

Accepting the government’s claim, the District Court ruled that “EMTALA

obligates the treating physician to provide stabilizing treatment, including abortion

21

care.” App. 57a. Without that obligation, EMTALA does not require what Idaho law

forbids. A close reading of the statute denies any support for such an obligation.

It is undisputed that EMTALA requires a Medicare-participating hospital to

provide “stabilizing treatment” when a screening exam concludes that a patient has

an emergency medical condition. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (heading); accord id. §

1395dd(b)(1)(A) (requiring “such treatment as may be required to stabilize the

[emergency] medical condition”). But neither of those provisions—nor anywhere else

in EMTALA—mention the word abortion. The only form of stabilizing treatment

expressly endorsed by the statute is delivering a child when a pregnant woman with

contractions has an emergency medical condition. Id. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A). That

Congress expressly endorsed delivery as a stabilizing treatment surely counts against

the government’s contention that EMTALA demands access to abortion.

So do other textual clues. Under EMTALA, “stabilized” means that “no

material deterioration of the [emergency medical] condition is likely, within

reasonable medical probability, to result from or occur during the transfer of the

individual from a facility.” Id. at § 1395dd(e)(3)(B). The corresponding definition of

“emergency medical condition” requires medical care when a pregnant woman has a

condition placing “the health of the woman or her unborn child in serious jeopardy.”

Id. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Since abortion exposes the unborn child to

“serious jeopardy,” it cannot be a legitimate “stabilizing treatment” under the statute.

Id. § 1395dd(b).

22

Still other textual clues point away from the District Court’s construction.

EMTALA contains four provisions expressly requiring emergency care for both a

pregnant woman and her unborn child. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395dd(e)(1)(A)(i);

1395dd(e)(1)(B)(ii);

1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii);

and

1395dd(c)(2)(A).

The

preliminary

injunction order casts aside half the pivotal definition of “emergency medical

condition” as it addresses “a pregnant woman who is having contractions.” Id. §

1395dd(e)(1)(B). The proffered explanation for ignoring that language is that the

Court regarded subsection (B) as “not relevant.” App. 42a n.1. But that explanation

is implausible. Relevance is self-evident, considering that the United States invokes

EMTALA as the source of a federal mandate concerning medical treatment for

pregnant women. That the District Court disregarded EMTALA’s text heightens the

sense that the preliminary injunction rests on quicksand. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,

442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (“In construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if

possible, to every word Congress used.”) (citation omitted).

Worse, the District Court deliberately excised EMTALA’s remaining reference

to the medical needs of an unborn child in the operative language of the preliminary

injunction. EMTALA says that an “emergency medical condition” exists when the

absence of “immediate medical attention” probably will result in “placing the health

of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the health of the woman or her

unborn child) in serious jeopardy.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Yet

the lower court selectively quoted from the statute, thereby effectively removing the

phrase “or her unborn child” from its injunction. See App. 77a (prohibiting the

23

enforcement of section 622 insofar as an abortion is “necessary to avoid (i) ‘placing

the health of’ a pregnant patient ‘in serious jeopardy’”).

Through these two errors—disregarding relevant statutory language about the

medical treatment of pregnant women and removing the phrase “or unborn child”

from its injunction—the District Court effectively rewrote EMTALA. Where

EMTALA guarantees emergency medical care for a pregnant woman and her unborn

child, the District Court read the statute as protecting the woman alone.

2.

The District Court violated the major questions doctrine—or at

least the ordinary rules of statutory construction.

A troubling implication of the District Court’s decision is ceding to the

Executive Branch authority that Congress did not delegate. Courts presume that

Congress will “speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast

economic and political significance.” Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324

(2014). When that occurs, “something more than a merely plausible textual basis” is

necessary, West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2609 (2022): only “clear

congressional authorization” will do. Util. Air, 573 U.S. at 324. Indeed, “exceedingly

clear language” is necessary if Congress “wishes to significantly alter the balance

between federal and state power.” U.S Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Preserv.

Assn., 140 S. Ct. 1837, 1850 (2020). Requiring “a clear statement,” Biden v. Nebraska,

143 S. Ct. 2355, 2375 (2023), of congressional authority to justify the consequential

exercise of executive power rests on “both separation of powers principles and a

practical understanding of legislative intent.” West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2609. Like

other clear-statement rules, the major questions doctrine “ensure[s] Congress does

24

not, by broad or general language, legislate on a sensitive topic inadvertently or

without due deliberation.” Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 139

(2005).

The major questions doctrine has figured prominently in recent terms. See

West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2616 (voiding an EPA rule because “[a] decision of such

magnitude and consequence rests with Congress itself, or an agency acting pursuant

to a clear delegation from that representative body”); NFIB v. OSHA, 142 S. Ct. 661,

666 (2022) (setting aside an OSHA standard requiring large employers to ensure that

their employees were vaccinated against COVID-19); Ala. Assoc. of Realtors v. Dep’t

of Health and Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) (voiding a nationwide eviction

moratorium imposed by the Centers for Disease Control). Only months ago, Biden

held that the Department of Education exceeded its authority by instituting a loanforgiveness program in reliance on the HEROES Act. 143 S. Ct. at 2372–73.

The legal theory underlying the preliminary injunction here fits the pattern of

such decisions. Like the OSHA vaccination mandate, an EMTALA abortion mandate

combines a “lack of historical precedent” with a startling “breadth of authority.”

NFIB, 142 S. Ct. at 666 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acc’t Oversight Bd.,

561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010)) (cleaned up). Like the CDC’s eviction moratorium, the

United States leans on “a wafer-thin reed”—EMTALA’s generic obligation to provide

stabilizing treatment—to justify “such sweeping power.” Ala. Assoc., 141 S. Ct. at

2489. Like the EPA’s electricity generation rule, the United States has interpreted

EMTALA as a national abortion mandate that “Congress had conspicuously and

25

repeatedly declined to enact itself,” West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2610. See Women’s

Health Protection Act of 2023, H.R. 8296, 117th Cong. §§ 4(a)(1), 5(a)(1) (2022)

(proposed legislation prescribing a federal right to “abortion services” that would

“supersede” contrary state law); S. 4132, 117th Cong. §§ 3(a)(1), 4(a)(1) (2022) (same).

And like the Attorney General’s interpretive rule concerning assisted suicide, the

government’s claim to authority is “incongruous with [EMTALA’s] statutory purposes

and design.” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006). Gonzales rightly concluded

that an “oblique form” of statutory authority is insufficient when the assertion of

executive power concerns a matter of “earnest and profound debate across the

country.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, it is just as objectionable to read EMTALA as

an “implicit delegation” of authority to compel physicians to perform abortions

prohibited by state law based on the statute’s “oblique” language. Id.

Because EMTALA does not confer clear congressional authority for the

abortion mandate the United States asserts, the major questions doctrine applies.

The District Court’s handling of EMTALA raises additional concerns. Unlike

the HEROES Act, EMTALA is not a statute enacted to address unpredictable

national emergencies, Biden, 143 S. Ct. at 2399 (Kagan, J., dissenting), and the

provision relied on by the United States directs hospitals to provide “stabilizing care”

for patients. It does not confer on HHS “broad emergency powers.” Id. The District

Court’s statutory analysis distorts the text. A statute that endorses delivery as

stabilizing treatment and mentions unborn children four times is (to say the least)

an unpromising candidate for a national abortion mandate. That the lower court

26

disregarded or excised those references suggests that the preliminary injunction rests

not so much on the EMTALA that Congress enacted but on the EMTALA the

government and the District Court preferred. That approach flouts the principle that

a federal agency “literally has no power to act, let alone pre-empt the validly enacted

legislation of a sovereign State, unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”

Louisiana Pub. Serv. Com’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986).

Sanctioning the government’s new-found power under EMTALA would have

profoundly troubling consequences. Allowing the United States to treat EMTALA’s

duty of stabilizing treatment as a blank page to fill with the Executive Branch’s

preferred medical policy would empower the government to impose federal mandates

compelling hospitals to provide any sort of medical procedures—so long as the

purported mandate can be framed as “necessary stabilizing treatment.” 42 U.S.C. §

1395dd(b). Such an approach would displace Congress’s role as the Nation’s

lawmaker and the States’ historic police power to regulate medical care.

C.

The District Court Likewise Misconstrued Section 622.

Although EMTALA contains no abortion mandate with which the State of

Idaho must comply, we want to correct the record about how section 622 actually

operates because the District Court got the state side of its federal-state conflict

wrong too. In the Court’s opinion, “EMTALA obligates the treating physician to

provide stabilizing treatment, including abortion care. But regardless of the pregnant

patient’s condition, Idaho statutory law makes that treatment a crime.” App. 57a.

Going further, the Court characterized section 622 as an impediment to decent

medical care for a pregnant woman in distress. See App. 74a–75a (describing “the

27

pregnant patient, laying on a gurney in an emergency room facing the terrifying

prospect of a pregnancy complication that may claim her life” but where “her doctors

feel hobbled by an Idaho law that does not allow them to provide the medical care

necessary to save her health and life”). Not so. Section 622 does not discourage a

doctor from protecting a pregnant woman’s life and health.

First, the statute wholly exempts a woman who obtains an abortion. IDAHO

CODE § 18-622(5). She faces no liability at all. Full stop.

Second, Idaho law does not treat all medical procedures terminating a

pregnancy as an abortion. The Idaho Supreme Court has clarified that section 622

does not cover ectopic or other non-viable pregnancies. See Planned Parenthood, 522

P.3d at 1202–03. Further, section 622 does not apply when necessary medical

treatment accidentally results in the death of an unborn child. See IDAHO CODE §§ 18622(4) (statutory exemption); 18-604(1) (defining abortion as using some means “to

intentionally terminate” a pregnancy).

Third, recent amendments clarify that section 622 contains straightforward

exceptions. See H.B. 374, 67th Leg., 1st Sess. (Idaho 2023). An abortion performed to

save a woman’s life or (during the first trimester) to address a pregnancy from rape

or incest “shall not be considered criminal abortions.” IDAHO CODE §§ 18-622(2); 18622(2)(b). Nor does a physician face prosecution for an abortion performed in the

belief that a woman’s life was at risk. Mistakes of fact are no basis for prosecution.

These exceptions form a safe harbor for a physician who acts “in his good faith medical

judgment and based on the facts known to the physician at the time.” Id. §§ 18-

28

622(2)(a)(i), (ii). Within that zone, section 622 should no longer “deter physicians from

providing abortions in some emergency situations.” App. 31a.

Far from posing an arbitrary obstacle to medical care, section 622 simply

restores Idaho law to its pre-Roe condition. See Planned Parenthood, 532 P.3d at 807

(Abortion was a crime under Idaho law from territorial days until Roe). By prohibiting

abortion unless necessary to save a woman’s life or end a pregnancy resulting from

rape or incest, section 622 fairly reflects Idaho’s “history and traditions” under which

a nontherapeutic “abortion was viewed as an immoral act and treated as a crime.”

Planned Parenthood, 522 P.3d at 1148.

In short, the federal-state conflict for which the District Court issued a

preliminary injunction is false at both ends. Reading EMTALA as an abortion

mandate defeats Congress’s evident intent to secure emergency medical care for both

a pregnant woman and her unborn child, and Idaho’s section 622 is not the draconian

measure depicted by the District Court. Without a conflict between EMTALA and

section 622, the preliminary injunction lacks any foundation in law.

D.

Enjoining Section 622 Because of EMTALA is Unconstitutional.

1.

The preliminary injunction violates the Tenth Amendment.

Dobbs held that “the authority to regulate abortion must be returned to the

people and their elected representatives.” Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2279. By enjoining

section 622 based on a misreading of EMTALA, the District Court denies Idaho’s

authority to regulate abortion.

29

Structural implications follow from reserving legislative power to states. Dobbs

contemplates that abortion will be regulated in a way that “will be more sensitive to

the diverse needs of a heterogenous society,” that “increases opportunity for citizen

involvement in democratic process,” that “allows for more innovation and

experimentation in government,” and that “makes government more responsive by

putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.

452, 458 (1991) (citation omitted). All these virtues of a federal system guarded by

the Tenth Amendment naturally follow from Dobbs’s determination that states hold

the power to regulate abortion.

The preliminary injunction generates the contrary implications. It rests on the

Supremacy Clause, which the court described as a rule that “state law must yield to

federal law when it’s impossible to comply with both.” App. 41a. Waving aside

concerns about Idaho’s sovereignty, the Court added that “Dobbs did not overrule the

Supremacy Clause … even when it comes to regulating abortion, state law must yield

to conflicting federal law.” App. 76a. This misconceives the nature of the Supremacy

Clause. True, “if Congress acts under one of its enumerated powers, there can be no

violation of the Tenth Amendment.” Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 867 (9th Cir.

2007). But “[t]his is an extraordinary power in a federalist system … that we must

assume Congress does not exercise lightly.” Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460. A federal agency

can distort our federal system, no less than the separation of powers, by exercising

authority that Congress does not confer. That is why this Court insists on

“exceedingly clear language” if federal law is to “alter the balance between federal

30

and state power,” Cowpasture River, 140 S. Ct. at 1849–50. But such “exceedingly

clear” delegation of authority to HHS, id. at 1849, is hardly satisfied by EMTALA’s

requirement to provide “necessary stabilizing treatment.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b).

2.

The decision below violates the Spending Clause.

The construction of EMTALA adopted by the District Court also transgresses

the Spending Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

First, that Clause forbids the United States from coercing an unwilling state

into complying with a regulatory command. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 582

(2012) (holding that a provision of the ACA amounted to “economic dragooning that

leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion”).

Here, the United States says that section 622 denies it “the benefit of its bargain …

by affirmatively prohibiting Idaho hospitals from complying with certain obligations

under EMTALA.” Complaint at 13. The government adds that section 622

“undermines the overall Medicare program and the funds that the United States

provides in connection with that program.” Id. at 13–14. This suggests that Idaho

hospitals must perform abortions when the United States says that EMTALA

requires it or risk the loss of billions in Medicare funding. The scale of that risk is

eye-popping. Idaho received “approximately $3.4 billion in federal Medicare funds”

between 2018 and 2020. U.S.A. Mem. ISO Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 6, United States v.

Idaho, No. 1:22-cv-00329-BLW (D. Idaho Aug. 8, 2022), ECF No. 17-1. HHS Secretary

Becerra made the threat crystal clear by warning Medicare-funded hospitals that

adherence to State law rather than complying with the government’s conception of

31

EMTALA risks “termination of its Medicare provider agreement.” Letter from

Secretary Becerra to Health Care Providers, July 11, 2022, at 2, available at

https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/emergency-medical-care-letter-to-healthcare-providers.pdf. The State of Idaho thus faces the loss of billions in Medicare

funding unless it obeys the government’s abortion mandate, for which EMTALA is

little more than window dressing.

Second, the abortion mandate requirement pressed by the United States is

retroactive. It comes long after Idaho agreed to the conditions of participating in

Medicare. Imposing a novel mandate retroactively is another way that the

government violates the Spending Clause. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981).

III.

THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE EQUITIES FAVOR A STAY.

Nken holds that the remaining factors—harm to the opposing party and the

public interest—“merge when the Government is the opposing party.” 556 U.S. at

435. These too favor a stay.

What matters are “the relative harms to applicant and respondent, as well as

the interests of the public at large.” Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Proj., 138 S. Ct.

2080, 2087 (2017) (quoting Barnes v. E-Systems, Inc. Group Hosp. Med. & Surg. Ins.

Plan, 501 U.S. 1301, 1305 (1991) (Scalia, J., in chambers (cleaned up)). Start with the

harm to the Legislature. Enjoining section 622 inflicts an irreparable harm on the

State of Idaho and its institutions, including the Legislature, King, 567 U.S. at 1303.

Judicial interference with state law is an independent injury.

32

By contrast, the United States will not suffer an irreparable injury from a stay.

Ninth Circuit precedent has rebuffed “general pronouncements that a Supremacy

Clause violation alone constitutes sufficient harm to warrant an injunction.” United

States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 894 (9th Cir. 2019). But “[g]eneral

pronouncements” are all the United States has to offer. Id. Letting a preempted state

law operate could impose irreparable harm on the United States—but only if its claim

of preemption is valid. See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 366 (9th Cir. 2011),

rev’d in part on other grounds, 567 U.S. 387 (2012). And that seems highly doubtful

considering the flaws in the government’s preemption claim. Any harm from waiting

to persuade an appellate panel that EMTALA preempts section 622 before enjoining

Idaho law is hardly “irreparable” since the government “may yet pursue and vindicate

its interests in the full course of this litigation.” Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151,

1168 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Golden v. Washington, 138 S.

Ct. 448 (2017).

The public interest lies in preserving the integrity of EMTALA as adopted by

Congress and by “maintaining our constitutional structure” of powers divided among

the three branches of the national government and between the federal government

and the states. BST Holdings, LLC v. OSHA, 17 F.4th 604, 618 (5th Cir. 2021). See

also Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 677 (9th Cir. 2019) (public interest would

be served by “respecting the Constitution’s assignment of the power of the purse to

Congress, and by deferring to Congress’s understanding of the public interest”).

Dobbs reserves to States like Idaho the authority to regulate abortion. Beyond that,

33

EMTALA’s text expresses Congress’s sense of the public interest—that the life and

health of both a pregnant woman and her unborn child deserve federal protection.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1). At the same time, EMTALA embodies a legislative

determination to respect a State’s traditional authority over public health, which is

why EMTALA is governed by express non-preemption clauses limiting the statute’s

preemptive reach. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f), 42 U.S.C. § 1395.

The District Court saw the public interest in starkly different terms. The

preliminary injunction order accepted as a “key consideration … what impact an

injunction would have on non-parties and the public at large.” App. 74a (citing

Bernhardt v. L.A. Cnty., 339 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 2003)). Public interest would be

best served, in the Court’s view, by vindicating the government’s claim under the

Supremacy Clause. See id. Added to that, “allowing the Idaho law to go into effect

would threaten severe, irreparable harm to pregnant patients in Idaho.” Id. Hospital

capacity in neighboring states “would be pressured as patients may choose to cross

state lines to get the emergency care they are entitled to receive under federal law.”

App. 75a. Compared with these interests, the opinion concluded that “the State of

Idaho will not suffer any real harm if the Court issues the modest preliminary

injunction the United States is requesting.” App. 76a.

This analysis goes astray in several respects.

First, the District Court overlooked the irreparable harm that the preliminary

injunction inflicts on the State. King, 567 U.S. at 1303.

34

Second, a concern with the Supremacy Clause is overblown when the United

States produces only “general pronouncements that a Supremacy Clause violation

alone constitutes sufficient harm to warrant an injunction.” California, 921 F.3d at

894. Nor, to be clear, can third-party harm relieve the United States of the duty to

show injury to itself. Nken, 556 U.S. at 426.

Third, concern with third-party harm cannot overshadow irreparable injury

and the likelihood of success when evaluating equitable relief. Id. at 434 (the “first

two factors of the traditional standard are the most critical”). Concern with nonparties should not distract from the government’s failure to demonstrate a likelihood

of success—“the most important” factor in considering interim equitable relief. Garcia

v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015).

Fourth, the District Court misstates Idaho law. The lower court relied on

declarations prepared within a three-week period that have never been tested at trial,

to portray section 622 as a brutal threat to Idaho women. It isn’t so. The complaint

says that “ectopic pregnancy, severe preeclampsia, or a pregnancy complication

threatening septic infections or hemorrhage … could be deemed an ‘abortion’ under

Idaho law.” Complaint at 7. The Idaho Supreme Court has conclusively held

otherwise—that section 622 does not cover ectopic or other non-viable pregnancies

and that it authorizes an abortion to save a woman’s life. See Planned Parenthood,

522 P.3d at 1202–03. Even if other emergency medical conditions pose serious risks

to women, the legal analysis remains unchanged. Under EMTALA, what matters is

whether a pregnant woman with an emergency medical condition can get emergency

35

treatment to preserve her health and life; whether an abortion is available in every

such instance is beside the point. The difficult questions that arise in deciding when

abortion should be legal belong to the people of Idaho and their elected

representatives—not to federal agencies wielding a contrived mandate.

CONCLUSION

Dobbs assured the country that the American people and their elected

representatives have the authority to regulate abortion. 142 S. Ct. at 2279. The

District Court’s preliminary injunction, founded on an unprecedented construction of

federal law, thwarts Idaho’s sovereign authority to regulate abortion as it has done

through most of its history. To avoid irreparable harm to the State while the

Legislature defends Idaho law on the merits, the Legislature respectfully requests an

administrative stay, if necessary, and a stay of the preliminary injunction pending

disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such a writ is timely sought.

Respectfully submitted,

Daniel W. Bower

MORRIS BOWER & HAWS PLLC

1305 12th Ave. Rd.

Nampa, ID 83686

(208) 345-3333

dbower@morrisbowerhaws.com

/s/ William C. Duncan

William C. Duncan

Counsel of Record

1868 N. 800 E.

Lehi, UT 84043

(801) 367-4570

billduncan56@gmail.com

Counsel for Applicants

November 20, 2023

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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